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Presidential Address **J**

The Political Context of Political Behavior

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Too often our research ignores the effects of the legal and political context on the political behavior of individuals. The argument is made that our research should incorporate measures of political context and is illustrated through a discussion of the effects of political culture on political behavior in the American states. The utility of using culture to account for political mobilization processes as reported in several recent studies is discussed. Measures of political culture can help explain both differences between states and variations within a state in political mobilization processes.

In the study of individual political behavior, as in other areas of political science, our theories are devices for selective perception. Theories structure the questions we ask, the data we collect, and the conclusions we reach.

Much of the research on individual political behavior has been guided by theories drawn from economics, psychology, and sociology. This borrowing of theory from other disciplines can help us explain patterns of political behavior, yet all too often we fail to take into account the effects of the legal and political environments in which individual political behavior occurs.

If we learned nothing else from the research of V. O. Key, and certainly there is much that we should have learned, we must acknowledge that it is foolish to ignore the impact of the legal and political environments on political behavior.

Many political context variables may influence patterns of political behavior. For example, contextual factors structured by the electoral system may

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affect both perceptions of the political system and subsequent decisions by citizens about the extent and the forms of their participation in the political system. The relative ease with which a citizen may register to vote; the size of the district, the number of candidates to be elected from each district; the electoral biases created by the design of city, county, and state legislative districts, the political competitiveness of the district; the perceived importance of the offices being contested, the processes of selection and recruitment of candidates for elective office—all contribute to the context within which decisions are made about whether and how to participate. These contextual factors contribute to the structuring of perceptions, preferences, attitudes, and beliefs, which our research treats as the proximate cause of patterns of political behavior

All too often, however, the potential effects of contextual variables are not adequately considered in our research. Those that are most easy to measure, such as the competitiveness of an electoral district or the number of legislators to be elected from a district, may be added to a data set. Others, more difficult to measure, are either ignored or assumed to have equal effects on all respondents

For example, one contextual variable that should be considered is that of political culture.¹ To Almond and Powell, political culture is the "set of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings about politics current in a nation at a given time" (1978, p. 25). Historical experiences and current conditions—economic, social, and political—shape political culture. And as Almond and Powell argue, political culture affects "the conduct of individuals in their political roles, the content of their political demands, and their responses to laws" (1978, p. 25).

Another perspective on political culture is provided by Daniel Elazar (1966), who focused on patterns of political culture prevalent in each state rather than on the specific distributions of political orientations held by individuals. To Elazar, political culture is "the particular pattern of orientation to political action in which each political system is imbedded" (1966, p. 79). Elazar argues that each state has certain dominant traditions about what constitutes proper government action. Three aspects of political culture are viewed by Elazar as influential in structuring the nature of state political systems. "(1) the set of perceptions of what politics is and what can be expected from government, held both by the general public and the politicians, (2) the kinds of people who become active in government and politics, as holders of elective office, members of the bureaucracy, and active political workers; and (3) the actual way in which the art of government is practiced by citizens, politicians, and public officials in light of their perceptions" (1966, p. 85).

¹ For a survey of the origins and evolution of the concept of political culture, see Gabriel A. Almond (1990).

Thus, the dimensions on which Elazar's typology of political culture is based include the extent to which government is conceived of as a commonwealth or a marketplace, the expected and accepted degree of participation of various components of the citizenry, and the role of the bureaucracy and political parties in the governing process. The diversity and motivations of political elites also shape and, in turn, are shaped by the political culture.

From these dimensions Elazar derives three basic types of political culture. The traditionalist culture is characterized by ambivalence toward the marketplace and a paternalistic and elitist conception of the commonwealth. While government has a positive role, that role is limited to maintaining the status quo. Political power is thus closely held by a self-perpetuating group, and social and family ties are most important, with the nonelite expected to refrain from political activity. The second is the individualistic political culture, which emphasizes utilitarian motives for the organization and operation of government, with the political system viewed as serving the private marketplace; government serves private concerns, not a common good (1966, pp. 86-87). This culture is personalistic, professionalized, and antibureaucratic. A third type, the moralistic, emphasizes the commonwealth conception of the political system, considered to be oriented toward achieving the public good and advancing the public interest. Communal orientation and concern with issues, with the government being the instrument for advancing the public good, predominate in this culture. Political participation and an activist government are valued and encouraged.

In applying his conceptual scheme to the United States, Elazar indicates that a state may contain more than one type of political culture, arrayed by regions within a state, or that two of the political cultures may overlap within a region (1966, p. 97). Two others who have examined the role of political culture in structuring political behavior, Raymond Gastel (1975) and Joel Garreau (1981), view the United States as consisting of distinct cultural regions rather than being composed of overlapping types of political cultures.

These conceptual schemes are very interesting, but crucial questions remain. Does political culture help to explain patterns of political behavior? Is culture a type of contextual variable that should be taken into account in our research? Should we undertake the often difficult task of classifying states or counties on the basis of political culture and adding measures of these to our data sets?

Although interest in the use of political culture as an explanatory variable was stimulated in the 1960s by the publication of Almond and Verba's *Civic Culture* (1965), perceived difficulties in definition and measurement resulted in less focus on political culture as an explanatory variable. Several recent studies, however, provide evidence in support of the view that political culture can be a useful explanatory variable. In a paper presented at the 1987 American Political Science Association meeting, Joel Lieske tested the utility

of the cultural regions schemes of Elazar, Gastil, and Garreau to account for patterns of party identification. In Lieske's model, religious affiliation, ethnicity, and social structure have both direct effects on political party registration and indirect effects through political culture, with culture also directly affecting registration. Estimating the model three times, using the three different measures of political culture, the measure of political culture was significant in each model ($R^2 = .66$ for Democrat, $.37$ for Republican, and $.46$ for Independent). However, the model employing Gastil's cultural regions best predicted mean levels of party registration.

Other research also provides evidence of the contributions that political culture can make to explaining patterns of political behavior. An excellent examination of this is contained in Earl and Merle Black's *Politics and Society in the South* (1987). Stephen Shaffer's study of Mississippi (1987) provides additional support for the view that political change can be explained in terms of the changing political culture using Elazar's model. Research by Erikson, McIvor, and Wright (1987) indicates that including measures of state political culture contributes to explaining differences among states in patterns of party identification and political ideology.

These studies all provide support for the argument that political culture is a useful contextual variable that contributes to explaining patterns of mass political behavior, either in comparisons among states or in comparisons across time within one state.

Political culture can also contribute to explaining within-states differences in patterns of political behavior. A research question that illustrates the importance of contextual variables is simply, "How can patterns of voter registration be explained?" This is of concern not only to scholars but also to those charged with policy making. This question was raised by a Maryland governor's task force that examined the state's voter registration laws and the registration procedures used in the twenty-four local jurisdictions that were assigned the task of managing voter registration. In 1986, the Maryland Task Force on Voter Registration commissioned a survey, conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Maryland, to study the impact of a number of factors on voter registration patterns. That data set, to which has been added measures of the local political culture and of the twenty-four local jurisdictions' voter registration services and procedures, provides further evidence of the utility of political culture in explaining political behavior.

The research was guided by Verba and Nie's (1972) model of political participation, which views life circumstances as influencing voter registration and other forms of political participation, both directly and indirectly through civic attitudes. In this model, life circumstances create the conditions that establish, modify, and reinforce relevant civic orientations and the skills necessary for political activism. Starting with this basic model of life circumstances and civic orientations, what contributions do political variables, specifically political culture, make in explaining patterns of voter registration?

A historian who has done extensive research on Maryland describes the state as having four distinct political cultures (Callcott, 1985). His concept of political culture includes Almond and Verba's view of political culture as "the particular distribution of patterns of orientations toward political objects" (1965, p. 13). Also imbedded in his concept of political culture are the three elements incorporated in Elazar's conceptualization of political culture, an important component of which is expectations about patterns of political conflict and political control.

The four Maryland political cultures that Callcott perceived as present in the state developed from distinctive patterns of settlement, different patterns of economic, social and cultural development, and divergent political histories. One distinctive cultural region is the city of Baltimore. Although Baltimore was governed through much of its history by a centralized political organization that exercised substantial influence over the activities of local government, factions based on religious, ethnic, economic, and ideological differences competed for political influence and for the rewards available from the organization. The resulting electoral competition focused on controlling party and elective office through putting factional supporters in office. Therefore, the goals of each faction were served by registering supportive eligible voters and mobilizing them on election day. While the degree of centralized influence has declined, political competition remains within Baltimore's dominant Democratic party. Individual candidate organizations, political clubs aligned with party factions, and various nonparty groups (such as civic and ethnic group associations, churches, ministerial associations, and economic interests) act as mobilizing agents to register city residents.

The three other political cultures also formerly shared a pattern of strong local organizational control, but their political cultures are different. Western Maryland differed from other areas of the state in its patterns of initial settlement. Its economic base has consisted of small farms and orchards, mines, and factories, although several large industrial plants in western Maryland have been forced to close under the pressure of foreign economic competition. The diverse economy and successive waves of settlement by different ethnic groups contributed to the development of a relatively competitive political environment, including in some counties an active two-party system.

The economies of the Tidewater counties on the eastern shore of Maryland's Chesapeake Bay and on the lower western shore historically were based on plantations, as well as maritime-related occupations. More recently, small industrial plants and grain and poultry farms provide the economic base for these counties. Patterns of political influence largely continue to reflect the predominant role played by a small group of economic and political leaders in each of the region's counties.

In contrast, the political culture of the suburban counties surrounding Baltimore and adjacent to Washington have evolved quite dramatically as the counties shifted from rural counties with traditional political machines, each

usually led by a single political boss holding an elected office and dominated by a small group of economic influentials, to urbanized counties with highly complex political systems. The traditional political machines lost power during the twenty-year period after the end of World War II. In these now densely populated, affluent, economically diverse, and socially complex counties, party factions and numerous economic and social interests compete for political influence.

Within-state variations in political culture are usually ignored in empirical research on registration and turnout. The first question addressed here is, "Do within-state differences in political culture affect patterns of voter registration?" The simple answer to this question is yes. Taking into account the within-state differences in political culture does contribute to the explanation of voter registration patterns in Maryland. One measure of political culture is statistically significant (that for western Maryland, $p = .025$) in explaining individual-level patterns of voter registration in an analysis of the entire state-wide sample (Conway and Dolan, 1987).

More important, when separate analyses are conducted of distinct within-state political cultures, are differences in the impact of explanatory variables found? The answer to that is also yes, but, unfortunately, because of the small number of respondents in the Eastern Shore-Southern Maryland cultural region, the more traditional (other than suburban) political cultures must be combined into one subsample with dummy variables entered for the separate political cultures.

In these two subsamples, the patterns of political mobilization that are operating are quite different. Voter registration in suburban areas reflects a political culture in which political mobilization relies more on the individual's political attitudes, with low levels of political trust and greater strength of partisan identification stimulating voter mobilization. Use of the news media to acquire political information is also related to an increased probability of voter registration in the suburban area. In contrast, in the subsample containing the other three political cultures, voter registration patterns are more dependent on group mobilization processes. Group processes are important, regardless of the socioeconomic status of the citizen, reducing the importance of such political orientations as political trust, evaluations of the quality of government performance, and partisan loyalty in mobilizing citizens to register to vote (Conway and Dolan, 1987).

A number of questions can be raised about the within-state differences in political culture and their impacts on political behavior in other southern states. Do such states as North Carolina and Virginia have this same four-part division of political cultures, with the more traditional Tidewater, Piedmont, and city political systems differing from the new suburban systems, or have distinctive state and local histories resulted in different patterns of within-state differences in political cultures? Do other southern states have distinct

patterns of political cultures? For example, Florida has experienced continuing waves of settlement by immigrants from within the United States and from other countries. What are the political cultures of Florida? One analysis divides its counties among four distinct types of political cultures: the urban liberal South, "New Florida," partially "reconstructed" counties, and "Little Dixie" (Hill and Kent, 1988, pp. 9-12). This typology of within-state differences in political cultures has proved useful in analyzing vote choice. We are left with the question, however, of whether any typology of within-state types of political cultures, other than Elazar's, can be developed that could be used in analyzing variations in patterns of political behavior within all fifty states or in only the southern states.

I have emphasized the concept of political culture, but it is only one of many contextual variables that merit our attention in analyses of political behavior.² What data sources can be used to analyze the impact of political context on political behavior? In our efforts to assess the impact of contextual variables on political behavior, one underutilized resource is state or regional polls. Many research problems in the study of political behavior can be analyzed using data collected from state or local surveys. Political science has benefited enormously from research projects that collect national-level data and from data archives, such as the InterUniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research, which disseminate those data sets. However, the variables necessary to test important hypotheses may not be included in national data sets. Furthermore, even when such variables are included, contributions can be made to resolving controversies over the "best" measurement of concepts through studies based on samples drawn from state or local populations.

More than thirty states now have state polls that conduct statewide surveys on a regular basis. It is disappointing that such resources have not been used to collect a number of comparable multistate data sets for the analysis of patterns of citizen participation, vote choice, public opinion, and policy preferences. That resource for increasing our understanding of the political context of political behavior has not been adequately utilized.

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Articles **J**

The Policy Consequences of Political Intolerance: Political Repression During the Vietnam War Era

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In this article I analyze the relationship between mass and elite political intolerance and the adoption of repressive public policies by the states of the United States. My focus is on statutes adopted by the states during the Vietnam War era that were designed to quash dissent on university campuses. The analysis reveals that repressive public policy reflected neither the intolerance of the mass public nor the political elites in the state. Instead, restrictions on campus protest seemed to be a direct response to levels of disruption on the campuses. Somewhat paradoxically, political tolerance seems to have created the conditions for dissent to occur, but it failed to block repressive reactions when dissent became disruptive. More intolerant states did not act repressively, in part because the climate of intolerance discouraged dissent in the first place. These findings are contrasted to earlier research on repression during the McCarthy era and ultimately are used to impugn the elitist theory of democracy.

Those who study mass public opinion in the United States accept the fact that deep strains of political intolerance exist. When the American people find a political minority threatening, they usually support political repression of it. As a consequence, political nonconformists have not fared well in American political history.

This basic empirical finding serves as the fundamental underpinning of the so-called elitist theory of democracy. The elitist theory argues that democracy is best protected through the rule of tolerant elites; conversely, direct political

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[West Supp. 1972]). Because the statutes were so vague, discretion was essentially unbounded, making it possible for university officials to mobilize the law to stifle dissent on campus.

Trespass statutes are not ordinarily treated as a means of circumscribing dissent.⁴ They are so treated here due to the circumstances attending the adoption of such legislation. The purpose of most trespass legislation was to give university administrators a tool for controlling "outside agitators" and thus to suppress dissent on campus. Moreover, such statutes typically granted unfettered discretion to campus officials. In Virginia it was a misdemeanor to fail to leave campus when "directed to leave . . . by a person duly authorized" (VA CODE ANN. Sec. 18.1-173.2 [1972]). The campuses were wellsprings of dissent against the Vietnam War, one reasonably effective way to control that dissent was to deny "outsiders" access to the campus.

Another state policy response to dissent was the promulgation of detailed and severe university rules and regulations. Such actions are beyond the purview of this research. However, state legislatures were also involved in the formulation of internal university rules. Three sorts of actions were taken by state governments: (1) resolutions or statutes reassuring the academic communities that administrators had the power to make and enforce campus regulations, (2) orders to universities to develop and implement their own rules (often with the threat of losing appropriations for failure to do so), and (3) statutes containing mandatory university rules and procedures. These categories are not mutually exclusive inasmuch as some states adopted all three types of statutes (e.g., California). This sort of legislation was clearly designed to create political interference in the internal academic affairs of public universities for purpose of quashing dissent. Table 1 reports state scores on a simple index of statutory restrictions on access to public campuses and an index of degree of statutory interference in campus governance.⁵

⁴ For a similar treatment of such legislation, see Barkan, 1965.

⁵ With one exception, these indices are simply counts of the number of types of legislation the state adopted. The exception concerns restrictions on access to campuses. So as not to overweigh laws concerning interference in campus activities (i.e., actual interference and intent to interfere), laws making it illegal to enter a university with intent to interfere in campus activities were scored at 0.5 rather than at 1.0. Other restrictive policies were adopted on such an idiosyncratic basis that they have not been included in the measures of state public policy. On the civil side these include: (1) changes in admission policies to exclude potential and proven troublemakers—FL, LA, TX, WI, (2) requirements that teachers teach a minimum number of hours per week—FL, MI, and (3) grants of the power to create security departments and raise the status of security officers to that of peace officers—AL, AZ, CA, FL, IA, KS, KY, MD, MT, NV, NJ, NY, ND, TX, UT, WA. Other forms of special criminal legislation directed against campus unrest include: (1) weapons legislation (prohibiting weapons on campus, frequently even when licensed)—AL, CA, IL, NJ, NC, SC, TX, UT, (2) riot legislation—AR, LA, MI, NM, NC, OK, WV, WY, (3) statutes prohibiting advocacy of unlawfulness—FL, NV, OK, and (4) statutes regulating sound-amplifying equipment—NC, WI.

TABLE 1

**POLITICAL RESTRICTIONS ON DISSENT ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES
BY AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENTS—EARLY 1970s**

State	Restrictions on Access to Campus	Interference in Campus Governance	Scale Score*
Pennsylvania	3 0	4 0	3 08
Texas	3 0	3 0	2 50
California	2 0	4 0	2 14
Illinois	2 0	4 0	2 14
North Carolina	2 0	4 0	2 14
Tennessee	2 0	4 0	2 14
Wisconsin	2 0	4 0	2 14
Oklahoma	1 5	4 0	1 67
Louisiana	2 0	3 0	1 56
Utah	2 0	3 0	1 56
Virginia	2 0	3 0	1 56
Florida	1 0	4 0	1 20
Michigan	1 0	4 0	1 20
Missouri	1 0	4 0	1 20
Washington	1 0	4 0	1 20
Arizona	2 0	2 0	0 98
Delaware	3 0	0 0	0 77
Maine	3 0	0 0	0 77
Maryland	3 0	0 0	0 77
Massachusetts	3 0	0 0	0 77
Nevada	1 0	3 0	0 63
Ohio	1 0	3 0	0 63
Indiana	2 0	1 0	0 41
New Mexico	2 0	1 0	0 41
Iowa	0 0	4 0	0 27
Colorado	2 0	0 0	- 17
Idaho	2 0	0 0	- 17
Nebraska	2 0	0 0	- 17
Oregon	2 0	0 0	- 17
North Dakota	0 0	3 0	- 31
Minnesota	1 0	1 0	- 53
New Jersey	1 5	0 0	- 64
South Carolina	1 5	0 0	- 64
Mississippi	0 0	2 0	- 80
New York	0 0	2 0	- 80
Arkansas	1 0	0 0	- 1 11
Kentucky	0 0	1 0	- 1 47
Alabama	0 0	0 0	- 2 05
Alaska	0 0	0 0	- 2 05
Connecticut	0 0	0 0	- 2 05
Georgia	0 0	0 0	- 2 05
Hawaii	0 0	0 0	- 2 05
Kansas	0 0	0 0	- 2 05
Montana	0 0	0 0	- 2 05
New Hampshire	0 0	0 0	- 2 05
Rhode Island	0 0	0 0	- 2 05

continued

TABLE 1 (continued)

State	Restrictions on Access to Campus	Interference in Campus Governance	Scale Score ^a
South Dakota	0 0	0 0	-2 05
Vermont	0 0	0 0	-2 05
West Virginia	0 0	0 0	-2 05
Wyoming	0 0	0 0	-2 05

^aThe scale score is the sum of standardized restrictions and interference indices. For additional details, see N 5.

Also shown in table 1 is a summary scale score indicating the degree of restriction on dissent on university campuses by the state governments. The measure is simply the sum of the standardized measures of restrictiveness and interference.⁶ The data reveal that Pennsylvania did more than any other state to constrain campus protest, adopting all of the legislation under consideration here. Many of the states with high scores on this measures have a reputation for being relatively progressive (e.g., California, Wisconsin). A total of thirteen states took no action against their universities, including, surprisingly, Alabama and Georgia.⁷ This index serves as the dependent variable for the remainder of the analysis.

⁶ It is useful to examine the relationship between this measure and measures of other sorts of policy outputs. Klingman and Lammers (1964) have developed a measure of the "general policy liberalism" of the states. General policy liberalism is a predisposition in state public policies toward extensive use of the public sector and is thought to be a relatively stable attribute. I would expect that efforts to quell dissent are not directly related to liberalism, and indeed they are not. The correlation between general policy liberalism and political repression during the 1970s is only .03. Moreover, the relationship between repression and a measure of New Deal social welfare liberalism policy (see Rosenstone, 1963), and Holbrook-Provost and Foe (1957), is only -.19. Limits on campus dissent were as common in states with histories of liberalism as they were in states typically adopting conservative policies. Thus, this measure is not simply a form of political liberalism, a finding that contributes to the apparent validity of the measure.

⁷ There is a moderate relationship between political repression of Communists during the McCarthy era (see Gibson, 1996) and political repression during the Vietnam War era ($r = .40$). Many states taking action to quell campus dissent were states that had earlier repressed Communists. There is also some relationship between these outbreaks of political repression and the adoption of criminal syndicalism statutes following World War I. This may suggest that there is a propensity toward repression that reflects relatively stable attributes of the state political cultures. This question is considered more fully in Gibson (1998).

ORIGINS OF STATE EFFORTS TO QUELL DISSENT

The simple linkage hypothesis is that, where the public was more intolerant, policy was more repressive. There is evidence from extant research that state legislators felt themselves pressured by the mass public to do something to control dissent on campus. For instance, based on a survey of legislators in nine states, Eulau and Quinley (1970) strongly support the view that the impetus for political interference in university affairs was the intolerance of the mass public. Legislative leaders were more sympathetic toward university autonomy, more understanding of the value of academic freedom, and more inclined to restrain themselves from interfering in the internal affairs of the universities. However, political pressure from their constituents forced them to take direct action to quell the disturbances. For instance, Eulau and Quinley asserted, "Legislators who told us about incidents of interference [in academic affairs] generally explained that the legislature had been "forced" to act, because the "professionals"—university administrators, or sometimes the state's coordinating board—had in some way neglected their responsibility for running the educational system in accord with the interests of the taxpayers" (1970, p. 61). A number of legislators were "themselves distrustful of the actions of the dissident students and faculty, but they were often under intense pressure from the public to take strong actions to end the demonstrations. The result was that those who might have defended the activists found it politically dangerous to do so" (Eulau and Quinley, 1970, p. 153). This account of repression of dissent on campus fits squarely within the elitist theory of democracy.

In order to test the hypothesis linking opinion and policy, it is necessary to derive a measure of the intolerance of public opinion. It is to that task that we turn next.

PUBLIC OPINION INTOLERANCE

"Political tolerance" refers to the willingness of citizens to support the extension of rights of citizenship to all members of the polity—that is, to allow political freedoms to those who are politically different. Thus, "tolerance implies a willingness to 'put up with' those things that one rejects. Politically, it implies a willingness to permit the expression of those ideas or interests that one opposes. A tolerant regime, then, like a tolerant individual, is one that allows a wide berth to those ideas that challenge its way of life" (Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus, 1979, p. 784). Political tolerance includes support for institutional guarantees of the right to oppose the existing regime, including the rights to vote, to participate in political parties, to organize politically, and to attempt political persuasion. Though there may be some disagreement about the operationalization of the concept, its conceptual definition is relatively noncontroversial (generally, see Gibson and Bingham, 1982).

The simple linkage hypothesis, as stated earlier, is that where the mass public is more intolerant, state public policy is more repressive. Though the hypothesis is simple, deriving measures of mass intolerance is by no means uncomplicated. Indeed, the study of state politics continually confronts the difficulty of measuring public opinion at the state level. Though there are five general alternatives,⁸ the only viable option for estimating state-level intolerance during the Vietnam War era is to aggregate national surveys by state.

The source of the opinion data used to estimate state opinion is a survey conducted in 1973 by Nunn, Crockett, and Williams. This survey was a replication of the famous Stouffer survey of intolerance, conducted during the McCarthy era. The Stouffer survey is widely regarded as the classic study that initiated inquiry into the political tolerance of elites and masses (even though earlier studies exist—e.g., Hyman and Sheatsley, 1953). The Nunn, Crockett, and Williams survey was based on a representative sample of the mass public and a systematically selected sample of elites.⁹ Both the 1954 and the 1973 surveys used unusually large sample sizes.

Political intolerance is measured through a multi-item scale.¹⁰ Nunn,

⁸ First, individual state-level surveys can be conducted (e.g., the Comparative State Elections Project, Black, Kovenack, and Reynolds 1974; Wright, 1974). Second, national surveys can be aggregated by state or constituency (e.g., Miller and Stokes, 1964; Erikson 1976). Third, state-level opinion can be simulated on the basis of national survey data and full population data (e.g., census data) for each state (e.g., Weber and Shaffer, 1972; Weber, Hopkins, Mezey, and Munger, 1972; Sutton and Wilson 1974). Fourth, a series of national surveys can be pooled and then aggregated by state (e.g., Wright, Erikson, and McIver, 1985). Finally, surrogates for public opinion have been derived (e.g., referenda voting, Kuklinski and Stanga, 1979; contributions to the United Way, Plotnick and Winters 1985). Each of these approaches has its own difficulties and limitations.

⁹ They defined elites as those who held certain positions of influence and potential influence in local politics. Their elite sample was drawn from those holding the following positions: Community Chest chairmen, school board presidents, library committee chairmen, Republican county chairmen, Democratic county chairmen, American Legion commanders, Bar Association presidents, Chamber of Commerce presidents, P.T.A. presidents, presidents of the League of Women Voters, police chiefs, newspaper publishers, and labor union leaders. In one sense, these leaders constitute a population rather than a sample: an attempt was made to interview all individuals holding specific positions of leadership in cities with populations between 10,000 and 150,000. In another sense, however, they are a sample, because the ninety-one cities were sampled from a larger sampling frame with 300 locations. The selection of the cities and respondents was highly rigorous; for details, see Nunn, Crockett, and Williams, 1978, pp. 188–90. It should be noted that these are nongovernmental elites. Missing from this analysis are data on the levels of political tolerance of the members of the state government.

¹⁰ I have chosen to use a measure of general political intolerance in this analysis rather than the responses to specific items about protest on campus. This decision is predicated upon the belief that political intolerance is a generalized, enduring attitude, most likely strongly rooted in personality attributes (e.g., Sullivan, et al., 1985), rather than an ephemeral opinion on the particular issue of the day. Attitudes can serve as a "standing decision," instructing representatives, while opinions on *many* issues are difficult for policy makers to discern. The use of a broad-based index rather than a few discrete items also reduces measurement error. Moreover, there

Crockett, and Williams created a six-point index to indicate political intolerance (see Stouffer, 1955, appendix C, pp. 262-69; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams, 1978, pp. 179-91). The scale is a Guttman scale based on the responses to fifteen items concerning support for the civil liberties of Communists, socialists, and atheists. The items meet conventional standards of scalability and are widely used today as indicators of political tolerance (e.g., Davis, 1975; McCutcheon, 1985; General Social Survey, conducted annually). Given the mix of activities and groups involved in these fifteen items, this index properly stands as a generalized measure of political tolerance.¹¹

The process of aggregating these tolerance scores by state is fraught with difficulty. A variety of statistical tests was conducted in an attempt to determine the magnitude of the aggregation error (see appendix). Since the results of these tests were quite encouraging, the tolerance scores were aggregated by state of residence of the respondent to create summary indicators of the level of intolerance in each of the states.¹² Table 2 reports the means, standard

is a moderately strong relationship between opinions toward radical students and the more general measure of intolerance. A final advantage of this approach is that it allows direct comparison with data from Stouffer's survey of the 1950s, which is useful in assessing aggregation error (see appendix). It should be noted that none of the findings reported here is altered in any substantive way if the more discrete measures of opinion are used.

¹¹ The Stouffer measures of tolerance have recently been criticized by Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus (1982). Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of this criticism is the assertion that the Stouffer items measure tolerance only for a specific group and thus are not generalizable. Because Stouffer was only concerned about intolerance of Communists, his findings may be time bound as the objects of mass displeasure evolve; the Communist-based approach to tolerance becomes less relevant and useful. This difficulty does not affect the analysis of opinion from the 1950s because Communists were probably a major disliked group for nearly all Americans in the survey. It may be considered, however, whether the measures are also valid for the early 1970s. Several factors suggest that they may be. First, most dissent during the 1960s and early 1970s came from the political left. Right-wing targets of intolerance did not become prominent until the late 1970s. Second, the Stouffer items, at least with an elite group and as supplemented by a demonstrations item, performed reasonably well in comparison to other, more sophisticated measures of intolerance (Gibson and Bingham, 1982). Third, I have shown elsewhere (Gibson, 1986) that there are a variety of limitations to the Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus measure and analysis. Finally, even if directed against a specific group, the measures are not hopeless. According to the Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus conceptualization of the problem, all of those giving an intolerant response to the Communist stimulus are providing valid data. Of those giving a tolerant response, some portion would give an intolerant answer were their disfavored group given as the stimulus, while the other portion would give a tolerant response under all circumstances. Thus, the amount of measurement error in the Stouffer items is directly a function of the size of the group that would not repress Communists but that would repress others. This group is not very large (see McCutcheon, 1985). Thus, the amount of measurement error is not great and it is legitimate to use Stouffer's scale as a measure of general political intolerance.

¹² State of residence is not in the original Nunn, Crockett, and Williams data set. The variable was supplied to me by Response Analysis, the firm that conducted the survey.

TABLE 2
STATE MEAN INTOLERANCE SCORES:
NUNN, CROCKETT, AND WILLIAMS, 1973

State ^a	Mass Public			Number of Primary Sampling Units	Elites		
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Number of Cases		Mean	Standard Deviation	Number of Cases
Wisconsin	5.19	1.34	13	1	5.09	1.38	11
Colorado	5.15	1.14	38	4	5.43	1.51	7
California	5.05	1.35	317	21	5.57	.94	61
Washington	5.03	1.24	123	11	5.25	1.36	12
Utah	5.01	1.35	59	4	5.14	1.07	7
Michigan	4.97	1.26	105	5	6.00	.00	13
Massachusetts	4.89	1.31	121	11	5.45	1.16	60
Virginia	4.88	1.31	59	5	5.60	.84	10
Vermont	4.86	1.61	50	4	5.50	.94	14
New York	4.85	1.46	252	19	5.28	1.25	32
Illinois	4.71	1.52	202	21	5.14	1.27	57
New Jersey	4.69	1.51	191	14	5.57	.82	75
Montana	4.67	1.21	20	1	—	—	—
Oregon	4.63	1.50	25	2	5.71	1.07	14
Idaho	4.60	1.51	63	2	—	—	—
Florida	4.55	1.55	126	5	5.67	.71	9
Maryland	4.57	1.59	36	4	5.40	.84	10
Pennsylvania	4.54	1.53	173	13	5.43	1.13	7
Oklahoma	4.53	1.72	35	3	5.64	.92	11
Ohio	4.44	1.53	247	23	5.46	.98	57
Minnesota	4.25	1.36	57	4	—	—	—
Missouri	4.24	1.60	127	9	5.64	.57	25
Texas	4.21	1.69	172	13	4.90	1.33	52
Kansas	3.97	1.51	130	5	4.57	1.27	7
Indiana	3.96	1.59	76	6	5.30	1.08	20
North Carolina	3.84	1.69	151	12	5.16	1.31	25
Georgia	3.74	1.47	68	6	—	—	—
Tennessee	3.56	1.71	106	7	6.00	.00	7
Louisiana	3.42	1.46	90	7	4.71	1.99	7
Mississippi	3.37	1.25	24	2	—	—	—
Alabama	3.25	1.74	93	5	5.57	.53	7
South Carolina	3.18	1.60	55	7	4.92	1.50	13
Arkansas	2.99	1.50	15	1	4.50	1.64	6
Connecticut	2.88	0.94	14	2	5.00	1.35	13
Wyoming	2.69	1.70	50	3	—	—	—
Average	4.27	1.49	102	5	5.33	1.06	22

^aStates not listed were not included in the sample.

deviations, and numbers of cases and primary sampling units (PSUs) for this tolerance scale for the states. The means serve as the measure of mass political intolerance.

Aggregating the elite interviews to the state level is in one sense more perilous and in another sense less perilous. With a considerably small number of subjects ($N = 649$), the means become more unstable. However, the aggregation is not done for the purpose of estimating some sort of elite population parameter. The elites selected were in no sense a random sample of state elites, therefore, it makes little sense to try to make inferences from the sample to some larger elite population. Instead, the elite samples represent only themselves. Table 2 also reports the state means and numbers of cases for the elites in the Nunn, Crockett, and Williams survey.

There is a moderate relationship between elite and mass opinion in the state ($r = .43$; $N = 29$)¹³ To the extent that we would expect elite and mass opinion in the states to covary, this correlation serves to validate the aggregate measures of opinion. The substantive implications of this correlation are considered below.

THE EFFECT OF CAMPUS DISTURBANCES ON STATE POLICIES

Before considering the relationship of elite and mass opinion to the adoption of repressive public policies, it is fruitful to consider whether the state legislatures were responding to actual disturbances on campuses within the state. My earlier research has shown that the adoption of repressive policies during the McCarthy era was clearly not related to the magnitude of the Communist menace within the state. Perhaps the policy responses of the late 1960s and early 1970s were quite different; perhaps they were a direct response to protest and unrest on the campuses. If so, then it will be important to control for the frequency of unrest in considering the impact of opinion on policy.

Data on the frequency of campus disorders are available from a study conducted for the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations (1969). The study enumerated and described each campus riot or disorder occurring from October 1967 to May 1969. I hypothesize that states experiencing more frequent disorders were more likely to adopt legislation restricting campus protest.

Efforts to quell campus dissent were, in fact, strongly related to the frequency of actual disorders. The correlation between campus repression and the number of campus disturbances in the state is .48 ($N = 50$).¹⁴ Where there

¹³ By imposing a ten elite respondent minimum per state, the correlation rises to .52 ($N = 20$).

¹⁴ The number-of-disturbances variable was recoded to bring in the two extreme outliers of New York and California. Because the skewness in the distribution was due only to these two outliers, their scores were recoded to a score equal to the highest of the remaining scores plus the difference between this highest score and the next lowest score. This technique is recommended by Rummel, 1970, p. 282. A related variable was considered—the number of campuses affected by disturbances—but it is too strongly correlated with the number-of-disturbances variable to be useful.

were more disturbances, there was greater legislative response. Thus, to some degree, the legislative interference in campus affairs was a direct result of threats to the political status quo as a result of disorders on campus.¹⁵ But to what extent were these disturbances the catalyst for the mobilization of political intolerance?

THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL INTOLERANCE ON STATE POLICIES

Figure 1 reports the bivariate relationships among mass and elite political tolerance and the adoption of restrictive public policies by the American states during the Vietnam era. The relationships are not at all as predicted. Where mass opinion was more *tolerant*, public policy was more *repressive*. The relationship is moderately strong. At the same time, there is a weaker relationship between elite opinion and policy, but it is still in the wrong direction. Interference in campus affairs seems not to have stemmed directly from either mass or elite opinion. Thus, we are confronted with a paradox: even in the states with more repressive mass and elite opinion in the 1970s, there was not more political repression than in states with less repressive opinion. This paradox requires explanation.¹⁶

The frequency of disturbances on campuses is related to both mass political tolerance ($r = .41$) and mass liberalism-conservatism ($r = -.49$).¹⁷ Disturbances were more likely to occur in more tolerant states and in more liberal states. Together these variables can account for nearly one-third of the variance in the frequency of disturbances.¹⁸ This finding provides a clue to understanding the relationship between tolerance and repression.

It is not difficult to explain why political liberalism is associated with dissent, since the Vietnam War was more strongly opposed by liberals than by

¹⁵ An additional 10 percent of the variance in the policy measure can be explained by adding a quadratic term to the simple policy-disturbances equation. This means that when there were a large number of disturbances, their effect on policy was especially substantial.


¹⁶ Even the relationship between the responses to discrete, directly relevant items and campus repression is in the wrong direction. For instance, the correlation between the percentage of the state mass sample supporting the firing of suspected Communists teaching in universities and campus repression is $-.35$, indicating that where there was more support for firing Communist professors there was less repression on the campuses. Similarly, where citizens perceived a greater threat from radical college students, there tended to be less political repression.

¹⁷ The measure of mass conservatism in the state is taken from Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1985). The measure is based on the aggregation of a large number of telephone surveys conducted between 1976 and 1982. The question aggregated is the ideological self-identification of the respondent.

¹⁸ The addition of elite tolerance and elite conservatism to the equation results in little additional increment in R^2 . (For the measure of elite opinion, see Erikson, Wright, and McIver, 1987). Because elite and mass liberalism are so strongly correlated, substantial multicollinearity is introduced when elite opinion is added. While I have chosen to focus on mass opinion, it might be more properly said that the climate of opinion created by both mass and elite opinion within the state contributed to campus unrest.

FIGURE 1

THE SIMPLE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG OPINION AND POLICY



NOTE: ENTRIES ARE BIVARIATE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

conservatives. Dissent is also more likely among those who are more tolerant. Tolerance involves the recognition of the legitimacy of different points of view and the appropriateness of widespread political competition. Students attending college in more liberal and more tolerant states were exposed to a climate of opinion that not only was opposed to the policies of the government but also was supportive of citizen efforts to challenge those policies. Thus, liberalism and tolerance both contributed to dissent.¹⁹

¹⁹ Eisinger (1973) observed much the same thing in his analysis of protest behavior in American cities. It was the very openness of the local political system that seemed to encourage protest. Since more open systems tend to be more responsive, openness reinforces the efficacy of protest behavior. In closed political systems the process was quite different. "Not only is protest likely to be an inadequate tactic for enhancing political opportunities in a closed system but it is not likely to be tolerated. Protest will not flourish where its use finds neither tolerance nor elicits favorable responses" (Eisinger, 1973, p. 28).

A host of research has focused on the microlevel origins of student protest behavior—see, for example, Clarke and Egan (1972). For aggregate analyses of protest behavior, see Eisinger (1971, 1973) and Gamson (1975). A more current consideration of the problem can be found in Muller and Opp (1996).

At the same time, more liberal and more tolerant states engaged in more repression of campus dissent. This is the puzzling finding. A portion of the explanation is that restrictions on campus protest were unlikely to occur without the stimulus of disruptions, and disruptions were more common in liberal and tolerant states. It must be remembered, however, that repression during the McCarthy era was just as common in states with no significant Communist presence as it was in states with substantial party membership (Gibson, 1988). Disruptions are obviously not a necessary condition for repression.

Perhaps some of the campus disruptions simply went too far, threatening even those who were liberal and tolerant. At some point, this may have caused the legislatures to crack down on dissent, adopting repressive legislation. Perhaps this was done because even in the most tolerant and liberal states there could be found a significant minority of more conservative and more intolerant citizens. In states overwhelmingly tolerant, the response would not have been repressive. In states overwhelmingly intolerant, there was no initial permissiveness that allowed or encouraged the dissent in the first place. But in states with a moderate degree of tolerance, that is, mixed tolerance and intolerance, the tolerance contributed to the dissent, but the intolerance contributed to the repression. At low levels of tolerance, repression is unnecessary because the intolerance preempts dissent. As tolerance increases, the likelihood of repression increases as well, because moderate tolerance creates the condition necessary for dissent and protest to begin, but it is not so strong as to protect dissent that "gets out of hand." Political tolerance in the United States knows limits; when those limits are reached, important segments of the elite become threatened and mobilized, resulting in political repression. Only in the most tolerant states is the reaction to dissent restrained and unlikely to result in political repression. Few if any of the American states reach this level of tolerance.²⁰

Some support for this assertion can be found in the relationship between the size of the American Legion chapter in the state and the extent of political repression ($r = .41$). Where there were more Legionnaires, the legislative response to campus disruptions was more repressive. When dissent "goes too

²⁰ This hypothesis is best assessed with a quadratic equation. When policy is regressed on tolerance and the square of tolerance, we do in fact see some hint of a curvilinear relationship. The equation is

$$\text{Policy} = -13.1 + 5.4 (\text{Tolerance}) - 0.6 (\text{Tolerance}^2)$$

This indicates that at the very highest levels of tolerance, policy becomes less repressive. However, in these data, the quadratic equation is only marginally (and not significantly) superior to the linear equation. I suspect that this is in part a function of the fact that few states reach the level of extreme tolerance, and thus there are few observations on which the quadratic equation can capitalize. This is a common problem of empirical research: it is difficult to test the functional form of relationships when empirical observations across the full range of variability are not available within a particular sample.

far," conservative and intolerant segments of the population mobilize, "forcing" legislators to take action. This process seems to occur even in the states that are the most tolerant and the most liberal.

These processes can be more fully understood with the aid of multivariate analysis. Though the limited number of cases (i.e., states) means that the coefficients are somewhat unstable, the multivariate analysis can provide greater insight into the origins of public policy. Table 3 reports the results of this analysis.

First, we see that the simple model involving mass tolerance, mass liberalism, the frequency of disturbances, and the strength of the American Legion does a reasonably good job of explaining the variance in state public policy. Nearly one-half of the variance can be accounted for by the four variables. Policy was more repressive in more liberal and more tolerant states and where disturbances were more common. Though the impact of the American Legion is diminished in the multivariate analysis, the conclusions of the bivariate analysis are supported generally.

Table 3 also reports the interactive effect of disturbances with mass political intolerance and the strength of the American Legion. I hypothesize a conditional relationship between the frequency of disturbances and mass intolerance. As the number of disturbances increases, the effect of mass political intolerance is expected to change rather significantly. Where there are few disturbances, tolerance is expected to be positively associated with repression. However, where there are many disturbances, tolerance is expected to be negatively associated with repression. The coefficients in table 3 support this hypothesis.²¹ Moreover, in states with a greater-than-average number of campus disturbances, the relationship between mass tolerance and repression is $- .22$; in states with fewer-than-average disturbances, the coefficient is $.41$. Though the data are too limited to support fully the conclusion, it appears that political tolerance contributes both to repression—through implicit support for protest, which generates repression when protest goes too far—and to policy tolerance before protest becomes too widespread.

We also see in table 3 evidence that the impact of the American Legion is conditional upon the frequency of disturbances.²² Where there are few campus disruptions, the effect of the Legion is substantial. However, as disturbances become more common, the effect of the Legion declines. Perhaps this is a function of the changing salience of public policy. Before the issue becomes salient in the state, activist interest groups can have some influence

²¹ Though the coefficient is not statistically significant and though the increment in explained variance does not quite attain significance, I interpret this coefficient as substantively significant. As I argued above, the small number of highly tolerant states results in a bias against the conditional hypothesis.

²² Not only is the interactive coefficient significant, but also the increment in explained variance is 0.10 , which is highly significant.

TABLE 3
A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF STATE POLICY
REGARDING DISSENT ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES

	Impact on Policy Repression			
	Linear Model		Interactive Model	
	<i>b</i>	β	<i>b</i>	β
Linear Terms				
Mass Political Tolerance	0.80	0.36*	1.13	0.51*
Frequency of Campus Disturbances	0.09	0.43**	0.53	2.47
Strength of the American Legion	0.00	0.16	0.00	0.67**
Mass Opinion Liberalism-Conservatism	9.39	0.47*	9.55	0.48*
R^2	.44			
Interactive Terms				
Tolerance \times Disturbances	—	—	-0.07	-1.69
Legion Strength \times Disturbances	—	—	0.00	-0.94*
R^2	.56			

Note: $N = 35$

* $p < .05$, ** $10 < p < .05$

over state legislatures. As campus protest became more salient, the issue permeated mass consciousness, and the influence of specialized interest groups like the American Legion declined. Ironically, the impact of the American Legion seems to have been to have aided the spread of repression to those states with relatively few campus disruptions.

These findings stand in sharp contrast to my earlier findings on the origins of repression during the McCarthy era. During the McCarthy Red Scare, there was a modest relationship between elite and mass opinion and repressive public policy. In states in which the mass public was more intolerant, there tended to be greater political repression. The relationship was somewhat stronger between elite opinion and repression. Multivariate analysis revealed that it was elite opinion that most influenced public policy; the beta for mass opinion was $-.06$; for elite opinion it was $-.35$. Thus, political repression occurred in states with relatively intolerant elites. The preferences of the mass public seemed to have mattered very little beyond the intolerance of elites.

The origin of political repression during the McCarthy era was quite different than the origin of efforts to stem campus dissent during the Vietnam era. This may be due in part to the generally greater tolerance of Americans during the early 1970s. Over the two decades between the surveys, there was

a considerable increase in political tolerance. Indeed, applying the Stouffer/Nunn, Crockett, and Williams scheme for categorizing the tolerance scale, nineteen states can be considered to have had relatively tolerant mass publics in the early 1970s, while none of the states qualified during the 1950s. As a result of the increase in political tolerance, the climate of mass public opinion strongly supportive of political repression during the 1950s dissipated in the early 1970s.²³

The repression of the McCarthy era was also largely symbolic, having little to do with local protest movements (see Gibson, 1988). Where Communists were stronger, repression was not more severe. There was little need for a measure of tolerance to initiate dissent as a precursor to repression. Since the threat of Communism was largely an external threat with few local manifestations in most states, the threat could be perceived in tolerant and intolerant states alike. The protest of the Vietnam era was quite different, more real and more local, and less symbolic and external. Thus, these episodes seem to reflect quite different origins.

DISCUSSION

What do these findings tell us about the relationship between opinion and policy? Perhaps the simplest conclusion is that the relationship is far from simple and direct. Elsewhere I have argued that while mass political intolerance may not have been responsible for repressive state policies during the McCarthy era, mass opinion did set broad constraints on the behavior of policy-making elites (Gibson, 1988). Here we see that, while opinion did not directly shape public policy, it did seem to establish a climate conducive to dissent on campus. In a dialectical sort of way, political tolerance planted the seeds of repression by legitimizing dissent. Thus, we see that the origins of repressive policy in the American states are much more complicated than had been hypothesized by the elitist theory of democracy. Mass political tolerance does play a role in the process, but it is much different than the role envisaged by the elitist theory.

At the same time, it is important to consider how these findings comport with other analyses of the opinion-policy linkage process. For instance, Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1987) have recently shown that public policy in general in the American states strongly reflects state public opinion. Using a survey-based measure of liberalism-conservatism self-identification and a measure of general policy liberalism based on public policies in eight different areas, they observe correlations exceeding .80 between opinion and policy. Why would policy in general reflect opinion within the state, while public policy on campus unrest was not directly affected by opinion?

²³ For an analysis of change in opinion at the microlevel, see Davis (1973). For a contrary point of view, see Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus (1982).

One possibility is that tolerance and liberalism are not isomorphic. Even if there is some tendency at the microlevel for those who are more liberal to be more tolerant (e.g., McClosky and Brill, 1983), there is no necessary relationship between the two concepts. One can easily imagine that conservatives—those who oppose redistributive public policies—are as strongly committed to democratic values as are liberals. And, as we have seen, a number of states that are generally thought to be liberal took severe actions against university protest. This leads to the interesting hypothesis that, while political conflict that is easily subsumed under the traditional liberal-conservative cleavage may well reflect the basic values of the citizens of the state, policies that crosscut this dimension are susceptible to influence from other political forces.

What conclusions about the elitist theory of democracy and the theory of pluralistic intolerance does this analysis support? Most important, I have discovered little evidence that political repression in the United States stems from demands from ordinary citizens to curtail the rights and activities of unpopular political minorities. The finding is not predicted by the elitist theory of democracy. Nor are these findings necessarily compatible with the theory of pluralistic intolerance. Though political intolerance in the 1950s was widespread and highly focused, there seems to have been little direct effect of mass opinion on public policy. The evidence is even stronger that mass opinion did not determine public policy during the Vietnam era, even though radical college students were probably a target group for a large number of Americans.²⁴ Like the elitist theory of democracy, the theory of pluralistic intolerance places too much emphasis on mass opinion as a determinant of public policy.

At the same time, however, public opinion may not be completely irrelevant. Tolerance opinion, in both the 1950s and the 1970s, strongly reflects the political cultures of the states, and, at least in the 1950s, political culture was significantly related to levels of political repression. Opinion is important in the policy process because it delimits the range of acceptable policy alternatives. It may well be that mass opinion is manipulated and shaped by elites; nonetheless, those who would propose repressive policies in California face a very different set of political constraints than those faced by supporters of repressive policies in Arkansas. This is not to say that repression is impossible in tolerant states—indeed, California was one of the most repressive states during the Vietnam era—but rather that the task of gaining acceptance for repression is different under differing cultural contexts.

Finally, I should note that the basic causal direction in the linkage process may need to be reversed. Opinion may not cause policy; instead, it may reflect

²⁴ A Gallup poll in 1969 reported that 82 percent of a national sample believed that college students who break laws while participating in college demonstrations should be expelled, while 84 percent believed that such students should have their federal loans taken away. *New York Times*, March 13, 1969, p. 38.

policy. Perhaps one reason why we so often observe so much intolerance in the United States is that the American people have learned from their leaders that the appropriate response to threatening disruptions from unpopular political minorities is repression. Indeed, given the regularity with which the United States has repressed dissent throughout its history (e.g., Goldstein, 1978), it would be extraordinary if citizens did not learn the lessons of intolerance. In the final analysis, there is probably a reciprocal relationship between opinion and policy, each reinforcing one another, and each contributing to a culture of political conformity.

For over three decades now political scientists have systematically studied public policy and public opinion. Significant advances have been made in understanding many sorts of state policy outputs, and we have developed a wealth of information about political tolerance. To date, however, little attention has been given to repression as a policy output, and even less attention has been devoted to behavioral and policy implications of tolerance attitudes. The failure to investigate the linkage between opinion and policy is all the more significant because one of the most widely accepted theories in political science—the elitist theory of democracy—was developed on the basis of an assumed linkage between opinion and policy. I hope that this research, though only a crude beginning, will serve as an early step in continuing research into these important problems of democracy.

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APPENDIX

THE VALIDITY OF STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF POLITICAL INTOLERANCE

Since the Nunn, Crockett, and Williams survey was not designed to be aggregated by state, it is necessary to try to determine whether there is any obvious bias in the state-level estimates. A few empirical tests can be conducted, while not assuaging all doubts about the aggregation process, may make one somewhat more comfortable about using the state means.

The Nunn, Crockett, and Williams survey was very nearly an exact replication of a survey conducted in 1954 by Samuel Stouffer. In terms of the indicators of tolerance, it was an exact replication. Nunn, Crockett, and Williams were extremely careful to reproduce Stouffer's scaling methodology, creating a summary index of intolerance (Nunn, Crockett, and Williams, 1988, pp. 179–91). Thus, it is possible to aggregate the same scale variable by state and derive a measure of political tolerance for the mid-1980s.

With completely independent samples (including independent sampling errors), one would not expect that there would be much of a correlation between the Stouffer and Nunn, Crockett, and Williams state-level estimates.

Chance fluctuations in the distributions of PSUs would tend to attenuate the correlation between the state-level estimates.²⁵ Yet the correlation between the estimates from the two surveys is a remarkable .63 ($N = 29$). If I were to exclude the 1973 estimate for Connecticut, an estimate that shows that state to be quite intolerant, then the correlation increases to .77 ($N = 28$). It is difficult to imagine an explanation for this correlation other than that it is due to a common correlation of the state means with the true score for the state.²⁶

Another bit of evidence supporting the aggregation process comes from the correlations of tolerance and political culture. The correlation between Elazar's measure of political culture and average state tolerance in the 1970s is $-.58$. Because political cultures have clear implications for political tolerance, this correlation serves to enhance my confidence in the utility of the state-level estimates.

Another very different tack can be taken in estimating the error associated with the aggregation process. I have aggregated the proportion of the respondents having twelve years or more of formal education. These percentages can be compared to census estimates of the level of education in the state.²⁷ The correlation for the 1970s data between the survey and the census estimates of education is a substantial .49 ($N = 35$). While this correlation does not speak directly to the utility of the state-level estimates of tolerance, it does suggest that aggregation from the survey to the state is not completely inappropriate.

The correlation between elite opinion in the 1950s and elite opinion in the 1970s is .25. That the correlation is not higher is a bit worrisome, although it is not difficult to imagine that there is greater flux in elite opinion over the two decades separating the two surveys than there is in mass opinion. Moreover, there were some slight differences in the nature of the elite samples drawn in 1954 and 1973.

²⁵ The average number of PSUs in the Stauffer/NORC survey is 2.3, for the Nunn, Crickett and Williams survey it is 7.8.

²⁶ I have also investigated the relationship between state sample size and number of primary sampling units and aggregation error. I first assumed that differences between the t_1 and t_2 estimates of state opinion were due to aggregation error. The residuals resulting from regressing t_2 opinion on t_1 opinion represent this error. If squared, the residuals represent the total amount of error. The correlations between the squared residuals and t_1 sample size and number of PSUs are $-.30$ and $-.27$. The correlations between the residuals and t_2 sample size and number of PSUs are $-.29$ and $-.29$. These correlations indicate that aggregation error is larger in states in which the number of subjects and number of PSUs is smaller, a not unexpected finding. However, since the relationships are quite modest, they do not undermine the basic aggregation procedure.

²⁷ The comparison is not perfect due to two considerations. First, the census data are themselves population estimates drawn from survey samples. Second, the census reports the percent age of residents over the age of twenty-five with twelve or more years of education. I assume that those with twelve or more years of education have a high school degree, although this may not be true for every single respondent. Moreover, it is not possible to isolate those respondents twenty-five years and older in the Stauffer survey.

As a means of assessing the validity of the aggregation of elite opinion, elite tolerance is compared with other elite attitudes. Erikson, Wright, and McIver (87) have developed a separate measure of the degree of liberalism of state elites. The measure summarizes the ideological positions of the state's congressional candidates, state legislators, political party elites, and national convention delegates. As an overall index of the liberalism-conservatism of state elites, the average score of the Democrats and the Republicans is taken. Thus, each state receives a score indicating the degree of liberalism-conservatism of state elites. Though most of the indicators are drawn from the 1970s, the authors believe this to be a more stable attribute of state elites. According to this index, the most conservative elites are found in Mississippi, while the most liberal elites are found in Massachusetts.²⁰

The correlation of state elite conservatism and political tolerance is $-.46$ ($N = 26$) for the Stouffer elites and $-.22$ ($N = 29$) for the Nunn, Crockett, and Williams elites. Though liberalism-conservatism is conceptually distinct from political tolerance, some solace can be taken in this correlation. The aggregation process seems not to have introduced unexpected or obviously biased estimates of state-level elite opinion.

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Persuasion, Manipulation, and Dimension

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Manipulation of dimensions, a heresthetic strategy advanced by Riker (1986), is described as a deterministic strategy. The dimensions of a political decision, once established, cannot be ignored. This article explores conceptually the factors that might make it impossible to ignore new or fixed dimensions. Two factors—the existence of an audience that could be persuaded to accept the dimension as relevant and the beliefs of manipulated actors about that audience—are claimed to play an important role in effective manipulation. Potential changes in the audience's support or opposition are the factors the manipulator seeks to affect by controlling the dimensions under consideration. Persuasion thus may play a role in manipulation of dimensions, both by facilitating a change in audience opinion and by influencing other actors' perceptions of audience opinion. Riker's central claim, however, that manipulation of dimensions as a form of heresthetic is distinct from persuasion is supported.

The concept of dimension enters into many discussions of politics and political science research. One of its more important roles may be in facilitating discussion of the complex political landscape. For instance, we now are confident that the traditional liberal-conservative dichotomy masks multiple dimensions of liberalism and conservatism that may or may not interact. It is possible for people to maintain a liberal view of domestic programs to aid the poor, while maintaining a conservative view of the threat of communism. Understanding a person's claim that he or she is a liberal or conservative, therefore, requires consideration of two or more dimensions, not a single evaluation (Conover and Feldman, 1981).

Dimensions also play an important role in aggregate electoral trends. E. E. Schattschneider (1975) subtitles his account of the realignment of 1932 "A Case Study in the Changing Dimensions of Politics." He maintains that the realignment reflected a shift from a sectional to a national dimension of party conflict. This shift drove the process of realignment.

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An important dynamic to understand, given the importance of dimensions in politics, is the process by which dimensions can be set or changed. How is it that voters come to see candidates as liberal or conservative? How is it that a party succeeds in defining or redefining the central issues of national, regional, or local politics? In a different context, how is it that elected or appointed officials come to view, or at least choose to describe, a particular policy in terms of a particular dimension or set of dimensions?

William Riker's recent work on "heresthetic" (1986) offers one account of this process. Heresthetic is a term Riker coins to identify an underdeveloped "liberal art . . . of language" (1986, p. x). Riker distinguishes heresthetic from the other, widely recognized liberal arts of language by focusing on the central concern of each art. "Logic is concerned with the truth-value of sentences. Grammar is concerned with the communications-value of sentences. Rhetoric is concerned with the persuasion-value of sentences. And heresthetic is concerned with the strategy-value of sentences. In each case, the art involves the use of language to accomplish some purpose: to arrive at truth, to communicate, to persuade, and to manipulate" (1986, p. x).

This essay is intended to examine the relationship between manipulation of dimension, as a form of heresthetical art, and persuasion, or rhetoric. According to Riker, manipulation of dimension is distinct from persuasion in that it is concerned not with changing individuals' beliefs but with maneuvering them into choices that are the ones the manipulator desires. The force that drives a change of dimension is, first, the choice of an actor to identify a particular dimension as important to a decision and, second, the induced response of other actors to this identification. The heresthetical act of fixing or changing dimension has, by Riker's account, a deterministic, or nearly deterministic, effect on the decision process.

The purpose of this essay is to develop a conceptual account of the interplay of manipulator, target of manipulation, and audience that will clarify the nature of the relationship between heresthetical moves to manipulate dimensions and the response of the targets of manipulation. In general, the approach is to modify, rather than to repudiate, the heresthetic approach to dimensions. This clarification will follow two lines. First, it will be argued that succumbing to an attempted manipulation of dimensions is a matter of belief. This argument challenges Riker's insistence on the nonpersuasive character of heresthetical maneuvers. Successful manipulation of dimensions will be seen as implicating successful persuasion of the targeted actors. These actors are not persuaded that the proposed dimension should be considered in making the decision (as they would be by a rhetorician). Instead, they are persuaded that the manipulated dimension creates the potential for loss or gain, which the targeted actors are likely to experience because that dimension has been invoked.

Second, the force of a heresthetical maneuver will be defined in terms of an audience that may be persuaded to accept the proposed dimension as salient and that is a potential witness to the statements and the actions of the actors who are the targets of manipulation. While audiences are mentioned, and at times discussed in some detail, in his manipulation of dimension "stories," Riker does not develop a careful account of their role in the process of manipulation. It will be argued here that it is the putative existence of such an audience that gives to manipulation of dimensions, as an activity distinct from persuasion, its motive force. Successful manipulation of dimension, therefore, involves persuasion as well as strategic positioning.

MANIPULATION OF DIMENSIONS

Of the three heresthetical devices identified by Riker,¹ "manipulation of dimensions is just about the most frequently attempted" (1986, p. 150). It is a distinct strategy in that it occurs prior to any actual collective decision (unlike strategic voting) and is concerned with how one thinks about a decision, rather than the order in which decisions are to be made (unlike agenda control).

To manipulate dimensions, one must know something of the distribution of preferences along the various dimensions that are available. Before Abraham Lincoln could formulate his question to Stephen Douglas, "Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits prior to the formation of a state constitution?" (Riker, 1986, pp. 1-2), he had to know that the Democratic party was sorely divided on this issue and was divided differently than on other dimensions, dimensions more favorable to Douglas' senatorial and presidential aspirations. Douglas was an influential and well-respected Democrat and future presidential candidate. Dividing the Democratic party (which, at the time, was the dominant party in national politics) may have seemed the only way to create an opportunity for the newly formed Republican party to win the presidential election. Knowing Douglas' prominence and the distribution of opinion on slavery among Democrats, Lincoln was able to devise a heresthetical maneuver that effectively undermined the presidential front-runner and divided the majority party.

What distinguishes manipulation of dimensions from rhetorical efforts to persuade is the role of the target's beliefs about the issue. The goal of rhetoric is to change the target's mind, to cause the target to see his or her position as incorrect and the speaker's position as correct. The goal of manipulation of dimensions is to force the target to choose among alternatives chosen by the manipulator; that choice puts the manipulator in a position of strategic advantage. One does not seek to change the target's belief about these alterna-

¹ Strategic voting, agenda control, and manipulation of dimensions

tives, merely to make the target choose from a constrained position. This goal is achieved either by consistently reasserting the salience of some already acknowledged dimension (to the exclusion of other dimensions) or by introducing to the political discourse new dimensions that undermine existing coalitions by requiring some decision makers to reexamine their position from the perspective of the new dimension(s).

Manipulation of dimensions involves focusing individuals' evaluations of alternatives on one or more dimensions that divide opinion so that the manipulator's preferred alternative stands a better chance of selection than it would if other dimensions were considered. According to Riker, the key move is the introduction of the dimension. Once introduced, the manipulation takes on a life of its own. "This manipulation works even though those who are manipulated know they are being manipulated because, once a salient dimension is revealed, its salience exists regardless of one's attitude toward it. It may be that this is why the manipulation of dimensions is the preferred heresthetical maneuver; once performed it does its work without further exertion by the heresthetician" (1986, p. 151).

A central assumption of this claim is that dimensions have salience. Salient dimensions are revealed, not created. Once revealed, they cannot be ignored. Thus, when Lincoln raised the slavery issue in the 1858 senatorial campaign in Illinois, Douglas could not ignore it because it was salient. Lincoln's role was to unveil the dimension; it was the dimension's inherent salience that did the work.

While it may be impossible to ignore the relevance of slavery to an election for national office in 1858, one wonders whether all decisions have some set of salient dimensions that, once revealed, must be accepted. What is it that determines the salience of a dimension?

Three possibilities suggest themselves. First, simply invoking a dimension in discourse with or among decision makers may give it salience. Second, it may be that there is an objective relationship between each potential decision and a set of dimensions. Third, the salience of a dimension may depend upon the beliefs of the decision makers. One way to adjudicate between these alternatives is to consider a metaphor for politics that is, at least in some senses, a simplified environment in which to examine salience and manipulation of dimensions. Chess offers such a metaphor. Within that metaphor, the move known as "the fork" seems to correspond to manipulation of dimensions in political decision making.

THE FORK

The idea of the fork is that one places one's piece such that a new threat emerges to two or more of the opponent's pieces simultaneously, while the threatening pieces remain relatively secure from attack. The fork is like ma-

nipulation of dimensions in that it directs the opponent's attention to a specific "dimension" of the chess conflict, namely, the threatened pieces and the piece making the threat. This shift of attention is along lines that are favorable to the attacker and typically detrimental to the opponent's objectives, just as a manipulation-of-dimensions move places the political choice in a more favorable light from the manipulator's perspective. The fork, like manipulation of dimensions, forces the opponent to choose from among specific alternatives: which of two or more pieces does the opponent wish to lose?

The fork can be employed with a variety of intents. One may simply wish to capture some of the opponent's principal pieces, without any particular preference as to which piece one captures. The more careful player, however, seeks to capture a specific piece, to clear a specific area of the board in preparation for an attack, or to reduce the direct protection of the king (or, conversely, the impending assault on one's own king). In these instances, the fork must be carefully devised, not simply to place some of the opponent's pieces at risk but to permit one to capture the specific piece desired.

Determining how to set up such a fork requires one to know, or at least to be able with reasonable accuracy to estimate, the relative value of the pieces to be "forked." Two cases seem very clear-cut, namely, those of the king and the queen. One does not have the option of allowing one's king to be taken, as this would end the game.² Consequently, any fork that threatens the king will force the opponent to respond to that threat, regardless of the other pieces threatened. Similarly, one would have a reasonably high degree of confidence that an opponent would not sacrifice a queen to save another piece, given the power of the queen.

In these two instances, predicting the direction of the opponent's response would be relatively easy; there seems to be something of an objective relationship between the objects (king and queen) and their values.³ One might also be reasonably confident that one could estimate the relative value of all other pieces. Conventionally (for good reason), the order of importance of the remaining pieces is rook, bishop, knight, and pawn. Assuming that the opponent will follow this conventional scale, one could predict the direction of response to any well-constructed fork involving two different types of pieces.

But players do not always value the pieces according to rule. Some simply have a preference for a particular type of piece. Others may have a strategy in the game in question that requires the use of a piece that is threatened. And there is always the possibility that the opponent has an unseen strategy

² One assumes, of course, that chess players seek their own advantage within the rules of the game rather than pursuing other objectives (e.g., to make one's opponent feel good by letting him or her win). Similar egoistic assumptions typically underlie rational choice accounts of political behavior.

³ This is not to suggest that one would always be able to predict the opponent's response to the threat. As chess players know, there are often a number of possible responses to a fork, not all of which necessarily result in the loss of one of the threatened pieces.

for which one of the threatened pieces is a decoy, the result, predicting the response of the opponent to a fork will not be without difficulty, especially in some circumstances and with some players. More difficult still will be predicting the response to a fork that is threatening two pieces of the same type.

This set of confounding factors also complicates any account of the source of a threat's salience. In one sense, one cannot say that a threat to any pieces, even two pawns, is without salience, if by salience one means absolute cost. Any move that creates a fork, therefore, reveals a new and salient dimension to be considered by the decision maker.⁴

It may be more useful, however, to think of salience in terms of thresholds. Some moves are so subtle that the threat is not discerned (and this too can be a tactic). Others involve pieces of so little value, in the context of a specific game, that the opponent does not consider their loss in choosing among alternatives, except to discount their cost initially. In these terms, salience is not established by revealing either a new dimension or (at least directly) an objective relationship between the dimension and the choice to be made; the opponent's view of the context, the objectives, and the costs and benefits mediates the effect of any attempt to manipulate dimensions.

The mediating role of the opponent's vantage point and beliefs makes the setting of an effective fork more difficult. Any given move may not, in fact, create a complex threat in the opponent's mind. When this consideration is added to the uncertainty of the opponent's response, if the threat does achieve salience, the prediction of the effects of alternative forks becomes quite difficult.

While predicting the response may be difficult, it is essential to the effective use of the fork for many purposes. Unless one wishes simply to capture one of the opponent's pieces, without preference as to which piece, one must be able with reasonable accuracy to anticipate how the opponent will respond to the threat. Similarly, if one wishes to redirect the opponent's attention to the threat posed by the fork, and away from other aspects of the game, one must be able to choose a move that will achieve salience from among those that will not. To do this, one might utilize information about conventional values, the opponent's playing history (in this game and other games), the emergent strategy the opponent appears to be playing, and even nonverbal and verbal cues given off by the opponent.

The central issue in this process is the need to be able to assess the opponent's view of the game. A knowledge of his or her beliefs about the value of pieces in the particular contest will resolve most of the uncertainties surrounding the opponent's likely response to a fork. Assessments of piece value

⁴ One might claim that this is not a process of revealing but of creating. I think it is reasonable to speak of revealing threats, since the threat was implicit in the earlier position of pieces on the board. This is why chess is a game that must be played, mentally, many moves ahead. The analogy may, in fact, be all the more fitting for the great number of potential threats, one suspects that most political decisions could be evaluated along many different potential dimensions.

The simple linkage hypothesis, as stated earlier, is that where the mass public is more intolerant, state public policy is more repressive. Though the hypothesis is simple, deriving measures of mass intolerance is by no means uncomplicated. Indeed, the study of state politics continually confronts the difficulty of measuring public opinion at the state level. Though there are five general alternatives,⁸ the only viable option for estimating state-level intolerance during the Vietnam War era is to aggregate national surveys by state.

The source of the opinion data used to estimate state opinion is a survey conducted in 1973 by Nunn, Crockett, and Williams. This survey was a replication of the famous Stouffer survey of intolerance, conducted during the McCarthy era. The Stouffer survey is widely regarded as the classic study that initiated inquiry into the political tolerance of elites and masses (even though earlier studies exist—e.g., Hyman and Sheatsley, 1953). The Nunn, Crockett, and Williams survey was based on a representative sample of the mass public and a systematically selected sample of elites.⁹ Both the 1954 and the 1973 surveys used unusually large sample sizes.

Political intolerance is measured through a multi-item scale.¹⁰ Nunn,

⁸ First, individual state-level surveys can be conducted (e.g., the Comparative State Elections Project, Black, Kovenock, and Reynolds, 1974; Wright, 1974). Second, national surveys can be aggregated by state or constituencies (e.g., Miller and Stokes, 1984; Erikson, 1976). Third, state-level opinion can be simulated on the basis of national survey data and full population data (e.g., census data) for each state (e.g., Weber and Shaffer, 1972; Weber, Hopkins, Mezey, and Munger, 1972; Sutton and Wilson, 1978). Fourth, a series of national surveys can be pooled and then aggregated by state (e.g., Wright, Erikson, and McIver, 1983). Finally, surrogates for public opinion have been derived (e.g., referendum voting, Kuklinski and Stanga, 1979; contributions to the United Way, Plotnick and Winters, 1985). Each of these approaches has its own difficulties and limitations.

⁹ They defined elites as those who held certain positions of influence and potential influence in local politics. Their elite sample was drawn from those holding the following positions: Community Chest chairmen, school board presidents, library committee chairmen, Republican county chairmen, Democratic county chairmen, American Legion commanders, Bar Association presidents, Chamber of Commerce presidents, P.T.A. presidents, presidents of the League of Women Voters, police chiefs, newspaper publishers, and labor union leaders. In one sense, these leaders constitute a population rather than a sample: an attempt was made to interview all individuals holding specific positions of leadership in cities with populations between 10,000 and 150,000. In another sense, however, they are a sample, because the ninety-one cities were sampled from a larger sampling frame with 300 locations. The selection of the cities and respondents was highly rigorous; for details, see Nunn, Crockett, and Williams, 1977, pp. 196–90. It should be noted that these are nongovernmental elites. Missing from this analysis are data on the levels of political tolerance of the members of the state government.

¹⁰ I have chosen to use a measure of general political intolerance in this analysis rather than the responses to specific items about protesters on campus. This decision is predicated upon the belief that political intolerance is a generalized, enduring attitude, most likely strongly rooted in personality attributes (e.g., Sullivan, et al., 1985), rather than an ephemeral opinion on the particular issue of the day. Attitudes can serve as a "standing decision," instructing representatives, while opinions on most issues are difficult for policy makers to discern. The use of a broad-based index rather than a few discrete items also reduces measurement error. Moreover, there

Crockett, and Williams created a six-point index to indicate political intolerance (see Stouffer, 1955, appendix C, pp. 262-69; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams, 1978, pp. 179-91). The scale is a Guttman scale based on the responses to fifteen items concerning support for the civil liberties of Communists, socialists, and atheists. The items meet conventional standards of scalability and are widely used today as indicators of political tolerance (e.g., Davis, 1975; McCutcheon, 1985; General Social Survey, conducted annually). Given the mix of activities and groups involved in these fifteen items, this index properly stands as a generalized measure of political tolerance.¹¹

The process of aggregating these tolerance scores by state is fraught with difficulty. A variety of statistical tests was conducted in an attempt to determine the magnitude of the aggregation error (see appendix). Since the results of these tests were quite encouraging, the tolerance scores were aggregated by state of residence of the respondent to create summary indicators of the level of intolerance in each of the states.¹² Table 2 reports the means standard

is a moderately strong relationship between opinions toward radical students and the more general measure of intolerance. A final advantage of this approach is that it allows direct comparison with data from Stouffer's survey of the 1950s, which is useful in assessing aggregation error (see appendix). It should be noted that none of the findings reported here is altered in any substantive way if the more discrete measures of opinion are used.

¹¹ The Stouffer measures of tolerance have recently been criticized by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982). Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of this criticism is the assertion that the Stouffer items measure tolerance only for a specific group and thus are not generalizable. Because Stouffer was only concerned about intolerance of Communists, his findings may be time bound as the objects of mass displeasure evolve: the Communist-based approach to tolerance becomes less relevant and useful. This difficulty does not affect the analysis of opinion from the 1950s because Communists were probably a major disliked group for nearly all Americans in the survey. It may be considered, however, whether the measures are also valid for the early 1970s. Several factors suggest that they may be. First, most dissent during the 1960s and early 1970s came from the political left. Right-wing targets of intolerance did not become prominent until the late 1970s. Second, the Stouffer items, at least with an elite group and as supplemented by a demonstrations item, performed reasonably well in comparison to other, more sophisticated measures of intolerance (Gibson and Bingham, 1982). Third, I have shown elsewhere (Gibson, 1986) that there are a variety of limitations to the Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus measure and analysis. Finally, even if directed against a specific group, the measures are not hopeless. According to the Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus conceptualization of the problem, all of those giving an intolerant response to the Communist stimulus are providing valid data. Of those giving a tolerant response, some portion would give an intolerant answer were their disfavored group given as the stimulus, while the other portion would give a tolerant response under all circumstances. Thus, the amount of measurement error in the Stouffer items is directly a function of the size of the group that would not repress Communists but that would repress others. This group is not very large (see McCutcheon, 1985). Thus, the amount of measurement error is not great and it is legitimate to use Stouffer's scale as a measure of general political intolerance.

¹² State of residence is not in the original Nunn, Crockett, and Williams data set. The variable was supplied to me by Response Analysis, the firm that conducted the survey.

TABLE 2
STATE MEAN INTOLERANCE SCORES:
NUNN, CROCKETT, AND WILLIAMS, 1973

State*	Mass Public			Number of Primary Sampling Units	Elites		
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Number of Cases		Mean	Standard Deviation	Number of Cases
Wisconsin	5.19	1.34	13	1	5.09	1.38	11
Colorado	5.15	1.14	38	4	5.43	1.51	7
California	5.05	1.35	317	21	5.57	.94	61
Washington	5.03	1.24	123	11	5.25	1.36	12
Utah	5.01	1.38	59	4	5.14	1.07	7
Michigan	4.97	1.26	105	8	6.00	.00	13
Massachusetts	4.89	1.31	121	11	5.45	1.16	60
Virginia	4.86	1.31	59	5	5.60	.84	10
Vermont	4.86	1.61	50	4	5.50	.94	14
New York	4.85	1.46	282	19	5.28	1.28	32
Illinois	4.71	1.52	202	21	5.14	1.27	57
New Jersey	4.69	1.51	191	14	5.57	.82	75
Montana	4.67	1.21	20	1	—	—	—
Oregon	4.63	1.50	25	2	5.71	1.07	14
Idaho	4.60	1.51	63	2	—	—	—
Florida	4.58	1.58	126	8	5.67	.71	9
Maryland	4.57	1.59	36	4	5.40	.84	10
Pennsylvania	4.54	1.53	173	13	5.43	1.13	7
Oklahoma	4.53	1.72	35	3	5.64	.92	11
Ohio	4.44	1.53	247	23	5.46	.96	57
Minnesota	4.28	1.36	57	4	—	—	—
Missouri	4.24	1.60	127	9	5.64	.57	25
Texas	4.21	1.69	172	13	4.90	1.33	52
Kansas	3.97	1.81	130	8	4.57	1.27	7
Indiana	3.96	1.59	76	6	5.30	1.09	20
North Carolina	3.54	1.69	181	12	5.16	1.31	25
Georgia	3.74	1.47	68	6	—	—	—
Tennessee	3.56	1.71	106	7	6.00	.00	7
Louisiana	3.42	1.46	90	7	4.71	1.99	7
Mississippi	3.37	1.25	24	2	—	—	—
Alabama	3.25	1.75	93	8	5.57	.53	7
South Carolina	3.15	1.60	95	7	4.92	1.50	13
Arkansas	2.99	1.50	15	1	4.50	1.64	6
Connecticut	2.88	0.94	14	2	5.00	1.35	13
Wyoming	2.69	1.70	50	3	—	—	—
Average	4.27	1.49	102	8	5.33	1.06	22

*States not listed were not included in the sample.

deviations, and numbers of cases and primary sampling units (PSUs) for this tolerance scale for the states. The means serve as the measure of mass political intolerance.

Aggregating the elite interviews to the state level is in one sense more perilous and in another sense less perilous. With a considerably small number of subjects ($N = 649$), the means become more unstable. However, the aggregation is not done for the purpose of estimating some sort of elite population parameter. The elites selected were in no sense a random sample of state elites, therefore, it makes little sense to try to make inferences from the sample to some larger elite population. Instead, the elite samples represent only themselves. Table 2 also reports the state means and numbers of cases for the elites in the Nunn, Crockett, and Williams survey.

There is a moderate relationship between elite and mass opinion in the state ($r = .43$; $N = 29$).¹³ To the extent that we would expect elite and mass opinion in the states to covary, this correlation serves to validate the aggregate measures of opinion. The substantive implications of this correlation are considered below.

THE EFFECT OF CAMPUS DISTURBANCES ON STATE POLICIES

Before considering the relationship of elite and mass opinion to the adoption of repressive public policies, it is fruitful to consider whether the state legislatures were responding to actual disturbances on campuses within the state. My earlier research has shown that the adoption of repressive policies during the McCarthy era was clearly not related to the magnitude of the Communist menace within the state. Perhaps the policy responses of the late 1960s and early 1970s were quite different; perhaps they were a direct response to protest and unrest on the campuses. If so, then it will be important to control for the frequency of unrest in considering the impact of opinion on policy.

Data on the frequency of campus disorders are available from a study conducted for the U. S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations (1969). The study enumerated and described each campus riot or disorder occurring from October 1967 to May 1969. I hypothesize that states experiencing more frequent disorders were more likely to adopt legislation restricting campus protest.

Efforts to quell campus dissent were, in fact, strongly related to the frequency of actual disorders. The correlation between campus repression and the number of campus disturbances in the state is .48 ($N = 50$).¹⁴ Where there

¹³ By imposing a ten elite respondent minimum per state, the correlation rises to .58 ($N = 20$).

¹⁴ The number-of-disturbances variable was recoded to bring in the two extreme outliers of New York and California. Because the skewness in the distribution was due only to these two outliers, their scores were recoded to a score equal to the highest of the remaining scores plus the difference between this highest score and the next lowest score. This technique is recommended by Rummel, 1970, p. 282. A related variable was considered — the number of campuses affected by disturbances — but it is too strongly correlated with the number-of-disturbances variable to be useful.

were more disturbances, there was greater legislative response. Thus, to some degree, the legislative interference in campus affairs was a direct result of threats to the political status quo as a result of disorders on campus.¹⁵ But to what extent were these disturbances the catalyst for the mobilization of political intolerance?

THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL INTOLERANCE ON STATE POLICIES

Figure 1 reports the bivariate relationships among mass and elite political tolerance and the adoption of restrictive public policies by the American states during the Vietnam era. The relationships are not at all as predicted. Where mass opinion was more *tolerant*, public policy was more *repressive*. The relationship is moderately strong. At the same time, there is a weaker relationship between elite opinion and policy, but it is still in the wrong direction. Interference in campus affairs seems not to have stemmed directly from either mass or elite opinion. Thus, we are confronted with a paradox: even in the states with more repressive mass and elite opinion in the 1970s, there was not more political repression than in states with less repressive opinion. This paradox requires explanation.¹⁶

The frequency of disturbances on campuses is related to both mass political tolerance ($r = .41$) and mass liberalism-conservatism ($r = -.49$).¹⁷ Disturbances were more likely to occur in more tolerant states and in more liberal states. Together these variables can account for nearly one-third of the variance in the frequency of disturbances.¹⁸ This finding provides a clue to understanding the relationship between tolerance and repression.

It is not difficult to explain why political liberalism is associated with dissent, since the Vietnam War was more strongly opposed by liberals than by

¹⁵ An additional 10 percent of the variance in the policy measure can be explained by adding a quadratic term to the simple policy-disturbances equation. This means that when there were a large number of disturbances, their effect on policy was especially substantial.


¹⁶ Even the relationship between the responses to discrete, directly relevant items and campus repression is in the wrong direction. For instance, the correlation between the percentage of the state mass sample supporting the firing of suspected Communists teaching in universities and campus repression is $-.35$, indicating that where there was more support for firing Communist professors there was less repression on the campuses. Similarly, where citizens perceived a greater threat from radical college students, there tended to be less political repression.

¹⁷ The measure of mass conservatism in the state is taken from Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1985). The measure is based on the aggregation of a large number of telephone surveys conducted between 1976 and 1982. The question aggregated is the ideological self-identification of the respondent.

¹⁸ The addition of elite tolerance and elite conservatism to the equation results in little additional increment in R^2 . (For the measure of elite opinion, see Erikson, Wright, and McIver, 1987). Because elite and mass liberalism are so strongly correlated, substantial multicollinearity is introduced when elite opinion is added. While I have chosen to focus on mass opinion, it might be more properly said that the climate of opinion created by both mass and elite opinion within the state contributed to campus unrest.

FIGURE 1

THE SIMPLE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG OPINION AND POLICY



NOTE: ENTRIES ARE BIVARIATE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

conservatives. Dissent is also more likely among those who are more tolerant. Tolerance involves the recognition of the legitimacy of different points of view and the appropriateness of widespread political competition. Students attending college in more liberal and more tolerant states were exposed to a climate of opinion that not only was opposed to the policies of the government but also was supportive of citizen efforts to challenge those policies. Thus, liberalism and tolerance both contributed to dissent.¹⁹

¹⁹ Eisinger (1973) observed much the same thing in his analysis of protest behavior in American cities. It was the very openness of the local political system that seemed to encourage protest. Since more open systems tend to be more responsive, openness reinforces the efficacy of protest behavior. In closed political systems the process was quite different. "Not only is protest likely to be an inadequate tactic for enhancing political opportunities in a closed system but it is not likely to be tolerated. Protest will not flourish where its use finds neither tolerance nor elicits favorable responses" (Eisinger, 1973, p. 28).

A host of research has focused on the microlevel origins of student protest behavior—see, for example, Clarke and Egan (1972). For aggregate analyses of protest behavior, see Eisinger (1973, 1973) and Gamson (1975). A more current consideration of the problem can be found in Muller and Opp (1986).

At the same time, more liberal and more tolerant states engaged in more repression of campus dissent. This is the puzzling finding. A portion of the explanation is that restrictions on campus protest were unlikely to occur without the stimulus of disruptions, and disruptions were more common in liberal and tolerant states. It must be remembered, however, that repression during the McCarthy era was just as common in states with no significant Communist presence as it was in states with substantial party membership (Gibson, 1988). Disruptions are obviously not a necessary condition for repression.

Perhaps some of the campus disruptions simply went too far, threatening even those who were liberal and tolerant. At some point, this may have caused the legislatures to crack down on dissent, adopting repressive legislation. Perhaps this was done because even in the most tolerant and liberal states there could be found a significant minority of more conservative and more intolerant citizens. In states overwhelmingly tolerant, the response would not have been repressive. In states overwhelmingly intolerant, there was no initial permissiveness that allowed or encouraged the dissent in the first place. But in states with a moderate degree of tolerance, that is, mixed tolerance and intolerance, the tolerance contributed to the dissent, but the intolerance contributed to the repression. At low levels of tolerance, repression is unnecessary because the intolerance preempts dissent. As tolerance increases, the likelihood of repression increases as well, because moderate tolerance creates the conditions necessary for dissent and protest to begin, but it is not so strong as to protect dissent that "gets out of hand." Political tolerance in the United States knows limits; when those limits are reached, important segments of the elite become threatened and mobilized, resulting in political repression. Only in the most tolerant states is the reaction to dissent restrained and unlikely to result in political repression. Few if any of the American states reach this level of tolerance.²⁰

Some support for this assertion can be found in the relationship between the size of the American Legion chapter in the state and the extent of political repression ($r = .41$). Where there were more Legionnaires, the legislative response to campus disruptions was more repressive. When dissent "goes too

²⁰ This hypothesis is best assessed with a quadratic equation. When policy is regressed on tolerance and the square of tolerance we do in fact see some hint of a curvilinear relationship. The equation is

$$\text{Policy} = -13.1 + 5.9 (\text{Tolerance}) - 0.6 (\text{Tolerance}^2)$$

This indicates that at the very highest levels of tolerance, policy becomes less repressive. However, in these data, the quadratic equation is only marginally (and not significantly) superior to the linear equation. I suspect that this is in part a function of the fact that few states reach the level of extreme tolerance, and thus there are few observations on which the quadratic equation can capitalize. This is a common problem of empirical research: it is difficult to test the functional form of relationships when empirical observations across the full range of variability are not available within a particular sample.

far," conservative and intolerant segments of the population mobilize, "forcing" legislators to take action. This process seems to occur even in the states that are the most tolerant and the most liberal.

These processes can be more fully understood with the aid of multivariate analysis. Though the limited number of cases (i.e., states) means that the coefficients are somewhat unstable, the multivariate analysis can provide greater insight into the origins of public policy. Table 3 reports the results of this analysis.

First, we see that the simple model involving mass tolerance, mass liberalism, the frequency of disturbances, and the strength of the American Legion does a reasonably good job of explaining the variance in state public policy. Nearly one-half of the variance can be accounted for by the four variables. Policy was more repressive in more liberal and more tolerant states and where disturbances were more common. Though the impact of the American Legion is diminished in the multivariate analysis, the conclusions of the bivariate analysis are supported generally.

Table 3 also reports the interactive effect of disturbances with mass political intolerance and the strength of the American Legion. I hypothesize a conditional relationship between the frequency of disturbances and mass intolerance. As the number of disturbances increases, the effect of mass political intolerance is expected to change rather significantly. Where there are few disturbances, tolerance is expected to be positively associated with repression. However, where there are many disturbances, tolerance is expected to be negatively associated with repression. The coefficients in table 3 support this hypothesis.²¹ Moreover, in states with a greater-than-average number of campus disturbances, the relationship between mass tolerance and repression is $- .22$; in states with fewer-than-average disturbances, the coefficient is $.41$. Though the data are too limited to support fully the conclusion, it appears that political tolerance contributes both to repression—through implicit support for protest, which generates repression when protest goes too far—and to policy tolerance before protest becomes too widespread.

We also see in table 3 evidence that the impact of the American Legion is conditional upon the frequency of disturbances.²² Where there are few campus disruptions, the effect of the Legion is substantial. However, as disturbances become more common, the effect of the Legion declines. Perhaps this is a function of the changing salience of public policy. Before the issue becomes salient in the state, activist interest groups can have some influence

²¹ Though the coefficient is not statistically significant and though the increment in explained variance does not quite attain significance, I interpret this coefficient as substantively significant. As I argued above, the small number of highly tolerant states results in a bias against the conditional hypothesis.

²² Not only is the interactive coefficient significant, but also the increment in explained variance is 0.10 , which is highly significant.

TABLE 3
A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF STATE POLICY
REGARDING DISSENT ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES

	Impact on Policy Repression			
	Linear Model		Interactive Model	
	<i>b</i>	β	<i>b</i>	β
Linear Terms				
Mass Political Tolerance	0.80	0.36*	1.13	0.51*
Frequency of Campus Disturbances	0.09	0.43**	0.53	2.47
Strength of the American Legion	0.00	0.16	0.00	0.67**
Mass Opinion Liberalism-Conservatism	9.39	0.47*	9.55	0.48*
R^2	.44			
Interactive Terms				
Tolerance \times Disturbances	—	—	-0.07	-1.09
Legion Strength \times Disturbances	—	—	0.00	-0.94*
R^2	.56			

Note: $N = 35$

* $p < .05$; ** $10 < p < .05$

over state legislatures. As campus protest became more salient, the issue permeated mass consciousness, and the influence of specialized interest groups like the American Legion declined. Ironically, the impact of the American Legion seems to have been to have aided the spread of repression to those states with relatively few campus disruptions.

These findings stand in sharp contrast to my earlier findings on the origins of repression during the McCarthy era. During the McCarthy Red Scare, there was a modest relationship between elite and mass opinion and repressive public policy. In states in which the mass public was more intolerant, there tended to be greater political repression. The relationship was somewhat stronger between elite opinion and repression. Multivariate analysis revealed that it was elite opinion that most influenced public policy; the beta for mass opinion was $-.06$; for elite opinion it was $-.35$. Thus, political repression occurred in states with relatively intolerant elites. The preferences of the mass public seemed to have mattered very little beyond the intolerance of elites.

The origin of political repression during the McCarthy era was quite different than the origin of efforts to stem campus dissent during the Vietnam era. This may be due in part to the generally greater tolerance of Americans during the early 1970s. Over the two decades between the surveys, there was

a considerable increase in political tolerance. Indeed, applying the Stouffer/Nunn, Crockett, and Williams scheme for categorizing the tolerance scale, nineteen states can be considered to have had relatively tolerant mass publics in the early 1970s, while none of the states qualified during the 1950s. As a result of the increase in political tolerance, the climate of mass public opinion strongly supportive of political repression during the 1950s dissipated in the early 1970s.²³

The repression of the McCarthy era was also largely symbolic, having little to do with local protest movements (see Gibson, 1988). Where Communists were stronger, repression was not more severe. There was little need for a measure of tolerance to initiate dissent as a precursor to repression. Since the threat of Communism was largely an external threat with few local manifestations in most states, the threat could be perceived in tolerant and intolerant states alike. The protest of the Vietnam era was quite different, more real and more local, and less symbolic and external. Thus, these episodes seem to reflect quite different origins.

DISCUSSION

What do these findings tell us about the relationship between opinion and policy? Perhaps the simplest conclusion is that the relationship is far from simple and direct. Elsewhere I have argued that while mass political intolerance may not have been responsible for repressive state policies during the McCarthy era, mass opinion did set broad constraints on the behavior of policy-making elites (Gibson, 1988). Here we see that, while opinion did not directly shape public policy, it did seem to establish a climate conducive to dissent on campus. In a dialectical sort of way, political tolerance planted the seeds of repression by legitimizing dissent. Thus, we see that the origins of repressive policy in the American states are much more complicated than had been hypothesized by the elitist theory of democracy. Mass political tolerance does play a role in the process, but it is much different than the role envisaged by the elitist theory.

At the same time, it is important to consider how these findings comport with other analyses of the opinion-policy linkage process. For instance, Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1987) have recently shown that public policy in general in the American states strongly reflects state public opinion. Using a survey-based measure of liberalism-conservatism self-identification and a measure of general policy liberalism based on public policies in eight different areas, they observe correlations exceeding .80 between opinion and policy. Why would policy in general reflect opinion within the state, while public policy on campus unrest was not directly affected by opinion?

²³ For an analysis of change in opinion at the microlevel, see Davis (1975). For a contrary point of view, see Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus (1982).

One possibility is that tolerance and liberalism are not isomorphic. Even if there is some tendency at the microlevel for those who are more liberal to be more tolerant (e.g., McClosky and Brill, 1983), there is no necessary relationship between the two concepts. One can easily imagine that conservatives—those who oppose redistributive public policies—are as strongly committed to democratic values as are liberals. And, as we have seen, a number of states that are generally thought to be liberal took severe actions against university protest. This leads to the interesting hypothesis that, while political conflict that is easily subsumed under the traditional liberal-conservative cleavage may well reflect the basic values of the citizens of the state, policies that crosscut this dimension are susceptible to influence from other political forces.

What conclusions about the elitist theory of democracy and the theory of pluralistic intolerance does this analysis support? Most important, I have discovered little evidence that political repression in the United States stems from demands from ordinary citizens to curtail the rights and activities of unpopular political minorities. The finding is not predicted by the elitist theory of democracy. Nor are these findings necessarily compatible with the theory of pluralistic intolerance. Though political intolerance in the 1950s was widespread and highly focused, there seems to have been little direct effect of mass opinion on public policy. The evidence is even stronger that mass opinion did not determine public policy during the Vietnam era, even though radical college students were probably a target group for a large number of Americans.²⁴ Like the elitist theory of democracy, the theory of pluralistic intolerance places too much emphasis on mass opinion as a determinant of public policy.

At the same time, however, public opinion may not be completely irrelevant. Tolerance opinion, in both the 1950s and the 1970s, strongly reflects the political cultures of the states, and, at least in the 1950s, political culture was significantly related to levels of political repression. Opinion is important in the policy process because it delimits the range of acceptable policy alternatives. It may well be that mass opinion is manipulated and shaped by elites; nonetheless, those who would propose repressive policies in California face a very different set of political constraints than those faced by supporters of repressive policies in Arkansas. This is not to say that repression is impossible in tolerant states—indeed, California was one of the most repressive states during the Vietnam era—but rather that the task of gaining acceptance for repression is different under differing cultural contexts.

Finally, I should note that the basic causal direction in the linkage process may need to be reversed. Opinion may not cause policy; instead, it may reflect

²⁴ A Gallup poll in 1969 reported that 82 percent of a national sample believed that college students who break laws while participating in college demonstrations should be expelled, while 84 percent believed that such students should have their federal loans taken away. *New York Times*, March 13, 1969, p. 38.

policy. Perhaps one reason why we so often observe so much intolerance in the United States is that the American people have learned from their leaders that the appropriate response to threatening disruptions from unpopular political minorities is repression. Indeed, given the regularity with which the United States has repressed dissent throughout its history (e.g., Goldstein, 1978), it would be extraordinary if citizens did not learn the lessons of intolerance. In the final analysis, there is probably a reciprocal relationship between opinion and policy, each reinforcing one another, and each contributing to a culture of political conformity.

For over three decades now political scientists have systematically studied public policy and public opinion. Significant advances have been made in understanding many sorts of state policy outputs, and we have developed a wealth of information about political tolerance. To date, however, little attention has been given to repression as a policy output, and even less attention has been devoted to behavioral and policy implications of tolerance attitudes. The failure to investigate the linkage between opinion and policy is all the more significant because one of the most widely accepted theories in political science—the elitist theory of democracy—was developed on the basis of an assumed linkage between opinion and policy. I hope that this research, though only a crude beginning, will serve as an early step in continuing research into these important problems of democracy.

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APPENDIX

THE VALIDITY OF STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF POLITICAL INTOLERANCE

Since the Nunn, Crockett, and Williams survey was not designed to be aggregated by state, it is necessary to try to determine whether there is any obvious bias in the state-level estimates. A few empirical tests can be conducted that, while not assuaging all doubts about the aggregation process, may make us somewhat more comfortable about using the state means.

The Nunn, Crockett, and Williams survey was very nearly an exact replication of a survey conducted in 1954 by Samuel Stouffer. In terms of the indicators of tolerance, it was an exact replication. Nunn, Crockett, and Williams were extremely careful to reproduce Stouffer's scaling methodology in creating a summary index of intolerance (Nunn, Crockett, and Williams, 1978, pp. 179–91). Thus, it is possible to aggregate the same scale variable by state and derive a measure of political tolerance for the mid-1950s.

With completely independent samples (including independent sampling frames), one would not expect that there would be much of a correlation between the Stouffer and Nunn, Crockett, and Williams state-level estimates.

Chance fluctuations in the distributions of PSUs would tend to attenuate the correlation between the state-level estimates.²⁵ Yet the correlation between the estimates from the two surveys is a remarkable .63 ($N = 29$). If I were to exclude the 1973 estimate for Connecticut, an estimate that shows that state to be quite intolerant, then the correlation increases to .77 ($N = 28$). It is difficult to imagine an explanation for this correlation other than that it is due to a common correlation of the state means with the true score for the state.²⁶

Another bit of evidence supporting the aggregation process comes from the correlations of tolerance and political culture. The correlation between Elazar's measure of political culture and average state tolerance in the 1970s is $-.58$. Because political cultures have clear implications for political tolerance, this correlation serves to enhance my confidence in the utility of the state-level estimates.

Another very different tack can be taken in estimating the error associated with the aggregation process. I have aggregated the proportion of the respondents having twelve years or more of formal education. These percentages can be compared to census estimates of the level of education in the state.²⁷ The correlation for the 1970s data between the survey and the census estimates of education is a substantial .49 ($N = 35$). While this correlation does not speak directly to the utility of the state-level estimates of tolerance, it does suggest that aggregation from the survey to the state is not completely inappropriate.

The correlation between elite opinion in the 1950s and elite opinion in the 1970s is .25. That the correlation is not higher is a bit worrisome, although it is not difficult to imagine that there is greater flux in elite opinion over the two decades separating the two surveys than there is in mass opinion. Moreover, there were some slight differences in the nature of the elite samples drawn in 1954 and 1973.

²⁵ The average number of PSUs in the Stouffer/NORC survey is 2.3; for the Nunn, Crockett and Williams survey it is 7.8.

²⁶ I have also investigated the relationship between state sample size and number of primary sampling units and aggregation error. I first assumed that differences between the t_1 and t_2 estimates of state opinion were due to aggregation error. The residuals resulting from regressing t_2 opinion on t_1 opinion represent this error. If squared, the residuals represent the total amount of error. The correlations between the squared residuals and t_1 sample size and number of PSUs are $-.30$ and $-.27$. The correlations between the residuals and t_2 sample size and number of PSUs are $-.29$ and $-.29$. These correlations indicate that aggregation error is larger in states in which the number of subjects and number of PSUs is smaller, a not unexpected finding. However, since the relationships are quite modest, they do not undermine the basic aggregation procedure.

²⁷ The comparison is not perfect due to two considerations. First, the census data are themselves population estimates drawn from survey samples. Second, the census reports the percent age of residents over the age of twenty-five with twelve or more years of education. I assume that those with twelve or more years of education have a high school degree, although this might not be true for every single respondent. Moreover, it is not possible to isolate those respondents twenty-five years and older in the Stouffer survey.

As a means of assessing the validity of the aggregation of elite opinion, elite tolerance is compared with other elite attitudes. Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1987) have developed a separate measure of the degree of liberalism of state elites. The measure summarizes the ideological positions of the state's congressional candidates, state legislators, political party elites, and national convention delegates. As an overall index of the liberalism-conservatism of state elites, the average score of the Democrats and the Republicans is taken. Thus, each state receives a score indicating the degree of liberalism-conservatism of state elites. Though most of the indicators are drawn from the 1970s, the authors believe this to be a more stable attribute of state elites. According to their index, the most conservative elites are found in Mississippi, while the most liberal elites are found in Massachusetts.²⁶

The correlation of state elite conservatism and political tolerance is $- .46$ ($r = .26$) for the Stouffer elites and $-.22$ ($N = 29$) for the Nunn, Crockett, and Williams elites. Though liberalism-conservatism is conceptually distinct from political tolerance, some solace can be taken in this correlation. The aggregation process seems not to have introduced unexpected or obviously biased estimates of state-level elite opinion.

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Persuasion, Manipulation, and Dimension

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Manipulation of dimensions, a heresthetic strategy advanced by Riker (1986), is described as a deterministic strategy. The dimensions of a political decision, once established, cannot be ignored. This article explores conceptually the factors that might make it impossible to ignore new or fixed dimensions. Two factors, the existence of an audience that could be persuaded to accept the dimension as relevant and the beliefs of manipulated actors about that audience, are claimed to play an important role in effective manipulation. Potential changes in the audience's support or opposition are the factors the manipulator seeks to affect by controlling the dimensions under consideration. Persuasion thus may play a role in manipulation of dimensions, both by facilitating a change in audience opinion and by influencing other actors' perceptions of audience opinion. Riker's central claim, however, that manipulation of dimensions as a form of heresthetic is distinct from persuasion is supported.

The concept of dimension enters into many discussions of politics and political science research. One of its more important roles may be in facilitating discussion of the complex political landscape. For instance, we now are confident that the traditional liberal-conservative dichotomy masks multiple dimensions of liberalism and conservatism that may or may not interact. It is possible for people to maintain a liberal view of domestic programs to aid the poor, while maintaining a conservative view of the threat of communism. Understanding a person's claim that he or she is a liberal or conservative, therefore, requires consideration of two or more dimensions, not a single evaluation (Conover and Feldman, 1981).

Dimensions also play an important role in aggregate electoral trends. E. E. Schattschneider (1975) subtitles his account of the realignment of 1932 "A Case Study in the Changing Dimensions of Politics." He maintains that the realignment reflected a shift from a sectional to a national dimension of party conflict. This shift drove the process of realignment.

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An important dynamic to understand, given the importance of dimensions in politics, is the process by which dimensions can be set or changed. How is it that voters come to see candidates as liberal or conservative? How is it that a party succeeds in defining or redefining the central issues of national, regional, or local politics? In a different context, how is it that elected or appointed officials come to view, or at least choose to describe, a particular policy in terms of a particular dimension or set of dimensions?

William Riker's recent work on "heresthetic" (1986) offers one account of his process. Heresthetic is a term Riker coins to identify an underdeveloped "liberal art . . . of language" (1986, p. x). Riker distinguishes heresthetic from the other, widely recognized liberal arts of language by focusing on the central concern of each art. "Logic is concerned with the truth-value of sentences. Grammar is concerned with the communications-value of sentences. Rhetoric is concerned with the persuasion-value of sentences. And heresthetic is concerned with the strategy-value of sentences. In each case, the art involves the use of language to accomplish some purpose: to arrive at truth, to communicate, to persuade, and to manipulate" (1986, p. x).

This essay is intended to examine the relationship between manipulation of dimension, as a form of heresthetical art, and persuasion, or rhetoric. According to Riker, manipulation of dimension is distinct from persuasion in that it is concerned not with changing individuals' beliefs but with maneuvering them into choices that are the ones the manipulator desires. The force that drives a change of dimension is, first, the choice of an actor to identify a particular dimension as important to a decision and, second, the induced response of other actors to this identification. The heresthetical act of fixing or changing dimension has, by Riker's account, a deterministic, or nearly deterministic, effect on the decision process.

The purpose of this essay is to develop a conceptual account of the interplay of manipulator, target of manipulation, and audience that will clarify the nature of the relationship between heresthetical moves to manipulate dimensions and the response of the targets of manipulation. In general, the approach is to modify, rather than to repudiate, the heresthetic approach to dimensions. This clarification will follow two lines. First, it will be argued that succumbing to an attempted manipulation of dimensions is a matter of belief. This argument challenges Riker's insistence on the nonpersuasive character of heresthetical maneuvers. Successful manipulation of dimensions will be seen as implicating successful persuasion of the targeted actors. These actors are not persuaded that the proposed dimension should be considered in making the decision (as they would be by a rhetorician). Instead, they are persuaded that the manipulated dimension creates the potential for loss or gain, which the targeted actors are likely to experience because that dimension has been invoked.

nipulation of dimensions in that it directs the opponent's attention to a specific "dimension" of the chess conflict, namely, the threatened pieces and the piece making the threat. This shift of attention is along lines that are favorable to the attacker and typically detrimental to the opponent's objectives, just as a manipulation-of-dimensions move places the political choice in a more favorable light from the manipulator's perspective. The fork, like manipulation of dimensions, forces the opponent to choose from among specific alternatives: which of two or more pieces does the opponent wish to lose?

The fork can be employed with a variety of intents. One may simply wish to capture some of the opponent's principal pieces, without any particular preference as to which piece one captures. The more careful player, however, seeks to capture a specific piece, to clear a specific area of the board in preparation for an attack, or to reduce the direct protection of the king (or, conversely, the impending assault on one's own king). In these instances, the fork must be carefully devised, not simply to place some of the opponent's pieces at risk but to permit one to capture the specific piece desired.

Determining how to set up such a fork requires one to know, or at least to be able with reasonable accuracy to estimate, the relative value of the pieces to be "forked." Two cases seem very clear-cut, namely, those of the king and the queen. One does not have the option of allowing one's king to be taken, as this would end the game.² Consequently, any fork that threatens the king will force the opponent to respond to that threat, regardless of the other pieces threatened. Similarly, one would have a reasonably high degree of confidence that an opponent would not sacrifice a queen to save another piece, given the power of the queen.

In these two instances, predicting the direction of the opponent's response would be relatively easy; there seems to be something of an objective relationship between the objects (king and queen) and their values.³ One might also be reasonably confident that one could estimate the relative value of all other pieces. Conventionally (for good reason), the order of importance of the remaining pieces is rook, bishop, knight, and pawn. Assuming that the opponent will follow this conventional scale, one could predict the direction of response to any well-constructed fork involving two different types of pieces.

But players do not always value the pieces according to rule. Some simply have a preference for a particular type of piece. Others may have a strategy in the game in question that requires the use of a piece that is threatened. And there is always the possibility that the opponent has an unseen strategy

² One assumes, of course, that chess players seek their own advantage within the rules of the game rather than pursuing other objectives (e.g., to make one's opponent feel good by letting him or her win). Similar egoistic assumptions typically underlie rational choice accounts of political behavior.

³ This is not to suggest that one would always be able to predict the opponent's response to a threat. As chess players know, there are often a number of possible responses to a fork, not all of which necessarily result in the loss of one of the threatened pieces.

are to some extent both idiosyncratic and context dependent; only with a clear sense of the opponent's perspective can one have much confidence in one's predictions.

THE POLITICAL FORK

Manipulation of dimensions, like the fork, involves defining an issue such that it forces the opponent to choose among alternatives in terms of perceptions that place the manipulator's preferred alternative in an advantaged position. To be fully successful, both the chess fork and manipulation of dimensions must be structured so that one can be confident of the choice the opponent will make and that this choice will be the one the manipulator desires.

Just like the fork, successful manipulation of dimensions requires a knowledge of the opponent's view of the choice to be made, the issues involved, the costs and benefits of alternative choices, and the larger context in which the choice is to take place. For example, if one does not know whether or not a majority of senators is opposed to foreign policies that they understand as "interventionist," one does not know whether casting a particular policy as a choice for or against interventionism will increase or decrease the number of senators supporting one's position.

Similarly, one must know the perceived context of the decision. Lincoln's question to Douglas obviously depended for its effectiveness upon the larger political climate of the time.

Knowing even this much is not enough, however. One also must find a way to get the opponent to see the choice in the terms one desires. An example might help to make this clearer.

During the legislative session of 1984, the New York State Assembly debated a bill that would have raised the alcohol purchase age in the state from nineteen to twenty-one. The issue was hotly contested in the media, the hallways and the offices of the Legislative Office Building, and on the floor. Immediately after the principal sponsor of the bill laid out his case, Assemblyman Vincent Graber rose to be recognized:

The Executive of this State has chosen to make this his big battle, if you will, for this particular year. I look at the New York Post for this morning, May 29, and there are a couple of remarks in the Post that so infuriates [sic] me, I have to make mention of them. It states, "That all of the polls show that the public wants a higher drinking age to protect teenage lives, notes one top Cuomo aide." Then, whether or not [Mario] Cuomo said this or the top aide, whoever he may be, "If they (the Legislature) vote 'no' on this one, it'll show just how much contempt they have for the public."

This Governor should have the audacity to say that I am contemptuous. (Transcript of Floor Debate, New York State Assembly, May 29, 1984, pp. 58-59.)

Assemblyman Graber, at that time the chair of the Standing Committee on Transportation, then proceeded to make two arguments against the assertion that the legislature had contempt for the public. First, Graber pointed out that another bill that was backed by a majority of New York residents, a bill reinstituting the death penalty, had passed the legislature each of the last two years, but the governor had vetoed it each time. By implication, Graber argued that the governor had to be at least as contemptuous of the public, if voting against majority public opinion constituted contempt (Transcript of Floor Debate, New York State Assembly, May 29, 1984, pp. 60–61).

Second, Graber enumerated the twenty-seven changes in the laws regarding highway safety enacted by the legislature since 1980. He concluded, "I say that is not sitting on our hands, that is doing something about the problem, that is not oversimplification, that is not overkill, and that is what raising the drinking age to 21 is . . ." (Transcript of Floor Debate, New York State Assembly, May 29, 1984, p. 65).

In terms of strategic manipulation, the story in the *New York Post* could be seen as an effort to add the dimension of responsiveness to the will of the people to legislators' calculations on the purchase age bill. Legislators who voted against the bill were to be seen as contemptuous of the public. Those who voted for the bill were, by implication, to be understood as fulfilling their obligations to their constituents.

Graber sought to repudiate this attempted manipulation by demonstrating that the governor also acted contrary to public opinion on some issues and that the legislature had done a great deal to address the problem of drunk driving, rather than to ignore the public's concerns. In short, what Graber was saying was that the dimension, contempt or respect for the public, should not be considered salient for the decision at hand.

Are the statements of the governor's aide and Assemblyman Graber more usefully understood as persuasive, or manipulative, acts? The aide's statements seem poorly designed, if their intent was to persuade the legislature. For one, they were not made directly to the legislators or through a medium that was targeted to them (though most offices, especially those of downstate members, would look through the *Post* each day). For two, they were couched in terms that were fairly hostile, putting those who were to be persuaded in a very unfavorable light.

The aide's statements make more sense as manipulative acts designed to add a salient dimension to legislators' evaluations of the issue before them, namely, respect for the wishes of the public. One can imagine a legislator confronting the tough choice between voting against the bill on its merits, and thereby showing contempt for the public's wishes, or voting for the bill out of respect for the public's wishes, and thereby promoting what he or she viewed as flawed policy.

One could ask, however, why any legislator opposing this bill would find the aide's comments particularly disturbing. Legislators often vote counter to public opinion. Concerns about their performance as representatives probably remain on most legislators' minds most of the time. What is the contribution that the aide's comments made to this process?

The medium through which these statements were made is revealing. The aide did not circulate a memo to members of the assembly, nor did he or she make a series of phone calls to individual members in which this statement was made. The selected medium was a mass-circulation newspaper in the single most influential part of the state. One suspects that this choice was not an accident.

The same point could be made about Lincoln's question. Lincoln did not choose simply to raise the question in private conversation with Douglas or in a letter to him. Instead, he raised it in a public forum and then made sure that the records of these debates were published in Ohio in 1859 (Riker, 1986 p. 6). Again, one suspects that this was not an accident.

A fundamental component of manipulation of dimensions may be the effect of the manipulator's statements, not on the decision makers themselves but on some audience. It is this effect that may give salience to manipulations of dimension.

This audience must be one whose opinions of the actors and their actions are considered important by the actors themselves. In the case of a member of a legislature, this audience might be a constituency, particularly the residents of his or her district on whom the margin of victory may rest. In the case of Lincoln and Douglas, there were two such audiences: the Illinois electorate in 1858 and the U.S. electorate (particularly southern Democrats) in 1860.

These two examples suggest that manipulation of dimensions may involve influencing an audience as well as a set of decision makers. The decision processes of the audience in these two examples, namely, the voters, then become important components of any account of manipulation of dimensions.

PERSUADING THE AUDIENCE

Illinois voters were not forced to make a tough choice between alternatives which placed the manipulator (Lincoln) at an advantage. Lincoln's manipulation of dimension, and Douglas' answer, may actually have helped Illinois voters vote against Lincoln.³ Similarly, most New York voters were not forced

³ Southern and proslavery Democrats, however, may be seen as having been manipulated. Given Douglas' position, they were forced to choose between supporting a potentially successful northern Democratic candidate for president who opposed them on slavery and a much less likely to be successful southern Democratic candidate who favored them on slavery. But it was not Lincoln's statement that created this problem. It was Douglas'. Lincoln's statement laid a trap for Douglas, not southern Democrats. Douglas' response determined whether northern or southern

to choose between alternatives more to Cuomo's liking. Many of the legislators who were to be "contemptuous" were Democrats with whom Cuomo had worked successfully on other occasions; forcing voters to choose between contemptuous incumbent legislators and challengers was not to Cuomo's advantage. While the heresthetical endeavors of Lincoln and Governor Cuomo's aide may have posed problems for Douglas and the assembly, respectively, they do not seem to have created comparable difficulties for the voters.

It is hard to envision confronting voters with forced choices between undesirable alternatives in quite the same fashion as one manipulates dimensions for leaders. It is clear that voters do not simply absorb whatever political information comes their way; their selectivity is well documented (Patterson, 1980; Graber, 1984). The effect of the manipulator's statements on the voters may be simply to ensure that the voters have access to information about the opponent's positions on an issue about which the public already has strong beliefs, as was the case with regard to slavery and to young people's privileges. Additionally, some statements may be aimed at activating a particular belief, as seems to have been the case with the *Post* story. This latter move is persuasive in character. In the example from New York's liquor purchase age debate in 1984, the governor's aide apparently was trying to define the question of the twenty-one bill in terms of responsiveness to public opinion. Conversely, Graber was trying to define it in terms of the bill's appropriateness as a response to the problem. These two dimensions probably would have produced different judgments by voters about the propriety of the legislature's decision. But the effect was not so much one of setting up for the voters a forced choice between alternatives as it was one of convincing the voters that either responsiveness or appropriateness was the salient dimension on which the legislature's decision on the bill ought to be evaluated.

In the Lincoln/Douglas case, Douglas may not have made any comparable effort to persuade the voters that slavery should not be a salient dimension. Perhaps because such an effort would have fallen on deaf ears. For those who cared about slavery at all, it seemed likely that this particular election would have to deal with it. Lincoln's skill in posing the question left Douglas with little room to avoid offending important constituencies, but it did not force the voters into a similar bind.

It would appear that the effect of these public arguments on the voters was to provide information about the views of elected officials, to activate some other beliefs and deactivate others, and perhaps on occasion to forge new connections. All of this involves dimensions but does not fit comfortably within the boundaries of manipulation of dimensionality, predominantly because Graber's description of the manipulation as forcing a choice does not conform

Democrats would be confronted with a difficult choice. If one focuses on Lincoln's actions, therefore, it remains unclear (from a heresthetical standpoint) why, when his target was Douglas, he, nevertheless, chose a public forum.

to the position many voters would face. As actors in the process, the effect of the message on the voter seems to be either informative or persuasive, not manipulative.⁶

AUDIENCE, BELIEF, AND MANIPULATION

If one could change voter opinion, through information, activation, or persuasion, one could create forced choices for their elected representatives. The *New York Post* article and Graber's statements on the floor of the Assembly suggest the potential of such efforts.

The message in the *Post*, sent by the governor's office, seems to be that the decision on the twenty-one purchase age bill was a question of voting with or against, the people of the state of New York. The argument was almost inductive, with the premise unstated:

State legislators ought to act in accordance with public opinion (unstated)

Public opinion supports the twenty-one bill ("... all of the polls show that the public wants a higher drinking age ...")

Therefore, state legislators ought to support the twenty-one bill ("If they vote 'no' on this one, it'll show just how much contempt they have for the public ...")

Of course, there is more than logic in the message. The aide speaks of contempt, perhaps to draw public attention, perhaps to ensure that his or her statement would be reported, perhaps to make the statement more persuasive. In any event, the dimension being identified is voting with or against the public.

The effect of such a message might be to activate the public's concern about the responsiveness of elected officials and then to persuade voters that a 'no' vote is equivalent to a wanton disregard of the public's views. If the members of the state legislature who opposed the bill came to believe that significant segments of their constituencies accepted this claim about a dimension of the decision, then they would find themselves in a forced choice between voting with their own opinions (and losing some measure of constituency support) or voting against their constituencies (and betraying their own opinions). Given legislators' legendary concern with reelection, defining the decision in the terms clearly placed passage of the bill (Cuomo's objective) in an advantageous position.

Graber's efforts, and the medium he chose, can easily be understood in this context. Graber may have been trying to persuade his colleagues not to consider the dimension of responsiveness by offering persuasive arguments against that view of the bill. Alternatively, he may have been providing his

⁶ Nor, one should add, does it appear that Riker's interest in the Lincoln/Douglas story is in voters as victims of manipulation. It is Douglas who was being manipulated or, in the moral story, the members of the assembly who opposed the purchase age legislation.

colleagues with explanations they could use to minimize the cost associated with voting against the bill, a cost resulting from the activities of the governor's office. For those who opposed the bill on other grounds, these accounts may have been precisely what was needed to permit them to continue their opposition.

Perceived successful persuasion of a relevant audience (voters) changes the costs and benefits of the alternatives confronted by the legislators. If the informational, activational, and persuasive efforts of the governor's office were successful, legislators who opposed the purchase age bill had an added inducement to support the governor, independent of their own beliefs about the quality of the bill as public policy. Fully in line with Riker's definition, these legislators were being manipulated.

Grabber's immediate goal would have appeared to be to affect the beliefs of legislators, not the general public. His statements on the floor of the assembly were unlikely to receive much publicity. His target audience would seem to have been the legislators themselves, and his message was that the apparent costs of voting against the bill were not as great as they seemed. His two arguments may not have been intended to convince the legislators about the legitimacy of their position as much as to give them confidence that their votes could be defended, should they be challenged by their constituents.

The beliefs of the actors themselves, therefore, play an important role in the process of manipulation. Actors have to be convinced that the conditions created by invoking a particular dimension make the manipulator's preferred alternative more attractive than it otherwise might have been. Doing this requires convincing some audience outside the actors, but important to them, to accept the dimension proposed and its implications.

CONCLUSION

The argument developed here is that new dimensions are effective, not because they must persist but because some audience is believed by the relevant actors to have been persuaded that the dimension is salient for the decision question. Both actor beliefs and audience are important components of the process of manipulation of dimensions.

Without an audience, the target of the manipulation need not consider the dimension raised. What would have prevented Douglas, for instance, from simply refusing to address the issue of territorial control of slavery? The issue did not have to be decided in the 1858 senatorial campaign in Illinois. Nor would it have had any consequences for Douglas if the Democratic party, north and south, had not been an audience for his pronouncements. That this is the case is made clear simply by imagining the counterfactual condition in which nothing Douglas said would ever reach the ears of southern Democrats. In the absence of the audience, one of the two pieces in the fork (Douglas's presidential ambition) was not threatened.

Similarly, what difference would it have made what the governor's aide said, unless that statement was published and widely circulated among not only the actors, who were the targets of manipulation, but also their constituencies? Unless the public is believed to view the vote in the aide's terms, legislators do not run any clear risk in voting against the bill; the fork is again incomplete.

Of course, it may be that a successful introduction of a new dimension into political debate works, at least at times, because the actors come to accept sincerely the importance of that dimension. By sincere acceptance I have in mind a belief not rooted in the simple pragmatics of politics (e.g., what will this cost me?) but in one's own best judgments, one's normative assessment of the choice to be made. State legislators may have questioned their right to go against public opinion as expressed in recent polls and may not have been concerned with the effects of the *Post* story on their level of constituency support. Such changes undoubtedly occur. They are not examples of manipulation however, in that the sincere acceptance of a new dimension reflects a change in one's beliefs about the problem presented. Beliefs are the concern of persuasion and rhetoric, not manipulation.⁷

Riker set out to elucidate a kind of political activity that was distinct from rhetoric and persuasion. That effort was largely successful. Strategic voting and agenda control seem to be relatively distinct activities from the rhetorical arts. His presentation of manipulation of dimensions, however, leaves the distinction less clear.

I have argued here that manipulation of dimensions, as an activity distinct from persuasion, requires an audience and pivots on the victim's beliefs about audience reactions. When one does not have an audience, one has activities that fall comfortably within the rhetorical domain; the driving force of the strategy becomes changing the victim's mind, not forcing the victim into a decision with which he or she is inclined to disagree but nonetheless is trapped.

The interpretation of manipulation of dimension offered here does not conform in all respects to Riker's position as suggested in *The Art of Political Manipulation*.⁸ I believe, however, that it gives greater clarity to the concept as distinct from persuasion and helps to reveal the dynamics that give the strategy effect.

This presentation also glosses some important areas of residual ambiguity. One of the most important, I believe, concerns the process by which the victim

⁷ This apparently is Riker's view, in any event, and it is mine as well.

⁸ Of the stories Riker identifies as examples of manipulation of dimensions (Lincoln, DePree, Chrystal, City Manager, Magnuson, and Morris), Chrystal, Magnuson, and Morris appear at least somewhat problematic in light of the understanding of manipulation of dimensions presented here. In all three, the central issue concerning the argument presented is whether the actors come to accept the dimension as relevant in its own right or whether, in view of some audience's beliefs, they feel compelled to accept the dimension.

im's beliefs about the audience emerge. If the manipulator can affect these beliefs by the style of presentation, then the distinction offered here between manipulation of dimensions and persuasion becomes clouded. In the end, however, I believe the distinction is useful. It offers students of politics the beginnings of a classification scheme for strategies and tactics of influence in political decision making. Even if that scheme requires substantial modification over time, its existence will increase our ability to analyze and account for political influence.

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Justice and Political Economy in Commercial Society: Adam Smith's "Science of a Legislator"

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The problem of Adam Smith's assessment of "commercial society" is inextricably linked to the nature of the unity of his moral philosophy. In this article, I offer an interpretation of Smith's "Science of a Legislator" that locates its unity and meaning in the application of a certain method of analysis in his theory of justice and political economy. In Smith's Science, commercial society is constituted by a set of principles, or mechanisms, the two most important being moral sentiments and competitive markets. These mechanisms transform the pursuit of self-love toward the public good and are based upon the faculty of sympathy. When properly guided by the legislator, they yield both justice and opulence. The effects of commerce on the character of the laboring classes, however, threaten to undermine moral sentiments and thus, the basis of justice and social cohesion. The advancement of justice in commercial society, then, will depend upon the legislator's ability to ensure the proper functioning of these mechanisms and to protect the moral sentiments from the corrosive effects of commerce. Smith's Science provides a limited and skeptical endorsement of commercial society as a means to the establishment of justice. It is offered as a guide to those "men of public spirit" who would endeavor to ensure the preservation of justice and the moral ties that bind the community in a world increasingly dominated by commerce.

Periods of political and economic change always involve attempts to interpret and reinterpret the implications of the tradition of political-economic thought for contemporary problems and choices.¹ This has been especially true during the last fifteen years, which have seen a tremendous amount of reassessment of the ideas of the leading figures in the history of political economy. The thoughts and arguments of Adam Smith, especially concerning the

I wish to thank Professor James Farr, Professor Charles Camie, and the reviewers of this paper for their detailed comments and criticisms on an earlier draft.

¹ I have used the Glasgow editions of the works and correspondence of Adam Smith in this study, as reprinted by Liberty Fund, Liberty Classics. The texts have been abbreviated as follows. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, TMS; *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, WN; *Essays on Philosophical Subjects*, EPS; *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*, LRBL; and *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, report of 1762-63, LJ(A), pp. 5-364, report of 1766, LJ(B), pp. 397-586.

litical and economic merits of commerce, have been a central part of this discussion. In the polity, Smith has been called upon as an inspiration and y for those who would reduce the role of the state in the economy and extend the role of the market in social life. In Smithian scholarship, a broad revisionist movement has produced a significantly different image of Smith, one which leaves the implications of his arguments for contemporary politics in much more ambiguous light.

A central part of coming to grips with our current political economic choices is the clarification of the intentions and arguments of those thinkers whose ideas shape our thought. In this essay, I will present an interpretation of Smith's work that draws upon the diverse revisionist literature so as to contribute to the rethinking of Smith's intentions, in particular his assessment of commerce and "commercial society." A central theme of Smith's work, I argue, is the development of a "Science of a Legislator," a system of principles and prescriptions that will guide the legislator in the task of ensuring the enforcement of a specific ideal of justice in commercial society.

In Smith's Science, commercial society is constituted by a set of principles, mechanisms, the two most important being moral sentiments and competitive markets. These mechanisms transform the pursuit of self-love toward the public good and, when properly guided by the legislator, can yield both justice and opulence. The effects of commerce on the character of the laboring classes, however, threaten to undermine moral sentiments and, thus, the basis of justice and social cohesion. The advancement of justice in commercial society, then, will depend upon the magistrate's ability to ensure the proper functioning of these mechanisms and to protect moral sentiments from the corrosive effects of commerce. Smith's Science provides a limited and skeptical endorsement of commercial society as a means to the establishment and promotion of justice.

SMITH REVISIONISM

In Smithian scholarship, the problem of Smith's assessment of commerce has traditionally been linked to that of the unity of his work as a whole.² During the late nineteenth century, this issue came to be known as "The Adam Smith Problem," a term given by a group of German scholars who argued that there is a fundamental disjunction between Smith's accounts of human action in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (TMS) and in *The Wealth of Nations* (WN).³ While in TMS Smith investigated the complexity of human motivations, his account of action in WN is dominated by the pursuit of self-love, revealing a deep inconsistency in Smith's thought as a whole. The most sophis-

This literature review owes much to the treatment of the Smith literature in Dickey, 1988, Robertson, 1983.

A short critical summary of this debate is in Oncken, 1997.

ticated formulation of this problem was presented by Jacob Viner (1927), who argued that these two works were separated by fundamentally contrasting cosmologies. While TMS presented "an unqualified doctrine of a harmonious order of nature, under divine guidance, which promotes the welfare of man through the operation of his individual propensities," in WN "this harmony is represented as not extending to all elements of the economic order, and often as partial and imperfect where it does extend" (1927, pp. 220, 222). It is on the basis of this much less compelling harmony that Smith argues the need for state intervention to preserve "the system of natural liberty," which seems to work autonomously in TMS. The question of Smith's understanding and assessment of commerce, then, depends upon the clarification of the coherence of his moral philosophy as a whole.

The challenge of reconstructing the unity of Smith's *oeuvre* has stimulated the emergence over the last fifteen years of a large revisionist literature in Smithian scholarship. One central group of reinterpretations, the Cambridge school, has produced three major paradigms of Smith analysis. The "civic virtue" approach, associated with the work of J. G. A. Pocock, emphasizes the problem of citizenship and virtue in eighteenth-century thought and has been applied with generally disappointing results.⁴ At best, it seems, a concern with the effects of commerce on the prerequisites of republican citizenship was a secondary concern in Smith's work. More promising has been the "civic moralist" approach, which portrays Smith as a critic of the adequacy of civic republican values in commercial society and an advocate of the Addisonian virtues of "polite conversation and enlightened taste."⁵ In this view, WN provided the analysis of the historical development and functioning of commercial society, which, if properly regulated, would promote the "polite" and private virtues praised in TMS. This approach has a good deal of power in providing coherence in Smith's writing, through its emphasis on Smith's concern with sympathy.

The most successful of these attempts at providing a unified view of Smith's moral philosophy has been the "natural jurisprudential" paradigm. This approach emphasizes the central role of the natural law tradition of Grotius and Pufendorf, transmitted through Francis Hutcheson, in Smith's work.⁶ From this perspective, Smith's *Science of a Legislator* was an attempt to develop a more complete and modern jurisprudence as a basis for the criticism and improvement of the British polity and political economy and as an alternative to civic republican statecraft. The central value in this tradition was justice—

⁴ The two most important analyses in this area have been Winch, 1978, and Robertson, 1983. Winch, 1983, has since further minimized the influence of these concerns in Smith's thought.

⁵ Phillipson, 1983, is the key work in this approach, but Lindgren's excellent treatment of Smith (1973) can be seen as falling into the same category.

⁶ The most important works in this approach are Forbes, 1975a, 1975b; Hansonson, 1981; Hunt and Ignatieff, 1983a, 1983b; Winch, 1983; and Tetchenbier, 1986.

"the personal liberty and security of individuals guaranteed by law" (Forbes, 1975b, p. 184). The origins and nature of a just polity were elaborated in TMS and the *Lectures on Jurisprudence* (hereafter LJ), and Smith's advocacy and criticism of "free markets" in WN are seen as resulting from the application of this concept to economic life.

THE ARGUMENT

As Laurence Dickey (1986) points out, these three approaches do not resolve the type of problem discussed by Viner. Whether focusing on the character of virtue, the relationship of justice and political economy, or human motivation, these writers leave unresolved the seemingly contrasting cosmologies of TMS and WN. In *A System of Social Science* (1979), however, Andrew Skinner sketches an alternative approach to Smith that promises to accomplish this task. According to Skinner, Smith attempted to develop a moral philosophy that would encompass the whole range of social phenomena with a common methodology and common principles of explanation. Speaking of his essay on astronomy, Skinner notes Smith's "marked predilection for systematic argument may be particularly significant in that this feature may be found in all his major works—ethics, jurisprudence, and economics, not to mention the *Astronomy* itself" (1979, p. 41). This approach had been anticipated by J. Ralph Lindgren (1973), who argued that Smith's theory of inquiry provides the key to understanding his social philosophy. Smith's emphasis on the structure of language as the paradigm of intellectual activity requires us to turn to the structure of his own system to understand his aims. While both works begin to carry this argument through and are central bases for my analysis, they remain more programs for action than completed projects.

The research of the revisionist scholarship will be used to develop Skinner's and Lindgren's insights, with the aim of setting Viner's paradox in proper perspective. I will shift the focus to the structure of Smith's analysis, which unifies both works and the whole of his moral philosophy. Moral philosophy, according to Smith, is "the science which pretends to investigate and explain those connecting principles"—that is, those principles that connect the "maxims of common life" (1981, p. 769). The connecting principles of social life provide the unifying thread of Smith's *Science of a Legislator*. The original contribution of this study, then, is the emphasis on the methodological unity of Smith's moral philosophy.

Smith's *Science* provides an analysis of the workings of commercial society that will guide the legislator in the cultivation of justice. In brief, Smith's picture of commercial society is one of a number of "spheres" constituted by a set of invisible mechanisms that tend naturally to turn the pursuit of self-interest to the public advantage. It is through the systematic deception of human agents that these effects are brought about. His analysis of moral sentiments argues that sympathy and spectator mechanisms work so that the

result of each individual's pursuit of the approval of others is moral consensus and respect for justice and authority. His analysis of competitive markets demonstrates that the pursuit of economic gain by individuals has the unintended consequence of maximizing the opulence of society as a whole. While these mechanisms tend toward positive ends on their own, however, Smith concludes that they will not function adequately unless supplemented by the positive action of the magistrate. In order to ensure respect for justice and authority, government and law must actively enforce the principles of the spectator. The efficient and just functioning of competitive markets requires an active "police" to counter all threats of monopoly and privilege, as well as a program to supplement the market through "publick works." Smith's analysis in TMS is the same as that in WN; the harmony of the former is as perfect as is the latter.

Smith goes further to argue that the natural functioning of these mechanisms, when supplemented by government, will reinforce one another in many ways. However, Smith identifies situations in which well-functioning competitive markets will tend to undermine justice and authority through the weakening of the sympathy and spectator mechanisms. Here lies the fundamental task of Smith's Science: to guide this somewhat mysterious "mechanic" so that the destructive tendencies of commerce can be corrected for justice, order, and social cohesion.⁷

It is to the elaboration of these elements of Smith's Science that the rest of this article will be devoted. After discussing Smith's conception of moral philosophy, I will elaborate the principles of social life and the role of government and law presented in TMS, LJ, and WN, attempting to demonstrate the unity of Smith's method of analysis and conception of commercial society. I will finally consider the problem of reconciling justice and commerce and assess the implications of Smith's arguments for current debates over commerce and justice.

SMITH'S METHOD

"Philosophy is the science of the connecting principles of nature" (Smith 1982c, p. 45). The key to Smith's approach to moral philosophy is contained in this sentence. Smith's analysis of human inquiry began from a psychological premise; philosophy was pursued in order to resolve the tension or stress created when we encounter phenomena that cannot be fit into our existing generalizations. When "one or more objects appear in an order quite different from that to which the imagination has been accustomed," we are overcome

⁷ In Smith's usage, the legislator is that person who defines and enacts the laws of the polity. The true legislator is guided in these efforts by the dictates of natural jurisprudence, and it is to this figure, especially, that Smith's Science is aimed. The magistrate refers to the judicial authorities who enforce these laws.

with surprise and wonder and strain to "fill up the interval betwixt them, . . . join them together by a sort of bridge . . ." (1982c, pp. 41–42). The philosopher attempts to discover "the invisible chains which bind together all these disjointed objects, endeavours to introduce order into this chaos of jarring and discordant appearances" (1982c, pp. 45–46). The task of the moral philosopher, then, is to provide a system of principles that links together in unexpected ways, but through analogy with familiar objects, the phenomena of human society.⁸

These systems, though, can be thought of as resembling machines. While machines are systems of principles governing phenomena, a system is "an imaginary machine invented to connect together in the fancy those different movements and effects which are already in reality performed" (Smith, 1982c, p. 66). Human society, in turn, "appears like a great, an immense machine, whose regular and harmonious movements produce a thousand agreeable effects" (Smith, 1982a, p. 316). The full meaning of Smith's passage on moral philosophy in WN can now emerge clearly. A system of moral philosophy attempts to present and analyze a set of principles that are postulated to govern and order the appearances of human society. The more advanced systems are those that explain the most phenomena using the fewest principles, and Smith's aim in moral philosophy is thus to unite the phenomena of human society through the analysis of the few, powerful mechanisms that order it.

In moral, as opposed to natural, philosophy, however, providing coherence through a minimum amount of principles is not enough. An adequate moral philosophy must also satisfy the criterion of "propriety"; it must take into account the motivations and self-understandings of human agents in explaining social action (see Lindgren, 1973, pp. 15–19). Without this concern, the moral philosopher becomes equivalent to the "man of system," who sees some of the form but misses the complex content of human life. But the issue is not whether to develop systems but if their principles are adequate as an account not only of surface coherence but also of the complexity of the forces produc-

⁸ Smith's conception of moral philosophy follows that of Hutcheson: "The consideration of all that variety of senses or tastes, by which such a variety of objects and actions are naturally recommended to mankind, and of a like multiplicity of natural desires, and all of them pretty constant and changeable, and often jarring with each other, some pursuing our own interests and pleasures of one of the other of the various kinds mentioned, and some pursuing the good of others, as we have also a great many humankind affections. This complex view, I say, must at first make human nature appear a strange chaos, or a confused combination of jarring principles, until we can discover by a closer attention, some natural connexion or order among them, some governing principles naturally fitted to regulate all the rest. To discover this is the main business of Moral Philosophy, and to show how all these parts are to be arranged in order" (1747, p. 36).

ing it. Smith's moral philosophy is built upon principles that satisfy both criteria.⁹

This form of discourse is what Smith termed didactic. As opposed to rhetorical discourse, which heightens one side of an argument to persuade at all costs, didactic discourse tries to present a balanced view so that it will "persuade no farther than the arguments themselves appear convincing" (1985, p. 62). More specific, it follows the Newtonian method of didactics, in which "we lay down one or a very few principles by which we explain the several rules or phenomena, connecting one with the other in a natural order" (1985, p. 62). The division between rhetorical and didactic, however, should not be equated with that of "persuasion" versus "critical" assessment.¹⁰ As the astronomy discussion implies, Smith saw Newtonian didactic discourse as a powerful persuasive tool, and a persuasive aim shapes the construction and content of Smith's moral philosophy.

These principles of method are the basis upon which Smith's moral philosophy, and in particular its subdivision of the Science of a Legislator, are constructed. The Science is made up of the teachings of natural jurisprudence "a theory of the general principles which ought to run through and be the foundation of the laws of all nations" (1982a, p. 341). In LJ, Smith points out that his Science has four branches or "objects": justice, police, revenue, and arms (1982b, p. 398). After arms, or national defense, justice and police are the next important, and Smith thus describes their relationship:

"The first and chief design of every system of government is to maintain justice, to prevent the members of a society from encroaching on one another's property, or seizing what is not their own. When this end is secured, the government is next desirous of promoting the opulence of the state. This produces what we call police. Whatever regulations are made with respect to trade, commerce, agriculture, manufacturers of the country are considered as belonging to the police" (1982b, p. 5).

The Science of a Legislator draws upon moral philosophy and political economy for its analyses of the mechanisms behind justice and opulence in order to guide the legislator in how to achieve these aims. It provides an analysis of how the various spheres of social life function and interrelate, thus satisfying the legislator's desire for order and coherence and guiding him in how to regulate these mechanisms.

⁹ This discussion is relevant in light of Lindgren's warning that we not take the machine metaphor too seriously. When properly understood, Smith's use of the term does not reflect only the ways of thinking of the "man of system." Smith realized the danger of using the term, as "society appears as a machine only 'when we contemplate it in a certain abstract and philosophical light'" (1982a, p. 316). His accomplishment here was to connect the operation of the machine to the phenomenological structures of human thought and motivation.

¹⁰ As Campbell does (1971, p. 30).

SYMPATHY, SPECTATORS, AND JUSTICE

In TMS, Smith presented his account of the origin of moral norms through the development of a theory of moral psychology that focused around the notions of "sympathy" and the "spectator."¹¹ Smith begins with the observation that, "how selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it" (1982a, p. 9). Human beings are constantly seeking to understand each other's passions and to communicate with their fellows, and the basis of this capacity Smith terms sympathy. What sympathy amounts to is the ability to imaginatively put oneself in the situations of others and react as they would (1982a, p. 9). Since sympathy is a basic capacity, it can lead to positive or negative judgments concerning others' actions or opinions. It is to the former, or "approbation," Smith argues, that we aim most of all; human action is shaped by the desire to have others approve of our passions. It is the continual attempt to persuade others of the correctness of one's actions, passions, and opinions that is the stuff of human intercourse (see 1982a, pp. 21–23).¹²

To achieve the sympathy of others, however, we must make important adjustments in our own behavior. The basic problem we face, Smith argues, is that others—as spectators—can never fully sympathize with our feelings. Our reaction to this difficulty is to sympathize with the position of the spectator and imagine how he or she would react when observing our behavior (see 1982a, pp. 112–113). But how would a spectator judge our actions? Smith's answer is that that judgment is based on the standard of "propriety": our actions or passions in response to a given situation are judged on the basis of how most would normally react in such a situation. The result is that our pursuit of the sympathy of others would lead us to constantly moderate our reactions to the point at which spectators can indeed give their full approbation. It is this constant, mutual moderation of our passions that gives rise to the rules of morality, which provide the maxims to guide our actions (1982a, p. 9). These rules are not rational constructions but the unintended outcomes of a multitude of individual experiences of personal and outside reactions. They are of special importance "in correcting the misrepresentations of self-view . . ." (1982a, p. 160). Their influence, in turn, results from the drive for sympathetic approbation.

At this point we can begin to see how Smith's form of analysis—the attempt to identify mechanisms that transform self-interested action into public

¹¹ My discussion of Smith's moral psychology is based on the accounts presented in Skonssen, 1981, and Teichgraber, 1986.

¹² Smith here follows Hutcheson in portraying sympathy as an essentially aesthetic act or judgment (see Hutcheson, 1725).

benefits—is applied to moral psychology. While no single individual aims at anything more than the approbation of spectators, the process of mutual adjustment guided by sympathy produces from this a common moral consensus according to which individuals shape their actions. Through a process of unintended consequences, the reactions of agent and spectator “have such a correspondence with one another, as is sufficient for the harmony of society (1982a, p. 22). The natural tendency of each agent to satisfy the desire for approbation leads him or her to restrain behavior in a way that reinforces the common moral code necessary for the unity of society.¹³

Smith’s account of the development of moral judgment includes a further and central concept. As they naturally judge each other’s conduct, individuals increasingly look to a more neutral standpoint, which is that of the “impartial spectator.” It is the standpoint beyond that of the participants in any context and, indeed, to a degree beyond that of the established moral rules; it is the position from which we can criticize specific judgments and rules (1982a, pp. 135–36). The motive for taking this position, Smith argues, is that in our most virtuous moments, we are not satisfied with simple approbation, but we want to deserve it as well, and it is only the impartial spectator that can provide this judgment (see 1982a, p. 116).¹⁴ It is, as we will see, the Smithian position

The moral rules in which Smith’s Science is particularly interested are those of justice. Here, Smith follows the natural jurisprudential tradition in identifying only “commutative” justice as deserving the term, because these are the only rules the violation of which can be legitimately punished by coercive means. In the crucial discussion in LJ(A) (1982b, pp. 7–10), Smith notes that this distinction corresponds to the basic discussion of “perfect” and “imperfect” rights; only the respect for the former and the performance of the corresponding obligations can be coerced (1982b, p. 9). Smith’s central innovation in natural jurisprudence, and a key to his Science, is to shift the explanation for this distinction from the dictates of reason to the operations of sympathy. The key concept here is that of injury. Only the commission of an injury can be the source of a perfect right. The foundation for the distinction between rights, Smith argues in TMS, is that we can sympathize with an

¹³ Smith’s emphasis on sympathy as a capacity is an excellent example of the kind of principle with which his system was concerned. While accounting for order in the moral sentiments, sympathy links this order with the full variety of human motivations and virtues. Much of TMS is an attempt to develop a theory of virtue that combines the best of a variety of ethical systems. The principle of sympathy allows for such an account, as opposed, for instance, to the Epicurean emphasis on one motive—that of self-interest—to account for all human action (1982a, pp. 290–300).

¹⁴ The judgments of the impartial spectator, in effect, provide the content of Smith’s Science. It is the source of those “principles that ought to run through and be the foundation of the law of all nations.” The existence of such a position detached from and yet in dialogue with the existing moral rules provides Smith with the basis for a constructive critique of these rules and, especially, the rules enforced through the existing legal system.

her's pain more distinctly than with his joy and can thus enter into his re-
 nment to a much greater degree. Only in this case, then, can we "approve
 'the violence employed to avenge the hurt . . ." (1982a, p. 79).

The operation of the principle of sympathy in this case unintentionally pro-
 ces public benefits. "Society may subsist, though not in the most comfort-
 le state, without beneficence; but the prevalence of injustice must utterly
 'stroy it" (1982a, p. 86). Our moral psychologies are naturally structured so
 to produce adherence to those rules necessary for social coherence. They
 e in themselves a force tending to bring to fruition the first domestic task
 the Legislator, the maintenance of justice.

But these rules are not enough. The other side of the teaching of the Science
 'a Legislator is that the spectator mechanism in fact does not work automat-
 ally to override self-love. This is particularly true in cases in which justice
 ay threaten our immediate interests or demand that we curb powerful pas-
 ons. In such cases, we may often allow ourselves "to be so far transported
 / passion as to violate this rule" (1982a, p. 161). The power of the "misrep-
 sentations of self-love" cannot be underestimated, and the way to compen-
 te is the establishment of a magistrate and legal system to enforce the gen-
 al rules of justice. "As the violation of justice is what men will never submit
 from one another, the public magistrate is under the necessity of employing
 e power of the commonwealth to enforce the practice of this virtue. Without
 is precaution, civil society would become a scene of bloodshed and disorder.
 ery man revenging himself at his own hand whenever he fancied he was
 jured" (1982a, p. 340). Smith's attempt to outline the rules of justice that
 l sovereigns ought to enforce in LJ is based on the assumption of the ne-
 ssity of this role demonstrated in TMS.

In sum, Smith's discussion of the origin and enforcement of the rules of jus-
 ce, the basis of the Science of a Legislator, illustrates the basic principle of
 e analysis he used. Natural mechanisms tend to turn the pursuit of self-love
 to a public benefit but must be supplemented by the legislator in order to
 truly effective. TMS does not present a world of perfect natural harmony.

SYMPATHY AND AUTHORITY

The magistrate in commercial society, in enforcing the rules of justice that
 erge naturally, introduces no new principles of human action. Legal pun-
 tments and rewards are simply the means of ensuring that the sympathy
 echanism functions properly throughout society. But why will the sovereign
 obeyed? This is one of the crucial questions that drew Smith in the direc-
 n of historical investigation.¹⁵ These studies yielded two general principles
 t have historically accounted for obedience to government, "authority" and

¹⁵ These investigations, which culminated in Smith's "stage theory" of history, have been most
 ely analyzed by Ronald Meek, 1976.

"utility," both of which are based in the operations of sympathy. Authority Smith argues, is based in the fact that "mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than with our sorrow" (1982a, p. 50). The result of this disposition is that most tend to identify more easily with and aspire to the condition of the "great and powerful"—"we admire their happy situation enter into it with pleasure, and endeavour to promote it" (1982a, p. 401).¹⁶ Historically, Smith finds a number of possible sources of authority—age, strength, wisdom—but in commercial society wealth and power are the pre-dominant sources.

In commercial society, though, the principle of utility achieves a previously unmatched importance. By utility Smith refers to obedience based upon sympathetic approval of the legal system as necessary for the preservation of justice. (More generally, one thinks in terms of utility when one focuses on the effect of an action or institution.) On the face of it, this introduces a role for rationality to a degree quite out of place in Smithian explanations.¹⁷ As one would expect, however, there is an ironic twist crucial to Smith's understanding of utility. In his elaboration of this concept, Smith argued that a certain "contrivance" is commonly valued for its magnificence itself, and the purpose for which it was made is forgotten. It often happens "that the exact adjustment of the means for attaining any conveniency of pleasure should frequently be more regarded, than that very conveniency or pleasure, in the attainment of which their whole want would seem to consist" (1982a, pp. 179–80).

When one considers the utility of government, then, one tends to focus more on its attractiveness as an instrument rather than on the ends for which it is used. It is the aesthetic elements of sympathy that underlie the considerations of the utility of the magistrate. Subjects and legislators are impressed more by the aesthetic quality and impact of the means rather than the ends of the legal system that enforces justice. As a result, it is less the prosaic advantages than the aesthetic appeal of a system of law and police that convinces. One will be more likely to persuade if one describes "the great system of public police which procures these advantages, if you explain the connexions and dependencies of its several parts, their mutual subordination to one another and their general subserviency to the happiness of society" (1982a, p. 186).

Thus we return to the principle of sympathy. It is this principle of moral psychology that ensures obedience to the institutions of law and government.

¹⁶ In this context, Smith again describes the faculty of sympathy in aesthetic terms with the implication that it often deludes the imagination (1982a, pp. 51–52). The implication is no accident. For Smith, the tendency in commercial society to sympathize with the rich and powerful at the expense of the wise and virtuous is the source of "the corruption of our moral sentiments" (1982a, p. 61).

¹⁷ In his attempt to minimize the role of rationality in explaining social institutions, Smith followed Hume, who shared his assessment that it was the potentiality of such a strategy that was Hutcheson's unique contribution to moral philosophy and natural jurisprudence (see Haskins, 1981, and Teichgraber, 1988).

ese, in turn, are needed to ensure the enforcement of the rules of justice necessary for the social order that the sympathy principle generates. And all this is based on a form of unintended consequences that verges upon deception; the mechanisms reconciling self-love and public good depend on the continual pursuit of delusion and the constant misunderstanding of how to achieve our ends. Smith has indeed made the most of an invisible chain.

THE "INVISIBLE HAND" AND PUBLIC OPULENCE

The establishment of justice and order in commercial society requires an understanding of the principles of economic activity, and this is the contribution of political economy in Smith's *Science*. The form of analysis and its applications for the legislator, though, are strikingly parallel to those concerning justice. In his political economy, Smith identifies mechanisms that turn the pursuit of self-love into the production of public benefits but concludes that the proper working of these mechanisms require that the legislator enforce the necessary legal framework.

As before, Smith's argument begins with moral psychology, in particular, the motivation underlying economic activity, an account of which is provided in *TMS*. Rather than the aim of supplying our necessities, "it is chiefly from a regard to the sentiments of mankind, that we pursue riches and avoid poverty," that we undertake "that great purpose of human life which we call bettering our condition." This connection is most clearly stated in *LJ*, where Smith argues that "if we should enquire into the principle of the human mind which this disposition of trucking is founded, it is clearly the natural inclination everyone has to persuade." Thus, "everyone is practicing oratory on others through the whole of his life" (1982b, p. 352).¹⁶

But why should people pursue wealth in order to gain the sympathy of others? Here, Smith utilizes the same principle as in the discussion of obedience: it is easier for spectators to sympathize with the happiness that wealth and power are assumed to bring. In this context, the shift of sympathy from happiness to its means in commercial society assumes its most central place. According to Smith, though, these means, or contrivances, do not produce the comfort, ease, and pleasure that we believe they do. Even if they did, the logic of Smith's argument suggests that we could never enjoy these benefits, since trucking would deprive us of the sympathy garnered from the constant presence of the contrivances in the view of the spectators. Economic life in commercial society appears as the pursuit of that which constantly avoids our grasp.

It is in this pursuit, however, that Smith believed he had made a major discovery. For "it is this deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind" (1982a, p. 183). Here we see the same form of ar-

The more closely one reads Smith, it seems, the less one finds home economics.

gument as in the discussion of justice. The ability of sympathy to deceive us and make us prey to the persuasive force of contrivances results in the unintended consequence of opulence.

The central element of the "invisible hand" mechanism by which opulence is brought about from the pursuit of self-interest is the division of labor (see 1981, pp. 13–24). The division arises directly from the "disposition to truck, barter, and exchange"; in order to gain the cooperation of others in commercial society, we must offer them something they require in return. "For man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only . . . We address ourselves not to their humanity, but to their self-love and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages" (1981, pp. 26–27). Human beings thus begin to specialize in the production of one particular good or service, with the aim of exchanging it for other needs. The result is a tremendous increase in the productivity of labor and thus in the opulence of society. Indeed, this division ensures the unprecedented phenomenon of a "universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people" (1981, p. 22).

The division of labor also provides the most efficient means to achieve this opulence. The key factor, of course, is the price mechanism. In an exchange economy with a developed monetary system, variations in prices will indicate the amount of demand for a product and, indirectly, the costs of production required if one's endeavor in a given industry is to be profitable. Smith's classic analysis of the relationship of supply and demand concludes that the competitive market economy will ensure that each will use talents, abilities, and resources only where they are the most profitable. It is this system of competitive markets and the division of labor regulated by the price system that turns the pursuit of self-interest in economic activity to the promotion of social benefits.¹⁰

Political economy, then, uncovers the mechanisms by which the pursuit of self-interest in commercial society produces unintended social benefits. The form of the analysis—the notion that natural propensities in human psychology and social organization will direct the pursuit of self-love to the creation of beneficial social outcomes—is exactly the same as that used in the analysis of justice. And the parallel does not stop here. As in the sphere of justice, the pursuit of self-love in economic activity needs the proper institutional context in which to develop and produce such results, and it is the task of the legislator to ensure this. The specification of these tasks fill out the rest of the subdivision of police in the Science of a Legislator.

¹⁰ This discussion provides the context for Smith's most famous metaphor: "By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner that its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention . . ." (1981, p. 486).

The first and most basic of these tasks is the provision of a framework of security necessary before individuals will venture to use their resources, that is, the protection of perfect rights, especially property rights, or the rules of justice. Only if these are guaranteed will the economic activities of commercial society develop properly (Smith, 1981, pp. 284–85). Without the enforcement of the rules of natural justice, the pursuit of self-interest would be turned in different directions, and the development of the division of labor, competitive markets, and opulence would be frustrated.

The provision of justice entails some more specific actions as well. Once the "barbarisms" of feudal society are suppressed, there remain the problems of individuals in commercial society attempting to overstep the bounds of justice and restrain others in the rightful use of their property. For Smith, this was the essence of mercantilism, and thus justice called for a major reform of British police as Smith knew it (see Skinner, 1979, esp. p. 217). The aim of Smith's legal reform program was the elimination of the variety of restrictions on competition and grants of privilege that were a central part of the civil law of the time.²⁰ These restrictions, as well as monopoly in general, are "contrary to that justice and equality of treatment which the sovereign owes to all the different orders of his subjects" (1981, p. 654). A constant, aggressive enforcement of the rules of justice is necessary for the proper workings of the competitive market mechanisms, for the emergence of order and opulence from the pursuit of self-love.

The final task of the magistrate is that of maintaining those "public works and institutions" that, though required by markets, are not provided for by market incentives. In a version of what would currently be termed a "market failure" thesis, Smith argues that these pursuits "are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could never repay the expence to any individual or small number of individuals, and which it, therefore, can not be expected that any individual or small number of individuals should erect or maintain" (1981, p. 23). In this category fall such infrastructures as buildings, roads, and canals. In sum, the areas of justice and police demonstrate remarkable parallels. In both contexts, there exist natural mechanisms that tend to turn the pursuit of self-love to the public good. Indeed, the single moral psychological principle of sympathy underlies both these mechanisms; it leads us to the development of the rules of justice and to the division of labor, the former buttressing the latter. But the effective working of this principle requires the active aid or visible hand of the sovereign. Smith's analysis of the proper workings of commercial society insists on the combination of visible and invisible hands, and the Science of a Legislator aims to provide the proper balance.

²⁰ As Smith summarizes this task, the magistrate ought to "break down the exclusive privileges of corporations, and repeal the statute of apprenticeships, both of which are real encroachments on natural liberty, and add to these the repeal of the law of settlements" (1981, p. 478).

THE "SCIENCE OF A LEGISLATOR" IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Smith's analysis of the principles of commercial society was embedded in a historical analysis of its rise and development (Smith, 1982b, p. 14; see Meek, 1976). It was the need to explain the transition from agriculture to commerce that stimulated Smith to develop this theory, and, as Teichgräbe points out, it was the context of the need to develop a historical vision in natural jurisprudence that shaped the way he posed the question (1986, pp. 139-54). The key problem was the origin of modern forms of property rights, "the only case where the origin of naturall rights is not altogether plain" (Smith, 1982b, p. 13). This explanation required an understanding of the evolution of the moral sentiments. The emergence of a legal system that protected property rights was the story of the evolution of a magistrate who enforced the rules of natural justice and, thus, the key to explaining the preservation of justice in commercial society.

Smith's argument is based in the thesis that "commerce and manufacturing gradually introduced order and good government, and with them, the liberty and security of individuals" (1981, p. 412). Employing yet another invisible hand mechanism, Smith argued that the spread of commerce, resulting from an alliance of princes and towns against the landed aristocracy, weakened the relations of direct dependence upon which the latter's arbitrary power was based. The expansion of commerce provided new outlets for aristocratic wealth and was followed by the dismissal of retainers in order to mobilize this wealth, the same retainers upon which their power was based. With their power diminished, "they became as insignificant as any substantial burgher or tradesman in a city." This allowed the magistrate to exert control over the whole of a given territory, thus providing the regular administration of justice necessary to social order and the flourishing of the pursuit of wealth (1981, pp. 420-21).

The emergence of commercial society did not eliminate human interdependence but established a new form more favorable to the enhancement of liberty and justice. With the division of labor, dependence is perhaps heightened, since each individual is able to satisfy only a small portion of his needs. But this dependence is dispersed. "Each tradesman or artificer derives his subsistence from the employment, not of one, but of a hundred or a thousand different customers. Though in some measure obliged to them all, therefore he is not absolutely dependent upon any one of them" (1981, p. 420). At the same time that commerce strengthens the ability of the magistrate to enforce justice, then, it makes subjects more independent of the will of others and thus reduces the ability of individuals to oppress each other.

The central role that the elimination of direct dependence played in the rise of commercial society can be seen as well when considering the sympathy mechanism. For the erosion of the close ties of individuals in earlier civil-

zations underlies the distinction between perfect and imperfect rights that the moral sentiments now recognize. The enforcement of positive duties of benevolence to others seems increasingly unjustified, as the injury resulting from their absence seems less severe. Personal independence is a more crucial condition, and violations of property and the other perfect rights are more dangerous. Analysis of the effects of changing dependence relationships, then, helps explain the changing commands of the spectator.

At the same time, as we saw above, utility becomes a more central consideration in sympathetic judgments, as we are less connected with the context of others' lives and communicate increasingly through symbols. Here we have the origins of that great deception, that concern with contrivances supposed to produce happiness, that provide the motivation for economic activity in commercial society. As the gaps between individual situations that sympathy has to bridge widen with the reduction of dependence, sympathy requires a greater ability to use symbolic representation as the basis of communication.

There is a final way in which the focus on contrivances tends to structure commercial society. However distasteful the fact that respect and admiration are focused on the rich and powerful, it is "upon this disposition of mankind, to go along with the passions of the rich and powerful, [that] is founded the distinction of ranks, and the order of society" (1982a, p. 52). As well as benefiting the magistrate, this tendency shores up what Lindgren terms the "deference structure of the community" (1973, p. 78). This is crucial to the maintenance of justice and order, as the protection of property, which is the heart of justice, is at the same time the protection of inequality, and thus respect for superiors is central to the preservation of justice (see Smith, 1982b, pp 208-9).

The distinction of ranks, however, cannot be too great or the sympathy mechanism would be strained too far. "Those persons most excite our compassion and are more apt to affect our sympathy who most resemble ourselves, and the greater the difference the less we are affected by them" (Smith, 1982b, p. 184). The more graded the distinction, the more similar the different groups, and the less gap sympathy will have to travel. Competitive markets will help reinforce this, but, again, the legislator must intervene through the enforcement of the rules of justice in economic life to ensure that this occurs. Again, Smith's Science rests on a conspiracy of visible and invisible hands.

THE "SCIENCE OF A LEGISLATOR" AS ARGUMENT

The unity of Smith's Science of a Legislator, as a part of his moral philosophy, can thus be seen in the method of analysis he uses. Throughout human society and historical development, Smith identifies invisible hand mechanisms, which tend of their own accord through systematic deception to direct the pursuit of self-love to the public good. In commercial society, the sym-

pathy, spectator, and price mechanisms tend to the achievement of justice, order, and opulence. But these mechanisms require the guidance of the legislator or magistrate in order to work properly. This basic structure of argument enables Smith to provide complementary explanations in all areas of moral philosophy.

Smith further elaborates his method by reducing the actual invisible hand principles to the smallest possible while explaining a wide variety of social phenomena and outlining the tasks of the legislator. In commercial society, it is basically the operation of sympathy under the conditions of a growing division of labor that is used to account for an extraordinary variety of phenomena. The attempts of the former to overcome the gaps in understanding between individuals caused by the latter is the basic principle underlying moral psychology, social consensus, political authority, and economic activity in "civilized societies." Viner's paradox can thus be resolved. Whatever the differences in tone, and they are significant at points, we are not presented with two different cosmologies in TMS and WN. In all of Smith's writings, the harmony promised by invisible mechanisms of sympathy can be established only with the help of the visible hands of the legislator.

What light does this perspective shed on the aims of Smith's Science? In Smith's words, "Some general, even systematical, idea of the perfection of policy and law, may no doubt be necessary for directing the views of the statesman" (1982a, p. 234). But the construction and appeal of systems is always a source of danger. The virtue of taking a broad concern with the prosperity and justice of one's society has often degenerated into the "spirit of system." "Men of system" are those individuals who are more committed to implementing a certain plan for society than to the rights and well-being of citizens. Such an individual "is often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from any part of it. He goes on to establish it completely and in all its parts, without regard either to the great interests, or to the strong prejudices, which may oppose it" (1982a, pp. 233-34). This type of individual makes the mistake of treating society as if it were the same thing as a simple machine. The plan is based on those simple principles that ignore the complexity of human action and relationships.

Smith's Science, however, seems to be aimed at providing systematical guidance for the legislator or statesman, the "man of public spirit." These individuals embody "the love of humanity, . . . a real fellow-feeling with the inconveniences and distresses to which some of our fellow-citizens may be exposed" (1982a, p. 232). The legislator aims to reform the system of law and police so as to alleviate these distresses in the interests of justice. Unlike the man of system, however, "he will content himself with moderating, what he often cannot annihilate without great violence . . . He will accommodate, as well as he can, his public arrangements to the confirmed habits and prejudices of the people" (1982a, p. 233).

Smith's Science is constructed with this approach in mind. Rather than simply viewing society in an "abstract, philosophical light," it combines a concern for the overall public good with an understanding and a respect for the habits and sentiments of citizens. It directs the statesman to care for the moral ties that bind the community and to adjust the system of law and policy to the conceptions of justice prevalent among citizens, while always trying to raise these through persuasion. In commercial society, Smith saw the operation of processes that would lead on their own toward this end, and his Science was aimed at guiding the man of public spirit to cultivate and correct these forces in the name of justice.²¹

For Smith, then, the form of his Science was intimately related to its content. Public-spirited guidance could only be provided by a properly constructed system or science. The human tendency to be preoccupied with the beauty of a system, or its utility, was a fact of psychology especially pronounced in commercial society and a source of concern for the public good. The task of a properly constructed Science of a Legislator is to direct that tendency toward positive, justice-promoting action (see Haakonssen, 1981, pp 89-93).

THE PRESERVATION OF JUSTICE IN COMMERCIAL SOCIETY

Smith's Science of a Legislator is a tool designed to convince statesmen to reform the legal system and government policies in the hope of attaining justice in commercial society. It adopts the position of the impartial spectator, reflecting upon the established moral rules of particular societies with the aim of implementing the principles of natural jurisprudence as much as possible. As we have seen, this aim is assured if the operation of the natural mechanisms of sympathy, the division of labor, and the practices of commercial society are supported more generally. At the same time, however, Smith argues that commerce contains a threat to the achievement of justice, and it is to the control of this threat that his Science turns its attention and teaching.

The central challenge commerce poses to justice is its tendency to undermine the basic mechanism of moral psychology—sympathy—among the lower classes. Ironically enough, the division of labor has the most debilitating effects on human thought and judgment. In commercial society, the majority of workers is employed in one or a limited number of specialized tasks, with the result that the laborers become unfamiliar with and eventually incapable of exerting their understanding beyond the limited range of their tasks. The condition of workers is such that "the torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable of bearing any part in a rational conversation, but of conceiving any

²¹ Smith's Science, then, was aimed like Hume's at those moderate, "forward-looking" individuals who would avoid the evils of tyranny, faction, and enthusiasm in guiding state and society. It is this similarity that leads Forbes to categorize both thinkers as "sceptical Whigs" (1973b).

generous, noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgement concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life. Of the great and extensive interest of his country, he is altogether incapable of judging" (Smith, 1981, p. 782). Specialization destroys the mental capacities and moral sentiments of the mass of laborers, leaving them "as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become" (Smith, 1981, p. 782).²²

The destruction of the workers' capacities for thought and judgment can only result in the weakening of the sympathy and spectator mechanisms among these people. Sympathy is an aesthetic capacity; it requires the ability to expand one's mind to see things from another's point of view, an ability to experience a wide variety of emotions, and the capacity to appreciate beauty in its many forms. In order to develop these capacities, one has to be exposed to a wide variety of objects, situations, and passions; "when the mind is employed about a variety of objects it is somehow expanded and enlarged" (1982b, p. 539). Specialization, when taken too far, undermines the very basis of sympathy.²³

Commerce, then, can be an extreme danger to the enforcement of justice and order in commercial society. The destruction of sympathy among the lower classes could plausibly have the following effects. If men could no longer sympathize with and attempt to emulate the rich, the constant pursuit of riches necessary for the opulence of society would be undermined at its source. More important, the mechanisms ensuring respect for the magistrate and the legal system would be damaged. And, centrally, the mechanism upon which the basic respect for justice depends would be damaged; without this invisible hand tending to the emergence of common rules of justice, the legislator would be almost helpless in his main tasks. Commerce, usually a firm support for justice, can be its deadliest enemy as well.

How can the legislator control these effects of commerce? Smith's tentative answer to this question is a system of mass education to stimulate and develop the capacities of sympathy that commercial society deadens. "For a very small expence the publick can facilitate, can encourage, and can even impose upon the able body of the people, the necessity of acquiring the most essential parts of education" (1981, p. 785). While this would include a certain amount of basic skills, it will also involve a "necessary introduction to the most sublime as well as the most useful sciences" (1981, p. 786). The emphasis on the sublime

²² The seeming paradox of Smith's two different views of the division of labor is explored by Nathan Rosenberg, 1963.

²³ Two additional characteristics of commercial society operate toward the same end. As a result of urbanization, the worker "is sunk in obscurity and darkness. His conduct is observed and attended to by nobody, and he is therefore very likely to neglect it himself, and to abandon himself to every sort of low profligacy and vice" (1981, p. 785). The removal of the spectator undermines the strength of sympathy. Finally, the ever-present threat of extreme inequality would stretch the capacity of sympathy beyond its limits as well.

is the key to what differentiates Smith's program from an attempt to develop human capital. It is a program to expand the understandings of the young. Smith's concern is with the basic ability of individuals to orient their conduct toward the passions and needs of others. Without sympathy, justice and liberty could not be preserved in commercial society. Education was an attempt, perhaps an ultimately inadequate one, to ensure that the inherently social capacities of the lower classes were not destroyed, and social harmony with them.²⁴

CONCLUSION

The structure of Adam Smith's *Science of a Legislator*, then, contains the key to understanding the unity of his work. Constructed with the aim of guiding public-spirited individuals in the achievement of justice in commercial society, the *Science* clarifies Smith's vision of a society characterized by a set of principles that guides the pursuit of self-love toward the promotion of public benefits. At the same time, it shows how the unintended consequences of such invisible hands will come to fruition only with the aid of the visible hands of the legislator. The conclusions of moral philosophy and political economy are the tools used by this "mechanic" to ensure the achievement of justice as the central goal of natural jurisprudence.

As such, Smith's *Science* presents an understanding of commercial society that is more complex and skeptical than is often recognized. This society achieves a limited but important concept of justice, and commerce plays a central role in this process, providing the degree of personal independence required for liberty and equality of treatment. The benefits of commerce, however, are not the result of an automatic process. Commerce promotes justice and social cohesion only if properly guided and limited by a magistrate and a legal system that embodies the dictates of the impartial spectator in fruitful tension with the moral sentiments of the community.

The care and cultivation of these sentiments thus becomes the central task for Smith's legislator, and in this context Smith's fears for the effects of commerce on the moral sentiments are particularly striking. Specialization and

²⁴ This educational program has been a key source for those writers attempting to fit Smith into the civic virtue paradigm. Both Winch, 1978, and Robertson, 1983, emphasize the political elements of this program and see it as connected to Smith's postulated desire to increase the participation of the lower classes in politics as a counter-weight to the power of merchants and manufacturers. To be sure, there is no doubt that virtue remained a central concern for Smith. He always retained Hutcheson's concern with the use of moral philosophy to improve character and in one classical passage lamented the corruption of the moral sentiments in commercial society. However, as Harpham (1984), Teichgraber (1986), and the civic moralist writers point out, Smith's notion of virtue diverged from that of the political participant and martially courageous citizen. Virtue for Smith was a fundamentally private affair of the balancing and controlling of passions.

the division of labor, the very defining characteristics of commercial society, may systematically deaden the mental and moral capabilities of the mass of workers to the point that they are barely capable of a satisfactory social existence. Furthermore, as Dickey (1986) has argued, there is considerable evidence that in the later years of his life Smith even began to despair of the ability of properly working markets to keep self-interest in check. The connection of commerce and justice was by no means inevitable, and, unlike many of commercial society's current defenders, Smith's advocacy of this form of life was by no means consistently optimistic.

The connection of commerce and justice in Smith's work was thus a complex and often paradoxical one. It was an appreciation for these elements of social life that Smith believed was characteristic of the public-spirited individual and that his Science was supposed to convey. By satisfying the mind's preference for order and beauty, the Science of a Legislator aimed to turn these qualities to good use and to counteract the spirit of system that would turn to simple, dogmatic solutions. This suggests what is perhaps the most important lesson we can learn from a reexamination of Smith's thought. Smith's approach was that of a critical, skeptical thinker attempting to make sense of, and provide guidance during, a period that saw unprecedented transformations in social and economic life. It is by understanding his work in this light, rather than through deriving direct guidance from isolated elements of his thought, that we can learn most concerning our contemporary dilemmas and options.

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The Impact of Jurisdictional Boundaries: An Individual-Level Test of the Tiebout Model

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Despite the considerable research attention accorded the Tiebout model, its empirical foundations are not especially well developed. That is, existing empirical investigations of the Tiebout model only indirectly address many of its central assumptions, given their nearly exclusive focus on aggregate-level analyses when the model evaluates institutional arrangements on the basis of a number of assumptions about individual attitudes and behaviors. This paper takes one step toward improving this situation by examining survey data on individual political behavior under two polar cases of institutional arrangement within metropolitan areas. By comparing the responses of five Louisville-area cities with those of their matched Lexington neighborhoods, we directly assess the impacts of jurisdictional arrangements on a number of attitudes and behaviors that underlie the Tiebout model.

The Tiebout model has served as one of the major theoretical frameworks for urban research for more than two decades. As originally presented by Tiebout (1956) and developed by Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961), the model suggested that, under certain assumptions having to do with mobility, information, and other factors, citizens may potentially create a quasi market of local public goods via "voting with their feet." One implication of the model, of course, is that jurisdictional boundaries in urban settings should be drawn so that citizens have numerous options in selecting tax-service packages within a metropolitan setting (Ostrom, 1973; Bish and Ostrom, 1973; Bish, 1971). This conclusion contrasted sharply with traditional civic-reform interpretations of optimal institutional arrangements, which had long been used to support the notion of consolidating local jurisdictions in metropolitan areas (Ostrom, 1972; Lyons, 1977). Thus, the Tiebout model has served to an-

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chor one end of a continuum of jurisdictional choice that continues to be a central focus of urban politics research.¹

Curiously, however, the empirical foundations of the Tiebout model are not especially well developed. Whatever the status of the model's theoretical underpinnings, existing empirical investigations only indirectly address many of its central assumptions (Sharp, 1986, pp. 136-37; Schneider and Logan, 1982, p. 97). More important, the model evaluates institutional arrangements (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren, 1961) on the basis of a number of assumptions about individual attitudes and behaviors. Yet, most of the purported tests of the model have been conducted at very high levels of aggregation, whether at the state or metropolitan level (e.g., Pack and Pack, 1978; Stein, 1987; Cebula, 1974; 1976; 1977; 1978; Cebula and Avery, 1983; Zodrow, 1983; DiLorenzo, 1983; Broder and Schmid, 1983; Lowery, 1982; Schneider and Logan, 1982; Parks and Ostrom, 1981; Parks, 1985; Schneider, 1986; Wagner and Weber, 1975). For example, many of these studies focus on the relative service delivery characteristics of fragmented and consolidated governments. While these analyses usefully test implications of the Tiebout model, they can only indirectly bear on the many individual-level propositions that provide it with such analytical power. Other studies, such as those by Cebula on migration issues, do address individual-level behaviors. Unfortunately, their reliance on aggregate data about such behaviors effectively precludes more detailed consideration of the attitudinal foundations of individual political action.

A few studies, primarily within the "citizen contacting" literature, attempt to address some of these individual-level propositions (e.g., Orbell and Uno, 1972). Especially important in this regard is Sharp's work (1982; 1984a, 1984b, 1984c, 1986), which attempts to assess some of the individual-level propositions of the model with both HUD national survey data and data from individual city surveys of citizens in Wichita and Kansas City. But, while Sharp's analysis is an important exception to the general lack of attention to the individual-level assumptions of the model, it too is limited. For example, her necessary reliance on secondary analysis of the HUD survey data precluded consideration of more than a limited range of propositions. And the individual studies of Wichita and Kansas City precluded examination of individual responses under varying institutional arrangements—the key issue in the debate over the institutional design implications of the Tiebout model.

¹ The number of models along this continuum has increased recently with the introduction of at least two more complex and closely related models of individual behavior under alternative institutional arrangements. Both Sharp (1984a) and Lyons and Lowery (1986) have developed models based on Hirschman's (1970) "Exit, Voice, Loyalty" model that serve to make the theoretical issues associated with the choice of urban institutions more complex than the simple choice between consolidation or fragmentation.

In sum, empirical work on the underlying assumptions of the Tiebout model has not matched the theoretical attention it has received. This paper takes one step toward improving this situation by examining survey data on individual political attitudes and behaviors under two polar cases of institutional arrangement within metropolitan areas. Specifically, we examine a number of the underlying assumptions of the Tiebout model by comparing survey responses for five cities within the Louisville, Kentucky, metropolitan area to responses from five matched neighborhoods in Lexington, Kentucky. The latter research site represents a typical consolidated urban-county government while the former closely matches the ideal, fragmented institutional arrangement of supporters of the Tiebout model. By comparing the responses of five Louisville-area cities with those of their matched Lexington neighborhoods, we directly assess the impacts of jurisdictional arrangements on a number of attitudes and behaviors that underlie the Tiebout model.

THE PRECONDITIONS AND OPERATION OF THE TIEBOUT MODEL

The Tiebout model—as developed by Tiebout (1956) and applied to the question of drawing institutional boundaries by Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961)—has a number of underlying, individual-level attitudinal assumptions that are central to its institutional design recommendations. Quite often, though, these assumptions and hypotheses are only indirectly articulated or remain ambiguous.

The Preconditions of the Tiebout Model

For citizens to effectively “vote with their feet,” several conditions must be met. Most of the theoretical literature on the Tiebout model focuses on the stated assumption of perfect mobility. But the model makes a number of additional, more implicit assumptions about individuals that are central to its institutional design conclusions. First, it is implicitly assumed that individuals are attentive to the tax-service packages of city government in making location choices. That is, citizens may be fully mobile, but if they are not attentive to local goods and service packages in making their location choices, then that potential mobility need not lead to use of the exit alternative. Thus, if they view the county government or some other broader level of local government as the most important in their daily lives, we might not expect that levels and mixes of city services provided by particular subunits of government within the county would necessarily drive locational and exit behaviors.

Second, the Tiebout model implicitly assumes that citizens in fragmented institutional arrangements (i.e., metropolitan or urban areas served by numerous units of local government) are aware of alternatives to their present location choice. This, of course, is part of the full information assumption. Quite simply, for the exit alternative to work, not only must there be viable

alternatives to an individual's present tax-service package. Also, citizens must be aware of those alternatives. Without such awareness, no level of dissatisfaction will lead to voting with one's feet. And, more important, the general low salience of local government to most citizens suggests that the assumption of full information is at least questionable.

Third, the Tiebout model implicitly assumes that citizens will be motivated to exit because of dissatisfaction with their current tax-service package. While this is clearly assumed, the point remains ambiguous (Lyons and Lowery, 1986). The mere existence of Tiebout-like institutional arrangements may lead citizens to initially locate in jurisdictions that fully match their preferences. Stein (1987) has labeled this interpretation of the Tiebout model the "sorting hypothesis." If the sorting hypothesis is valid, then, we would see little current dissatisfaction-based exit in Tiebout-like communities because the initial sorting process would have perfectly coordinated citizen preferences with available combinations of local taxes and services.

There is, however, reason to expect that the sorting hypothesis does not provide a valid account of how the Tiebout model operates. That is, the hypothesis assumes that citizens initially vote with their feet by congregating in homogeneous communities with quite different tax-service packages. But while Stein (1987; Pack and Pack, 1978) and others have found heterogeneous tax-service packages across jurisdictions within metropolitan areas, the populations of these jurisdictions have not been found to be socioeconomically homogeneous as would be expected if the sorting hypothesis were true. Initial sorting of metropolitan populations into homogeneous communities does not seem sufficient to provide evidence for this interpretation of the operation of the Tiebout model.

An alternative interpretation of the model would suggest that voting with one's feet is an ongoing process that never resolves to a static and stable distribution of population across metropolitan jurisdictions. That is, voter preferences for tax and spending packages might be expected to change over time. Moreover, local jurisdictions may alter their tax-service packages over time in a manner that reduces the level of satisfaction of some citizens. In either case, this interpretation of the Tiebout model suggests that there will nearly always be some level of dissatisfaction-motivated exit within the metropolitan area. Indeed, we would argue that this interpretation of the operation of the model is consistent with Tiebout's original analysis. As he noted: "Except when this system is in equilibrium, there will be a subset of consumer-voters who are discontented with the patterns of their community. Another set will be satisfied. Given the assumption about mobility . . . [t]he consumer voter moves to the community that satisfies his preference pattern. The act of moving or failing to move is crucial. Moving or failing to move replaces the usual market test of willingness to buy a good and reveals the consumer-voter's demand for public goods" (1956, p. 420). And, consistent with this view of move-

nent as an ongoing process, most empirical tests of the Tiebout model examine current movement of dissatisfied citizens (Cebula, 1976; 1977; 1978) for evidence of the Tiebout model's operation, not initial sorting into homogeneous subpopulations. Therefore, we follow the strategy of this existing literature.

In sum, for exit to be used in the manner outlined by the Tiebout model, at least some citizens in fragmented jurisdictions must be attentive to local government, must be aware of alternatives, and must be dissatisfied with their present tax-service package. Unfortunately, the model does not provide clear standards about the minimum level of these criteria that must obtain for the model to work. For example, how many people must be attentive to the local government's tax-service package for the model to work? How many people must be dissatisfied with the tax-service packages of their cities for the model to work? Clearly, some citizens must meet the underlying assumptions of the model, but how many are enough?

Given the lack of absolute standards on the minimum levels of these criteria necessary for the model to be operative, we believe that they can best be studied in a *comparative institutional* setting where responses of those living in fragmented jurisdictions can be compared with those of citizens operating within the essential features of the civic reform model of consolidated government. Thus, we can transform most of the hypotheses into comparative statements about their relative levels across fragmented and nonfragmented jurisdictions. For example, we would expect that, since there are objectively more jurisdictions in their environment, citizens in fragmented jurisdictions are likely to be more aware of the location alternative than citizens in consolidated city-county governments. If this objective condition is not recognized, fragmentation need not lead to greater exercise of the exit alternative. By shifting to comparative institutional analysis, then, we can better assess the levels of the criterion variables where no absolute standards exist.

Moreover, the use of this comparative jurisdictional strategy will allow us to directly address the important question of the impact of alternative institutional arrangements. That is, what difference do alternative institutional arrangements make in providing for the preconditions essential to the operation of the Tiebout model? If there are no differences in these attitudes between citizens in fragmented and consolidated arrangements, it would seem that institutional structure would not make a great deal of difference in either facilitating or inhibiting the operation of Tiebout-like behaviors on the part of citizens, though it may very well still influence other aspects of the local service delivery system.

The Operation of the Tiebout Model

If all of the preconditions are met, we would expect the Tiebout model to be operative in situations of fragmented government. That is, we would ex-

pect those in fragmented jurisdictions to exercise the exit option when dissatisfied. Again, however, it is very unclear how much exit is needed to make local officials responsive to citizen preferences. Based on partial data and some important assumptions, Sharp (1986, p. 153) estimated that 2.4% of Kansas City's population intended to engage in Tiebout exiting over several years. Given the assumptions involved, this estimate must be regarded with caution. But, even if we accept it on its face, we do not know if this figure is high or low relative to the requirements of the model. Even more important, we do not know how much of this exiting behavior is influenced by the manner in which jurisdictional boundaries are drawn. Therefore, in addition to looking at absolute levels of use of the exit option using more direct measures of the number of Tiebout exiters, we can conduct our analysis on a comparative institutional basis by contrasting the levels of use of the exit option in fragmented versus consolidated cities.

Clearly, we need not necessarily see greater use of the exit option under conditions of fragmented institutional arrangements for the Tiebout model to be effective. As noted above, one implication of the sorting hypothesis interpretation is that citizens are expected, through their initial location choices from among a set of fragmented jurisdictions, to be better satisfied with their tax-service packages than they would have been had their choice been restricted to a single consolidated jurisdiction.

More important, a number of proponents, as well as critics, of the institutional arrangements implied by the Tiebout model have belatedly come to recognize that exit is costly. It is a drastic response (e.g., Oakerson, Parks and Bell, 1987; Orbell and Uno, 1972). Accordingly, they have begun to reconceptualize the behavioral predictions of the model. Two such reinterpretations have been articulated.

First, the simple availability of the exit option, it has been argued, serves to enhance the effectiveness and level of use of "voice" behaviors—complaints to officials (Oakerson, Parks, and Bell, 1987; Kenyon, 1984; Sharp 1986, pp. 138–39; Orbell and Uno, 1972). This argument is predicated on both Hirschman's (1970) observation that voice will only be effective if the exit option serves as a threat to give it meaning and the observation that contacting officials should be easier in smaller communities where officials are friends and neighbors. Thus, we might expect that higher levels of voice behaviors should be found in fragmented jurisdictions than in consolidated jurisdictions if the Tiebout model offers a viable account of actual patterns of citizen interactions with their local government.

Second, the fragmented jurisdictional arrangements that are consistent with the exit option of the Tiebout model are also viewed as supportive of other, less-extreme forms of exit. These methods of exit would take the form of the citizen remaining in the jurisdiction but opting out of the municipal service net for a specific service. Particularized forms of exit might include a

number of service options—such as relying on volunteers or self-help—that would fall under the general heading of “coproduction” of public services. For instance, Lyons and Lowery (1986) have identified individual contracting for services that are provided by local government, but are the object of dissatisfaction on the part of the citizen, as a particularized form of exit. Without question, the Tiebout model and individual contracting for alternative services are viewed as complimentary options within the general framework of public choice theory (Savas, 1982). Fragmented jurisdictions, because they are viewed as encouraging citizens to think of tax-service package options more generally, may tend to encourage greater use of this more particularized exit option as well. Comparatively, then, we would expect to find greater levels of individual contracting for alternative services in fragmented jurisdictional arrangements than in metropolitan areas with consolidated city-county governments.

While the voice and contracting hypotheses are plausible given the existing public choice literature, alternative hypotheses are also plausible. That is, the public choice literature tends to view all nonbureaucratic service options as a distinct set of compatible alternatives to traditional forms of service provision (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren, 1961; Bish, 1971; Bish and Ostrom, 1973). The general expectation developed in this literature is that factors that serve to promote one form of nontraditional response, such as fragmented jurisdictions and the Tiebout exit response, should also promote other forms of response to dissatisfaction with traditional services. Thus, we have hypothesized that fragmented jurisdictions should lead to more exit, voice, and private contracting.

An alternative perspective, based on Lyons and Lowery's (1986) analysis, would suggest that jurisdictional boundaries may enhance some forms of response to dissatisfaction with public services and minimize others. In particular, because consolidated jurisdictions increase the cost of exit by reducing the location options a citizen might have, we might find increased reliance on other forms of response to dissatisfaction in precisely these jurisdictions. From this perspective, voice and private contracting for services might become even more important, rather than less, in consolidated jurisdictions simply because the exit option is foreclosed. Therefore, we might expect to find opposite of what is generally implied in the public choice literature; the propensity to employ nontraditional responses to dissatisfaction with public services may not be related to jurisdictional boundaries in a unidimensional manner.

Generally, however, the propensity to use private contracting, as one form of particularized exit, or voice is not analyzed in terms of jurisdictional boundaries. Rather, wealth is usually identified as the key variable determining a citizen's likelihood of invoking the contracting option. Miller (1981, p. 83), for example, in his analysis of contracting in the Los Angeles metropolitan

area, concluded that the formation and operation of "minimal cities" that rely on extensive private provision of public services was based on a desire of property owners to avoid funding of redistributive services. Wealth is clearly important in facilitating voice and private contracting, probably far more important than jurisdictional boundaries. To assess the independent impact of jurisdictional boundaries, then, we need to control for differences in wealth across jurisdictions. And, once again, the use of a comparative jurisdictional design is critical; by comparing jurisdictions that are similar in all important respects but the framing of jurisdictional boundaries, we should be able to assess the specific role of boundaries in facilitating or inhibiting voice and private contracting for services.

TESTING THE TIEBOUT MODEL

The Lexington-Fayette and Louisville-Jefferson County Surveys

In order to adequately test the Tiebout hypotheses, it is imperative that survey data be gathered from individuals living in a variety of discrete socioeconomic worlds in urban settings with varying forms of institutional arrangements. As we have seen, previous assessments of the attitudinal foundations of the Tiebout model have been severely restricted by the limitations imposed in the use of secondary data and the use of single-city surveys. Aside from insuring greater generalizability, such a research strategy is also necessitated by the need to control for the nonsituational determinants of political participation (i.e., those arising from individual predispositions, wealth, social position, or any of the other factors examined in the traditional political participation literature) that have little to do with our interest in the impact of jurisdictional boundaries on attitudes and behaviors associated with the Tiebout model. Obviously, it would be prohibitively expensive to draw samples of every conceivable type of socioeconomic world discussed in the literature or to replicate the study in a large number of urban areas throughout the United States. Therefore, we focused on five basic types of socioeconomic worlds and conducted surveys of these socioeconomic worlds in two different urban areas, one of which can be characterized as having a fragmented political system and the other as having a consolidated system. Thus, a total of ten surveys were conducted.

The two research sites are Louisville-Jefferson County and Lexington-Fayette County, Kentucky. Louisville-Jefferson County, with a population (1990) of 685,004 contains more than ninety units of general purpose local governments (i.e., incorporated municipalities). It is, therefore, prototypical of the kind of governmentally fragmented urban environment proposed by the Tiebout model. However, the Lexington-Fayette County (1990 population of 204,000) setting, with its fourteen-year-old consolidated city-county govern-

ment, provides a research environment where individuals living in the same kinds of spatially defined social worlds have little chance of finding the kinds of conditions associated with the Tiebout model within the confines of the county itself.

Based on an examination of the available census data concerning all of the incorporated cities in Jefferson County other than the city of Louisville, coupled with tract and block data concerning various sections of Lexington-Fayette County, we identified five distinct, spatially defined social worlds in each of these two communities that would vary in terms of such factors as socioeconomic status (SES), race, age, and levels of familism versus nonfamilism. The only major difference is that in the Louisville setting the "boundaries" of each of these social worlds also happen to correspond very closely to the official boundaries of an incorporated city; whereas in Lexington their equally spatially defined "mirror-images," in terms of basic socioeconomic characteristics, are forced to exist and operate within the context of a larger consolidated city-county government. The ten sites across the two research settings and the five social worlds, as well as their defining characteristics, are identified in table 1.²

Households located within each of the ten purposively selected areas were identified from the Municipal Directory published by R. L. Polk, for each of the urban areas in question.³ Approximately three hundred households were selected in each of the ten social worlds to provide a total of approximately three thousand potential respondents to the study. In four instances—two in the Lexington area and two in the Louisville area—the number of households with listed telephone numbers was less than or equal to our desired figure of three hundred. In these cases, the University of Kentucky Survey Research

² Although socioeconomic status is a very relative term, the definitions used in this case were based on conventions related to household income and education. Familism and nonfamilism were determined on the basis of census data indicating the presence or absence of children in a majority of households. (See Lyons and Engstrom, 1971, for a discussion of survey versus aggregate measures of familistic versus nonfamilistic life-styles.) Although it is possible to identify social worlds composed of younger, nonfamilistic households, the decision was made in this instance to focus on spatially defined nonfamilistic areas that also happen to be composed of relatively large numbers of persons over sixty-five years of age. Such a strategy allows us not only to include nonfamilistic lifestyles in the study but also to introduce more variation on the age dimension of defining social worlds.

Two factors were held relatively constant in selecting the five social worlds—type of dwelling and occupancy status. All of the incorporated cities in the Louisville-Jefferson County setting were predominantly single unit, in terms of dwelling type, and mostly owner occupied. Although the theoretical import of these factors is perhaps open to more speculation, given the current housing market, traditional wisdom would suggest that being able to control for such variables ought to be given some consideration.

³ A simple random-digit dialing technique was not a viable option since telephone numbers, including the first three prefix numbers, are rarely assigned on the basis of areas that conform to the kinds of spatial considerations that were imperative for this project.

TABLE 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF MATCHED CITIES AND NEIGHBORHOODS

Lexington-Fayette Neighborhood (Consolidated)	Louisville-Jefferson Independent City (Fragmented)	Characterization
Blueberry Hills	Minor Lane Heights	Moderate to low SES, younger, more familistic, predominantly white
Chinoe	Beechwood Village	Moderate to low SES, more elderly, less familistic, predominantly white
Stonewall	Barbourmeade	Moderate to high SES, middle age, more familistic, predominantly white
Crestwood/Shadeland	Windy Hills	Moderate to high SES, more elderly, less familistic, predominantly white
Green Acres	Newburg	Moderate to low SES, younger, more familistic, predominantly black

Center (UKSRC), which was engaged to conduct the telephone interviews for this study, was instructed to survey the universe of households. In the other six cases, the UKSRC was instructed to use random selection techniques to identify the three hundred households with listed telephone numbers to be surveyed. In all cases, random selection tables were used by the UKSRC to select the adult in each household to be interviewed. Information on the number of households, number of surveys, and response rates is presented in table 2.

To assess whether the five matched sets of social worlds selected on the basis of 1980 census data had, in fact, generated comparable pairs of research sites, tests of the differences of means (or proportions) between each social world in the consolidated government setting and its counterpart in the fragmented setting were performed using data from the telephone surveys concerning such variables as age, income, education, race, home ownership status, and number of children under eighteen years of age living at home. For the most part, the differences were small and statistically nonsignificant, providing good support for our matching procedures.

Some statistically significant differences were observed, however.⁴ Most

⁴ A summary of the demographic information concerning the households in the survey is provided in table 9. The figures are the mean or proportion values for the specified demographic variables for the matched pairs of research sites. Information on the indicators used in these tests is listed

TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF SURVEY SITE HOUSEHOLDS,
TELEPHONES SURVEYED AND RESPONSE RATES

Consolidated/Fragmented Government Matched Sites	N of Households with Listed Phone #	N of Valid Phone # Surveyed	N of Completed Interviews
x Blueberry Hills	310 ^a	259	211 (81.5)
u Minor Lane Heights	307 ^a	240	157 (65.4)
x Chinoe	753 ^b	329	225 (68.4)
u Beechwood Village	497 ^b	303	166 (62.0)
x Stonewall	661 ^b	319	254 (79.6)
u Barbourmeade	290 ^a	254	173 (68.1)
x Crestwood/Shadeland	858 ^b	316	253 (80.1)
u Winds Hills	657 ^b	301	161 (60.1)
x Green Acres	302 ^a	264	206 (77.6)
u Newburg	691 ^b	276	166 (59.7)

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the percent of valid telephone numbers called that resulted in completed interviews.

^aAll households with telephone numbers listed in the municipal directory were defined as a universe to be surveyed.

^bA random sample of approximately three hundred households was drawn from the list of all households with telephone numbers listed in the municipal directory.

not all, seemed to have little substantive import. For example, significant differences ($p < .05$) in racial composition were observed in three of the matched pairs of social worlds even though we had selected our survey cities to be predominantly white or black. In all three cases, however, the racial composition of the paired social worlds were as predicted from the 1990 census (i.e., they were predominantly and overwhelmingly white or black despite statistically discernible differences in proportions computed from information given by respondents on this dichotomous measure of race). Simply put, one of the matched pairs of sites had somewhat more white (or black) respondents than its matched site, though both had very, very few. Similar arguments can be made for the significant differences observed for most of our other nominally and ordinally measured demographic variables. And, for the two demographic variables measured with interval-level indicators (age and number of children), no statistically significant differences were observed between the paired research sites.

Aside from its practicality, there are several other advantages in using these two particular research settings. First, both research sites share the same, broad cultural milieu, based on Elazar's (1972) classification scheme. Second,

the school systems in both Louisville-Jefferson County and Lexington-Fayette County are consolidated. This will allow us to focus squarely on the impacts of institutional structure on tax-service packages other than education. Third, both research sites are in the same state, thereby allowing us to control for the influence of differing patterns of state/local fiscal centralization, tax reliance, and legal requirements pertaining to the provision of local tax-service packages.

A basic assumption of this design is that by sampling five similar socioeconomic worlds in two research settings it will be possible to assess the impact of jurisdictional boundaries on the basis of ten different samples—five from a fragmented setting where each political world is essentially homogeneous in socioeconomic terms and therefore presumably quite consensual in terms of its political style and five from a consolidated setting where the boundaries of political worlds embrace a more heterogeneous set of social worlds and where each social world is placed in a presumably more competitive political posture

Findings

The first prerequisite of the Tiebout model in fragmented institutional arrangements is citizens' *attention to their most local level of government* in making their location choices. To assess this prerequisite, respondents in the five Louisville-Jefferson County research sites were asked, "What is the most important government in your daily life—your particular city or the county government?" Respondents in the five Lexington-Fayette County cases were not asked this question since their city and county governments are merged.

As seen in table 3, the responses of the fragmented government respondents do not provide much support for the attentiveness assumption. That is the respondents overwhelmingly pointed to their county government as the

TABLE 3
PRIMARY GOVERNMENTAL JURISDICTION ORIENTATION
OF FRAGMENTED ARRANGEMENT (LOUISVILLE)
CASE RESPONDENTS

City	Percent Oriented to City Government	Percent Oriented to County Government	N
Minor Lane Heights	30.76	69.23	143
Beechwood Village	35.06	64.94	174
Barbourmoode	29.31	71.69	166
Windy Hills	26.54	73.46	162
Newburg	20.13	79.87	154

most important in their daily lives; across the five cities, only 20.13% to 35.06% of the respondents focused on their particular city government as the most important. Thus, for most respondents, the tax-service packages of their city government would not seem to play an especially important role in their location decisions. And even this level of attentiveness probably overstates the role of taxes and services in location choice given previous findings that government taxes and services—whether at the city or county level—are secondary issues in individual location and exiting decisions relative to more personal considerations, such as income, job, and family (Sharp, 1986).

Beyond attentiveness to local government, we have suggested that some realistic *perception of the availability of alternatives* is a prerequisite of the Tiebout model. To assess this, respondents were asked, "How would you rate your chances of finding another place to live within the [Fayette or Jefferson] County area that has the kind of local tax and service package that you prefer?" The response set included very good, only fair, and poor.

Contrary to expectations, the results were quite mixed across the five matched sets of surveys. As seen in table 4, where the responses are cross-tabulated with jurisdictional type, for three of the matched sets—Blueberry Hills—Minor Lane Heights, Chinoe—Beechwood Village, and Crestwood/Shadeland—Windy Hills—respondents in the consolidated government jurisdictions exhibited higher levels of confidence of finding an alternative jurisdiction with a preferred tax-service package.⁵ Moreover, in one of these matched sets, the difference generated a significant χ^2 value. For the other two matched sets, however, the respondents in the fragmented institutional arrangement demonstrated higher levels of confidence, a finding that is more consistent with the objective situation in which they find themselves. And in both of these cases, significant χ^2 values were generated. Given these mixed results, it appears that perceptions of alternative availability have little relation to the actual or objective availability of alternatives as influenced by jurisdictional boundaries.

The pattern is similar for *levels of dissatisfaction* with local government services. Two questions were used to assess levels of dissatisfaction. First, re-

⁵ One possible explanation for this finding is the fact that the Lexington-Fayette Urban County government does offer a variety of tax-service districts, as do nearly all consolidated governments. Thus, there is some choice of tax-service packages even within consolidated governments despite the caricature of such governmental arrangements presented in the anticonsolidation literature. Given this, it may not be surprising that the citizens in such arrangements perceive some level of choice. One implication of this is that the caricature of the consolidated government offered in the anticonsolidation literature is something of a straw man that rarely has empirical content.

However, it should also be noted that four of the five Lexington-Fayette neighborhoods examined in this research were in the full-service districts within the urban-county government; their citizens received the most complete service package offered by the city and, correspondingly, were exposed to the highest level of taxes. The exception was the Stonewall neighborhood, which was slated to enter a full-service district beginning in 1990.

TABLE 4

PERCEPTIONS OF ALTERNATIVES BY INSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENT—MATCHED LEXINGTON AND LOUISVILLE SITES

Perceptions of Alternatives	Consolidated Government	Fragmented Government	N	χ^2
	Blueberry Hills	Minor Lane Heights		
Poor	10.62%	17.98%	47	
Fair	40.09%	41.00%	140	
Good	49.27%	41.00%	159	
Total	207	139	346	4.568
	Chinoe	Beechwood Village		
Poor	11.76%	18.58%	51	
Fair	31.01%	44.23%	127	
Good	57.21%	37.17%	165	
Total	187	156	343	13.776***
	Stonewall	Barbourmeade		
Poor	17.12%	11.92%	55	
Fair	33.33%	23.64%	106	
Good	49.53%	64.23%	204	
Total	216	151	367	7.786**
	Crestwood/Shadeland	Winds Hills		
Poor	10.64%	14.89%	43	
Fair	32.87%	31.20%	115	
Good	56.48%	54.60%	199	
Total	216	141	357	1.013
	Green Acres	Newburg		
Poor	21.87%	13.29%	61	
Fair	43.22%	39.86%	140	
Good	34.90%	46.95%	134	
Total	192	143	335	6.472**

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

pondents were asked, "Would you say that you are currently very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way [name of local government] is doing its job?" And second, they were asked, "In general, how good a job do you feel the [name of local government] is currently doing in providing services?" Responses to the latter question included excellent, good,

fair, and poor and were inversely coded to be consistent with our focus on levels of dissatisfaction. Since the two items were highly correlated (.67), they were combined to form a dissatisfaction scale.

Differences in the mean responses across the five matched sets of cases are presented in table 5. Sharp differences in dissatisfaction were observed across the jurisdictional types for all five matched sets. But in two cases—Chinoe-Beechwood Village and Crestwood/Shadeland-Windy Hills—dissatisfaction with government services was higher in the consolidated government case than in the fragmented government case. For the other three matched sets of surveys, the opposite pattern was found, with the fragmented government condition exhibiting higher levels of dissatisfaction. Thus, jurisdictional structure does not seem to have any strong relation to current dissatisfaction, and it would seem more likely that local factors account for current dissatisfaction. If dissatisfaction is what drives individuals to invoke the exit response, there would seem to be no inherently higher or lower motivation to exit jurisdictions depending on whether or not they are organized in a manner consistent with the Tiebout model.

To determine if *actual intentions to exit*, as opposed to dissatisfaction, differ across the two types of jurisdictions, respondents were first asked how likely they were to move in the next two or three years. Those indicating "definitely

TABLE 5
CURRENT DISSATISFACTION DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TESTS FOR
ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS—MATCHED
LEXINGTON AND LOUISVILLE SITES

Consolidated/Fragmented Government Matched Sets	Mean Dissatisfaction	Standard Deviation	N	Difference of Means	t Value
Lex Blueberry Hills Lou Minor Lane Heights	2.53 2.78	0.99 1.25	210 153	25**	2.06
Lex Chinoe Lou Beechwood Village	2.00 1.29	1.09 1.15	220 185	-71***	-6.36
Lex Stonewall Lou Barbourmeade	2.43 3.76	1.08 1.54	247 169	1.33***	9.76
Lex Crestwood/Shadeland Lou Windy Hill	2.14 1.79	1.08 1.35	242 167	-35***	-2.76
Lex Green Acres Lou Newburg	2.60 4.22	1.28 1.62	199 139	1.62***	9.86

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

will" or "probably will move" were then asked if the move would entail leaving their current local unit of government. Those who answered yes were then asked, "What are the two or three most important reasons you will or might move out of [name of local government]?" Those making any mention of taxes, local government services, political corruption, or anything pertaining to local government performance were coded as having "regime-government" type reasons for moving. All other reasons (e.g., job, distance from relatives, divorce, retirement, health, etc.) were coded as "personal-economic" type reasons for moving.

To be coded as an "Exiters" for this study, the respondent had to give a yes response to the first two questions and a mention of a regime-government reason in response to the last question. This is admittedly a far more stringent measure of exit than used in any other study that we know of, including those by Sharp (1984c) and Orbel and Uno (1972). However, it has the great advantage of tapping precisely the conditions that underlie the notion of exit as set forth in the Tiebout model. Moving for reasons other than what we have called regime-government type reasons does not satisfy the condition of the model that citizens use exit and locational choices to shop for an optimal package of public goods at the lowest possible costs relative to their preferences in a competitive market of differing tax-service packages within a given urban area. Moving because of a job transfer or to get closer to one's place of work is not a very Tiebout-like kind of exit behavior, though of considerable importance to the more general study of demographics of public service.

Cross-tabulations of responses to this final measure with type of city structure for the five matched sets of surveys are presented in table 6, where it can be seen that higher levels of actual intentions to exit were found for the fragmented government cases as would be expected by the Tiebout model. More exiters were found in the fragmented government condition in all five matched sets of cases, though only one produced a significant χ^2 value. However, the key finding is the across-the-board low level of use of the exit response. The actual number of exiters is extremely small, ten or fewer, in each of the ten survey sites. Therefore, while the differences between the fragmented and consolidated cases follow a pattern that might be expected by the Tiebout model, both the differences between the levels of exit found in the matched cases as well as the absolute levels of intentions to exit are so small that they raise serious doubt about the viability of the exit threat to seriously influence the decisions made by government officials.⁶



⁶ While previous research has hardly shown exit to be a major form of political participation (e.g., Sharp, 1986, p. 153), our findings suggest that Tiebout exiting is even less frequent than had been thought. One possible reason for this is our use of actual measures of intention to exit rather than combining simple mobility data with assumptions about the number moving for regime-related reasons.

TABLE 6
LIKELIHOOD OF MOVING FOR REGIME/GOVERNMENT REASON BY
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT—MATCHED
LEXINGTON AND LOUISVILLE SITES

Likelihood of Moving	Consolidated Government	Fragmented Government	N	χ^2
	Blueberry Hills	Minor Lane Heights		
Low	96.17%	95.54%	365	
High	1.82%	4.45%	11	
Total	219	157	376	5.243**
	Chinoe	Beechwood Village		
Low	99.55%	99.46%	410	
High	0.44%	0.53%	2	
Total	224	186	412	.000
	Stonewall	Barbourmeade		
Low	96.81%	94.25%	422	
High	1.18%	1.71%	6	
Total	253	175	428	1.74
	Crestwood/Shadeland	Windy Hills		
Low	99.20%	98.89%	430	
High	0.79%	1.10%	4	
Total	253	181	434	.00
	Green Acres	Newburg		
Low	97.59%	93.93%	356	
High	2.40%	6.06%	15	
Total	206	165	373	.999

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

If actual exit is not the manner in which institutional fragmentation or consolidation primarily influences political behavior, what of other forms of response to dissatisfaction? We previously noted that recent theorists have suggested that the primary manner in which the Tiebout model will alter patterns of political behavior is not exit but voice and, perhaps, efforts to privately contract for services already provided by government. Based on the work of Lyons and Lowery (1996), we also indicated that the exact opposite might be

plausibly expected. To assess differences in the *voice behaviors* of citizens in fragmented and consolidated government settings, respondents were asked if they had (1) "ever attended a meeting or meetings called to discuss problems in your neighborhood or local community"; (2) "ever belonged to any organization attempting to solve problems in your neighborhood or local community"; (3) "ever helped to organize a petition drive regarding problems in your neighborhood or local community"; (4) "ever telephoned or written to an elected official or agency of the [name of local government] regarding problems in your neighborhood or local community"; (5) "ever signed a petition regarding any particular problem in your neighborhood or local community", or (6) "ever met informally with neighbors to work on solving problems concerning local government services in your neighborhood or community." Positive responses were coded one and negative responses zero and were combined to form a voice scale (reliability $\alpha = .68$).

Tests of differences of means on this scale across the five matched sets of survey responses are presented in table 7. Contrary to the expectations of Oakerson, Parks, and Bell (1987), Kenyon (1984), and Hirschman (1970) greater availability of the exit option seems to have little impact on voice behaviors. That is, higher levels of voice behaviors were found in consolidated government settings for three of the five matched sets, and two of these differences—for Stonewall-Barbourmeade and Crestwood/Shadeland-

TABLE 7
VOICE DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TESTS FOR ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS—MATCHED LEXINGTON AND LOUISVILLE SITES

Consolidated/Fragmented Government Matched Sets	Mean Voice	Standard Error	N	Difference of Means	t Value
Lex. Blueberry Hills Lou. Minor Lane Heights	2.30 2.52	1.86 1.70	217 155	22	.20
Lex. Chinne Lou. Beechwood Village	2.44 2.24	1.89 1.67	218 155	- .20	-1.14
Lex. Stonewall Lou. Barbourmeade	3.55 3.22	1.63 1.45	252 173	- .33**	-2.20
Lex. Crestwood/Shadeland Lou. Windy Hills	3.14 ^a 2.85	1.73 1.77	246 176	-.29*	-1.77
Lex. Green Acres Lou. Newburg	2.45 2.49	1.83 1.93	208 163	.04	.20

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

Windy Hills—were significant at the .10 level or better. If anything, relative lack of a viable exit alternative seems to enhance the exercise of voice behaviors, though the results are obviously too weak to conclude that the alternative Lyons and Lowery (1986) view is unambiguously supported.

The remaining response to dissatisfaction is *targeted exit or private contracting* for services already provided by the city. We had hypothesized that such private contracting might be expected to be higher in fragmented jurisdictions than in jurisdictions with consolidated governments, if the general implication of the public choice model that nonalternative service options tend to be enhanced by a common set of institutional-political factors is valid. Alternatively, however, we noted that the lack of an effective exit option in consolidated jurisdictions might increase the propensity of citizens in those units to rely on private contracting for services. To assess levels of private contracting, respondents were asked the following, "In recent years private companies have started to offer a number of services that were traditionally provided by local governments like [name of local government] How about you? Have you or members of your household ever considered looking for some way to have a private company provide a service that is currently offered by [name of local government]?" In a follow-up question, respondents were asked what that service was, with approximately two-thirds of those saying they had considered contracting for service mentioning garbage service and one-third mentioning police service. Only a handful of respondents across the five surveys mentioned any other form of service contracting.

The responses to the general contracting question are cross-tabulated with type of jurisdiction in table 8, where the failure of the public choice model expectations are quite evident. In four of the five matched survey sets, respondents in the fragmented government exhibited lower levels of private contracting behavior than respondents in their matched consolidated governmental setting, and three of those differences generated significant χ^2 values. The expected difference was observed only for the Green Acres-Newburg case, and it generated a significant χ^2 value as well.

CONCLUSION

In sum, our results seem to provide little support for several of the underlying assumptions of the Tiebout model as developed by Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961) and extended by public choice scholars (Ostrom, 1973; Bish and Ostrom, 1973; Bish, 1971). Contrary to the expectations flowing from the model, most citizens in cities with fragmented institutional arrangements do not seem to focus on the city as the central source of goods and service provision and, paradoxically, are somewhat less likely to perceive high levels of alternative availability in comparison to citizens in consolidated institutional settings (see table 9). Furthermore, patterns of dissatisfaction were found to be largely unrelated to institutional arrangement. Thus, it would seem that

TABLE 8
CONSIDERED PRIVATIZED SERVICES BY INSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENT—MATCHED LEXINGTON AND LOUISVILLE SITES

Considered Privatization	Consolidated Government	Fragmented Government	N	χ^2
	Blueberry Hills	Minor Lane Heights		
No	86 17%	93 58%	333	
Yes	13 82%	6 41%	40	
Total	217	156	373	4.466*
	Chunoe	Beechwood Village		
No	95 04%	97 31%	392	
Yes	4 95%	2 68%	16	
Total	222	186	408	8.44
	Stonewall	Barbourmeade		
No	60 95%	88 88%	345	
Yes	23 10%	11 11%	77	
Total	251	171	422	9.025**
	Crestwood/Shadeland	Windy Hills		
No	75 40%	92 00%	348	
Yes	24 50%	8 00%	75	
Total	245	175	423	18.254**
	Green Acres	Newburg		
No	96 11%	85 09%	335	
Yes	3 89%	14 90%	32	
Total	206	161	367	12.447**

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

institutional arrangements do not uniformly predispose citizens to harbor attitudes that might encourage them to act as Tiebout exiters.

Despite this, the respondents from the fragmented Louisville research settings did evidence greater support for the exit alternative and were somewhat more likely to opt for the Tiebout option of voting with their feet than were their Lexington counterparts. Still, the general message from this set of results must be a negative one in regard to the viability of the Tiebout model. Quite simply, even in the Louisville settings, so few citizens intended to in-

TABLE 9
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES FOR MATCHED
LEXINGTON AND LOUISVILLE SITES

Consolidated/Fragmented Government Matched Sets	Age	Educ	Income	Mean Race	Mean Occup	Rent/Own	Children
Lex Blueberry Hills	41.2	4.59	2.88	1.06	4.14	1.90	1.69
Lou Minor Lane Heights	43.6	3.15*	2.30*	1.01*	3.20*	1.92	1.90
Lex Chinoe	52.8	5.59	3.39	1.00	4.79	1.75	1.53
Lou Beechwood Village	53.4	5.55*	3.21	1.00	4.98	1.91*	1.52
Lex Stonewall	51.2	5.47	4.92	1.04	4.75	1.96	1.72
Lou Barbourmeade	49.9	5.42	4.88	1.04	4.95	1.99	1.76
Lex Crestwood/Shadeland	54.9	5.50	3.57	1.00	5.14	1.94	1.41
Lou Windy Hills	56.4	5.35	4.14*	1.05*	4.56*	1.98*	1.48
Lex Green Acres	44.9	3.46	2.33	1.88	3.26	1.82	1.91
Lou Newburg	43.8	3.52	2.16	1.93	3.17	1.96	1.93

Note: Description of Indicators: Age: stated in number of years, Education: 1 = 9 years of school or less, 2 = 9 to 11 years, 3 = completed high school, 4 = high school plus business or technical training, 5 = some college, 6 = completed college, 7 = graduate or professional school beyond college, Total Household Income: 0 = under \$10,000, 1 = \$10,000 to \$20,000, 2 = \$20,000 to \$30,000, 3 = \$30,000 to \$40,000, 4 = \$40,000 to \$50,000, 5 = \$50,000 to \$60,000, 6 = \$60,000 to \$70,000, 7 = \$70,000 to \$80,000, 8 = over \$80,000, Race: 1 = white, 2 = black, Occupation: 1 = laborer or machine operator, 2 = clerk or retailer, 3 = skilled technician, 4 = manager or supervisor, 5 = owner or chief executive officer, 6 = professional (M.D., dentist, engineer, professor, etc.), Home Ownership: 1 = rent, 2 = own, Number of Children: living at home: number

* $p < .01$

voke the exit response that it hardly appears to constitute a major form of political participation. While we do not know how many actual exiters it takes to lend operational meaning to the Tiebout model, the low numbers observed here hardly appear sufficient.

In contrast, institutional arrangements do seem to be related to two other forms of political action—individual privatization through contracting and voice activities. Importantly, however, the results appear to be just the opposite of those that would be expected by a proponent of the public choice model. That is, levels of both individual privatization contracting and voice were found to be somewhat higher in the consolidated government cases than in their matched fragmented cases. Moreover, the number of respondents involved in voice behaviors and the number that had considered private contracting were considerably higher than the number that intended to exit for

regime reasons, a finding that suggests that voice and contracting might be more important, or at least more common, responses to dissatisfaction than exiting. Given data limitations, we cannot determine if the voice and contracting findings are unambiguously a function of reduced options to exit or some other reason (Sharp, 1986). But, whether through exit or more indirect behavior patterns, fragmentation of jurisdictions in the manner consistent with the Tiebout model does not seem to be clearly associated with the behavioral hypotheses of that model.

The final implication of our results is methodological in nature. That is, for many of our findings, wide variations were found across the five matched sets of jurisdictions. This suggests that factors occurring in the independent cities and neighborhoods may be more important than the more general variable of institutional arrangement. Such variation would not show up in analyses of individual cities or even a single matched fragmented city-consolidated government pair. Caution, then, must be exercised in drawing broad conclusions about the impacts of jurisdictional arrangements from the kinds of limited data commonly found in tests of the Tiebout model. Multijurisdictional analyses of the types presented here are more appropriate for future study of the effects of local governmental institutions.

We recognize that our analysis is limited. At this point we have only investigated the impact of one variable on these attitudes and behaviors—the impact of jurisdictional boundaries; we have not developed a more comprehensive model to fully account for individual-level attitudes and behaviors in response to dissatisfaction beyond simply controlling for those variables via a comparison group design. Importantly, such a comprehensive model might identify conditions under which the Tiebout model might work better and/or subgroups of the population for whom jurisdictional boundaries might matter more. These conditions might include sociodemographic determinants of political participation as well as differences in patterns of political behavior across policy areas. In terms of this last issue, for instance, our study explicitly controlled for Tiebout-like behavior as a function of education policy, a policy area that might be better related to location decisions. Fortunately, the literature contains the theoretical foundations for such a more general model (e.g., Orbell and Uno, 1972; Sharp, 1984a; Lyons and Lowery, 1986), suggesting that the present analysis might be usefully extended.

Still, the literature has given great attention to the role of institutional boundaries, the central focus of this paper, and has generated a number of rather blunt and unconditional hypotheses about their impacts on individual attitudes and behaviors. Given our findings, it would seem that much of this theoretical work will need to be reconsidered. Boundary types just do not seem to influence attitudes and behaviors in the gross manner suggested by the Tiebout model. Switching from a consolidated structure to a fragmented structure would not seem to change political participation patterns very

greatly. And insofar that they do change, our results suggest that they may not be in the direction hypothesized by the Tiebout model. Therefore, it would seem that attention to more complex, conditional, and comprehensive models is needed.

However, this conclusion leaves us with something of a mystery. If citizen attitudes and behaviors are not associated with institutional structure in the manner suggested by the Tiebout model, then many of the aggregate-level findings on service delivery may have to be rethought. As noted in the introduction, many, though by no means all, of these studies have found that fragmented jurisdictions are believed to provide superior levels of services when compared to consolidated governments. And many of these studies account for this finding via reference to the Tiebout hypothesis and the threat of exit. If this is not the source of a fragmented government's reputed service advantage, as our results suggest, then something else must account for the difference. Fortunately, the literature contains many other propositions (Ostrom, 1972), many of which have to do with elite and institutional rather than citizen behavior, that might provide such a set of alternative explanations.

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Federal District Judges and Presidential Power During the Postwar Era

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Analysis of nearly two hundred federal district court decisions in cases involving the exercise of presidential power during the postwar era reveals two very different models of judicial decision making. In cases concerning presidential control of foreign and military policy, judicial decision making appears to be dominated by the recognition of fixed rules. So clear are these rules of deference to the executive that identification of the policy-making area alone constitutes an excellent predictor of case outcomes. By contrast, the statistical importance of such predictor variables—presidential prestige and whether the judge was appointed by the same president as that whose powers are at issue in the case—suggests much greater relativism in the judicial response when the president is challenged as a domestic policymaker. As far as the federal district courts are concerned, presidential power over foreign and military affairs may aptly be called “the power to command” while the executive’s power in domestic affairs is better thought of as “the power to persuade.” In these respective models, we find confirmation of a distinction developed half a century ago by the Supreme Court in *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.* (200 U.S. 304, 1936) that approximates the “two presidencies” concept.

Of all the conflicts that have shaken and scarred the modern-day study of public law, perhaps the most intense controversy has been over whether rule or discretion is the determinative factor in judicial decision making. The debate not only has been fierce but also has been endless.

The tension between these two factors is readily apparent in the jurisprudential discussions of Hart (1958; 1961), Wasserstrom (1961), and Dworkin (1977; 1985), for example. The model of rules suggests that the controlling force in judicial decision making is the logical application of formally stated rules. Thus, the description of an institution, in the traditional view, is taken to be the aggregate of statements made about its rules or legal powers (Ducat 1978, pp. 44–56; Weiler, 1968). The model of discretion that underlies the jurisprudential theory of legal realism and that constitutes much of the basis

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for modern study of judicial decision making (Becker, 1963) argues that the interpretation and creation of rules as public policy are the product of judicial choice, which is, in turn, conditioned by such factors as the judges' political attitudes, their personalities, and contemporary dynamics of the political system (Rohde and Spaeth, 1976; Schubert, 1963, 1965, 1974a, 1974b, 1975; Spaeth, 1979; Weiler, 1968).

The triumph of the discretionary model, after a quarter century of judicial behavior research, has today made it commonplace that law is what the judges say it is. Few public law scholars these days seem eager to make the case for adjudication as a rule-applying activity. There is also plenty of evidence to link the political values of presidential administrations with the appointment of federal judges who will effect basic policy changes through their decisions, although presidents have displayed differences in interest and commitment to judicial policymaking predicated on ideological conviction (Abraham, 1985; Carp and Rowland, 1983; Chase, 1972; Goldman, 1967, 1965, 1987, ch. 4; Pritchett, 1948; Tribe, 1985). Indeed, without such assumptions as these, much of the controversy surrounding many of the Nixon and Reagan appointments to the federal bench would have no meaning at all.

What there has not been is systematic examination of whether federal courts have placed constraints on presidents and, if they have, what it is that has moved them to do so. Although several significant pieces of traditional scholarship have been published during the postwar era on the treatment of presidential power by the federal judiciary, there remains a virtual absence of any empirical study of federal judicial decision making on the issues of presidential power as distinguished from research about federal judicial support for policy items that comprise the president's agenda (cf. Genovese, 1960).¹

By definition, the extant traditional scholarship on judicial-executive relations has focused on the legal rules that define the institution of the presidency. After inventorying the holdings in what are mostly Supreme Court decisions, these traditional works usually have concluded that the president has fared rather well (Corwin, 1964; Miller, 1977; Pritchett, 1977, chs. 15-17; Schubert, 1957; Scigliano, 1971). What few constraints the courts have imposed upon the executive in peacetime all but vanish in times of war and national emergency (Corwin, 1947; Randall, 1951; Rossiter, 1951; Schubert, 1957). Generally, scholars have had little trouble arguing the proposition that the courts have been ineffective in restraining the expansion of presidential power. However, despite the fact that nearly a decade and a half has passed

¹ As contrasted with the domain of our study, which is limited to judicial decisions about the president's statutory or constitutional authority. Genovese's inquiry extended beyond this to include presidential effectiveness with the Supreme Court generally, that is, an administration's success in getting the judges to accept political preferences that accorded with the executive's public policy agenda.

since the events generically labeled Watergate, empirically speaking, this terrain of judicial-executive relations remains largely uncharted territory.

Nor has public law scholarship examined or tested models of executive power developed by scholars on the presidency. Although there are arguably several theories of presidential power (see Koenig, 1981, pp. 7-11), two principal concepts, one articulated by Neustadt (1980) and the other by Piou (1979), appear particularly useful to public law scholars. Among the many advantages of these two concepts is their link to the traditional debate in public law about the importance attached to the alternative factors of rules and discretion in decision making. The models of presidential power would appear to interface well with the study of judicial politics when the question becomes one of judges' holding presidents to specific statutory or constitutional strictures or deferring to areas of policymaking left largely to executive discretion.

Much of Neustadt's (1980) contribution to an understanding of presidential power, although virtually none of his discussion is directed to judicial-executive relations, lies in his criticism of the idea that legal rules are the equivalent of political power. His attacks on the single-minded preoccupation with the separation-of-powers concept and the simplistic notion of presidential power as the power to command constitute an effective rejection of the legalistic study of presidential power as a collection of rules.² For Neustadt, legal principles embody powers capable of being wielded successfully only by an executive who is wise, clever, and determined in employing his power to persuade; calculating and decisive in maintaining his professional reputation and assiduous in cultivating his public prestige. Thus, the powers of office—beyond those negatives that are the bare bones of his constitutional endowment and in which he seeks refuge when the political tide turns dramatically against him—vary with political dynamics. In sum, whether others oppose him depends ultimately upon their reading of political currents, including public opinion (Cook, 1977).³

Probably the most empirically testable aspect of Neustadt's model in the area of judicial-executive relations lies in examining the impact of the president's popular prestige on the decisions of federal judges to allow him leeway

² Although Neustadt's discussion makes no reference to theories of jurisprudence, his treatise of the separation-of-powers concept, and especially his emphatic rejection of presidential power as the power to command, can readily be seen as an effective repudiation of features most characteristic of analytical positivism, particularly the notion of law as "the command of the sovereign" (Ducut, 1978, pp. 130-40, n. 40). See also Shapiro (1984) for a comparable perspective on the Supreme Court.

³ In her article, Cook links the decision making of federal district judges in draft cases to fulfilling a certain representational function despite their institutional independence. Our argument in this paper is less ambitious.

or to constrain his exercise of power.⁴ While federal judges are different from some, but by no means all, of the officeholders with whom the president deals, it remains to be seen whether judicial treatment of presidential prerogatives is associated with variation in the president's public prestige.⁵ To the extent that federal judicial decisions constraining presidential power increase as the president's public prestige diminishes, the argument could be made that federal judges have, consistent with Neustadt's view, afforded the president less and less leeway and increased their own assertions of power.⁶

Other contemporary scholars of the presidency, notably Pious (1979), have hesitated to accept the pervasive relativism about presidential powers that Neustadt asserts. Reaching into and beyond traditional political science schol-

⁴ There has been surprisingly little empirical testing of Neustadt's model of presidential power at all and, indeed, comparatively little quantitative research on the presidency generally (Edwards, 1980, p. 50). In one of the few empirical pieces extant, Edwards found support for his proposition that presidential success in Congress was generally associated with the magnitude of the president's public prestige (1990, pp. 86-115).

⁵ To the extent that federal district judges can be said to share a natural human interest in career advancement, they cannot be unaware that cooperating with the executive has its rewards. Of the 299 appointments to federal appellate judgeships made by postwar administrations through March 1967, 120 came from the ranks of sitting district judges. Thus, on the average, two out of every five appellate appointments were promotions. Throughout the period of better than four decades, this proportion remained surprisingly constant. Only two administrations deviated. Of the 11 appellate appointments made by President Ford, 8, or 73 percent, reflected the elevation of district judges, while during President Carter's term this proportion dropped to 23 percent (11 of 48 appointments). These two exceptions can probably be explained by the post-Watergate perceived need for stability in the former case and in the latter case by a deliberate decision to widen the representation on the bench of groups not heretofore largely included in federal judicial appointments (e.g., women, blacks, and Hispanics). Moreover, in each of three administrations—those of Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan—promotion of the president's own district judges (as distinguished from the elevation of lower-court judges put there by a preceding administration) accounted for 20 percent of the appellate appointments.

Nor should appellate judges be thought immune from such striving. Of these 300 appeals judges, 12 were nominated for positions on the U. S. Supreme Court. Two (Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell) were not confirmed. One federal judge (Charles Evans Whittaker) succeeded in running the full federal judicial hierarchy. Presidents during the postwar era made 22 nominations to the Supreme Court. Whittaker's nomination combined with those of 11 other appellate judges constituted about 55 percent of this total. This suggests that appeals judges may have an even keener appreciation of the rewards a president can bestow. The virtues of elevating a sitting federal judge would not go unappreciated by a president either. Filling a judicial vacancy by appointment from within rather than from outside holds the prospect of making twice as many people happy.

⁶ A natural hesitancy about judicial involvement, however, may be attributable to the fact that public regard for the courts appears to increase as presidential popularity increases, while activist judicial decisions running against the popularly elected branches seem to be associated with decreased public regard for the courts (Caldiera, 1988). Although sinking or swimming together may be a general attribute of "separated institutions sharing powers" (Neustadt, 1960, p. 26), it is probably a matter of special concern to the third branch of government, which is particularly dependent on the executive for enforcement of its decisions.

arship, Pious argues that the constitutional powers of the presidency are the bedrock of the office. Statutory powers may ebb and flow with political tides, but constitutional moorings remain steadfast. Pious cuts this theme from a discussion of presidential power throughout the various policy-making facets of the office, however, and does not specifically focus on judicial-executive relations.

Koenig (1981, p. 9) sees Pious' theory as illustrative of the command model, and we agree. Whether exemplified by the sophistication of Pious, who embellishes the command theory by discussing the uses of such powers that result in "frontlashes," "backlashes," or "overshoot and collapse" effects, or illustrated more primitively by Chief Justice Taft's opinion in *Myers v. United States* (272 U.S. 52, 1926), it is nevertheless the rule-oriented character of the command model that stands out. Although Taft's literalist conception of the presidency stressed the constraints that constitutional and statutory rules imposed on presidential activity—constraints that he doubtless assumed were for federal judges to enforce—the command model just as easily acknowledges large areas of authority that are committed to the president's discretion and whose policy judgments in those spheres are entitled to the greatest deference.⁷ Whether we are talking about spheres of action where presidential decision making is constrained by rules or areas where judges exhibit virtually categorical deference to his discretion,⁸ it is clear that the identity of the policy area will be determinative.

It is for its contribution precisely along these lines that Justice Sutherland's opinion for the Court in *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.* (299 U.S. 304, 1936) is justifiably regarded as indispensable to an understanding of constitutional law. In order to evaluate the impact of the command theory, we need to see whether the identity of particular policy areas is significantly associated with judicial decisions consistently invalidating or approving presidential actions. Antedating Wildavsky's (1969) discussion of the "two presidencies" thesis (cf. Edwards, 1986), Justice Sutherland suggested that judi-

⁷ For advocates or bedfellows of the command theory of law, the analytical positivists, the co-existence of these two circumstances is not contradictory. Within certain spheres of action, legal rules may severely constrain the decision maker, while in other areas legal rules or the absence of them may consign decisions to the absolute and unfettered discretion of the policymaker (see Hart, 1981, but cf. Dworkin, 1977, pp. 31–39). The completely "open texture" of certain constitutional rules affecting presidential power is reflected in the Court's invocation of the political question doctrine, for example, to preserve virtual *carte blanche* authority of the chief executive in some spheres of action (see, as illustrations, *Mississippi v. Johnson* [71 U.S. 473, 1867], *Baker v. Carr* [369 U.S. 186, 1962], and *Goldwater v. Carter* [444 U.S. 800, 1979]).

⁸ Justice Jackson, in what is probably the best known of the judicial attempts to articulate an evaluative framework of presidential power, incorporated both of these models. In his scheme of things, articulated in his concurring opinion in *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer* (343 U.S. 579, 1952, pp. 635–39), the Neustadt model becomes Jackson's category 2 cases while the command model is reflected in both category 1 and category 3 cases.

cial postures of constraint and deference to executive power could be drawn along the lines of domestic and foreign policy, respectively.⁹ We need to see if this is so or if perhaps more particularized conclusions are warranted.

Accordingly, this study attempts to address the void in our empirical knowledge of judicial-executive relations by uncovering patterns of deference and constraint as federal district judges react to exercises of presidential power. Mainly, we shall be asking whether this interbranch relationship is best explained by the prevailing discretionary model or by the less-favored model of rules. Since these two models correspond so closely to Neustadt's and Piou's conceptions of presidential power, our inquiry will simultaneously test them. To do this, we will examine the association between a judge's vote on an issue of presidential power and his political party affiliation, whether he was appointed by the same president as that whose power is at issue, and the president's public prestige. We shall also want to see if some presidential powers are more resistant to judicial incursion than others. Understanding judicial-executive relations requires at least this much knowledge of the conditions under which friendly or hostile rulings on presidential power can be expected from the federal courts.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The database of decisions for this paper consists of all cases on presidential power decided by single-judge federal district courts between January 1949 and March 1984. We first consulted *Shepard's Citations* and screened all of the cases that were listed as citing any portion of the following parts of the Constitution: Article I sec. 7, Article II, or Amendments XII, XX, XXII, or XXV. From this general collection, all cases dealing with matters that could not reasonably be described as relating to presidential power were eliminated (e.g., presidential electors, voting rights, etc.). The collection of cases was further reduced by deleting all cases that merely cited one or more of the constitutional provisions identified above only in a peripheral or illustrative manner (usually in a note). The cases included in this study, which were identified via *Shepard's*, mentioned the president or executive in the headnotes or in points of law or else contained substantial discussion or reference to presidential power in the opinion (usually a paragraph or more).

The second source for identifying cases was WESTLAW. Reliance upon a resource capable of reaching beyond constitutional cases was essential because many important cases on presidential power have been decided without

⁹ Acknowledging that the distinction between foreign and domestic affairs is important but can be overdrawn, Henkin argues, with keen political insight, that "the courts are not likely to step into intense confrontations between President and Congress, or inhibit either when the other does not object" (1972, pp. 274-75). As studies of judicial-legislative relations confirm, cooperation of another branch of government is often essential in the inverse situation, that is, where an effort is being made to curb the Court (Murphy, 1982; Nagel, 1989, ch. 21).

necessarily implicating constitutional provisions (e.g., impoundment cases, Iranian hostage settlement cases, etc.). As Shapiro (1964) pointed out long ago, there is much more to political power than constitutional power. Decisions interpreting statutory authority are perhaps just as important, and such cases usually are more numerous, than those implicating constitutional provisions. Because a simple WESTLAW search for federal cases using the term "president" and "executive" turns up thousands of completely irrelevant cases (involving, for example, presidents or executives of corporations, unions, school boards, etc.), we searched WESTLAW for all federal cases decided after 1948 in which "executive" or variations of the word "president" appeared in the headnotes or as topics or where those terms appeared in individual points of law under any of the following topics: war, national emergency, constitutional law, or United States.

Since even this narrowing of the WESTLAW search produced several thousand cases, the field was then screened according to the following principles. The discussion of presidential power had to be directly related, not peripheral, to the decision of the case. Disputes in which judicial reference to congressional and executive power was made in the same breath, so that there was no separate mention or focus on presidential power, were eliminated. Also deleted were cases involving administrative, as distinguished from executive, power. Although on occasion it was difficult to draw this distinction we sought to restrict the inclusion of suits naming cabinet officers, other officeholders inferior to the president, and agencies to those cases in which validity of an executive order was at issue (as distinguished from controversy over the interpretation of such an order, unless the president's intention in the order was clear and under attack). In other cases where a cabinet officer or officeholder inferior to the president was impleaded as the defendant, we included the case if there was evidence in the opinion that the officer was executing an order from the president, where the matter at hand was of such significance it was inconceivable that the president would not have been involved, or where the opinion dealt with the officeholder's actions in such a manner as to refer to specific powers of the executive branch or to identify the officer as the alter ego of the president. Also eliminated were cases in which the suit named the United States as a party and the interest identified by the court was "governmental," as distinguished from one specifically executive or presidential, or where there was only a very casual mention of the executive and far greater emphasis was placed on the governmental interest of the United States. Obviously, cases that named the president or an ex-president personally were included.¹⁰

¹⁰ The association of specific court decisions with particular presidents was governed by the exact dates of presidential tenure. The only exception to the assignment of court decisions according to the then-incumbent president occurred for a number of cases involving suits in or against former President Nixon arising out of the events of Watergate or certain surveillance practices of his administration. Because each of these cases specifically named the former president

Since the focus of the database was decisions on presidential power, only those implicating the constitutional or statutory authority of the office were included.¹¹ Consequently, cases involving the claims of American Indians, for example, were excluded unless the involvement of presidential power was explicit. And, of course, cases involving threats against the president's life or the validity of sanctions imposed for demonstrating against him or making statements critical of the administration were excluded because those disputes involved the validity of certain criminal processes, not presidential power.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE CASES

During the period under study, the federal district courts decided 196 cases that met the criteria for inclusion in the data set. (Three cases yielded results that were sufficiently mixed so that we could not classify the outcome as either a presidential win or loss.) Of the total codeable cases, 119, or 61 percent, were decided in favor of the president while 76, or 39 percent, could be regarded as defeats for presidential power. For each classifiable case, a dummy variable, coded as 1 for decisions favoring executive authority and 0 for those representing a defeat, was constructed.

As table 1 shows, the decisions were not evenly distributed across administrations. The number of cases per administration ranged from a low of six during the tenure of John F. Kennedy to a high of sixty for the Nixon years.¹² Although it might be tempting to dismiss the litigiousness occurring during the Nixon Administration as an anomaly, the table shows a decided post-Johnson increase in court challenges to presidential power that did not abate with Nixon's resignation. Even Gerald Ford's abbreviated term of office pro-

as plaintiff or defendant, the cases were regarded as personal to Nixon and were assigned the presidential prestige figures for the end of his term.

¹¹ In describing the precise focus of this study, we think the difference between looking at presidential policy preferences and presidential power needs to be emphasized. The decisions we included directly implicate the president's authority. Ours is not an inquiry into the general success rate of presidential administrations in persuading the federal courts to adopt or validate the executive's views of policy. Were this our focus, we would have examined the win-loss record of the solicitor general, since his views in litigation are taken to mirror administration policy (see Segal 1989, p. 136; Segal and Reedy, forthcoming). As a result, decisions included in our study would not include cases on the exclusionary rule, affirmative action, the death penalty, and a host of other controversial issues about which administrations have sought to influence the federal courts but which, without more, do not implicate the president's powers of office. However, controversies about the pocket veto, mandatory drug testing of federal employees, and the conduct of covert operations abroad, for example, are included because such disputes directly implicate the statutory or constitutional authority of the president. We alluded to this distinction in note 1 by way of contrasting the focus of this study with that of Genovese (1989).

¹² Because our interest is in the decision making of district court judges operating as single-judge tribunals, the judges did not respond to an identical set of cases. Therefore, as is commonly done (see Walker, 1972, pp. 646-47; and see Goldman, 1975, p. 493, for illustrations and other examples), we have assumed that the case stimuli were roughly similar across judges.

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During the period under study, the federal district courts decided 198 cases that met the criteria for inclusion in the data set. (Three cases yielded results that were sufficiently mixed so that we could not classify the outcome as either presidential win or loss.) Of the total codeable cases, 119, or 61 percent, were decided in favor of the president while 76, or 39 percent, could be regarded as defeats for presidential power. For each classifiable case, a dummy variable, coded as 1 for decisions favoring executive authority and 0 for those presenting a defeat, was constructed.

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duced seventeen codeable cases. Similarly, the first three years of Reagan's tenure yielded forty-three cases, a total second only to the Nixon years. Indeed, the post-Johnson era was marked by an explosion of litigation challenging assertions of presidential power.¹³ Approximately 74 percent of the decisions included in the data set were rendered during the administrations of Nixon, Ford, Carter, or Reagan. Whatever may be said of any "new patterns in judicial control of the Presidency" (Dionisopoulos, 1976), it is abundantly clear that a new litigiousness has asserted itself in the last decade and a half, at least where presidential powers are concerned.

Table 1 also shows that, while not all of the postwar presidents were equally victorious, only Richard Nixon won less than half the time. Gerald Ford's success rate of almost 53 percent was only slightly better, however. Of the post-Johnson presidents, Reagan did the best with victories in slightly over 67 percent of the cases, but this was only marginally better than Truman, the least successful of the pre-Nixon presidents.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Presidential Prestige

Since this study involves an examination of the relationship between federal court decisions on presidential power and the president's public prestige, our database includes Gallup Poll results as indices of the president's popularity. The state of the president's prestige at any given time was operationalized as the percentage of the public recorded as approving of his performance in office, as periodically reported in *The Gallup Report* or, earlier, in *The Gallup Public Opinion Index*.¹⁴ Since a one-point-in-time measure could be distorted

¹³ Richard Nixon can be said to have brought the law explosion into the Oval Office in two distinct but closely related senses. Not only did there come to be rapid increase in suits that challenged the exercise of presidential power, but also the onset of his presidency constituted a watershed in the practice of naming the president specifically as a party in such suits. In the twenty-year period before 1969, no case decided by a federal district court included in this study named the president as a party, not even in the Steel Seizure controversy. Beginning with Nixon, however, every president after 1969 was specifically named as a party in at least one suit. As of the closing date on our research, Nixon was named as a plaintiff or defendant in fourteen cases involving presidential power, Ford in one, Carter in twelve, and Reagan in seventeen.

¹⁴ Neustadt makes the important point—and certainly we do not disagree—that the concept of the president's public prestige is amorphous and has many nonmeasurable components. Indeed, as he notes, the president has many publics. The softness of the concept is reflected in his statement that, "prestige is a matter to be judged, not 'known'" (1980, p. 60). One might well agree with both his deprecating view of public opinion ("Presidential standing outside Washington is actually a jumble of imprecise impressions held by relatively inattentive men" [1980, p. 65]) and his criticism of the evaluative Gallup Poll question on approval or disapproval of presidential performance ("Unlike a query on specific issues, it does not relate to any concrete information. The question is unfocused, so is the response, which tells us anything or nothing about what respondents meant by what they said" [1980, p. 71]). Still, freed of pretensions that it is

TABLE I
DISTRICT COURT CASES ARRAYED BY INCUMBENT PRESIDENT AND
VICTORY OR DEFEAT FOR PRESIDENTIAL POWER (IN PERCENT)

President	Presidential Victories	Presidential Defeats	Total Cases
Eisenhower (1949-1953)	66.7 (8)	33.3 (4)	100 (12)
John F. Kennedy (1953-1961)	76.5 (13)	23.5 (4)	100 (17)
Lyndon B. Johnson (1961-1963)	83.3 (5)	16.7 (1)	100 (6)
Richard M. Nixon (1963-1969)	86.9 (8)	11.1 (1)	100 (9)
Jimmy Carter (1969-1974)	48.3 (29)	51.7 (31)	100 (60)
Ronald Reagan (1974-1977)	52.9 (9)	47.1 (8)	100 (17)
Jimmy Carter (1977-1981)	56.1 (18)	41.9 (13)	100 (31)
Jimmy Carter (1981-1984)	67.4 (29)	32.6 (14)	100 (43)
George H. W. Bush (1984-1993)	61.0 (119)	39.0 (76)	100 (195)*

Note: Figures in parentheses represent number of cases.

Three cases could not be classified as presidential victories or defeats and thus were omitted from these calculations.

last-minute changes in public mood, especially at a point falling so late in the process of judicial decision, we computed average measures of presidential prestige for each decision. These measures ("Presidential Approval") were the mean approval ratings reported for all samplings of public opinion that took place during the three-month period before the date on which a court

inflamed mirror, it does have value as an approximate reflector, as is borne out by Neustadt's preceding discussion, much of which draws on findings reported in response to asking that specific question.

decision was announced.¹⁵ This period constitutes a rough, although reasonably accurate, time frame for a court's decisional process (from the date on which oral argument is heard to the date on which the opinion is released).

Political Party Affiliation

Because political party affiliation has been shown to be a useful but crude predictor of judicial behavior (Tate, 1981), we coded the partisan affiliation of the judges. The variable "Judge's Party" was assigned the value of 1 for Democrats and 0 for Republicans. Since political liberalism has often been linked to the stewardship theory of the presidency, we expected that Democratic judges would be more receptive to the exercise of executive power than Republicans.

This expectation seemed logical because virtually all of the federal judges included in this study were appointed after the depression. Given the extent to which the stewardship conception of the presidency has become linked to the dominance of New Deal-Fair Deal-New Frontier-Great Society interests, we thought there was a natural connection between the expectation of presidential leadership and political sympathy among Democrats of this era for the philosophy of positive government and a strong executive (Nelson, 1984, pp. 5-28). By contrast, we hypothesized that Republican judges, entertaining a political outlook more compatible with negative government, would be more resistant to exercises of presidential power.

Judicial Appointment

An alternative interpretation of the party variable, one capable of linking voting patterns in these highly diverse fields, is that of judicial loyalty to the appointing president or political party. Although presidents have occasionally been disappointed by the performance of their judicial appointees, there is substantial evidence that "the surprised president" is a myth (Tribe, 1985, pp. 50-76). Appointments to the bench, as we noted earlier, are typically calculated to accomplish policy goals consistent with those of the incumbent administration, and appointees are generally supportive of those policies. Moreover, since it is well established that the job does not seek the individual, but instead that eager individuals seek the judgeships (Chase, 1972), one might expect that the political orientation of the appointees would be evident in a general identification with the political positions of the party from which they were appointed.

¹⁵ An alternative version of the variable using a one-point-in-time measure of presidential approval ratings—the last Gallup Poll figures prior to the announcement of the court decision—was tested. Although the one-point-in-time measure resulted in a slightly higher estimate for presidential approval, we chose the more conservative path.

To reflect these relationships two dummy variables were created. The variable "Same President" was coded 1 if the decision was rendered by a judge pointed by the same president involved in the case. Otherwise, the variable was coded as 0. Similarly, the variable "Same Party" was coded 1 if the deciding judge was of the same party as the president implicated in the suit and otherwise.

Previous Executive Experience

In the expectation that federal judges who had previous experience in the executive branch, either at the state or federal level, might be prone to sympathize with a president, a dummy variable "Executive Experience" was created. This variable was coded 1 if the judge had previous experience in the executive branch and 0 otherwise. The estimate was expected to be positive.

The Nixon Presidency

Since the Nixon Administration provided over 30 percent of the cases and over than 40 percent of the losses in the data set, one might argue that the cases could be explained wholly in terms of Nixon. A dummy variable "Nixon" was created to distinguish decisions of that administration from others. The variable was coded 1 if the Nixon administration was involved. Otherwise, it was coded 0. The estimate was expected to be negative.

Policy Area

The final set of variables represents the distinctive policy areas litigated. Initially, the cases were divided into two policy areas, foreign and domestic. A dummy variable "Foreign/Military Affairs" was coded 1 if the case involved an issue of presidential control over foreign relations or military affairs, including presidential war-making powers. Domestic cases were coded as 0. The estimate was expected to be positive.

For purposes of further analysis, the two policy areas were subdivided into more specific categories shown in table 2. From these narrower policy areas eight dummy variables were created, with each variable being coded 1 if the policy area was at issue in the case and 0 if it was not present.

ANALYSIS

Since the dependent variable, the district court decision for or against the president, is measured dichotomously, least squares regression is inappropriate. Consequently, the estimations were done by probit, which is a maximum-likelihood estimation technique well suited for use with dichotomous dependent variables (see Aldrich and Cnudde, 1973). Although the maximum-likelihood estimates (MLEs) cannot be compared because the variables are related in different units, the MLEs divided by the standard errors are useful since they approximate a Z distribution.

TABLE 2
DISTRICT COURT CASES ARRAYED BY POLICY AREA

Policy Area	Number of Cases	Percent of Cases
Foreign/Military Affairs		
Foreign Affairs	38	19.4
Embargoes, tariff adjustments, passports, travel restrictions, covert operations, extradition, treatment of aliens, etc		
War Powers and Military Personnel	31	15.9
Deployment of weapons, legality of engaging in undeclared war, draft registration and regulations, trial of civilians in military area, as Commander-in-Chief during declared war military discipline, military promotions, etc		
Domestic Affairs		
Spending	36	18.5
Impoundment, program termination, orders relating to practices of government contractors, etc		
Law Enforcement	30	15.4
Surveillance regarding national security, censorship keeping order, control over prosecutions, suits to compel the executive branch to follow the law, presidential tort liability, pardons etc		
Appointment and Removal	21	10.8
Economic Regulation	16	8.2
Seizure of industry, wage and price regulation, injunctions to halt strikes, etc		
Presidential Privilege/Confidentiality	13	6.7
Executive privilege, control of presidential papers, presidential depositions, etc		
Legislative Power	10	5.1
Pocket veto, legislative veto, executive branch reorganization, proclamations, etc		
Total	195	100.0

TABLE 3
PROBIT ESTIMATES FOR ALL DISTRICT COURT CASES INVOLVING
CLAIMS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER

Variable	MLE	S E	MLE/S E
Identical Approval	1.805	0.797	2.263**
Judge's Party	-0.035	0.211	-0.166
Is President	0.683	0.306	2.217**
Judge Party	-0.273	0.247	-1.103
Unknown	-0.323	0.215	-1.501
Executive Experience	0.225	0.229	0.983
Foreign/Military Affairs	0.385	0.215	1.787*
Constant	-1.197		
Incorrectly Predicted			
Probit	70.27		
Null	61.08		
185			

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

As table 3 shows, the probit model was moderately successful in explaining district court decisions. Of the 185 cases analyzed,¹⁶ the model correctly predicted slightly over 70 percent of the decisions. Since knowing that the case involved an issue of presidential power would lead one to predict victory for the executive in 61 percent of the cases, the addition of the independent variables produces a 24 percent reduction in error.

A further examination of table 3 reveals that the three-month average of public approval ratings is significantly and positively related to district court decisions favoring the president. Similar to Edwards' (1980) findings on presidential success in the House of Representatives, the table demonstrates that the more popular the president, the more victorious he is in district court decisions challenging executive power.¹⁷ Moreover, the table also demonstrates there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the presence of a judge appointed by the president whose claim is at issue (Same Party) and decisions favoring the executive. Clearly, presidents do better in district court judges appointed during their administration.

What is somewhat surprising is the result reported for the judge's party identification. The initial assumption had been that Democrats would be more in-

The analysis reported here excludes ten cases in which the political party affiliation of the judge was unknown. We are indebted to Elliot Slotnick, C. K. Rowland, and especially Sheldon Danes for some of the particularly hard-to-find party affiliation data.

As part of an initial analysis, we added variables to reflect possible interaction effects between individual administrations and public approval. The results showed no significant effects in interactive terms.

TABLE 5

**PROBIT ESTIMATES FOR DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING C
OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS CASES**

Variable	MLE	S E	MLE/S
Presidential Approval	1.921	1.003	1.914
Judge's Party	-0.076	0.287	-0.265
Same President	0.827	0.462	1.789
Same Party	0.004	0.351	0.012
Nixon	-0.332	0.274	-1.210
Executive Experience	0.493	0.308	1.600
Appointment and Removal	0.261	0.427	0.611
Legislative Power	0.235	0.602	0.391
Spending	-0.973	0.385	-2.528
Presidential Privilege	-0.783	0.490	-1.596
Law Enforcement	0.056	0.421	0.135
Constant	-0.363		
% Correctly Predicted			
Probit	70.24		
Null	54.55		
N = 121			

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

ables. Observe that two of the distinctly political variables, Presidential approval and Same Party, which produced statistically insignificant estimates in the foreign/military cases, do quite well in the domestic affairs decisions. Although presidential prestige appears to have little effect on district court decisions in foreign and military affairs, it shows a positive and significant relationship in the disposition of domestic cases. Presidential popularity matters when domestic policy issues are at stake. In the decision of domestic affairs cases, presidents are also clearly advantaged by trial before judges they have appointed.

Five of the six domestic policy areas¹⁸ were included in the model to provide an opportunity to examine further whether some presidential powers were less vulnerable to judicial constraint.¹⁹ As the table shows, almost all of the policy areas had little effect on the district court decision.

¹⁸ To avoid statistical degeneracy, the dummy variable for economic regulation was dropped from the model.

¹⁹ In analyses not reported here, we created and tested a series of interactive relationships. A set of terms that utilized dummy variables for the policy areas multiplied by public area were introduced into the model. Similarly, a series of variables that measured the interaction between policy areas and the Nixon presidency were also specified in the model. In none of the results demonstrate significant effects for these terms.

areas of domestic policy stand out. The negative and statistically significant estimate for Spending suggests that in that area of domestic policymaking, judges recognize and apply clear rules that limit presidential discretion. Nor do presidents fare very well in cases raising an issue of Presidential Privilege or confidentiality. Although the relationship here is not statistically significant, the negative estimate clearly indicates the presence of an issue area that cuts against presidential discretion.

CONCLUSION

Analysis of nearly two hundred federal district court decisions in cases involving the exercise of presidential power during the postwar era reveals two very different models of judicial decision making. Although recent scholarship on legislative-executive relations suggests that "there is less to the two presidencies than meets (or met) the eye" (Edwards, 1986, p. 262), our findings underscore the existence of "two presidencies" with respect to judicial-executive relations. Furthermore, models of judicial decision making in these two realms also bear a striking resemblance to the principal theories of executive power articulated by Neustadt and Pious.

Judicial decision making in cases involving presidential control of foreign and military policy appears to be dominated by the recognition of fixed rules. In accordance with the blueprint of the "two presidencies" sketched by Justice Sutherland in the *Curtiss-Wright* (1936) case, these durable rules charter broad presidential discretion in foreign and military affairs. Consequently, there is little judicial constraint on those powers. Foreign and military policy making is an area so dominated by clear rules of deference that identification of this policy-making area alone constitutes an excellent predictor of the likely outcome when the president's power is challenged in court. Neither knowledge of various political factors reflecting the connection of judges with presidents nor the president's public prestige is of additional help in forecasting decisional outcomes in federal district court. From a judicial perspective, presidential power over foreign and military affairs reasonably can be characterized as "the power to command."

If the landscape of foreign and military policymaking, as mapped by the district courts, suggests that challengers face a stiff uphill struggle because the promontories of executive power are carved from solid bedrock, the topography of domestic affairs suggests a seascape. Except for clear negative rules severely limiting executive control over spending, which we believe account for the significance of this policy subfield as a predictor of judicial decisions, the disposition of presidential power cases in domestic affairs appears to be governed by political tides. The statistical importance of such predictor variables as presidential approval and whether the judge was appointed by the same president as that whose powers are at issue in the case suggests a much

greater political relativism in judicial decision making when the president is challenged in domestic policymaking. As Neustadt argued over a quarter of a century ago, presidential leadership on the home front depends upon his persuasive power backed by his public prestige. In this area, district court judges have not acted much differently from other officeholders with whom the president deals.

If one looks beyond the specific findings of the present study, our examination of postwar judicial-executive relations suggests several things of consequence. First, whatever may be said of the ascendancy of the discretionary model of judicial decision making, the model of rules is alive and well in some areas of constitutional and statutory law. Second, while the executive enjoys clear entitlement to direct foreign and military policy, the prospect of an imperial presidency in domestic affairs is belied by the fluctuating pattern of judicial response. In domestic affairs, federal district judges can and do constrain the executive, particularly when the president falls from public favor.³⁰ For an institution like the federal judiciary, which is chronically assailed as undemocratic, this is reassuring news for us all. Finally, we think we have shown that the study of public law can be substantially enriched when judicial politics scholars attempt to borrow and build on contributions from other fields of political science.

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³⁰ It is open to some argument, of course, whether even such decisions as *Youngstown Sheet & Tube* and *United States v. Nixon* (418 U.S. 683/1974) should actually be considered defeats for the presidential office. One of the authors has argued elsewhere that even these celebrated setbacks for the executive were little more than personal defeats suffered by politically vulnerable incumbents (Ducat, 1978, pp. 136-38, n. 43). While consideration of presidential power cases as victories or defeats assumes equivalence and lessens sophistication, the only alternative, we think, is to return to the sort of traditional case-by-case analysis, discussed at the outset, which has heretofore dominated the study of judicial-executive relations.

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Issues and Constituencies in the Progressive Era: House Roll Call Voting on the Nineteenth Amendment, 1913-1919

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This paper examines House roll call voting patterns on the Nineteenth Amendment in the context of Progressive Era legislation, particularly Prohibition, immigration, black civil rights, labor and military preparedness. Though historical accounts often have linked woman suffrage with arguments of "expediency" rather than "rights," this analysis finds roll call voting patterns on suffrage associated with social justice and civil rights rather than with status constituency issues, such as Prohibition and immigration. In addition, it is established that partisan and regional voting patterns on woman suffrage are not as explanatory as are state-level constituency influences. The dramatic increase in House support for the Nineteenth Amendment from 1915 to 1919 is best understood as a result of the corresponding increase in the number of members representing states with state-level woman suffrage. This finding points to the importance of linkages between state and national legislatures in the Progressive Era as an explanation of how responsibility for social policy was transferred from state to federal levels of government.

Contemporary techniques analyzing roll call voting have been applied to a number of important historical periods, though less so to the enigmatic Progressive Era.¹ Yet, during these years a fundamental transition occurred in the political development of American government: the transfer of primary responsibility for social policy from the state to the federal level (Blum, 1980;

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¹ See Silbey (1981) for an excellent review of historical literature focusing on congressional roll call studies and Allen, Clausen, and Clubb (1971) for an interesting analysis of Senate roll call votes on blacks' civil rights in the Progressive Era.

Campbell, 1980; Clubb and Allen, 1967, p. 567). Whatever else might be said about Progressive reform legislation, establishing the federal government as a major locus for formulating social policy contributed an uncontested crucial legacy to the New Deal Era that followed.

One of the most important pieces of legislation to move from the state to the federal level during the Progressive Era was the Nineteenth Amendment enfranchising women. Though introduced into Congress in 1868, it was first voted on in the House of Representatives in 1915. Initially it failed, 204 votes to 174, though four years later it passed in the House by an overwhelming majority of 77 percent.

Focusing on the Nineteenth Amendment in the context of the Progressive Era raises three important questions. First, how is the Nineteenth Amendment linked to other reform issues in this time period, and what do these issue configurations tell us about the unidimensionality versus multidimensionality of the reform agenda in the Progressive Era? Second, in a time of nonrealignment, how are partisan and regional identifications related to the dramatic policy change on the Nineteenth Amendment in the House of Representatives from a resounding defeat in 1915 to an impressive victory in 1919? Third, in a period noted for the obduracy of states as political entities, what might be the connection between state legislative action on woman suffrage and corresponding voting patterns on this issue at the national level?

ISSUE CONFIGURATIONS, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONSTITUENCIES

Our first question concerns the nature of issue configurations in the Progressive Era. This period has been typified by social policy legislation formulated at the national level in response to increasing problems posed by industrialization and urbanization no longer manageable at the state level alone (Link and Cotton, 1967). While the argument can be made that the resulting reform orientation distinctive to these decades has a general, unidimensional character, historical analyses usually have stressed the opposite view, namely, that issues were marked by great discontinuities (Filene, 1970; Clausen and Cheney, 1970).

Woman suffrage, in particular, has been connected in various, if not conflicting, ways to other Progressive Era legislation. Some consider woman suffrage to have become a "status consistency" issue by the turn of the century and to be expediently linked with other social control legislation, such as Prohibition and immigration restriction (Kruskator, 1965). However, woman suffrage also is associated with the emerging "social justice" legislation designed to ameliorate the ruthless treatment of laborers caught in the social—if not actual—machinery of unregulated, industrial capitalism as well as the exploitation of many children trapped in an "uncaring" economic system. For those who consider women, collectively, to have a "maternal morality" concerned

with the needs of the helpless and the disadvantaged, enfranchising women proffered a means for implementing social justice legislation.

Still others argue that woman suffrage is historically based on civil rights principles related to citizenship and, as such, should be most closely joined with support for black civil rights. Finally, some contend that military preparedness in relation to World War I was the single most important backdrop affecting passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. The war issue cut both ways on the suffrage question. On the one hand, it was difficult to fight a war to make the world "safe for democracy" while condoning disenfranchisement solely on the basis of sex for half of the adult American population. On the other hand, for others, to enfranchise women during a time of war raised national security concerns, given women's noted pacifist sentiments as well as their exclusion from direct participation in the war effort as military combatants fulfilling "complete" obligations of citizenship.

Thus, consideration of the Nineteenth Amendment raises disputes over the exact content of issue domains as well as their multiple versus unidimensional structure. Analyzing roll call voting patterns in the House of Representatives will help determine the most accurate issue configurations characteristic of the period in general and of woman suffrage legislation in particular.

Our second question asks how we can explain shifts in roll call voting patterns in a time of nonrealignment. Social policy legislation in the Progressive Era often involved dramatic policy position changes, and the Nineteenth Amendment is a prime example, evidenced by the increase from only 47 percent supporting this legislation in 1915 to 77 percent voting to pass this amendment in 1919 in the House of Representatives. In the context of a nonrealignment period, we will assess the relative impact and/or confluence of partisan and regional identifications on social policy orientations.

We note that Woodrow Wilson became the leader of a conservative Democratic party having a stronghold in the "anti-Progressive" South even while campaigning nationally on party platforms endorsing progressive reform. Also, the Democratic sweep of both houses of Congress in 1912 left Republicans disunited and gave Democrats control of all powerful congressional committees. Throughout his presidency, Wilson faced real challenges from his own party as he sought to implement reform legislation (Blum, 1980; Hurley, Brady, and Cooper, 1977, p. 392). We want to determine whether relative levels of support for specific types of legislation are related to regional and/or partisan identifications despite the nonrealignment character of the time. Specifically, we will examine in some detail whether the shift in support for woman suffrage in the House of Representatives can be linked to distinctive regional and/or partisan roll call voting patterns (Brady et al., 1979; Brady and Sinclair, 1984).

Our third question seeks an understanding of how social policy positions are developed at the federal level by examining the relationship between

state-level activity on social policy issues and similar national-level legislation. The Progressive period stands out in this regard. During these decades, states were still considered by many to be the most appropriate political unit for formulating social policy. Thus, an unusually large number and wide range of social policy legislation, such as Prohibition, woman suffrage, and labor legislation, were voted on at both state and national levels.

Uniquely transitional, the Progressive Era enables political scientists to expand established definitions of constituencies. That is, in addition to defining constituencies in terms of demographic characteristics, sets of attitudes and interests, or partisan orientations that might indicate issue orientations (Fenno, 1978, p. xii), we have a more finely calibrated measure: the actual votes at the state level on an issue prior to its consideration in the national Congress. With state-level constituencies defined in terms of state-level votes—either in state legislatures or grass-root referenda—we will assess how House members voted on the same legislative issue at the national level, using the Nineteenth Amendment as a case in point.²

DATA DEFINITION

With these perspectives in mind we turn to an analysis of House roll call voting in the later years of the Progressive Era. To determine whether issues are joined unidimensionally or in issue domains, we will assess voting patterns on woman suffrage, black civil rights, Prohibition, immigration, child labor, labor, and military preparedness. The paired yeas and paired nays are added to the number of yeas and nays cast directly; roll call votes are retained for analysis if the yea/nay split is at least 15 to 85 percent; yea/nay votes have been recoded where necessary to produce consistent positive/negative vote directions within each issue domain. In the Sixty-third House, on the basis of these criteria, there are twenty-two votes on eleven legislative items available for analysis and, in the Sixty-sixth House, twenty roll call votes on eleven different items. Techniques include factor analysis and probit analysis.

We will investigate the relative impact of partisan and regional influences upon social policy voting by analyzing regional and partisan voting patterns on the Nineteenth Amendment. Republican and Democratic party identifications are used; other party identifications are excluded from an analysis of party. Regions are defined as North, South, East, and West.

Finally, we explore the influence of state-level constituencies for the Nineteenth Amendment by measuring the presence or absence at the state level

² Though members represent districts, when successful passage of legislation at the state level occurs, it is hypothesized that this may be an important constituency influence upon House members' voting subsequently on the same legislation at the national level. Thanks go to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that state-level support for a social policy could be viewed as a surrogate measure for increased mass-level support or as a source of increased "lobbying interest" at the federal level, accounting for eventual support in Congress.

of Prohibition and/or woman suffrage. State-level woman suffrage is hypothesized as being a direct positive influence upon House members' support for the national amendment. State-level Prohibition may be indirectly linked to voting on the suffrage amendment, since it was commonly assumed that, when women got the right to vote, they would vote for Prohibition.³

In measuring the effect of state-level constituencies, roll call voting patterns in the Sixty-third, Sixty-fifth, and Sixty-sixth House are merged so that specific typologies can be constructed. First, states are categorized in terms of the presence or absence of state-level suffrage: *stable suffrage states* (states with state-level woman suffrage in both the Sixty-fifth and Sixty-sixth Congresses) and *conversion suffrage states* (states without state-level woman suffrage in the Sixty-fifth Congress but with state-level woman suffrage in the Sixty-sixth Congress).

Second, House members are categorized as *stable voters* (members who voted at least once in a preceding congress in the same direction as he voted in the Sixty-sixth Congress) *conversion voters* (members who changed from a no to yes position, or vice versa, on the suffrage issue by the Sixty-sixth Congress), and *replacement voters* (new members who had not voted on the woman suffrage issue prior to the Sixty-sixth Congress). These typologies for state-level suffrage support and for congressional roll call suffrage support are used in probit analysis investigating the impact of state-level constituencies on the overwhelming passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in the House of Representatives in the Sixty-sixth Congress compared to the decisive defeat in the Sixty-third Congress.⁴

ANALYSIS

Issue Configurations

To address the question of a general reform area, we first look at all of the roll call votes on the issues identified above. Table 1 lists a factor analysis for all the votes of the Sixty-third House. The unrotated factor analysis most directly tests the unidimensionality thesis, since its first component "represents the single best summary of the linear relationships exhibited in the data" while subsequent components highlight contrasts that remain after the general underlying dimension has been determined (Verba and Nie, 1972, p. 61). If a unidimensional orientation underlies the votes, we should find most votes and all types of issues loading onto one major factor in the unrotated solution.

³ This view was reinforced by propaganda of powerful liquor lobbies as well as notable overlaps among leadership elites of women's temperance and suffrage organization, even though analysis of grass-root referenda voting patterns on suffrage and prohibition does not indicate strong associations between these two issues (McDonagh and Price, 1985).

⁴ See author for a list of votes used in the analysis and classification of regions, state-level woman suffrage states, and state-level Prohibition states.

TABLE 1
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 63RD CONGRESS, 1913-1915
Factor Matrix for Issue Voting

Issue Votes	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Communalities
Suff 1	0.457	-0.292	0.412	0.015	0.240	0.521
Suff 2	0.631	-0.327	-0.195	-0.010	0.164	0.570
Proh 1	0.212	0.736	-0.131	-0.072	-0.441	0.804
Proh 2	0.249	0.612	-0.115	-0.088	-0.451	0.660
Race 1	0.581	-0.174	-0.239	-0.039	0.005	0.427
Race 2	0.824	-0.221	-0.188	0.027	0.103	0.774
Race 3	0.772	-0.218	-0.323	-0.024	0.033	0.749
Immig 4 (Race)	0.662	0.002	-0.320	-0.050	-0.040	0.544
Immig 1	0.469	0.760	-0.151	-0.107	0.318	0.932
Immig 2	0.378	0.778	-0.129	-0.111	0.260	0.845
Immig 3	0.476	0.734	-0.133	-0.158	0.301	0.899
ChLab 1	0.575	0.086	0.540	-0.072	-0.077	0.592
ChLab 2	0.517	-0.011	0.377	-0.093	-0.041	0.419
ChLab 3	0.531	0.117	0.593	-0.015	-0.228	0.749
Labor 1	-0.543	0.183	0.348	0.040	0.153	0.474
Labor 2	-0.693	0.394	0.399	0.064	0.111	0.803
Labor 3	0.550	-0.340	-0.121	-0.090	-0.092	0.447
Milt 1	0.167	0.179	0.080	0.872	-0.006	0.827
Milt 2	0.215	0.185	-0.059	0.755	-0.006	0.654
Milt 3	0.552	0.063	-0.093	0.474	0.003	0.542
Milt 4	0.773	0.083	0.279	-0.113	-0.050	0.694
Milt 5	0.581	-0.376	-0.339	-0.038	-0.070	0.600
Percentage of Total Variance	30.1	15.9	8.6	7.6	0.866	
Eigenvalue	6.96	3.70	2.26	1.95	1.13	

Note: Initial (unrotated) factors are based on a principle axis factoring technique assuming inferred factors

Table 1, however, presents a different picture. It shows that woman suffrage (Suff), black civil rights (Race), child labor (ChLab), and some military issues (Milt) load onto the first, general factor. However, immigration (Immig) and Prohibition (Proh) votes are notably absent from the first factor. Since historical accounts, as noted above, have argued for correlation between issues, varimax rotation (not reported here) was done, further refining the picture. In the rotated factor solution, the first factor contains labor (Labor) and some black civil rights votes along with one military vote; the second factor contains woman suffrage, child labor, and black civil rights votes; the remaining three

factors separately contain immigration votes, military votes, and Prohibition votes, respectively.

As noted above, woman suffrage has been interpreted by historians in multiple (if not conflicting) ways as a status consistency, social justice, and civil rights issue. However, table 1 does not support a status consistency interpretation of woman suffrage, since suffrage is not combined on the same factor with Prohibition or immigration restrictions (based on literacy requirements). Rather, suffrage is related to social justice (particularly child labor votes), civil rights (interracial marriage and black immigration votes), and some of the military-preparedness issues. Finally, the direction of the votes on woman suffrage and black civil rights issues further challenges the accuracy of the expediency thesis, since those who vote for woman suffrage vote consistently against racist exclusionary legislation, as indicated by the signs of the factor scores. Table 1 also indicates that woman suffrage intersects to some degree with concern about the defense of the state, suggesting that the war issue was not a serious depressant for woman suffrage support

Partisanship and Regional Influences.

The Nineteenth Amendment is a significant piece of legislation in its own right. In addition, by virtue of its multiple classification as a status consistency, social justice, and civil rights issue, it typifies major analytic ambiguities of Progressive Era social policy. To understand the political dynamics that underlie the formulation of social policy during this time of nonrealignment, let us look at the effect of party and region on the voting patterns for woman suffrage.

The years 1913–1915, when the House first voted on the woman suffrage amendment, are known for a lessening, though not total lack, of strong partisan voting patterns caused by the structural reorganization in 1910 of the House of Representatives and nonrealignment in general (Brady and Althoff, 1974; Brady, 1972; Sellers, 1966; Clausen, 1967; Clubb and Traugott, 1977).⁵ In the absence of strong partisan cues for voting decisions, we might expect that regional and constituency influences would take precedence as important influences affecting voting outcomes.⁶

At first glance, we might infer that there are conspicuous partisan splits in support for woman suffrage, since 70 percent of House Republicans supported

⁵ Bogue, however, evaluates the partisanship of this time as somewhat more significant than in the Civil War Senate of the Thirty-seventh Congress and in general makes a case for the continuing importance of partisanship in Congress even during periods noted for sectionalism (1967, pp. 239, 241). See Weisberg (1978) for an excellent critique of the relative merit of models incorporating partisanship as an explanatory variable predicting roll call voting patterns.

⁶ For an analysis of the blocking effects on progressive policy of a conservative coalition dating back to 1925, see Brady and Bullock (1980). Flinn and Wolman (1988) attribute roll call voting behavior of southern conservative congressmen to their constituency interests.

the Nineteenth Amendment compared to only 34 percent of Democrats. Region, however, is significantly conjoined with party in the Sixty-third House, particularly in the Democratic South (Sinclair, 1977, p. 941). It is the extreme opposition of southerners to the amendment that contributes to the generally weaker Democratic support: only 6.8 percent of southern Democrats supported suffrage compared to 55 percent of nonsouthern Democrats.

However, it is the presence or absence of state-level suffrage that may be more importantly related to support for the federal suffrage amendment than either party identification or region (Scott and Scott, 1982). In fact, 96 percent of House members from states with woman suffrage supported the Nineteenth Amendment compared to only 37 percent from states without. Yet, we must remember that in 1915 state-level suffrage, like partisanship, was extremely connected to region; not one eastern or southern state had legislated suffrage, whereas every western House member (except one) came from a state where woman suffrage (at least at the level of the presidential vote) already was in place.

Table 2 summarizes the influences of partisanship, region, and state-level constituencies on support for the woman suffrage amendment. Both state-level suffrage and state-level Prohibition are measured as constituency influences since, as noted above, these issues were often viewed as connected in this time period and many assumed that women would vote for prohibition if enfranchised. The "Specification 1" probit analysis reported in table 2 indicates that, indeed, the strongest positive influence for support for woman suffrage is state-level woman suffrage, while the strongest negative influence is the southern region. Partisanship and state-level Prohibition are statistically significant, though with much less strength; Democrat is negatively related to support for the federal suffrage amendment, while state-level Prohibition is positively related.

However, as noted above, state-level woman suffrage and partisanship are conjoined with region. Table 2 examines the relative impact of partisanship and state-level constituencies upon support for the woman suffrage federal amendment for each region. Interestingly, for all regions but the Midwest, the impact of party is statistically insignificant. Furthermore, only in the Midwest is state-level suffrage statistically significant, which is understandable, since in the West virtually all House members are from states with state-level suffrage and in the South and East no House members are from states with state-level suffrage. Thus, only in the Midwest is there a mixture of states with and without state-level woman suffrage, allowing for measurement of the impact of this state-level constituency influence. The results indicate a high, positive, statistically significant coefficient for state-level woman suffrage for a region where this variable, indeed, has variability.

Roll call voting patterns of House members from the Midwest on the Nineteenth Amendment confirm state-level woman suffrage as a positive constit-

TABLE 2
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (PROBIT ANALYSIS) FOR SUPPORT FOR
WOMAN SUFFRAGE AMENDMENT, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 63RD
CONGRESS, 1913-1915

	Vote for Woman Suffrage Amendment ^a			
	Midwest	South	East	West
Specification I Party and State Level Constituencies				
Democrat ^b	-0.687***	-5.285	0.038	-2.327
State-Level Woman Suffrage ^c	1.557***	—	—	-2.749
State-Level Prohibition ^c	2.868	0.849**	0.051	1.541
Intercept	5.417***	6.353	4.940***	11.299
Specification II Party, State-Level Suffrage, and Prohibition Constituency Interaction				
Democrat	-0.700**			
State-Level Woman Suffrage and State-Level Prohibition	-1.715**			
Intercept	7.140**			

^aVoting is measured 1 = yes or paired yes, 0 = nay or paired nay, absent or not voting not included in analysis.

^bAll dummy variables and interaction terms based on dummy variables are coded 1 = presence, 0 = nonpresence.

^cSee author for classifications of regions, state-level suffrage states, and state-level Prohibition states.

p < .05, *p < .01

ucency effect: 92 percent of House members from midwestern states with state-level suffrage support the amendment, compared to only 40 percent of midwestern House members from constituencies without state-level woman suffrage. Slight partisan differences in the Midwest virtually disappear in those midwestern states with state-level suffrage, indicating the primacy of constituency rather than party in determining orientations on woman suffrage at the national level. Further, if we look at midwestern states without state-level woman suffrage, we do see some partisan differences, in that Republicans are somewhat more supportive of the Nineteenth Amendment than Democrats.

Why did more Republicans in midwestern states without state-level woman suffrage favor suffrage at the national level? This question evokes the traditional connection between woman suffrage and Prohibition. Though we have

challenged the validity of this assertion as characteristic of a national pattern in the Progressive Era, nevertheless, we might speculate whether it accurately portrays more regionally specific policy orientations. Certainly in the Midwest, for decades the site of bitterly contested state referenda campaigns on both issues, there might have been a salient connection between them.

Table 2 examines this question by assessing the interaction effects between state-level woman suffrage and state-level Prohibition for midwestern House members in conjunction with partisan main effects. As "Specification II" in table 2 denotes, in the Midwest the interaction of state-level woman suffrage and state-level Prohibition has a strong negative effect upon support for the national suffrage amendment.

Further analysis (not reported) supports the probit analysis in table 2. Polarized voting on Prohibition and woman suffrage occurs only in midwestern states where there is no state-level Prohibition and no state-level woman suffrage; only in the presence of both conditions does the degree of association between voting on Prohibition and on woman suffrage increase. This is particularly true of Republicans from such states ($\phi = .703$), which may explain the slightly greater support for suffrage among midwestern Republicans in general compared to Democrats, as noted in table 2 by the negative coefficient for Democrat for the Midwest. However, in all other instances in the Midwest there is no systematic relationship between support for Prohibition and woman suffrage at the national level.

Consideration of other regions reinforces the uniqueness of the polarized voting patterns in this one context. We find no statistically significant connection between roll call voting on national woman suffrage and Prohibition for any other region. For example, over half the southern Democrats support Prohibition but reject woman suffrage, clearly demonstrating that strong support for Prohibition does not generate corresponding support for suffrage. In the West, the opposite case holds true: House members support the Nineteenth Amendment regardless of their voting positions on Prohibition.

Thus, we conclude that partisan identification with suffrage support is non-existent in the East and West, extremely marginal in the Midwest, and important only in the Democratic South. Woman suffrage at the state level favorably affected policy orientation on the Nineteenth Amendment, but support for the amendment was not connected to concomitant support for Prohibition. The one exception is the case of House members from midwestern states that had not legislated either issue. Rather than confirming historical generalizations about linkage of the issues, the exception suggests serious reassessment.

1919: Landslide Triumph in the House

The House of Representatives in 1919 passed the woman suffrage amendment by a 77 percent majority, not only an unusually comfortable margin but

also a striking contrast to the 47 percent vote supporting suffrage cast in 1915. What changed over these four years? Was suffrage, by 1919, connected differently to other Progressive Era issues, leading to greater support? Did partisan and/or regional orientations change? Did membership replacement and/or conversion within the legislature produce the radically greater percentages supporting suffrage? Or had state-level constituency effects influencing suffrage support become stronger by 1919? These are important questions, particularly in a nonrealignment period, as we search for explanations accounting for social policy shifts.

Many areas of legislation pertinent to this study were considered in both the Sixty-third and the Sixty-sixth Congresses. Furthermore, not only are issue areas measured independently for each of those sessions, but also the dependent variable of interest, the Nineteenth Amendment, retained its form from the first period of interest (Sixty-third Congress) to the last (Sixty-sixth Congress), thereby satisfying crucial assumptions for comparing legislation in the two congresses (Clausen, 1967, pp. 1020, 1033).

Issue areas are remarkably similar in consistency patterns in the Sixty-third and Sixty-sixth Congresses. Twelve House votes were taken on Prohibition issues in the Sixty-sixth Congress, ten of which dealt directly with the Eighteenth Amendment and two with civil rights issues embedded in search-and-warrant procedures.⁷ Analysis not reported here indicates that in the Sixty-sixth House there were, in fact, similar issue domains. There is no relationship between woman suffrage and immigration issues (average absolute phi is zero) and virtually none between suffrage and Prohibition (average absolute phi is .110), once more challenging historical assertions linking suffrage with Prohibition and immigration as a characteristic national pattern. Prohibition, however, strongly relates to immigration voting patterns, again demonstrating little change in the issue domains in the Sixty-third House as compared to the Sixty-sixth House.

A factor analysis of the 1919 votes (not reported here), confirms that issue domains remained much the same between 1915 and 1919. There appears to have been no general reform dimension linking all issues. Rather, Prohibition is the dominant first factor, followed by suffrage (combined on the second factor with labor and military issues). The third factor is immigration, and the fourth civil rights. In addition, we find no statistically significant degree of association between partisanship and support for suffrage in either the West, Midwest, or East, which parallels our finding for the Sixty-third House. What has changed dramatically in the intervening four years is overall support for suffrage from the Midwest, which increased from 62.4 percent in the Sixty-third House to 95.6 in the Sixty-sixth, and from the East, which increased

⁷ The only important exceptions were the absence of House floor votes on child labor and black rights.

from 48.5 percent in the Sixty-third House to 81.5 percent in the Sixty-sixth. (Western support for suffrage was virtually unanimous in the Sixty-third House and totals 100 percent in the Sixty-sixth House.)

Let us look more closely at the impact of state-level woman suffrage on support for the Nineteenth Amendment. First, woman suffrage was the same legislative issue at both state and national levels. Thus, one could argue that voting at the state level on this issue provided an explicit constituency cue about a preferred policy position on the Nineteenth Amendment. Second, woman suffrage involved the franchise itself, making "accountability" on the Nineteenth Amendment particularly salient for House members facing state constituencies that included women voters able to provide "object" lessons about the importance of the franchise by voting members in or out of office. Since it has been well established that constituency influences are most important in relation to reelection chances, state-level woman suffrage may have been a constituency pressure having both an unusual degree of specificity and electoral power. Third, the number of states with woman suffrage increased dramatically from only thirteen in 1915 to thirty in 1919, supporting the argument that the influence of this state-level constituency on House roll call voting patterns deserves serious attention.

In order to look at state-level suffrage patterns, we categorized states as stable suffrage states if woman suffrage was in place at the state level during both the Sixty-sixth and preceding Sixty-fifth Congresses and conversion suffrage states if suffrage was in place only at the time of the Sixty-sixth Congress. To develop such a typology, we merged those congresses in which the suffrage amendment reached the House floor for a vote (Sixty-third, Sixty-fifth, and Sixty-sixth).

The question is to what extent did state-level woman suffrage influence support for the Nineteenth Amendment? Table 3 provides the answer, showing the impact of state-level suffrage patterns. As indicated in Specification 1, both stable suffrage states and "conversion suffrage states" have a positive and statistically significant affect upon support for the federal amendment, while Democrat remains a negative influence, and regional effects are statistically insignificant.

However, region and state-level suffrage patterns are conjoined, and important campaigns for state-level suffrage succeeded in the East and Midwest in the interim years between the Sixty-third and Sixty-sixth Congresses. When we look at the interaction affects of "conversion suffrage states" with the Midwest, we see in Specification 1. In table 3 a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the interaction term almost equal in impact to the main effect of stable suffrage states. Clearly, for the Midwest, "conversion suffrage states" were an important source of support for the suffrage amendment in the Sixty-sixth Congress.

Let us also consider the composition of House members' voting on the issue in relation to state-level constituency patterns. We want to observe the di-

TABLE 3
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (PROBIT ANALYSIS) FOR SUPPORT FOR
WOMAN SUFFRAGE AMENDMENT, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 66TH
CONGRESS, 1919-1921

Vote for Woman Suffrage Amendment ^a	
Specification I Party, Region, State-Level Constituency	
Democrat ^b	-0.831***
East ^c	-2.417
South	-2.908
Midwest	-2.125
Stable Suffrage State ^d	1.189***
Conversion Suffrage State ^d	0.812**
Intercept	8.106**
Specification II Party, Interaction Terms for Region and State-Level Suffrage and Prohibition Constituencies	
Democrat	-1.065***
Stable Suffrage State	1.473***
Conversion Suffrage State, East	3.428
Conversion Suffrage State, South	0.834*
Conversion Suffrage State, Midwest	1.253***
Intercept	5.544**

^aVoting is measured 1 = yes or paired yes, 0 = nay or paired nay, absent or not voting not included in analysis

^bAll dummy variables and interactions terms based on dummy variables are coded 1 = presence, 0 = nonpresence

^cSee author for classification of regions and state-level suffrage states

^dStable Suffrage State = passage of state-level woman suffrage (at least presidential vote) prior to the 66th Congress, Conversion Suffrage State = passage of state-level woman suffrage (at least presidential vote) by, but not before, the 66th Congress

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

rection of a member's vote and whether the vote was a stable vote, in the same direction as a previous vote on suffrage, a conversion vote, representing a change in direction on the suffrage issue, or a new replacement vote, from a House member never before voting on the suffrage amendment. Our question is, how do state-level woman suffrage patterns influence stable, conversion, and replacement voting patterns on the Nineteenth Amendment?

Table 4 provides the answer, showing the impact of state-level suffrage upon the typology of House members defined above. As Specification I indicates, stable voters were most affected by stable suffrage states and affected

positively, as is expected. Conversion suffrage states also predisposed stable voters to support the suffrage amendment, indicating that these House members were, in fact, anticipating what later became a state-level constituency characteristic, since stable voters were voting for the suffrage amendment prior to their state-level constituencies' conversion to state-level suffrage. Democrat remains a strong negative influence on stable voters, while no region has a statistically significant effect. We note that Specification I does not indicate comparable impact of state-level suffrage constituencies upon conversion voters or replacement voters. This leads us to ask whether it is the interaction of state-level constituencies with regions that accounts for the importance of stable suffrage states and conversion suffrage states.

Specification II in table 4 explores the impact of interaction effects between region and state-level constituencies upon support for suffrage. What we find is that stable suffrage states remain the most important source of positive support for stable voters but do not influence conversion voters or replacement voters. However, the interaction term for conversion suffrage states and the Midwest evidences an important source of support for the federal suffrage amendment for both stable voters and replacement voters; new voters on the suffrage amendment from the Midwest were influenced positively by state-level constituencies that had converted recently to state-level suffrage but were not affected if they were from states with a stable pattern of suffrage support.

The lack of significant coefficients measuring influences on conversion voters is due to the fact that there is little variability to explain in the dependent variable, support for suffrage, for conversion voters; virtually all conversion voters convert in the same direction from a no to yes position on suffrage (there are only two exceptions). There were important victories for state-level woman suffrage in the East prior to the suffrage vote in the Sixty-sixth Congress, such as the 1917 New York success. However, only four House members from Eastern conversion suffrage states actually voted on the national amendment, and all four of these House members had voted previously for the suffrage amendment, making them stable voters rather than conversion voters. Thus, the interaction term combining conversion states with the eastern region is statistically insignificant.

Thus, we see in table 4 the constituency influence of stable suffrage states upon stable voters along with the newer impact of those last state-level referenda campaigns, particularly those in the Midwest, which had a positive impact upon both stable voters and replacement voters.

CONCLUSION

We have uncovered striking perspectives in this investigation of Progressive Era roll call voting, in general, and support for woman suffrage, in par-

TABLE 4

REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (PROBIT ANALYSIS) FOR SUPPORT FOR WOMAN SUFFRAGE AMENDMENT, FOR STABLE VOTERS, CONVERSION VOTERS, REPLACEMENT VOTERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 66TH CONGRESS, 1919-1921

	Vote for Woman Suffrage Amendment ^a		
	Stable Voters ^b	Conversion Voters	Replacement Voters
Specification I Party, Region, and State-Level Constituencies			
Democrat ^c	-1.033***	1.967	-1.213*
East	-2.654	1.398	-1.339
Midwest	-2.260	1.310	-2.812
South	-3.357	0.000	-2.111
Stable Suffrage State ^d	1.166***	0.069	3.946
Conversion Suffrage State ^d	0.819**	2.376	2.162
Intercept	8.263	4.629	7.302**
Specification II Party, Region, and State-Level Constituency Interaction Terms			
Democrat	-1.398***	0.624	-1.445**
Stable Suffrage State	1.597***	0.066	3.80
Conversion Suffrage State, East	3.521	—	—
Conversion Suffrage State, South	0.763	2.334	3.40
Conversion Suffrage State, Midwest	1.384***	2.681	1.106**
Intercept	5.451***	6.014***	5.572***

^aVoting is measured 1 = yea or paired yea, 0 = nay or paired nay, absent or not voting not included in analysis

^bStable voters = voted on woman suffrage amendment prior to and in same direction as 1919 vote. Conversion Voters = voted prior to but in opposite direction of 1919 vote. Replacement Voters = did not vote on woman suffrage amendment prior to 1919 vote

^cAll dummy variables and interaction terms based on dummy variables are coded 1 = presence, 0 = nonpresence

^dStable Suffrage State = passage of state-level woman suffrage (at least presidential vote) prior to the 66th Congress, Conversion Suffrage State = passage of state-level woman suffrage (at least presidential vote) prior to the 66th Congress. Conversion Suffrage State = passage of state-level woman suffrage (at least presidential vote) by, but not before, the 66th Congress

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

ticular. There is no evidence that issues in the Progressive Era were connected unidimensionally. Rather, our research supports those historical accounts linking issues into distinct categories. We did, however, find that modifications to the specific content of the issue domains were needed, and,

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Religious Roots of Political Orientations: Variations Among American Catholic Parishioners

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Social scientists have formulated several theories or prototheories to account for party identification, political ideology, and issue positions of Americans and, by extension, of American Catholics. These include ethnic assimilation and communalism, social class, regional political culture, political generations, and recently gender. At the same time, some scholars have argued that religious values profoundly affect these political variables. But their measures have never been convincing or their findings strong. This paper formulates a new measure of foundational religious beliefs and, controlling for measures of other theoretically relevant variables, estimates the impact of such beliefs on political variables. Data are drawn from the 2,667 registered Catholic parishioners included in the Notre Dame Study of Catholic Parish Life. The overall model appears modestly powerful, but individual findings are of interest. Interpreting results through theories of partisanship, this paper argues that the traditional measure of partisanship resonates to social structural characteristics of Catholics but that newer theories of partisanship may be better predicted by a measure of foundational religious beliefs. Political ideology and many "cultural politics" issues are responsive to foundational religious beliefs. Positions on more traditional public policy concerns—for example, defense spending, equal opportunity—are better predicted by demographic variables, but even these issues respond to religious values.

Although the dimensions of religiosity and their impact on various forms of social and political behavior have been examined extensively since the pioneering works of Lenski (1963) and Glock and Stark (1965) (see also Glock and Stark, 1966; Glock, Ringer, and Babbie, 1967; Stark and Glock, 1968; Hadden, 1969; Kersten, 1970), scholars have seldom found satisfying measures of religiosity that show powerful relationships to political variables (see Yinger, 1969; Rokeach, 1969–1970; King and Hunt, 1972; Wuthnow, 1973;

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Roof and Perkins, 1975; McCreedy and Greeley, 1976; Roof, 1979; Greeley, 1984; Hoge and Zulueta, 1985). Perhaps lacking convincing arguments for using more precise measures, political scientists who employ multivariate models to account for political attitudes and behavior have generally omitted religiosity or settled for single-item indicators, such as nominal affiliation or frequency of attendance (see, for example, Verba and Nie, 1972; Fee et al., 1980; Conway, 1985; Abramson et al., 1987).

Existing theory is consulted to account for the partisanship, ideology, and issue positions of American Catholic parishioners. But, in a departure from extant literature, we also focus on foundational religious beliefs and formulate a new measure of such beliefs that characterizes religious individualism and communitarianism. The measure is grounded in the notion that, to understand religiosity, perceptions about the phenomena that religion is thought to address are more important than the embrace of doctrinal symbols or the associational practice of religious rituals. In this view, variations of religious beliefs are not uncommon within a denominational body (see Wilcox, 1986, for a similar argument dealing with evangelicals and fundamentalists within and across Christian bodies). Once formulated, the impact of foundational religious beliefs is compared to the effects of measures for other variables, such as assimilation, social class, political generations, regionalism, and gender. We are left with an assessment of what religious beliefs can explain about political orientations beyond that explained by other relevant variables.

Throughout this paper we treat party identification, political ideology, and issue positions as different, but related, forms of political orientation. Considerable theory argues that over time there is a tendency toward consistency among the three forms of orientation (Downs, 1957; Nie and Anderson, 1974, Greeley, 1974). Nevertheless, any one of the three may be poorly synchronized with the others at given points (Carmines, Renten, and Stimson, 1984). Furthermore, it has been shown that political ideology is multidimensional and that ideological self-classification does not predict uniformly to "liberal" or "conservative" issue positions, yet, there is still some overlapping meaning between party identification and political ideology, particularly for Republicans (Conover and Feldman, 1981). The persistent independence of different forms of political orientation has led political scientists to examine the theory behind even such fundamental measures as party identification (Dennis, 1981a; 1981b). That Dennis has isolated three theories of partisanship and that each has different requirements for measuring political orientations suggests we need to examine all three forms of political orientation.

POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS AMONG AMERICAN CATHOLICS: RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND OTHER THEORETICAL BASES

That Catholics are more Democratic and slightly more liberal in ideology and on most issue positions than white, gentile non-Catholics is well docu-

mented (Greeley, 1977; Abramson et al., 1986; Penning, 1986; Wald, 1987). Even the most recent movement of Catholics toward the Republican party and more conservative issue positions has trailed other religious groups by about a half-dozen percentage points (Petrocik, 1975; Greeley, 1985; Penning, 1986). The central intellectual question that concerns us is not whether Catholics differ but why these differences exist. To uncover the bases for variation, scholars have used a wide variety of theories and prototheories. The typical designs use general population surveys and compare self-designated Catholics with self-designated members of other religious bodies. Such designs assume that the label "Catholic" designates a group of sufficient homogeneity to make group-level comparisons efficient.

Since the Roman Catholic church, as an ecclesia-type body, embraces people from many nationalities and social strata, however, one can anticipate sufficient variability among Catholics to reflect in political differences. Perhaps less expected are the varieties of religious differences within a large denominational body that could account for political differences. Beliefs and practices may fluctuate from one type of Catholic to another. Some may be more devout or serious in their religious orientations than are others.

Castelli, for example, has compared political data from active parishioners in the Notre Dame Study of Catholic Parish Life to similar data on a Gallup survey of self-designated Catholics from the same time period (Castelli, 1987; see also Gallup and Castelli, 1987). Parish-connected Catholics and self-identified Catholics (who may or may not have parish connections) are quite similar in their party identifications and their stands on many recent issues, such as support for the Equal Rights Amendment. They differ substantially, however, on several issues where Catholic church leaders have offered teachings or taken public stands. These include the so-called seamless garment issues—opposition to abortion on demand, opposition to capital punishment, and support for a bilateral nuclear freeze. The "churched" Catholics have taken positions closer to their leadership than have the self-designated Catholics. Castelli does not use multivariate methods to uncover either the demographic or religious differences among the alternative samples of Catholics that would account for political differences. Castelli captures devoutness, to return to a previous point, by the initial sample differences.

There may be deeper differences in religious orientations than those captured by parish affiliation. Sociologists of religion have struggled for some time to characterize such differences. We will review that work, offer our own "deep" measure of religious beliefs, and compare its utility in interpreting political orientations with other measures.

Toward a Measure of Foundational Religious Beliefs

Writing in the 1830s, Tocqueville argued that the mores of the American people, more than their political structures, maintained the republican de-

mocracy of the country. He called these mores "habits of the heart" and found them deeply rooted in the religious values of the people (Tocqueville, 1969). Bellah and associates (1985), examining contemporary America, argue that the loss of communitarianism and the rise of utilitarian and expressive individualism are linked to the loss of "communities of memory," which have been based most often on religious institutions.

Empirically oriented social scientists have also long examined linkages between religious values and the political order. Most of that work has centered on the linkage between religious beliefs (defined operationally as doctrinal orthodoxy) and political conservatism (Glock and Stark, 1965; Rokeach, 1969-1970; Kersten, 1970). In studying Catholics, some scholars have felt constrained by such measures and developed questions more appropriate to Catholic institutional experience (Fee et al., 1980). Sometimes these questions have utilized a different style of measurement altogether, and Greeley (1984), McCreedy and Greeley (1976), and Fee and her colleagues (1980) have argued that these measures may prove more useful in understanding the relationship between religion and politics than are the doctrinal measures. All are based on symbolic vision or religious imagery and have grown from studies on Catholic samples. There is a solid theoretical basis for their arguments.

In 1969 Yinger contended that the Glock-Stark approach was capable of measuring religious views not held (which the investigator thought important), but it was incapable of capturing whether or how a person is religious (Yinger, 1969). Outside of conventional doctrinal symbols, the approach disregarded the operating religious symbol system of the individual. But, according to Geertz (1973), religion consists of just such a symbol system that addresses recurrent "ultimate" problems of human existence, rites and beliefs that are organized to cope with such problems, and loyalty to groups organized to propagate such rites and beliefs.

For us, foundational beliefs may involve symbols learned through religious institutions, but they are also operating beliefs that interpret and give meaning to the reality perceived by the individual. Foundational beliefs may overlap doctrinal symbols; in rare cases of completely effective religious socialization, they may be identical to doctrinal symbols. But the realities the church addresses may not be the realities of one's experiences. Thus, foundational beliefs guide individuals to what is problematic about the world, offer ways to cope with or avoid problems, and provide ultimate solutions to these problems. Foundational beliefs are often thought to be rooted in parent-child relationships (Greeley, 1982).

The utility of such thinking about foundational beliefs is demonstrated in Benson and Williams' study of religion and politics on Capitol Hill (1982). In that study the authors devised open-ended questions to tap perceptions of fundamental human problems, paths to salvation (or the solution of these problems), and the outcomes of salvation. Certain themes were found to recur in response to these items and were classified along the following dimensions

of religiosity: religion as agentic (individualism preserving) or communal (community building), restricting (legalistic) or releasing, vertical or horizontal, comforting or challenging. These classifications of themes, together with material elsewhere in the recorded interview, allowed Benson and Williams to construct six types of religiosity and to show rather strong relationships with political ideology and roll call voting behavior. Not only is consistency shown between how a person is religious and political values, but also religious types are shown to spread unpredictably across religious denominations.

The promise of post-Yinger research and, specifically, the experience of Benson and Williams suggest two important points. First, it may be that the strongest linkage between religion and political orientations is reflected in measures of foundational beliefs. Second, foundational beliefs may vary within the same religious body, permitting fruitful inquiry in single-denomination samples. Thus, foundational beliefs, as a fundamental set of religious values, are the central focus in our investigation.

OTHER THEORETICALLY RELEVANT SOURCES FOR POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS OF CATHOLICS

Foundational beliefs quite obviously are not the sole source of political orientations for American Catholics. Past research has identified several sources that reflect the importance of demographic factors and historical circumstance. Fee (1976a; 1976b), for example, traces enduring Catholic political alignments to several sources and concludes from the examination of available data that theories of ethnicity and assimilation contribute the most to understanding the linkage between Catholics and Democratic alignment. The ethnic groups that came earlier (Northern Europeans, Canadians) are less likely to have maintained (or formed—the data are unclear) Democratic identities. Furthermore, Catholics who have a stronger communal attachment to other Catholics are more likely to be Democratic. Fee argues, "It is not the institutional, religiously devout Catholic who is a Democrat, but the social Catholic, the Catholic as an ethnic and as a member of a minority religion" (1976b, p. 67).

Less extensive analysis has been devoted to ideology and issue positions of specific Catholic ethnic groups. Typically, this research does not offer controls for the effects of education and social class, among others, which correlate highly with degree of assimilation (e.g., Greeley, 1977). But it is clear ethnicity alone is not the significant element in the assimilation process. Rather, it is the extent to which in-group affinity endures and the time at which immigrant groups were assimilated into American culture.

Another source for Catholics' political orientations is identified in theories of social class (Alford, 1963). Because Catholic ethnics have historically occupied the lower rungs of the educational, income, and occupational ladders, they typically identified with the Democratic party. As Catholics moved up these ladders, presumably, they would become Republicans. Given that

Catholics have shown the greatest upward mobility of the membership of any Christian body in recent decades (Greeley, 1977; 1985), one should expect greater-than-average movement among them toward the Republican party (Groer, 1961; Dionne, 1981). Greeley (1985) and Fee (1976a), however, argue that the shift has failed to materialize. Recent findings by Penning (1986) are inconclusive: while the relationship between education and party identification among Catholics is statistically significant and in the predicted direction, it "has apparently weakened in recent years." Moreover, the relationship between subjective social class and party identification among Catholics has disappeared in the 1980s. Other empirical relationships with political ideology and issue positions are even more complex and have not always been consistently linked with social class among Catholics.

Political generations have also been identified as a source of political orientations. Age cohorts within the population share common political outlooks based, in large part, on social cleavages that divided society when members of the cohort developed political consciousness (Beck, 1974; 1985).

Although these generational effects have not been directly tested with samples of Catholics drawn in the 1980s, Penning has observed a strong relationship between age, as a continuous variable, and partisanship among Catholics and reports: "younger Catholics appear to be less partisan and more independent than older Catholics" (1986, p. 40). The relationship found between age and political ideology and issue positions is complex; the overall relationship has declined, and, although the percentage of liberal respondents among the young and the old has declined through the years, it has remained the same for middle-aged respondents. Young Catholics, like other young Americans, are more likely to be liberal on social issues and conservative on economic issues, while the relationship is reversed among older Catholics.

Region of residence, manifested in the political culture of a region (Key, 1949; Berelson et al., 1954), may also exert an influence on the political orientations Catholics form. In particular, because Catholics have been concentrated preponderantly in the Northeast and the cities of the East North Central states, it has been hard to distinguish between the Catholic cultures and Democratic political climates that have emerged in those regions. More recently, however, there has been an apparently slow but steady movement of Catholics from Rust Belt to Sun Belt regions (Leege and Trozzolo, 1985). Thus, it may become increasingly interesting to examine regional effects in studies of Catholics' political orientations.

Finally, there is growing evidence that gender has come to shape political orientations more than was originally recognized (Klein, 1984; Sapiro, 1983). For example, on a self-report of liberalism-conservatism, women with more privatized views of their roles (i.e., confined to the private, not public sector) are considerably more likely to call themselves conservative, whereas married women are only slightly more likely to be conservative (Sapiro, 1983, pp. 152-54). Also, women are more likely to be moralistic in sociopolitical attitudes

and to show political interest in issues relating to education, child welfare, peace, and the environment, while men show stronger interest in issues concerning business and economic stability, foreign policy, and the military (Sapiro, 1983, pp. 145-46). These orientations are thought to derive from traditional gender-role differences and gender stereotyping that privatize women. There is also some suggestive evidence (Rossi, 1982, pp. 190-233) that being Catholic contributes, on the one hand, to opposition to abortion on demand but, on the other, to "bottom-line" feminism and support for equal economic rights among National Women's Conference delegates. However, these data are for political elites rather than for rank-and-file Catholic women.

It is difficult to say, then, what the impact of gender is on Catholic political orientations. Married women, for example, might be more liberal because a higher proportion of Catholic married women than non-Catholic married women work outside the home, while they may be more conservative because they are more likely to attend religious services. Conversely, Catholic women might be more liberal because they are more likely than others to live in urban places. Finally, Catholic women may be more Democratic than Catholic men either because they are privatistic or because they are less traditionalistic about employment. The political gender knot has simply not been untied for Catholic samples, but it clearly should not be ignored in studies of political orientation.

METHODS

Sampling and Data Collection

Data used in this investigation were collected from registered Catholic parishioners who responded in late 1983 and early 1984 to a survey that was part of the Notre Dame Study of Catholic Parish Life. This comprehensive study was an attempt to understand contemporary parish life and the attitudes and behaviors of presumably the most active Catholics, namely, registered parishioners. As we have indicated elsewhere (Leege and Welch, 1985), Catholic parishes and their constituent parishioners (rather than all individuals who identify themselves as Catholics) were the foci of the study for essentially theoretical (see Greeley et al., 1981, pp. 7, 14; Glock and Stark, 1965, pp. 151-68, for supporting rationales), as well as methodological, reasons.

A complex multistage, stratified sampling design was used to select non-Hispanic parishioners from thirty-six representative, non-Hispanic parishes across the United States (see Leege and Welch, 1985, for detailed descriptions).¹ Multiple-wave mail-outs (see Dillman, 1978, for description of

¹ Because of vastly different styles of religiosity, language problems, and cultural differences among Hispanic groups, we took conscious steps to exclude Hispanic parishes and parishioners from the sample.

basic technique) of self-administered questionnaires yielded 2,667 responding parishioners (usable response rate of approximately 60%).²

There are some identifiable differences between our sample and National Opinion Research Center (NORC) non-Hispanic Catholic subsamples we examined from the same period. Our active parish-connected Catholics are more frequent Mass attenders, slightly older, more likely to be female, and slightly more conservative than Catholics in general on some church issues, such as birth control (Leege and Trozzolo, 1985). These respondents, however, are far from uniformly traditionalistic. Only 15% go to confession once a month or more, 60% would accept married male priests, and 35% would accept women priests.

A Measure of Foundational Religious Beliefs.

Religious Individualism/Communitarianism Our measure of foundational beliefs represents an attempt to apply Geertz's conceptual apparatus and Benson and Williams' measures to a mass, nonelite sample. We knew that open-ended items on a questionnaire would elicit fewer complete responses than would a structured set of choices that allowed respondents opportunities to elaborate. We were also impressed by Stephenson's (1953) and Brown's (1980) arguments that the unique arrangement of idea-elements should be captured by asking respondents to order them, within a specific range. Although we preferred card-sorting approach to measurement, we knew it would be too complex for a mass-sample, mailed questionnaire, and would not allow for choices outside the range specified by the investigator. Thus, we back-translated Benson and Williams' code categories, pared down their number through pretests, pretested alternate wordings and question layouts, and settled on the question design shown in appendix A.

The sequenced responses of parishioners were classified as primarily individualistic or communitarian based on the foundational religious themes re-

² The mail-out questionnaire was used because a pretest of three approaches to data collection showed the pace and anonymity of the questionnaire allowed for the most reflective and complete response to sensitive religious questions. Most respondents took over two hours, in private, neither objective could have been achieved with the direct personal interview. Further, the response rate from this multiwave mailout does not differ appreciably from that achieved by direct personal interview.

Black parishioners were oversampled because we had reason to believe the response rate for this subpopulation might be intolerably low. To compensate for this procedure, we reweighted the sample to correspond to the best estimates of regional and national proportions of black Catholics (estimates derived from Harfmann, 1985). Comparisons were then made between distributions on selected variables for the unweighted and weighted samples, but on no variables were there significant differences in parameters. Because we are not interested in estimating population parameters in this paper but rather in uncovering relationships between variables, we have used the unweighted sample. This simplifies problems with significance tests that would be introduced with weighted samples. Given the absence of any substantial differences in data patterns between our weighted and unweighted samples, this seemed a relatively safe procedure.

flected in each pattern (Leege, 1986).³ Benson and Williams found individuals with mixtures of the two religious themes (classified as integrated) in their congressional data. We too found some individuals who had a complex set of foundational beliefs described by both individualist and communitarian sequences. Thus, our final classification arrayed respondents on a continuum representing religious individualism/communitarianism, where 1 = high individualism (low communitarianism), 2 = integrated response (roughly equal in individualistic and communitarian emphasis), and 3 = high communitarianism (low individualism).

Measures of Other Relevant Variables

Because we wished both to compare the effects of foundational beliefs against those of other theoretically relevant variables as well as to control for these latter effects, twelve additional variables were measured. We have grouped these variables into six blocks representing basic demographic factors

Ethnic Assimilation Measures *Ethnic Assimilation and Communalism* Ethnic Assimilation was measured by an item asking, "Besides being an American, what is your main nationality background?" When respondents selected more than one ethnicity, we used binomial probabilities to assign individuals to categories.

Ethnic groups were then arranged on a continuum of assimilation based on the recognition that successive waves of migration, non-English-language persistence, and prevailing residential patterns led some ethnic groups to assimilate earlier than others (Fee, 1976b, Dolan, 1985). Thus, we have arranged Catholic parishioners' ethnicities in the following order from least assimilated (coded 1) to most assimilated (coded 10). black, Hispanic, French, Polish, Italian, Irish, East European, German, Scandinavian, and English (including American, Canadian, British, Welsh, and Scottish).⁴

³ This classification procedure was too complex to be described in detail but it is elaborated more fully in Leege and Welch (1985, pp. 35-39; Leege, 1986).

⁴ The most troublesome classification decisions were the Irish and the Eastern Europeans. One might argue for their reversal. However, although the Irish shared the English tongue and mastered American political procedures early, they often lived in large ethnic enclaves of the cities, and historians agree that they were an especially visible target for nativist sentiment, fueled not in the least by colonial relationships in the home countries. Immigrants from various central and eastern European countries outside Poland arrived later than the Irish and had greater language difficulties, but, historians argue, they were often located in smaller enclaves that could not sustain their own language over successive generations (as had the early-arriving Germans and the later-arriving Italians and Poles). Some of them also settled in smaller towns and rural areas where their survival and opportunity argued for faster assimilation; they could mobilize little economic clout and formed relatively small political blocs in such locales. While some Polish enclaves were in small towns, most were in cities and were large enough to sustain their own parishes, language, cultural distinctiveness, and economic institutions.

Communalism was measured by a four-item scale characterizing the degree of Catholic in-group affinity displayed by a respondent (low communalism = 0, high communalism = 4).⁵ Items included attachment to the parish, degree of distress over leaving the parish, number of closest friends within the parish, and extent to which the parish satisfies social needs. Interitem correlations were strong, with a corrected coefficient alpha of .64. The items are close to Lenski's notion of communalism, developed so effectively in the electoral context by Converse (1966), but the frame of reference is one's specific parish rather than a general Catholic culture. Thus, it is an even stronger measure of exclusiveness than earlier measures.

Measures of Social Class Education and Income Education is measured by the standard NORC and Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies (SRC/CPS) question about the level of education attained by the respondent. Our response categories were recoded by level attained (1 = some or completed grade school, 2 = some or completed high school, 3 = some or completed college, 4 = graduate or professional school), rather than number of years in school.

Income is also measured by the standard NORC and SRC/CPS question about total family income derived from all sources in the previous year. We used slightly different response categories in the middle-income ranges, as can be seen in the following codings: 1 = less than \$10,000, 2 = \$10,000 to \$19,999, 3 = \$20,000 to \$29,999, 4 = \$30,000 to \$39,999, 5 = \$40,000 to \$49,999, 6 = \$50,000 or more.

Measure of Political Generation 80s Generation and Dealignment Generation. The measure for political generations was similar, but not identical, to that devised by Beck (1974). After examining the respondent's present age, we classified those 18–32 as in the 80s Generation (1 = 18–32 years old, 0 = other) and created a second dummy variable (Dealignment Gener) to represent the dealignment generation (1 = 33–48 years old, 0 = other). Older generations of respondents were included in the suppressed reference category.

We have placed the French closer to the less-assimilated end because, although some were here early, the heaviest waves of French migration to New England have been during the twentieth century. Even South Louisiana had waves of French migration much later than the arrival of the Cajuns.

⁵ Initially, we had hoped to develop a measure that included dimensions of both Catholic within-group affinity and outgroup hostility. Several trials with multiple items yielded no single-dimensional scale. The offending items were those on outgroup hostility. We finally settled on a single item for the latter—the judgment that Catholics who marry outside the church are no longer true Catholics—but it quickly dropped out of the equations because of its low F-score.

⁶ We used only these two dummy variables to represent political generations because alternative analyses demonstrated that a more complete set of dummy variables introduced an unacceptable degree of multicollinearity and did not improve the explanatory power offered by the

Measures of Regionalism: Mid-Atlantic, South, Midwest, Intermountain, Pacific. Respondents from parishes in New England were classified as Northeast; those in parishes stretching from southeastern Pennsylvania to North Carolina as Mid-Atlantic; from Mississippi to eastern Texas as South; East North Central to West North Central as Midwest; Colorado to Idaho as Intermountain; and Washington to Oregon as Pacific. Five regions were coded as dummy variables (1 = resident of region, 0 = nonresident) and New England was treated as the suppressed reference category for our multivariate analyses, because New England most closely represents a Catholic political cultural region.

Gender. Male Gender was coded as a dummy variable, with females (1 = Male, 0 = Female) being the suppressed reference category.

Dependent Variables

Respondents' political orientations are represented in the following dependent variables: party identification, political ideology, and issue positions

Party Identification Our question asked the respondent, "Do you have a political party preference? If so, which one?" and presented five options (1) no preference, (2) Republican, (3) Democrat, (4) independent, (5) other. We did not use standard SRC/CPS and NORC wording because the "strong," "not very strong," and "leaning" options offered more precision than we needed and because we suspected a very high proportion of the independents would select "no preference" if it were visibly offered to them.⁷ For the analysis, Par-

two-variable set. It is interesting to note that the current Times-Mirror study of the electorate (1987) finds the principal generational cleavage to be above and below forty-five years of age. There are several smaller cleavages under age forty-five. Thus, we are not surprised that collapsing generations from the System of 1906, the New Deal, and Children of the New Deal together, while isolating the dealignment generation from the generation of the 1960s, gave us strong explanatory power in an active Catholic sample. Designating the former as a suppressed reference is consistent with both the Times-Mirror study and the observed impact of the Smith-Hoover election and New Deal on Catholic populations (Degler, 1964).

Concern about question wording appears to have been well advised. 21.3% of our parishioners chose "no preference" and 11.7% chose "independent." By comparison, among non-Hispanic Catholics in the 82-84 GSS, 9% chose "no preference" and 34.8% chose "independent." Also, previous studies (cf. Abramson, 1983, pp. 105-19) have shown that younger people are less likely to have a fixed party preference. When we examine our 80s Generation (respondents aged 18-32), we find that 39.2% state "no preference" and 9.7% offer "independent," whereas, in the GSS data for the same cohort, 1.3% show "no preference" and 42.8% are "independent." Thus, beyond any differences in sample design, there appear to be question-wording effects. In an era of party de-institutionalization, we think the differences between "no preference" and "independent" are important, and we prefer a wording that makes either option equally available to the respondent.

ty ID is treated as a nominal variable with "no preference" coded 1, "independent" coded 2, "Democrat" coded 3, and "Republican" coded 4. ("Others" were discarded because of the negligible number of respondents in the category).

Political Ideology. This item asked, "Which of the following labels best describes your political position?" Response categories avoided the use of "extremely" because of the popular aversion to "extremists" of any type. Instead, our responses ranged from "very liberal" (coded 1), "liberal" (coded 2), "moderate" (coded 3), "conservative" (coded 4), to "very conservative" (coded 5). Because we treat issue positions as a set of political orientations distinct from ideological self-classification, the dimensionality issue is not central to this paper (Conover and Feldman, 1981).

Issue Positions Controversial sociopolitical issues were represented by twelve dependent variables and grouped into two basic categories: (1) public policy and (2) cultural or life-style issues. Issue categories, representative variables, item wordings, and coded values are reproduced in appendix B. To simplify analyses and maintain consistency with the scoring of Political Ideology, all variables are scored so that high values indicate a more politically conservative response

Data Analysis

Net relationships between predictor and dependent variables were examined through multiple regression and discriminant analyses. Although some of the measures of the predictor variables appear to be merely ordinal, we have followed Borgatta and Bohrnstedt's (1981) reasoning in our analyses. In general, they contend that multiple regression analyses generate results that are highly robust in the face of measurement violations. Moreover, in working with underlying constructs that are assumed to be continuous, parametric analysis techniques should be used despite the ordinal or imperfectly interval character of the operational measures. At the conceptual level all variables

Confirmation for this view is found in Dennis's Partisan Supporter Typology, which allows for individuals who are neither party supporters nor political independents (Dennis 1981a, 1981b). Dennis classified such people as "unattached" and noted they were unlike the independent-leaners and highly involved independents found by many scholars (1981b, p. 3) within the category "independent."

Depending on the wave of the SRC/CPS study, Dennis classified between 25.4% and 30.3% of the respondents as "unattached." Adjusting for the importance of party as a reference group for active Catholics, we suspect our figures and Dennis's figures are reinforcing. Both argue for techniques that isolate "no preferences" or "unattached" from true independents and independent-leaners.

used in regression analysis are presumed to be continuous; thus the technique is appropriate.

To assess the predictive power for several of the demographic variables, we also computed sheaf coefficients (Whitt, 1986). This approach allowed us to compare most effectively the predictive power of demographic factors represented by different numbers of variables (e.g., political generation vs assimilation).⁸ In addition, the set of predictor variables was screened for severe collinearity (see Berry and Feldman, 1985, and Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980, p. 105, for appropriate techniques), and residuals were analyzed to detect possible violations of assumptions underlying OLS regression (again, see Berry and Feldman, 1985, for description of procedures). No severe multicollinearity problems or violations of OLS assumptions were detected.⁹ Finally, discriminant function analysis (Klecka, 1980; Tatsuoka, 1970) was used to predict political party affiliation. The predictor variables included in the regression analyses were also included as predictors in the discriminant analysis

RESULTS

Results of the discriminant function analysis are reported in table 1. Three statistically significant and theoretically interpretable functions emerged from

⁸ In addition, Whitt (1986) notes, sheaf coefficients can be interpreted as equivalent to standardized partial regression coefficients, thus allowing for comparisons with betas. We have also included the betas for component variables (e.g., ED, INC, and RACE for Deprivation) to describe direction of net relationships.

⁹ Because we suspected that the set of dummy variables representing region might introduce an unacceptable level of multicollinearity into the analyses, we performed an alternative analysis that represented region as a single dichotomy (1 = New England resident, 0 = other region of residency). New England was selected as the primary indicator for the regional variable because, within our sample, it best approximated a region where Catholic culture predominates (see Shortridge, 1977, for supporting evidence). Comparisons of partial regression coefficients for other variables in the model showed virtually no appreciable differences between the sets, suggesting considerable stability in these parameter estimates. Moreover, other tests for multicollinearity (e.g., "tolerances" associated with predictor variables, "condition numbers" characterizing the matrix of predictors, and inspection of R^2 for all combinations of single predictor variables regressed on the remaining predictors) indicated the absence of severe effects.

Some violations of the normality assumption (see Berry and Feldman, 1985, p. 11) were apparent for five of the twelve models, however, additional alternative analyses performed with transformed dependent variables (see Neter and Wasserman, 1974, pp. 306-308; and Norusis, 1985, p. 33, for examples of transformation procedures) provided only one appreciable increase in goodness-of-fit for all the transformed models (e.g., change in R^2 of approximately 1.2%). Few models displayed changes of more than 0.2%. Because the benefits of these transformations were really confined to a single model, we have reported only data on original nontransformed models to maintain consistency in our discussions and avoid unwarranted complexity. Such a decision seems justified, when one recognizes that OLS analyses are highly robust when confronted with violations of normality, especially when large samples are involved (Hanushak and Jackson, 1977, p. 66; Berry and Feldman, 1985, p. 11). To conserve space, we have not included a correlation matrix in this paper. The matrix is available upon request from the authors.

TABLE 1

STANDARDIZED DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS, EIGENVALUE
AND CANONICAL CORRELATIONS FOR RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
PREDICTOR VARIABLES AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Predictor Variables	Coefficients for Function 1 (Highly Assimilated High Income)	Coefficients for Function 2 (80s Generation)	Coefficients for Function 3 (Mid-Atlantic Region)
Communalism	- .159	- .155	.053
Assimilation	.518	.162	- .062
Education	.147	- .394	- .076
Income	.478	- .191	.288
80s Generation	.174	.844	- .276
Dealignment Generation	.044	.471	- .199
Male	.170	- .058	.120
Intermountain	.063	.205	.984
Mid-Atlantic	- .411	.240	1.120
Midwest	- .300	.430	.796
Pacific	- .279	.342	.942
South	- .224	.524	.848
Religious Individualism/ Communitarianism	- .141	.061	- .060
Eigenvalues*	.138	.099	.071
Percent Relative Variance	44.7	32.2	23.1
Canonical Correlation	.348	.301	.256

Note: Analysis is based on 2,078 grouped cases.

*Tests for significance of Wilk's Lambda indicate all functions are statistically significant, $p < .05$.

this analysis.¹⁰ Our examination of the structure coefficients (Klecka, 1980, p. 31) from the discriminant analysis suggested that each of the functions has a relatively clear interpretation. For example, high structure coefficients (as reported in table 1) for Income ($r = .609$) and Assimilation ($r = .601$) on the first function appear to indicate that it represents a dimension reflecting a high degree of cultural assimilation: those who score highest on the dimension are wealthier than their peers and members of more socially-accepted, assimilated ethnic groups. Because income attainment is generally thought to be strongly related to assimilation, an interpretation of the loading pattern

¹⁰ Although tests for the significance of Wilk's Lambda indicate all three functions are statistically significant, the large sample size led us to place more emphasis on other criteria, for example, the fact that the canonical correlations were in the moderate range (Klecka, 1980, p. 67). In addition, because our sampling design involved the use of both stratified and simple random sampling, we were inclined to interpret these significance tests more conservatively (Klecka 1980, p. 39).

seemed straightforward. This function accounts for nearly 45% of the total variance in party identification explained by the set of functions, and the canonical correlation between this dimension and Party ID is .348. The second function, representing the 80s Generation, displays the next highest degree of predictive ability (accounting for 32.1% of the total variance, canonical correlation = .301). The single relatively high structure coefficient for 80s Generation ($r = .661$) made the identification of function 2 similarly easy. Younger respondents, as members of more recent political generations, tended to have relatively higher scores on the function than those older respondents within the suppressed reference category. Function 3 also displayed only one comparatively high structure coefficient (i.e., Mid-Atlantic, $r = .360$). This last function displays the lowest degree of predictive power (23.1% of the total variance, canonical correlation = .258). The standardized discriminant coefficients (reported in table 1), showing the relative contributions of variables to the discriminant scores, reinforce the preceding interpretations.

Group centroids for the four categories denoting party identification are also arranged in a pattern that is intuitively sensible and further supports our interpretation of the functions. For example, Republicans show the highest group mean (.485) on the function representing respondents who are Highly Assimilated and High Income, with Democrats (-.387) showing the lowest mean. Also, as might be expected, those reporting no party preference exhibit the highest group mean (.552) for the function representing the 80s Generation (see Abramson et al., 1986, pp. 105-19, for supporting evidence), and Republicans again display the highest group mean (.370) for the function representing Mid-Atlantic Region.

As a set, the three functions exhibited a modest ability to predict variation in party identification, with 45.7% of the grouped cases in our sample being classified correctly. This accuracy estimate indicates that the three-function model offers slightly less than a 28% reduction in classification error ($\tau = .76$) compared to a purely random assignment model (see Klecka, 1980, p. 1, for a discussion of the tau statistic).

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND ISSUE POSITIONS

Results of the multiple regression analyses (tables 2 and 3) show a number of interesting patterns. First, a relatively small number of the regression models display substantial ability to account for variation in the dependent variables. The set of predictor variables displays R^2 values greater than 10% for only the following five of the twelve selected dependent variables: Censor Texts, Prayer, Gay Teacher, Cohabit, and Male Breadwinner.¹¹ In general,

¹¹ For one of the models, the low R^2 values (i.e., < 10) may be as much attributable to reduced variance in the dependent variables—a particular problem in many single-demonstration samples—as to deficiencies in predictive power. If we collapse the variable representing attitudes toward the acceptability of abortion into a trichotomy, it suffers from substantially reduced vari-

the full set of predictor variables seems most effective in accounting for variation in positions related to cultural or life-style issues (e.g., sexuality and the definition of family roles). (The average R^2 value across the four dependent variables in table 3 is .103, higher than the mean R^2 for variables represented in table 2.) The full set of predictors also does relatively well for educational issues, such as whether to allow prayer in public schools and whether parents should be allowed to censor the texts their children read in schools and public libraries. In general, however, the set displays only modest predictive power across a broad spectrum of political issues.

With other important demographic variables controlled, the religious individualism/communitarianism variable (Relind/Comm) appears to be a relatively strong predictor ($\beta > \pm 100$) for the measure of ideology (liberalism-conservatism) and attitudinal positions on such issues as abortion, ERA, premarital cohabitation, husband as exclusive breadwinner for the family, and the extent to which one views secular humanism as a threat to society. For each of these attitudes, the net relationship between Relind/Comm and the dependent variable is negative, low in absolute magnitude (ranging from $-.110$ to $-.136$), and statistically significant ($p < .001$). Thus, the higher the level of religious communitarianism, the less likely Catholics are to be politically conservative and the less likely they will be to take conservative positions on other issues as well. This pattern, in particular, would seem to suggest that foundational religious beliefs display fairly consistent net relationships to attitudinal positions on women's rights, sexuality, and changing familial roles. The mean absolute betas and sheaf coefficients (disregarding signs) in table 3 also reinforce this conclusion. the mean beta for Relind/Comm (.121) is considerably larger than the mean coefficients for all of the other sets of demographic variables except one, Political Generation.

Although the religious individualism/communitarianism measure displays statistically significant net relationships to nearly all of the twelve dependent variables reported in tables 2 and 3 (the lone exception is the net relationship to Prayer, table 2), Relind/Comm is clearly less potent in predicting Catholics' attitudes toward various public policy issues, such as unilateral nuclear freeze ($\beta = .040$), defense spending ($\beta = -.050$), the right of parents to censor school and public library books ($\beta = -.061$), busing to achieve integrated schools ($\beta = -.065$), and the rights of homosexuals to teach in schools ($\beta = -.062$). Again, all of these net relationships are negative, indicating that Catholics who exhibit higher levels of religious communitarianism are less likely to hold conservative positions on questions of public policy. Despite the relative lack of predictive power shown by Relind/Comm for the policy issues

ability approximately 60% of all respondents believe that abortion is acceptable when there is a severe threat to the mother, whereas approximately 30% believe abortion is never acceptable (this position represents the church's official stance), and about 5% believe abortion is always acceptable or acceptable under most conditions.

NET RELATIONSHIPS, SHEAF COEFFICIENTS AND R² VALUES FOR REGRESSIONS OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND POSITIONS ON SELECTED PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES ON DEMOGRAPHIC AND FOUNDATIONAL BELIEF VARIABLES

Dependent Variables	Assimilation		SES		Demographic Variables				Regional				Foundational Belief Variable		
	Comm	Assim	Ed	Inc	Gen	Gen	Dealign	Gender	IM	MA	MID	P	S	Comm	R ²
Ideology	- 023 (117) ^a	113 (117) ^a	- 068 ^b (075) ^a	072 (075) ^a	- 052 ^a (050)	027 (050)		052 ^b	024	046 (062) ^b	035	- 039	- 033	- 114 ^c	049
Busing	- 104 ^a (167) ^a	123 (167) ^a	- 052 ^a (084) ^a	065 (084) ^a	- 045 ^a (083) ^a	043 ^a (083) ^a		026	076 ^b	021 (107) ^a	115	046	033	- 065 ^c	059
Cross Tests	067 (067) ^a	003 (067) ^a	- 114 ^a (172) ^a	- 083 (172) ^a	- 204 ^a (195) ^a	- 094 ^a (195) ^a		037 ^a	005	- 048 ^a (106) ^a	033	046	078 ^b	- 061 ^c	125
Prayer	087 (135) ^a	- 092 (135) ^a	- 150 ^a (169) ^a	040 (169) ^a	- 033 (084) ^a	- 033 (084) ^a		- 054 ^b	- 166 ^a	- 048 ^a (182) ^a	- 006	- 143 ^a	- 149 ^a	- 027	142
ERA	014 (087) ^a	067 (087) ^a	039 (046) ^b	067 ^b (046) ^b	- 070 ^a (089) ^b	040 (089) ^b		064 ^b	068 ^a	- 001 (100) ^a	054 ^a	082 ^a	067 ^b	- 115 ^c	053
Gay Teacher	030 (079) ^a	075 (079) ^a	- 132 ^a (143) ^a	028 (143) ^a	- 066 ^a (166) ^a	104 ^a (166) ^a		102 ^a	037	- 047 (104) ^a	074 ^b	019	045	- 062 ^a	104
Defense Spend	- 062 (125) ^a	060 (125) ^a	064 ^b (102) ^a	106 ^a (102) ^a	- 066 ^a (064) ^a	036 (064) ^a		110 ^a	069 ^b	- 013 (156) ^a	069 ^b	- 094 ^a	- 096 ^a	- 050 ^b	063
Un-Freeze	110 ^a (154) ^a	100 (154) ^a	- 006 (116) ^a	125 (116) ^a	- 051 ^a (052) ^a	003 (052) ^a		143 ^a	010	012 (081) ^a	062 ^b	- 032	- 044	- 040 ^a	074
Mean Absolute Coefficients	(119)	(119)	(116)	(116)	(096)	(096)		074	(116)	(116)	(116)	(116)	(116)	(116)	067

Note: Sheaf coefficients are indicated by parentheses. N equals 2 667 for all models.

^aAll regression models are statistically significant at p = .01 level.

^bSignificant at p < .05 level.

^cSignificant at p = .01 level.

^dSignificant at p = .001 level.

however, it is nevertheless evident that significant relationships continue to appear even after important demographic controls have been applied.

DISCUSSION

Our results suggest that the religious roots of political orientations are indeed real and should not be ignored. We have submitted the measure of foundational religious beliefs introduced in this paper to a "tough test," i.e., characterizing those beliefs in a national sample of Catholic parishioners. It is a tough test because a single-denomination sample and its more active membership offer less heterogeneity than is found in a sample of adherents and apostates on a cross-denominational sample. Furthermore, our findings extend current literature about the multidimensionality of political orientations at the same time that they shed light on the "elusive relationship" (Wuthnow, 1973) between religious beliefs and political attitudes.

Clearly, we have found evidence that party identification remains responsive to measures of assimilation and theoretically similar variables, such as region and political generations. The party identification of active Catholics may be responsive to social class when characterized by income but definitely not when characterized by education. This suggests, as Dennis (1981a; 1981b) indicates, traditional measures of party identification may capture long-term social structural characteristics. These measures, however, are less responsive to the ideological and attitudinal orientations of our active Catholics. For example, when religion is communal in character and compounded within ethnicity (as it is often measured), it is useful in understanding Catholics' party identification. But, when religion is foundational in character and concerns the content of belief systems, it appears to contribute virtually nothing to understanding the party identifications held by active Catholics.

Foundational religious beliefs are more powerful for understanding political values that are less socially structural and more attitudinal in character. Thus, our measure of individualistic and communitarian beliefs is the second strongest predictor of political liberalism/conservatism (after the block of the assimilation variables) and is among the better predictors, compared to the demographic variables, for a range of issues. There are distinctively different foundational beliefs among active Catholics, and these lead to predictable differences in political ideology and some policy positions. In that respect, we have discovered something similar in a mass (but religiously homogeneous) sample to what Benson and Williams (1982) found in an elite (but religiously heterogeneous) sample. Both studies seem to show that the aspect of religiosity that we have called individualism-communitarianism can predict attitudinal manifestations of basic political values.

It is not yet clear, however, that a strong argument exists for countering all of Hoge and Zulueta's (1985) contentions about the connection between religiosity and political orientations. While it is true foundational religious be-

TABLE 3

NET RELATIONSHIPS, SHEAF COEFFICIENTS, AND R^2 VALUES FOR REGRESSIONS OF POSITIONS ON SELECTED CULTURAL OR LIFE-STYLE ISSUES ON DEMOGRAPHIC AND FOUNDATIONAL BELIEF VARIABLES

Dependent Variables	Assimilation		SES		Demographic Variables				Regional			Foundational Belief Variable		
	Comm	Assim	Edu	Inc	Gen	Gen	Design	IM	MA	MID	P	S	Relind/Comm	R ^{2a}
Abortion	124 ^a (.126) ^a	.053 ^b (.053) ^a	.003 (.013)	.012	.105 ^c (.100) ^c	.022	.045 ^c	.005	.061 ^a (.063)	.002	.006	-.011	-110 ^c	.053
Capitalist	.063 ^a (.047) ^a	.056 ^b (.053)	-.050 ^a (.053)	-.077	.263 ^c (.250) ^c	.101 ^c	.005	.006	.046 ^a (.090) ^a	-.001	.040	.052 ^a	-136 ^c	.121
Male Breadwinner	.061 ^a (.071) ^a	.041 ^a	.077 (.090) ^a	.026	.275 ^c (.291) ^c	.214 ^c	.073 ^c	.022	-.034 (.096) ^a	-.009	.042	.076 ^b	-122 ^a	.160
Secular Human	.060 ^b (.090) ^a	.002	.070 ^a (.061) ^a	.022	.172 ^c (.173) ^c	.115 ^c	.006	.049 ^a	-.010 (.078) ^b	.032	.073 ^b	.037	-117 ^c	.076
Mean Absolute Coefficients	(.090)		(.054)		(.204)		.032		(.106)					.121

Note: Sheaf coefficients are indicated in parentheses. N equals 2,667 for all models.

^aAll regression models are statistically significant at $p < .01$ level.

^bSignificant at $p < .05$ level.

^cSignificant at $p < .01$ level.

^dSignificant at $p < .001$ level.

liefs relate to a person's general sense of political liberalism or conservatism, they still predict more about positions tending toward the private sphere (e.g., gender, family, or sex-related issues) than about most public policy issues (e.g., civil liberties, race relations, or defense). This suggests that, if the political agenda continues to shift from the economic sector to the cultural sector generally (and the family specifically), foundational beliefs may become more useful in understanding the roots of political orientations.

A second line of argument reinforces this conclusion as well. Scholars are beginning to see partisan dealignment as a specific instance of the more general destructuring of Western society (Dalton et al., 1985). If theories of partisanship that place greater emphasis on short-term electoral factors—for example, “rationality” as retrospective voting, media effects, and image voting—are increasingly useful in understanding American political alignments (see Dennis, 1981b, for a discussion of theories of partisanship), it is possible that the forms of political orientation involving political ideology and issue positions will wax in relevance while long-term party identification will wane. And, if churches too are amidst a realignment and dealignment phase characterized by the waning attention and social influence of many “mainline” denominations (see Hadden, 1987, pp. 601–603; Hoge, 1987), it makes sense to characterize religiosity less by associational, ethnic, and communal variables and more by foundational religious beliefs. In such a demystified world the ties that once bound no longer bind, but they may orient and structure, and it is wise to recognize this with the measures we use.

We also recognize, as social scientists have suggested, the continuing influence of region, social class, political generation, and, to a much lesser extent, gender on many issue positions held by Catholics. And it is political generation, in particular, that should merit continued interest, particularly because of its strong empirical linkage to several issues around which Catholics' political orientations now focus.

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APPENDIX A

INSTRUCTIONS AND FORMAT FOR MEASURE OF RELIGIOUS INDIVIDUALISM/COMMUNITARIANISM

Now we are going to ask you to be an artist. Religion always identifies a basic human problem, something that is wrong with humans and their world. Then religion talks about a path to salvation, that is, a way that basic human problems can be overcome. Finally, religion talks about outcomes of salvation—a change in persons' lives or the way the world is as a result of salvation. Below

salvation, and outcomes of salvation. Think about your religious beliefs now you be the artist. What do you think is the basic human problem that religion deals with? What do you think is the path to salvation? When you decide these, draw an arrow from the box that describes the basic human problem (under "A") to the box that describes the path to salvation (under "B"). Finally, what do you think is the outcome of salvation? Now draw an arrow from the box you have chosen under B to the box you have chosen under C — the outcome of salvation. If any of our descriptions in the boxes under A or C do not really describe what you think is the basic problem, or the path, the outcome, then you can try to describe it in your own words. We have left some open boxes for you to write in something if you want. But be sure to connect whichever boxes you choose for A, B, and C with arrows.

(A) The Basic Human Problem	(B) The Path to Salvation	(C) The Outcome of Salvation
	Doing good works to earn God's favor	
Something lacking in my individual life		My life on earth is changed. I feel fulfillment, meaning, joy
	Trusting in God's free gift of forgiveness	
Separation of human beings from God, unfulfillment		I will live forever with God in heaven after I die
	Relying on the church's sacraments to set things right	
Lack of human community or closeness between people		The world will be changed so that people live together in peace and harmony
	Working hard to make our society better and more just	

APPENDIX B

DEPENDENT VARIABLES REPRESENTING ISSUE POSITIONS,
ITEM WORDING, AND CODED VALUES

The variables listed below represent responses to the following question
"Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements?"

Issue	Predictor Variable	Topic	Response
Culture or Life-style	Cohabit	"It is morally wrong for couples to live together when they are <i>not</i> married "	(1) Strongly disagree (2) Disagree (3) Agree (4) Strongly agree
Culture or Life-style	Male Breadwinner	"It is best if the wife stays at home and the husband works to support the family "	(1) Strongly disagree (2) Disagree (3) Agree (4) Strongly agree
Culture or Life-style	Secular Human	"Secular humanism has greatly eroded the moral fiber of our society "	(1) Strongly disagree (2) Disagree (3) Agree (4) Strongly agree
Public Policy	Censor*	"Parents should have the right to censor textbooks and books selected for the public library	(1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree

The variables listed below represent responses to the following question
"Catholics in the United States hold various positions on a variety of social and church issues confronting Americans today. Below are statements that address some issues of significance to all Americans. How do you feel about these statements?"

Issue	Predictor Variable	Topic	Response
Public Policy	ERA	"The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)"	(1) Strongly favor (2) Favor (3) Oppose (4) Strongly oppose
Public Policy	Prayer*	"Requiring prayer in public schools"	(1) Strongly favor (2) Favor (3) Oppose (4) Strongly oppose
Public Policy	Gay Teacher*	"Allowing homosexuals to teach in public schools"	(1) Strongly favor (2) Favor (3) Oppose (4) Strongly oppose

APPENDIX B (continued)

Issue	Predictor Variable	Topic	Response
Public Policy	Busing	"Busing to achieve racial integration in the public schools"	(1) Strongly favor (2) Favor (3) Oppose (4) Strongly oppose
Public Policy	Defense Spend*	"Increased spending for national defense"	(1) Strongly favor (2) Favor (3) Oppose (4) Strongly oppose
Public Policy	Unifreeze	"Urging our own government to 'freeze' the development of nuclear weapons regardless of what the Soviet Union does"	(1) Strongly favor (2) Favor (3) Oppose (4) Strongly oppose
Culture or Life-style	Abortion	"Which of the following statements comes closest to your view about abortion?"	(1) Abortion is always acceptable (2) Abortion is acceptable under most circumstances (3) Abortion is acceptable only under extreme circumstances like a threat to the mother's life, rape, or incest (4) Abortion is never acceptable

*Denotes items that were reverse-coded

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Richard Nixon as Pinocchio, Richard II, and Santa Claus: The Use of Allusion in Political Satire

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Our approach to the uses of metaphor and allusion in political satire is rooted in the interaction view of metaphor offered by the philosopher Max Black. We focus on one central illustration, the assertion that "Richard Nixon is Pinocchio" — contained in a 1970s monologue by the political satirist David Frye. We argue that the meaning attached to this assertion requires us to know about both Richard Nixon and Pinocchio. The more we know of each, the more sophisticated will be our understanding of what makes this allusion both satirical and apt. Also, for an allusion to work, it must not contain elements that appear to contradict the satirist's central thrust, and that central thrust must be comprehensible to the audience even if some of the fine points may be missed. Moreover, some allusions are "richer" and more successful than others, such as that of Nixon as Pinocchio. To demonstrate these points, we contrast two other allusions involving Nixon, one portraying him as Richard II, the other as Santa Claus.

Our concern in this research note will be to demonstrate how figures of speech such as allusion, metaphor, and analogy work in the context of political satire. First, we shall explicate the interaction view of metaphor made famous by Max Black (1962; 1977; 1978), extend it to other tropes and show its applicability to political satire.¹ Next, we shall discuss in detail a simple allusion

I wish to express a particular debt of gratitude to Max Black, whose ideas I have freely borrowed for this paper. The manuscript was typed from my handwritten scribbles by the staff of the Word Processing Center of the School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine. The encouragement to write it came from two individuals, George Gordon, Department of Communications, Hofstra University, and my UCI colleague, Lewis (Creel) Froman. I am also indebted to helpful comments from an anonymous referee.

¹ Political satire is a much-neglected topic. Although there is a sizable literature in communications on cartooning, I found only a handful of references to political satire in political science journals (see, however, Coupe, 1989; Zashin and Chapman, 1974) and virtually none that dealt with contemporary satire or satirists. Aristophanes is a more likely candidate for scholarly study in political science than is Art Buchwald or Bill Mauldin. While satire is studied in the humanities more than in the social sciences, most humanists who have looked at satire are simply not very interested in political satire, and, with rare exceptions, even when they do deal with political satire (e.g., Orwell's *Animal Farm*) they look at it primarily in literary terms. Moreover, humanists, too, seem to have a bias against investigating contemporary satire. One of the most important areas, and one of the most neglected, is visual satire. An important exception to this neglect, how-

that permits us to illustrate our major points, the assertion that "Richard Nixon is Pinocchio." For contrast, we then consider two other allusions Richard Nixon: as Richard II and as Santa Claus. We shall seek to demonstrate the claims that (1) satirical allusions are implicit arguments that must "be decoded" by the listener or reader; (2) often, allusions can be understood more than one level, depending upon the sophistication of the audience; (3) for an allusion to be fully successful it may not contain elements that appear to contradict the satirist's central thrust; (4) for an allusion to be at all successful its surface meaning must be comprehended by the audience, even if details of interpretation are missed, and (5) some allusions are "richer" and more significant than others, even though we may simultaneously hold several allusions in our mind with respect to the same object.

THE INTERACTION VIEW OF METAPHOR AND ITS APPLICATION TO METAPHOR AND OTHER FIGURES OF SPEECH

There are three commonly held views of metaphor. The first, the *substitution view*, treats a metaphoric expression as a substitute for a meaning that might have been expressed literally "The author substitutes M for L, it is the reader's task to invert the substitution by using the literal meaning of M as a clue to the intended literal meaning of L. Understanding a metaphor is like deciphering a code or unraveling a riddle" (Black, 1962, p. 32). The second, the *comparison view*, holds that a metaphor is "a condensed or elliptical simile" (Black, 1962, p. 35).² The third approach, the *interaction view* (Black, 1977), will be the basis for the approach taken in this paper.

Let us consider the ever popular example, "Richard is a lion." The substitution view would require us to find a literal predicate that is to be substituted for the metaphorical one, for example, "Richard is a lion" means "Richard is brave." The comparison view would translate "Richard is a lion" as "Richard is like a lion [in being brave]," with the "added words in brackets being understood but not explicitly stated" (Black, 1962, p. 36).

Black (1962; 1977) notes that there are a number of difficulties with both the comparison and substitution views. First, both views treat the decoding process as involving matching up M (lion) with L (brave) without regard to what may be known about characteristics of the primary subject (Richard) and without apparent regard to the context in which the metaphoric statement

ever, is the December 1975 issue of *20th Century Studies*, which is devoted to "politics in cartoon and caricature." (I am indebted to Professor Seymour Colin-Ure, University of Kent, for calling this issue to my attention.) Another important exception is Press (1981).

² As Black points out, the comparison view of metaphor can be regarded as a special case of the substitution view, "for it holds that the metaphorical statement might be replaced by an equivalent literal comparison" (1982, p. 35).

uttered.³ Second, both views treat metaphor as what we shall call a "close-ended expression," that is for a given M there exists some specifiable set of L_1, L_2, \dots, L_N by which it is to be appropriately translated (the substitution view) or to which the subject of the metaphor is to be likened (the comparison view).

Black has suggested that even the simplest and seemingly most straightforward metaphors cannot be readily decoded in the fashion suggested by either the substitution or comparison view. Consider, for example, the assertion that "man is a wolf." While there may be standard beliefs about the characteristics of wolves (e.g., wolves are fierce, carnivorous, and treacherous) that the metaphor is expected to call to mind, other equally well-known attributes of wolves are somehow being neglected (e.g., wolves are four footed and have a fur pelt). Which characteristics of the secondary subject of the metaphor, "wolves," are regarded as relevant and which are regarded as irrelevant will depend upon the perceived attributes of the principal subject of the metaphor, "man."

The effect, then, of (metaphorically) calling a man a "wolf" is to evoke the wolf-system of related commonplaces. If the man is a wolf, he preys upon other animals, is fierce hungry, engaged in constant struggle, a scavenger, and so on. Each of these implied assertions has now to be made to fit the principal subject (man) either in normal or in abnormal senses. If the metaphor is at all appropriate this can be done—up to a point at least. A suitable hearer will be led by the wolf-system of implications to construct a corresponding system of implications about the principal subject. But these implications will *not* be those comprised in the commonplaces *normally* implied by literal uses of "man." The new implications must be determined by the pattern of implications associated with literal uses of the word "wolf." Any human traits that can without undue strain be talked about in "wolf-language" will be rendered prominent, and any that cannot will be pushed into the background. The wolf-metaphor suppresses some details, emphasizes others—in short, *organizes* our view of man (Black, 1962, p. 41).⁴

³ "There are many contexts (including nearly all the interesting ones) where the meaning of a metaphorical expression has to be reconstructed from the speaker's intention (and other clues) because the broad rules of standard usage are too general to supply the information needed. When Churchill, in a famous phrase, called Mussolini 'that uterail,' the tone of voice, the verbal setting, the historical background, helped to make clear what metaphor was being used" (Black, 1962, p. 29).

⁴ However, a zoologist who knew a great deal about wolves would be unlikely to interpret the metaphor "man is a wolf" in exactly the same way as one whose knowledge of wolves was less reliable and less detailed. Similarly, "men who take wolves to be reincarnations of dead humans will give the statement 'man is a wolf' an interpretation different from the one [we] have been assuming" (Black, 1962, p. 40), as will contemporary feminists. For example, the metaphor "marriage is a zero-sum game" (discussed in Black, 1977, pp. 443–44) will be more meaningful the more one knows about game theory.

To remedy the limitations of the substitution and comparison views of metaphor, Black (1962; 1977; 1978), building on the work of Richards (1936), has proposed a third approach, an interaction view of metaphor, which we may paraphrase (Black, 1977, pp. 441–43).

A metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects, identified as the primary subject and the secondary one. The metaphorical utterance works by applying to the primary subject a set of implications that is predictable of the secondary subject. An interpretation of a metaphorical statement selects, emphasizes, and suppresses features of both the primary and the secondary subject so as to construct an isomorphism between the two. In the context of a particular metaphoric statement, the two subjects interact in that the presence of the primary subject incites the reader to select some of the secondary subject's properties that "fit" the primary subject and the presence of the secondary subject incites the reader to select for properties of the primary subject that can be "matched" to characteristics of the secondary subject.

In Black's view (and ours), a metaphorical statement demands selection, organization, and projection, in short, "a creative response from a competent reader" (Black, 1977, p. 442). Moreover, any attempt to translate a metaphor into some set of literal statements will be misguided. Not only will the set vary with individual readers but, even if this variation is treated as insignificant, "the set of literal statements . . . will not have the same power to inform and enlighten as the original. For one thing, the implications previously left for a suitable reader to deduce for himself, with a nice feeling for their relative priorities and degrees of importance, are now presented explicitly as though having equal weight" (Black, 1962; p. 46).

Black has informally characterized the interaction view of metaphor in terms of "a piece of heavily smoked glass on which certain lines have been left clear . . . Then I shall see only the stars that can be made to lie on the lines previously prepared upon the screen, and the stars I do see will be organized by the screen's structure. We can think of a metaphor as such a screen. . . . We can say that the principal subject is 'seen through' the metaphorical expression—or, if we prefer, that the principal subject is 'projected upon' the field of the subsidiary subject" (Black, 1962, p. 41).

My own preferred metaphor to characterize the interaction view is that a metaphor is a wardrobe. We try out the clothes in the wardrobe on the principal subject to see which fit. Having tried the garments one at a time, even if many don't fit, we see if we can come up with a combination that comprises a matching (and fitting) outfit—one that covers the principal subject (or at least doesn't leave too many ragged edges).⁵

⁵ Of course, if most of the wardrobe doesn't fit (or at least doesn't appear to), then the metaphor is apt to be a failure. "It may seem justified to speak of the metaphor as creating connections but nothing intelligible can be created *ex nihilo*. . . . When the author presents the metaphor to his audience, its effectiveness depends upon whether the imagery evoked can send the au-

While metaphor is sometimes used as a generic term that encompasses virtually all other figures of speech, by defining it as characterizing an object in a way not meant to be taken literally, one needn't take such an extreme position to recognize that certain tropes (in particular, allusion) can often be treated as special cases of metaphor. In particular, like metaphor, allusion can have a power to enlighten by creating a coherent pattern that is imposed upon a series of otherwise rather disjointed observations. The allusion described in the next section, Richard Nixon as Pinocchio, can serve just such a role

RICHARD NIXON AS PINOCCHIO

The straightforward application of Black's interaction view of metaphor to a case of use of allusion for political satire can be demonstrated with an excerpt drawn from a comic monologue by David Frye—from his early-1970s routine called "Richard Nixon Superstar"—which portrays Nixon's childhood and adolescence

"Hello, Betty? This is Dick Nixon. Uh, Dick Nixon from school. I've been sitting behind you for five years. That's right. Pinocchio."

How are we to interpret the allusion "Richard Nixon as Pinocchio"? To say "Richard Nixon is like Pinocchio" doesn't help us much unless we know what characteristics of Pinocchio are to be attributed to Nixon. When I asked students in my class in political satire to adumbrate the characteristics of Pinocchio, they drew up a reasonably long list. For example, Pinocchio is a wooden puppet who had a very long nose, and told lies, and telling lies made his nose grow longer. But Pinocchio also wanted to be human and eventually succeeds in becoming human after he learns to stop lying. Furthermore, he goes for a ride in the belly of a whale, is created by a puppet maker named Geppetto, and has a friend called Jiminy Cricket.⁶ Which of these characteristics are relevant to deciphering the allusion?

In the context of the Frye routine, one might think that it is sufficient to realize that Richard Nixon is usually caricatured by emphasizing his long nose, presumably the feature by which Betty remembers him. Thus we might decode the metaphor as "Richard Nixon has a long nose" or "Richard Nixon, like Pinocchio, has a long nose." But note that to interpret the allusion we look not just to the characteristics of Pinocchio but also to the characteristics of Richard Nixon—to see what match-ups between the two sets of characteristics seem to make sense in the given context. Finding a suitable match yields ar

dience down various paths that ultimately will reveal those relationships" (Zashin and Chapman 1974 pp. 301-302). We reject the view of some philosophers (e.g., Davidson, 1979 p. 30) that there are no unsuccessful metaphors." (See also Balbus, 1973; Booth, 1979; Ortony, 1979; Perkins, 1975; Richards, 1936; Sacks, 1979; Streicher, 1967.)

⁶ Most American students are familiar with the story of Pinocchio via the Walt Disney cartoon which contains a number of elements not in the original fairy tale written by Collodi.

"aha" sensation that is crucial to our enjoyment of the satire. However, the notion that the only "relevant" attribute of Pinocchio is his wooden nose is far too simplistic.

The allusion to Nixon as Pinocchio works on more than one level. Nixon was perceived by many as physically stiff (wooden) in his gestures, a cold personality who very much wanted to be thought of as just one of the guys (human). Enemies of Nixon (the routine is pre-Watergate) certainly regarded him as a liar. Moreover, close students of Nixon's career were aware of the role of Murray Chotiner as the mastermind (puppet maker) of Nixon's early political career. However, only the most highly sophisticated members of the audience would be able to recognize the last similarity between Nixon and Pinocchio.

Thus, while not all the characteristics of Pinocchio fit Nixon, enough do so as to be able to render intelligible a metaphor that can work simultaneously at several different levels. However, different listeners will read into the allusion different meanings, depending both upon what is recalled about Pinocchio and upon what they know or believe about Richard Nixon. Hence, there is no single translation of the allusion (cf Zashin and Chapman, 1974, pp. 297-98). Nonetheless, this is a rich allusion with a variety of aspects that fit the subjects. Thus, most of us, I suspect, would find Frye's use of Pinocchio to characterize Nixon as a successful use of allusion.

In addition to metaphor, analogy, and allusion, the satirist's lexicon contains a repertoire of devices, such as hyperbole, metonymy, synecdoche, and pun. Cartoons, in particular, abound in visual analogues to these figures of speech (see, e.g., Black, 1977; Conrad, 1974; Editor, 1978; Feiffer, 1968; Freeman, 1975; Hess and Kaplan, 1974; Westin, 1979). In this brief note, however, we focus on the use of allusion (For a detailed inventory of literary devices see Lanham, 1969).⁷

⁷ Black (1962) regards metaphorical statements as having two components: the *focus*—the term or phrase that is being used metaphorically, and the *frame*—the remainder of the sentence. If we substitute "in a nonliteral fashion" for "metaphorically" in the above definition of the focus of a metaphor, we can define the focus and the frame of any figure of speech that involves a nonliteral use of terms (e.g., synecdoche, metonymy, hyperbole). Analysis of many figures of speech used in a satirical context is often facilitated by regarding the meaning of the trope to derive from an interaction between its focus (nonliteral component) and its frame (its direct or indirect subjects and the context in which they are embedded). Contrast, for example, the metaphor "He was shielded behind a cloak of anonymity" with the metonymy "The CIA shielded him behind its cloak of anonymity." In addition to the contrast between the active and the passive verb forms used in the two expressions, the latter differs from the former in that the link between "cloak" and "cloak and dagger" (i.e., spying) is far more pronounced because of the interaction between "cloak of anonymity" (the nonliteral expression) and "CIA." Similarly, if we compare "the CIA shielded him behind a cloak of anonymity" with "the IRS shielded him behind a cloak of anonymity," I would argue "cloak of anonymity" is apt to connote "a spy in from the cold" in the one case and "faceless bureaucrats" in the other. What has changed is not the metaphor but the context in which it is to be interpreted.

It is critical for the audience to "get the joke," to be able to decide the satirical allusion. Contemporary American satirists are more likely to take their references from current movies (e.g., *Jaws*, *Superman*, *Star Wars*) than from such traditional sources as the Bible, Greek mythology, and Shakespeare. Such topical references lend spice to political satire, but only at the cost of making such satire as skits and political cartoons appear dated in a short time. However, the more recondite the allusion the less likely it is to be understood, and, even for college-trained readers, mythological and classic literary references may be incomprehensible. To compensate for this, satirists who use literary and historical allusions often try to provide enough clues to the reader so that the central thrust is clear even to those unfamiliar with the allusion.

However, those unfamiliar with an allusion may still miss some elements of the cartoon's implicit message. For example, a 1974 Conrad cartoon (Conrad, 1974) depicting Richard Nixon as Richard II, even though a caption from Shakespeare is included, is not an allusion that most people could grasp. While the "politics of failure" might seem the core message, heightened by the similarity in names, even the sophisticated reader may wonder exactly what else, if anything, Conrad has in mind. In a 1950s cartoon from the *Chicago Tribune* (Hess and Kaplan, 1974) depicting the United Nations as a Trojan horse that would bring "alien spies and agents" into the United States, the horse is not labeled. The Trojan horse was presumably a reference with which the cartoonist expected *Tribune* readers to be familiar.

In 1974 a cartoon appeared in the *National Review* (a die-hard Nixon defender), which was a takeoff on a series of English prints featuring dogs in human roles. The satirical thrust of this cartoon falls flat for two reasons: first, because the identity between the senators on the Judiciary Committee and the breeds of dogs by which they are represented is not well established; second, because the political point of the cartoon is not clear. Few others than dog fanciers have clear-cut images of the characteristics of various breeds. While Sam Ervin as a bulldog seems apt, should I regard the portrait of Nixon-defender Gurney as a collie as a compliment? Given the conservative proclivities of the *National Review* (and in the light of my own fondness for Lassie and for stories by Albert Payson Terhune), I take the answer in this case to be yes. Are the breeds identified as Republicans (or as Nixon supporters) generally superior to those identified with the Democrats (or Nixon haters) on the committee? I can't tell! Moreover, what is the cartoon all about? Are we to take this to be a portrait of the impeachment investigation as a pack of hunting hounds in full scent after the quarry or as a pack of low curs, or are we simply to be amused by the transmogrifications? The chief defect of the cartoon is its failure to communicate a clear message.

Satirical allusion fails when the most obvious elements of the match-up between the primary and the secondary subject are incongruent with the satiric thrust. A good illustration of such a failed allusion is an early-1970s cartoon

in a university student newspaper portraying Nixon dressed in a Santa Claus suit driving a sleigh of reindeer labeled Exxon, Shell, Mobil, and so on, laden with bundles of goodies labeled "excess profits," "oil depletion allowance." Here the allusion fails because the primary attributes of Santa Claus (a kindly old man who rewards good children with presents—"He knows if you've been bad or good, so be good for goodness sake") are at odds with the cartoonist's aim of suggesting Nixon as unjustly rewarding big oil. Also, portraying Nixon in the driver's seat is at odds with the cartoonist's almost certain intent to portray Nixon as a servant of big business.

The examples that we have considered illustrate our five central points. Richard Nixon as Pinocchio illustrates the point that allusion can work on more than one level; the richness of the interpretation will depend upon the knowledge (and political views) of the observer. Richard Nixon as Richard II illustrates the limits of classical allusion for an audience unfamiliar with the necessary background to translate it. Richard Nixon as Santa Claus demonstrates the need for the key elements of the match-up between primary and secondary subject to operate in a mutually reinforcing fashion so as to sustain the thrust of the satire. Portraying Nixon as Santa Claus driving a sleigh with labeled reindeer and labeled gifts formally satisfied the requirements for allusion but failed to provide a coherent substantive interpretation of the allusion's meaning.⁸ Finally, comparing Pinocchio to the other two uses of allusion suggests the difference between a successful allusion, potentially rich in detail and relatively easy to decipher at least at a surface level, and less successful allusions—ones that fail either the decipherability test or the substantive test of conveying a credible message to most members of the intended audience.

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⁸ However, figures of speech work best if they are not hackneyed. Consider two cartoons: one shows Uncle Sam trying to balance his checkbook—which is shown as overdrawn; the second shows President Carter steering a ship (labeled "Ship of State" and depicted as a paddle-wheel steamer) down a reef-strewn river on a dark and stormy night (with reefs labeled inflation, unemployment, energy crisis, etc.)—with other figures (labeled Congress, the bureaucracy, etc.) fighting for control of the wheel. Implicit in these cartoons are political arguments: "Uncle Sam has to balance his budget the same as any other citizen" and "the Ship of State requires a firm hand at the helm; she cannot have more than one pilot lest she go aground." Both are arguments that rest on analogy and metaphor—and this remains true whether we express them in verbal or in visual form. However, both are clichéd and thus lack impact.

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Review Essay **J**

Civic Illiteracy and the American Cultural Heritage

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The Closing of the American Mind. How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students By Allan Bloom. (New York. Simon and Schuster, 1987 Pp. 392. \$18.95 cloth, \$7.95 paper)

Cultural Literacy. What Every American Needs to Know. By E. D. Hirsch, Jr. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987 Pp. xi, 250 \$16.95 cloth, \$4.95 paper.)

What Do Our 17-Year-Olds Know? A Report on the First National Assessment of History and Literature By Diane Ravitch and Chester E. Finn, Jr. (New York. Harper and Row, 1987 Pp. ix, 293 \$15.95)

American Memory. A Report on the Humanities in the Nation's Public Schools By Lynne V. Cheney (Washington, DC. National Endowment for the Humanities, 1987 Pp. vi, 29 \$2.00)

Political conservatives have made educational reform one of their principal battle cries during the Reagan era. The former education secretary, William Bennett, is even talked of as a future presidential candidate. However, the state of American educational values, particularly as reflected in the curriculum, has become a broader political issue as evidenced by the Democratic party's platform and the attention focused on Stanford University's required course "Culture, Ideas, and Values." The general consensus of the works discussed here is that something is seriously wrong at all levels of education with what American students are learning about their culture. The general prescription offered to revise its content is some form of the "Great Books."

As the grateful product of a Great Books education, this reviewer, while largely sympathetic to the critique of educational vacuity reflected in these works, has encountered a number of difficulties. In particular, the intellectual content and philosophical basis of what is invoked as the American cultural heritage is often either unsettling or undefined. (Allan Bloom's book presents the most problems and will be discussed at greatest length.) Despite their limitations, however, the works reviewed here have provoked a much-needed

debate about how best to realize the democratic goal of a literate citizenry capable of informed involvement in public affairs.

Cultural Literacy has passed from a book title to an educational catch word. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., a professor of English at the University of Virginia, is worried about the decline in the content of what many young adults bring to the exercise of literacy. He blames this state of affairs on the "content neutral conception of educational development that has long been triumphant in American schools of education and has long dominated the 'developmental, content-neutral curriculum of our elementary schools'" (p. xv). What is deficient about American education is the network of information stored in the minds of the common readers that would allow them to read newspapers and general-interest books "with an adequate level of comprehension, getting the point, grasping the implications, relating what they read to the unstated context which alone gives meaning to what they read" (p. 2). For Hirsch, cultural literacy "lies *above* the everyday levels of knowledge that everyone possesses and *below* the expert levels known only to specialists" (p. 19).

Citing results of testing by the National Assessment of Educational Progress, Hirsch observes that, during the period from 1970–1985, "the amount of shared knowledge that we have been able to take for granted in communicating with our fellow citizens has been declining. More and more of our young people don't know things that we used to assume they knew" (p. 5). Referring to an article from the *Washington Post* on the financial plight of farmers in Missouri, Hirsch suggests that, even in so typical a piece, one could not assume that the common reader would necessarily know where Missouri was located and what USDA and a federal appeals panel are, let alone why the farmers are debt ridden and why their predicament might be a public responsibility. Teachers of the introductory American government course could doubtlessly provide further documentation of this state of affairs.

"Cafeteria-style education, combined with the unwillingness of our schools to place demands on students, has resulted in a steady diminishment of commonly shared information between generations and between young people themselves" (pp. 20–21). Yet, as Hirsch argues, even if there were general agreement on a condition of cultural illiteracy, there is sharp disagreement about what would constitute an agreed-upon foundation of a literate citizenry. In particular, "objectors have said that the traditional materials are class-bound, white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant, not to mention racist, sexist, and excessively Western" (p. 21). For their part, the educational counter-reformers of the 1980s are committed to a return to a more traditional curriculum.

Believing it essential that the educational curriculum be content based and that this content should be "traditional literate knowledge," Hirsch goes a step further by detailing the information, attitudes, and assumptions that literate Americans share. This is the now-famous list, "What Literate Americans Know," which is appended to *Cultural Literacy* (pp. 152–215). Compiled by

Hirsch and two colleagues at the University of Virginia (professors of history and physics), the items on the list were generated from "indexes, reference books, textbooks, general books, magazines; one combed through a large dictionary page by page" (p. 135). This compilation was then submitted to more than one hundred consultants from outside the academic world who reported agreement on over 90 percent of the items listed. Oddly, Hirsch provides no indication of who these consultants were: doctors, lawyers, investment bankers?

The list of what we are all supposed to know comprises some five thousand terms—mostly of literature, history, geography, and current events, with a fair smattering of scientific references. Whether Hirsch's list represents a rough approximation of the referential vocabulary of the common reader, literate adult, or educated American would require a more extended analysis than is warranted by the scope of this review. Some indication of the kind of political information that might be assumed can be gathered from the following sample that is drawn from page 187: "Marseilles; Marshall, Chief Justice John, Marshall, General George C, Marshall Plan; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Marxism-Leninism; Mason-Dixon Line; massive retaliation, mass media, Mata Hari, materialism, Mather, Cotton, McCarthy, Senator Joe: McCarthyism; McGovern, George; Mecca, the; medieval; meet one's Waterloo; Melbourne (city); Mellon, Andrew; melting pot "

Hirsch's list is more of an appendix than was intended. It is certainly debatable whether the list successfully reproduces "shared cultural schemata that underlie literate communications of the present day" (pp. 135–36); rather, it is more of an appendix in the old sense of a "subsidiary extraneous adjunct." In fact, Hirsch claims only proximate status for his list as "a provisional index to a forthcoming larger work" (p. 136). Nevertheless, by taking the route of listing the items that purport to represent a shared cultural heritage, Hirsch has unfortunately, if unintentionally, shortchanged his central goal of reforming American education by suggesting that it is a "trivial pursuit."

It may be that our students know less than at least the brightest of them once did. Certainly there has been a marked decline in the classical education that, until recently, might have been presumed to typify a college-bound student. This is disturbing, but it is certainly not a malady to be cured through the incantation of a litany of literacy culled from conversation and *Cliff's Notes*. As Hirsch himself confesses, "Only a small proportion of literate people can name the Shakespeare plays in which Falstaff appears, yet they know who he is. They know what *Mein Kampf* is, but they haven't read it" (p. 147). One wonders that, if this is cultural literacy, can the culturally illiterate be so much worse off?

What Do Our 17-Year-Olds Know by Diane Ravitch and Chester E. Finn, Jr., is "A Report on the First National Assessment of History and Literature" with a foreword by Lynne V. Cheney, the chairman of the National Endow-

ment for the Humanities. Cheney wrote *American Memory: A Report on the Humanities in the Nation's Public Schools*, which was a successor to William Bennett's report on the humanities in higher education, entitled *To Reclaim A Legacy*. Chester Finn was counselor to Secretary of Education Bennett. Diane Ravitch (and E. D. Hirsch) served on the NEH Advisory Group on History and Literature that advised Chairman Cheney, and NEH funded the nationwide test of what seventeen-year-olds know about history and literature. There is nothing necessarily cozy about these interrelationships. They do, however, suggest that a certain "coterie" has made a "cottage industry" (terms not found on Hirsch's list) out of promoting a role for the humanities as the dogma for a particular educational ideology. ("Dogma" and "ideology" are on Hirsch's list.)

Ravitch and Finn base their argument for how poorly the schools are transmitting the nation's cultural heritage on the results of a test administered to 7,800 high school juniors in 1986. The more startling evidence of specific lack of information about the "common culture" has been widely publicized. The nature of this problem is indicated by the following: 30.6% correctly identified the Magna Carta as the foundation of the British parliamentary system; 32.2% could place the Civil War between 1850 and 1900; 40.1% knew that the purpose of *The Federalist Papers* was to secure ratification of the Constitution; 42.6% were aware that the controversy surrounding Senator Joseph McCarthy focused on investigations of individuals suspected of Communist activities (pp. 49, 56, 74, 83). Consequently, teachers of introductory courses in the social sciences and humanities are forewarned about making any references based on general information. Such terms as the "magna carta of the labor movement" or "McCarthyite tactics" are bound to fall largely on uncomprehending ears.

Following Hirsch's lead, Ravitch and Finn set out to discover "whether American students have the information and knowledge that they need to read newspaper stories, magazine articles, books, and other written material that assume a knowledgeable reader" (p. 12). The answer is no. Ravitch and Finn calculated that only 54.5 percent of the history questions were answered correctly (p. 46), as were 51.8 percent of the literature questions (p. 85). The high school students surveyed received a decided "F" on the test even though "most of the information represents knowledge that most literate people ought to possess" (p. 45). Ravitch and Finn also criticize "education formalism," that is, believing "that skills can be learned without regard to content" (pp. 17-18). "As Hirsch has shown, students who know the mechanics of reading but lack background knowledge are handicapped as readers; they are, in fact, culturally disadvantaged" (p. 18). "It is a tragic downward spiral that can only erode the culture, trivialize the intellect, and in time pauperize our civic life" (p. 20).

Lynne Cheney's pamphlet, *American Memory*, echoes all the foregoing criticisms of Hirsch and Ravitch and Finn. The cause of our educational mal-

aise is the emphasis on process over content, which by de-emphasizing the cultural content of learning runs "the danger of unwittingly proscribing our own heritage" (p. 7). Whether from a conscious denigration of the contributions that the past can make to our understanding of the present or from a commitment to progressive pedagogy, process is to be blamed for holding "that we can teach our children *how* to think without troubling them to learn anything worth thinking about, the belief that we can teach them *how* to understand the world in which they live without conveying to them the events and ideas that have brought it into existence" (p. 5). Similarly, the assigned material in the classroom is judged deficient for a greater concern with "readability formulas" than with "the best specimens of style" (p. 15). Chairman Cheney demands a humanities education for every child. "If history gives us perspective on our lives, then shouldn't every young person be encouraged to study it? If literature connects us to permanent concerns, then shouldn't every young person read it?" (p. 10).

Cheney as well as Ravitch and Finn make recommendations for the improvement of American education. These vary from the specific, such as require the study of foreign language from first grade through high school (Cheney, p. 28) and the greater use of narratives, journals, biographies, and autobiographies to enliven the study of history (Ravitch and Finn, p. 211), to the general, such as "teach history in context so that people and events are seen in relation to consequential social and economic trends and developments" (Ravitch and Finn, p. 205) "Both history and enduring works of literature should be a part of every school year and a part of every student's academic life" (Cheney, p. 28). All of these recommended reforms demand that discipline-based, curriculum-oriented humanities education become a central part of everyone's learning experience. Such an education, if not exactly classical, would be traditional. Seventeen-year-olds, at least those college bound, would be versed in the chronology of Western history and familiar with the canon of Western literature. In other words, Shakespeare, Milton, and Hume along with Cranmer, Cromwell, and Charles I should strike a bell if not a responsive chord.

Allan Bloom's *The Closing of the American Mind* is one of the publishing phenomena of the decade. Indeed, it may be compared to Charles Reich's *The Greening of America* and Christopher Lasch's *The Culture of Narcissism* (also the works of academics) as providing a popularized synecdoche of the current cultural malaise. Bloom is of particular interest as a well-known political philosopher (the translator of Rousseau's *Emile* and the author of *Shakespeare's Politics*) and because of what he has to say about the state of American higher education. Not much of Bloom's central complaint—the collapse of the humanistic content of the core curriculum—is new.¹ However, like all successful

¹ See, for example, Lionel Trilling, "The Uncertain Future of the Humanistic Educational Ideal," in *The Last Decade* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), pp. 160–76.

jeremiads, it has struck a nerve both inside the academy and among the general public, and, as is typical of such undertakings, *The Closing of the American Mind* has proven as controversial as it is polemical and personal.

Bloom's book is not a work of political theory. It is a popular book that glosses over many complex ideas. For example, the chapter "From Socratic Apology to Heidegger's *Rektoratsrede*" (pp. 243–312) is a breathless gallop through the history of philosophy. It wants to show that American educational thought has become perversely captive to a misunderstanding of the ideas of Nietzsche, Weber, and Heidegger. Moreover, philosophy has become the handmaiden of an ideology of self-indulgence rather than a system of values. Bloom should be invited to develop a sustained monographic work on this theme—at proper length and with the necessary scholarly detail. As the philosophical foundation of *The Closing of the American Mind* now stands, its reasoning must be accepted on faith rather than on evidence. Bloom would have better represented the political-science profession by having argued this chapter more carefully.²

Bloom does sustain two fundamental lines of attack against the "relativism" and "historicism" that are supposed to pervade the university and the broader society. For Bloom, relativism is synonymous with an openness that "pays no attention to natural rights or the historical origins of our regime . . . It is open to all kinds of men, all kinds of life-styles, all ideologies" (p. 27). In such a situation, everyone is entitled to an opinion, and one person's opinion is weighted the same as another's. For the relativist, "the respectable and accessible nobility of man is to be found not in the quest for or discovery of the good life, but in creating one's own 'life-style,' of which there is not just one but many possible, none comparable to another" (p. 144). Bloom also stands opposed to the notion that values are properly understood in relation to the historical circumstances in which they are formulated. This is relativism in another guise, for, if ideas are circumstantial, they cannot be transcendent.

"Cultural relativism succeeds in destroying the West's universal or intellectually imperialistic claims, leaving it to be just another culture" (p. 390). This is Bloom's great *cri de coeur*; for, if we reject the transcendent and transcultural bases of truth, we have relegated philosophy to matters of opinion and the good life to a question of life-style. However, Bloom's transcendent truths lack either a metaphysical or a theological foundation; rather, their bases seem to be either in received tradition or in particularized knowledge. What kind of truth is Bloom propagating? He is as understandably ambiguous in the face of so daunting a question as he is critical of the deficiencies of modern ambiguities.

² For a discussion of Bloom's philosophical rigor, see Martha Nussbaum, "Undemocratic Vistas," *New York Review of Books*, November 5, 1987, pp. 20–26.

For Bloom, the fundamental questions are enduring—especially *the* question, “What is man?” in relation to his highest aspirations as opposed to his low and common needs” (p. 21). Moreover, fundamental questions are only answerable with reference to an enduring canon of Great Books that needs to be properly understood. However, contrary to Bloom, understanding these books in historical context is not historicism; the error to avoid is a determinism that denies the independent standing of ideas. Similarly, to appreciate the diversity of meaning that can be derived from a work is not relativism. Subjectivism is what Bloom actually opposes when he argues against the substitution of personal opinion for defensible ideas, and this is not a particularly startling intellectual insight.

“A good program of liberal education feeds the student’s love of truth and passion to lead a good life” (p. 345). Traditionally, such an education involved some systematic exposure to the core texts that have come to define the meaning of an educated person. These Great Books provided the curriculum of a liberal arts education and, for many at least, were synonymous with the idea of the university. For Bloom, a liberal education entails “reading certain generally recognized classic texts, just reading them, letting them dictate what the questions are and the method of approaching them—not forcing them into categories we make up, not treating them as historical products, but trying to read them as their authors wished them to be read” (p. 344). Bloom’s notion of a Great Books curriculum, however, is both highly idiosyncratic and deeply flawed.

First, he exhibits an ethnocentrism that is at odds with his professed goal of educating students in the cultural heritage that is their birthright. Bloom equates civilization with Western civilization, and someone with his learning should know better. What are we to do with *Gilgamesh* or *The Upanishads*? If Aquinas knew Aristotle through the translation of Averroes, are we to dismiss the Islamic tradition? Is the thousand-year Byzantine civilization Western or Eastern? For that matter, how Western is classical Greece? Does it make a difference if our goal is to understand how humankind has come to terms with enduring questions of essence and existence?

Second, to equate the Great Books with what is largely an upper-middle-class, early twentieth-century conception of our cultural heritage trivializes an admirable educational goal. Bloom’s parochialism would remain just that except that it contributes to unnecessary debates, such as the dispute at Stanford over whether the curriculum should be “western” or “world” civilization. Surely, the only civilized option is for catholicity, and the standard of judgment is quality, not geography.

Third, any Great Books curriculum wants to inculcate the habit of living an examined life. To achieve the Socratic abilities of active practical reasoning, the texts must be approached not just with respect for the canon, but also with an eye to the clarity and subtlety with which they explicate the enduring ques-

tions of how to live the good life. Bloom appears to rely upon the close examination of a few, highly selected texts. There is much to be said for textual analysis, but an exegetical demand for the original meaning would be enhanced by a hermeneutical quest for the variety of interpretations.

Fourth, Bloom's prescription for the failures of higher education is profoundly antiphilosophical. Despite vigorous protestations about his love of inquiry, Bloom would impose a body of anointed works, which, while individually recommendable, are hardly exhaustive. In actuality, with the exception of *The Republic*, Bloom is understandably vague about curricular specifics; details of the canon are not provided; even less information is provided about how the canon might be adapted and augmented. The canonical approach is inevitably problematic "It is problematic aesthetically because of shifts in tastes and political realities; historically because works are determined by historical moments but also determine them; ideologically because literature creates and weaves ideologies but is in turn determined and woven by them and politically because it can serve as an instrument of cultural assertiveness even repressing other voices."³

There are certain other aspects of *The Closing of the American Mind* that though they lie far outside the scope of this essay and too much within this reviewer's experience, nevertheless deserve some cursory observation.

Bloom's account of "The Sixties" (pp. 313-35) represents him at his polemical best and provides a subtext to the entire book. Suffice it to say that Bloom's interpretation of the student movement is radically biased. Reminiscing about, or excoriating, the late 1960s is akin to the war of memoirs that surrounds the radicalism of the 1930s and the McCarthyism of the 1950s. The passing of time may allow a proper historical perspective. Nonetheless, it can be observed that, Bloom notwithstanding, Cornell did not experience a *Kristallnacht* in 1968 and Tom Hayden was not Joseph Goebbels. Heidegger bears a far more serious historical burden for his *Rektoratsrede* than do the authors of the "Port Huron Statement."

Throughout Bloom's work there is a presence that dares not speak its name. Although Leo Strauss is cited only once in the index (p. 167), his thinking pervades *The Closing of the American Mind*. Perhaps Bloom has eschewed invoking his mentor's name in argument. The reader, however, cannot escape his influence any more than can the author. Straussians, among whom Bloom has staked out a claim as the leading disciple, are enjoying something of an intellectual vogue in extrapolating the master's thinking.⁴ Unfortunately, the



³ Victor Brombert, *New York Times*, May 29, 1988; see also the symposium "On Cultural Literacy. Canon, Class, Curriculum," *Salmagundi*, 72(Fall 1986) 101-165; and Stephen R. Graubard, "Western Civilization and Its Children," *New York Times Book Review*, July 24, 1988.

⁴ See Gordon S. Wood, "The Fundamentalists and the Constitution," *New York Review of Books*, February 18, 1988, pp. 33-40.

legitimate concerns about natural law and natural rights that occupied Strauss here become points of contention, and in this Strauss is badly served.

Bloom does not issue a clarion call to higher learning but rings the tocsin against intellectual diversity. What we are offered is not philosophical inquiry but methodological gnosticism. Bloom's intellectual propositions are derived from a closed system that is apprehensible only to the properly initiated, cannot be validated by external referents, and excludes competing claims to truth. Bloom constantly appeals to the authority of the texts to support his arguments, but such textual authority is highly debatable and widely interpreted. Where Bloom fails so profoundly is by invoking axioms from without, rather than from within, the matters under discussion.

This closed system is elitist, not in its call for a higher learning but because access to this learning is denied to all but the *cognoscenti*. Can it really be the case that the greatest creations of the human mind are informed with only one correct meaning? Bloom is also doctrinaire when the need is to demonstrate how the Great Books are relevant to the enduring and specific issues of this age. To deny this relevance, and to substitute a particularized conception of knowledge, is to adopt a decidedly anti-Socratic position. The lover of wisdom must know that the truly learned stands in profound ignorance of the ultimate truths reflected in the Great Books. Consequently, the search for truth must also be enduring as we seek to provide adequate answers to persistent moral challenges. Bloom seems to need reminding that the greatest value of the Great Books is their capacity to open up new insights, not to close off inquiry with singular interpretations.

While the tone of this essay may seem otherwise, there is much that strikes a responsive chord with this reviewer and, doubtless, among many readers of these widely discussed books. No one who teaches can help but be appalled by the state of American higher education. This is not to indict the students for their educational poverty; at best, this would be to blame the victim. The impoverishment of our undergraduates is clearly the result of curricular decisions of professorial devising. If students don't know—or worse, don't know to care—about their cultural heritage, the responsibility for this state of affairs rests with the educational leadership. The hackneyed question of "Why Johnny can't read" or appreciate the beauties of classical culture is both rhetorical and misdirected. Johnny doesn't appreciate the life of the mind because the values of such a life are largely tangential to the missions of many universities and to the reward system of American society in general.

The great weakness in all the pleas recorded above for a reinvigorating of the humanities component of higher education lies with the professoriate. This cannot be the occasion for a discussion of the current conditions of graduate education in the humanities and social sciences. However, it might be observed without too much objection that the Ph.D. no longer pretends to certify its recipient as an educated person if this means an ability to examine

the questions of living the good life with relation to the greatest works of history, philosophy, literature, and art.

In *To Reclaim A Legacy*, William Bennett poses this question: "Should we be satisfied if the graduates of our colleges and universities know nothing of the Parthenon's timeless classical proportions, of the textbook in medieval faith and philosophy that is Chartres cathedral, of Michelangelo's Sistine ceiling, or the music of Bach and Mozart?"⁵ Unfortunately, a question that is supposed to register shock may be judged largely irrelevant by many professors in the liberal arts disciplines. A not atypical response might be that we are no longer in the business of producing educated people; we are in the business of training political scientists—as if these were mutually exclusive categories.

Bloom resounds loudly on the problem of the decomposition of the university and its learned disciplines (pp. 347–80). However, his prescriptions seem applicable only to a potential mandarin state willing to undergo a constricted intellectual regimen. Moreover, Bloom's disquiet over our cultural condition has a curiously atavistic tone. He indicts a variety of culprits for the decline of Western civilization while turning a blind eye to the evidence that this cultural tradition may have, in the eyes of many contemporary observers, contributed to its own delegitimization. It may be that the greatest moral and political conundrums of our time were not "David Easton's disgraceful address to the American Political Science Association in 1966" (p. 327) and the sixties but Auschwitz and the atomic bomb.

Hirsch, for all that his book is linked with Bloom's, presents a more open, if admittedly more modest, proposal for a revival of humanistic education. Following in the philosophical (if not the pedagogical) tradition of John Dewey, Hirsch recognizes that the educational system must be reformed if we are to have an electorate capable of understanding public debate. "He wants to make the students better citizens of a democracy. He wants them to recognize more allusions, and thereby be able to take part in more conversations, read more, have more sense of what those in power are up to, cast better informed votes."⁶ Hirsch argues for a substantial reemphasis on history and literature in the primary and secondary grades and a universal Great Books curriculum in the first two years of college. Given his concern that the broad citizenry became acquainted with the "specific, communally shared information" necessary "to participate in complex cooperative activities" (p. xv), his basic idea makes good sense. If it does not guarantee public discourse on a par with the Socratic dialogues and *The Federalist Papers*, it suggests an alternative to mass ignorance.

⁵ For a discussion of Bennett's views, see Kevin V. Mulcahy, "The Humanities and the Failure of American Higher Education. Reactions to William Bennett's *To Reclaim A Legacy*," *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, 20(Summer 1986):98–102.

⁶ Richard Rorty, "Straussianism, Democracy, and Allan Bloom," *New Republic*, April 4, 1968, p. 31. See also the response of Harvey C. Manfield, Jr., pp. 33–37.

So, "What is to be done?" Hirsch, as indicated, offers a good starting place: require two years of course work in great books (if not the Great Books) for all university students. Barring this, individual departments could act unilaterally to give such works a prominent place in their required courses. Political science has an important mission here since, as Bloom reminds us, it "is the only discipline in the university (with the possible exception of the philosophy department) that has a philosophic branch" (p. 366). One need not adhere to the notion of our discipline as architectonic to acknowledge that great books have been written over the past two millennia on the art of government and the requirements of a conceived and fulfilled life.

Any listing invites charges of canonization and selectivity, but some texts do come to mind: *The Republic*, *The Politics*, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, *The Analects of Confucius*, *The City of God*, *The Prince*, Locke's *Second Treatise on Civil Government*, Rousseau's *Social Contract*, *The Federalist Papers*, Tocqueville's *Democracy In America*, Mill's *Representative Government*, Hegel's *Philosophy of History*, selected writings of Marx and Engels, Lenin's *State and Revolution*, such major American documents as the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, the letters of Adams and Jefferson, the speeches of Lincoln and Martin Luther King, Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*.

This is not to promulgate a return to "Plato through NATO" courses. There is as great a variety of methods for careful analyses of such texts as those listed above as there is a plurality of meanings to be gained from their reading. The goal must be to open students' minds to the enduring ideas of state, citizenship, and justice. The political science discipline is especially fortunate in possessing a corpus of works that have engaged these issues. For all the apocalyptic warnings, Western civilization is no more in decline than it has been since the Fall of Rome. This civilization has always been in a state of flux as it seeks to accommodate new approaches and broader viewpoints. One can only hope that the Great Books survive the disservice done to them by those who would delimit their scope and dictate their meaning. Could there be a greater demonstration of the poverty of political science if the only escape from an empirical scholasticism is into a normative sectarianism?

Book Reviews **P**

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Book Reviews

Edward B. Portis, Editor

Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment: Nature and the State in a Post-Hegelian Era. By Jane Bennett. (New York: New York University Press, 1987 Pp 166. \$30.00.)

This is a short but ambitious book. It uses the insights of Nietzsche and Foucault to challenge radically our thinking about nature, reason, and politics. Even measured against the breadth of such ambitions, Bennett succeeds remarkably well.

Today we remain locked in a debate that mirrors Hegel's dialectic of faith and enlightenment. His critique of these positions still throws light on our thinking about environmentalism and the state. Faith, on the one hand, pursues a "harmonious holism" that resists the central dichotomies of enlightenment thought. However, its persistent quest for unity of the human and non-human comes at the cost of that clarity of concepts that is the hallmark of its adversary. Enlightenment, on the other hand, raises the human subject and instrumental reason to predominance in the world but cannot contain this subject's destructiveness to itself or the world around it.

The real contribution of Bennett's analysis is her argument that the two opponents actually share a "silent partnership." Each tries to cover its own defects by exaggerating those of its opponent; hence the two positions curiously require one another—and, in being so intertwined, they create a subtle but effective closure of conceptual space that still has a hold on us. Even more important, each manifests a deep, recurring need: the "quest for a home" (p. 2). In the one case, it is framed in terms of attuning ourselves and society to a niche in the cosmos; in the other, it is framed in terms of making ourselves at home by mastering the recalcitrance of nature.

From this reading of faith and enlightenment, Bennett turns to the environmental debate and persuasively demonstrates the persistence of these problems in the two dominant positions: "natural holism" and "environmental management." She asks whether we might be able to conceive of an environmental ethic that treats nature neither as simply standing reserve to be instrumentally processed nor as having been predesigned as a home into which we should reverently nestle.

A parallel line of thinking is then directed at contemporary views of the state, for Bennett wants to show that views of nature have political implica-

tions. The enlightenment position is represented by Theodore Lowi's "individualist, juridical state" and Jurgen Habermas' "collectivist, consensus state." Bennett attempts to show how the enlightenment heritage in biology leads to the endorsement of a centralized state whose urge to instrumental mastery leads it "to extend the mechanism of bureaucratic regulation" and denigrate those "others" who do not conform to the dominant consensus (89-90). The contemporary variant of faith is found in Charles Taylor's "attuned state." Here the corrosiveness of enlightenment reason is neutralized in a decentralized "steady state," where civic virtue induces citizens to limit their destructiveness and seek their good in attunement with the bent of the world. Taylor's holism accepts the idea that nature is "other" to us and projects but not so "other" that we cannot perceive an inherent order in it. Bennett endorses this recognition of otherness, but criticizes Taylor for smuggling this insight too quickly in a vision of harmony, a move that can also be seen as a compulsive repetition of the quest for a home. Moreover, compulsiveness has dangerous political implications, since it means that bonds of civic virtue must be so tight as to threaten those who chafe under the project of attunement. Again, the silent partnership of faith and enlightenment emerges, as the attuned state, like its adversaries, shows itself to be a place deeply hostile to otherness.

Bennett's analysis has, as I have said, strong Foucauldian roots. She strives to distance us radically from our familiar theoretical discourse, thereby showing how it unconsciously commits us. This is certainly a healthy exercise, but it does have its dangers. Descriptions are likely to be so loaded that one rarely hardly recognize the object described. Bennett portrays Habermas as favoring a bureaucratic, collectivist, centralized state that drives incessantly toward "social coordination and economic mastery" (pp. 89-90, 106, 113-114). The whole project of a communicative, as opposed to an instrumental, rationality tends to disappear from view, as does Habermas' critique of the "colonization of the lifeworld." My complaint has a systematic intent. Unless we are content to remain exclusively within Foucault's distancing voice and its radical disharmony thesis, we must at some point switch voices and recommence dialogue. This shift of voice haunts the contemporary project of thinking political theory along Foucauldian lines. The distancing gesture generates its own "others," and yet they somehow have to be finally called back and given enough flesh to talk.

As an alternative to faith and enlightenment, Bennett sketches an idea of "fractious holism." It seeks a way of conceiving the interconnectedness of human and nonhuman, subject and nature, such that the former is drawn to attend to the latter with awe and respect. However, it sees this interconnectedness as too murky to sanction projects aimed at attunement. As for ethical and political implications, she argues that these ontological assumptions might inspire a greater tolerance for otherness as well as a wariness of abstraction.

tions and a commitment to what is "local, experimental, and tentative" (pp. 152-53). In pursuing such arguments, she recognizes the need to draw Taylor back into the dialogue; had Habermas not been rendered so one-dimensional, he might also have had something useful to say here. But, overall, Bennett is quite honest about the difficulties in her position, and this helps make the book an extraordinarily good example of the dilemmas and the attractions of Foucauldian political thinking.

Stephen K. White, *Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University*

Presidential Power and Management Techniques By James G. Benze, Jr.
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1987. Pp. 158. \$32.95.)

The Politics of Public Management. By Philip B. Heymann. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. Pp. 196. \$22.50.)

Upon election to office, American presidents typically strive to make an immediate impact on government policy and policymaking. Cabinet appointments are made, policy agendas set, and budgets formulated. The president is ready to implement policies, both his own and those negotiated with the Congress, and through the implementation process give concrete expression to the political ideals that will distinguish his administration. Indeed, and at risk of being too cynical, the new president will claim a mandate for change based upon the electoral results (in whatever way distinguished) that propelled him into office.

The new officeholder quickly learns, though, that the idealized view of executive leadership in no way matches reality. As Heymann notes, the president not only "must win the support of the Congress to carry out his goals . . . he has the additional responsibility and burden of dealing with massive organizations having their own momentum and their own ties to the legislature." The problem is compounded by the "independent policies and interests of his major subordinates and the bureaucratic politics through which they exercise influence and garner power" (p. 3). The nature of the relationship between president and bureaucracy is the focus of both authors. The basic question concerns how government bureaucracy can be made more responsive to the direction of elected policymakers. The authors offer explicit prescriptions for successful policy management by the executive.

While each text addresses the same basic issues and questions, their analyses and conclusions are quite distinct. Benze offers a traditional study of bureaucratic structure and compliance with executive orders. The book's opening sentence is a model of understatement, a tone maintained throughout the text. "Modern presidents have expressed dissatisfaction with their inability to control policy implementation by the federal bureaucracy" (p. 1). Benze begins his search for the root causes of the lack of executive control with a short

chapter on "Presidential Power and Presidential Management." A key distinction is made between power and influence. Presidential power is "defined in part as the president's ability to implement policies regardless of the wishes or actions of other policy elites" (p. 10). Influence is not clearly defined but distinguished by attempts "to persuade other policy elites to implement his policies" (p. 10). The president's managerial role is then shown to lack a formal base of constitutional power, but it is not completely left to the nebulous realm of pure persuasive influence. Presidents are able to muster specific power within the bureaucracy by exercising control over the flow of information, personnel appointments, structural reorganization, and budgets. This power, combined with personal attributes and skills, provides presidents with a baseline of methods to obtain greater control over policy implementation.

Benze follows the distinctions of managerial methods based upon power and influence with an examination of the history and application of presidential management techniques. With increasing frustration over their inability to control policy implementation, presidents have sought to centralize power within the office of the chief executive. While every president has pursued such centralization of power, the specific methods employed have varied by administration. This leads ultimately to the empirical core of the book, an investigation of the differing techniques utilized and levels of success achieved in controlling the bureaucracy by the Carter and Reagan administrations.

The specific management goals and techniques of the Carter and Reagan administrations are briefly outlined in separate chapters. Carter is shown to have favored a more technique-driven management style, utilizing major structural reorganization and implementation of zero-based budgeting. The Reagan era is marked by a more political style of management, focusing on control of personnel appointments and linkage of personnel to budget formation. The effectiveness of the Carter and Reagan management initiatives is then evaluated through survey data from career federal executives. Overall, Carter's faith in technique and structure fails in the politically charged environment of the federal bureaucracy, while Reagan's emphasis on political management receives much higher marks.

The relative success of Reagan's administrative control efforts is also linked to a variety of personal traits and political skills. The analysis identifying the factors that lead to a president's managerial success is, by far, the best section of the book. Benze's survey data provide empirical support for a variety of personal and political traits thought to be important for management of the bureaucracy. Future analysts can benefit from the work done by Benze by employing these scales.

Benze provides a basic overview of the development of administrative techniques presidents can employ in extending their influence over the bureaucracy. While at times informative, the work is generally underdeveloped. The discussion of presidential power and influence needs considerable expansion.

There was certainly an opportunity for the author to link Neustadt's incomplete view of presidential power with the more structurally based analysis of James Anderson. Such a synthesis could then be augmented with the analysis of personal traits and abilities along the lines of Barber for a complete view of presidential power. Discussion of the Carter and Reagan management structures is largely journalistic; the work of Kessel, for instances, is not cited. The analysis sections are generally straight frequencies with no controls for partisanship or tenure of the respondent. Given the works of Cole and Caputo and Aberbach and Rockman, such an omission leaves a number of questions, the most striking being the high marks for Ronald Reagan and the low evaluations of Jimmy Carter, despite the popular belief that the bureaucracy is generally more politically liberal in outlook. The author is too brief and understated in both theoretical development and empirical analysis.

Heymann follows a different track in analyzing presidential control of the bureaucracy. Instead of focusing on the primacy of presidential policy direction, Heymann concludes that "most decisions about what each government organization will do [and thus what government as a whole does] are made at the organizational level" (p. 4). From this perspective the role of the president is not to control directly or to constrain the bureaucracy but rather to give it general guidance. "Most matters to be handled by the federal government simply do not bear on the president's major programs, electoral demands, and needs for legislative support. . . . Beyond this, a sensible president simply does not want his concerns to automatically control even relevant matters." Instead, he is best served by a manager who "weigh[s] presidential concerns intelligently against others" (p. 5).

Heymann presents an enlightened and ultimately more realistic view of relations between president and bureaucracy. Instead of emphasizing conflict, control, and compliance, he views government decision making as, ultimately, the ability to balance numerous sources of power in a cooperative effort. Executive direction, no matter what condition of electoral mandate might be claimed, competes equally with congressional authority, legal oversight, and long-term organizational goals and professional norms. It is the fool, executive or administrative, that ignores either the safe or treacherous paths in any decision-making environment.

The book is divided into two parts. Part one focuses on "The Politics of Management." Here Heymann puts into a prescriptive whole a wide range of findings from various subdisciplines of political science and public administration. The work is a masterful synthesis that provides "guidance to the government manager responsible for an organization operating in this complicated context of relationships" (p. 10). Using a series of questions a manager must address, Heymann illustrates the competing demands and skills that must be balanced to produce effective public policy. The points made are backed by in-depth case studies of government decision making, often following a decision

through the many permutations it takes over time in the changing scene of national politics.

The second part of the book looks more directly at the structure and process of the political environment in which the federal bureaucracy operates. Most political scientists will find nothing particularly new in this material. The focus on and analysis of the congressional process follows straight from Fenno. The interesting twist provided by Heymann is to look up to the congressional process from the bureaucracy. In doing so Heymann effectively integrates fundamental insights from Wildavsky, Fenno, Downs, Ripley, Allison, and Neustadt. Again, the analysis is backed by richly detailed and flawlessly argued case studies.

Analysts have long sought to delineate the proper role of the bureaucracy in responding to executive orders. While the traditional approach in political science focuses on what the executive can or should do to achieve compliance, Heymann's text turns the issue around to focus on how political appointees deal with a political environment in which the president is just one source of power and legitimacy. This focus on the bureaucracy is ultimately more useful as it concentrates on how the vast majority of issues are analyzed, argued, and resolved. Heymann's work could well become a classic; a text useful to a range of researchers in both public administration and political science. It has the additional advantage of being a valuable guide for practitioners of the art of public management.

Eric B. Herzik, *Arizona State University*

Understanding United States Government Growth: An Empirical Analysis of the Postwar Era. By William D. Berry and David Lowery. (New York Praeger, 1987. Pp. xiv, 212.)

Professors Berry and Lowery have taken upon themselves a daunting task: the explanation of changes in the size of the U.S. public sector during the thirty-four years from 1948 through 1982. They have done this by analyzing a time-series data set made available to them by Citibank; hence, the book is primarily as advertised: an empirical analysis. There is much to admire in this effort, but there also are methodological problems in the analysis.

Much has been written, especially in recent years, concerning the growth of the size of the public sector. According to the authors, however, this literature has not distinguished between real and nominal growth, on the one hand, and has operated on an excessively high level of abstraction, on the other. To meet the latter objection, the authors analyze data on government expenditures relative to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) not only for total expenditures but also for domestic purchases, transfers, and defense purchases. To meet the former objection they adjust their data using implicit price de-

flators (similar to the familiar Consumer Price Index but adjusted differently for each economic category).

They find that total nominal expenditures grow throughout the period, but real (i.e., cost-adjusted) expenditures decline until the late 1970s, when they begin to rise. The reason is that government costs grew more quickly than similar costs in the private sector—primarily because government is a service-intensive operation. Real transfers increased throughout most of the period; domestic purchases increased until the late 1970s, declining thereafter; defense expenditures declined throughout the period, bottoming out in the late 1970s. There seems to be some problem here because we have increasing trends for transfers and domestic purchases, yet the trend for total expenditures is basically down—resembling the pattern for defense purchases. The authors offer no discussion of this phenomenon.

To explain government growth, the authors concentrate on changes in real shares of GDP. This is a defensible choice because the authors go on to analyze cost changes. Otherwise, it would be problematic because taxpayers must pay the actual, noncost-adjusted increase. Berry and Lowery adopt the sensible approach that growth is a combination of real changes and cost changes.

The authors fruitfully categorize the theories of government growth as falling into two classes, termed the "responsive government" and the "excessive government" approaches. The former consists of theories that government spending (the authors' measure of size) responds to changes in public preferences, social demographics, and technology. The second, deriving primarily from the public choice literature, emphasizes the role of self-interested bureaucrats and politicians in the expansion of the public sector. The authors use their data to estimate regression equations based on these theories in four categories: total expenditures, domestic purchases, defense purchases, and changes in the cost of government.

The most convincing chapter, and the most thorough by students of the size of the public sector, is that on changes in costs. The weakest chapter is that on defense expenditures, where the authors tread on a well-worked intellectual area with scant success. The results overall strongly suggest that the responsive government approaches are preferable and that the "selfish politician and aggrandizing bureaucrat" are mostly myths of public choice authors—or, at least, if they exist they are not able to alter the size of government.

There are, however, several methodological problems that limit the utility of this work. Some of these consist of problems of measurement and operationalization. There is little doubt, for instance, that the responsive government explanations are better operationalized than are the excessive government approaches in general. Size of demographic groups is calculated differently in the two models: as a proportion of the population in the responsive government approaches and as a proportion of the voting-age population

in the excessive government approaches. Political competition is operationalized at the national level alone; yet expenditures refer to state and local governments also.

A more severe problem is the attempt to assess complicated models on a single short-time series. At one point the authors specify a fourteen-variable model for their thirty-four data points (although multicollinearity forces them to drop variables). More problematic is the generally increasing (or decreasing) nature of the series for the dependent variables; many variables grow through time more or less linearly and thus will correlate highly with the dependent variables of interest. The authors find themselves rejecting explanations where regression models have coefficients of determination of .97 (wrong signs on coefficients). If wrong explanations yield this kind of predictability, how confident can one be of one's findings?

Finally, the authors do not recognize a final explanation for changes in the relative size of the public sector: change in the size of the economy. There is no mechanism in the theories tested that would cause government to shrink while the economy is shrinking at the federal level (although there is at the state level: balanced budget requirements). If government expenditures stay constant while the GDP shrinks (in real terms), then the ratio of interest will increase.

In many ways, the graphs presented early in the book (along with the direct test of cost growth) are the best parts of the work. A number of explanations of growth can be ruled out because they are not consistent with this information. The attempt to squeeze more out by complex (and methodologically flawed) modeling adds less to our understanding of growth.

In sum, then, this work is a contribution to our understanding of changes in the size of government in the United States. Particularly strong are the work on differential cost growth and the deliberate comparison of the various theories bandied about to explain government growth. Methodological weaknesses detract from the work, however, and point to the difficulty of assessing causal processes on limited time series.

Bryan D. Jones, *Texas A&M University*

The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations. By James A. Bill. (New Haven. Yale University Press, 1988. Pp. xii, 520 \$25.00.)



American-Iranian relations are described with a historical overview from the early part of the nineteenth century up through the congressional hearings on the Iran-Contra affair. During the early part of the twentieth century the extension of American economic support enhanced an already attractive re-

lationshship. A downward trend began with American covert attempts to manipulate a popularly established, anti-shah, anti-Western (but pro-Iranian) government in 1953 in order to restore the shah to power; this government, however, was forced out of the country by almost the same sectors of Iranian society that pressured the shah to leave again in 1978. The ultimate tragedy that Bill describes is the general American-Iranian relationship during the twentieth century. After examining this less-than-acceptable condition, Bill concludes with certain lessons, presumably to influence an adjustment of American foreign policy procedures. While the description of the historical background, important events, and significant political actors in both states is a marvelous portrayal, Bill's analysis in the end fails to provide any sort of theoretical framework to assess the past or prepare for the future, either to understand Iran any better than the West does presently or to employ a comparative perspective. Therefore, Bill's aims are not completely fulfilled, at least in this format.

If there is a single theme that is used to support a charge of failure on the part of American decision makers, it is that Iranian specialists had a very different view of the country than did official government spokespersons. American policy, it is suggested, was engineered by American mandarins with a shallow appreciation of Persian political dynamics or statecraft and, furthermore, was guided by Iranian political elites who had little or no contact with those very Iranians who would later conduct a revolution. In addition, the American bureaucratic machinery that deals with foreign policy on a macro-level was simply not equipped to ingest data and perspectives derived from the Iranian social strata below the national (or at least decision-making) levels. Support for the shah in the United States among Washington officials resulted from the argument that Iran assisted this country to achieve its wide-ranging interests in the region. The Iranian human rights record, discord, or discontent within the country was viewed simply as a domestic matter, which, in this instance and on balance, was of a lower priority than the strategic political-military considerations. The Pahlavis played on this theme and catered to the complex American social and industrial-military network emphasizing an ideologically conservative agenda that ultimately swayed large blocks of decision makers. The scenario established by Bill's description can easily be seen to be an application of Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick's thesis regarding the authoritarian-totalitarian spectrum: authoritarian allies on the right are superior to totalitarians on the left; we can influence the former, if we must, while the latter will always be anathema to the West. Our policy toward Iran is filtered by the realistic school of international politics with the general perception that equates force with order, resulting in stability, which thereby reinforces a view of power as force made preponderant. There is, hence, a characterization of the regime of Iran by successive American administrations

as a political edifice of granite, failing to appreciate that the popular foundation (at a minimum the *bazaar*, the Muslim clergy, and the lower classes) was quicksand.

Bill's condemnation of American foreign policy toward Iran results also, in part, from the cruel and harsh measures employed by the shah's regime to ensure its legitimacy, a policy that Bill shows was quite possibly known to the shah and maybe even directly ordered by him. The American audience, it should be noted, is short of sympathetic views toward the shah that would provide not necessarily balance but simply additional information as to intent. Bill places responsibility, or at least explicit knowledge, of the regime's excesses clearly on the shah, unlike Gholam R. Afkhani, who, from the shah's inner circle, claims that his centralized bureaucracy hid the underside of the application of policy authority from him (*The Iranian Revolution*. Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 1985).

Bill points out that after 1971 the shah relied increasingly on the use of coercion and repression of political dissent, as well as on stronger control over those forces in Iran that stood for traditionalism and in opposition to western-style modernization. Moreover, confrontation between Iran and the United States increased in intensity commensurately with the domestic turmoil. Then there was Carter's emphasis on human rights, which rang similar to the charges being made by religious dissidents who were, however, simultaneously not favorably disposed toward the United States. So while the shah sought American support he also attempted to placate his opposition by permitting anti-American sentiment to appear in the Iranian press. The American response to the shah, argues Bill, was contradictory and confusing, especially at the time when it became known that the shah was critically ill. The decision whether or not to permit his admittance into the country for medical treatment became controversial both here and in Iran and was crucial to the ultimate breakdown in relations.

What is missing from Bill's damnation of U.S. foreign policymakers' inability to correctly assess the range and depth of opposition to the shah is a theoretical guide to satisfy a demand for reassessment. To his credit, Bill does offer a dozen lessons (pp. 440-46) which may be employed easily not only with Iran but also with the entire Third World. These lessons result simply from the way the American political system operates, that is, a pluralistic society with strong ethnic interest group representation. Then there is a call for greater proficiency among foreign service officers, particularly in language training, which is difficult to fault. Still another demand is for better information processing, essentially between the State Department, Embassy folk in the field, and independent specialists. Together his lessons represent more of an argument for a particular form of management than a country-specific operational plan.

The combination of a revolutionary event and a particular perspective on it makes Bill's book worthy of consideration. He has produced a credible case study and an important one. But in addition he has provided far more—perhaps unintentionally—not only to the Middle East specialist but also the the comparativist who is handed a treasure trove of testable hypotheses.

Sanford R. Silverburg, *Catawba College*

Women and the Ideal Society: Plato's Republic and Modern Myths of Gender.

By Natalie Harris Bluestone. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987. \$25.00 cloth, \$11 95 paper.)

The enterprise of rendering classic texts comprehensible to modern audiences, while at the same time retaining the explicit and implicit meanings intended by their long-dead authors, is at the core of political theorizing today. Esoteric debate rages concerning the authoritative nature of the tradition of political ideas and its relevance to political experience. Most would agree with Natalie Harris Bluestone in *Women and the Ideal Society: Plato's Republic and Modern Myths of Gender* that the foundation of Western philosophy in general, and utopian thought specifically, lies in Plato's speculative polis. There is no longer a consensus, however, on the traditional claim, which Bluestone takes as a given, that Plato raised definitely "all the fundamental questions of philosophy" for all time, especially with respect to the status of women (p. 167). Her ambitious attempt at historical deconstruction of Platonic scholarship is dedicated to recovering the lost foundations of claims for female equality.

Bluestone argues that "all the major contemporary issues of sexual equality are touched on in the arguments of the Republic, Book V" and that "even the order in which Plato raised the questions still remains cogent." In her meticulous critical analysis of every extant commentary on Book V from the nineteenth century to the present, Bluestone measures the scope and nature of each author's commitment to sexual equality by the accuracy of his or her rendering of the "Three Waves." Textual fidelity to a disputed section of the *Republic* is the evaluative standard chosen as the litmus test for both authentic feminism and objective political theory.

She has no patience with feminist scholars, such as Jean Elshtain and Arleneaxonhouse, whom she accuses of seeking a women's "voice" that eschews the voice of the mind Plato offers his Philosopher-Queens. Bluestone is particularly critical of Elshtain's *Public Man, Private Woman* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), which she says attacks Plato as an advocate of uniformity over diversity, rigid rationalism in the public space over the affective complexity of human life (pp. 126–40). Both Elshtain, whom Bluestone terms

a "mother-scholar" (p. 131), and Saxonhouse, categorized as a Straussian, as condemned for displaying a "zeal to validate the emotional strengths and family contribution of women," which "unduly praises[s] women's separate virtues practiced in a private sphere." "Afraid that women will become like men, feminists and Straussians alike "lead us away from the truth that indeed identical traits should be valued in both" (p. 17).

Underlying her account of the interpretive errors in Platonic scholarship, feminist or otherwise, is her own preferred "moral utilitarian" or "functionalist" approach to human nature sustained by Platonic texts and fully compatible with equal citizenship for women. The important question first raised by Plato and yet to be answered, Bluestone argues, is whether it is in the interest of society that more than half its citizens be underutilized. Bluestone would prefer to characterize Plato's political arguments as collectivist, rather than totalitarian, and based on the deductively perceived good of the whole. How this is to be reconciled with modern democratic culture is not discussed.

The happiness, or even rights, of individuals is less the issue in the Platonic context than the functional nature of men and women in the polis constructed along frankly elitist lines. Though Bluestone deplores the antique exclusivity of Plato's understanding of political life, her focus parallels his in remaining almost exclusively on the upper tier of the triangular structure of the Republic. As a result, Bluestone is able to exclude questions of political and economic stratification and concentrate on the dynamics of the guardian philosopher King-Queen class. While the textual framework is narrow, the resulting analytic range is broad and includes a detailed examination of social, biological and broadly feminist commentary, as well as classical scholarship.

This is less a work of political theory, in the disciplinary sense, than a closely argued, often personal, commentary on the philosophical import of Plato's proposals in Book V. Bluestone devotes little attention to the much-criticized Platonic definition of citizenship that excludes the "mechanic" class and, thus, by definition, the majority of both men and women. What is at stake in Book V is the philosophic nature of an elite regardless of gender. Cleaving faithfully to her Platonic text, she also avoids the problem of causal relationship between Plato's abolition of families and property for the guardians in his "Second Wave" and his inclusion of women as the equals of men, guardianship, and philosophy in the other two "waves."

She is unimpressed by the claims of Susan Moller Okin that the key to the status of women in Book V is the separation of political virtues from private economic activities. Instead, Bluestone prefers to take the three Platonic proposals distinctly, in the order written, without any implicit critique of wealth and materialism as a unifying theme. Plato is to be taken at face value in his assertion, through Socrates, that the capacity for reason and, hence, rulership is as natural in exceptional males as in exceptional females and can only be developed in a communal context. "There is a danger that speculation about

which of the Two Waves comes first will distract from our consideration to the justice of each," Bluestone concludes (p. 106).

Similarly, it is hard to ignore the antifemale comments of Socrates, who thanked the gods that he was not created a woman. Yet Bluestone places such notorious comments alongside the proposals for equality in Book V and argues that their inherently contradictory nature cannot be resolved without doing harm to the author's intention. Since Plato's entire concept of justice would be undermined if women were allowed "to do work for which they were not suited" (p. 82), Book V must mean what it says about individual women, that in other contexts women as a class are undeniably judged inferior. Bluestone simply wants to let Plato be Plato.

Platonic ambiguities and contradictions have, unfortunately, fostered "the projections of scholars' own attitudes onto the work" (p. 83), whether on the part of feminist debunkers of Plato or Straussian partisans of "esotericism." In a devastating tour de force she hoists Allen Bloom on his own methodological petard by showing that his blatant attempt to rescue Plato from the feminist implications of Book V does irreparable violence to the texts, even in his own translation. Bluestone herself tries to short-circuit the hermeneutical trap by simply projecting, in good Platonic form, Plato's stated utopian projections onto late twentieth-century culture as a standard by which the status of women ought to be measured, whether in politics or the groves of academe.

Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott, *California State University, Long Beach*

Forecasting Political Events: The Future of Hong Kong By Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, David Newman, and Alvin Rabushka. (New Haven and London. Yale University Press, 1985. Pp x, 198.)

The authors of this book apply an expected utility model to predict the political future of Hong Kong. In a draft agreement signed in September 1984, the British and Chinese governments agreed that the sovereignty and administrative control over Hong Kong would be returned to China in July 1997 (when the British lease for the New Territories of the Crown Colony from China will expire). To assure business confidence and political stability in the interim and thereafter, Beijing pledged to preserve many aspects of Hong Kong's current political and economic system for at least fifty years after 1997. The stated purpose of the book is to determine whether Beijing can be relied upon to implement its guarantees.

For readers familiar with the authors' earlier works (for Bueno de Mesquita, particularly *The War Trap* and "The War Trap Revisited" in *American Political Science Review*, 1985; and for Rabushka, particularly his coauthored book with Kenneth Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies*), *Forecasting Political Events* pursues a similar method of inquiry via the use of formal or mathe-

mathematical models. The expected utility model presented in this volume tries to predict political events on the basis of interactions among relevant interest groups, each of them being treated as a unitary actor. The key variables determining the outcomes of such group interactions are (1) these actors' respective preferences on a given issue, (2) their relative capabilities for affecting the outcome of this issue, (3) the different salience attached by them to the issue, and (4) their degree of risk aversity or propensity. These data inputs enable the authors to propose probable coalitions among the group-actors and to predict the likely resolution of issues in the familiar tradition of spatial analysis exemplified by Anthony Downs' classic work, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. The expected utility model helps to integrate these data according to explicit algorithms.

Forecasting Political Events has several important strengths. Formal or mathematical modeling sometimes comes across as castles built in the air that somehow never touch the ground of empirical reality. Not so in this case. The authors combine effectively the tasks of theory development and theory verification. Indeed, they have conscientiously and systematically undertaken a series of studies that attempt to test the power of the expected utility model by offering a variety of falsifiable predictions about political controversies in different countries. The concern with Hong Kong's future apparently forms a part of their long-term interest in this regard. This attention to cumulative research and to empirical prediction as a means for model validation and improvement is exemplary. While many of us pay lip service to these desiderata, few actually do something about them. In the same vein, the effective combination of concerns with basic research and with applied research offers a relatively rare example worthy of emulation.

The authors' candor in pointing out several limitations of their analysis is also refreshing. For instance, they forthrightly admit that the collapse of issues into one-dimensional continua and the failure to attend to issue interdependence (thereby disregarding the possibilities of log rolling, side payments, and strategic voting) are less than satisfactory. Similarly, a more dynamic treatment of group interactions as a multiple-inning game would be appropriate. Each inning, or iteration, of the game would presumably affect the actors' preferences, capabilities, issue salience, and risk acceptance for subsequent innings.

It would have also been desirable to place more explicitly and to discuss more extensively the expected utility model in a broader context of alternative theories of or approaches to studying decision making. How does the rational actor tradition (from which this model is derived) compare with alternative perspectives stressing, say, bounded rationality or incremental behavioral adjustment in terms of descriptive accuracy and explanatory/predictive power? Are people's judgmental processes more effectively or validly represented by algorithms or heuristics (that is, rough rules of thumb)? Under what circum-

stances can the utility model be expected to perform better or worse than alternative approaches to studying decision making, such as cognitive mapping and operational codes?

The aspect of the book that I have the greatest concern with and uneasiness about regards the nature of expert opinions used as data inputs for the empirical predictions. As the authors rightly acknowledge, the expected utility model provides a useful analytic apparatus for guiding the search, integration, and evaluation of pertinent information. The quality of the predictions produced by this model is dependent on the quality of its data inputs. Regrettably, whereas the authors evidently resorted to some sort of delphic procedure for soliciting expert estimates, they do not offer any information about who these experts are, what their credentials are, how many of them there are, and how their opinions are aggregated and otherwise processed for analysis.

The authors also fail to discuss how they (or their informants) have determined the various issues and actors that constitute the basis of analysis. For instance, they present as pertinent groups for internal Chinese politics the following actors: (1) Deng Xiaoping, (2) the bureaucracy, (3) communist party ideologues, (4) modern military, (5) army, and (6) Guangdong provincial leadership. It is not clear to me how these actors are identified in the first place; the authors do not provide bibliographic references or explicit rationales for the purpose of documenting or explaining this and the other empirical determinations (such as the estimates of group capability). Nor do they provide any corroborating evidence for these determinations.

In the preface of the book (p. vii), the authors argue that the past flip-flops of Beijing's policies make Hong Kong's investors and residents uneasy about the prospect that it will honor its guarantees in the long run. Unfortunately, scholarly treatments of China have also undergone quite a few flip-flops. They tend to play catch-up, attempting to adjust retrospectively to the twists and turns in Beijing's policies. In other words, the track record of China scholars does not inspire confidence. In their conclusion (p. 160), the authors state "the predictive power of any approach, whether grounded in a formal model, statistical curve fitting, or expert judgment, is only as good as the information that goes into it. Fortunately, superb expertise on individual countries, regions, and issue-areas is readily available within the academic, government, and business communities." Whereas I strongly concur with the first part of the statement just cited, I am far less optimistic about the second part as far as sinology is concerned. The authors of *Forecasting Political Events* would have been more persuasive if they had documented the "superb expertise" supplying the data inputs of their analysis. Surely they would agree that one cannot just take the experts' words of their own expertise. After all, I take that to be the very reason for objective analysis and, indeed, the very point of this book in regard to the desirability of explicit verification efforts.

In conclusion, the authors are gloomy about Beijing's ability to carry out its promises to Hong Kong in the long run, even though they feel that its current intentions are sincere. In their words, "the issue . . . is the durability not the short-run credibility, of China's written word" (p. vii). Such a conclusion may, of course, be applicable to negotiations between the strong and the weak in general. Had the native American tribes had the benefit of the authors' sage advice, I presume that they would also have been told not to pin their hopes on Washington's living up to its various treaty obligations.

Steven Chan, *University of Colorado*

The Resurgence of Conservatism in Anglo-American Democracies. Edited by Barry Cooper, Alan Kornberg, and William Mishler. (Durham and London: Duke University Press. Pp. 464.)

The past decade has witnessed a sharp resurgence in the electoral success of conservative governments in many of the Western industrial democracies. Originating with the Alberta Conference of May 1986, the contributors to this volume, representing some of the leading scholars in the discipline, seek to explain both the causes and consequences of the recent surge of conservative electoral success in Great Britain, Canada, and the United States.

For purposes of exposition, the essays contained in this work can be divided into three parts. The first part provides a general comparative overview of the determinants of conservative electoral success. Part two looks at the political priorities and consequences of the successes, along with an examination of the role of courts in Canada and the United States. Part three provides a more in-depth, country-specific analysis of the forces behind the conservative resurgence in the three relevant countries.

One immediate observation to be made is of the dramatically differing interpretations of the causes for the conservative revival. Smith, Kornberg, and Nebbitt contend in "Structural Factors of the Conservative Resurgence" that the shift in political fortunes resulted from a variety of conditions brought about by changing features of the political system, including the growth of foreign competition, stresses on social welfare programs, and declines in political participation among certain groups. Ultimately, the authors suggest that the conservative parties' electoral success was based chiefly on a performance-based rejection of liberal or left parties and leaders, rather than on a sweeping ideological shift to the right by the electorate. In contrast, Mishler, Hoskin, and Fitzgerald in "Hunting the Snark . . .," as the title indicates, argue strongly that not only has there been no ideological shift but also there is precious little evidence of a broad-based reaction of left parties and grounds of poor performance. They suggest that conservative electoral success during the relevant period constituted nothing more than part of the cycle of "normal politics" and

was due largely to idiosyncratic factors having to do with personalities and events.

The policy contributions also represent a diverse array of views. Norman Thomas, in his comparative study, suggests that all three nations (with the partial exception of Canada) have seen significant changes in macroeconomic policy as new conservative governments responded to inflationary conditions with monetarism, free markets, and competition. James Alt's chapter, "New Wine in Old Bottles . . .," suggests that, at least in the British case, the government, while seeking significant change, was only partially successful in its policy goals (reduction of expenditures, tight monetary policy) and that institutional constraints have resulted in policy outcomes not radically different from those that would have been obtained under a government of different ideological complexion. However, while there is a suggestion of like-mindedness in economic policy, William Booth illustrates the tensions that can arise in foreign policy relations between governments with otherwise broadly congenial interests when an asymmetric power balance between the respective states is combined with a militantly anticommunist world view of the Reagan administration. Two additional articles in the section explore the role of the courts in Canada and the United States. While both Morton and Pye point to the important differences between the role of the courts in the respective countries, there is evidence that judicial activism could well become a political issue in Canada just as it has been for years in the United States.

The volume concludes with a series of country-specific essays on the nature of recent conservative gains. Crewe and Searing reinforce the earlier papers' more general findings suggesting that recent Tory electoral success owes more to the clear, coherent, and confident message presented by Thatcher's leadership than to a pro-conservative shift in the British electorate. In rather stark contrast, Mark Franklin contends that recent Tory success has indeed been based in part on a conservative shift in the electorate, although this shift has occurred on a relatively new issue dimension involving questions of tax cuts, privatization, and encouragement of entrepreneurial values.

Neither Roger Gibbins' essay nor the Kornberg and Clarke study point to any long-term realignment of the Canadian party system. Although, as Gibbins suggests, there may have been some incremental shift in the issue agenda, the Kornberg and Clarke essay offers strong evidence that the 1984 Progressive Conservative survey was based primarily on negative performance judgments of the incumbent liberal government along with short-term issue and leadership effects. Subsequent events have borne out this analysis. As for the United States, Chappell and Keech's contribution presents a theory of partisan economic differences. According to this argument, Reagan's success can be substantially based on negative performance evaluations of the Democratic party resulting from high inflation (given the Democratic policy

preferences for highly stimulative macroeconomic policies) and the relative success of the Reagan administration in these areas. While the authors argue for a retrospective, performance-based model of recent electoral behavior, the Gillespie-Lenich and Fiorina papers, while differing dramatically in methodology, point to a limited shift to the right within the electorate. The former finds limited evidence in the religious revival of recent years. While, along with the other authors, Fiorina rejects the notion of a conservative transformation of the electorate, he finds voters are not basing decisions simply on performance evaluations but in certain policy areas are willing to see policy move (to a limited extent) in a conservative direction. Fiorina's argument is imbedded within an intriguing theory of split-ticket voting.

In sum, this work provides a comprehensive overview of contemporary politics in the Anglo-American democracies. Indeed, this reader's only major criticism is its effort to incorporate an excessive number of topics and subject areas. Nonetheless, comparativists and specialists in electoral behavior and political economy, in addition to a more general audience, will find *The Resurgence of Conservatism* an imminently worthwhile contribution to the study of this highly relevant topic.

Euel Elliott, *University of Oklahoma*

On Diplomacy. A Genealogy of Western Estrangement. By James Der Derian. (Oxford. Basil Blackwell, 1987. Pp. vi, 258. \$34.95)

This book is an ambitious consideration of diplomacy using the tools of the continental tradition in political theory. These include theories of alienation from Hegel and Marx, genealogical insights from Nietzsche and Foucault, and theories of symbolism from Freud and contemporary structuralists. James Der Derian's book is not the first to combine political theory with international relations. After all, there is a long tradition of normative concern in this area. But it may be the first to approach international relations from contemporary continental perspectives, representing a new kind of interface between the subfields—an important achievement in our increasingly fragmented discipline.

Der Derian does, however, take the path of least resistance by not dealing with the behavioral, quantitative, or policy-oriented literature on diplomacy. His study is closest to classical histories of diplomacy, and he offers historical kinds of explanation. But Der Derian's history is different because it is filtered through the questions suggested by continental political theory and ignores in more traditional approaches: What are the relations among symbolization, language, and power? Between solutions to everyday existential dilemma and politics? We know that diplomacy rests on a fragile combination of discussion, symbolism, and force. But we rarely ask how it could be that a wideh

accepted set of practices, recognitions, and immunities—diplomatic culture—could arise among entities that have little else in common. The originality of Der Derian's work is that he uses questions inspired by the continental tradition in political theory to remind us just how problematic and congenial diplomatic practices are.

Der Derian develops his analysis by identifying six models, each of which describes a set of mediations of foreign relations other than war. Diplomacy (chaps. 3 and 6) describes an international culture within which there is reciprocity among equals, as well as recognition of certain immunities and norms of conduct toward strangers. Diplomatic culture can emerge only within an international system where the boundaries of states are the paramount divisions, where *raison d'état* is the ultimate justification for diplomatic relations, and where a balance of power maintains. Der Derian's other models describe situations where these conditions do not exist but where interactions still include fragments of diplomacy. Mythodiplomacy (chap. 4) locates the origins of symbolic reciprocity between "foreign" entities in mythology and religion. One might understand ritual sacrifice, for example, as a way of bargaining with the gods. Proto-diplomacy (chap. 5) identifies prototypes of diplomacy that developed during the middle ages. These include reciprocal but unequal obligations between the center and periphery of Christendom, reciprocity between traders and even between warriors. Interestingly, Der Derian credits the hostile equality between the Christian and Islamic worlds with altering hierarchical views of international order. Anti-diplomacy (chap. 7) refers to idealist rejections of state boundaries and *raison d'état*, as in Christian universalism and various sixteenth- and seventeenth-century utopian writings. Neo-diplomacy (chap. 8) occurs when anti-diplomacy is politicized, as in socialist internationalism. And techno-diplomacy (chap. 9) describes situations in which diplomatic interactions can no longer contain new kinds of interactions made possible by new technologies. Nuclear weapons can produce total destruction far too quickly to allow for diplomatic responses, and modern mass communications allow the media to develop their own forms of symbolic mediation. Der Derian does not celebrate diplomacy as the only desirable form of interaction, but he holds that it is the least dangerous possibility "until we learn to recognize ourselves as the Other" (p. 209).

Der Derian's theoretical apparatus combines a genealogical method with theories of alienation to identify these several models of interactions. Genealogy here refers to the kind of historical deconstruction practiced by Nietzsche and Foucault. Unfortunately, there is little current agreement about what genealogy in this sense commits one to, and Der Derian does little to clarify the issue. Still, two dimensions of genealogy come through. History is often written teleologically, in ways that impose an implausible unity and logic on the development of a practice, institution, or cultural entity. Classical histories of diplomacy, for example, tend to reify state systems, in this way

imposing a unity on the conditions under which diplomacy emerged. Genealogical stipulations assert that, at any point in time, a form of life will impose a unity on inheritances that may, in their origins, have had nothing to do with one another. In the case of diplomacy, Der Derian looks for the many ways in which practices, rituals, and symbols oriented toward nondiplomatic problems (e.g., death, salvation, and lord-vassal power relations) are taken over for diplomatic ends when foreign relations become problematic for one reason or another.

A second dimension of genealogy is a guiding assumption that power relations are partly constituted within the media of culture—a point that is particularly appropriate to the highly symbolic arena of international power relations. For Nietzsche and Foucault, the symbolic/interpretive dimension of power resides in the fact that different ways of interpreting interests, self-identities, and the world maintain different forms of human interaction. Symbolism (or “truth,” as Foucault sometimes says) and power are intrinsic to one another. Struggles for power produce symbolic reactions and mediations, and existing symbolic structures can be taken over by new forces and used to new ends. In Der Derian’s reading of the Old Testament, for example (pp. 51–60), an ancient Jewish reaction to oppression was to create an otherworldly kingdom. This kingdom simultaneously explained suffering and mortality, mediated Jewish relations with other peoples, and solidified a Jewish community. While none of these symbols were motivated by diplomacy, they did ritualize relations with the “otherness” of strange and dangerous peoples by giving self and others intelligible places in the cosmos. Under different power relations, these symbolizations may have provided cultural templates for diplomatic practices, since diplomacy requires a ritualization that makes strangeness psychologically and culturally manageable. The methodological contribution of genealogy lies in drawing attention to these vacillating relations between interpretive/symbolic structures and power, and many of Der Derian’s hypotheses illustrate the fruitfulness of this kind of attention.

Der Derian combines this genealogical approach with the hypothesis that many of the enabling practices of diplomacy possibly originated as ways of mediating alienation. The point seems so central that one wonders that Der Derian is the first to have capitalized on it in a contemporary context. Foreign relations are relations of estrangement, expressed in differences of cultures and languages, in the domination of one nation over another, and in war. Foreign relations are, of course, only one form of estrangement. But by combining this form with a genealogical approach, one can see how dealing with one form of estrangement might provide a formula for dealing with another. This is what allows Der Derian to borrow from Hegel and Marx. Hegel, of course, based a theory of religion, politics, and history on a phenomenology of estrangement; Marx applied Hegel’s phenomenology to capitalism and the state. Der Derian’s point is that the sum total of ways of mediating otherness

affect how a particular culture deals with foreignness in its many guises. His models show that these guises need not be only religious and mythical. They might also consist in hierarchical political relations between empire and periphery. They might be embedded in trade and commerce. Or they might be norms that evolve in the conduct of war itself. Any of these mediations might appear in the conduct of diplomacy.

Der Derian's book is not a complete, nor even a very neat, account of diplomacy. It is a book of suggestions. While many are bold and insightful, some are argued only by association, while others are unconvincingly thin, as if they were only excuses to explore theoretical possibilities. The arguments are not ordered for maximum clarity, and the style is often turgid. Nonetheless, this is a work of great intellectual energy, worth these occasional irritations for the payoffs.

Mark Warren, *Georgetown University*

Legacy of a War By Ellen Frey-Wouters and Robert S. Laufer (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1986. Pp. 450. \$32.50)

The Vietnam War continues to haunt the American conscience, and there is a wealth of works that attack a broad variety of problems associated with the origins, processes, and termination of the war. In contrast to most studies of the subject matter, Ellen Frey-Wouters and Robert S. Laufer take a grounded approach to the study of the Vietnam War. The most significant finding of their study is that Americans at large and many of the men and women who fought the war were bitterly opposed to it. In addition, although the majority of Americans were opposed to the war, the state continued to execute policies that were at considerable variance with public opinion.

This work draws on the experiences of 1,159 men described as members of the "Vietnam generation." In total, there was a sample of 1,259 men composed of veterans and nonveterans at ten sites in the United States. Eight hundred sixty were white, while 399 were black. They were all born between 1940 and 1953. A substantial number of those interviewed were veterans, and the survey was conducted in the late 1970s. Paradoxically, women were excluded entirely. Ninety percent of the sample, regardless of their experiences, opposed military action against individual citizens. Seventy-five percent opposed bombings and shellings of cities to terrorize the population. Ninety percent of nonveterans and 70 percent of veterans would not support future military action by the United States in the Third World. Perhaps the most meaningful task of the authors is their effort to map the background experiences of the population with their attitudes and judgments regarding the Vietnam War.

There are several lessons that can be drawn from *Legacy of a War*. First, war structures, indeed, create a whole novel set of relations between state and

society. Second, long after war has concluded, members of society, both those who fought and those who did not fight, are haunted by war. Social movements tend to be driven in special ways by the activities of young men and women with life experiences that were shaped by war. Finally, the preoccupation of social scientists with the causes of war have led us to ignore one of the more important relationships that is crucial to understand: war and society.

The most significant problem raised by the authors of this volume is how states can engage in war under circumstances where the public bitterly opposes the policies of its respective leadership. The answer to this question requires detailed explanation. Much of the work presented by the authors describes attitudes and processes associated with the Vietnam War without providing adequate explanations. Thus, this work identifies a series of puzzles that must be given a great deal more attention. In this context, it can be argued that *Legacy of a War* constitutes a major contribution to our understanding of war and society and provides a framework for more advanced research. This is a fine work!

Darryl Roberts, *Duke University*

The Political Economy of International Relations. By Robert Gilpin and Jean M. Gilpin. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. Pp. xvi, 449 \$45.00 cloth, \$9.95 paper.)

Robert Gilpin's 1975 book, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation*, was important because it helped redefine our understanding of the international political economy (IPE) and even, to some extent, recreate this field of study. In the years that followed, the field of IPE expanded exponentially. Gilpin's latest book is not of such a seminal nature but is similarly important to those interested in IPE and international relations. Gilpin presents a broad-ranging synthesis of the IPE literature and evaluates that literature from his own theoretical approach; he develops, expands, and clarifies that approach; and, he examines current developments and likely future directions of the international economic order (or, increasingly, disorder).

Gilpin's central concerns in this study are "the impact of the world market economy on the relations of states and the ways in which states seek to influence market forces for their own advantage" (p. 24.) His earlier expressed view of the importance of the structure of international political relations on international economic relations remains, but his view of the relationship between the state and the market has become more explicitly balanced. Neither is the primary determinant in their interaction. They are, rather, very different ways to organize human activities, based on opposed characteristics and logic.

Three general propositions about the state-market relationship are derived from a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of economic liberalism, Marxism, and economic nationalism. First, all states are concerned directly with production location and output. Second, the international division of labor is determined by both economic and political factors (price relations and national policies). And, third, changes in production location and the international division of labor take place unevenly, eroding the political foundations of established economic order and creating instabilities requiring new political-economic orders. The processes of economic growth, particularly uneven growth, redistribute economic activities by region, produce expanding and declining sectors, and lead to increased interdependence and vulnerability to external change. Uneven economic growth has undermined the basis for American leadership necessary for the stable growing international economy. Uneven growth has imposed the need for constant adjustment by economic actors leading to conflict within and among states over the distribution of adjustment costs. Increasing interdependence, uneven growth, and declining leadership potential has led to increased uncertainty and instability.

The tendency for the state or the market to dominate the interaction is cyclical and dependent on the presence of a hegemony or international cooperation, the rate of economic growth, and the degree of similarity in industrial structure. Structural changes in the world political economy have reduced the domination of the market, increasing levels of state interventionism and protectionism. The relative decline in American economic and political power has led to decreasing American leadership, increasing the instability and uncertainty in the world economy. The rate of economic growth has slowed with the closing of the technological frontiers, technological diffusion, and the demands placed on the state by welfare capitalism. The less conflictual intra-industry trade characterizing the 1950s and 1960s has become transformed into more competitive and conflictual interindustry trade in the 1970s and 1980s.

To maintain a liberal international economy in the face of these structural changes would require significantly increased international cooperation to achieve one or more of the following: policy coordination, harmonization of domestic structures, establishment of new economic regimes based on the changing distribution of power, and/or domestic economic adjustment to changed international economic conditions. Gilpin concludes that this outcome is unlikely, seeing that domestic goals have been taking priority over international norms. The emerging international order will rather be a mixed system of economic nationalism, regionalism, and sectoral protectionism.

Gilpin's book is an impressive statement of the consequences of hegemonic decline on the international economy, and he examines these effects on monetary relations, trade relations, direct investment, economic development in less developed countries, and international finance. Because I am in broad

agreement with both his analytical approach and his conclusions, it seems niggling to point to two justifiable omissions given the study's purpose, scope, and length. First, much of his analysis rests on theoretical judgments and intuitive observations about causation, changes, and trends in the international political economy. The evidence presented in support, however, tends to be anecdotal and inconclusive, in some cases probably the best that can be done. There is little systematic empirical evidence presented, however, even when available. For example, a fundamental conclusion of his analysis is that there are increasing levels of protectionism and interventionism in the world. While he recognizes that the increased rhetoric of protectionism has been more the norm than the reality of increased protectionism, much of his analysis centers around this trend. While his judgments may well be correct, they would carry greater weight if the empirical evidence had been more systematically evaluated where appropriate.

Second, much has been written about finding ways to preserve the benefits of a liberal international economy faced with the declining ability and willingness of the United States to exert leadership. If Gilpin's pessimistic conclusion about the low probability of maintaining an open liberal international system is correct, much more work needs to be done to find ways of minimizing the costs of at least a degree of closure. Work on the conditions for international cooperation after hegemony by such writers as Axelrod and Keohane, important though it may be, needs to be better supplemented with evaluations of second- and third-best policy options. Gilpin does not address the problem of the United States' learning to act as a "normal" state in the international system. In his theoretical synthesis, Gilpin seems to be trying to meld a state-centered neomercantilist analysis with a market-centered liberal analysis in giving equal weight to both sides of the state-market interaction. The result is still an analysis that remains fundamentally rooted in neomercantilist assumptions. It is rather his personal values and objectives that are fundamentally liberal (see p. 25). Thus, his failure to come fully to terms with the implications of his pessimistic conclusions may be due in part to the inherent tension between his analytical assumptions on the one side and his liberal values on the other.

James Conrad, Mount Holyoke College

The Sound of Leadership. Presidential Communication in the Modern Age.

By Roderick P. Hart. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. Pp. xxiii, 277. \$39.95 cloth, \$14.95 paper.)

The Rhetorical Presidency. By Jeffrey K. Tulis. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. Pp. x, 209. \$19.95.)

This review examines two recent additions to the growing literature on the public presidency. In *The Rhetorical Presidency*, Jeffrey Tulis places presi-

dential rhetoric within the larger context of changing conceptions of the political order in an admirable and successful effort to integrate the history of ideas with the study of political institutions. He views presidential rhetoric as both a reflection and an elaboration of underlying theories of governance. The founders worried about the danger that a powerful executive might pose to the system if power were derived from the role of popular leader. They feared demagoguery and designed institutions to mitigate the effects of such appeals. They also settled the major questions of the regime by the founding itself and thus narrowed the range of acceptable demagogic appeals.

Official rhetoric in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries conformed to this constitutional theory. Presidential policy rhetoric was written, not spoken, and was addressed principally to Congress, not the public. Rhetoric directed primarily to the people, such as inaugural addresses and proclamations, focused on popular instruction of constitutional principle and articulation of the general tenor and direction of presidential policy rather than the merits of particular policy proposals. Although later in the nineteenth century the quantity of presidential rhetoric increased, the character of presidential speech remained within traditional bounds, with the exception of that of the ill-fated Andrew Johnson.

At the turn of the century, Theodore Roosevelt broke with the practice of his predecessors and embarked on a series of rhetorical campaigns to secure passage of legislation to regulate the railroads. Nevertheless, he was constrained by existing principles of governing and was careful to limit his public appeals to periods preceding and following Congress' deliberations over the Hepburn Act. He also took care to state his case in terms of principle, not detailed policy, to repeat principles often, and to moderate public expectations of the success of policy.

Roosevelt felt that the times required plebiscitary leadership through inspirational rhetoric to revive and perpetuate the country's founding principles and thus that he was acting in a fashion that was consistent with the essential objects and most general principles of the Constitution, even if he was departing from specific constitutional prescriptions. All the while he was concerned about the potential abuse of rhetoric and with setting an example of moderation in its use.

William Howard Taft followed Roosevelt into the White House and produced policy-specific messages to Congress. But it was Woodrow Wilson who set the modern practice of presidential popular leadership, combining Roosevelt's inspirational approach with the policy specificity of Taft. Moreover, he legitimized these practices with a reinterpretation of the constitutional order. Compared to the founders, Wilson accorded greater weight to the role of public opinion in the daily conduct of government and to the interplay between the leader and the people. He was more concerned with increasing energy in the executive and less about the consequences of dema-

goguery. Thus, his policy rhetoric was more often spoken and was addressed principally to the people, not Congress, in order to enhance his leadership of Congress and increase the executive's accountability. The content of his speech also diverged from past practice: it became more visionary, articulating a picture of the future and leading the public to it rather than appealing to and reinvigorating established principles. Moreover, Wilson often took specific policy stands in his speeches.

The form and content of Wilson's rhetoric became the pattern for his successors. Tulis asserts that it was Wilson's justification for his innovations in rhetoric that legitimized similar behavior on the part of future chief executives. This is a plausible explanation, but we could have more confidence in such a conclusion if the author had systematically examined alternative explanations and the thinking of the presidents who followed Wilson into the Oval Office.

Tulis is a close student of the rhetorical presidency, but he is not enamored with it. Through short, provocative case studies of Woodrow Wilson's campaign for the League of Nations and Lyndon Johnson's efforts to obtain the passage of his War on Poverty, the author insightfully adds his voice to the growing chorus of analysts pointing out that there are limits to both what presidents can accomplish through popular leadership and the system's ability to function under the auspices of a theory of popular leadership.

The final chapter, in which the author reflects on the meaning and significance of the transformation of American politics wrought by the rhetorical presidency, is less systematic and rigorous than the preceding chapters, and careful readers are likely to find the reasoning less compelling. Notwithstanding, this is a book well worth reading; it increases substantially our understanding of the public presidency.

Roderick Hart picks up where Tulis leaves off. His concern is the nearly ten thousand instances of presidential speech between the day Harry Truman took office and the end of 1985. Moreover, he is less concerned with the substance of what presidents said than with why they said what they did and when and where they said it.

There are other important differences between the books as well. Where the bulk of *The Rhetorical Presidency* is narrowly focused and rigorously reasoned, *The Sound of Leadership* is expansive and the inferences are often unsupported and speculative. Where Tulis argues from a theoretical basis, Hart's reasoning is ad hoc. Where the former has a careful structure to his analysis, the latter is disorganized and difficult to follow.

Nevertheless, Hart's data base is impressive and represents an immense research effort. Moreover, the author exploits his data in a wide variety of ways. Readers are sure to find something of interest in the pages of the volume and learn much that they did not know.

Not unexpectedly, Hart finds that presidents speak more often to a more diverse set of audiences on a wider variety of topics than ever before. Much

of this is accounted for by the increase in the ceremonial role of the presidency. One of his key conclusions is that "public speech no longer attends the processes of governance—it *is* governance" [Hart's italics] (p. 14).

In his discussion the author provides numerous tables and graphs to support his conclusions. Yet they frequently array the data in ways that do not illuminate the questions he has raised. For example, he asserts that presidents have not changed the topics about which speak over time. The data he provides the reader, however, are comparisons of the topics addressed by Democratic and Republican presidents, not the more appropriate comparisons of individual presidents in chronological order. Similarly, he argues that the audiences addressed, the topics discussed, and the locations selected for speeches do not change over the course of an administration. Yet he compares the first and second halves of all administrations combined together, thus masking any variation across administrations. When he focuses on the range of topics on which presidents speak, he again aggregates the speeches of all presidents. This problem occurs throughout the study.

The author believes that speech is a powerful tool of presidential leadership, yet he is able to find no systematic evidence that speech is related to public support. Unphased by this, he examines the rhetorical efforts of presidents Johnson and Nixon and concludes that, although it is unclear that speech gave them power, at least they *acted* as if it did. How do we know this? The author turns psychologist and explains, without the benefit of proof, that they relied on speeches "to establish their authority over their opponents and . . . it made them feel safe from their opponents and better about themselves" (p. 103). Even the fact that the two chief executives responded rhetorically to crisis situations in their administrations in fundamentally different ways is not enough to challenge this conclusion. It is apparently impossible to disprove

Too often the author makes strong assertions, unencumbered with qualifications, about how presidents think and fails to support them with evidence. For example, according to the author, "presidents use speech to convince themselves and others that they are not impotent" (p. 79). The next sentence reads: "One anecdote should suffice to make this latter point."

The chapter on media coverage of the president contains interesting data on presidential news stories. For example, the president is shown speaking only a very small percentage of the time on television news. Moreover, there was no relationship between the number of speeches presidents gave and the major media coverage they received. (Such findings would seem to undercut assertions about both the importance of speech and the White House's ability to orchestrate the media.)

The chapter on presidential elections reports that presidents intensify the speech-making schedules and broaden the geographic locations of the speaking in election years but do not change the topics on which they speak. They do, however, place increased emphasis on values in their election year

speeches. Unsurprisingly, voter density and political competitiveness drive presidential decisions regarding the locations of campaign speeches.

In the concluding chapter Hart joins Tulis in a negative appraisal of the rhetorical presidency. He finds that the emphasis on public speech dulls the president's intellect, robs him of time to reflect, creates an artificial reinforcement for the correctness of his views, and encourages a feeling that rhetoric is equivalent to action. Presidents become too powerful and more concerned with exploiting citizens' predispositions than with meeting their needs. They choose speech that pacifies and shrink from rhetoric that challenges, stimulates, or educates.

At the same time, voters pay too much attention to the president, depriving him of privacy and other governmental actors of the attention they require. In addition, presidential ceremonies encourage people to lessen their surveillance of the president as a political figure. The public also places too much emphasis on personal attractiveness in selecting presidents.

All of these criticisms deserve attention and some of them may be valid. Unfortunately, the author offers them as truisms rather than as propositions that require rigorous evaluation. In this regard they are characteristic of this fascinating but undisciplined work.

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The In-and-Outers: Presidential Appointees and Transient Government in Washington. Edited by G. Calvin Mackenzie. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987. Pp. xix, 239. \$26.50)

The "in-and-outers" analyzed in this collection of essays are the six hundred to seven hundred presidential appointees who run the government. As G. Calvin Mackenzie argues, "From the earliest days of the United States as a nation, the highest-ranking administrators of the federal government have been drawn from a category of people known in federal parlance as 'in-and-outers,' individuals for whom government service is neither a profession nor a career. No other nation relies so heavily on noncareer personnel for the management of its government" (p. xiii). However, despite the high profiles of these appointees, there has never been a comprehensive study of the selection process until the National Academy of Public Administration's Presidential Appointee Project in 1982. The essays in this book are based largely on this database and are attempts to provide reliable information about these appointees and their job experiences.

Presidential government is the "thin layer" of officials with policy-making powers in the White House, departments, and agencies. These appointees define a given administration: creating its tone and setting its operational style and managerial effectiveness. In Dom Bonafede's judgment, "the character

and caliber of the people whom the president selects to serve under his imprimatur tell us in a vicarious way what kind of leader he hopes to be and what concept of governing he has" (pp. 30–31). In his analysis of the development of the White House personnel office over the past fifty years, Bonafede notes an overall absence of consistency and lack of depth in the selection process that he finds surprising given the stakes involved. Bonafede notes "the common practice of incoming presidents to fill many of the choice vacancies in their administrations with loyalists from their campaigns, or those fortunate enough to be personally acquainted with the presidents or one of their senior advisers" (p. 54).

Such personnel practices are, of course, hardly surprising to students of administrative management or to readers of the novels of Anthony Trollope and C. P. Snow. However, it should be noted that sheer chance does not play a predominant part in the process of presidential appointments. This elite—white, male, middle-aged graduates of prestigious universities—also includes a significant number who come with public-, rather than private-, sector backgrounds. In particular, there has been a substantial increase in the number of appointees from congressional staffs and Washington-based law firms, "think tanks," and interest groups (see table 1.6, p. 15). For Calv in Mackenzie and Linda L. Fisher, "What this would seem to suggest is that, on the 'in' side of the 'in-and-outer' equation, more and more appointees are coming into the government from not very far out" (p. 27).

One of the most significant trends identified by the Presidential Appointees Project was the steady decline over the past two decades of tenure in office—half the top political executives served less than two years in the same position. Of course, the in-and-outer system characteristic of American national government results in higher turnover than does those political systems characterized by career bureaucrats serving in top policy-making positions. There are also benefits to be realized in increased bureaucratic responsiveness from the recruitment of outsiders as top-level government officials. But, as Carl Brauer observes, it is very possible to have too much of a good thing. "Turnover at the excessively high rate American government has today makes it much more difficult to achieve the political responsiveness that lives at the very heart of the in-and-outer system" (pp. 193–94). The result is a "government of strangers."

Hugh Heclo's concluding essay is a highly critical evaluation of the in-and-outer system of federal executive management. While recognizing the unquestioned vitality that temporary political executives bring to administrative management, Heclo indicts the system for inculcating a short-term rationale in policymaking, for promoting discontinuities in the setting of priorities, for "encouraging the reproduction of pint-size political executives throughout the government," and for introducing a systematic bias into the job-recruitment process. Rather than citizen executives constituting the corps, the prime

didates for temporary political assignments are largely people "in professions where government appointments provide a marketable expertise"; however, "the nonstarter as a potential political executive is on a line of career advancement that is more or less unaffected by goings-on in Washington." For example, "If one is an independent-minded academic or policy analyst, toeing the line for any particular administration may not be too appealing" (pp. 206-11).

Like it or not, the system—in Heclo's judgment—is probably here to stay. "The in-and-outer system, with its mixed emphasis on technical competence and political responsiveness, seems well-fitted to the American political context" (p. 215). Given the violent personnel disruptions that routinely occur with every new administration, one would think that there would be a regularized procedure for the recruitment and orientation of presidential appointees during the transition period. James P. Pfiffner demonstrates how poorly developed the procedures are for starting up a new government. "Despite many attempts and much experience with orientation programs for new political appointees, none of the programs has been sufficiently institutionalized to enable it to last more than one administration. Thus, each new administration enters office and appoints most of its officials without the benefit of any formal orientation to their new jobs" (p. 151).

Presidential transitions, as Pfiffner reminds us, are extremely short and intense time periods. "During the transition the president must set up his White House and establish budget and legislative priorities as well as staff his administration. All of this must be done against the backdrop of people struggling for position and power in the new administration" (p. 61). Pfiffner warns, "If a president-elect's transition operation does not have in place a system to handle this deluge the day after the election, it will be swamped with demands and will be at risk of losing control of the appointment process" (pp. 66-67). He offers useful guidelines for new administrations to avoid being overwhelmed by the recruitment process (pp. 74-76).

The In-and-Outers represents the best of collaborative, data-based research efforts. The contributions are of a uniformly high quality, address a timely and ongoing aspect of presidential governance, and are informed with a common theoretical concern about the transience of political executives. It might rightly be judged a fitting *festschrift* to Heclo. For this reviewer, the book proved to have more than academic interest when appointed to the governor-elect's Transition Team Panel on the Reorganization of Government. It was very helpful to have *The In-and-Outers* at hand (especially the essays by Pfiffner, which concentrated on transitions as a structural process) to guide my own, admittedly very minor, activities within Louisiana's government of friends and neighbors.

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Issues in the History of International Relations: The Role of Issues in the Evolution of the State System. By Robert F. Randle. (New York: Praeger, 1987. Pp. xiii, 307. \$45.00.)

Randle's study is based on the premise that "viewing the subjects of world politics, its state systems, and the systems of each constituent state as issue realms will prove a valuable supplement to conventional emphasis upon state actors" (p. 1). His ensuing exposition, however, largely fails to live up to these expectations.

For the most part, Randle's analysis is on a high level of theoretical abstraction and is written in a jargonistic style that at times is difficult to follow but, when finally deciphered, proves rather prosaic. However, when Randle switches to an analysis of specific issues, to a large extent he simply repetitiously restates well-known, historical events to illustrate his issues paradigm. Indeed, the very title and subtitle of his book reflect this frequent redundancy.

In his first chapter on "issues and their characteristics," Randle states that an issue is a disputed point or question, the subject of a conflict or controversy" (p. 1). He argues that issues "are the core of politics. They are the bases of controversies and the more serious conflicts that determine the character of historical periods" (p. 8). He also defines the concepts "valuation intensity" and "q-connectivity". the former concerns "the extent to which (but, principally, the intensity with which) peoples and their leaders value an issue and its subject matter" (p. 2), while the latter refers to "the interconnectedness of states interested in a particular active issue" (p. 3). Throughout his ensuing analysis, Randle returns to these two concepts to help explain his data.

In his next chapter on "issues and constitutions," Randle explains that "constitutions are the products and consequences of active issues that have been resolved and therefore provide norms and procedures . . . for future legal and political controversies" (p. 32). He then maintains that "major peace settlements, such as Westphalia (1648) or Vienna (1815), have the characteristics of constitutions" (p. 34). As he does in most of his other chapters, Randle illustrates his concepts concerning constitutions by going over a great deal of familiar historical issues. The insights garnered from this approach prove no more interesting than such findings that "when identities of the Great Powers change over time, the system also changes" (p. 47).

Chapter three deals with "peace settlement regimes," such as those of Westphalia and Vienna. Four tables illustrative of various kinds of wars and their settlements are included. Again, the terrain covered by discussing various issues seems rather prosaic. In addition, Randle fails to spot a rather obvious error in his manuscript when he mistakenly writes that "the death of Assad . . . prevented the extension of the Camp David principles" (p. 68). Assad, of course, is meant.

In his fourth chapter on "issue networks," Randle explains that "states interested in an active issue constitute a unique network delimited by common interest in the issue and its subject matter" (p. 99). An unnecessarily abstract figure of "a highly aggregated issue network system" (p. 110) is "explained" by an equally abstract textual paragraph that concludes with nothing more profound than that "the system of Figure 4.2 is highly aggregated [centralized]" (p. 111). More text is then spent on mapping "a highly disaggregated [decentralized] issue network system" (p. 112) and analyzing the rather obvious differences between the two types of systems.

However, Randle does offer the heuristic finding that "the disaggregated system is associated with fairly stable, even peaceful conditions. . . . In an aggregated system, any equilibrium that could be said to have been established would very likely be unstable" (p. 115). Further platitudes follow, however, such as the observation that "great, multilateral wars of modern history have had one or more . . . dominant issues as the source of conflict" (p. 125).

Chapter five on "issue transformations" explains how issues can be transformed over time and what effects such changes will have on implicated states and the networks in which they are participating.

The final chapters contain historical descriptions of the issues in the state system since the year 1500 and might have constituted a separate, second section in Randle's analysis. A lengthy table of "major transnational primary issues, 1500-1980" runs from page 186 to 215. Randle argues that an analysis of the table "enables us . . . to determine the approximate times of the state system transformations" (p. 216). This he proceeds to do, but the results would not seem to be very interesting or even particularly useful. "The state system transformations . . . are of basically two kinds: those based upon the resolution of generally persistent, certainly refractory primary . . . issues and those resulting from the activation of a new set of issues that, in the ensuing period, became dominant" (p. 234).

A rather short bibliography (which is compensated for, however, by thorough notes at the end of each chapter) and an even shorter index conclude this study.

Michael M. Gunter, *Tennessee Technological University*

Selecting the President: The Nominating Process in Transition. By Howard L. Reiter. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985. Pp xviii, 192. \$22.50 cloth, \$8.95 paper.)

This work addresses the process of presidential selection through a systematic, empirically based critique of the vast body of literature on that topic that has appeared in recent years. For his literature review, Reiter establishes four broad categories into which he places the various authors and their works. The

categories are not mutually exclusive; the same author can occupy positions in more than one group.

The 1972 school consists of those who argue that the process has changed as a result of new rules governing presidential nominations, specifically the McGovern-Fraser reforms, which manifested themselves dramatically at the 1972 Democratic national convention. The party-decline school agrees that important changes have occurred. However, it views the 1972 reforms as having less explanatory significance than long-term trends diminishing the standing of political parties and partisanship in the political system. The great bulk of the contemporary literature on presidential nominations falls into these two categories.

In addition, Reiter identifies two much smaller groups. The 1936 school asserts that the catalysts for change can be found in two events occurring in 1936. In that year, the public opinion surveys became a prominent feature of the campaign for president, and the Democrats abandoned their traditional two-thirds rule in favor of a simple majority requirement for nomination. Finally, the stasis school implicitly rejects the argument that fundamental changes have occurred and instead treats national conventions as going about their decision making in time-honored fashion. In summarizing and classifying this literature, Reiter makes a useful contribution.

He goes on to contend that the party-decline thesis appears to have the greatest explanatory value. His specific argument is that "the nominating process has evolved since the 1950s gradually into one in which state and local party leaders can no longer control nominations, and this is due to the long-term decay of party organization in the United States" (p. 14). Therefore, he seeks to demonstrate that the proponents of the other positions, in particular the advocates of the 1972 school, are off base in their assessments.

Reiter accuses several of the scholars who have preceded him in assessing party reform of grievous methodological errors in presenting their findings. Among them are floating comparisons, unsubstantiated assertions, and incomplete and selectively employed data. Furthermore, he points to ideology as a normative reason why so much scholarly attention has been focused, mistakenly in his estimation, on the new rules as causing changes in the nominating process. He indicts both liberals and conservatives for concentrating on them in seeking explanations for the changes.

Thus, it is incumbent on him to develop a methodology for testing the various theses that will avoid these alleged shortcomings. He carefully outlines a series of investigatory guidelines and empirical measures to evaluate numerous hypotheses about presidential nominations he extracts from the literature. These hypotheses relate to nominating patterns, control over nominations, characteristics of convention delegates, party factions, characteristics of nominees, and effects of the process. He devotes a chapter to examining each array. The concluding chapter addresses implications for future reformers.

The measures he employs are imaginative and instructive. They substantiate his claims that significant changes have indeed occurred and that neither the 1936 nor the 1972-era reforms alone fundamentally altered the character of the nominating process. Instead, the contemporary patterns can be discerned in evolution over several decades.

Reiter ably contrasts these contemporary patterns with their traditional counterparts. In addition, he gives the new rules their due by pointing out the limited areas where they do appear to have been causal agents. Finally, he notes the elements of the nominating process that have not changed significantly over time.

Reiter demonstrates to his satisfaction that the party-decline hypothesis best accounts for the major modifications that have occurred. In turn, he argues that the more recent reform rules routinized and legitimated the new system that had already substantially evolved. He is aware that there are potential methodological problems relating to nonfalsification in his approach, since party decline becomes the residual hypothesis to be fallen back on after discounting others.

My major concern with Reiter's analysis is with his conceptualization of party decline. His indicators are "the tendency of voters to use partisanship as a guide to voting behavior less often than they used to, . . . the looser bonds of party among elected officials, or . . . the atrophy of party organizations" (p. 7); it is the third on which his argument ultimately depends. He identifies the long-term decline of state and local organizations as the main cause of the transformation of the nominating process.

However, while he offers convincing empirical evidence regarding declining partisanship in the electorate, and both empirical and anecdotal indications of weakening partisan ties in the government, he essentially takes for granted that diminishing control over nominations produces atrophy in the party organizations. While conventional wisdom surely supports this inference, it has been sharply challenged in the important research findings of Cornelius Cotter and John Bibby, "Institutional Development of Parties and the Thesis of Party Decline" (*Political Science Quarterly*, 95:1-27), and joined by James Gibson and Robert Huckshorn, *Party Organizations and American Politics* (Praeger, 1984). They demonstrate that, in many important respects, contemporary party organizations are far stronger than their predecessors. I find it disconcerting that Reiter does not address their powerful argument in associating party decline with organizational decay. Still, his focus is on nominations; here there is no doubt that the party organization's power has eroded.

This book is a valuable addition to the party-reform literature. It is thorough, well organized, and well written. Beyond its summary worth and innovative generation of data to test propositions, it presents a thoughtful critique of the enterprise of reform. Moreover, it should incite controversy

Reiter has challenged the perspectives of a number of notables, including Banfield, Ceaser, Crotty, Kirkpatrick, Polsby, and Ranney, and he has buttressed his criticisms with a formidable empirical base. I predict a lively and clarifying dialogue will ensue.

Harold F. Bass, Jr., *Ouachita Baptist University*

The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community. Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior. By Jerel A. Rosati. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987. Pp. 259. \$24.95.)

There has been much debate about whether the foreign policy of the Carter Administration was informed by a coherent and consistent worldview. Jerel Rosati attempts to shed light on this question by examining the role of individual and collective beliefs within the Carter Administration and the impact of those beliefs on the administration's foreign policy behavior. He poses the following research questions: What was the administration's worldview during its four years in office? Did high-level Carter administration officials share the same image of the international system? Did the administration's image of the international system remain stable over time? Did the foreign policy behavior of the administration coincide with its worldview?

Rosati defines "worldview" as "how decisionmakers perceive the general structure and processes of the current international system and how they view the future of the international system . . ." (p. 188). Rosati characterizes the administration's image of the current international system in terms of the most important issues and actors mentioned in formal statements of high-level Carter Administration officials—President Carter, Secretary of State Vance, and National Security Adviser Brzezinski. The administration's image of the future international system is defined by whether global change is desirable.

To identify significant foreign policy behaviors, Rosati constructed an events data set using *Deadline Date on World Affairs* as the data source. He then conducted a rank-order correlational analysis between the data sets on beliefs and behaviors to determine the level of association between the Carter Administration's worldview and its major foreign policy behaviors.

Rosati concludes that the Carter Administration came to Washington, DC, with a cohesive worldview, which he labels "the quest for global community." This worldview was dominated by an optimistic image of a complex international system in which global change was desirable. The consensus surrounding this worldview dissolved in 1978 and 1979, as differences began to emerge among high-level officials over Soviet and Cuban intervention in Africa. During 1978, Carter and Vance remained optimistic about the international system, but Brzezinski became more pessimistic, particularly with respect to the

Soviet Union The administration became hopelessly divided in 1979, as Carter grew more skeptical and moved back and forth between the views held by Vance and Brzezinski. A new consensus, which Rosati labels "in search of global stability," formed by 1980 as a result of shifts in the belief systems of Carter and Brzezinski. The new worldview was dominated by political-military issues and the narrowing of key actors (e.g., by 1980, the Soviet Union had become the dominant concern).

Rosati also identifies four stages in the level of association between the Carter Administration's worldview and its foreign policy behavior. There was a high level of consistency between beliefs and behaviors in 1977, reflecting the shared images of Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski. The administration's foreign policy became less consistent in 1978, as individual differences in worldview arose. By 1979, the administration's foreign policy behavior was inconsistent and unstable. Finally in 1980, the Carter Administration's foreign policy again reflected its worldview, but by this time both the worldview and foreign policy behavior had changed to reflect the policy of global containment of the Soviet Union and a near-term focus on Southwest Asia and the Iranian hostage crisis.

The findings of this study have important implications for understanding the role of beliefs in foreign policy. Rosati offers three propositions for future study: (1) the greater the consensus in image among policymakers, the greater the likelihood that the collective image will be cohesive (p. 159); (2) the greater the consensus in image among policymakers, the greater the likelihood that the collective image will be stable (p. 159), and (3) the greater the consensus in image among policymakers, the greater the likelihood that foreign policy behavior will be congruent with beliefs (p. 161).

The strength of Rosati's book is that he tackles a difficult subject—the relationship between beliefs and behavior—mindful of the limitations of his data and the problem of determining causality. There are some weaknesses in the analysis, however, that must be mentioned.

First, Rosati excludes Secretary of Defense Harold Brown from his sample of high-level administration officials. Rosati admits that Brown was a significant actor (p. 183) but argues that Brown's involvement did not extend across the range of issues addressed by Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski. At the same time, many of the significant foreign policy behaviors included in the data set are indisputedly defense related (e.g., January 18, 1977—Department of Defense authorizes the development of two versions of the cruise missile; June 30, 1977—Carter cancels B-1 production; April 7, 1978—Carter defers production of neutron weapons; June 21, 1979—United States plans rapid deployment force for the Middle East and the Third World; September 7, 1979—Carter approves plans to deploy two hundred MX missiles; February 11, 1980—United States agrees with Oman, Kenya, and Somalia to give U.S. forces access to military facilities in their countries in return for military aid).

Moreover, Secretary of Defense Brown is identified as the primary actor in a number of these foreign policy events. The exclusion of Brown's beliefs from the definition of the administration's worldview may have resulted in an overestimation of the degree of consensus that existed in 1977 and an underestimation of the degree of consensus that existed in 1980. In any event, the reader cannot be certain of the impact of the exclusion of Brown's beliefs from the analysis.

A second weakness stems from relying only on formal statements of high-level officials as the data source for characterizing the Carter Administration's worldview. Many of these statements, such as the State of the Union address, are designed to highlight a number of issues and actors, in what only can be described as a superficial way. In addition, formal statements generally are drafted by bureaucrats, not by high-level officials. They may reveal less the view of an individual official than the compromises inherent in the process by which they are drafted.

A third problem concerns the extent to which external events and domestic factors have independent effects on foreign policy behavior. Rosati acknowledges that external events and domestic factors, such as public opinion and democratic elections, may influence belief systems or the worldview of an administration. But these factors, including bureaucratic political considerations, may have direct and independent influences on foreign policy choices. Because Rosati does not investigate these influences in a systematic way, he leaves the reader uncertain about the relative influence of beliefs on foreign policy behavior

Linda P. Brady, *Georgia Institute of Technology*

Private Power and Centralization in France: The Notaires and the State By Ezra N. Suleiman. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987 Pp xxi, 338. \$35.00.)

This is a study of the notarial professional in France, how it has transformed itself and managed to resist the attempts by others to reform it. The case material is used to throw light upon a particular problem, examining the conventional wisdom that "centralized structures . . . possess powers," and "use that power for the good of the community" and that decentralized state structures allow for the "undue influence" of private groups that can in fact take over the policy process (p. 16).

The study begins by setting out the nature of the profession. The notaire, a state-granted monopoly regulated by government-set tariffs, is responsible for drawing up contracts and may also act as tax adviser, management consultant, and accountant. While highly dependent on the state for their monopoly position, the notaires as a professional group have successfully resisted

incorporation into the civil service proper or any other major change in their status despite occasional serious challenges. Suleiman's study concentrates upon the successful efforts by the profession to reform itself in the 1970s and its again successful efforts to resist reform by the Socialist government in the 1980s.

Resilience to outside reform stemmed to a large degree from its internal adaptation in the 1970s, above all, by "changing a mentality"; it had to be 'forced on the majority of members of the profession' that the notaire deals with clients and renders a service, "that he is not some exalted jurist to whom people are obliged to go" (p. 120). Rather than be the friend of the family, arranging things "for bourgeois people so that their fortunes are well taken care of," the notaires managed to transform themselves into a modern profession. This was achieved by such measures as elevation of educational qualifications of new entrants, computerization, and creation of information services for notaires.

Despite these internal reforms, the position of the notaires came under scrutiny again by the Socialist government after 1981. Suleiman explains the mildness of the resulting reforms by the absence of consensus within the government over why the notaires needed to be reformed and consequently what that reform should look like. As time went on, the notaires mobilized and gained significant concessions from the government; above all, because the notaires had champions in central government in the Ministry of Justice and the *Caisse des Depots et des Consignations* and could exploit dissent within the state apparatus.

Suleiman concludes from the successful resistance of the notaires that pluralist pressure can be found even in "strong" governments with centralized executive-dominated authority. He recognizes that there are some peculiar features of the notaires as a group that give them special advantages vis à vis the state. Yet there can be little argument that he has convincingly demonstrated that simple unqualified distinctions between "strong" and "weak" states cannot be made since "state power of autonomy varies across sectors, and there is no predetermined constellation of factors that renders a state either a prisoner of civil society or wholly independent of that society" (p. 303). The question must remain, however, of how far this insight takes us. The conventional view of French government-group relations might still by and large obtain, since nothing in Suleiman's work suggests that examples of a weak state in the face of strong group power is easier to find than, say, in the U.S. state legislature. Suleiman does bring some comparative evidence into his concluding discussion, but one would like to have seen more.

Suleiman's work has three major virtues. First, it is a well written and enjoyable read. Second, the author has managed to uncover a lot of interesting material about an important profession in France; the discussion of the relationship between the notaires and the *Caisse des Depots et des Consignations*.

which acts as a banker to the notaires, was particularly fascinating. Third, while the degree to which one can generalize from this case must remain open to question, the study provides at least a very valuable corrective to traditional conceptions of the relationship between the state and interest groups both in France and in cross-national comparison. At most, Suleiman's study could be part of a major challenge to these conceptions.

Edward C. Page, *University of Hull*

Evaluating U.S. Foreign Policy Edited by John A. Vasquez. (New York: Praeger, 1986. Pp 241 \$38.95.)

As the editor notes in his introduction, the foreign policies of states have not yet been systematically evaluated by those who study the subject. This book is intended to aid in the development of the capacity of scholars to effectively evaluate a state's foreign policy. In order to achieve his goal, Vasquez asserts that science can assist foreign policy decision makers in two ways, by demonstrating knowledge of how and why the world works as it does and by providing feedback about the consequences of foreign policy. According to the editor, a person engaging in evaluation research should specify the criteria a foreign policy should follow and then conduct careful, unbiased studies to determine whether these criteria have been met.

In line with the chief points in his introduction and in order to assist scholars with their evaluations of foreign policy, Vasquez has brought together a number of essays that evaluate the Reagan Administration's foreign policy. In the first section, four studies consider Reagan's hard-line stance toward the Soviet Union. These are Michael Wallace's assessment of several basic assumptions of Reagan's defense policy; Russell Leng's examination of the precepts of political realism, which he considers the administration's outlook, and how these precepts affect crisis bargaining; Louis René Beres' sharp criticism of Reagan's nuclear strategy; and Anatol Rapoport's analysis of the global strategies of the two superpowers that he believes negatively affect the structure, functioning, and evolution of the international system. The second section contains three studies that evaluate specific policies of the Reagan Administration. The three are Neil Richardson's examination of the American government's use of economic sanctions in its Soviet policy, E. Thomas Rowe's assessment of the impact of Reagan's human rights policy on nongovernmental organizations working in this area, and Howard Zinn's comparison of the Reagan Administration's policies in Central American with the moral values in the Declaration of Independence, in which he finds that America's policy in that region is not moral. Finally, the third and concluding section contains two essays that look toward the evaluation of foreign policy in the future. The first of these

essays is by Richard Ashley who explains why liberal positivism is inherently inadequate as a basis for successfully evaluating foreign policy in a scientific manner. He presents an alternative to liberal positivism that he calls a "critical-dialogical" approach. The second chapter in the section is by the editor, who discusses a taxonomy of foreign policy designed to aid in studying and evaluating foreign policies.

Although the variety of scholarly approaches presented in this volume is admirable, the differences among the contributions are so great in many respects that discussing them as a group is a difficult task. How should these studies be evaluated? One way would be to evaluate each on its own explicitly stated criteria, but this is impossible because the authors do not give the criteria by which their individual works should be evaluated. Furthermore, the contributors appear to have at best only a limited agreement among themselves regarding the overall task of evaluating a state's foreign policy. In fact, going further, Ashley's broad attack on liberal positivism makes it appear doubtful that he approves at all of the work of some of the other contributors. It is clear that each reader will have to determine for himself or herself the appropriate criteria for evaluating each chapter. It is a near-classic understatement to say here that this collection of studies is a "mixed bag."

If the editor's call for objectivity in evaluating foreign policy is taken seriously, then it ought to be asked how objective the authors were in their individual pieces as well as how objective the editor was in his choice of contributions. In regard to the former, the studies by Leng, Richardson, and Rowe, for example, appear to be careful and fair in their procedures and conclusions while, in the other direction, Beres and Zinn excoriate the Reagan foreign policy approach from start to finish in colorful, passionate language. Is such passion consonant with objective scholarship? Although there are different views about this, many readers are likely to find at least a couple of the contributions to be highly biased. And, as for the editor's objectivity, it is hard to believe in it when every policy examined in his collection of essays is found to be mistaken. This volume certainly looks as though it was designed to show how recent American foreign policy could be criticized and found wanting from a number of viewpoints.

Finally, are the papers dated or still current in their material? And, if several are dated, does this affect the validity of their assessments? As this review is being written, the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union have just signed a treaty eliminating intermediate-range missiles in Europe, and there is also a good deal of serious talk that next year the two governments will make deep cuts in their arsenals of ICBMs. But, if these large cuts in nuclear arms go into effect, the very hard-line policies toward the Soviet Union that several of the contributors have argued are hopelessly flawed failures may be found later to have contributed in an important manner to what will become this administration's most widely acknowledged foreign policy success.

In short, it looks as though major events have overtaken several of the studies and their evaluations.

Despite its weaknesses, this book ought to be read by all students of foreign policy. Although a fair amount of it is unconvincing, at a minimum, it challenges the reader to come to grips with major questions.

Joseph M. Scolnick, Jr., *University of Virginia*

Elites and the Idea of Equality: A Comparison of Japan, Sweden, and the United States. By Sidney Verba, Steven Kelman, Gary R. Orren, Ichiro Miyake, Joji Watanuki, Ikuo Kabashima, and G. Donald Ferree, Jr. (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1987. Pp. x, 331 \$30.00.)

For those who take seriously the "comparative" in comparative political study, this book by Sidney Verba and his American and Japanese colleagues is essential reading.

The study undertaken by Verba and his colleagues is based on a mailed questionnaire to approximately parallel organizational elites in Japan, Sweden, and the United States. The organizations are conceptually divided into three types—those established within the system, those challenging the system, and those mediating in the system. Exemplars of the first type typically are major functional interests, such as business, labor, and farm organizations. The second type is exemplified by feminist organizations in all countries and minority group organizations in the United States and Japan. The last group includes party elites, media elites, and intellectual elites. The research itself was conducted in the latter half of the 1970s.

The foremost argument of this study is that elite values play a very important role in influencing policies regarding equality; they are not simply epiphenomena. Yet, as the authors also argue, values are themselves influenced by the social consensus that results from past policy patterns. This interaction between the two factors—elite values and the impact of past policy patterns—helps to explain why, for example, Swedish businessmen support income equality to a greater extent than the farthest-left American organizational elite group. It also helps explain why, despite their unconventional instrumentation, conservative governments in Japan have promoted policies that foster income equality under conditions of relatively low conflict.

In Sweden, direct state intervention through the tax system and the welfare state helps to redirect the greatest pretax inequality of income into the least posttax inequality. In the United States, a high pretax inequality is much less deeply affected by tax and welfare state interventions. Yet, in Japan, pretax inequality is much lower to begin with, and so a state with an even more lim-

ited social welfare profile than the American one achieves a higher degree of equality, mostly through subsidies and by fostering socially based rather than state-based welfare provision.

Economic equality, however, is not the sole focus of the authors' analysis. They focus on political equality as well and on the relationship between political and economic equality. In politics, as distinct from economics, a clear metric by which to assess outcomes is not available. Therefore, the authors deal here with perceptions of power and normative conceptions as to how power should be distributed. Politics is seen by the authors as a constant-sum game, economics as a variable-sum game. The struggle for political power, consequently, may be more subject to radical redefinition than economic power. The authors discover this to be true. Organizational elites are more willing to radically redistribute (in their favor, of course) political than economic power. Moreover, established elites are as likely as any to feel abused in the existing allocation of political power, and none so much as American business elites!

As in most cross-national investigations, uniformities stand out but are pressed inevitably by national differences. Thus, while the structure of conflict often seems similar across nations, the range of conflict and what is agreed upon and not is often a function of a nation's political culture and its past. On the issue of income equality, for example, in each of the countries, business and labor structure this conflict, representing the basic division. However, the range of conflict varies greatly, and so do the issues over which conflict takes place. For instance, while the welfare state is not a matter of controversy among Swedish elites, issues of income equalization are. But the welfare state lingers as a controversy in the United States.

How does the past impinge on responses to these issues? Verba and his colleagues point to the way in which culture and prior institutions influenced the emergence of a strong central state. Ironically, the egalitarian past of the United States—its high degree of social and cultural equality (and skepticism of authority)—works especially against economic equality and limits the extent to which a strong state capable of guiding social change may emerge.

Similarly, the institutionalization of the parties influences their ability to assimilate challenging groups into their agenda. In Sweden, the Social Democrats moved to assimilate and shape the feminist agenda, whereas in the United States, feminist groups continue to remain largely outside of the party system, pressuring governmental institutions from the outside. In Japan, the demands are weak to begin with, and polity, to some degree, is likely to be generated from above, particularly in the bureaucracy.

No doubt there will be some quibbles about particular interpretations of the data, and there also are some theoretical issues that might be given more attention. But, more obviously, *Elites and the Idea of Equality* is an immensely rich empirical analysis of the concept of equality, the uniformities

underlying the struggles behind it, and the powerful differences of political cultures in influencing the shape, intensity, and definition of these struggles.

Bert A. Rockman, *University of Pittsburgh*

Black Presidential Politics in America: A Strategic Approach. By Ronald W. Walters. (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988. Pp xvii, 255. \$49.50 cloth, \$14.95 paper.)

With this study, Ronald Walters permanently expands the knowledge base in political science by extending the knowledge parameters of presidential and black politics simultaneously. Drawing upon his role as Jesse Jackson's deputy campaign manager for issues in 1984; his participation in the 1972 Gary convention, the 1972 Little Rock convention, the 1976 Cincinnati convention, and the 1980 convention of the National Black Independent Political Party; his observations of the Black Democratic Caucus meetings in Charlotte in 1976 and Richmond in 1980; his data from his survey of black delegates to the Republican and Democratic national conventions of 1976 and 1980; and his training as a political scientist, Walters writes an illuminating and pioneering book. Walters' book, by any account, is a major triumph because of the voluminous data he brings to bear upon his conceptualization of presidential politics and black presidential politics in particular.

Beginning with a synthesis of democratic theory as it relates to the reality of a permanent minority and moving to a discussion of how black political leaders had to develop an election theory that took into account the status of a permanent minority, Walters' work develops a theoretical paradigm with two strategic techniques for influencing public policy — a dependent-leverage technique and an independent-leverage technique. Such a theoretical matrix for analyzing black presidential politics has never before been seen in the literature.

Once such a conceptualization has been developed and placed in a rich theoretical context, Walters immediately reveals to the reader which leverage strategy he supports and desires. At this point, Walters starts the reader through the strategy techniques and reveals in great detail how each has worked and what it has achieved for the black voter. The book starts with, of course, the dependent-leverage strategy and then moves through its variations and modifications to the independent-leverage strategy.

In fact, it is in the chapter on independent-leverage strategy that Walters develops the Three-Ballot Scenario voting options — as shown in table 5.2 (p. 133), which describes how blacks can try to impact the presidential primaries, the political conventions, and, finally, the general election. It is not only the most thoughtful idea to emerge in the assessment of black presidential politics but also the first time that it has been presented with such clarity and sophistication.

Following this cogent insight, Walters then shows, in a carefully reasoned and brilliantly argued chapter, the role that a black political party can play in the independent-leverage strategy and shows in great detail black efforts to do so.

Then comes the chapter on Jesse Jackson's 1984 campaign, which Walters sees as an independent-leverage strategy but one which is played out inside (intraparty) the Democratic party. And, presenting this from an insider's perspective, the book reveals the strengths and weaknesses of such a leverage strategy in black presidential politics. This chapter alone is worth the price of the book. The work closes with a spirited conclusion and well-written summary overview.

Current assessment of the 1988 Jackson efforts, by journalists, pundits, media elites, and scholars, would be greatly improved and enriched with a reading of this enormously timely work. When the second edition is published, however, I would like the author to correct some minor errors. Parker Moon should be Henry Lee Moon (pp. 23-24); the Black Panther symbol was not for the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party in 1964 but for the Lowndes County Freedom Party in 1966 (p. 141); and 1848 is 1948 in figure 8.1. In no way do these minor errors detract from such an excellently conceived, theoretically rich, well-reasoned, and path-breaking volume. It will become the bench-mark study in the area, and this is probably why the National Conference of Black Political Scientists gave it their first book award.

Hanes Walton, Jr., *Savannah State College*

The New Politics of Old Values. By John Kenneth White (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1988. Pp. x, 188. \$18.00 cloth, \$9.95 paper.)

In this brief monograph, John Kenneth White's goals are twofold. White seeks to describe the essentials of the American political culture; or, as he puts it, "This book is . . . about what kind of people we Americans are" (p. 6). At the same time, White attempts to account for the extraordinary popularity of the Reagan administration and to contrast Reagan's apparent success with the "failure" of his immediate predecessors. In the words of innumerable titles in political science, White hopes to describe stability and change in American politics.

The key to this enterprise, according to White, is to realize that values (presumably, as opposed to interests) are the stuff of politics in the United States. White argues that there exists a national consensus on such values as liberty, individualism, and equality of opportunity, which are subsumed under the concept of the "American Dream." However, the political expression of the

American Dream will vary according to time, place, and circumstance. More specifically, White informs us that macrolevel conflict in the United States is caused by vacillations between Hamiltonian Nationalism (in which freedom is balanced by authority) and Jeffersonian Democracy (in which freedom is balanced by local civic responsibility). White attempts to convince us that we live at a historical moment in which an era of Hamiltonian Nationalism (begun by Franklin Roosevelt) is ending and an era of Jeffersonian Democracy has begun.

Ronald Reagan is not so much a cause as a symbol of this historic transition. As White notes, ". . . presidents do not make the times, they reflect them" (p. 111). However, White's Reagan seems to have an acute sensitivity to the moment as well as an unusual fluency in the symbols of Jeffersonian Democracy. Thus, Reagan is neither a historical deviation nor the cause of a political realignment but is rather the precursor of a distinct era in American politics.

White uses a number of diverse sources as evidence to this transition from Hamiltonian Nationalism to Jeffersonian Democracy, including public opinion polls, election returns, and descriptions of the popular culture. However, *The New Politics of Old Values* ultimately fails on both conceptual and evidentiary grounds.

Conceptually, the distinction between Hamiltonian Nationalism and Jeffersonian Democracy is inadequate. Political scientists will be justifiably suspicious of any attempt to categorize American political conflict into simple, dualistic classifications. Indeed, careful readers of Burns' *The Deadlock of Democracy* will wonder whether the Jefferson Administration itself should be characterized as Hamiltonian or Jeffersonian. At a minimum, White's distinction between these two movements is important and controversial enough to warrant more extended discussion than the five pages he devotes to it. At worst, the distinction is too vague and imprecise to support the weight White places upon it. Moreover, White is quite unclear on the content of the values that underlie American politics. In his initial description of "the American consensus," White focuses on liberty, individualism, and aspiration toward social mobility. To show the high level of commitment Americans have toward individual liberty, White presents evidence (p. 27) to show that Americans are tolerant of unorthodox sexual practices. Later in the volume (pp. 110-11) White details the financial troubles of Hugh Hefner's *Playboy* empire to show the dramatic reassertion of "family values." The concept of family values forms no part of the original discussion of the American consensus (or, for that matter, of the Hamiltonian or Jeffersonian schools of American government) but has been sneaked into the argument in mid-discussion. This inconsistency points to a very real problem with White's entire argument. The American consensus is an extraordinarily difficult object to describe, if indeed such a thing exists. While this problem is common to all consensus theorists, White's

solution of making the content of the consensus rather slippery is hardly satisfactory.

White's examples from the popular culture also leave much to be desired. It is easy to imagine White as a superlative teacher of undergraduates, using examples from his students' own (televised) experiences. However, the relevance of his television illustrations to the case he is trying to build is, at best, questionable. For example, White argues (p. 120) that the characters in the comedy *M*A*S*H* have been changed in a more "respectable" direction, coinciding with the change in national mood. Such inept characters as Colonel Blake and Major Burns have been replaced by more respectable Colonel Potter and Major Winchester. Major Houlihan has undergone a transformation from "Hot Lips" to the more sympathetic "Margaret," and Klinger has abandoned his quest for a section-eight discharge. Aside from the accuracy of White's description (the series retained its virulently antiwar character, and ICORPS remained maddeningly bureaucratic throughout), the comedy is used to illustrate a societal change in a more Jeffersonian direction (away from centralized authority and toward more individual autonomy). A television series that, over time, presents a symbol of national authority, such as the army, in a more positive light would seem to prove the opposite of White's thesis and would suggest that the American political culture is moving in a more Hamiltonian direction.

The New Politics of Old Values is also a work that is more than a little short on scholarly sources. For example, in his chapter on possible party realignment, White wisely (if conventionally) focuses attention on two important groups: white Southerners and very young voters. However, White seems unaware that a great deal of excellent work has already been done on the partisan tendencies of these groups. An account of Southern realignment that does not include names familiar to readers of this journal, such as Philip Converse, Alexander Lamis, Bruce Campbell, and Harold Stanley, may strike some readers as less than thorough. Similarly, a description of major political change based on generational replacement should probably devote some attention to the work of Paul Abramson, Kristi Andersen, and Ronald Inglehart. An increased sensitivity to recent work in the area of partisan identification would have improved White's effort immeasurably.

As political scientists, we still do not know whether the Reagan Administration is a temporary testament to the personal popularity of Ronald Reagan or the beginning of a new era in American national politics. Similarly, we do not know whether a national consensus on fundamentals is the defining characteristic of the American political culture. Unfortunately, *The New Politics of Old Values* does not contribute significantly to our understanding of either question.

Ted G. Jelen, *Illinois Benedictine College*

The Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas: Reason, Justice, and Morality. By Stephen K. White. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Pp. 190.)

No one else writes more clearly about Habermas, and continental philosophy generally, than Stephen White. Nor is this merely an achievement of style. White uncovers the basic structure of an argument and is willing to transform the author's order of presentation in order to explain it. To read White on Habermas is an exercise in intellectual hygiene.

As the title suggests, White focuses on the relatively recent work of Habermas, works written since *Knowledge and Human Interests* appeared in English in 1971. As would be expected, White pays particular attention to *The Theory of Communicative Action*, which appeared in Germany in 1981. White's work thus makes a perfect complement to Thomas McCarthy's *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas*, which breaks off about 1976. It has been said that when Habermas was confused about what he himself had written he would call McCarthy, who would explain Habermas to Habermas. Now Habermas can call White, too. Indeed, the highest compliment I can pay White's book is that it belongs next to McCarthy's.

The attempts by Habermas, in his earlier works (through *Knowledge and Human Interests*), to construct a foundation for knowledge (his quasi-transcendental project, as Habermas once called it) now seem a little naïve. What remains of lasting value is Habermas' insight that moral development and scientific-technological development do not go hand in hand. One can make a similar distinction regarding Habermas' recent work. Habermas, as White points out, distinguishes the philosophical from the social-scientific tasks of contemporary critical theory. The philosophical task is to develop a theory of rationality that can support the claim of modernity to universality. Though Habermas and White use the concept loosely, the core of this claim seems to be that modern consciousness, which distinguishes between three forms of argumentation and value (empirical-theoretical, moral, and aesthetic), best enables humanity to learn.

The social-scientific task of critical theory, according to Habermas, is to reconstruct the critique of instrumental reason of the first generation of the Frankfurt School, particularly Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, so as to distinguish between the limits of instrumental reason and the limits of reason *per se*. Constructing the task in this way, as White points out, also allows Habermas to avoid an excessive reliance on an "objective teleology of history," to which historical materialism often succumbs. Habermas argues that the problem of modernity is not that all reason becomes an ideology concealing domination and the will to power but that the modern world often mistakes instrumental reason for reason. Habermas refers to this process as the "colonization of the lifeworld," when instruments of power and control, such as

money, begin to displace communicative rationality, upon which the life-world is built. White's book is useful in generally distinguishing the philosophical and social-scientific aspects of Habermas' program, encouraging—or at least allowing—the conclusion that, while the philosophical aspect is questionable (even with all the qualifiers, such as “minimal” or “nonfoundationalist” universalism), the social-scientific aspect may be quite useful.

White first explains Habermas' concepts of communicative action and communicative rationality, showing how these concepts support Habermas' communicative ethic and a concept of justice derived from this ethic. Perhaps the most useful part of the book comes next, in which White shows how Habermas' empirical analysis of modernity (i.e., the social-scientific aspect of his project) draws upon this communicative ethic, which is concerned with how modernity “must create its normativity out of itself,” as Habermas puts it (p. 91). Toward the conclusion of the book, White compares the approaches of Foucault and Habermas. In what will surely be one of the most interesting aspects of the book for many readers, White suggests that Foucault gives content to the criticism that Habermas' view of the subject remains excessively rational and abstract. At the same time, White shows how it is almost impossible for Foucault to transform this insight into any form of social or political practice.

White concludes this last section by suggesting that the approaches of Habermas and Foucault might build on each other. In making this suggestion, White echoes a troublesome tendency in Habermas' approach. Sometimes the drive to reconcile conflicting ideas, so that they may be integrated into Habermas' project, does not fully appreciate the “otherness” of these ideas, to use a term that has become fashionable lately. Another example would be the suggestion that Carol Gilligan's *In a Different Voice* represents not an alternative to a universalistic ethic of discourse but only an emphasis on the details of this discourse. Actually, I am not entirely sure if this is White's position as well or just Habermas'. In any case, here is a problem. Sometimes White lets Habermas get away with too much, particularly Habermas' tendency to subsume alien views as special cases of his own. However, White pays respectful attention to some highly critical secondary literature on Habermas.

White lets Habermas get away with too much in one other respect as well. White notes that Habermas' argument for universalism is unlikely to convince either relativists or contextualists, which is quite true. However, after reading White's explication of Habermas' arguments for universalism, one wonders whether the term, as Habermas employs it, even makes sense. To say that modernity represents the organization of consciousness in which knowledge is most effectively accumulated seems either trivially true (if it refers to knowledge as it is understood by moderns in the first place) or simply false (if, for example, knowledge is seen as the articulation of a revered tradition). Still, there is something attractive about Habermas' contradiction-filled defense of

modernity. Perhaps it is simply that Habermas generally appreciates these contradictions, while many postmoderns do not. In the end, this seems to be White's position as well.

The blurb on the inside cover of the book states that it will appeal to readers wanting an introduction to the complexity of Habermas' ideas as well as those already conversant with them. Actually, a reader unfamiliar with Habermas' work would find it tough going (though no tougher than reading Habermas himself). The book's greatest value is probably to those already familiar with Habermas' work who want to get a better sense of how the pieces of his project fit together. White conveys this better than anyone else around.

C. Fred Alford, *University of Maryland*

The Truly Disadvantaged. The Inner City, the Underclass, and the Public Policy By William Julius Wilson (Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1987 Pp 254. \$19.95.)

"Despite a high rate of poverty in inner-city areas during the first half of this century, rates of joblessness, out-of-wedlock births, single families, welfare dependency, and serious crime were significantly lower than they are today and did not begin to rise rapidly until after the mid-1960s, with extraordinary increases in the 1970s. The [book addresses] why social problems in the inner city sharply increased when they did and in the way they did, and why existing policy programs assumed to be relevant to such problems are either inappropriate or insufficient" (p. 140).

Wilson's book focuses on these problems as they have been increasingly experienced by the black "underclass" in the inner cities. He concludes that such problems have been caused largely by a history of white racism, flight of the black middle and working classes out of the inner cities, and macro-economic trends in the postindustrial period in particular. The solution lies, according to Wilson, in a comprehensive economic policy designed to apply universally to all Americans. Such programs as central economic planning, full employment, guaranteed family income, readily available day care, and so on would both help the underclass and sustain support among the nonpoor.

Despite the reservations indicated below, I found this to be an excellent book overall. It provides an impressive review of related literature and a solid synthesis of pertinent data. The author is courageous in his frank approach to such sensitive topics as black single families and the "culture of poverty." The book is insightful in much of its analysis and relatively bold in its policy proposals. In addition, it is clear and succinct (164 pages of actual text), with concepts summarized and integrated in chapter 6 and the entire argument effectively reviewed in chapter 7. In my view, it ranks with Michael Harrington's *New American Poverty* as an analysis of American poverty in general, and I may adopt it for use in urban and black politics courses.

In particular, I appreciated Wilson's realistic discussion of the inherent value biases in all social scientific research. I was impressed by his open, direct, and honest search for causes and solutions to ghetto problems, such as crime, single-parent families, out-of-wedlock births, and so on. His emphasis on the impact of black middle- and working-class flight was both interesting and insightful. But most valuable of all was his primary focus on the postindustrial economy. I strongly concur with him on the centrality of postindustrialism to an understanding of contemporary inner-city plight, and I have argued as much in my own *Political Power in the Postindustrial City*.

For all intents and purposes, *The Truly Disadvantaged* is an extension of Wilson's controversial *Declining Significance of Race* but this time focusing on the black urban underclass—an approach that adds clarity, relevance, and logical coherence to his basic argument. My reservations, however, have to do with what I see as his continued insistence on underplaying both existing white racism and the value of race-conscious policies, as well as his failure to go far enough in the kind of comprehensive changes he proposes.

As for the continuing significance of race, I would have thought someone from Chicago, especially after the rancorous and revealing 1983 mayoral election, would have had no trouble locating a deep reservoir of contemporary white racism. But, besides the overt manifestations, it is no accident that the underclass remains disproportionately black; I am not at all convinced that they might not have fallen even further of late had it not been for race-conscious policies forcing the hand of white employers in the secondary labor market and the hand of white bureaucrats in their provision of governmental services. Beyond that, it is also no secret that much of his vaunted black "middle-class" ascendancy can be traced to a combination of governmental employment and affirmative action pressures. And, until those gains can be solidified in the form of wealth accumulation, even this group remains extremely vulnerable to the type of political backlash that has marked the Reagan years and has led to a more than \$3000 decline in the earning power of the upper 60 percent of black families. Race and class remain intricately intertwined as independent variables here, although I would have no problem with him referring to the "increasing significance of class." In addition, he also needs to be more sensitive to the particular difficulties faced by black women—the juncture at which racism, class, and sexism converge. Lastly, he argues that there is simply no evidence of any significant "trickle down" from the black middle class to the black underclass. However, there is no evidence to the contrary either; unless he has reason to suspect the black middle class of being as racist as their white counterparts, it is hard to imagine that blacks in decision-making capacities have not been more open to hiring blacks and lending contracts to black firms. What we also do not know is how many middle- and working-class blacks would have fallen into the underclass group had it not been for more equitable treatment by those blacks elevated to

decision-making positions at least in part with the assistance of race-conscious remedies.

Nevertheless, in terms of policy, Wilson is absolutely correct in arguing for comprehensive socioeconomic changes in what he refers to as a "holistic approach" (p. 132). There is little doubt that a full employment program, a guaranteed family income, universally available day care, and the like would go far toward improving the life chances of the American underclass but also be more politically feasible because of the breadth of coverage. However, as I argue in my forthcoming *Black Politics in Conservative America*, more significant alterations in both political and economic structures will be necessary before even these potentially sizable political majorities can work their will in such a fashion.

Wilson mentions, but does not elaborate on, the need for "national bargaining structures," such as those found in the Scandinavian countries and elsewhere. These are needed in order to overcome the decentralization and fragmented power inherent in the existing American political system. He is correct, but it almost certainly will have to precede the policy changes desired. Without increasing the responsibilities of the national government, publicly financing all federal elections, opting for some form of parliamentary system to overcome many of the checks and balances willed to us by our antidemocratic founding fathers, for example, there will be little realistic way to pass and sustain his holistic alternatives.

Simultaneously, the economic system must be addressed. As long as the ownership of capital assets remains highly concentrated, and the owners of such capital are allowed the mobility facilitated by postindustrial technologies, those with that capital will hold a virtual veto over any significant redistributive change. They can simply refuse to invest their capital in the United States, driving the economy into turmoil and at the same time reinforcing the general perception that their interests and those of the working public are one and the same. Thus, a serious redistribution of capital ownership must be contemplated as well. Wilson's "centralized planning" would be a step toward democratizing the decision making over such capital, but such input is not going to be realistically "democratic" until all participants enter the process on relatively equal footings—meaning a far more equal distribution of wealth.

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Political Mythology and Popular Fiction. Edited by Ernest J. Yanarella and Lee Sigelman. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988. Pp. x, 200. \$37.95.)

This volume includes eight literary essays of high quality, all of which were written by political scientists. Each essay investigates a genre of popular American literature: western literature (John Moeller), children's literature

(Timothy E. Cook), sports fiction (Thomas C. Shevory), historical novels (Samuel M. Hines, Jr.), middle-class literature (Ethan Fishman), literature of the small town (Jean Bethke Elshtain), war novels (Cecil L. Eubanks), and pastoral science fiction (Ernest J. Yanarella). The authors and editors have also provided excellent bibliographies that will undoubtedly prove useful for those venturing into this research area.

Yanarella and Sigelman's introduction establishes a perspective from which to read the individual essays and in addition offers a general approach to the study of political themes in popular literature. The editors identify myth—"specifically, the mythical foundations of American politics and its supporting culture" (p. 2)—to be the "organizing concept" for the essays, and they see literary investigation in this context as relating the themes identified in each fiction genre to relevant national myths. The ultimate goal is to reveal the significance these myths have for contemporary American politics and political culture. Yanarella and Sigelman associate that significance with a functional view of literature: the themes and the plot formulas found in popular literature are related to the maintenance of prevailing societal interests as well as with the harmonization of conflicting interests and the incorporation of value changes into existing cultural patterns.

There are some reservations that I have about the essays and the editors' theoretical discussion. First, Yanarella and Sigelman's framework for viewing popular literature and its relationship to political understanding is limited to the extent that it depends upon a functional approach. While functional analysis provides a suspect framework for empirical explanation, when the investigations are nonempirical in orientation (as these claim to be), an emphasis upon a "maintenance function" (p. 8) for literature is all the more questionable. I doubt that a functional approach would plausibly increase the sort of understanding the editors and authors are after. The individual essays, however, do not on the whole depend upon an explicit functional analysis. In addition, the offerings differ in perspective sufficiently to give the alert and sympathetic reader a tantalizingly varied sampling of approaches to the role of literature in political study.

Second, a potential ambiguity in these studies concerns the nature of the subject matter. Words such as "quintessential" and "archetypal" appear fairly frequently, and, while such terms undoubtedly refer to plot formulas and typical fictional characters, my suspicion is that they may at times inadvertently substitute for empirical generalizations about the "real world" of politics. Thomas Shevory's exceptionally good treatment of the baseball pastoral represents the difficulties involved in making the complex link between literature and its context. For instance, while Shevory appropriately lauds Donald Hays' baseball novel, *The Dixie Association*, this novel's value does not reside—as Shevory appears to be saying—in any quasi-empirical claim about the place sport might contingently take in the political process but rather in the con-

ceptual uses to which sport may be put to suggest prospects and alternatives in American politics. A frequent theme in the novels Shevory discusses is "lost innocence." However, novels that Shevory does not treat deny the existence, whether past or present, of baseball's pastoral innocence (for instance, E. L. Doctorow's *Ragtime* includes a description of a not-so-innocent turn-of-the-century baseball game, and Harry Stein's *Hoopla* provides a fictional account of the prevalence of corruption in pre-1919 professional baseball). A novel may not so much reflect the mythical foundation of politics as provide a basis for the critical examination of a myth in terms of its conceptual status within the political culture.

A closely associated reservation is that the organizing theme of myth may contribute to overlooking a view of literature as an alternative source of truth within the study of politics. Some of the authors, however, explicitly recognize literature's potential for truth. For instance, Ethan Fishman, in his essay on middle-class literature, refers to "the study of literature to reveal essential political truths" (p. 105), and Jean Bethke Elshtain, in her discussion of the literature of the small town, claims that this literary genre offers truths that are partial and exaggerated, but truths nonetheless. In contrast to Samuel Hines' distinction between the novelist's concern for persons and the social scientist's focus upon processes and institutions (the social scientist also deals with persons—that is, aggregates of persons), a more appropriate emphasis for this type of truth is the particular as opposed to the general: the truths of literature are specific to the individuals and circumstances conceived in the fictional work. Eubanks's discussion of war novels offers an interesting balance between the propensity to generalize and the recognition that literary truths are particular. Such literary truths are not dependent upon empirical regularities but rather upon the complexity of context within the story as well as upon the bases for understanding found in the logical connections the story may have with the reader's own life.

Fourth, some of the authors face difficulties in their attempts to associate more explicitly a literary genre with political theory. Yanarella's discussion of pastoral science fiction proves to be especially interesting in this regard. Yanarella claims that this genre contributes to the coherent integration of the pastoral ideal with socialist politics: "The socialist pastoral finds its chief value in liberating the political imagination from the shopworn nostrums of both reform liberalism and reactionary liberal-capitalist thought" (p. 182). I am not sure, however, that Yanarella has persuasively separated the "pastoral garden" from the fascistic tendencies he identifies in ecologically oriented science fiction. What steps would the egalitarian garden itself be compelled to take in order to achieve its objectives? To put this question in Nozickian terms, would the egalitarian garden find it necessary to forbid capitalist acts among consenting adults? The varied responses that might be given to this troubling question depend upon the ability of literature not just to voice an

already accepted argument within political theory but also to present alternative considerations of which political theory has failed to take account.

Although I have introduced some cautionary notes, on the whole this edited work points in the right direction: literature is the basis for an essentially non-empirical inquiry within political science that offers a kind of truth distinct from the results of social scientific investigation. As Fishman rightly comments, political scientists have neglected this kind of truth "with unfortunate results" (p. 105). If this volume encourages additional thought about the place of literature (great as well as popular) in the study of politics, it will have made a valuable contribution to the discipline of political science.

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Articles **J**

1

Realpolitik and the Bases of Multistate System Endurance

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This paper focuses on policy and structural factors that preserve or undermine the pluralism of interstate systems. Using a large scale computer simulation model that incorporates many of the essential elements of the "automatic stabilization" version of the balance of power theory, we conduct a systematic exploration of alternative Realpolitik theses that purport to define the conditions and policies required to prevent the emergence of a hegemonic system. The exploration relies on ninety-six experimental runs of the model wherein five factors are varied. Analysis reveals that overoptimism in expectations about war's outcome plays the paradoxical role of maximizing the length of system endurance. The distribution of power within the system, error in decision processes and punitiveness on the part of victors in war are also found to have a conditioning role in the endurance of the system while no discernible effect is apparent in the case of the costliness of war. Analyses focusing on the processes underlying the evolution of the system also point out the importance of context-specific conditions in generating the deterrence situations Realists argue to be important within the workings of a balance of power system.

INTRODUCTION

What allows a collectivity composed of inherently competitive actors to endure as a pluralistic system? Can such a system resist transformation into a hegemonic entity given the predatory practices endemic to its denizens? In the field of international politics interest in this problem has frequently taken the form of a concern for national and international attributes which putatively preserve the sovereignty of the states within the system and prevent the rise of a universal imperium. The object of attention, then, is the constellation of

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conditions and policies that assure individual autonomy and sovereignty within multiactor systems. This paper begins a series of studies in which we will explore alternative Realpolitik theses that address this and related problems.

Historically, pluralistic state systems have had a difficult time sustaining themselves (Wesson, 1978, pp. 16–17). Indeed, both the pace at which they have been destroyed and the scope of successive eliminations purportedly have tended to increase over time (Taagepera, 1978a; Lewis, 1982). Some argue that this increased tempo and greater breadth follow from changes in technology and evolving capacity for organization. In turn, these transformations have led some to conclude that the complete unification of the global system is not far into the future (Carneiro, 1978; Naroll, 1967; Lewis, 1982).

A wide range of arguments touches on the sources of multistate system destruction. For example, Robert Carneiro (1978) sees war as a critical instrument of state creation and through its use a phenomenon similar to that found amongst biological systems, a process of "competitive exclusion," is set in train. The destruction of smaller political units and the consequent rise in hegemony and empire follow directly from this process. A somewhat similar sort of argument based on a physical analogue was advanced by Taagepera to account for the pattern of empire formation within isolated multistate systems. This phenomenon of "autokinetic growth" is one wherein the "substance or structure itself acts as a nucleus for the formation of further quantities of the same substance or structure" (1968, p. 174). Still yet another image is presented by Collins who sees primitive psychological factors at work in combination with military technologies and geopolitical opportunities. A "predatory pattern" forges the destruction of such systems and rests upon the actions of political leaders operating "more upon impulse than calculation" (Collins, 1978, p. 27).

This concern is for a phenomenon similar to what Schumpeter (1976), in writing on the dynamics of markets, has described as the principle of "creative destruction." It falls into a shared focus of research that includes "organizational ecology" (cf. Kaufman, 1975; Carroll, 1983, 1984; Hannan and Freeman, 1977) and economic "evolutionary theory" (Nelson and Winter, 1982). In addition, it has been one of the central concerns of those who have written on the conduct of foreign policy and the dynamics of international politics. Indeed, Martin Wight (1977, pp. 22, 40) described this as one of the insistent questions regarding states systems that need to be addressed. Wight's (1977, p. 43) analysis led to the conclusion that "(m)ost states systems have ended in a universal empire which has swallowed all the states of the system. It has been particularly clear in the case of the primary states-systems, those that are the political expressions of a single culture." In Wight's view, this raises an important set of questions for history and political science: "Is there any states-system which has not led fairly directly to the establishment of a world empire? Does the evidence rather suggest that we should expect a states-

system to culminate in this way? If so, what can be said about the causal connections? It might be argued that every states-system can only maintain its existence on the principle of the balance of power, that the balance of power is inherently unstable, and that sooner or later its tensions and conflicts will be resolved into a monopoly of power" (Wight, 1977, p. 44).

The disciplines of history and political science have been attentive to the problem and the general approach that has marked efforts in both. Realpolitik, can certainly be said to have been a fecund source of arguments with respect to the putative bases of system endurance. For example, in history, Dehio (1962), in examining the sweep of modern European history, has advanced a set of arguments regarding the dynamics of a multistate system and the geopolitical conditions required for the regulation of its stability. Gulick's (1955) study of the historical roots of diplomatic maneuvering at the end of the Napoleonic era describes a set of stylized customs and rules that statesman had evolved and implemented in efforts that had the effect of fostering the maintenance of pluralism. Sorel's (1885/1971) late nineteenth century work on the *ancien régime* also detailed a set of principles and practices rooted in Realpolitik logics that regulated the interactions of the European major powers and were thought to help constrain inherent pressures for hegemony. Focusing on a more remote period, Walker (1953) has sought to reconstruct the power-based logics that guided action in the ancient multistate system of China.

Within political science numerous efforts at grappling with this problem mark the landscape. Early examples include Wright (1965, pp. 743–66, 1389–91), who in his major opus on war sought to elucidate the assumptions upon which a balance of power system rests and to identify the conditions that affect its stability, and Morgenthau (later joined by Thompson, 1985), who perhaps made the most salient contribution to the intellectual foundations of the modern conception of Realpolitik. These provided the basis for later efforts at formalizing the essential elements of such a system and analyzing its potential for stability and endurance. One of the earlier efforts in this tradition is Kaplan's (1957) formulation of the rules that characterize a balance of power regime that preserves pluralism and the conditions which foster the abandonment of these rules. Kaplan's study, in turn, helped spark a number of further efforts at clarifying the logical foundations of Realpolitik. Riker (1962, pp. 159–74), for example, using game theory refuted Kaplan's argument by demonstrating that in both the particular case of Kaplan's rules, stability cannot be guaranteed, because the rules themselves are inconsistent, and that in the more general case, an n -person zero-sum game, stability is basically impossible. Chatterjee's (1971) analysis has led him to conclude that stability under conditions of either certainty or uncertainty within a balance of power system is not a very likely outcome. Wagner (1986) has examined a variety of claims regarding the prerequisites of stability in a balance of power system using

game theoretic techniques and has helped clarify the logical soundness of claims regarding the necessary number of essential actors in such a system—a highly contested issue in the literature (cf. Kaplan, Burns, and Quandt, 1960; Deutsch and Singer, 1964; Waltz, 1964; Ostrom and Aldrich, 1978; Zinnes, Gillespie, and Tahim, 1978). Other work in this tradition includes some notable attempts at examining (1) the logical properties of alternative specifications of the theory's assumptions (Simowitz, 1983) and (2) the effects of decision makers anticipating the future implications of choices within a balance of power context (Niou and Ordeshook, 1986, 1987).

In the next section we briefly examine some of the major theoretical constructs found in the Realist approach that purport to describe the basic workings of the international political system and highlight some of the major factors argued to be important in determining these workings. Following that, the third section details the structure of one of these constructs as embodied in a formalization represented in a computer simulation model. The fourth section provides an analysis employing the model to address some of the contending opinions within this approach. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of potential for further work in this area.

REALPOLITIK AND THE AUTOMATIC STABILIZATION MODEL

Three Images of Stabilization

Our endeavor builds upon the effort of numerous scholars of international politics and directly follows from the attempt by Bremer and Mihalka (1977) to synthesize and formalize some of this work. Bremer and Mihalka constructed a model of a multistate system wherein states, depicted as using a limited set of stylized decision rules, could engage in power accumulation, intimidation, coalition formation, war, exploitation, and destruction of other states. The stated objective was to determine the logical consequences of the Realpolitik rules with which they had endowed the state actors in this system.

Drawing upon the synthesis of power politics thought developed by INIS Claude (1962), three major alternative theses can be said to describe the behavior required to maintain a multistate system. The alternatives included the "manually operated" form, the "semi-automatic" case, and the "automatic stabilization" model. These three alternatives can be arrayed along a dimension of decreasing consciousness or intentionality with respect to the objective of system preservation. Bremer and Mihalka (1977, p. 306) saw their accomplishment as having "completed the construction and preliminary testing of a working version of the automatic stabilization model."

Each of Claude's three models represents the essential elements of the ideas associated with different groups of Realist writers. The models themselves are concerned with how systems of states operate and how they are sus-

tained. All are founded on the premise that war and destruction are integral elements of social life since the latter is rooted in power. Where they differ is in the mechanisms they assume to be at work in managing power.

All three images of the "balance of power" system portray international relations in the form of a laissez-faire arrangement (Claude, 1962, p. 9). They share certain assumptions in seeing such relations as a tightly bound network or system, in viewing power as central to the operation of the system, and in positing the importance of "counterbalancing" power with power as the primary mechanism for maintaining the independence of states and frustrating attempts at hegemony (Claude, 1962, pp. 42-52).

The three treat such an equilibrium as possible. In the case of the "automatic" version, the equilibrating process works as if Adam Smith's "invisible hand" were directing the tides of international politics. No conscious intervention on the part of particular states or decision makers is assumed to operate. This "natural law" version of international politics envisions system preservation as deriving from the "self-neutralizing tendency of power; thrust engenders counter-thrust, power drives cancel each other" (Claude, 1962, p. 47).¹

¹ This is one of the dominant interpretations of the Realpolitik logics and the workings of the balance of power. Witness, for example, the discussion of Arnold Wolfers (1962, p. 123).

While it makes little sense to use the term 'automatic' literally, as if human choices and errors were irrelevant to the establishment, preservation, or destruction of a state of equilibrium, there nevertheless is significant element of truth in the theory of 'automatism' which is valid even today. If one may assume that any government in its senses will be deeply concerned with the relative power position of hostile countries, then one may conclude that efforts to keep in step in the competition for power with such opponents, or even to outdo them, will almost certainly be forthcoming. If most nations react in this way, a tendency towards equilibrium will follow, it will come into play whether both sides aim at equilibrium or whether the more aggressive side strives for superiority. In the latter case, the opposite side is likely to be provoked into matching these aggressive moves. Forces appear therefore to be working 'behind the backs' of the human actors, pushing them in the direction of balanced power irrespective of their preferences.

Another graphic portrayal has been provided by Morse (1976, p. 39) who sees the idea rooted in a system of economic thought that preceded Smith's:

When the balance of power was invoked as an automatic mechanism for creating equilibrium in international society, it was thought to be a natural law that governed the relationships among states. It was mechanistic, thought to be a means of providing automatic self-adjustment to disorders in international politics and for preventing mankind from slipping into an anarchic Augustinian universe. It implied equilibrium among the states in the international system. Briefly, according to this law, whenever a center of power existed in international affairs, one or more additional power centers would arise to preserve equilibrium. This natural law was based upon many of the assumptions of mercantilism, but especially the assumption that each state in existence was eternally trying to maximize the power at its disposal. As a result of the mutual attempt of each state to maximize its power,

In the "semi-automatic" version, a special role is attributed to one or more states which consciously take on the responsibility of the "balancer." This regulator of the system is no "ordinary" state, but one likely to be very powerful (Claude, 1962, p. 48). At the same time it attempts to maintain the existing configuration of the system because of the rewards that the status quo provides. System-stability, then, is no *deus ex machina* but rather the product of deft and subtle manipulations on the part of a small and select, more properly, self-selected, set of states.²

In the "manually operated" version the conscious effort at seeking "equilibrium" is identified as the central principle. All statesmen are assumed to recognize the need to counter the ambitions of others. This appreciation leads to actions that help achieve a balance and in turn preserve the multiplicity of states within the system (Claude, 1962, p. 50). In this vision apparently every statesman is favored with the gifts of a Bismarck or Metternich.³

For many Realism is the key to successful policy and by extension the foundation of multistate system stability. In the case of the latter, there is, as Claude describes, a "widespread tendency to make the balance of power the symbol of realism" (1962, p. 39). In effect, the equation that captures the dynamics of state interaction guided by Realism is the balance of power. For many the equation is a closed system which takes the form of the automatic stabilization model—though some see the need to introduce nonmechanistic elements into the equation (be it a "balancer" or "hegemon" in the semi-automatic version, or the intrepid, insightful, and dexterous statesmen of the manually operated system). But even amongst Realists who subscribe to the automatic stabilization model, there is no unanimously accepted description of the equation: the terms to be included and the nature of the influence that these terms work.

there was a tendency for the whole system to remain in equilibrium, preventing thereby the predominance of any single state. This equilibrium assured stability in the international system and preserved the security and autonomy of each state.

² The use of this imagery in describing the workings of Realpolitik is widespread. A central example of this tradition is to be seen in Culick's intriguing description of the assumptions, aims and means of the European balance of power system wherein the "consciously adopted policy of 'holding the balance'" is argued to have been frequently practiced by various states (1955 pp. 65–67). An interesting parallel might be drawn between this imagery of the balance of power system and the now somewhat fashionable theory of "hegemonic stability" (cf. Gilpin, 1981).


³ Walker's (1983, p. 100) characterization of the ancient Chinese multistate system seems to rely on an imagery of the manually operated system. "Thus, major policies were security policies. Security and power were the concerns of the day. Such actions as rounding out frontiers, joining leagues, transferring alliances, treaty arrangements, fomenting civil war elsewhere can all be interpreted in terms of the quest for security. Each of the great powers suspected the other great powers of ambition to rule all of their world, and this was prevented during Ch'un-ch'iu times only by a strategy of balance of power which accounts for the many diplomatic revolutions of the time."

Some Realpolitik Theses: Five Possible Bases of System Endurance

In this section we briefly cover some of the discussions extant in the Realpolitik literature that deal directly or indirectly with the question of multistate system endurance. It should be noted that this is not an exhaustive review of this problem area. This incompleteness refers both to the broad set of theses that have emerged in this rich tradition and, as well, to the questions that can be explored with the computer simulation model that will be described within the next section.

As a starting point for this discussion, it is worthwhile noting that the implicit structure of the arguments treated here and to be explored later with the simulation model takes the form described in figure 1. There are two basic tracks along which the putative determinants are assumed to work their effect. On one track, the damaging character of war itself is heightened or lowered. Such an influence is represented as acting to effect the losses suffered by members of the system. This works on the strength of the system's components and thus influences its size. Along the second track, the likelihood of war is affected and in so doing the frequency of war altered. This, again, adds

FIGURE 1
MAJOR LINKAGES EXPLORED WITH MODEL



to the cumulative destruction experienced and affects the survival chances of the states, thus ultimately determining the size of the system. Five general areas are the focus of attention. These deal with such conditions and policies as the distribution of power within the system, the degree of restraint attributed to decision makers, the accuracy with which decision makers assess capabilities, the destructiveness of war, and the role of chance in determining the outcome of wars (the "power illusion"). In the paragraphs that follow we deal with each of these.

Distribution of Power. Many consider the distribution of power in a multistate system to be a significant determinant of its relative tranquility and/or sustainability. Blainey (1973, p. 110-111), for example, discusses the common view that a world of many as opposed to a few powerful states will be more peaceful because aggression on the part of any one has a greater likelihood of provoking sufficient countervailing effort on the part of others. This and related ideas reflect a typical belief "in the virtues of free competition within an economic system." It rests upon the notion that many competitors of comparable strength, each dedicated to self-interest will, as in the economist's reverie, prevent anyone of their fellows from acquiring preponderance and the ability to destroy and acquire the assets of others. This primitive characterization of the marketplace sees the efficacy of factors that lend themselves to competition as assuring mutual survival, not efficiency nor some other social good. As Blainey (1973, p. 111) points out, this perspective on international affairs became the conventional view just at the time Smith was refining an analogous doctrine in the economic sphere. Today, echoes of this can be seen in statements by some American statesmen. Thus Kissinger (1979, p. 55) warns: "(i)f history teaches anything it is that there can be no peace without equilibrium and no justice without restraint." Nixon and Kissinger argue that "(p)ease requires strength. So long as there are those who would threaten our vital interest and those of our allies with military force, we must be strong" (quoted from the first Nixon-Kissinger "State of the World Message" in Singer and Small, 1974, p. 284).

Power and its distribution influence the way in which the system functions. Despite of the compelling quality of arguments based on analogies with physical phenomena, it is not clear whether an egalitarian distribution is more or less conducive to stability.⁴ Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972), for example, identify two opposing hypotheses regarding this linkage. One holds equality

⁴ Quincy Wright (1965, p. 755) argued that, "(s)tability will increase as the parity in the power of states increase . . . Even with a large number of states acting independently, comparative equality would tend to augment the capacity of each to defend itself and so to increase stability." For Wright (1965, p. 755fn), the plausibility of this appears to rely on the fact that it "resembles the second law of thermodynamics, which asserts that entropy tends to a maximum, i.e., that the tendency of a system toward stability is promoted by a uniform distribution of its energy."

to favor peacefulness and system maintenance while the other argues just the opposite. Both hypotheses treat "uncertainty" as the critical link and, of course, view it as having contradictory consequences. The importance of power-based uncertainty in preserving system stability is probably most conspicuous in Deutsch and Singer's (1964) discussion. Here systems with a large as opposed to a small number of significant powers are represented as replete with uncertainty and thus more stable—at least in the short- and medium-run. In the long run, however, the image is quite different (Deutsch and Singer, 1964, pp. 323–24). A multipolar system, in their view, is prone to long-run instability. One basic reason for this is the "zero-sum" character of relations in such a system where all are acquisitive but none endeavor to create new rivals. The uncertainty in such a system, even when minimal, will, with the frequent opportunities provided with the passage of time, provoke erroneous decisions and thus destroy states within the system while doing nothing to replace those that are eliminated. The Deutsch-Singer model then predicts a decreasing number of "effective contenders." This condition eventually brings about the rise of a bipolar world or a single imperium.

Restraint. Regardless of how it may be distributed, power, as the brief quote from Kissinger reminds us, must be controlled and directed; there must be a measure of restraint. Thus, the character and extent of its application are also of importance to the Realist. In the view of Thucydides, for example, Athenian hubris was a stimulative factor in generating opposition to itself in the Greek city-state system—and in turn contributed to the destruction of that system. And although arrogance was obviously not an intrinsic component of power politics, there was the recognition that the strong would do what they could while the weak would do what they must. The value of restraint, then, has been at the core of Realist concerns. And while for some the exhortation "*Carthago esse delendam*" seemed only prudent, others who have lived in crowded and dangerous environments have sensed some ambiguity in the situation: "From this arises the following question, whether it is better to be loved than feared, or the reverse. The answer is that one would like to be both the one and other; but because it is difficult to combine them, it is far better to be feared than loved if you cannot be both." (Machiavelli, p. 96). Alternatively, though, some have subscribed to Benjamin Franklin's principle that "(e)verything one has a right to do is not best to be done" (Tuchman, 1964, p. 150).

For many modern analysts, Franklin's injunction is evocative of the sort of restraint that must be widespread within a multistate system for international stability to reign. This is a leading argument of one international systems theorist (Rosecrance, 1963, p. 281) and also is at the core of Kissinger's (1957) views on international stability. In Kaplan's (1957, p. 23) formulation of the rules governing behavior within a balance of power system, one third are

given over to the importance of practicing restraint Riker's (1962, p. 174-5) critique of Kaplan's model also emphasizes the necessity of the practice of restraint (either moral or institutional) as the critical basis for the survival of a balance of power system. Gulick (1955, p. 76) accords this a central role attempting to reconstruct the logic that guides statesmen in a balance of power system "The importance of moderation as far as balance of power is concerned lies in the necessity of preserving the significant counterweights in the system of equilibrium. Moderation is probably necessary to successful equilibrium in diplomacy, and its absence may mean failure to establish a workable balance."

More generally it has been argued that international norms, in effect, the cultural climate of the international system, affect the behavior of states (Singer, 1971) and thereby contribute to the system's war-proneness and the structural transformations that might ensue. There is some evidence to the effect that the extent to which members of the international system view treaties as binding, and thus restraints on their behavior, has had a depressive impact on the magnitude, severity, and intensity of international war (Kegley and Raymond, 1982). More germane to the immediate question of the practice of restraint within war is the conclusion of Kecsmeti (1958) that a demonstrative lack of restraint on the part of a warring state can have untoward consequences in terms of the costs endured by both sides.

Accuracy Although restraint and the distribution of power are debated in terms of their importance and their contribution to the preservation of the system and its component parts, few have gainsaid the importance of accuracy in assessments of opponents' capabilities and intentions—and for that matter one's own.⁵ Indeed, a typical part of the self-promoting specification of the wherewithal needed to be a statesman is something on the order of the following. "Statesmanship requires above all a sense of nuance and proportion, the ability to perceive the essential among the mass of apparent facts, and a intuition as to which of many equally plausible hypotheses about the future is likely to prove true" (Kissinger, 1979, p. 39).

While obviously an attractive ideal, there are those who suggest that the frequency with which it occurs is vastly overstated: "political scientists . . . in discussing the nature of power, always treat it, even when negatively, with immense respect. They fail to see it as sometimes a matter of ordinary men walking into water over their heads, acting unwisely or foolishly or perversely as people in ordinary circumstances frequently do. The trappings and impact of power deceive us, endowing the possessors with a quality larger than life" (Tuchman, 1984, p. 23). Indeed, Levy (1983) puts forward the argument that models which assume accurate perceptions of "external threats and opportunities" are contradicted by a good deal of evidence. In turn, he suggests that

⁵ Walker (1983, p. 100) notes that the process of balancing was integral to the policies of the Chinese states in their dealings with each other and that "(s)uch a balancing process placed a premium on the ability to determine which was the major threat power."

misperception," in a variety of forms, is an integral part of the process that generates war. Many of these forms of misperception relate to failures in properly estimating capabilities and intentions. This hypothesis accords with the significant role that Blainey (1973, p. 108-24) attributes to decision makers' perceptions relative to actual conditions. War and actor elimination, then, may be "the outcome of a diplomatic crisis which cannot be solved because both sides have conflicting estimates of their bargaining power" (Blainey, 1973, p. 114).

In addition to arguing for the acceptance of misperception as an important element in war and the dynamics of the international system, one could suggest that its role is actually one of dashing bellicosity and thus helping to preserve the system of states. Claude (1986), for example, suggests that our understanding is blocked by certain widely shared myths about the state among which he includes the "myth of the monolithic government." A more accurate view is one which portrays government as a bumbling unwieldy system replete with varied and contradictory assessments of its international environment. It follows that the surprising absence of action, the relative infrequency of war, and the preservation, indeed the flourishing of the interstate system, can become more comprehensible.⁶

Destructiveness The destructiveness of war, principally determined by the character of military technology and the extent to which offense is favored over defense, is frequently argued to be a factor in the endurance of a multistate system. Howard's (1976) position is that increasingly destructive technologies have helped foster "total" conflicts. These, of course, sap the vitality of many states within the system and provide the opportunity for hegemonic domination. Ivan Bloch concluded that such a trend in military technology had, by the beginning of the twentieth century, made war unthinkable since there could be no victor (Blainey, 1973, p. 209-25). And while the "offensive/defensive balance" has proven to be a somewhat slippery concept (Levy, 1984), there is still widespread sentiment that the destructiveness that derives from this factor plays an important role in international affairs. Thus, Wright (1965, pp. 324-28) notes a tendency for the character of war to pass through cycles with the earlier phases characterized by agility and an offensive quality that tends to minimize the costs of war. Later phases see greater resources being applied in ways that perfect earlier tactics and strategies and eventuate in "deadlock and the war of attrition." He notes that this has affected the sustainability of multistate systems and has often led to the development of hegemony. Sharing the view that weapons technology and destructiveness plays

⁶ With regard to system stability this view accords with Kaplan's discussion of a balance of power system wherein actors sharing common rules of behavior, even rules encouraging efforts at increasing capabilities, could be sustained. Here, for example, the European balance of power system is cited as a case where "even clumsiness or stupidity on the part of several actors was not disastrous" (1957, p. 62).

a central role in shaping political developments is Quigley (1983, pp. 40–59) who argues that one can detect through the long sweep of history sympathetic rhythms in destructiveness entailed by the application of military force and the size and intensity of political organization.

Power Illusion The Realist's state is a predatory creature, and confrontation with environments that are more or less beneficent vis-à-vis the assumptions that accord or are in dissonance with its decision-making processes should affect both its success and consequently the functioning of the system within which it is embedded. The importance of this is reflected in the effects of power disparities on war outcomes. Virtually every description of the workings of the balance of power system highlights the importance of amassing greater power than the potential opposition. Implicit here is the assumption that marginal preponderance is sufficient to achieve one's aims in diplomacy and war. Aggressors with power superior to their victims will fight with the expectation of winning. Those that seek to deter an aggressor will do so by achieving a similar favorable imbalance. The Realist's state acts, then, on an image of war fighting and success that is dualistic: more wins, less losses.

But the modern analysis of the effects of the relative power on success in war suggests that the "production function" is not one which invariably places "God on the side of the larger battalions," but more oft than not casts the martial deity in the role of a craps player where the dice are loaded to some extent by the workings of mortal statesmen (cf. Rosen, 1972; Mack, 1975; Cannizzo 1980; Ray and Vural, 1985). And this too can be detected in some of the classical writings we traditionally associate with Realism. For example, we see it surfacing in Machiavelli's musings on "(h)ow far human affairs are governed by fortune . . ." when he suggests that chance or "fortune is the arbiter of half the things we do, leaving the other half or so to be controlled by ourselves . . ." and confront it again in the great emphasis given to the distortions that chance works on the effects on relative power in war found in the writings of Clausewitz (1832/1976).

Does a process which determines war outcomes that is more closely in accordance with the "military bean counting" philosophy of some balance of power and deterrence Realists have the effect of disrupting hegemonic drives (the phenomenon of "bandwagon empires") and thus retard the destruction of the multistate system? Or is it the case that a deeper entrapment in the power illusion noted by other Realists is more likely to work this effect?

A FORMALIZATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STABILIZATION MODEL

To examine the general question of system endurance within a balance of power system and to explore the importance of a variety of factors that have

been stressed within Realpolitik thought, we employ a large scale computer simulation model that is a reconstructed version of a model originally developed by Bremer and Mihalka (1977).⁷ As noted above, this model is a formalization of the "automatic stabilization" image of a multistate system. In brief, the model represents a multistate system with what are considered to be three essential characteristics. The first characteristic refers to the size of the system, i.e., the number of sovereign states. In the simulation model as many as 98 states can be represented, though systems of smaller size can also easily be portrayed. The second essential feature of such a system is the geopolitical character of its units. In this instance each state unit is provided with a distinct territorial domain located in an ordered geographical space. In addition, each unit possesses some amount of a resource, military power, that is vital to its survival and is subject to growth and destruction. The third and final characteristic relates to the capacity of each of these state units to observe their environments, assess the present situation, engage in decision making, and implement their decisions.


The system of states in terms of its physical characteristics has the form of that shown in figure 2. In addition to spatial characteristics, the model effectively incorporates a portrayal of time whereby actions take place within an

The Bremer and Mihalka computer simulation model has been described and limited analysis reported upon in a 1977 paper. The results it provided were fascinating and certainly justified their analysis and development. Indeed, the builders described what they saw as their agenda for future research—work which would be directed along four major avenues: 1. extensive experimentation with the model in its initial form (pp. 334–35); 2. search for and introduction of empirically based values for model parameters (p. 335); 3. development and evaluation of alternative theoretical structures for processes represented in the model (pp. 335–36); 4. extension and expansion of the model structure in order to include processes and behavior not contained within the original model (p. 336).

Unfortunately, none of these avenues were traveled. Work was apparently discontinued after publication of the only paper describing the model. In addition, the computer program embodying the model was lost. Ironically, an effort to reproduce and extend (this included a portrayal of internal disintegration of states as well as a different representation of the spatial aspects of the system) the model by two students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ended in a similar fashion: an initial report on the model was prepared and then the program code was lost (Mefford, 1978; Smith, 1979).

Until recently, apparently no other efforts were made to continue exploring or extending this model. However, there are now at least two efforts underway to revive and build upon the work of Bremer and Mihalka. A recent paper by Richard Stoll (1985) at Rice University reports on his efforts at reconstructing the model and also includes a discussion of an experimental study that deals with the geopolitical attributes that enhance a state's survival chances. Stoll also presented their analysis in a later publication (1987). Ours is the other effort, and recently we have joined with Stoll in further developing the model in an effort to address a broader range of questions (e.g., Cusack and Stoll, 1988). Both the Houston and Berlin versions have now been implemented on personal computers. The Houston version is written in the C computer language; the original Berlin version, whence the results presented in this paper derive, was written in BASIC and implemented on a main-frame machine. A newer p-c based version, implementing a variety of extensions to the original model, has been written in MODULA-2.

FIGURE 2
CONFIGURATION OF 98 STATES SYSTEM



iteration of the model and the consequences of these actions help to define and shape the circumstances that confront the state actors in the succeeding iteration. Within each iteration there are four major phases of activity. Three of these four deal with processes directly associated with war. The first phase determines whether a dispute will occur amongst some system members. In the second phase, the processes of dispute escalation and de-escalation are portrayed. In other words, during this phase decisions are taken by various state actors which determine whether a war occurs and which states will be involved. The third phase deals with the direct consequences of war in terms of assessing costs and transferring gains. In the fourth and last phase the power capabilities of the states in the system are updated.

Phase 1: Selection of a Potential Dispute Initiator

The objective of this phase is to identify from among the existing states that one which during the present iteration has the opportunity to choose a target for aggression. The selection procedure here relies on a uniform random number generator and sets each state's (i) probability of selection as the potential initiator ($pINIT$) equal to its relative share of the power capabilities (POW) in the system:

$$pINIT_i = \frac{POW_i}{\sum_{i=1}^n POW_i}$$

This relationship between initiation and a state's relative power is consistent with empirical evidence that the higher a nation's rank, the greater the likelihood of its involvement in, and, indeed, initiation of serious disputes and wars (Bremer, 1980; Eberwein, 1982).

Phase 2. Dispute Onset and Escalation

Four stages are included within this phase which is meant to represent a stylized version of interstate militarized disputes. In the first stage, the potential initiator decides whether to initiate a conflict and if it so chooses, selects a neighboring state for the target of its aggression. In the second stage, the target is provided with the opportunity to build a coalition to counter the threat from the initiator. In the third stage, the initiator is allowed to develop a counter-coalition to that of the target, to defer from such an alliance building effort and continue in its threatening mode, or simply terminate the dispute. The fourth stage (2d) is contingent upon the initiator pressing forward and allows the target the opportunity to widen its coalition. War occurs only if the first three stages are traversed, i.e., only when the initiator has twice chosen the war option. The target is seen as limited only to actions which enhance its capacity to counter the threatening power of the initiator (and, where such exists, the initiator coalition's power). The target cannot, for example, "buy off" its opponent through some concession. Let us look at each of these stages in more detail.

2a—Potential Initiator's Preliminary Actions. The initiator state, *i*, compares its power capabilities with each of its neighbors. These power assessments and comparisons are based on "estimates" subject to "error."

$$POW_i = POW_j * (1.0 + ERROR_j)$$

The error term is a normally distributed proportional term with specific values determined stochastically. The initiator takes no action (activity in this situation moves to the fourth and last phase, Power Adjustment) if no neighbor is estimated as weaker than itself. If there exist neighbors perceived as weaker, the one assumed to be the weakest is selected as the target.³ In effect, even "objectively" weaker states may attack due to error.

³ Implicitly built into the model is an assumption that the size of a state—in a spatial sense—is positively correlated with war proneness. Generally, states with larger numbers of territorial units are more likely to be selected as potential initiators because the possession of such units, other things held constant, is positively related to the amount of power held by the state. The size of the state—in terms of its territorial holdings—is also positively related to the number of inter-state borders (neighbors), hence the likelihood of a potential initiator finding a "suitable" target for its aggression. This assumption accords with empirical evidence on geographical opportunity and war proneness (Richardson, 1980; Wexley, 1982).

2 b—Target's Initial Response and Associated Activities The target compares its own power with the estimated power of its assailant. If the comparison favors the target in that it perceives itself as having more power than the initiator, it takes no further action (model moves to 2.c). An unfavorable comparison leads the target to attempt the construction of a "defensive coalition." The target will consider only "minimum winning" coalitions of contiguous states.⁹ Involved here are three considerations:

- 1 All possible coalitions of states contiguous to opponent are assayed;
2. The combined power of each such potential coalition is estimated;
3. Alliance membership bids are directed toward those states in the group which is contiguous to the opponent and which has more combined power and yet is the least powerful of all such proto-coalitions

If no such coalition exists, the target state takes no action (model moves to 2 c)

The potential allies, i.e., those states contiguous to the opponent which have received alliance bids, make their decisions independently.¹⁰ In other words, the decision is made without regard to the choice of other potential allies. This decision is based on the potential ally's own assessment of the estimated power of the proto-coalition in comparison with its estimate of the power of the opponent.¹¹ Where the proto-coalition is perceived as stronger,

⁹ The "minimum winning" criteria derives from Riker's (1962) theory of coalition behavior. While this principle has found significant support in the analysis of coalition behavior within national political systems, very little systematic research has gone into analyzing its applicability to international alliances. Siverson and McCarty (1978) suggest that coalitions, particularly within war-like contexts, are more likely to be greater than "minimum winning" given the implementation costs associated with waging war.

¹⁰ From one perspective this assumption of independent decision processes may appear unwarranted in light of some empirical findings. For example, Yamamoto and Bremer (1990) have demonstrated that the expansion of major power wars can best be predicted by a model that assumes decisional interdependence. A similar result also holds for the more relevant conflict phenomena, serious international disputes. In examining data on 634 such disputes for the 20th century, Bremer and Cusack (1993) were able to demonstrate that a stochastic process model based on the assumption of dependent decision making is far more accurate in predicting the widening of a dispute than is a model based on independent decision making. Alternatively, given, as described below, that the simulation model incorporates a number of opportunities for the widening of membership in a dispute—where decisions at each opportunity are based on what has preceded—the model can be said to effectively incorporate an element of dependent decision making.

¹¹ A more elaborate model of alliance bid acceptance/rejection has been developed and tested by Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979). Within the logic of their basic model not only does the assessment of power on the opposing sides play an important role, as here, but additionally states are argued to also act upon consideration of (1) the degree to which they share common international goals (as reflected in their alliance ties) and (2) the amount of "uncertainty" within the system.

the potential ally joins; where it is seen as weaker, the bid is rebuffed and the state stays outside the coalition

2.c—Initiator's Rejoinder to Coalition Building on the Part of Target and Associated Activities. Depending upon the target's success in building a coalition, the initiator acts in the following way.

- a If the target is unsuccessful in acquiring allies, the initiator opts immediately for war.
- b Where the target has constructed an alliance, the initiator first compares its estimated power with that estimated as under control of the target's coalition. If the initiator sees itself as stronger, it opts for war; otherwise it engages in the process of attempting to build its own coalition

The initiator seeks a coalition based upon the contiguous minimum winning criteria, i.e., the members must be contiguous to the principal opponent of the coalition builder, the assumed power of the coalition is greater than the assumed power of the opponent's coalition, and the assumed power of the coalition is the minimum assumed power of those coalitions that satisfy the first two criteria. If such a coalition is needed and does not exist, the initiator withdraws from the conflict and the dispute is ended. If such a proto-coalition exists, the initiator extends alliance membership bids to the potential members. A state's decision to join or refrain from joining such a coalition is again contingent upon its estimate of the potential success of that coalition. The latter hinges upon the estimated relative power of the two sides. It independently makes the decision to join if the estimated power of the proposed coalition is greater than that of the opponent's. It will independently decide not to join if it estimates the proto-coalition as weaker.

If all states invited to join the coalition of the initiator accept the bids, the initiator opts for war, however, if one or more such invitations are refused, the initiator is in a position of perceived weakness vis-à-vis the target and it opts for a termination of the dispute.

2.d—Target's Second Round of Coalition Building and Associated Activities. If the initiator has opted for war in 2.c, the target compares its assumed power, or the assumed power of its alliance when such has been constructed in 2.b, against that of the initiator's side. If the target sees its side as more powerful, it refrains from attempting to acquire more allies. Conversely, if it sees its side as weaker, it attempts to expand the size of its coalition. Additional members are selected on the bases described in 2.b. States invited to join the expanded alliance act in the same independent way described in 2.b and 2.c. Their actions conclude this phase of the iteration. The next phase of activity deals with the warring process and outcome.

Phase 3—War: Determining the Victor and Distributing the Benefits and Costs

As with the second phase, there are four stages to this phase. The first determines the victorious side in the war. In the succeeding stages, the consequences of the war, in terms of costs and benefits, are sorted out. Stage two deals with the determination of war costs confronted by all participants. The succeeding stage focuses on the assessment of indemnities and the fourth and final stage is given over to the processes involved in transferring territorial units.

3.a—War's Victor. Three general principles are incorporated in the determination of the war's outcome. First, the model represents war as producing a determinant outcome. That is, every war has a victorious and a vanquished side. No immediately inconclusive result is represented as possible. Second, all wars end in the period or iteration in which they began. Third, the identity of the victor and vanquished is stochastically related to the relative capabilities of the two sides. The likelihood of victory for the initiator is expressed as a complex function of the ratio of the initiator coalition's capabilities relative to the target coalition's capabilities. The shape of the curve provided by this function is logistic. The exact shape can be controlled by the value of one parameter. Two examples of the likelihood of victory (*LV*) function are provided in figure 3. It should be noted that the higher the value given to the controlling parameter, the flatter is the shape of the curve in the areas where the two sides are nearly equal.


3.b—Common War Participation Costs. Three principles guide the imputation of common war participation costs. First, all participants in the war bear costs. These costs are paid in the currency of power units. Second, all participants, regardless of whether on the victorious or vanquished side, suffer a decrease in power of equal proportion.¹² Third, the cost function that confronts each participant contains two principal components: (a) a parameter

¹² Ample evidence exists regarding at least the loss of human life in modern wars—and thus the debilitating consequence of war for the power of the state (Singer and Small, 1972). However conflicting findings exist with respect to the effects of war on later growth in the power of the participants. Wheeler (1980), for example, demonstrates that war participation does influence the rate of industrial growth—often negatively but sometimes positively. Being a winner or a loser, however, does not seem to affect the trajectory of performance. Organski and Kugler (1980), on the other hand, claim to detect the phenomena of a "Phoenix" effect, whereby vanquished states tend to outstrip the victorious in the postwar growth.

As to the immediate costs of war involvement there is some evidence which indicates the need to revise this formula. Cannizzo's (1980) empirical results suggest that proportional war costs suffered by opposing sides are not equal but vary, to at least some extent, on the bases of the relative capability ratio. Her findings would suggest that the homogeneity of costs assumption built into the model should be altered.

FIGURE 3

RELATIVE POWER AND VICTORY



specifying the maximum proportional war costs, and (b) the relative power of the opposing sides. The function takes the following form:

$$WARCOST_i = \left(1.0 - \frac{(LSR - .5)}{.5}\right) \cdot WARCOST_{max}$$

where LSR is defined as the ratio of the power of the larger side to the sum of the power of both sides in the war and $WARCOST_{max}$ is the maximum proportional cost parameter.

3.c—Assessment of Spoils (Indemnities). Each actor in the defeated coalition is assessed an indemnity equal to some constant proportion of the power units it possesses. This proportion is meant to reflect the punitiveness (i.e., lack of restraint on the part) of the victor. The total of indemnities contributed by the defeated states is allocated across the member states of the winning coalition on the basis of the each member's contribution to the total capabilities of the alliance.¹³ In addition to the direct transference of power units from the winning to the losing side, a more complicated and potentially more rewarding form of exploitation is provided for in the way of territorial transference from the principal losing state to the victorious coalition.

3.d—Assessment of Spoils (Territory) Territorial loss occurs only on the part of the "initial" member of the losing coalition. The amount or size of territorial loss, i.e., the distinct pieces of territory lost, is a function of the size of the loser and the "decisiveness" of its loss. The territory taken from the loser is parceled out amongst the members of the winning coalition on the basis of a proportionality rule with respect to the power units of each member of the coalition.¹⁴ Certain constraints restrict the application of this proportionality rule and help to define the identity of the pieces of territory that are to be

¹³ Describing episodes during the 15th and 16th centuries where the principle of the balance of power seems to have applied, Mattingly (1955, p. 163) characterizes the partitioning of defeated states by the victors as a process based upon a calculus whereby "the biggest dog gets the meatiest bone" and others help themselves in the order of size. Within the discipline of political science grounding for the proportionality principle can be seen in Morgenthau's (1985, p. 205) argument that "the distribution of benefits is thus likely to reflect the distribution of power within an alliance." It is broadly compatible with the results presented in Starr's (1972) analysis of war coalitions and the spoils that members of such coalitions acquired. Starr found thirty-four cases of states in such coalitions where indemnities were received, fifty-two cases of states within such coalitions that acquired territory, and fifty-two cases where member states acquired neither territory nor indemnities. In general, smaller and weaker states fell into the latter category. It should be noted that Starr does point out that in terms of both indemnities and territory acquired, the relative power of a member of a victorious coalition does not seem to be directly related to its share of the spoils. However, relative power is related to the relative contribution to the war effort (reflected in the costs sustained by the members), and this, in turn, is related positively to the relative share of spoils acquired.

¹⁴ It might be noted that within the European balance of power system the division of some hapless state's territory amongst other powers was a traditional outcome of wars and evolved according to Sorel (1895/1971, p. 34), into a "self-contained system," one which "replaced the simple doctrine of balance, which it both refined and completed under the name 'co-sharing system'."

distributed and specify the recipient of any particular territorial unit. Details on the procedure whereby such transference takes place are provided below.

The territories transferred from the defeated to the victorious side are extracted only from the "principal" (i.e., the first involved in the dispute on each side) state of the losing coalition. The "likelihood of victory" (LV) function is used to determine the proportion of the loser state's territorial holdings to be transferred. If the victor is the initiating coalition, the proportion of the loser's territories to be surrendered is the LV score. If the victor is the target coalition, the proportion is equal to 1.0 minus the LV score. The proportion is then multiplied by the number of territories possessed by the loser and the resulting product is rounded to the nearest integer. If, however, the loser possesses only one territorial unit, possession is transferred and the state is eliminated from the system. States with more than one territorial unit can also be eliminated if the magnitude of their defeat, as reflected in the LV score, is sufficiently large.

The territories extracted from the loser must be allocated among the members of the victorious coalition. This is done on a proportional basis with each state's share of the "booty" initially specified as equal to its relative power position within the victorious coalition. With these preliminary shares specified, the selection of territorial units begins. A member of the victorious coalition effectively queues for its allotment on the basis of its relative power standing. Certain related rules are iteratively applied to guide it in its selection of a territorial unit. In choosing its acquisitions, the recipient works on acquiring one territorial unit at a time. With its acquisition selected, the recipient begins to select the next unit it is to receive, or retires from the selection process if it has received its quota.

The first rule allows a recipient to choose only units that are contiguous to itself. If the application of this rule produces one such territory, the unit identified is transferred. Where more than one unit is identified, a second rule is invoked. Here all contiguous territories of the loser are identified and those which if removed from the loser would split the loser into two or more parts are removed from consideration. If one territorial unit of the loser still remains, that unit is transferred. If, however, a list with more than one contiguous unit exists which would not split the loser, the third rule is invoked. As presently implemented, this rule chooses from the list of possible acquisitions the loser's territorial unit that provides the choosing victor with the most compact shape to its overall territorial holdings and, as a secondary consideration, also aims for a compact shape for the remaining holdings of the loser.

One important point should be noted. An effort is made not to split any state. Indeed, the logic of the model does not permit the existence of states with noncontiguous elements. Should, in the application of the rules described above, the situation arise that a victor would be denied its "rightful reward," then, and only then, is the state "broken." With this splitting, the

model effectively creates a new state. The old state takes possession of the most powerful agglomeration of territorial units that remains. The new state receives title to the rump grouping.

With the leading, i.e., most powerful state of the victorious coalition finished with its selection of new acquisitions, the selection rights devolve upon the next most powerful and in succession to the weakest in the coalition entitled to acquire "booty." The completion of the rearrangement of the model effectively ends the war phase of the iteration.

Phase 4 Power Adjustment

This is the last phase of each iteration of the model. Herein, the power of each of the territorial units held by the existing states is increased by a percentage factor. The size of this factor is the same across all states.¹⁵ With the updating completed, the model has passed through a full iteration and moves into a new period.

EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS

Questions and Design

The approach taken here is to study the behavior of the model with the aid of an experimental design that emphasizes differences in Realpolitik thought. Given the character of the model, the set of theses discussed in the second section of the paper can be readily implemented by changing parameter values that reflect or embody these ideas. No structural changes were required to carry out this study. Four related questions will be addressed. First, was there a general tendency for the system to endure or did it normally collapse? Second, if a basic tendency toward system collapse or reproduction was evident, was the evolutionary track followed consistently patterned? Third, was there variation in the propensity of the system to endure across the experimental runs, to what extent was this variation dependent upon individual experimental conditions that have been manipulated in order to help represent points of contention with the Realpolitik literature? Fourth, and finally, how did the process of reproduction or collapse occur and what role did the experimental factors play in the elements of this process?

¹⁵ This constant and homogeneous rate of growth assumption is clearly a simplification which runs counter to some of the major theoretical concerns in international relations theory today (cf. Choucri and North, 1975; Ashley, 1980; Organski and Kugler, 1980; Gilpin, 1981). It is, however, in keeping with the image that Organski (1968, pp. 288-90) argues to be central to most descriptions of balance of power logics, viz., the notion that power differentials develop through external acquisitions and do not rest on the internal dynamics of the states embedded in such a system. Still, it would be worthwhile to incorporate mechanisms which relax this assumption. Part of our long-term research plans for the model include such an extension.

Drawing on the discussion in section 2 of the paper, five of the dimensions that help define a Realpolitik world were the focus of our experimental manipulations. These five, along with the different parameter values included:

- 1 *Distribution of Power.* Here the parameter controlling the dispersion around the average power holding of the states in the initial system is controlled. Specifically, the standard deviation of the initial distribution, which is normal, is experimentally set so that with the mean value of 100 the "narrow" case has a standard deviation of 10 while taking a value of 25 in the "broad" case.
- 2 *Error:* In every instance where the modeled states assess others' or their own power, an opportunity arises for error to invade the process. The error is symmetric in that it is normally distributed around a mean of 0.0 with negative (underestimation) and positive (overestimation) values possible. The error itself is created by a random number generator which produces normally distributed values having a standard deviation of 10% (low error) or 50% (high error).
- 3 *War Cost:* Both sides in a war are represented as suffering proportionally equal losses due solely to their participation in the war. The relative power of both sides acts to determine the scope of these losses with relatively balanced power ratios producing greater losses all around. The maximum loss that can be suffered is specified with the $WARCOST_{max}$ parameter and the experimental values employed in the study are 10% and 20%.
- 4 *Reparations.* The relative size of the indemnity that each member of a coalition must pay as a result of defeat in war can be varied parametrically so as to reflect the relative absence of restraint on the part of victors. In the more restrained version this parameter is set at 10%. In the less restrained version it is increased to 20%.
- 5 *Likelihood of Victory.* The likelihood of victory function (see figure 3) can be specified so as to heighten or lessen the degree to which war's outcome is more or less sensitive to marginal changes in the relative power ratio of the opposing sides. In the neighborhood of parity between the two sides a function such as A in figure 3 shows that marginal power ratio increases rapidly enhance the chances of the initiator, while one such as B transmits relatively smaller increments to the likelihood that the initiator will win. The two parameter settings for which curves are shown in the figure have been employed in the experiments.

A factorial experimental design was employed in order to evaluate not only the isolated impact of a change in a particular parameter but also the combined effect of two or more variables that have altered simultaneously. Each of the five parameters was assigned two different possible settings. In addition, given the presence of stochastic elements in the model, each combination of experimental parameter value settings was used three times under different

specifications of the "seed" for the pseudo random number algorithms within the model. This combination of different parameter settings in conjunction with the alternative "seeds" provided for 2^{5*3} , i.e., 96, experimental runs of the model.

System Endurance

Bremer and Mihalka (1977) reported on a limited set of analyses undertaken with the model. One central finding is a contradiction of the major expectation they ascribe to Realist writers. Specifically, it was concluded that large multistate systems composed of actors employing decision rules predicated on Realist notions of the "automatic stabilization" sort "almost always" degenerate, i.e., result in an hegemonic empire. In other words, rules that are generally assumed to preserve the many states in a multistate system actually lead to the destruction of all but one. The authors point out that the result is not that surprising in that "all closed dynamic systems will reach a steady state of some kind eventually." Although why that steady state is the opposite of that anticipated by many Realists is not made explicit. They conclude that "unique" conditions are required for an outcome other than multistate system collapse.

A table in the appendix provides information on the ninety-six experiments we have conducted. With respect to the duration of the system, i.e., the number of consecutive iterations of the model where more than one state existed within the system, the results under each set of experimental conditions are reported in the second column of the table. It should be noted that a maximum number of iterations for all experimental runs was used. This maximum value was 500. Any entry in the second column of the table with such a value actually represents a system which would have had a longer duration. The information that would have been gained, however, did not justify the associated costs.

Of the ninety-six runs, only five managed to endure for the "maximum" length. Indeed, the average duration of the system was only slightly greater than 300 iterations (305.74). This general tendency toward system destruction is consistent with Bremer and Mihalka's findings as well as with Stoll's (1967) recent analysis. System collapse is the modal outcome.

Evolutionary Path

A second major result to which Bremer and Mihalka (1977, p. 327) draw attention is the way the system becomes transformed from a multitudinous ecology of small states into a single empire. It is claimed that "three fairly distinct phases" are apparent in the "typical run of the simulation model." They correspond to a period of "political unification," a "balance of power" phase and a period of "imperial consolidation." According to the authors, the phases or periods appear to be "structurally and behaviorally" quite different systems. In the first, a steady decrease in system size (i.e., the number of

dependent units) occurs as a result of persistent widespread predation. This period draws to a close as conditions within the system lend themselves to "blocking coalitions" that obstruct further unit destruction. Eventually, this precarious balance is tilted as one or another state gains an advantage which it is able to parlay into a system-wide empire. In sum, the typical pattern of transformation contains two periods, at the beginning and at the end, of "feeding frenzy" wherein many states quickly disappear through conquest. In between, conditions impede this destruction for a significant period and allow the numerous surviving states to maintain their sovereignty. This developmental sequence of very different system epochs is seen as arising because "(A) given set of decision rules operating over time will modify the environment in which they operate, and the conjunction of altered environment and the unaltered decision rules produce a transformation of the system" (Bremer and Mihalka, 1977, p. 328).

Across the ninety-six experimental runs we conducted such a distinctive phasing of system evolution was not always apparent. Figure 4, which provides the time paths of experiments 1 through 6, is indicative of the general patterns we observed. A middle, or balance of power, phase frequently occurs, though not generally with the longevity that is apparent in the one full-length run described by Bremer and Mihalka.


The Bases of Variation in System Endurance

As noted above, the system endured on average for slightly more than 300 iterations. However, the range of endurance was fairly broad and extended from one case in which collapse occurred after only the 188th iteration to five cases where the system endured through the 500 iteration maximum.¹⁶ In table 1, the bases for the differences in system duration across the runs can be seen. Here we have provided information on an analysis of variance (as well as multiple classification analysis and regression analysis) of the ninety-six experiments using the five factors outlined above.

Four of the five factors have statistically discernible effects on system duration. Thus, the distribution of power when less egalitarian tends to promote longer lasting systems (an average of 319.2 iterations) relative to systems where power is distributed in a more egalitarian fashion (an average of 292.3). Error, as well, seems to matter. Systems characterized by a wider range of possible error in the decision-making process produce an average duration longer than those with a narrower error range (316.7 vs. 294.8). Restraint is also important in that systems where reparation extraction is minimized tend

¹⁶ These five experiments were later rerun with the maximum iteration set to 1,500. In no case did system collapse occur. Indeed in all five cases a deadlock had developed prior to the 500th iteration and this persisted through the 1,500th iteration with the effect that there was no further destruction of the remaining states.

FIGURE 4
EVOLUTION OF SYSTEM SIZE IN 6 EXPERIMENTS



to endure far longer on average (328.6 vs. 282.8). Finally, the shape of likelihood of victory curve plays a significant role with the steeper curve producing a much lower average system length (i.e., 255.4) relative to the flatter curve (356.1). The only factor that does not seem to play a significant role in determining duration is, surprisingly, the war cost maximum where the average durations across the two parameter settings are barely distinguishable (304.7 vs. 306.8).

The set of factors taken as a whole seems to provide one with a relatively good basis for predicting system duration. The overall degree of fit in the multiple classification analysis as measured by the R^2 is 57%. There is, as we saw, a clear pattern in terms of the importance of the individual factors. Thus, the shape of the likelihood of victory curve, in other words, the role of chance seems the most important factor. The degree of restraint seems the next most important determinant. This is followed by both the distribution of power and the range of error directly involved in the decision-making process. They are approximately equal in terms of their impact on the length of the experiment.

The Process

Can some light be shed on the way in which these factors helped shape the pattern of system demise? Space constraints do not permit a thoroughgoing description of the long and torturous tracks taken by the model through the many experiments conducted with it. But some insight can be gained by using fairly aggregate information drawn from the result files of the model runs. In the main, this analysis draws on information regarding average propensities that manifested themselves in the first 150 iterations of each of the 96 experiments.

System destruction follows from the occurrence and severity of war. These in turn emanate from decisions by states through a process of dispute initiation and escalation. Let us examine each of these in turn.

TABLE 1
STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF EFFECTS OF EXPERIMENTAL
CONDITIONS ON SYSTEM DURATION

Experimental Factor	ANOVA <i>F</i> -ratio (signif.)	MCA Beta	Regression coeff (<i>t</i> -stat.)
Mean Duration for Low(<i>L</i>) and High(<i>H</i>) Groups			
Power Distribution (<i>L</i> 292.3, <i>H</i> 319.2)	6.5 (0.012)	0.17	0.671 (2.55)
Error Range (<i>L</i> 294.8, <i>H</i> 316.7)	4.4 (0.040)	0.14	1.462 (2.07)
Reparations (<i>L</i> 328.6, <i>H</i> 282.8)	19.1 (0.001)	0.30	-455.12 (-4.32)
WarCost _{max} (<i>L</i> 304.7, <i>H</i> 306.8)	0.0 (0.842)	0.01	21.04 (0.19)
Likelihood of Victory (<i>L</i> 255.4, <i>H</i> 356.1)	92.2 (0.001)	0.66	50.385 (9.51)
			[constant 224.80 (7.66)]
Summary Statistics		$R^2 = .57$	$R^2 = .55$
Summary Statistics from Analysis of Variance			
	SS	F	
Main Effects	3230.49	24.5 (0.001)	
2-Way Interaction*	311.41	1.2 (0.315)	
Explained	3541.90	8.8 (0.001)	
Residual	2114.12		
Total	5656.02		

*Only one of ten 2-way interactions: Error Range and WarCost_{max} was significant

Was there variation in the frequency with which disputes occurred and to what extent was it associated with each of the parameters varied across the experiments? On average disputes occurred in 78% of the first 150 iterations across the range of experiments. Significant variation manifested itself amongst these runs with the range extending from a low of 61% to a high of 89%. Three of the five experimental factors appear to have contributed to the variation (see table 2). Both the amount of error embedded in the decision-making process as well as the degree of inequality in the initial distribution

- Key to Experimental Factors
- I—Standard Deviation of Power Distribution
- II—Standard Deviation of Error Term in Power Assessment
- III— $WarCost_{max}$ parameter
- IV—Parameter for Likelihood of Victory Curve
- V—Reparations parameter

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Presidents, Governors, and Electoral Accountability

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This paper is designed to demonstrate that citizen evaluations of presidential performance operate as an influence on voting in gubernatorial elections. The discussion first highlights the debate over the impact of presidential support in national elections and presents aggregate-level evidence suggesting that this impact extends to gubernatorial contests. Next, an individual-level model of the gubernatorial vote is estimated using a pooled data set from the election year survey conducted by the Center for Political Studies from 1972 through 1986. The estimated model reveals that evaluations of the president operate as an influence on the voting preferences of citizens. A series of diagnostic exercises shows that this influence is not an artifact of a particular survey type of election, or presidential administration. A series of simulations reveals that the impact of these evaluations is sizable enough to alter both the voting of individuals and the outcomes of gubernatorial contests. The discussion concludes by using these results to reflect upon the character of electoral accountability in the United States.

INTRODUCTION

Despite considerable methodological and theoretical diversity, the research on American voting behavior shares a common concern with the question of electoral accountability. Aside from the particulars of individual studies, those engaged in the enterprise of analyzing elections often use their results to draw conclusions and engage in debate about how officeholders are held accountable in a federal system with its attendant diffusion of decision making authority and responsibility. In recent times one of the most visible debates over accountability focuses upon citizen evaluations of the president's performance and their importance as an influence on citizen voting. This debate revolves around two contending schools of thought in the literature.

Systematic Accountability

The first school of thought can be termed the systemic view of accountability. According to this perspective, electoral accountability is imposed on a systemic or national basis through voting which is *presidency-centered, retro*

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spective, and *result-based* (see, for example, Key, 1966, Fiorina, 1981). This characterization is based upon the research in two related areas of presidential studies

The first pertains to the factors that influence citizen evaluations of presidential performance (Mueller, 1973, Kernell, 1978, MacKuen, 1983, Ostrom and Simon, 1985, Hibbs, 1987). The primary conclusion to be drawn from this research is that presidential approval is well behaved in the sense that it is responsive to a broad range of environmental conditions and events. These include the rates of inflation and unemployment, battle deaths during times of war, the level of international tension along with a variety of approval-enhancing (e.g., crises, diplomatic initiatives) and approval-diminishing events (e.g., domestic unrest, scandals). Presidential support thus reflects the degree of citizen satisfaction with the domestic and international environment. In this sense, the research establishes a result-based "line of accountability" from the environment to the president.

A second body of research emphasizes that these evaluations of presidential performance "spill over" and influence other political attitudes and choices of the public. The most prominent work focuses upon the impact of public support on the outcomes of congressional elections and includes numerous aggregate-level models (e.g., Marra and Ostrom, 1989, Oppenheimer, Stimson, and Waterman, 1986, Abramowitz and Segal, 1986, Lewis-Beck and Rice, 1984, Tufte, 1978) along with studies documenting the approval-vote relationship at the individual level (Fiorina, 1981, Kernell, 1977). Thus, there is convincing evidence that the public standing of the president will influence the partisan composition of both the House and Senate in both midterm and presidential election years. Together, the work shows that there is a second, presidency-centered "line of accountability" that runs from the president to the electoral fortunes of his political party.

When considered in tandem, this research illustrates how evaluations of presidential performance operate as a "mechanism of accountability." Citizens hold the president responsible for conditions and events which transpire over the course of a term, evaluate the performance of the president according to these outcomes, and in turn, use these evaluations in deciding how to vote in other elections. In this manner, the lines of accountability are joined: the quality of events and conditions in the environment is connected, via the president, to the electoral fortunes of his party. As a result, evaluations of the president's performance will operate as a short-term (Campbell, 1966) and national force (Stokes, 1975) with the capacity to shift the partisan division of the vote and the resulting distribution of political authority.

Candidate-based Accountability

A second and competing school of thought in the debate over electoral accountability is a "candidate-centered" view of elections (see, for example,

Hinckley, 1981). This view asserts that the outcomes of elections are primarily the result of local factors and the personal qualities of the contestants. Candidates and, in particular, congressional incumbents are cast as independent political entrepreneurs whose electoral resources do not depend heavily upon loyalty to either a political party or a presidential administration. Instead, candidates build their own political organizations, develop their own sources of funding, and rely upon their own "homestyles" (Fenno, 1978) to cultivate their reelection constituency. Thus, proponents of this view argue that citizen voting in elections is strongly influenced by incumbency and the attendant factors of campaign spending, voter contact, and name recognition (e.g., Abramowitz, 1980, Hinckley, 1980). As a result, there is little room for national forces, including presidential performance, to operate in these elections (see, for example, Mann and Wolfinger, 1980, pp. 629-30). Instead, there exists an atomistic, individualized form of accountability based upon the ability of officeholders to exploit the perquisites of office, service their constituencies, and fend off strong challengers.

To summarize this debate, the candidate-centered view of elections challenges the claims of the contending school of thought on two grounds. Their research (1) asserts that the impact of presidential evaluations is not "sizable enough" to draw inferences about systemic accountability (e.g., Ragsdale, 1980) and (2) questions the generality of this impact across elections and offices (e.g., Hinckley, 1980, pp. 117-23).

Presidents and Governors

As the description of this research illustrates, the debates over the nature of accountability has been largely confined to congressional elections, particularly those for the House of Representatives. This is unfortunate since attention to elections for offices more distant from the "beltway" has the potential to expand and to enrich this debate. Gubernatorial elections are a case in point. These elections would provide a particularly rigorous test of the approval-vote relationship given the visibility of governors and their "strong likelihood of being held accountable for the conditions of the state" (Bibby, 1983, p. 117). Governors are also less tied to politics inside the beltway and the issues dividing the president and members of Congress. Unlike their counterparts in the House and Senate, governors are not called upon to justify votes in support of or opposition to presidential policy initiatives. Compared to congressional contests, these characteristics suggest that "national forces" would play a less prominent role in gubernatorial contests. Moreover, the timing of gubernatorial elections is designed to dilute the possible impact of national forces. As Bibby (1983, p. 116) observes, a substantial number of states have shifted their gubernatorial elections from presidential to midterm years in order to "insulate state elections from national trends." For these rea-

sons, evidence of an approval-vote relationship in gubernatorial elections would add considerable weight to the case made by advocates of systemic accountability

This approval-vote relationship is the focus of this paper. My purpose is to extend the discussion of electoral accountability to gubernatorial contests and demonstrate that citizen evaluations of presidential performance operate as a voting cue in these contests. To achieve this purpose, the discussion is developed in four sections. The first looks at the prior research on this question and presents some initial, aggregate-level evidence which suggests that evaluations of the president operate as a short-term force in these contests. In the second section, I present a basic, individual-level model of citizen voting for governor and estimate the model on a pooled data set composed of the election year surveys conducted by the Center for Political Studies from 1972 through 1986. The model is then evaluated in the third section with particular attention devoted to assessing both the generality and magnitude of the impact of public support in gubernatorial elections. The results of the analysis are then used in the final section to reflect upon the debate over how electoral accountability is imposed in the United States.

PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT AND GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS AN INITIAL LOOK AT THE DATA

The possibility that citizen voting in gubernatorial elections is influenced by evaluations of the president is relatively unexplored terrain. This relationship has not been a central concern in the research on state elections (see for example, Tompkins, 1984). There are, however, a few exceptions. Based upon his analysis of survey data from the 1970 midterm elections, Pierson (1975, p. 690) concludes that the influence exerted by presidential evaluations is "not restricted to contests for the U. S. Senate and House of Representatives, but also extends to state races for governor." A similar conclusion is offered by Bibby (1983) in his examination of the 1982 midterm elections. Observing that "midterm gubernatorial elections are highly susceptible to national trends," he concludes that "change in partisan control of governorships is likely to be greater than the extent of switched party control of seats in Congress" (1983, p. 113). Finally, in a recent aggregate study of state elections, Chubb (1988, pp. 144-48) reports that changes in real income, when used as a "stand-in" variable for the performance of the presidential administration, exert a strong influence on the partisan control of governorships (see also Peltzman, 1987).¹

¹ This work also suggests that the influence of these assessments extends to races for other state and local offices. Chubb (1988, pp. 141-44) reports that a similar relationship holds for control of state legislatures. Pierson (1975, p. 691) reaches a similar conclusion from his analysis of the 1970 CPS survey.

Table 1 lends additional credence to the conclusions drawn by these studies. The table summarizes the outcomes of gubernatorial elections from 1950 through 1986. It was constructed in the following manner. First, each election year was placed into one of three categories based upon both the aggregate level of public support at the time of the election and the change in that level since the last election.² "Good years" are defined as those in which the level of public support is greater than 45% and the drop in approval since the last election was less than 15 points.³ "Bad years" are those in which public support is less than or equal to 45% and the drop in approval since the last election is greater than 15 points. Finally, "mediocre years" are those in which either approval is less than or equal to 45% or the drop in approval since the last election is greater than 15 points. Second, each election in each year was also classified according to whether an incumbent stood for reelection and, if so, whether the incumbent belonged to the presidential or opposition party. Third, for each combination of incumbency and approval categories, I calculated the proportion of elections won by candidates of the president's party. The table also displays this "victory rate" across all elections along with the average change in governorships controlled by the president's party. This latter quantity provides a measure of the net change or swing in party control of state houses and is analogous to the seat change measures often employed in studies of House elections.

The results in table 1 indicate that evaluations of the president are associated with the electoral success of gubernatorial candidates from the president's party. The table shows that there is substantial variation in the victory rates across the three approval-based categories. When all elections are considered, the rate drops from 50% in "good years" to 41% in "mediocre years" to approximately 26% in "bad years." A similar pattern holds for the average

² The data on presidential support were obtained from the *Gallup Opinion Index* (Report #182, October 1980, pp. 3-59) and from the *Gallup Report* (Report #264, September 1987, pp. 16-18). The change measure is based upon two quantities. The first is the aggregate level of approval recorded in the Gallup poll closest to the election; the second is the highest level of approval recorded by Gallup during the three months after the preceding election. Subtracting the current from this peak value thus provides a measure of the change in approval during the period between elections. The use of this measure is based upon a recognition that the aggregate level of approval may not completely convey the political circumstances of an administration. Consider, for example, the campaigns of 1958 and 1984. In both instances, the aggregate level of public support stood at 58%. For President Eisenhower, this figure was the result of a 15-point decrease from a peak value of 73% recorded in January 1957. The 58% reading for President Reagan, however, was an increase of 17 points from the level recorded in March 1983. The measure of approval change is included in the design of table 1 to distinguish between such situations.

³ In previous research (see Ostrom and Simon, 1984), the 45% level of approval was shown to be a meaningful lower threshold insofar as the political fortunes of the president are concerned. A level of approval below 45% is associated with primary challenges for renomination, a greater incidence of override attempts and successful overrides of presidential vetoes, and substantially lower success rates on roll call votes involving legislation supported by the administration. These results provide the justification for the use of the 45% level in constructing table 1.

TABLE 1
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT
AND GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION RESULTS 1950-1986

	Good Years ¹	Mediocre Years	Bad Years
Victory Rate ² in all Gubernatorial Elections	50.0% (122/244)	41.0% 57/139	25.6% 34/133
Average Net Change ³ in Governorships Held by President's Party	-1.4	4.0	-6.5
Type of Election			
Victory Rate in Elections with Incumbents of President's Party	65.4% (50/73)	63.4% 26/41	63.3% 19/30
Victory Rate in Elections with No Incumbent	51.3% (59/115)	39.3% 22/56	18.2% 10/55
Victory Rate in Elections with Incumbents of Opposition Party	23.2% 13/56	21.4% 9/42	10.4% 5/48

¹ Good Years are defined as those in which public support for the president is greater than 45% and the decline in public support since the last election is less than 15 points. Mediocre Years are those in which public support is less than 45% or the decline in support since the last election is greater than 15 points. Bad Years are those in which public support is less than 45% and the decline in support is greater than 15 points.

² The percentages displayed in the table represent the victory rate for gubernatorial candidates of the president's party. The victory rate is calculated by dividing the number of elections won by candidates of the president's party by the total number of gubernatorial contests. The parenthesized figures show the number of victories and elections for each of the categories.

³ The entries represent the average loss or gain in governorships controlled by the party of the president in the wake of each election.

change in governorships won by the president's party ranging from a loss of 1.4 state houses in 'good years' to a loss of 6.5 in 'bad years'. Turning to the different categories of incumbency, there is only a slight difference in the victory rates for incumbents of the president's party. The variation is much greater, however, in the other types of races. The table shows that public support exerts its greatest impact in the open election category where the victory rate drops from 51.3% in 'good years' to 18.2% in 'bad years'. While not as substantial, the influence is also apparent in races involving incumbents of the opposition party. Particularly noteworthy is the difference between 'good' (23.2%) and 'bad' years (10.4%).⁴

With the exception of the category of presidential incumbents, the difference between the victory rates during good and bad years is statistically significant at the .05 level. This was determined by performing a test for the difference between proportions. Using a difference in means test on the swing measure reported in table 1 leads to the same conclusion.

In sum, table 1 provides support for the proposition that evaluations of the president will "spill over" to influence the electoral fortunes of gubernatorial candidates from the president's party. The data show that there are substantial variations in victory rates across the categories defined by the level of change in the president's aggregate poll standing. The variations are particularly strong in the case of gubernatorial elections without incumbents. Thus, table 1 suggests that, at the aggregate level, the public standing of the president will influence the control of state houses by the president's party. The next stage of the analysis will consider not only whether the approval-vote connection holds at the individual level but also whether the relationship is general and sizable enough to offer conclusions about the nature of electoral accountability.

EVALUATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL PERFORMANCE AND CITIZEN VOTING FOR GOVERNOR

The essence of the disagreement between the systemic and candidate-centered views of accountability revolves about the relative importance of national forces such as presidential performance compared to factors such as partisanship and incumbency in the voting choices made by citizens. Accordingly, most analyses follow a strategy of specifying a model of candidal choice that includes measures representative of these factors and, after estimation, evaluating their impact (see, for example, Ragsdale, 1980).

A Model of the Vote

A similar strategy is adopted here via the following representation of the individual voting decision:

$$Pr(V_i = 1) = b_0 + \sum_{h=1}^H b_h EP_{ih} + \sum_{j=1}^J b_j S_{ij} + \sum_{k=1}^K b_k PID_{ik} \quad (1)$$

where

V_i = the gubernatorial vote of each citizen, this is a binary variable that assumes a value of one if a citizen casts a vote for the candidate of the president's party and is zero otherwise,

$Pr(V_i = 1)$ = the probability that citizen i votes for the gubernatorial candidate of the president's party,

EP_{ih} = the variables summarizing the citizen's evaluation of presidential performance,

S_{ij} = the variables describing the citizen's evaluation of the gubernatorial candidates in state j ,

PID_{ik} = the variables summarizing the party identification of each citizen

Equation 1 thus incorporates, in a simple and straightforward manner, the factors commonly identified as influences on a citizen's vote.⁵

Data and Operationalization

To operationalize and test this model, I first constructed a single, "pooled" sample using the election year surveys conducted by the Center for Political Studies. The sample includes all respondents who cast a vote in a contested gubernatorial race during the elections of 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, and 1986.⁶ This produces a sample of 3,920 respondents over seven sets of gubernatorial contests. The surveys were pooled for two reasons. First, pooling increases the generality of the results by providing a single estimate for each of the hypothesized influences over a fourteen-year period. This is particularly valuable given that the literature on voting has yet to offer any rationale explaining why the estimated impact of relevant factors should change over time. Second, pooling the surveys also increases the precision of the estimates by increasing the number of individuals within particular subsets of voters (e.g., opposition identifiers who approve of the president in a state with no incumbent running). In sum, then, the pooled sample was constructed to enhance the generality of the results and to provide the necessary numbers for reliable estimation of the voting model.

The dependent variable in this analysis is the reported gubernatorial vote of the citizen; the variable V_i assumes a value of one if the citizen casts a ballot for the candidate of the president's party and a value of zero if the citizen votes for the gubernatorial candidate of the opposition party.

The measurement of presidential evaluations is straightforward. The interview schedules of the surveys used in this analysis include the following presidential performance item: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way (incumbent) is handling his job as president?" This question is identical to the item

The model in equation 1 is presented in its most generalized form with FP 's and PID representing sets of factors relating to citizen evaluations of the presidential administration, their assessment of the candidates in a given gubernatorial contest, and partisanship respectively. The operationalized form of the model—the number of variables within each set and their measurement—will depend upon the content and quality of the data that is available.

⁵ These data were made available (in part) by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research and were originally collected by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, under grants from the National Science Foundation. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here. The number of voters in each survey included in the pooled sample are: 225 (1972), 860 (1974), 343 (1976), 576 (1978), 134 (1980), 606 (1982), and 576 (1986). The interview schedule of the 1984 CPS survey did not include the usual questions on voting for governor; the 1972 survey posed the performance item to only half the sample. Aside from these variations, the most noteworthy difference among the surveys is the smaller size of the on-year samples. This reflects the fact that during the period under study, a larger number of states held their gubernatorial elections in midterm years.

regularly administered by the Gallup organization with the responses to the item widely recognized as the most prominent measure of public support for the president

The variable EP_i is based upon responses to this question. It assumes a value of one if the citizen approves of the way the president is handling his job, otherwise EP_i is set to zero. It is expected that the probability of casting a vote for the candidate of the president's party will be greater among approvers than among nonapprovers.

To incorporate partisanship into the analysis, a series of six binary variables is defined to measure both the direction and strength of the citizen's party identification. This method of measuring partisanship is based upon the demonstration that the standard party identification measure included in the CPS surveys is not an equal interval scale (Fiorna, 1981, pp. 103–105). As Fiorna (1981, p. 103) notes, "when using party ID as a right-hand-side variable, the preferred course would be to represent the seven-point scale by a set of six dummy variables." Accordingly, the strength and direction of partisanship will be measured using the following variables: PS_i , PW_i , PL_i , OS_i , OW_i , OL_i . The variable PS_i assumes a value of one if the individual is a strong identifier of the president's party. Similarly, OS_i takes on a value of one if the individual strongly identifies with the opposition party. The remaining variables— PW_i , PL_i , OW_i , OL_i —are defined in the same manner and represent the weak and leaner categories among presidential and opposition identifiers respectively.

Unlike the evaluations of presidential performance and partisanship, the measurement of the candidate-based factors must, of necessity, be indirect. Ideally, the most appropriate measures would be based upon items designed to ascertain whether citizens "recognize" the gubernatorial candidates and if so, to elicit their evaluation of the candidates. Aside from the reported vote, the CPS surveys contain no questions about gubernatorial elections. As a result, available information is restricted to the party affiliation of incumbents running for reelection. This information is used to define two binary variables that assume a value of one if an incumbent of the president's party, PI_j , or the opposition party, OI_j , stands for reelection as governor in state j .⁷ It is anticipated that the presence of an incumbent of the opposition party will lower the probability of voting for the candidate of the president's party while the presence of an incumbent of the president's party will increase this probability.

Given these definitions, the operational form of equation 1 can be written as:

⁷ It should be observed that these are "strong" measures of incumbency in the sense that the operational form is assumed to exert the same impact on voting regardless of citizen information about the incumbent. This is equivalent to assuming that information about the incumbent is uniformly distributed.

$$Pr(V_i = 1) = b_0 + b_1EP_i + b_2PI_k + b_3OI_k + b_4PS_i + b_5PW_i + b_6PL_i + b_7OS_i + b_8OW_i + b_9OL_i + e_i \quad (2)$$

where it is expected that $b_1, b_2, b_4, b_5, b_6 > 0$ and $b_3, b_7, b_8, \text{ and } b_9 < 0$.⁵

Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, probit, a maximum likelihood technique, was used to estimate equation 2 (for details, see Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). Table 2 displays the maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients, the ratio of the estimates to their standard errors, and the summary information about the overall performance of the model. The table shows that the overall "fit" of the model is good. The analog to the *F*-ratio, $-2 \times LLR$, is equal to 1,627.69. The model predicts approximately 78% of the cases correctly compared to a null model or baseline prediction rate of 55%. This latter quantity is calculated by assuming that all cases fall into the largest response category of the dependent variable. The proportion of cases that are consistent with this assumption then serves as the benchmark prediction (i.e., 2,154 of 3,920 respondents voted for the opposition candidate).

The table also shows that all of the coefficients are statistically significant in the predicted direction. The partisan and incumbency variables operate as expected: the probability of voting for the gubernatorial candidate of the president's party increases with the direction and strength of partisanship; this probability will also increase with the presence of an incumbent of the president's party and will decrease if an incumbent of the opposition party is on the ballot. Finally, the estimates indicate that evaluations of the president operate as an influence in the gubernatorial arena: approval of the president's performance will increase the probability of voting for the candidate of the president's party.

THE IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL EVALUATIONS

The information displayed in table 2 leads to the conclusion that the model is well supported empirically; the overall fit of the model is satisfactory with the reported estimates both plausible and statistically significant. Given this support, this section is designed to use the model to assess both the generality

⁵ This specification raises a question about whether factors other than evaluations of presidential performance should be included as "national forces" in such a model. In particular, the conventional wisdom associated with congressional elections (e.g., Tuft, 1975) identifies variations in real income as such a force. To examine this possibility, equation 2 was augmented to include a measure of the annual change in real per capita disposable income for each of the election years in the study (for a similar exercise in the context of a presidential voting model, see Markus, 1988). Inclusion of real income as a macro-level variable not only captures the variability in the U.S. economy from 1972 to 1986 but avoids the "Kramer problem" (1983) associated with the use of survey responses to measure public reactions to economic conditions. The coefficient for the income variable was quite small and its inclusion left the other coefficients as well as the explanatory power of the original model unchanged.

TABLE 2
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE GUBERNATORIAL VOTE
ESTIMATES FOR EQUATION 2

	Coefficient (MLF)	T-Statistic (MLE/SE)
Incumbent Governor		
President's Party (PI)	0.305	5.377
Opposition Party (OI)	-0.381	-6.711
Presidential Approval (FP)	0.378	7.499
Presidential Party Identifiers		
Strong (PS)	1.162	11.731
Weak (PW)	0.764	8.524
Leaner (PL)	0.492	5.017
Opposition Party Identifiers		
Strong (OS)	-1.158	-11.536
Weak (OW)	-0.575	-6.543
Leaner (OL)	-0.423	-4.211
Constant	-0.326	-3.981
-2 × LLR (Chi-Square)	1,627.69	
Sample Size	3,920	
% Correctly Predicted	77.7	
% Predicted (Null)	55.0	

and magnitude of public support as a short-term force on gubernatorial elections, the questions on which judgments about systemic accountability rest

Generality of Impact

The first concern in assessing the operation of public support as a short-term force pertains to the generality of its impact. Here, generality refers to the question of whether the estimated coefficient for EP_i varies across types of elections or administrations, an additional concern is whether the results from table 2 are an artifact of a particular survey. To investigate these possibilities the pure performance measure in equation 2 was replaced with a set of interactive variables using the approval measure and binary variables representing (a) midterm and presidential election years and (b) the administrations included in the study (i.e., Nixon-Ford, Carter, and Reagan). As an additional check on the generality of the model, the respondents from each year were successively eliminated from the pooled sample and equation 2 reestimated. Table 3 reports the coefficients and standard errors of the approval variables that were generated by this exercise.

TABLE 3
THE IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL EVALUATIONS ON VOTING
FOR GOVERNOR TESTS FOR GENERALITY

	Coefficient (MLE)	T-Statistic (MLE/SE)
Type of Election		
Midterm Election Years	375	7.122
Presidential Election Years	355	4.701
Presidential Administration		
Nixon-Ford (1972-1974-1976)	390	6.020
Carter (1975-1980)	355	4.076
Reagan (1982-1986)	377	5.950
Survey Eliminated		
1972	364	7.032
1974	407	7.068
1976	399	7.584
1978	419	7.133
1980	370	7.190
1982	375	6.967
1986	315	5.632

The table clearly shows that the impact of public support is quite uniform in the case of both the election year and administration distinctions—a test of the difference between the coefficients (Kmenta, 1971, pp. 373–74) results in the failure to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal. The results of the “jackknifing procedure” (Markus, 1988, p. 145) demonstrate that none of the surveys included in the pooled sample exerts a disproportionate influence on the estimated coefficient of presidential approval reported in table 2.

This diagnostic exercise reveals then that the impact of presidential evaluations on the gubernatorial vote is not confined to a particular sample type of election, or administration. Further, the summary statistics obtained in conjunction with the exercise revealed no appreciable difference in the predictive accuracy of the models when compared to the results in table 2. On this basis, it is reasonable to conclude that presidential performance operates as a general cue and influence in gubernatorial elections.

Magnitude of Impact

A second concern is the magnitude of the impact exerted by evaluations of the president. The coefficient estimates in table 2 show that while statistically significant, the influence of presidential evaluations is not as strong as the

party or incumbency variables. Because of the nonlinear character of the model, however, the interpretation of probit estimates cannot rely on the conventional standards used to compare the coefficients generated by ordinary least squares. Consequently, as an aid in evaluating the impact of public support, a simulation was performed. First, the variables in equation 2 were combined to construct a set of voter profiles (e.g., strong opposition identifier, approves of the president, a state with an incumbent of the president's party). Second, the variable values that correspond to each profile were then used in conjunction with the estimates reported in table 2 to calculate a predicted probability of voting for the candidate of the president's party.

The results of this simulation are presented in table 4. Note that the cell entries can be interpreted in two ways. First, an entry represents the probability that a randomly selected voter from a particular cell will cast a ballot for the gubernatorial candidate of the president's party. Alternatively, an entry can be interpreted as the proportion of all individuals in the cell predicted to vote for the candidate of the president's party. Thus, it is possible to compare these probabilities or proportions among approvers and nonapprovers within each category formed by the intersection of partisanship and incumbency.⁹

When viewed from this perspective, the impact of presidential evaluations is considerable. There is a rather sizable reduction in the voting probability as we move from the approver to the nonapprover categories. As expected, the performance evaluations exert the most substantial impact on leaning partisans and independents. Note, in particular, that there are three instances where a shift from approval to nonapproval drops the voting probability below the .50 threshold (i.e., leaning presidential partisans in a state with an incumbent of the opposition party and independents in both open elections and those with an incumbent of the president's party). Even among stronger partisans, there is an appreciable change in voting probabilities. For example, among strong partisans of the president's party, the change in probabilities ranges from .06 in elections with presidential party incumbents to .13 in states with opposition incumbents.

Having demonstrated that changing performance evaluations will alter the voting probabilities in gubernatorial elections, there remains a question of whether the change in probabilities is "sizable enough" to influence the outcomes of these contests. While speculative, it is possible to use the entries in table 4 as "group probabilities" in a simulation of the aggregate gubernatorial vote. More precisely, a projected vote for a hypothetical candidate of the president's party can be calculated by combining the distribution of party

⁹ The difference between the approver and nonapprover probabilities is analogous to a derivative (see Aldrich and Nelson, 1984, p. 43-88). This difference provides an estimate of the rate of change in the probability of voting for the candidate of the president's party due to a change in the citizen's evaluation of the president.

TABLE 4
THE IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL EVALUATIONS ON VOTING
FOR GOVERNOR: A SIMULATION

	Incumbent President's Party		No Incumbent		Incumbent Opposition Party	
	App	Not App	App	Not App	App	Not App
Presidential Party Identifiers						
-Strong	93	87	55	80	80	67
-Weak	86	77	79	67	67	52
-Leaner	80	68	71	56	56	41
Independents	64	49	52	37	37	23
Opposition Party Identifiers						
-Strong	21	12	13	07	07	03
-Weak	41	27	30	15	15	10
-Leaner	47	32	35	23	22	13

identification, the distribution of approval and nonapproval within each category of partisanship, and the set of voting probabilities reported in table 4.¹⁰

Using this approach, two sets of simulations were performed. The first used the relevant distributions from the 1978 and 1980 samples. A comparison of these samples reveals that the aggregate level of public support for President Carter dropped from 55% in the 1978 survey to 33% in the 1980 survey. This sizable decline is largely a reflection of the inflation-ridden economy and the seemingly endless hostage crisis that confronted the administration during 1980. These surveys thus provide an opportunity to examine the electoral consequences of a deteriorating political situation. To perform the simulation, I simply used the distributions of partisanship and approval from 1978 and 1980 in tandem with the probabilities from table 4 to calculate an aggregate vote

¹⁰ More precisely, the following equation was used to calculate an expected vote proportion:

$$\text{Vote} = \sum_{k=1}^K [Pr(k) \cdot Pr(A|k) \cdot Pr(V|k, A)] + \sum_{k=1}^K [Pr(k) \cdot Pr(\sim A|k) \cdot Pr(V|k, \sim A)]$$

where $Pr(k)$ = probability that the citizen is in partisan group k

$Pr(A|k)$ = probability that a citizen in partisan group k approves of the president

$Pr(\sim A|k)$ = probability that a citizen in partisan group k does not approve of the president

$Pr(V|k, A)$ = probability that a citizen from partisan group k who approves of the president cast a ballot for the candidate of the president's party

$Pr(V|k, \sim A)$ = probability that a citizen from partisan group k who does not approve of the president will cast a ballot for the candidate of the president's party

in gubernatorial races involving presidential incumbents, no incumbent, and opposition incumbents respectively

The results are displayed in the upper portion of table 5. The change in the simulated vote associated with Carter's twenty-two point decline in approval is striking. The projected vote drops by approximately eight points in each type of contest. The vote for incumbents of the president's party is reduced from an "easy" to a "marginal" win while contests for open state houses are projected to fall into the victory column for the opposition.

The second set of simulations was performed using the data from 1982 and 1986. These surveys provide an instance in which the political fortunes of a president from the "minority party" improved. The aggregate level of public support for President Reagan increased from approximately 50% in the 1982 sample to 62% in the 1986 survey. The impact of this twelve-point increase is displayed in the lower portion of table 5. While not as dramatic as the results for the Carter Administration, Reagan's improved standing with the public translates to approximately a four-point increase in the simulated vote for Republican gubernatorial candidates.

It is important to emphasize that the results in table 5 are hypothetical and speculative. As noted, the projected vote depends upon the particular distributions of partisanship and approval (among partisans) that are employed. From an heuristic standpoint, however, the results show a rather sizable impact. The entries in table 5 imply that the projected vote for candidates from the president's party will change by approximately four points for every ten point change in public support for the president. Given the rather wild fluctuations observed in the level of public support during the era of the modern

TABLE 5
THE IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL EVALUATIONS ON GUBERNATORIAL
ELECTIONS: AN AGGREGATE-LEVEL SIMULATION

	Incumbent President's Party	No Incumbent	Incumbent Opposition Party
<i>Carter</i>			
55% Approval (1978 Data)	61.8%	53.5%	42.6%
33% Approval (1980 Data)	53.9%	45.5%	35.1%
<i>Reagan</i>			
50% Approval (1982 Data)	49.3%	41.5%	32.3%
62% Approval (1986 Data)	53.2%	45.1%	36.1%

president, the impact on gubernatorial contests can be substantial. In tandem with the "real world" results presented in table 1, the results of these simulations suggest that the impact of presidential support in gubernatorial elections is both statistically significant and substantively important.

CONCLUSION

This research was designed to address several questions pertaining to the importance of presidential evaluations in gubernatorial elections and to use the resulting "answers" to reflect upon the character of electoral accountability in the United States. Insofar as the questions are concerned, the results are easily summarized. The estimates for the model of the individual vote reveal that evaluations of the president operate as an influence on the voting preferences of citizens in gubernatorial elections. A series of exercises designed to evaluate the model show that the influence of these evaluations is not an artifact of a particular sample, type of election, or presidential administration. Further, these exercises demonstrate that the impact of presidential support is sizable enough to alter both the probability of voting for a candidate and the aggregate results of gubernatorial elections.

These results provide the evidence to conclude that the features associated with systemic accountability are present in gubernatorial elections. This is a rather novel result given that such elections are typically treated as state and local affairs removed from the forces of national politics. While no claim is made that presidential support is the most important factor in such contests, the analysis makes it clear that the electoral fortunes of gubernatorial candidates are tied to the public standing of the president. Moreover, given the research on the determinants of presidential support, this connection implies that these evaluations are a conduit by which public satisfaction or dissatisfaction with conditions in the national and international environment register an impact on state politics. It is in this sense that systemic accountability extends to gubernatorial elections.

Two implications follow from these conclusions about the presence of systemic accountability. The first pertains to the characteristics of this accountability and how it differs from the classic version of electoral accountability articulated in the doctrine of responsible political parties. Schattschneider (1960), for example, argues that systemic accountability depends upon the disciplined operation of two internally unified and programmatic political parties. By defining clear and competing agendas for political action, national parties not only organize political conflict on a systemic basis but offer the electorate a meaningful choice. If such is the case, the outcomes of national elections empower the victorious party to pursue its agenda and, in so doing, clearly identify who will be held accountable and the performance standards by which they will be judged. In this scheme, the line of accountability is di-

rect, running from the electorate to the political party, it leads to a collective responsibility for governance and imposes reward and blame collectively.

The form of accountability described in this analysis is neither as direct nor as discriminate. The absence of the strong parties envisioned by the doctrine produces a situation in which responsibility for environmental conditions and events is individualized and presidency-centered. However, as this analysis and others have shown, electoral retribution is imposed on a collective basis. This produces a form of systemic accountability that is indirect. Candidates of the president's party, particularly at the state level, bear little responsibility for either the expectations imposed on the president or his attempt to satisfy them. Nonetheless, the candidates will bear the consequences of his success or failure in the endeavor. There is an irony here. Although it is reassuring to know that accountability rests, in part, upon the quality of events and conditions in the environment, it is also disconcerting to realize that the electorate may be indiscriminate in targeting victims and beneficiaries.

A second implication involves the rhythm of electoral politics in the United States. The operation of public support as a political resource reveals that presidents have an incentive to influence how they are evaluated by the public. In the past, considerable attention has been devoted to the study of how economic policy can be manipulated to pursue this objective (e.g., Tufts 1978). More recent work, however, shows that the potential "levers" available to a president go beyond the economic and include the timing of speeches, diplomatic agreements, and other dramatic events (e.g., Marra and Ostrom 1989, Kernell, 1986, Ragsdale 1984). This in turn suggests that the idea of an electoral-economic cycle may be generalized to an approval-electoral cycle in which presidents, whether through economic or noneconomic "levers," attempt to increase their public standing at politically appropriate times.

When viewed against the backdrop of the results presented in this paper, these arguments have several interesting consequences. First, the connection between presidential support and the gubernatorial vote means that presidential attempts to influence their public support will be felt in state elections. If a president successfully induces such a cycle, the political beneficiaries will include gubernatorial candidates of his party. Second, despite the rescheduling gambit, the objective of insulating state elections from national trends and strategic manipulations has not been achieved. As table 3 reveals, the shift in the scheduling of gubernatorial elections from on-years to off-years makes little difference; the impact registered by evaluations of the president is essentially the same in both years. Third, examination of the aggregate-level data reveals that whether by design or circumstance, the public standing of the president is more favorable in on-years than in off-years. For example, during the period from 1972 to 1986, the average "inter-election" change in approval is a 3.5 point increase during presidential election years compared to a decrease of 18.7 points during midterm years. This suggests a final irony.

rather than insulating gubernatorial elections from national politics. Holding gubernatorial elections in midterm years has, in practice, produced the unintended consequence of reducing the vote garnered by candidates of the resident's party.

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Attitudes of Southern Democratic Party Activists Toward Jesse Jackson: The Effects of the Local Context

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This article examines the effect of the racial composition of the local context on the attitudes of southern Democratic Party activists toward the 1984 Jesse Jackson presidential candidacy. Relying on a survey of delegates to the 1984 North Carolina Democratic Party state convention, the analysis finds that white activists were more likely to have a negative attitude toward the Jackson candidacy when they were from a county that had a higher proportion of blacks. This relationship occurs because the racial composition of the local context affects both the conservatism of white activists, especially on racially related issues, and the assessment these activists have of the likely effects of the Jackson candidacy. Most important are beliefs that white activists have about the impact of the Jackson candidacy on the mobilization of black voters and on the generation of intra-party conflict.

Racial conflict has been a crucial aspect of southern politics. In particular, high concentrations of blacks have been associated with antagonistic reactions among whites. The connection between the size of the black population in the area and the behavior of whites certainly is stressed in Key's (1949) analysis of the solid South. More recent studies, such as Matthews and Prothro's (1966) analysis of southern politics in the early 1960s, also have found this relationship. The most sophisticated and thorough attempts to empirically examine the effects of the racial context on southern political behavior probably are Wright's (1976, 1977) examinations of the 1965 Wallace vote, which found that whites living in counties with high proportions of blacks were more likely to support Wallace. While voting patterns are one obvious manifestation of this effect, it can be displayed in other forms of behavior as well (Giles and Gathin 1980).

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The intense conflict associated with racial issues in the 1960s has subsided but racial issues still remain significant, as the analysis by Black and Black (1987) demonstrates. Disagreement over electoral arrangements, such as the shape of legislative districts or the existence of a runoff primary, persists. School integration and affirmative action programs remain controversial. Conflict over racially related issues is particularly threatening to the fragile coalition of whites and blacks that Democratic Party candidates have relied on for success in the post-civil rights period of southern politics (Lamis, 1984a).

This study examines the impact of the local racial context on individual political attitudes. The focus here is on party activists, not voters. Specifically, reactions to the 1984 presidential candidacy of Jesse Jackson among white Democratic Party activists are analyzed, with the particular aim of determining the effect of the racial composition of the individual's home county. Examining party activists is a useful complement to the study of voters. Divisions that exist among voters may not be present among activists, and vice-versa, and it is worthwhile to determine if in contemporary southern politics, activists are influenced by the racial character of their county.

THE JACKSON CANDIDACY

Jackson's candidacy stimulated a variety of responses. One view was that it could bring in new Democratic support. A major Jackson goal was the mobilization of black voters into a significant political force. The campaign aimed at increasing the number of blacks who were registered to vote and, consequently, at increasing the number of blacks who actually would go to the polls. A very ambitious goal of boosting black registration by 1.6 million voters was put forth (Bovarsky, 1984). Stimulation of such projects as voter registration drives would increase the number of black participants, even though those added to the rolls by a registration drive might be somewhat less likely to vote than those already registered (Erikson, 1981; Vedlitz, 1985). Along with the increased number of black voters, Jackson hoped to increase the number of blacks actively participating in election campaigns. All of this electoral mobilization would benefit blacks both in the short and the long run by making them a more politically influential group (Cavanagh, 1984). Concomitantly, it could benefit Democratic candidates across the board (Smothers, 1984).

Alternative views of the Jackson candidacy also were expressed. A frequent claim was that he would divide the Democratic Party and hurt its long-term position (Farney, 1983; Rames, 1984). This was not a position taken solely by conservative whites; even some black leaders felt that his candidacy was ill advised (Delaney, 1983; Press, 1984). By introducing divisive issues, Jackson might create deep cleavages within the Democratic Party, weakening its

chances for electoral success, especially in the South. For example, Jackson's insistence on the need to eliminate the runoff primary might well create serious splits in the Democratic coalition (Lamis, 1984b). This is not a question of whether the runoff primary has the effects claimed by many critics. Some careful analyses conclude that these criticisms are not well supported (Bullock and Johnson, 1985, Stanley, 1985). But strong beliefs concerning the runoff primary exist, and they provide the basis for conflict, regardless of their accuracy. Other issues pushed by Jackson also were potentially divisive. Moreover, Jackson seemingly implied that he would not support the Democratic Party nominee unless some political concessions were made, which further heightened the potential conflict (Williams, 1984). At the same time, if his demands were met, conservative white Democrats might move to the Republican party. Also, Jackson's mobilization efforts could produce a white backlash in the sense that conservative whites might register and vote as a response to a growing black electorate (Smothers, 1983). Finally, there was the possibility of blacks being alienated by Jackson's unsuccessful bid for the nomination. Blacks might have their expectations raised, perhaps to unreasonable levels, and when these expectations were unmet, they would respond by withdrawing from the party and the political process (Cavanagh and Foster, 1984). Not only may voters respond this way, but activists working for Jackson could display the same behavior. The phenomenon of dissatisfied workers for a losing candidate failing to support the nominee of the party has been demonstrated (Johnson and Gibson, 1974), and it certainly was a possible outcome in this situation.

One important question about the Jackson candidacy is how Democratic Party activists responded to this effort. What perceptions did they have of the potential impact, good or bad, that this candidacy might have on the party? Especially interesting are the reactions of white southern activists, as the Jackson candidacy might be seen as particularly threatening to this group. And, as we have suggested above, the reactions of the white southern Democratic Party activists may vary greatly depending on the racial composition of their area of residence. These research questions are the concern of this study.

The following analysis is based on straightforward theoretical ideas which can be briefly outlined. First, racial conflict remains an important aspect of southern politics, leading us to refer to attitudes on racially-related issues as part of any attempt to explain political behavior. Second, these racial attitudes are not distributed randomly, but represent the influence of structural factors of which the racial composition of the local context is one of the most important. Third, this pattern of relationships (social structure affects attitudes which affect political behavior) applies not just at the mass level but to activists and elites as well. These general orientations guide the selection of specific hypotheses that are tested here.

DATA AND METHODS

The data employed in this study come from a survey of delegates to the 1984 North Carolina Democratic Party State Convention. Details on the survey are contained in the appendix. Additionally, the proportion of registered voters who were black was calculated for each county, and these data were merged with the survey data. This measure of the racial composition was selected on the grounds that it is the most politically relevant. However, the results of this study do not depend on a particular operationalization of black concentration. The proportion of the population that is black correlates very highly ($r = .98$) with the proportion of the electorate that is black, indicating that other measures of the racial composition would yield identical results.

While the racial composition of a variety of contexts (e.g., the community or the neighborhood) could be examined, the county is the most appropriate especially for an analysis of party activists. The county is the basic unit of state party organization and an important governmental level for elected office. A high proportion of blacks in the county might be seen by whites as a threat to control of both the Democratic Party organization and key elected offices. The racial composition of other contexts, such as the congressional district also might affect the attitudes of party activists, but the greater overall political significance of the county suggests that the contextual effects will be the strongest at this level.

Combining survey and aggregate data allows us to conduct a contextual analysis, in which characteristics of the individual's local geographical context are used in combination with individual-level variables to predict political behavior. Contextual analysis has important theoretical and methodological underpinnings. Theoretically, it stresses that individual behavior is affected by the social and political milieu and not just by individual attributes or characteristics (see several of the articles in Dogan and Rokkan, 1969). Methodologically, it is a multi-level analytical approach capable of addressing questions that cannot be adequately answered with purely individual or aggregate data but sometimes presenting some particular methodological problems (Boyd and Iverson, 1979, Stipak and Hensler, 1982, Weatherford, 1982, Books and Prysby, 1988). In this case, many of the thorny methodological problems are avoided because the contextual variable is not derived from any of the independent or dependent variables in the analysis, and therefore some of the analysis procedures (such as the Boyd and Iverson centering technique) do not apply here.

REACTIONS OF ACTIVISTS

The data on North Carolina Democratic Party activists show that whites almost unanimously were not Jackson supporters. However, while they did not prefer Jackson over other candidates, most of the white delegates did not feel

that his candidacy was especially harmful to the party. The overall reaction of activists to the Jackson candidacy, in terms of whether its impact was good or bad for the Democratic Party, was measured by combining two items into an index. One item simply asked whether the Jackson candidacy was good for the party, the other item asked whether Democrats would receive more votes in November as a result of the Jackson campaign. The appendix contains details on the construction of this index ("Jackson"), which runs from 1.0 to 5.0, with a low score indicating a more positive assessment of the impact of the Jackson candidacy. The white activists display substantial variation on this index. They also are, on average, fairly positive (mean index score of 2.27), though less so than blacks (mean score of 1.65).

Examining the reactions of activists toward the Jackson candidacy is relevant to understanding southern electoral politics. Positive attitudes suggest a capacity for absorbing this faction and maintaining the white-black Democratic Party coalition. Negative attitudes indicate a potential for hostility and divisiveness that would make such a coalition more problematic. The earlier review of divergent views of the Jackson candidacy illustrates the salience of these reactions and indicates the significance of the Jackson candidacy.

Among white activists, we would hypothesize that those from counties with a higher proportion of blacks would be more negative toward the Jackson candidacy. Drawing on the ideas expressed in the literature reviewed earlier, a high concentration of blacks would constitute a threat to many whites. The perception of a group threat naturally would not be determined solely by the size of the black population, but it would be one important objective factor. Additionally, if there is a relationship between the racial composition of the individual's current county and the racial composition of the county in which he or she grew up, then socialization factors also might contribute to the contextual relationship.

While the expectation of a contextual effect is consistent with the findings of Wright (1976, 1977) and others, there are reasons to think that the hypothesis might not apply here. White Democratic Party activists in the 1980s may behave differently than white voters in the 1960s. The diminished intensity of racial conflict in the post-civil rights period could have altered the relationships that existed in earlier periods. Also, activists may differ from voters. Activists are self-selected, and it is plausible that in the 1980s the white southerners who choose to be active in the Democratic Party are individuals who generally are liberal on civil rights questions and are not threatened by a higher concentration of blacks in the county.

The question not only is whether a contextual effect exists, but if so, why? Contextual analysis has been faulted for ignoring the intervening variables that more fully explain how the context affects individual behavior (Books and Privsky, 1988). The concern here is to identify the attitudinal linkage that accounts for any contextual effects observed. This gives us the dual goal of an-

analyzing the reactions to the Jackson candidacy and examining the structural sources of these reactions

EXAMINING THE CONTEXTUAL RELATIONSHIP

The attitudes of white activists toward the Jackson candidacy are related to the racial composition of the local context. The correlation between these two variables is moderate ($r = .15$) and statistically significant. Although the size of the correlation coefficient may seem weaker than what would have been expected, the strength of this relationship actually is reasonably strong when put into perspective. The relationship between a political attitude and a social characteristic usually is not that great. As we shall later see, attitudes are as strongly related to the character of the context as they are to individual social characteristics.

The possibility that the contextual relationship is not linear should be considered. A possible pattern is that an increase in the black electorate produces more positive attitudes initially, with hostile group reactions developing only after the black proportion reaches some threshold or tipping point. Persuasive arguments for this curvilinear relationship are put forth by Huckfeldt (1980) and Keech (1968). These data, however, do not display such a pattern. Analysis of the residuals from the regression equation fails to reveal any significant departure from a linear relationship.

EXPLAINING THE CONTEXTUAL RELATIONSHIP

The important research task is to explain why these two variables are related. Is there truly a causal relationship between the racial context of the individual's home county and his or her reaction to the Jackson candidacy? so, exactly how and why does this effect occur? To answer these questions we need to delve more deeply into the sources of reactions to the Jackson candidacy. Drawing from both the general literature on party activists in presidential nomination politics and the media reports of reactions to the 1992 Jackson candidacy, reviewed earlier, five specific hypotheses are developed.

Reactions of white Democratic Party activists toward the Jackson candidacy should reflect individual ideological orientations. Ideology commonly is cited as one important determinant of support for a candidate among party activists, although there is some controversy over the relative weight placed on ideology and electability (Abramowitz and Stone, 1984; Stone and Abramowitz, 1983). If ideology explains support for a candidate, it also should explain a assessment of the value of a candidacy for the party, especially for a candidate perceived as ideologically extreme and unlikely to win. In addition to overall ideological placement, orientations on civil rights issues should play a particularly important role in the case of Jackson. This dimension is captured, albeit imperfectly, by a measure of the respondent's support for affirmative action.

programs. Also, the respondent's attitude toward the runoff primary should have an effect, given the emphasis on this issue in the Jackson campaign. These three concepts were operationalized using the available survey items; details on the three variables are in the appendix (see "Political Ideology," "Affirmative Action," "Runoff Primary"). In all cases, activists with more conservative views should be more negative toward the Jackson candidacy.

Reactions to the Jackson candidacy also should be influenced by perceptions about its effects on the Democratic Party. The earlier discussion of controversies over Jackson's decision to run leads to two hypotheses: (a) a belief that the Jackson candidacy will mobilize black voters will produce a more positive assessment of the Jackson candidacy among white activists, and (b) a belief that the Jackson candidacy will increase intra-party conflict will lead to a more negative assessment. Both concepts were operationalized by constructing indices from relevant survey items. The measures of the two beliefs or perceptions are described in the appendix (see "Black Mobilization," "Intra-party Conflict"). It should be clearly noted that while these variables have strong affective elements, they are perceptions of likely effects, not issue orientations or preferences. And while they are obviously related to the overall reaction to Jackson's candidacy, they are both conceptually and empirically distinct.

The five variables described above not only are hypothesized as explaining reactions to the Jackson candidacy, but also as accounting for the contextual relationship found earlier. Specifically, we expect to find that a high black proportion in the county is associated with more conservative attitudes among white activists, both overall and especially on racial issues. Also, we expect that the black proportion will affect the perceptions that activists have of the likelihood of the Jackson candidacy mobilizing black voters and generating intra-party conflict.

ANALYSIS RESULTS

The impact of these variables on reactions to the Jackson candidacy can be determined from the data in table 1, which presents the results from a multiple regression analysis of the "Jackson" index. Four of the five variables are significantly related to "Jackson," with the beliefs about the effects of the Jackson candidacy having a greater impact than the ideological or issue orientations. Although "Affirmative Action" is not significantly related to "Jackson" once the other four independent variables are taken into account, it does have important indirect effects, which are discussed shortly.

Table 2 repeats the above analysis, dropping out "Affirmative Action" and adding "Racial Context." This has virtually no effect on the data for the four attitudinal variables, but the relationship between "Racial Context" and "Jackson" becomes extremely weak and statistically insignificant. Since controlling for these attitudinal variables virtually eliminates the original contex-

TABLE 1
REGRESSION OF ATTITUDE TOWARD JACKSON CANDIDACY
ON FIVE ATTITUDES

Independent Variable	Beta	Signif
1 Political Ideology	.14	< .01
2 Affirmative Action	.02	n.s.
3 Runoff Primary	.09	< .02
4 Black Mobilization	.13	.01
5 Intra-party Conflict	.22	< .01
(N = 514 R = .66)		

Source: CSPA 1984 survey of delegates to the North Carolina Democratic Party State Convention. Analysis is of white delegates only.

Note: The dependent variable in the above multiple regression analysis is the attitude toward the Jackson candidacy. For details on the dependent or independent variables, see the appendix.

TABLE 2
REGRESSION OF ATTITUDE TOWARD JACKSON CANDIDACY
ON FOUR ATTITUDES AND COUNTY RACIAL COMPOSITION

Independent Variable	Beta	Signif
1 Political Ideology	.15	.01
2 Runoff Primary	.09	.02
3 Black Mobilization	.12	< .01
4 Intra-party Conflict	.22	< .01
5 Racial Context	.05	n.s.
(N = 524 R = .66)		

Source: CSPA 1984 survey of delegates to the North Carolina Democratic Party State Convention. Analysis is of white delegates only.

Note: The dependent variable in the above multiple regression analysis is the attitude toward the Jackson candidacy. For details on the dependent or independent variables, see the appendix.

tual association, we have identified either the intervening variables that produce the contextual relationship or a set of confounding variables that produce a spurious contextual association. Given the nature of the variables involved, the latter possibility seems unlikely. Thus, the logical conclusion is that white Democratic activists from counties with greater concentrations of blacks are more negative toward the Jackson candidacy because they: (a) are more politically conservative, and (b) perceive different consequences resulting from Jackson's candidacy.

Our understanding of how the racial context affects reactions toward the Jackson candidacy will be furthered by a specification of how the racial context

affects the intervening variables discussed earlier. The link is somewhat complex. Rather than having a direct influence, much of the effect is indirect, operating through attitudes on civil rights issues. Table 3 presents the results from a set of multiple regression analyses. In each case, the independent variables are "Affirmative Action" and "Racial Context." With civil rights attitudes held constant (at least to the extent that "Affirmative Action" is a measure of more general civil rights attitudes), the racial composition of the context is at best weakly related to the intervening variables. But "Racial Context" is related to "Affirmative Action" ($r = .15$, $p < .01$), which affects the other variables. Existing research has found attitudes on racial issues to be strongly related to other issue orientations, both for elites and masses (Carmines and Stimson, 1982; Perkins, 1982). These findings confirm that and also suggest that such attitudes affect beliefs or perceptions about how others behave politically. Thus, the dominant path of influence is from the racial composition of the local context, through attitudes on civil rights and race-related issues, to the specific intervening variables identified earlier, to the dependent variable.

One final possibility needs to be considered. It may be that there is no true contextual effect. Activists from counties with higher proportions of blacks may display more conservative attitudes on civil rights issues simply because they differ in relevant individual-level characteristics, such as education. Unless we can rule this out, we cannot conclude that a contextual effect is present. An examination of the data reveals three relevant social characteristics that are correlated with "Racial Context": education, frequency of church attendance, and self-identification as a born-again Christian. Other

TABLE 3
REGRESSION OF FOUR ATTITUDES ON COUNTY RACIAL COMPOSITION
AND ATTITUDE TOWARD AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable			
	Political Ideology	Runoff Primary	Black Mobilization	Intra-party Conflict
Racial Context—Beta	.03	.02	.07	.08
(significance)	(n.s.)	(n.s.)	.10	< .06
Affirmative Action—Beta	.54	.35	.37	.34
(significance)	< .01	< .01	< .01	< .01
N =	522	522	522	522

Source: CSPA 1984 survey of delegates to the North Carolina Democratic Party State Convention. Analysis is of white delegates only.

Note: The dependent variable for each of the above four multiple regression equations is listed above. For details on the dependent or independent variables, see the appendix.

TABLE 4

REGRESSION OF ATTITUDE TOWARD AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ON COUNTY
RACIAL COMPOSITION AND THREE SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS

Independent Variable	Beta	Signif
1. Racial Context	.19	< .01
2. Education	.17	< .01
3. Church Attendance	-.21	< .01
4. Born-Again Christian	.04	n.s.
(N = 509; R ² = .34)		

Source: CSPA 1984 survey of delegates to the North Carolina Democratic Party State Convention. Analysis is of white delegates only.

Note: The dependent variable in the above multiple regression analysis is the attitude toward the affirmative action. For details on the dependent or independent variables, see the appendix.

factors that might be related to civil rights attitudes, such as age, are unrelated with 'Racial Context' and therefore could not produce a spurious relationship. Table 4 presents a multiple regression analysis of 'Affirmative Action' and the results reveal that the relationship between 'Racial Context' and 'Affirmative Action' is not at all diminished by controlling for these individual social characteristics. Moreover, the effect of the racial composition of the local context is as strong as the effect of education or church attendance. Contextual characteristics can be as important as individual-level social characteristics in affecting attitudes.

CONCLUSIONS

The racial character of the local context remains an important force in southern politics, even affecting the attitudes of party activists in the 1980s. If effects may be weaker now than in the past—white activists from counties that have large black populations are only somewhat more conservative—but they do exist. Events or actions that tend to divide whites and blacks will produce particularly great intra-party conflict in counties with large numbers of black. Another presidential nomination attempt by Jackson is one of a number of potentially divisive forces. However, the data examined here indicate that much of the opposition to Jackson's 1984 candidacy stemmed from beliefs about the effects of his campaign. While these beliefs are colored by ideological orientations—conservatives are more likely to believe the effects would be bad—they are far from completely determined by these factors. It seems likely that these beliefs also will be influenced by the extent to which black really are mobilized and intra-party conflict actually results. Thus, the actual character and accomplishments of another Jackson candidacy will influence how white Democratic activists respond.

A few cautionary points should be made in conclusion. This study examines only a single slice of southern Democratic Party activists and only on a single dimension. Perhaps North Carolina convention delegates are atypical of all southern Democratic Party activists, and perhaps reactions to the Jackson candidacy involve some unique dynamics. A fuller understanding of how activists respond to racially-related events or issues, what the underlying attitudinal sources of these reactions are, and what impact is exerted by the local racial context will depend on further work in this area. The goal of this study has been to suggest some variables and relationships that seem useful for further research into contemporary southern politics.

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APPENDIX

- 1 *CSPA Survey* The survey data reported in this paper are drawn from a survey of delegates attending the North Carolina Democratic Party State Convention held in Raleigh on June 16, 1984. This was part of a larger survey project in which delegates to the state Democratic and Republican Party conventions were interviewed in thirteen states. The overall project was coordinated by Robert Steed, Laurence Moreland, and Tod Baker, all of the Citadel. The North Carolina surveys were conducted by Charles Prybyl and E. Lee Bermick. A standard questionnaire was used across the states, but the survey of the North Carolina Democratic delegates added a set of items on the Jackson candidacy and related issues, and the responses to these items provide much of the data reported here. The self-administered questionnaires were distributed to the delegates as they picked up their materials and as they entered the convention hall. The questionnaires were collected by people stationed at the exits and by the principal investigators who circulated throughout the convention. A total of 954 usable questionnaires were obtained. The Democratic Party records indicate that 1,543 delegates attended, making the response rate 62%. This analysis is concerned solely with the 683 white Democratic Party delegates. Additional information about the study, including the questionnaire and item marginals, will be provided to interested individuals on request.
- 2 *Operationalization of variables* For much of the analysis, individual items were combined into indices in order to better measure the key concepts. These indices and other key variables are described below. Unless otherwise noted, all index components are measured on five-point scales, running from strongly agree to strongly disagree.
- 3 *Jackson* This index is an overall measure of the respondent's opinion of whether the impact of the Jackson candidacy on the North Carolina Dem-

- ocratic Party would be good or bad. It is formed by taking the mean score on two related items ($\gamma = .51$). One item asked whether the Jackson candidacy was good for the party, and the other asked whether the party would win more votes in November because of the Jackson candidacy. A low score indicates a positive view of the impact.
- b. *Political Ideology.* The respondent's overall ideological orientation is measured by self-placement on a seven-point scale (extremely liberal to extremely conservative), with a low score indicating a liberal orientation.
 - c. *Affirmative Action.* This is a single item asking respondents their opinion of affirmative action programs. Responses are on a five-point scale (strongly agree to strongly disagree), with a low score indicating support. It was not possible to form a more general index measuring support for civil rights programs, because there were not additional items dealing directly with this area.
 - d. *Runoff Primary.* This index measures the respondent's opinion of the desirability of runoff primary elections. It is formed by taking the mean score on four related items (mean interitem $\gamma = .48$): (1) whether runoff primaries hurt black candidates, (2) whether more blacks would be elected if runoff primaries were abolished, (3) whether abolishing runoff primaries would help Republican candidates to win, and (4) whether the runoff primary is good because it insures that the Democratic candidate had majority support. A low score indicates disapproval.
 - e. *Black Mobilization.* This index measures the respondent's belief about the effect that the Jackson candidacy will have on mobilizing black voters, activists, and candidates. It is formed by taking the mean score on four related items (mean interitem $\gamma = .59$): (1) whether there would be increased black voter registration, (2) whether activists working for Jackson would work for other Democrats in November; (3) whether more blacks would run for office, and (4) whether blacks would be more influential within the party. A low score indicates greater mobilization effects.
 - f. *Intra-party Conflict.* This index measures the respondent's belief about the effect that the Jackson candidacy will have on intra-party conflict. It is formed by taking the mean score on two related items ($\gamma = .40$). One item tapped the potential for black dissatisfaction if Jackson did not accomplish enough. The other item measured the potential for white dissatisfaction if the Democratic Party met many of Jackson's demands. A low score indicates less of an intra-party conflict effect.
 - g. *Racial Context.* The racial composition of the respondent's home county is measured in terms of the proportion of the registered voters in the county who are black. Registration figures were obtained from the North Carolina

Board of Elections The black proportion of the county population also was calculated from census figures. This second measure correlates very highly ($r = .98$) with the first, suggesting that there is little practical difference between these two operationalizations.

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Should Congress Listen to Economists?

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Economists prescribe well-known remedies for those situations where private behavior does not maximize allocational efficiency. Legislatures, however, rarely enact microeconomic policies without substantially altering economists' solutions.

Those who defend elected officials' alterations offer three categories of justification—windfall losses of income negate efficiency improvements, indirect redistribution, though inefficient, serves progressive goals without generally repudiating market incomes, command-and-control regulation produces valuable symbolic outputs. Only the first line of argument has merit. Policy prescriptions often are insensitive to the wealth losses they create and can be improved through congressional attention to distributional issues. For the most part, however, no normative goal is well served when Congress ignores economic efficiency in the design of policies.

INTRODUCTION

The division of labor between political scientists and economists in the field of public policy analysis is a source of continuing intellectual friction, particularly in policy schools where they jointly teach. Economists prescribe well-known remedies for those situations where private-market behavior does not maximize allocational efficiency. Political scientists describe how "real" legislatures work (they generally don't listen to economists), develop positive theories to explain why the Congress does not enact microeconomists' policy proposals (Fiorina, 1977, Shepsle, Weingast, and Johnsen, 1981, Shepsle and Weingast, 1984, Nien and Ordeshook, 1985), and analyze large distributive questions (Rawls, 1971, Nozick, 1974, Hochschild, 1981). The question I consider in this paper is whether political scientists have a normative role not only at the Rawlsian level but also at the level of garden-variety market interventions (energy, housing, transportation, and telecommunications) where applied microeconomics is so prescriptively dominant.

I first characterize the main features of domestic microeconomic policy recommendations and then examine three potential political rationales for modifying economists' recommendations, paying particular attention to Steven

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Kelman's critique of economic incentives.¹ I conclude that legislators should directly tax and transfer income to adjust the distributional consequences of microeconomic policies but otherwise should optimally correct market failures as economists suggest.

ECONOMISTS' POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS

Economists who evaluate domestic public policies invariably conclude that problems exist because

1. prices do not equal true marginal social costs,
2. certain markets are nonexistent or underdeveloped, or
3. negative distributional aspects of market economies such as disinvestment, income fluctuation, and short-term rents are altered with sector-specific microeconomic policies instead of general tax-and-transfer methods.

When prices do not equal true marginal costs, economists propose that the legislature enact taxes if prices are too low and encourage firm entry if prices are too high. For example, in a recent article on interstate highways, Kenneth Small and Clifford Winston (1986) conclude that trucks do not pay road user fees that cover the marginal damage they inflict on highways. Small and Winston recommend that truck fees be raised drastically now to pay for better-built roads and then lowered once a more damage-resistant road system is in place.

When markets do not exist for various commodities, economists recommend that the government create new property rights. For example, numerous authors have argued that environmental problems are caused mainly by the lack of tradeable property rights in air and water (Kneese and Schultz, 1975; Friedlaender, 1978; Crandall, 1983). To be sure, the Congress would make initial collective choices regarding the acceptable ambient air- and water-quality levels, but once those choices were made, a free market actually would allocate pollution discharges across firms.

When distributional problems (including disinvestment, income variation and excess profits) arise, economists recommend general tax-and-transfer remedies rather than specific market interventions. Let me offer one example. Robert Crandall (1981) argues that falling world iron-ore prices and innovations in ocean shipping during the 1960-1970 period removed constraints that previously had given U.S. steel mills, located near iron-ore deposits, a cost advantage. The U.S. steel industry did not respond to these

¹ I do not discuss the appropriateness of market allocation for the military draft or other tragic choices such as kidney and heart transplants (Calabresi and Bobbitt, 1978). Nor do I discuss the utility of economics as a general positive theory of behavior (Rhoads, 1985). And I do not attempt to explain Congress's behavior except to observe that those citizens who are well-served by Congress's current decisions obviously have more effect on legislators' behavior than the rest of us who do not benefit.

changes and instead continued to use high-cost iron and labor inputs. As a consequence, the return on steel investment in the United States, as estimated by Crandall, is negative and disinvestment has been widespread since the late 1970s, creating real distributional problems for steel workers. Policies that promote markets for high-cost domestic steel, however, support steel-worker incomes at a very high real cost to the economy and also encourage consumers to substitute away from steel products, thus exacerbating the pressure on steel-worker incomes. Everyone would be better off if steel-worker incomes were supported directly through transfers rather than indirectly through steel-market adjustments.

Economists, then, have standard recommendations when they give policy guidance. Should the legislature modify these policy prescriptions? Three subsidiary questions must be answered in order to ascertain whether political institutions ought to alter these microeconomic policy recommendations:

1. What is the normative status of the one-time losses of income and wealth that result when any sector's prices are raised or lowered to remedy market failures?
2. Is the use of price and/or quantity techniques as an indirect method of ameliorating income inequality ever justified?
3. Is the creation of markets to prevent the overuse or underuse of commodities morally inferior to other policy solutions?

TRANSITION LOSSES OF INCOME AND WEALTH


One potential reason to alter economists' policy proposals is the subtle but important distinction between potential and actual Pareto improvements. All policy proposals that alter prices or create markets to improve allocational efficiency create one-time wealth gains and losses. Should those who lose wealth and income because of such policies be protected by political institutions and what form should that protection take? Should gainers be taxed?

Potential Versus Actual Pareto Improvements

Figure 1 graphically displays the wealth difficulties created by most microeconomic policy proposals. The axes represent utility for two groups in society affected by an efficiency-enhancing policy such as the pricing of both local and long-distance telephone service at marginal cost. Social welfare for telephone users before the 1980s is represented by distributions d_1 . Total social welfare is less than it could be in this initial state (within the welfare frontier) because long-distance prices are above incremental costs and numerous long-distance calls whose utility would exceed their costs are not made. Social welfare after long-distance prices were lowered is represented by distribution d_2 . Those who make long-distance calls are better off. Those who make no long-distance

FIGURE 1

ACTUAL VERSUS POTENTIAL PARETO IMPROVEMENTS



calls are worse off because local service is no longer cross-subsidized. And total welfare is much larger than the initial state.

Economists initially argued that any policy, such as telephone repricing that moved the economy from d_1 to d_2 was a Pareto improvement because the resulting distribution always could be rearranged to make everyone better off (distribution d_2) (Kaldor, 1939, 1940, Hicks, 1939, 1941). Scitovsky (1941) however, demonstrated that if the distribution d_2 that resulted from the implementation of an economic policy actually had more goods for some parties and fewer for others, then a move back to the status quo (d_1) also would be an improvement by the same criteria that approved the move to d_2 , if the change in distribution also changed equilibrium prices. The logical contradiction noted by Scitovsky can be solved if actual compensation is required and the people who would lose from the policy change, such as the users of local service, would be incapable of bribing those in favor of it, large users of long distance, for less money than they would require in compensation to approve the change.²

Political scientists argue that the problems of mixed gains and losses found in potential Pareto improvements should be managed through majority rule instead of compensation (Rae, 1969, Taylor, 1969). The use of majority rule

² The Scitovsky criterion insures that the better distribution could not be brought about through simple redistribution instead of microeconomic changes plus compensation (Little, 1957, p. 100).

maximizes a citizen's benefits from social decisions, given uncertainty about his position and the position of his descendants in the distribution of decision involving gains and losses. Majority rule lowers the likelihood that individual become pivotal and thus able to extract large sums for their consent to transactions that inflict losses. The losers, however, are forced to accept social decisions without compensation. The fairness of majority rule depends on whether the members of winning coalitions vary across decisions. If those who lose under majority rule lose repeatedly, then gains and losses do not balance across time and lack of compensation becomes a severe problem.

The issues involved in compensation versus majority rule relate directly to current dilemmas in the microeconomic management of airlines, telephones, banks, trucks, and the environment. In each of these areas, policies have been enacted or proposed that either lower prices through the elimination of entry restrictions (airlines, telephones, banks, and trucks) or raise them through the replacement of allocation by regulation with allocation by price (environment). In the former, employees lose income and owners lose wealth as the loss of entry barriers lowers the value of their assets. In the latter, holder of wilderness rights and discharge permits lose income, while owners of land and the taxpayers at large, and those who seek to utilize the environment (but can not because of entry regulations) gain income. These policies, then, are potential Pareto improvements of the character d_1 to d_2 in figure 1 and not actual Pareto improvements because compensation for the regulatory changes does not occur.

Can Losers Be Categorized?

Should the losers in these cases have political standing and, if so, what should political institutions do for them? The choice between majority rule and the new welfare economics is whether changes in status-quo property rights are purchased or simply enacted by majority rule. One possible solution would categorize changes in property rights as compensable or noncompensable and allow majority rule redistribution of rights only in those situations defined as noncompensable. In compensable situations, losers would have to give their consent freely to changes, presumably in return for compensation.

Compensable policy changes might include genuine shifts in priorities or responses to exogenous events where citizens could not have foreseen the need for modifications in the rules of the game. For example, the siting of roads, prisons, and mental health facilities often creates negative externalities for surrounding residents who purchased a certain collective ambience along with their homes. Compensation could accompany the construction of such facilities. Noncompensable changes could include those windfall losses created by the proper collective treatment of public goods and market failure where citizens could foresee the need for reform. For example, if the legislature enacted policies only where market failures existed, then citizens never

would have had the privileges created by milk-marketing restrictions, taxi medallions, and airline and trucking regulation. The removal, therefore, of the privileges created by policy errors would not be compensable.

In practice, the distinction breaks down between losses created by the eradication of privilege (noncompensable) and those created by normal alteration of the rules of the game (compensable). Public policies that create privilege (augment the income of a particular sector) increase the value of existing assets, but as entry occurs into the sector, the asset values return to their pre-privilege levels. Even if entry does not dissipate the rents entirely, only those entrepreneurs who own assets prior to the policy change would receive windfall wealth gains. Those who buy assets after the policy change would pay for the increased income and would not receive excess profits.

The reverse occurs when a policy change removes or alters a policy privilege. Returns are lowered to below normal levels initially, but disinvestment and unemployment occur to restore the equilibrium. If the industry is competitive, then only those who go bankrupt lose wealth. If the industry is not competitive (difficult entry and exit) two results occur. Those firms that remain in business and were in business prior to the enactment of the privilege simply lose the windfall gains they received. Firms that enter the industry after the enactment of the policy privilege and remain in business after its removal lose real wealth because they never received windfalls when they entered the industry (Tullock, 1980, Dorfman, 1981).

The enactment of policy privileges creates wealth windfalls only when entry is restricted and only for existing owners. The repeal of policy privileges creates compensable losses in only two situations: when entry (and exit) are easy and some owners become bankrupt (and some employees lose their jobs) and when entry is restricted and newcomers who paid for the policy privileges suffer real wealth losses. Thus, a classification scheme that sorts economic transactions involving gains and losses into compensable and noncompensable categories based on the origins of those benefits that were lost would require an extensive accounting system to monitor the timing and price of asset sales.

Compensation Useful Even If Imperfect

Even if such an accounting system could not be developed, some compensation, even if haphazardly distributed, probably would be better than none at all for two reasons. First, regimes that frequently rearrange the rules of the policy game without compensation risk undermining the stability of property rights and lowering total investment because of wealth-loss uncertainty. Second, the provision of compensation improves the likelihood of enacting legislation that promotes allocational efficiency that otherwise would be blocked through political action.

Recent changes in the income-tax law illustrate both propositions. Tax changes have occurred so frequently in the last ten years (1978, 1981, 1982

1984, and 1986), each time creating windfall income and wealth changes, that many political actors support a tax-changes moratorium to create stability in the rules of the game (Shanahan, 1986). The 1986 reform also contained 686 transition rules that protected many citizens and firms from one-time losses of income and wealth. These rules were decried by the press and some members of Congress as favors for the "fat cats," but, in fact, many of the transition rules did ameliorate legitimate wealth-loss concerns and thus facilitated the passage of reform. To be sure, the transition rules did not provide full or equitable compensation because the privileges were not given to all firms and most rules merely delayed the timing of the wealth loss, but the tax-reform experience illustrates that explicit attention to transitional wealth losses can facilitate the passage of reforms that enhance allocational efficiency.

Compensation and Moral Hazard Some economists believe that actual compensation would not enhance efficiency even if accounting systems were developed to monitor asset ownership and determine how asset values were affected by policy decisions (Baumol, 1986, chap. 5). In particular, Baumol believes that compensation both discourages externality victims from protecting themselves and encourages people to become victims. For example, Baumol believes that once citizens suspect a policy change will happen, they would buy the relevant assets or seek employment in the affected industries in order to receive compensation when the wealth loss occurred. I believe that moral hazard of this sort could be minimized through the enactment of retroactive legislation. Congress already manages wealth games by enacting grandfathering provisions. For example, to avoid a last minute equipment-buying spree, the repeal of the investment tax credit in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was effective January 1, 1986, even though the Act was enacted in August.

If the meaning of compensation is expanded to include schemes that legislatively create a limited but non-zero amount of property rights for "harms," allocate them equally across individuals, and require those who commit harms to buy the rights to do so (compensation), then Baumol's position is even less tenable for two reasons. First, victims' consent surely ought to be an input into the production process. At competitive equilibrium, the price of consent (compensation) would equal the cost of the least expensive preventative measures that victims could practice to keep their welfare constant. If they choose to accept compensation but not take preventative measures, allocational efficiency would not be reduced because their preferences were served better by money than by prevention. Second, Baumol also assumes the victims' behavioral choices include only prevention and inaction. The absence of compensation, however, induces citizens to use political activity to prevent policy changes that cause wealth losses. Political activity, of course, consumes resources and must be considered in any claims about optimality.

Compensation and Windfall Gains An additional obstacle to compensation is the need for symmetry in the treatment of windfall gains and losses created by policy activity. If compensation is provided to those who lose from economic transactions, then they need not expend resources on political activity designed to prevent losses imposed by the political system. The gains from reduced political activity will not be realized, however, if the windfall gains that result from political action also are not taxed because interest groups will seek to gain through the taxation of the general public knowing that if they succeed, their gains cannot be taken without compensation. In order to enhance allocational efficiency and distributional equity, the same accounting devices used to determine compensation also must be used to extract taxes from those who benefit from public action.

The Congress, then, either can provide compensation to those who lose and tax those who gain wealth and income because of changes in microeconomic public policies, or they can enact such changes through majority rule without compensation. At equilibrium both policies would have the same distributional effects because if no compensation ever were offered, all asset prices would be lower, reflecting the uncertainty that majority-rule political activity would create losses (Posner, 1980). The expected value of profits would be identical under both regimes.

Allocational efficiency, however, probably would differ under the two schemes. Total investment and income would be higher if owners knew that wealth losses created by policy changes would be compensated assuming the actual transaction costs involved in determining the scope and level of compensation were not prohibitive, the compensation schemes did not create moral hazard as discussed by Baumol, and windfall gains also were taxed. If compensation were not provided, total investment probably would be lower and numerous resources would be devoted to blocking legislative decisions that promote efficiency but create wealth losses. On balance then, compensation is the desirable option if the costs of implementation do not exceed the other benefits.

INDIRECT VERSUS DIRECT REDISTRIBUTION

In practice, the main discrepancies between actual policy decisions and economists' proposals occur because elected officials alter microeconomic relationships within a sector of the economy to augment the incomes of particular citizens or firms. Agricultural price supports, steel- and auto-import quotas, telephone cross-subsidies, tax privileges, rent controls, occupational licenses, and numerous other policies attempt to alter the market distribution of income in favor of groups that legislatures deem deserving.

Economists believe such indirect redistributive policies are counterproductive for a number of reasons. First, deadweight loss, a measure of sales that do not take place because of distorted prices, is created by all indirect

measures and severely limits the actual amount that is redistributed. David Bradford (1986, p. 207), for example, reports that efficiency losses created by tax privileges equal one-quarter to one-third of the current federal tax revenue. The recent voluntary auto-import quotas protected auto employment at an estimated cost of \$160,000 per job (Lawrence and Litan, 1985). Auto workers earn much less, of course, the differences are deadweight loss, which simply disappears from the economy, and rents to other countries, such as Japan.

Second, the intended redistribution does not occur at all if policies do not restrict firm and labor entry into the sector receiving the subsidies. The tax provisions affecting oil companies provide an illustration. Since the 1930s, liberals have railed against the depletion allowance and the intangible drilling-cost allowance—two features of the corporate income tax that allegedly create excess profits for oil-well owners. After these tax provisions became law, the rate of return on petroleum wells indeed did rise above the market rate of return. Those excess profits, however, spurred entry into the petroleum business to lower the rate of return. To the extent the rate of return did not fall to the market level, because of various entry barriers, the higher than normal cash flow created by the tax provisions was capitalized into the price of petroleum assets. Existing owners and their employees received windfall gains, but all subsequent owners paid a higher price for the assets, reducing their rate of return to the market level. Thus, contrary to conventional accounts of ruggles over the retention or repeal of policy privileges, many recipients of these privileges really do not receive windfall gains in income or wealth.

The third problem with indirect price-and-quantity regulatory attempts to augment incomes (when they actually do redistribute) is then pronounced tendency to aid precisely those individuals who don't require help. When prices for energy, apartments, and phones are kept below market levels, the bulk of the benefits flow to upper-income people if the commodity use is income elastic, as it often is. When prices for steel, autos, and other commodities are held above market levels, high-wage workers and the owners of assets are the beneficiaries. Rarely are indirect strategies utilized to raise the incomes of K-Mart employees or secretaries.

Finally, redistribution by indirect means creates allocational distortions that alter consumer and firm behavior to the point where new policy problems are created and governmental intervention in the economy is discredited. Petroleum policies illustrate this pattern.

Since the 1930s, attempts to augment the incomes of petroleum producers through tax privileges and price stabilization measures generally have induced more investment, more petroleum production, and further downward pressure on incomes. By 1966, wells in Texas were producing only at 34% of capacity in order to preserve prices at what were thought to be acceptable levels (McDonald, 1971, p. 189). Efforts to protect consumer incomes also have

induced counterproductive behavior. Domestic petroleum price controls, used during the 1973–1979 period to protect consumer incomes, created unequal profits for refiners. To equalize the profits of refiners that had differential access to price-controlled oil, the Department of Energy developed an oil-entitlement program that gave money to those refiners that imported more than average amounts of crude oil. Refiners responded, of course, by importing oil and placing pressure on the world market exactly at the time when our stated policy was energy independence (Kalt, 1981).

Elected officials use sector-specific microeconomic policies to redistribute income because most Americans give special moral status to incomes earned through labor market activity (Hochschild, 1981). Legislators do not get elected on the basis of campaign slogans that state we could reduce federal spending greatly if only we paid people to live in rural states instead of calling them farmers and paying them to grow commodities for which there is no demand. Politicians do get elected by promising to save farmers, save industries and save communities. Economic analysts cannot state that such slogans are wrong. They only can state that we pay an extremely high price to shroud our redistributive efforts with political symbols. If the public were fully informed of the arguments against microeconomic redistributive efforts, perhaps citizens would favor more direct redistribution and oppose such steep costs for symbols.³

CREATION OF MARKETS

A final dispute between economists and Congress involves the resolution of market failures, that is those situations where market institutions do not implement the Pareto rule successfully. Transactions that make some citizens better off and none worse off, that do not take place in private markets are called positive market failures (externalities) while those that make some citizens worse off but still occur are called negative market failures.

Positive externalities often are referred to as public goods. Private uncoordinated behavior will supply these goods in less than optimal amounts because consumption cannot be restricted easily to those who pay and because one person's consumption does not detract from another's consumption. Knowledge, defense, and local streets, just to name a few commodities, have such characteristics, and all are provided suboptimally by private markets.

Negative externalities exist when markets for harms do not exist or are underdeveloped. Bad outcomes are oversupplied in these situations because the commodity in question does not have to be purchased. Pollution, congestion and land-use conflicts are examples of negative externalities that exist because

³ If citizens continued to favor the use of microeconomic policies to redistribute income even after they were fully informed of the consequences, then economists could only note the price paid for such tastes.

property rights do not adequately protect third parties from losses in welfare.⁴ What institutions can remedy the failure of markets to implement the Pareto rule in these situations? In this final section, I characterize economists' solutions to market-failure problems and compare their recommendations with those of a prominent political scientist (Kelman, 1981)

Economists and Market Failures

Economists have demonstrated that optimal provision of public goods requires the state to utilize blind bidding to ascertain the demand for these goods, provide an amount equal to the sum, and charge citizens according to their individual bids (pure price discrimination) (Lindahl, 1919). The supply of public goods and the allocation of charges that result from Lindahl's scheme have been shown by Samuelson (1954) to be Pareto optimal.⁵ In practice, of course, Congress uses majority rule to make separate expenditure and revenue decisions, but if the legislature used a more Samuelson-like procedure, many of our current fiscal problems would disappear.⁶

Coase (1960) has shown that the resolution of negative externality problems need not involve any public action. In the absence of transaction costs, private behavior will "correct" negative externalities. The distribution of income and the equilibrium amount of nastiness, however, may differ depending on the assignment of status-quo property rights. For example, if firms must bribe residents before producing pollutants, ambient air quality probably will be better and the income transfer higher than if citizens must bribe firms to reduce negative environmental effects.

In addition to these initial wealth effects, most real-world externalities involve gains and losses for groups of people and not individuals, such as the farmer and rancher used in Coase's analysis. In group situations, externalities will not be resolved optimally because the benefits of the bargain cannot be restricted to those who contribute to the negotiations and subsequent income transfer. Externality negotiations are a public good from the perspective of individual members of the group. In these situations, collective action by government can improve citizens' welfare. For example, the legislature could provide bargaining, negotiation, and preference-revelation services to diffuse consumers to facilitate their bargaining ability in those situations where they bargained with a firm, airport, or any other organized entity.

⁴ See Kneese and Schultze (1975) or Schultze (1977) for the standard argument.

⁵ Economists have designed various bidding procedures that promote accurate preference revelation and are Pareto optimal. See Clarke (1971), Groves and Loeb (1975), and Tideman and Tullock (1976). Most economists treat these preference-revelation mechanisms as theoretical curiosities rather than practical plans. An exception is Kunreuther et al. (1987).

⁶ Analysts largely have concluded that the differences between reality and a public-goods auction result in overexpenditure on essentially private goods that interest groups secure from Congress and underexpenditure on genuine public goods (Mueller, 1979, chap. 8).

When property rights are created for behavior that has negative side-effect such as SO₂ emissions, airport noise, the location of poor people, or imported oil use, their distribution is a pure political problem. As long as the rights are dispersed sufficiently to allow a robust competitive market to develop, economic efficiency is not better served by one distribution or another. I personally favor an equal distribution, but other distributions are defensible.

Political Scientists and Market Failures

Market-failure solutions proposed by political scientists (regulatory approaches) differ from economists' prescriptions in several important ways. First, the regulatory approach has no particular procedures for establishing the amount of public good to be provided, such as the level of ambient air quality in the case of air pollution. Environmentalists, strong advocates of the use of bureaucratic standards to create a clean environment, often believe that ambient air quality should equal the preferences of those individuals who favor the cleanest air. Other environmentalists simply calculate the appropriate amount of clean air indirectly by summing the maximum technologically feasible individual pollution-reduction efforts. Numerous environmental laws, for example, require firms to install equipment that reduces emissions as much as is technically feasible (Ackerman and Hassler, 1981). Whatever ambient air quality results from this reduction effort is the collective choice. I find nothing, however, in Kelman's (1981) defense of existing regulatory procedures that necessitates or even discusses these or any other procedures to determine the amount of clean air to be supplied.

The second difference between the economic and regulatory approaches is the latter's insistence that firms expend resources to reduce equally their pollution discharges, regardless of the relative costs of doing so across firms. From Kelman's perspective, contributions to the environment are analogous to contributions to national military service. Just as no one should be able to evade his draft responsibilities in exchange for money, no one should contribute unequally to the nation's environmental quality.

Third, under the command-and-control approach, firms do not pay for emissions whose levels are below the standard, whereas under the economists' scheme, all emissions are paid for.⁴

Finally, proponents of the regulatory approach believe that economic methods cannot supply certain symbols that are essential components of a

⁴ I use the terms legal/bureaucratic, regulatory, standards and fines, and command and control interchangeably throughout the remainder of the paper to refer to policies that directly specify compliance behavior.

⁵ Technically, of course, the state can allocate initial emission rights at no cost and then allow trading to occur.

good society. Kelman argues that the application of economics to the supply of clean air and other market failures.

1. does not stigmatize those who violate the rules of the public-good provision scheme,
2. prevents society from examining the motives of those who don't comply with the rules of the public-good provision scheme, and
3. reduces the value of the public good compared to provision motivated by shared belief in the commons.

Table 1 lists the main characteristics of the regulatory and economic approaches applied to the air pollution case. The economic scenario supplies one output—clean air—and supplies it at levels that people want at minimum cost. The regulatory approach supplies several outputs—clean air, implementation discretion, all the symbols that legal proceedings can provide, and the good feelings that arise when goods are equally distributed and trading is not allowed. Does the command-and-control approach supply these extra outputs, Kelman asserts? Is the economic approach incapable of supplying them? The command-and-control approach actually supplies these extra outputs, are they worth the costs?

The Outputs of Regulatory Solutions to Market Failures

Kelman correctly asserts that an ideal regulatory system does castigate and stigmatize those who violate social rules and sends signals to the rest of us to internalize norms and abide by the law because we should, not because our interests are served. In practice, however, the regulation of behavior through legal procedures deviates from the ideal and, as a result, the symbols that Kelman values are not produced frequently. Legal procedures are extremely expensive and collectively we seem unwilling to expend the resources necessary to operate an effective legal system. The actual behavior of many court systems approaches the market that supporters of the legal approach so deplore: those who transgress the rules of the game and get caught often plea bargain and pay a charge for their bad behavior.

The production of stigma by regulatory procedures is probably less related to the use of judicial procedures per se than to the fraction of the population that engages in the behavior, the severity of punishment, and the degree of public exposure. Automobile moving violations probably endanger more lives, and deserve more stigma, than heroin operations run by the Mafia, but legal procedures do not stigmatize those who commit the former because too many people commit moving violations and the punishment is not severe. Legal procedures create stigma if and only if other social norms degrade and limit the incidence of the behavior.

The second virtue of traditional legal-regulatory approaches in Kelman's view is their ability to take account of motives. Not all people who shoot others

TABLE 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF REGULATORY AND ECONOMIC SCHEMES OF
POLLUTION ABATEMENT

Characteristic	Regulatory Approach	Economic Approach
Method for determining amount of clean air provided	Maximum feasible emission reduction creates aggregate result	Standard public goods aggregation procedure
Distribution of property rights	Citizens own air and firms pay	Separate collective decision
Payment for infra-marginal units of pollution	No	Yes
Level of discharge reduction by individual firms	Equal subject to discretion of judicial system	Whatever levels maximize gains at a given cost level
Is stigma placed on those who discharge at unacceptable levels?	Yes	No

are convicted of murder because the law cares deeply about why people kill others and not simply about the fact that someone has killed another person. Kelman correctly asserts that the economic approach to pollution abatement is concerned with results—ambient air quality—and their costs and not with the reasons firms pollute, but in my view the command-and-control approach is not concerned with motives either. Motives play a role in the adjudication of policy violations regardless of whether regulatory or economic methods are used. Command-and-control techniques directly prescribe behavior while economic techniques prescribe property rights and prices, but motives play no role in either system until someone violates the rules. Then—and only then—do motives play a role and—as I explain in the next section, motives can play a role in the adjudication of violations under either system.

The final and most difficult claim to assess is whether the standards-and-fines approach, through its emphasis on equal contribution to a public good (or prevention of a public bad), effectively promotes norms that discourage free-rider behavior. The ideal driving Kelman's argument is the response to a small-town barn fire, flood, or similar collective problem. Citizens simply pitch in and get the job done. Kelman is absolutely correct when he argues that markets work and property rights receive respect, in large part, because we internalize the rules and not because we calculate the marginal benefit of compliance. But how much should the small-town analogy govern national public-goods policies?

Because small towns are small by definition and often homogenous through self-selection and exclusion, equal contribution to public goods occurs volun-

tarily and with few costs. As the population grows and diverges in beliefs and circumstances, however, identical behavior creates costs for those individuals who disagree. As groups grow in size and become more heterogeneous, should people be allowed to trade what were previously equal public-goods obligations? If they are allowed to do so, will they retain enough shared norms to maintain a civil society?

Kelman answers both questions negatively. I share Kelman's concerns but believe that national public goods realistically cannot be provided in the same manner as small towns rebuild barns. Second, and more importantly, the regulatory system does not create the emotional bonds and internalized norms that Kelman so values. In fact, many argue that the extensive use of legal methods to resolve disputes in the United States has eliminated the role of trust in professional and managerial relationships (Vogel, 1983).

The Outputs of Market Solutions to Market Failures

Regardless of whether regulatory solutions to market failures produce valued symbolic outputs, if the solutions favored by economists also can provide stigma, motive examination, and emotional bonds, then the difficult trade-offs between the two approaches disappear. Both proponents and opponents of economic solutions to policy problems often forget that market systems require enforcement and hence require the legal methods favored by Kelman just as much as a command-and-control regulatory system. Firms that discharge pollutants in excess of the air rights they have purchased are similar in all respects to firms that violate standards under a regulatory approach. In both cases, violations must be detected and legal methods used to determine guilt and punishment. If stigma and motive examination are produced by legal methods, they easily can be part of the economic approach.

The one attribute of a legal-regulatory approach that cannot be created by market solutions is the equality of contributions to a collective good. Since the structural heart of the market approach is the ability to trade (and therefore to allow contributions of actors to vary), whatever outputs are created by equal contributions cannot be supplied by market methods. As I argued in the previous section, however, I do not believe that nonmarket regulatory methods actually produce the shared norms and community that proponents believe and hence the apparent loss is not a real one.

Are Symbols Worth the Cost?

Assume for a moment that Kelman's arguments concerning the important benefits that flow from nonmarket regulatory methods are correct. The implementation of these methods still might not be a sound social policy because they impose costs. The first is the deadweight loss that arises because firms cannot contribute differentially to collective goods. Under existing policy,

costs and benefits are not equated across pollutants or across different poll sources for the same pollutant. While precise estimates of the welfare loss are unknown, Crandall (1983, p. 64) has demonstrated that pollution fees that are set too low or too high (marginal costs lower or higher than the marginal benefit) create smaller efficiency losses than pollution standards that are set too low or too high as long as threshold health effects of the pollutant are minimal (marginal benefit curve is relatively flat).

Standards are optimal only for those pollutants where errors in the amount of discharge would create enormous costs. If the tax on nerve gas, for example, were incorrectly set and a bit too much were released, the nearby population would die, creating a large welfare loss. The industrial pollution debate, however, is about particulates, hydrocarbons, sulfates, and nitrogen oxides that do not have pronounced threshold effects, and not about nerve gases.

A final cost of standards is the tendency for Congress and the bureaucracy to design and implement standards that create additional wealth windfalls to existing firms beyond those created by the lack of payments for discharges that are less than the standards set by Congress and the EPA. Jackson and Leon (1981) argue, for example, that implementation of water-pollution regulation in the paper industry created quasi-rents for existing firms and delayed entry of new firms. Pashigian (1984) concludes that environmental laws have sharply reduced the growth of small firms and increased the size of the optimal plant. Crandall (1983, chap. 7) argues that the New Source Performance Standards are an attempt by northern congressmen to slow the growth of new industry in the South and West. The redistribution of wealth from taxpayers to firms created in the existing system by the lack of payment for discharges less than the standard and the use of differential standards for existing firms does not seem defensible on distributional grounds. Certainly most environmentalists would be appalled when informed that the policies they support give wealth to the "bad guys."

CONCLUSION

More often than not, Congress does not implement the policy prescriptions of microeconomists. Political scientists have extensively and successfully documented why members find it electorally useful to ignore efficiency advice. In addition, however, political scientists often have supplied distributional or philosophical rationales for Congress's behavior. In this paper, I have examined these arguments and the relevant economics in order to ascertain whether some obvious defensible normative goal is served when Congress ignores economists' policy recommendations.

I conclude that economic policy prescriptions often are insensitive to the transitional wealth losses that occur when market failures are corrected through policy. Congress clearly has a role to play in designing compensation

schemes to alter the distributional consequences of policies that promote efficiency, but it has rarely done so. Congress has played a more active role in the traditional distributional concerns of politics, but its persistent use of indirect, sector-specific, and regulatory methods to serve equity and moral concerns actually results in extensive privileges for the already fortunate.

Congressional deviations from economists' recommendations, often thought by political scientists as necessary to serve distributional goals, only rarely aid the poor. If Congress really wishes to aid those citizens that currently benefit from indirect, sectoral, price-and-entry policies, it could do so more cheaply if it followed economists' advice.

In conclusion, I find no defensible normative goal that is well served when Congress ignores economic efficiency in the design of policies.

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Group Components of the Presidential Vote, 1952-1984

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Except for bivariate analyses, previous research on the group basis of partisan strength in the United States has focused on party identification as the dependent variable. This essay examines the group basis of the presidential vote, 1952-1984, using a multivariate logit approach. Our multivariate analysis shows the persistence of group-based divisions between Republican and Democratic voters. Among other patterns, class-based divisions have noticeably increased.

Students of electoral realignment commonly focus on group differences in party choice. Numerous studies have examined the effects of group characteristics upon party identification over a series of elections. Knoke (1976), Petrocik (1981), Wattenberg and Miller (1981), Stanley, Bianco, and Niemi (1986). As a class, these studies are rigorously multivariate, examining the effect of each group characteristic while controlling for the others. Because these studies examine party identification over a series of election surveys, they can be examined for the kind of changes in group coefficients that would signal a partisan realignment. Collectively, however, these studies show few changes in group effects on party identification. Two exceptions are the sizeable increase in black support for the Democratic party, beginning with the 1964 election, and the secular decline in Democratic strength in the South.¹

The data utilized here were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. We owe a special note of gratitude to John Sprague. The authors are solely responsible for the errors in this paper.

Some recent studies focus on groups not as demographic descriptors but as social psychological reference categories that are useful for political attitude formation. To mention a few, see Brady and Sniderman (1985), Conover (1987), Lau (1983), Dennis (1987), Kiecolt (1987), and Miller, Gorm, Gorm, and Malanchuk (1981). To date, however, this approach has had little application to partisanship or voting decisions. Whatever the merits of studying affect for or identification

Oddly, these multivariate analyses of *party identification* have not been paralleled by similar multivariate analyses of group influences on *presidential voting*. The study of groups and the presidential vote has been dominated by Axelrod's (1972, 1974, 1978, 1982, and 1986) quadrennial reports of group coalitions in presidential contests. Axelrod's highly stylized reports are bivariate in nature, reporting (for example) the proportions of Republican and Democratic voters in the most recent election who were black, poor, or non-Protestant. Valuable though Axelrod's reports are, their lack of multivariate controls do not allow separation of group effects from spurious associations.

In our view, presidential voting has several compelling advantages over party identification as the dependent variable of choice for the multivariate analysis of partisan change:

1. Elections are decided by votes, not party identification. For instance, from 1968 through 1988 the Republicans won five out of six presidential elections—the best record of success since the Democrats' five successive post-Depression victories to begin the New Deal realignment. Yet the net balance of party identification has changed only glacially since 1968, giving little hint of the ongoing Republican success story.
2. Some groups typically cast presidential votes quite different from their party identifications. Most notable in this respect are white southerners. It would be folly to project a future of Democratic voting by white southerners on the basis of their (still) persistent Democratic identification.
3. Suppose the United States truly is undergoing a partisan realignment, with long-term changes in group partisan leanings. If so, presidential voting—not party identification—almost certainly would be the leading indicator of any realignment. When and if changing group allegiances causes a partisan realignment, the change should be evident in presidential voting before it becomes evident in the more durable variable of party identification. By almost all accounts, for instance, that is what happened at the advent of the New Deal realignment. First, certain groups began to *vote* more Democratic, and only secondly began to identify or affiliate with the Democratic party (Sundquist, 1973; Markus and Converse, 1979; Erikson and Tedin, 1981).
4. Even for normal times without realignment, we do not know how much short-term changes in group effects contribute to the often dramatic short-term changes in presidential vote outcomes. Groups often seem to create electoral news by voting contrary to their electoral tradition (e.g., union members "bolting to the G. O. P."). But do these movements simply reflect the flow of all groups uniformly to the same partisan tide? Or do groups

with certain groups, no apparatus exists to allow an examination of psychological reference categories back very far in time. To cite one limitation, feeling thermometer scores for Catholics, poor people, blacks, etc., were not collected in NES surveys prior to 1972.

move in different directions to the common short-term forces of a particular presidential campaign.²

The present essay reports a multivariate analysis of group influences on presidential voting, 1952-1984. As did Stanley, Bianco, and Niemi (1986) in their study of party identification, we borrow considerably from Axelrod's paradigm of group differences. For each election from 1952 through 1984, we computed a multivariate logit equation predicting presidential voting from several group characteristics. We included variants of each of Axelrod's group variables—race, religion, poverty, union membership, city size, and region. These variables reflect the group divisions that are typically thought to reflect partisan differences going back to at least the New Deal. We also added three group variables that have emerged only recently as prominent candidates to predict presidential voting. These are age, gender, and education.

METHODOLOGY

Except for religion (Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, other), we operationalized the independent variables as dichotomies. This facilitates comparison of the effects of different group divisions. To facilitate the comparison of group effects across time, we took care to maintain the appropriate constant operationalization of variables across time.

The dependent variable is the presidential vote among major-party voters, 1952-1984, coded 1 = Democratic and 0 = Republican. Independent variables are:

Race: BLACK—Black = 1, otherwise = 0.

Religion: CATHOLIC—Catholic = 1, otherwise = 0; JEWISH—Jewish = 1, otherwise = 0; NO RELIGION—no religious affiliation or non-Judeo-Christian affiliation = 1, otherwise = 0. Note that Protestant is the base category on religion, with Catholic, Jewish, and no religion effects based on the comparison with being Protestant.

Poverty: POOR—bottom third on family income (as coded for that year's national election study) = 1, otherwise = 0.

Union membership: UNION—union member in household = 1, otherwise = 0.

City size: METRO—resident of one of the twelve largest SMSAs in 1970 (census) = 1, otherwise = 0. Metropolitan areas grow (sometimes at different rates) but central cities often do not. Thus, to compare city size effects over time, we defined city in terms of SMSA instead of central city. Also to facilitate cross-time comparison, we kept the same set of twelve cities from 1952 through 1984. Conveniently, the same twelve SMSAs comprise the top twelve in the 1950, 1960, and 1970 censuses.

Region SOUTHERN WHITE—nonblack resident of one of eleven former Confederate states = 1, otherwise = 0

Education COLLEGE—college graduate = 1, otherwise = 0. College graduates vote disproportionately Republican for president, but it seemed of interest to see whether this held true while other group characteristics held constant

Gender FEMALE—female = 1, male = 0

Age YOUNG—under 30 = 1, otherwise = 0

We use logit rather than regression analysis because the dependent variable is dichotomous. With logit, the dependent variable is transformed to be the log of the odds ratio, or

$$\ln[p/(1-p)]$$

with p here the probability of voting Democratic. The log of the odds is presumed to be a linear function of the independent variables. Estimated logit effects can be transformed back to effects on probabilities, but these will depend on the voter's initial probability of voting Democratic based on other group characteristics.

The logit coefficients for each group characteristic for each election, 1952–1984, are reported in appendix A. Strictly speaking, logit coefficients cannot be translated in terms of easy-to-understand percents or proportions, except on a conditional basis. However, one can estimate the average marginal impact of each group characteristic in terms of an average percentage difference that the group characteristic makes.² We present these effects as percentages in table 1. For instance, a 45% average difference for blacks in 1952 means that based on the logit equation for that year, blacks voted 45% more Democratic than nonblacks with matching nonracial group characteristics.

THE RESULTS

The results shown in table 1 can be examined from several perspectives. Comparing coefficients across groups allows one to assess the electoral importance of group differences relative to other group differences. Comparing coefficients across time allows one to assess group movement over time, relative

² This method of displaying logit results was employed by Stanley, Bianco, and Niemi (1996) in their analysis of party identification. Stanley, Bianco, and Niemi chose to measure party identification as a dichotomy (Democratic vs. other). The comparability of method allows rough comparisons of the effects of some group characteristics on the presidential vote with their effect on party identification, using percent differences as the scale of magnitude. A comparison of our results (table 1) and Stanley, Bianco, and Niemi's (1996, p. 971, table 2) shows greater effects of race and union membership on the vote than on party identification, but greater effects of southern region on party identification. Religion and gender effects appear about the same for the vote and for identification.

TABLE 1
IMPACT OF GROUP CHARACTERISTICS ON DEMOCRATIC
PRESIDENTIAL VOTING, 1952-1984

	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984
Black	+ 45**	+ 30*	+ 37*	+ 39*	+ 66*	+ 58*	+ 49*	+ 57*	+ 54*
Poor	+ 5	+ 6*	1	+ 9*	- 1	+ 6*	- 11*	+ 13*	+ 17*
Union	+ 19*	+ 17*	+ 13*	+ 19*	+ 9*	+ 14*	+ 17*	+ 19*	+ 21*
College	- 8	7	7	12*	8*	+ 9*	10*	0	+ 6
Young	+ 1	- 1	+ 1	+ 6	3	+ 5*	1	3	- 4
Female	- 1	- 6*	- 6	+ 3	+ 0	+ 6	+ 1	+ 7*	+ 7*
Metro	7*	+ 0	- 2	2	5	4	2	5*	- 0
Catholic	+ 20*	+ 14*	+ 49*	+ 21*	+ 29*	+ 16*	- 16*	+ 10*	+ 13*
Jewish	+ 46*	+ 49*	+ 57*	+ 39*	+ 70	+ 35*	+ 38*	+ 27*	+ 40*
No Religion	+ 19*	+ 22*	+ 22*	+ 13	+ 34*	+ 17*	- 22*	+ 4	+ 20*
Southern	+ 20*	+ 23*	+ 19*	+ 2	5	- 11*	+ 7*	+ 3	+ 2
White									
Nonmembers	26 ¹	26	29	50	30	16	34	22	17

¹ Estimated difference between actual percent Democratic for group and what the group's percent Democratic would have been if they had not been group members.

² Predicted percent Democratic for respondents sharing none of the reported group characteristics.

* Indicates significant at .05 level.

Note: Based on major party voters only.

to the electorate as a whole. We can look for both short-term movement and long-term secular shifts. And we can examine whether group differences in general are becoming more or less electorally relevant.

Over the full 32-year span of this study, the major group effects are race, religion, and class. This of course is no surprise. However, it may be a surprise to see the effect of being Jewish (vs. Protestant) is almost as great as the effect of being black (vs. nonblack), and that membership in the "no religion" category generally makes one more Democratic than does being Catholic. It may also be a surprise to see the more important "class" measure to be union membership rather than poverty.

Inter-Group Comparisons

Some group effects turn out to be different in the multivariate analysis from what bivariate analysis would suggest. Urbanism (METRO) shows a small but persistent pro-Republican influence, even though residents of large urban areas tend to vote Democratic. And in the multivariate analysis, the tendencies for youth to vote Democratic and the college educated to vote Republican are far more muted than with simple bivariate comparisons.

Region is another variable with an effect somewhat different than one would expect without the multivariate controls. Southern whites have voted decid-

edly Republican in recent elections, even giving more votes to Ford than to fellow southerner Carter in 1976. But with the multivariate controls, the sign for SOUTHERN WHITE is in the Democratic direction for every election except 1968 and 1972. The reason is that southern whites still vote more Democratic for president than their pro-Republican traits of Protestantism and non-union membership would suggest.

Changes over Time

Only modest changes over time in group effects can be seen. One sees the expected post-1964 growth in black support for Democrats, the 1960 pro-Democratic spike for Catholics, plus the development of a modest gender gap. And although the effect of SOUTHERN WHITE has not turned in the Republican direction, the effect has become noticeably less pro-Democratic since the Eisenhower elections.

Perhaps the most noteworthy trend, however, is the growing class division that becomes clear with the multivariate controls. Union membership shows a steady effect, averaging at 17 percentage points, just under the 20 percentage point differential reported in *The American Voter* (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960, p. 306). The largest estimate of the union membership effect is for 1984. In that year when union members supposedly ignored their leadership to vote for Reagan, union members voted 21 percentage points more Democratic than their non-union counterparts with similar group characteristics. Clearer still, however, is the growth in the effect of POVERTY, especially for the Reagan elections. Until about 1976, being in the bottom third of income had little impact on presidential voting. In 1976, and especially in the two Reagan elections, however, POVERTY has been one of the strongest determinants of the vote.

Meanwhile, the effect of college education undergoes some periodic changes. Once, college education was a reliable indicator of Republican voting. Even with controls for other group effects, the effect of COLLEGE is usually pro-Republican. Nonetheless, the effect of college education actually shows a pro-Democratic sign for two elections, 1972 and 1984, perhaps from short-term increases in the salience of "new class" issues (McAdams, 1987).

Non-group Members and the Vote

Most of the groups we have examined are typically identified as elements of the Democratic party coalition. But what is the trend among voters without group ties? We can make this estimate from the intercepts of the logit equation.

¹ For 1968 and 1980, we also generated equations that included voters for non-major party independent candidates. For 1968, as an alternative to excluding Wallace voters, we compared Humphrey voters with combined Nixon and Wallace voters. For 1980, as an alternative to excluding Anderson voters, we compared combined Carter and Anderson voters with Reagan voters. In each instance, we found no major differences from the original equation.

tions, or—just as good but simpler—from the predicted voting behavior of the “non-group” members. The bottom row of table 1 traces the voting behavior of non-group members, 1952-1984. These nonmembers are northern white male Protestants who are not college educated but not poor, over thirty and living outside the largest SMSAs. These “vanilla” voters show a steady Republicanism that sometimes reaches margins of more than four to one. Still, the Democrats’ plight cannot center solely on a failure to reach nonmembers of the Democratic coalition. When the Democrats do win the presidency (1960, 1964, 1976), the Democrats need no more than about 30% support from the non-group members.

GROUPS AND THE DECLINE IN DEMOCRATIC FORTUNES

Can we account for the declining presidential fortunes of the Democratic party in terms of some sort of decay of the Democratic coalition? A decay of the Democratic coalition could occur in two ways. One way would be if members of the Democratic constituency groups began to vote more like nonmembers. But the pattern of secular growth rather than decline for the group effects, shown in table 1, tells us that group differences in the vote have not decayed. Elements of the Democratic coalition have grown more Democratic—not less—relative to the more Republican elements outside the coalition.

The other way that the Democratic coalition could decay would be if the groups that make up the Democratic coalition were to shrink in size. The proportions of each NES voting sample that belong to each group are reported in appendix B. The major changes in group sizes are the increased proportions of the voting electorate who are black, without religious affiliations, and with college degrees. The former two group characteristics are markers for Democratic voting while the latter group is becoming increasingly Democratic. Thus, we cannot say that the groups that make up the Democratic coalition have decayed in size.⁴

The proper demonstration of the net contribution of each group to the Democratic coalition is to demonstrate each group’s marginal contribution to the division of the popular vote. The marginal impact is the difference between the actual vote and the vote if the group characteristics were absent. For example, the marginal impact for POOR is the difference between the actual vote and the estimate of what the vote would be if the poor were not poor. These estimates of the vote without the particular group characteristic are made by simply multiplying the group effect in percent (table 1) by the proportion of the electorate with the particular group characteristic (appendix B). Table 2 shows these results.

⁴ This exercise does not apply to the variable POOR, since the proportion of the eligible electorate designated as POOR is constrained to be stable over time. The POOR are defined as the poorest one-third of the respondents in each NES survey.

TABLE 2
MARGINAL IMPACT OF GROUP CHARACTERISTICS ON NET
DEMOCRATIC VOTE 1952-1984

	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984
Black	+2 ^a	+1	+2	+3	+6	+5	+4	+7	+5
Poor	+1	+2	-0	+3	-0	+2	+3	+4	+1
Union	+5	+5	+3	+5	+2	+4	+4	+5	+5
College	-1	-1	-1	-2	-1	+2	-2	0	+1
Young	+0	-0	+0	+1	-0	+2	-0	-1	1
Female	-1	3	-3	+2	0	+3	+1	+4	+1
Metro	-2	0	1	1	-1	-1	-1	2	0
Catholic	+5	+3	+11	+5	+7	+4	+4	+2	+4
Jewish	+2	+2	+2	+1	+2	+1	+1	+1	+1
No Religion	+0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+0	+2
Southern White	+3	+5	+4	+0	+1	+2	+1	+1	+0

^a Marginal impact is the product of the group's proportion in the sample (appendix B) and the impact of the group characteristic on the vote (table 1).

Apart from the retreat by southern whites, table 2 shows no pattern of decline in the marginal contribution of the various groups to the Democratic vote. For instance, union membership continues to make a marginal contribution of about five percentage points to the net Democratic vote. As another example, blacks continue to add about five percentage points to the Democratic vote beyond what they would contribute if they voted like whites with similar demographics. Catholics, too, add about four percentage points to the Democratic vote beyond the result if Catholics were to vote like Protestants with similar demographics.

In sum, group characteristics continue to make as much of a difference in the presidential vote as they always have. Obviously, therefore, one cannot force a group explanation for the Democrats' plight in presidential elections. The decline in Democratic fortunes can best be understood not as some sort of decay of the old coalition, but as a general decline in Democratic voting across all groups.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has presented what appears to be the first multivariate examination of the effects of group differences on the presidential vote over time. Estimated group effects are mainly as expected. But some surprises show up when multivariate controls are imposed. They include the large effect of religious affiliation, the persistently pro-Democratic direction of the "white Southerner" effect, and the lack of an effect for metropolitan residence.

One might expect the trail of group effects over time to show an erratic pattern, with groups responding idiosyncratically to candidates and then partly

platforms. But group effects over time are generally more stable than that. If the analysis were to uncover evidence of realignment, it would be in the form of consistent trends over time in group effects. As verification of what is already known, racial differences in voting have increased since the 1950s. More surprisingly, economic class shows a modest increase in electoral importance over time. Differences in group voting have survived nicely in the years since the New Deal.

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APPENDIX A

LOGIT COEFFICIENTS FOR GROUP EFFECTS ON DEMOCRATIC
PRESIDENTIAL VOIE 1952-1984

	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984
Black	+ 1.05	+ 0.64	+ 0.90	+ 4.85	+ 2.10	+ 1.47	+ 1.63	+ 1.65	+ 1.49
Poor	+ 0.12	+ 0.13	+ 0.03	+ 0.22	- 0.00	+ 0.28	+ 0.25	+ 0.34	+ 0.43
Union	+ 0.44	+ 0.38	+ 0.34	+ 0.57	+ 0.21	+ 0.35	+ 0.40	+ 0.46	+ 0.51
College	- 0.21	- 0.17	- 0.22	- 0.29	- 0.23	+ 0.26	- 0.21	- 0.01	- 0.14
Young	+ 0.03	- 0.01	+ 0.11	+ 0.15	- 0.08	+ 0.21	- 0.04	- 0.08	- 0.11
Female	- 0.03	- 0.14	- 0.14	+ 0.06	+ 0.01	+ 0.16	+ 0.03	- 0.17	- 0.18
Metro	- 0.17	+ 0.01	- 0.02	- 0.09	- 0.15	- 0.11	- 0.06	- 0.22	- 0.00
Catholic	+ 0.43	+ 0.31	+ 1.15	+ 0.52	+ 0.63	+ 0.25	+ 0.34	+ 0.23	+ 0.31
Jewish	+ 1.04	+ 1.11	+ 1.62	+ 1.08	+ 1.94	- 0.77	- 0.85	- 0.63	- 0.91
No Religion	+ 0.44	+ 0.49	+ 0.64	- 0.30	- 0.74	+ 0.53	- 0.47	+ 0.11	+ 0.47
Southern	+ 0.44	+ 0.52	+ 0.48	+ 0.03	- 0.12	- 0.31	+ 0.16	+ 0.06	+ 0.05
White									
Intercept	4.49	4.47	4.56	4.96	4.58	4.16	4.66	4.37	4.21

APPENDIX B

PERCENT OF GROUP IN SAMPLE.

	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984
Black	1	4	5	9	9	9	8	11	9
Poor	29	31	28	32	30	28	26	29	24
Union	28	28	26	26	25	26	24	26	25
College	8	10	12	13	16	17	20	25	23
Young	15	14	12	15	16	25	23	22	20
Female	51	52	52	54	56	56	56	55	56
Metro	28	30	25	35	27	27	24	22	21
Catholic	24	24	22	25	23	25	25	23	28
Jewish	4	4	4	3	3	2	3	5	3
No Religion	2	2	1	4	2	5	6	9	7
Southern White	13	20	20	16	18	18	19	24	21

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How the Media Affect What People Think: An Information Processing Approach

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The political messages of newspapers are significantly associated with the substantive political attitudes of a national sample of their readers. Diversity of news perspectives and editorial liberalism show significant relationships to readers' support of interest groups, public policies, and politicians. The relationships vary among self-identified liberals, conservatives, and moderates in accordance with the predictions of information-processing theory. The standard assertion in most recent empirical studies is that media affect what people think *about*, not what they think. The findings here indicate the media make a significant contribution to what people think—to their political preferences and evaluations—precisely by affecting what they think about.

The belief that long dominated the scholarly community is that news messages have "minimal consequences" (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955; Klapper, 1960). Many media scholars still endorse something close to this view (cf. McGuire, 1955; Gans, and Neuman, 1986; also M. Robinson and Sheehan, 1983). The more popular recent view is that media influence is significant, but only in shaping the problems the public considers most important—their agendas (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). In some respects, agenda research challenges the minimal consequences view, but both approaches share a core assumption. Both assume audiences enjoy substantial autonomy in developing their political preferences.

Research contradicting the notion that media have minimal consequence or only influence agendas has emerged during the 1980s (see, e.g., the pioneering yet disparate work of such authors as Bartels, 1985; Patterson, 1980; Ivengar and Kinder, 1987; and Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey, 1987; cf. Rob-

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THE MEDIA AND THE DECAY OF AMERICAN POLITICS by Robert M. Entman.

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inson and Levv, 1986).¹ But this burgeoning research has not yet generated a theory that explicitly refutes the assumption of audience autonomy and explains more fully the media's impact on public opinion. This article probes the theoretical underpinnings of the autonomy assumption and provides empirical evidence that media messages significantly influence what the public thinks by shaping what they think about.

THE RESEARCH TRADITION

The audience autonomy assumption provides the foundation for the minimal consequences position. The assumption is that audiences form their political opinions in relative independence from the media. There are two somewhat distinct variants of this position. The first emphasizes that audiences think about communications selectively, screening out information they do not like (Klapper, 1960, cf. McGuire, 1985). The second holds that audiences pay so little attention and understand so little that the news cannot influence them (Neuman, 1986, cf. MacKuen, 1984).² In practice, both the selectivity hypothesis and the hypothesis of inattention and incomprehension (hereafter just "inattention") hold that media messages tend only to reinforce existing preferences rather than helping to form new attitudes or change old ones. Thus the media have little net impact on politics.

The central assumption of the more recent agenda setting research has been that media do exert significant influence, but only in a narrow sphere. In this view, the public's autonomy is not complete, but its susceptibility to media influence is limited to agendas. Agenda research almost always includes a sentence like this: "Although a 'minimal effects' model most accurately describes the media's ability to change opinions, recent research has shown that the media can play a much larger role in telling us what to think about, if not what to think" (Lau and Erber, 1985, p. 60). almost identical assertions appear throughout the literature, e.g., McCombs and Shaw, 1972; MacKuen, 1984, pp. 372, 386; and even radical critiques such as Parenti, 1985, p. 23; also see MacKuen and Combs, 1981; Behr and Ivengar, 1985; Miller, Erbrung, and Goldenberg, 1979).³ Agenda scholarship does not provide a comprehensive theory that explains why media influence is confined to agendas, but selec-

¹ DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach's "dependency theory" (1982) describes an important theoretical alternative to the autonomy assumption, but that work predates most of the recent surge in empirical evidence.

² Neuman (1986, chap. 6) grounds his argument in the lack of evidence that media can teach specific information or enhance political sophistication. The concern in this paper is with political evaluations and preferences, which do not require much information—often a simple emotional response will do (cf. Abelson et al., 1982). A related argument cites the public's inability to recall specific stories. But the influence of a single news story or show is rarely of interest. The primary concern is the effect of repeated news messages over time (cf. Graber, 1984).

³ But compare Ivengar and Kinder, 1987, and Protess et al., 1987, for agenda setting research showing that media influence of agendas also shapes, respectively, the mass public's critical political judgment and public officials' behavior.

tivity and inattention again seem to be key. In the agenda setting view, the media can overcome these barriers in determining the issues people think about but not in shaping how they evaluate issues or candidates (the most explicit discussion is MacKuen, 1984).

The problem with the agenda setting position is that the distinction between "what to think" and "what to think about" is misleading. Nobody, no force, can ever successfully "tell people what to think." Short of sophisticated physical torture ("brainwashing"), no form of communication can compel anything more than feigned obedience. The way to control attitudes is to provide a partial selection of information for a person to think about or process. The only way to influence what people think is precisely to shape what they think about. No matter what the message—whether conveyed through media or in person—control over others' thinking can never be complete. Influence can be exerted through selection of information, but conclusions cannot be dictated. If the media (or anyone) can affect what people think about—the information they process—the media can affect their attitudes.

This perspective yields an assumption of interdependence: public opinion grows out of an interaction between media messages and what audiences make of them. I will call this the "interdependence model." The competing positions—the minimal consequences and the agenda perspectives—both endorse the assumption that audiences form preferences autonomously. I will call this the "autonomy model."

INFORMATION PROCESSING AND MEDIA IMPACTS

Combining a recognition of the interdependence of audiences and media with information-processing models developed by cognitive psychologists may offer the best foundation for a new understanding of (Graber, 1984; Kraus and Perloff, 1985). There is no consensus among those who study information processing. But a number of generalizations pertinent to the mass media's impacts can be gleaned from their work.

Information-processing research shows that people have cognitive structures called "schemas,"⁴ which organize their thinking. A person's system of schemas stores substantive beliefs, attitudes, values, and preferences (cf. Rokeach, 1973) along with rules for linking different ideas. The schemas direct attention to relevant information, guide its interpretation and evaluation, provide inferences when information is missing or ambiguous, and facilitate its retention (Fiske and Kinder, 1981, p. 173).

Schemas are not filters used to select out all unfamiliar or uncomfortable information. As Bennett writes, "[I]nformation processing constructs [i.e., schemas] like party identification and ideological categories should not be re-

⁴ Scholars have used many other terms, including scripts, inferential sets, frames, and prototypes. While there are subtle differences among them, they need not concern us here. The term *schemas* is as good as any, and for clarity's sake I use the English plural, *schemas*, instead of the awkward *schemata*.

garded as rigid cognitive frameworks that work in fixed ways to screen out unfamiliar information" (Bennett, 1981, p. 91). Certainly people fail to think about much of the news, but not necessarily because they choose only congruent messages, or because they inevitably misunderstand or deliberately ignore media reports. Selectivity and inattention are stressed by the autonomy model, but that model fails to explain why many citizens do think about a great deal of the new information they encounter. Information-processing theory recognizes and helps explain how attitudes emerge from a dynamic interaction of new information with peoples' existing beliefs. In Bennett's (1981, p. 92) words, political thought is "data-driven" by external information and "conceptually-driven" by internal schemas.

Information-processing theory suggests that whether people ignore or pay attention to new information depends more on its salience, on whether it meshes with their interests, than on whether it conflicts with their existing beliefs (Markus and Zajonc, 1985, pp. 162 and *passim*; Kinder and Sears, 1985, pp. 710–12). While people may resist knowledge that challenges their fundamental values (Axelrod, 1973), most can accommodate new information and even hold a set of specific beliefs that may appear dissonant, contradictory, or illogical to an outsider (cf. Lane, 1962).

The explicit model of thinking that cognitive psychologists have been putting together thus contradicts the implicit model in much of media research. Rather than resisting or ignoring most new or dissonant media reports, as the autonomy model assumes, the information-processing view predicts that people are susceptible to significant media effects. In the information-processing perspective, a person first assesses a media report for salience. If salient, the person processes the news according to routines established in the schema system. Processing may lead the person either to store the information or discard it; if stored, the information may stimulate new beliefs or change old beliefs.

So selectivity and inattention are not the whole story. Often people may screen out information that contradicts their current views, but other times they think about disturbing reports they find relevant. The notion of an audience that actively resists all potentially conflicting information rests upon an assumption of a deeply involved and knowledgeable citizenry, a vision that does not apply to most people (e.g., Converse and Markus, 1979; Kinder and Sears, 1985). Common sense suggests it takes more information and time to change the minds of strong adherents than weak ones, but sometimes even loyalists do change. When the implications are not obvious—for example when the information is contained in the form of a subtle slant to the news (see Entman, 1989, chap. 3)—the probability increases that even activists will store conflicting data without experiencing any immediate dissonance.

And while it may take many repetitions of a media message to pierce the public's indubitable haze of neglect and distraction, this very same political indifference may enhance the likelihood that messages which do penetrate

will have an impact. Just because on most matters Americans have so little knowledge and such weakly-anchored beliefs, information provided by the media can significantly shape their attitudes. Not only do the majority of audience members lack detailed, expert knowledge or strong opinions (cf. Fiske, Kinder, and Larter, 1983), sometimes there are no old attitudes to defend. Many of the most significant political contests are played out over emerging issues or leaders, audiences do not have set attitudes toward them. That clears the path for significant media influence.

TESTING MEDIA INFLUENCE

Identification as liberal, moderate, or conservative is a key component of the political schema system that much of the public applies to political information. Ideological leanings affect responses to specific media reports: different identifiers may read the same message differently. This is why the media in common with all other sources of information cannot dictate public views and why an interdependence model seems appropriate. The interdependence model predicts that media influence varies according to the way each person processes specific news messages. Instead of treating ideology as a tool people use to screen out reports that conflict with their liberalism or conservatism, the model sees ideology as a schema that influences the use people make of media messages in more complicated ways.

The interaction between the attributes of the message and the schemas of the audience shapes the impact of the news. One element of this interdependence is message salience, which may vary among the ideological groups. Stories that interest liberals may bore conservatives; items that intrigue ideologues on either side may not interest moderates, who have few strong beliefs. Another aspect of interdependence involves whether the message is relevant to peripheral or central attitudes. The centrality of a message may vary for different groups, since liberals and conservatives appear to structure their ideas distinctively. Central to liberalism is attachment to ideals of change and equality; central to conservatism is attraction to capitalism (Conover and Feldman, 1981). The two groups probably process some media messages differently. This decidedly does not mean liberals, for example, screen out all material that challenges liberalism. Consider an editorial praising the ideal of capitalist markets and proposing to make the post office a private enterprise. While the message conflicts with liberal ideology, it does so peripherally, since government ownership of public utilities is not fundamental to American liberalism. The message may not only bolster conservatism among conservatives, but weaken liberals' commitment to liberalism, if only at the margin.

Another point of interdependence involves whether the message comes from an editorial, with its overtly persuasive intent, or from a news story that is ostensibly designed merely to inform. Conservatives may be more likely

to screen out editorial than news items that favor the left, since the slant of news may not be obvious. A final aspect of interdependence lies in how new or unfamiliar the reported topic is. All else being equal, the less familiar the object of the news, the less likely a person will respond by fitting the report into an established category and maintaining a set attitude. Where the subject of the news is unfamiliar to all sets of ideological identifiers, all will be susceptible to media influence.

Four hypotheses emerge from this use of information processing theory to develop an interdependence model of media influence. They are not all the hypotheses that merit exploration, but they are the ones that can be tested with the data available, and they should provide support for the superiority of the interdependence over the autonomy model.

Hypothesis #1 Editorials affect ideological identifiers more than moderates. Those identifying as liberals or conservatives are likely to find ideologically-charged editorial messages salient. Those with less-focused commitments, the moderates, may not find ideological editorials relevant.

Hypothesis #2 Liberal editorials should exert a leftward push on those attitudes of conservatives not central to their ideology.

Hypothesis #3 Editorial content has stronger effects on new subjects of news coverage than on long-familiar ones.

Hypothesis #4 News affects beliefs among liberals, moderates, and conservatives alike. People will tend to screen out news messages less than editorials. Shaped by objectivity rules, news stories are designed to appear neutral to audiences (e.g., Schudson, 1978, Tuchman, 1978, Molotch and Boden, 1985). The appearance of neutrality may soften the audience's defenses.

DATA

The dataset combines a national survey on Americans' political attitudes from 1974 and 1976 with information on the political content of the newspapers read by respondents. The 1974 Michigan Content Analysis Study provides extensive information on the front page news and editorial page content of ninety-two newspapers throughout the country. The total number of news and editorial items employed here is nearly 18,000.³ The content information (Institute for Social Research, 1978) is matched to data from a representative national survey, the University of Michigan Center for Political Studies poll of 1974. The sample analyzed consists of those who were surveyed and read

³ The study included ninety-six newspapers, of which four had incomplete data: readers of those four were excluded from the analysis.

one of the ninety-two newspapers included in the Content Analysis Study, a total weighted sample of 1,292 persons.⁶ Excluded were those who did not read a paper (approximately 30% of those surveyed) or who read papers for which no data were collected.⁷

The content data were gathered for ten days during October and November, 1974. Even though the data were obtained over a short time period, a check suggests they accurately reflect the typical stands of the papers. For example, among the ninety-two newspapers, the *Washington Post* scores higher in editorial liberalism than the (defunct) *Washington Star*, the *New York Daily News* scores to the right of the *New York Times*, and so forth.⁸ In any case, while far from perfect, the dataset is the most comprehensive collection linking media content to peoples' attitudes.

One measure of newspaper content taps *diversity in news stories*, the other *liberalism in editorials*.⁹ I expect both aspects of the newspaper's message to encourage opinions to move toward more sympathy with liberal politicians.

⁶ The actual number of people interviewed was 1,575. The answers of some members of the sample were counted three times to make a weighted sample of 2,523. This was done in order to ensure adequate representation in the sample of sparsely populated areas of the country. Thus, the weighted sample is the most representative.

⁷ The demographics of the final reader subsample closely parallel those of the 1974 national cross section as a whole. The mean education of the entire original sample (including non-readers, $n = 2,523$) is 11.5 years; the mean of the sample analyzed ($n = 1,292$) is 12.2; the mean income about \$11,000 versus \$12,000. On other demographic and political characteristics, the two groups are virtually identical.

⁸ Further enhancing confidence in the validity of the content measures is their use in such important studies as Erlbring, Goldenberg, and Miller, 1980.

⁹ Each editorial item was coded for zero, one, or two assertions favoring or opposing liberal and conservative policy stands. The *editorial liberalism index* is a percentage formed by first counting the number of times a paper endorsed a liberal position or opposed a conservative position, then subtracting assertions favoring conservative or derogating liberal stands. The result was divided by twice the number of editorial items, since each item was coded for up to two liberal or conservative assertions. The higher the score, the more liberal the editorial page. This index uses variables 21 and 28 in the *CPS Media Content Analysis Study 1974*.

A second measure employed data on news (variables 27 and 34 in the CPS study). The *news diversity* measure taps a dimension of news slant that audiences are less likely to screen than editorial liberalism. Like most aspects of news slant, it is a subtle trait of reporting that few audience members would notice. The front page news items were coded for mention of zero, one, or two problems. For each problem mention, coders noted whether two different actors overtly disagreed with each other. Each news item was coded as having zero, one, or two instances of two actors asserting different points of view. The diversity index is the number of times two actors expressed different positions divided by twice the number of stories. The higher the score, the more diversity of news. Examples of the actors coded in this variable include Gerald Ford, Richard Nixon, Nelson Rockefeller, Democratic Party, Republican candidates, and business leaders. Thus, a story might concern inflation and unions, and might contain opposing assertions by Gerald Ford and a Democratic Senate candidate on both the causes of inflation and the value of unions. The story would be coded 2 for one disagreement on each of the two problems. If the two actors agreed (or voiced no opinions) on unions but disagreed on inflation, the code would be 1. If they agreed on both or neither agreed nor disagreed, the code would be 0.

groups, and ideas. The basis for predicting that news diversity moves audiences leftward is that the majority of local newspapers appear to promote a generally Republican and conservative perspective (cf. Bagdikian, 1974, Radolf, 1984). Their editorial and perhaps news inclinations do not favor liberalism. All else being equal, I believe those papers with higher diversity probably provide more information that challenges the conservative editorial baseline. In addition, the mere presence of conflicting views in the news may convey an awareness of the diversity of the country, including its variety of races, economic classes, and viewpoints. Such consciousness may promote tolerance of change, and empathy for positions or groups that challenge the status quo.¹⁰ Diversity may also undermine authority by conveying the impression that a range of ideas is plausible, that the existing distribution of power, wealth, and status is not immutable. As for the other content measure while many readers no doubt skip editorial pages, Bagdikian (1974) shows that the editorial perspective tends to be mirrored in news slant. The editorial liberalism index may indirectly reflect the political tendency of news coverage.

The survey included "feeling thermometer" questions. Interviewers asked respondents to express their feelings toward several well-known groups and politicians. Respondents chose numbers ranging from "0" for the coldest feelings, through "100" for the warmest, with "50" meaning neutral or mixed feelings. I constructed five attitude indexes using factor analysis.¹¹ The Liberal Feelings Index combined ratings of Edward Kennedy, Hubert Humphrey, liberals, Democrats, and unions. The Radical Feelings Index consisted of thermometer ratings of radical students, black militants, civil rights leaders, and policemen. The Poor Feelings Index tapped thermometers of poor people, blacks, and George Wallace. The Republican Feelings Index was created from ratings of Gerald Ford, Richard Nixon, and Republicans. Finally, the Conservative Feelings Index rated big business, the military, and conservatives.¹²

The Michigan survey also asked respondents for their stands on government guaranteed jobs, dealing with urban unrest by solving the problems of unemployment and poverty, protecting legal rights of those accused of crimes

¹⁰ A competing hypothesis might be that diversity challenges initial viewpoints, so that it would promote conservatism among liberals and vice versa. That idea is not borne out by the data. Diversity is consistently associated with more liberal views.

¹¹ Surveys are described in Institute for Social Research, 1979. All feeling thermometers were classified on their face for relevance to the liberal-conservative continuum. Pertinent items received varimax factor analysis. Five factors had eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Indexes added together scores on all feeling thermometer responses loading above .40 on a factor. In two cases items loaded more than .40 on two factors, these were included on their highest loaded index. All dependent variable attitude indexes used in this paper have Cronbach Alpha reliability scores greater than .80.

¹² Policemen and Wallace loaded negatively on their respective factors. The feeling thermometer responses to each were subtracted from the sum of the other items in forming the indexes.

busing to achieve racial balance, the Equal Rights Amendment, integration of schools, government aid to minorities, and self-placement on the liberal-conservative spectrum.¹³ Using factor analysis again, all but one of the responses (to the ERA) were associated together and became the Policy Preferences Index.

Two final variables come from readers of sampled papers who participated in surveys during both 1974 and 1976. Their responses in 1976 provide an opportunity to check for media impacts on feelings toward a previously unknown presidential candidate, Jimmy Carter (Carter Index), and on presidential vote (Vote76).

FINDINGS

Testing the four predicted media effects requires probing for impacts of editorial liberalism and news diversity on the seven attitudes and on presidential vote. Regression analysis enables us to see whether, with all else equal, readers of more liberal or diverse papers exhibit more liberal attitudes and voting behavior. Editorial liberalism taps the persuasive element of the newspaper or, in agenda-setting terms, the aspect of the paper that attempts to "tell people what to think." News diversity taps the putatively informational element that only "tells people what to think about." The interdependence model holds that both editorials and news provide information to think about and thereby influence attitudes, whether intentionally or not. If selectivity or inattention precludes media influence, or if the effect is limited to agendas, the regressions should reveal no significant associations between attitudes and newspaper content.¹⁴

Table 1 summarizes regression results for the impacts of newspaper content on the beliefs of the entire sample of readers. The feeling thermometers are coded from 0 to 100 so that higher scores are warmer (more favorable). The higher the policy preferences score, the more conservative the responses. Vote76 is 1 for Carter, 0 for Ford, so higher scores indicate voting for Carter. The regressions include the following additional variables to control for forces that might also influence attitudes: urban-rural place of residence, age, years of education, family income, race, region, party identification, and ideological self-identification.¹⁵ The impacts of these non-media variables follow expect-

¹³ Variables 2265, 2273, 2281, 2288, 2296, 2302, and 2305 in the 1974 NES Codebook.

¹⁴ Although partisanship and ideology are not truly interval variables, the results of the regressions suggest that it is quite reasonable to treat them as such.

¹⁵ These variables are coded as follows: Age, coded in years; non-South, 1 = North or West, 0 = South; income, coded in thousands; party id., 7-point scale, 0 = strong Democrat, 3 = independent, 6 = strong Republican; urbanized, 1 = urban, suburban, 0 = rural; white race, 1 = white, 0 = nonwhite; education, coded in years; policy preferences index, adding six 7-point scales, so range is 6 = most liberal, 42 = most conservative; and ideology identification, 1 = most liberal, 4 = middle of the road or don't know, 7 = most conservative. On the latter, note

tations, which bolsters confidence in the validity of the attitude measures (For a full display of coefficients for all independent variables, see Entman, 1987). Multicollinearity among the independent variables is not a problem. Of the forty-five intercorrelations, only three exceed .20. The strongest was between education and income ($r = .357$).

Table 1 shows that the more editorially liberal the paper, the more warmly their readers respond on the Liberal Feelings Index. This relationship suggests that editorial liberalism influences the public's evaluations of key leaders and groups associated with the liberal coalition—in this case, Hubert Humphrey, Edward Kennedy, Democrats, unions, and liberals. Editorial liberalism is also significantly associated with less conservative policy stands¹⁶ among its readers, and with warmth toward¹⁷ and voting for Jimmy Carter.¹⁸ (Below I consider the possibility that liberals choose more liberal papers, rather than liberal papers causing more liberal attitudes.) The findings on Carter accord with hypothesis #3 that editorial persuasion about formerly unknown people or other new topics is most likely to influence public opinion where people do not have established attitudes. The relationship of opinions and news diversity is significant in four cases, and consistently in the liberal direction.¹⁹

that of the 1,292 readers of sampled newspapers, about 17% said they hadn't thought much about their placement on the liberal-conservative spectrum, 3.5% said they didn't know, and 1.4% were not ascertained. In order to prevent attrition of respondents while still employing a control for ideology, these subjects were recoded as "moderate" (middle of the road). The assumption was that lacking clear ideological self-conceptions, they would respond like moderates to messages from left or right. Regressions that exclude these 279 respondents (not shown), yielded similar results.

¹⁶ I omit ideological identification from the independent variable list because the policy preferences index contains that same variable (N 2305). If ideology is left in, the relationship between editorial liberalism and policy preferences just fails to reach significance ($p = .07$).

¹⁷ Among the 1974–1976 panel respondents, thirty no longer read (when surveyed in late 1976) the same paper they read in 1974. Exactly when they switched is not clear from the data, so it cannot be determined which paper had a greater impact on their opinions. Other complexities include the possibility that the new paper's coverage in 1976 was similar to the old paper's in 1974 or 1976, and that the person's attitudes were in fact more influenced by the 1974-era reporting than the messages conveyed in 1976. Because of these complications, I used a simplifying assumption: the regressions include only respondents who did not change residences between 1974 and 1976. Those in the same communities were likely to read the same paper or at least be exposed indirectly (through family, peer groups, and communications of political elites) to the paper's effects. An additional independent variable, an index of rating of economic performance and prospects in 1976 (variables 3137–3140) is included in the Carter regressions because it is likely to affect evaluations and voting for presidential candidates.

¹⁸ Gillespie (1977) endorses the legitimacy of employing linear regression with dichotomous dependent variables, especially when the sample is split about 50–50 as it was for the close 1976 race.

¹⁹ Another series of regressions included the 1,292 readers of sampled papers plus those who denied reading a paper (weighted $n = 733$), the latter given codes of "0" for the two content variables. With all other independent variables the same as in table 1, results closely resemble those reported in the text (see Entman, 1987, for a display of the coefficients). Giving a score of zero

TABLE 1
REGRESSIONS OF FEELING, THERMOMETER AND ATTITUDE INDICES
AND PRESIDENTIAL VOTE FOR ENTIRE SAMPLE

Independent Variables	Liberal <i>b</i>	Radical <i>b</i>	Pop <i>b</i>	Repub <i>b</i>	Conserv <i>b</i>	Pol Pref <i>b</i>	Carter <i>b</i>	Vote76 <i>b</i>
Age	0.1	-0.6***	0.02	0.1	0.5***	0.1***	-0.1*	-0.000
Non-South	22.3***	10.1**	15.3***	10.9**	9.7**	-1.9**	2.1	-0.09*
Income	2.1***	3.2***	0.2	0.3	1.2***	0.5***	-0.4	0.01*
Party ID	16.6***	2.3**	1.6**	5.4***	2.1**	0.5***	3.7***	-0.10***
Urbanized	3.2	9.2**	3.5	5.5	2.5	2.0***	0.4	0.04
White Race	37.4***	74.0***	45.1	12.3**	22.0***	6.1***	5.7	-0.23***
Ideology ID	11.5***	13.6***	5.3***	6.9***	15.9***	#	1.7*	-0.03*
Education	2.1**	5.5***	0.9	0.5	2.2***	0.5***	1.4***	0.01*
Editorial Liberalism	2.1**	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.2**	1.3***	0.02***
News Diversity	0.1	0.5**	0.3	1.2***	0.7**	0.1**	0.2	0.00
Rate Economy							1.5**	0.05***
Adjusted R ²	0.35	0.41	0.23	0.20	0.32	0.36	0.25	0.13
F test sig	< .0001	< .0001	< .0001	< .0001	< .0001	< .0001	< .0001	< .0001
N	1056	1113	1071	1117	1055	513	755	601

Significance of regression coefficient: * < .05 ** < .01 *** < .001 **** < .0001

Deleted see note 16

These significant associations suggest that reading different papers makes a difference to the audience's attitudes. The influence probably comes from the gradual impact of repeated exposure to a particular paper with its habitual level of news diversity and editorial liberalism. It is unclear how much of this influence involves altering existing attitudes, and how much forming new ones. In any case, in the real world flux of politics, it is often difficult to distinguish between developing new and changing old attitudes, the one often begets or merges into the other.

Further evidence of significant media impacts emerges from separate analyses of each group of ideological identifiers. Findings, displayed in summary form in table 2, largely accord with expectations.

¹Conservatives The impacts on conservatives provide the most persuasive evidence against the assumption that selectivity renders media impacts insignificant. For those on the right, editorial liberalism increases warmth toward liberals, the poor, and Jimmy Carter. It also makes conservatives significantly more likely to vote for Carter rather than Ford. While liberal editorials do not move conservatives on dimensions central to their identification, the Republican and Conservative Feelings Indexes, news diversity does. Diverse news also produces warmer feelings toward those all the way on the other side, the radicals.

No doubt, some conservatives screen out all liberal editorials, and others ignore news diversity. Still, these findings show that reading different newspapers does make a difference among citizens who identify as conservative. With all else equal, if you have two persons calling themselves conservative, the one who reads a paper with more liberal editorial pages or diverse news is likely to have less conservative attitudes and show more willingness to vote Democratic. Liberal editorials appear most influential in moving conservatives against their dispositions on matters not crucial to their identities as conservatives. But while the beliefs susceptible to influence may not be central to conservatives' political self-images, they are not trivial. Liberal newspapers seemed to make their conservative readers significantly more likely to vote for Jimmy Carter in 1976.

Liberals For those identifying on the left, reading liberal editorials is associated with more favorable feelings toward radicals and with less conservatism on the Policy Preferences Index. News diversity also strengthens liberalism by diminishing esteem of the opposing side—making liberals cooler on the Republican and Conservative Feelings Indexes. Conservatives tend to

to those who claim not to read a paper seems to me inaccurate, so the text focuses on readers. A zero score implies nonreaders live in a world without newspapers. Yet most people are probably influenced by the paper's messages indirectly, through friends and politicians. Other strategies for handling nonreaders, such as giving them a newspaper content score equal to the weighted average of all papers, seem to me similarly distorting of the real world process.

TABLE 2
REGRESSIONS OF FEELING THERMOMETERS POLICY PREFERENCES,
AND 1976 VOTE FOR LIBERALS, MODERATES AND CONSERVATIVES SEPARATELY

Newspaper Content	Liberal	Radical	Poor	Repub	Conserv	Pol Prefs	Carter	Vote76
1 Liberals ($n = 291$)							($n = 188$)	($n = 138$)
Editorial Liberalism	0.5	3.4**	1.4	-1.1	0.1	-0.3*	0.3	0.00
News Diversity	0.1	0.7	0.2	1.2*	-1.5	-0.03	-0.3	0.03*
2 Moderates ($n = 634$)							($n = 447$)	($n = 237$)
Editorial Liberalism	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.1	0.1	1.1**	0.01
News Diversity	1.3*	1.0*	0.6*	1.0**	0.3	-0.2***	-0.1	-0.00
3 Conservatives ($n = 367$)							($n = 248$)	($n = 226$)
Editorial Liberalism	4.2***	0.1	1.5*	0.9	0.3	-0.1	2.0***	0.03***
News Diversity	0.6	0.9*	0.4	1.3**	0.5*	1	-0.4	1.5

Significance * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$ **** $p < .0001$

Notes

- 1 All other independent variables in the regressions are the same as in table 1 except for ideological identification
- 2 Moderates include the responses of "don't know" haven't thought much about it and not ascertained
- 3 Numbers of cases for each regression vary slightly due to missing answers to opinion questions

dislike liberals more than liberals dislike conservatives (cf. Brady and Sniderman, 1985, Conover and Feldman, 1984), so when the media heighten liberals' animosity toward conservatives, significant political consequences may follow. In the absence of media bolstering, for example, liberals may be more likely to stray toward a vote for conservative Republicans.

This finding suggests that reinforcement by the media is both more complicated and more important than previous researchers acknowledge. Further supporting that point, the regressions show that editorial liberalism does *not* boost warmth on the Liberal, Poor, or Carter Feelings Indexes. The reason that liberal editorials do not intensify liberals' feelings on the Liberal and Poor indexes may be that most people calling themselves liberal already share warm emotions toward major symbols like Ted Kennedy, Hubert Humphrey, and poor people. Liberals agree less and have less firmly established beliefs about radicals or policy issues,²⁰ thus opinions toward radicals and policy among self-identified liberals may be more open to media influence. As for warmth toward Carter among liberals, he did not define himself in ideological terms and those already on the left did not judge him by ideological standards (as indicated by Conover and Feldman, 1986, p. 148). Even though some aspects of liberalism were reinforced by left-leaning newspapers, liberal readers may not have applied any revived liberal feelings when judging the ideologically-fuzzy Jimmy Carter.²¹ These effects of liberal editorials on liberals suggest an important modification to the dominant autonomy model, with its tendency to dismiss media influence as confined merely to reinforcing peoples' existing preferences. In an epoch of loose political loyalties, reinforcement is not as trivial or simple a media effect as the autonomy model implies. More research is needed on the ways the media bolster as well as form or change public opinion.

Moderates. As predicted, editorials do not affect moderates much. Among the three groups, moderates may be the most immune to the influence of overt editorial persuasion. The imperviousness comes not from selectivity but from a failure to find editorial information salient. On the other hand, news diversity does have a consistent influence on moderates. The impact on five of the seven attitudes is significant, all in the predicted leftward direction.²²

²⁰ The standard deviations of the "Radical Feelings" and "Policy" indexes exhibit more dispersion than the standard deviations of the "Liberal" and "Poor Feelings" measures among liberals.

²¹ On the other hand, news diversity is significantly related to liberals voting for Carter. The explanation might be that news diversity cooled feelings toward Republicans. By heightening some liberals' antagonism toward the opposite side, news diversity might have stimulated a vote against Ford, an archetypal Republican, without increasing warmth toward Carter.

²² It may seem surprising that moderates' feelings and votes for Carter are not associated with news diversity. It turns out that news diversity fails to affect feelings or votes for him in every

IMPLICATIONS

All four hypotheses received some support. The data suggest that editorials, openly designed to persuade, have little impact on moderates, who may find them of scant interest. But editorials do appear to influence those who consider themselves liberals or conservatives, who are more attuned to ideological discourse. Most intriguingly, liberal editorial messages seem to influence some conservatives. The data also suggest that attitudes toward unfamiliar matters are more susceptible to media influence than those toward the familiar. The most important evidence is that opinions toward the previously-unknown former Governor Jimmy Carter were apparently affected by editorials, even among conservatives—and among moderates, who were otherwise immune to the impact of editorials. Finally, news diversity appears to influence people in all three ideological groups. Selectivity and inattention seem to operate less on news than on editorials. Lacking strong selectivity tendencies, moderates were the most susceptible to news slant.

Perhaps we should amend the old phrase to read "The media do not control what people prefer; they influence public opinion by providing much of the information people think about and by shaping how they think about it." Americans exercise their idiosyncratic dispositions as they ponder the news, but the media's selection of data makes a significant contribution to the outcome of each person's thinking.²¹

These conclusions need to be placed in a larger context of social scientific research on attitudes. With the exception of voting for president, we have a great deal to learn about how people develop and change their political beliefs and preferences. Social scientists have developed neither a general theory of the forces that shape political thinking, nor a consensus understanding of cognitive psychology itself. Our store of findings is far too primitive to dismiss the specific role of the media. It is premature to conclude "the media do not tell people what to think" when we know so little about the forces that do determine their thoughts. To advance that understanding will require a deeper grasp of the part the media play in each individual's processing of political information.

case but one (liberals' voting, discussed in note 21). The finding may be traceable to Carter's blurry ideological image. For moderates, who do not think ideologically anyway, messages stimulating more liberal feelings may not have affected evaluations of this nonideological candidate whose campaign emphasized personal themes like honesty and competence.

²¹ This point is bolstered by the findings that television news can "prime" the public as it sets their agendas. For example, when the news emphasizes defense issues, those issues become more important to the public's judgments of a president. See Ivengar and Kinder, 1987.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION: SELECTIVE EXPOSURE

There are two interpretations of the statistically significant impacts of editorial liberalism and news diversity among moderates and conservatives. The one emphasized here is that reading relatively liberal and diverse newspapers helps to loosen attraction to conservatism or engender more sympathy to liberalism. The other interpretation is a variant of the selectivity hypothesis: selective exposure.

This view holds that people choose the newspaper most likely to conform to their existing opinions. To explain the findings described here, this perspective would assume not that newspapers affect attitudes, but that the more liberal-leaning among self-styled conservatives and moderates simply choose the more liberal newspapers available to them. Certainly some of the statistical association is attributable to readers who selectively choose newspapers based on their editorial stands. But selective exposure cannot be the whole story.

For one thing, research raises doubts about the prevalence of selective exposure (cf. Sears and Freedman, 1967; Kinder and Sears, 1985, p. 710; McGuire, 1985, p. 275; cf. Chaffee and Hochheimer, 1985; Lang and Lang, 1985; Roberts and Maccoby, 1985). While those with deep ideological feelings may seek and know how to find congruent media, most Americans are neither consistent ideologically nor sophisticated politically (cf. Neuman, 1985). Most Americans do not screen out information contrary to their ideological leanings, because they just do not have strong enough inclinations (cf. Kinder and Sears, 1985, pp. 666-70). The low level of citizen interest creates conditions conducive to media influence.

The statistical findings themselves contradict a selective exposure explanation. If selective exposure were the dominant explanation, significant relationships would have arisen among all three ideological groups, as, across the board, liberals chose the most liberal paper and conservatives the most conservative. The variation in media impacts, which largely accord with the low predictions generated by information processing theory and the interdependence model, belie the selective exposure interpretation.²⁴

In any case, a selective exposure hypothesis cannot explain the significant impacts upon moderates, who refuse to identify themselves with a consistent left or right orientation. Adherents to the selective exposure position might predict that more liberal-leaning moderates would choose the more liberal of the papers available and conservative-leaning moderates, the more conservative. But judging by the results discussed here, moderates have a tough time being selective. The editorials did not influence them much; they probably have neither good information nor much motivation to select a newspaper.

²⁴ See Entman, 1987, for regressions within party groups: the findings are nearly identical and support the conclusions on selectivity in this paper.

per on the basis of editorials. If moderates selected for editorial policy, their attitudes should have been more significantly associated with the editorial liberalism index.

It is possible though perhaps unlikely, that moderates, possessing a self-image of openness to all sides, selected for news diversity so that reading diverse newspapers has the effect of uniformly moving them leftward. This would be a combination of selective exposure, on nonideological grounds, and media impact, since the diversity does make a difference to their attitudes.

Extending selective exposure to conservatives multiplies the problems. The hypothesis would have to be that hardline conservatives choose papers farther to the right while less dogmatic conservatives choose more liberal papers. Curiously, then, selective exposure would assert that some conservatives deliberately choose to read the more liberal of two papers on ideological grounds. This becomes even more curious when recalling the selective exposure prediction for moderates, which was that some right-leaning moderates choose conservative papers for ideological reasons. Applying the selective exposure hypothesis therefore requires forecasting that moderates often choose a more conservative paper than conservatives. A prediction that moderates are motivated by ideology to act more conservative than conservatives renders the terms virtually meaningless. It seems more reasonable to hypothesize that conservatives will selectively choose a conservative paper. Yet the findings deny that prediction.

Another explanation would be that people do not have a good sense of their actual beliefs when they apply ideological labels to themselves (cf. Conover and Feldman, 1981), so that many persons who identify as conservatives actually have liberal or moderate beliefs. This view would hold that people do experience cognitive tension when their actual beliefs are challenged by the news. So, unconsciously, they seek out the more comfortable outlet even if it clashes with their professed ideologies. There is clearly some validity in this view. But conducting the analyses reported here with another schema, party identification, produces findings similar to those displayed in tables 1 and 2 (cf. Entman, 1987), and party identification might reflect real preferences better than ideology. If people select on the basis of anything, it ought to be their conscious ideological or party identifications. If selective exposure is perverse, with a lot of people who think of themselves as conservative actually holding liberal views and choosing more liberal papers, it becomes a problematic basis for a theory of media effects.

Not only the findings, but the sober facts of the marketplace make selective exposure a difficult hypothesis: most readers do not have a clear choice between newspapers offering distinct and obvious ideological approaches in their editorial or news columns. Most local markets in any case only offer one newspaper publisher. Although some people subscribe to out-of-town newspapers, that option has serious drawbacks: the papers probably have little or

no news of readers' own communities (or in many cases, their states), subscriptions are usually costly, and the papers often arrive days late.

The data allow an empirical test of the selective exposure hypothesis. The sample was split into two groups. One included respondents living in newspaper markets that offer ideological diversity, the other respondents living in markets offering ideologically homogeneous papers, or only one paper.²⁵ If selective exposure explains the relationships between newspaper content and attitudes, those associations should be stronger for the group of respondents who have a significant ideological choice among papers than for the group that does not. If this were to prove true, it would suggest that the relationships shown in tables 1 and 2 may be attributable largely to selective exposure among those who have an ideological choice among papers. Table 3 displays the unstandardized coefficients for regressions run separately for the two groups. The independent variables are the same as for the regression in table 1, except they include only editorial liberalism as the measure of media content, since it is unlikely respondents would engage in selective exposure based on news diversity.²⁶

There is no discernable pattern to the findings in table 3, with two significant coefficients for those in diverse markets and three for those in homogeneous markets. The two strongest effects are in the homogeneous markets. In four other cases, although coefficients are larger in diverse markets, they fail to reach statistical significance. If one accepts the insignificant coefficients as meaningful, they could indicate the simultaneous presence of selectivity effects and newspaper influence. Attempts to untangle the reciprocal relationships statistically were not appropriate with these data.²⁷ On balance, the

²⁵ Diverse markets are those served by two newspapers that are distinctly different in their editorial stands (scoring above the mean difference in editorial liberalism among pairs of papers in the sample). Similar markets are those served by two papers that resemble each other editorially (scoring below the sample mean difference in editorial liberalism) or served by a single paper. The sample was not split into groups by whether the respondent's community was served by monopoly or competitively owned papers because other research (Entman, 1985) showed economic market structure does not significantly shape newspaper content. Moreover, this split of the sample yielded two groups that were more similar on demographic and political factors than a division into respondents served by monopoly or competitive papers.

²⁶ There is also a logical and methodological problem since different respondents could in theory select papers based on both news diversity and editorial liberalism or on either alone (and papers could offer different packages of the two (editorially liberal but without news diversity, conservative but with diverse news, and so forth). Trying to sort all this out would be beyond the scope of this paper and would add little to the basic argument.

²⁷ The paper does not attempt to construct a system of structural equations employing two-stage least squares regression analysis. This is not because I doubt the relationship between newspaper content and attitudes is reciprocal (cf. Lindblom, 1977, chaps. 15, 16 on the "circularity of opinion formation"), but because, given the data available, I do not believe that technique would further illuminate the interdependencies. Combined with the limited nature of the data, the simplifying assumptions required by two-stage least squares could distort the complex intertwining of forces that produce public opinion.

TABLE 3
OPINION IMPACTS OF NEWSPAPERS IN IDEOLOGICALLY
DIVERSE AND IDEOLOGICALLY SIMILAR MARKETS

	Liberal	Radical	Poor	Repub	Bus	Pol	Prefs	Carter	Votr 76
	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i>
Ideologically Diverse									
Editorial Liberalism	3.6**	1.9	0.77	-2.1*	-0.42	-0.18	0.56	0.01	
Ideologically Homogeneous									
Editorial Liberalism	3.0**	-0.26	-0.22	0.46	0.19	0.06	1.7****	0.03****	

* $p \leq .05$

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

**** $p \leq .0001$

findings and analysis suggest that while selective exposure may occur to some degree, it is not the primary reason for the attitude-newspaper content relationship.

As this discussion indicates, even if selective exposure has a longer tradition and falls comfortably within the autonomy model, it enjoys neither more inherent logical justification nor more empirical support than the interdependence model. At least as much data and logic support a conclusion that news-

Some of the problems are statistical. For example, identification could be achieved in only one of the first stage regressions that estimate values for the instrumental variables of newspaper ownership and ideology. For the regression estimating the instrument of ideology, identification would necessitate arbitrary exclusion of an exogenous variable. In addition, because all the exogenous variables would be included as explanatory variables in the structural equations, high multicollinearity could become a problem (as it is not with the ordinary least square reported here). Cf. Berry, 1984, pp. 59-60, 69-71.

Equally serious are difficulties with the underlying theoretical structure that would be assumed in applying the technique. The process of attitude formation and change involves a series of interactions over the life cycle among media content and many other cultural and personal forces that socialize, reinforce, and challenge thinking, including generational events, parents, teachers, and peers. Employing the cross-sectional data available here could give a misleading picture of the influence paths. Thus, for example, the causal path from personal belief system to a newspaper's editorial liberalism might indicate substantial selectivity. But the model could not reveal whether the personal beliefs were formed by a set of influences from parents, teachers, and peers or whether they were all swayed themselves by the newspaper. Such problems in unraveling causality suggest the need for longitudinal research that follows individuals from early adolescence onward or another view of the need to reconceptualize and complicate the research paradigm. Cf. Chatfield and Hochheimer, 1985.

paper content shapes audience attitudes as support the idea that audiences select newspapers they agree with. The small minority of attentive Americans with strong ideological identities probably engage in selective exposure. Some of those who are less attentive and committed probably do too, at least on some issues. But many others do not. At a minimum, the selective exposure hypothesis requires considerably more refinement and testing before it is enshrined as the major reason for correlations between media content and public opinion.

AUDIENCE AUTONOMY RECONSIDERED

One might take the finding that conservatives, moderates, and liberals process news messages differently as an endorsement of the audience autonomy model. I believe the findings rather suggest that the very way scholars have conceptualized media influence may need revision. Scholars have usually attempted to find evidence that the media are persuaders, deliberate causers of public thinking. It may be more realistic to think of the media as contributing to—but not controlling—the structure of publicly-available information that shapes the way people can and do think politically. This information includes not only concrete data for cognitive processing but symbols that may engage little-understood emotional needs. Such a picture indicates an interdependent media and public, with neither fully controlling the news or its effects. Two points bolster this revised view of media influence: the media's contribution to the orientations that people use in processing information, and the sometimes-hidden and often-unintentional nature of media impacts.

Members of the audience do not autonomously form and maintain the orientations they use to process information. Their partisan and ideological loyalties arise from socialization in a political culture transmitted, reinforced, and constantly altered by parents, teachers, leaders, friends, and colleagues—most of whom use the media (cf. Chaffee, 1982). Further, much of the nation's political dialogue takes place in the press, where the meaning of terms like "liberal" and "conservative" varies over time. Such ideas as a flat income tax, once "far right," entered the mainstream in the 1980s, as ideas like national health insurance departed for the "far left." Audience autonomy would require that people produce and apply their schema systems completely on their own. Leaders also often use the media to stimulate emotional responses with little cognitive content. Recall, e.g., the scenes when the American medical students landed safely in the U.S. after their Grenada ordeal, or when the bodies of the Marines killed in the Beirut barracks bombing arrived home (both in 1983). If the schemas people employ in processing information are themselves influenced by media and other changing cultural forces, if people can be moved by messages that operate at levels other than rational persuasion, determining ultimate control over "what people think" becomes too

complicated for an assumption of audience autonomy to be accurate. The system is one of interdependency and connection, where the notion of autonomy finally does not make much sense.

Beyond this, much of the denial of media impact rests upon autonomy models developed when deliberate persuasion was the concern of researchers (e.g., Chaffee and Hochheimer, 1985). The idea that subtle and inadvertent messages are encoded within news stories whose conscious purpose is merely to inform does not fit very well with the autonomy model. For example, the autonomy model neglects the influence the media exert through their exclusion of inferences. Whether readers accept interpretation "A," which news coverage emphasizes, or keep thinking "B" as they did before—by excluding or barely mentioning some information, the coverage may discourage audiences from thinking at all of an entirely different reading "C." The media's omission of inferences that audiences might draw from political reality may be as important as encouraging deductions. While mass audiences can ignore any conclusion that bothers them and stick to their existing beliefs, it is harder for them to come up with an interpretation on their own—one for which the media do not make relevant information readily available.

The media's inadvertent reinforcement of existing attitudes through omission is far from the trivial effect that many scholars imply. Holding support under adverse new conditions is a crucial goal in politics—not just winning over new supporters. So one way the media wield influence is by omitting or de-emphasizing information, by excluding data about an altered reality that might otherwise disrupt existing support. But again, the media do not often set out deliberately to exercise control via omission or de-emphasis; they tend not to control the influence their coverage exerts.²⁸

These impacts should not be exaggerated. Scholars have much to learn about how and why ordinary and elite Americans develop their basic ideological orientations and their specific political attitudes. The forces that move public opinion remain complicated and mysterious, and the media fill in only part of the puzzle. While I make a strong case for taking the media's role seriously, I do not assert the media are the only important source of information or influence.

Still, the public must and indeed should rely in some measure on the mass media. In fact, if most members of the public did have fixed political convictions, they would possess even less autonomy than I argue. Independent action requires responsiveness to the changing conditions portrayed (however imperfectly) in the news, not rigid maintenance of stable beliefs. If people resisted media influence that they ignored all negative information about president or policy they liked, if they refused to take any account of altered

²⁸ On the media's paradoxical ability to exercise power over public opinion and the political process while lacking autonomy, see Entman (1989).

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Research Notes

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Members' Goals and Coalition-Building Strategies in the U.S. House: The Case of Tax Reform

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An important issue raised by recent work which views members of the U. S. Congress as purposive actors is how to conceptualize members' goals. This note proposes that coalition-building strategies employed by congressional leaders may provide empirical evidence bearing on this question. Unlike other sources of evidence on members' goals, appeals made directly by leaders to rank-and-file legislators are not easily discounted as posturing or position-taking. An analysis of the committee coalition-building strategy employed by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D-Illinois) on the issue of tax reform in 1985 supports earlier findings on the importance of prestige and policy goals for members of this committee and provides some additional empirical grounding for a conceptualization of members' goals of the type advanced by Richard F. Fenno, Jr.

One of the most important issues raised by recent scholarly work which views members of the U. S. Congress as purposive actors is how to conceptualize the motivations of members of the institution. One group of scholars has argued that congressional politics are best understood by viewing individual members as "single-minded reelection seekers" (Mayhew, 1974, p. 17). Others, the most influential of whom has been Richard F. Fenno, Jr., argue that a more complex set of motivational assumptions are required to explain decision making and policy outcomes in Congress. Those taking this second approach have emphasized the importance of members' concerns with prestige or influence in Washington and with advancing good public policy, along with motivations tied to reelection or local constituency interests (see Fenno, 1973, 1978; Kingdon, 1981; Smith and Deering, 1984; Hall, 1987).

For some congressional scholars, characterizations of members' goals are simply abstract assumptions used to build more or less formal theoretical frameworks in the style of economics (see for example, Mayhew, 1974, pp.

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5-7, 13-28, Shepsle, 1985, pp. 12-13). Others have sought more direct empirical grounding for conceptualization of members' goals and a number of studies have presented empirical evidence on individual members' motivations. Interview research on preferences for committee assignments (Fenno, 1973, Bullock, 1976, Smith and Deering, 1984, chap. 4) and on participation in committee work (Hall, 1987) has generally confirmed the importance of prestige and policy goals, along with concerns tied to reelection. The present note proposes that members' goals may also be investigated through an analysis of coalition-building strategies employed by congressional leaders.¹ Unlike members' public behavior or even comments made in interviews with political scientists, appeals made privately to fellow legislators are less likely to involve posturing or "position-taking" (see Mayhew, 1974, pp. 61-77). A less obtrusive approach involving analysis of leaders' direct appeals to fellow members can provide additional empirical evidence on members' goals and thereby help inform purposive theorizing about congressional politics.

COALITION-BUILDING AND MEMBERS' GOALS

A leader's strategy in building a legislative coalition reflects two basic factors: the leader's own objectives or style, and his or her judgments about what is important to rank-and-file members. Some leaders' strategies may reflect strong personal policy or ideological views.² Leaders of a more pragmatic bent, however, are likely to tailor appeals for support to rank-and-file members' goals as the leader perceives those goals in relation to various issues. The logical strategy for the pragmatic leader is to frame issues in terms of the things

¹ That successful leaders tailor their leadership styles and coalition-building strategies to fit rank-and-file members' concerns or goals has long been recognized by students of Congress. Ralph K. Hunt's (1961) study of Lyndon Johnson as Senate Democratic floor leader stressed that Johnson assembled coalitions by framing issues in ways he thought would appeal to key senators. Hunt concluded from the Johnson case (in language that anticipates the purposive approach of a later generation of congressional scholars) that a successful Senate leader "is one who can and does help individual senators to maximize their effectiveness in playing their personal roles in the Senate" (Hunt, 1961, p. 341). More recently, Fenno (1973, pp. 114-37) and Smith and Deering (1984, pp. 176-90) have shown the importance of committee members' goals for explaining why different types of leadership styles may be effective on different congressional committees.

² See, for example, John E. Owens' (1985) discussion of Wright Patman's extreme advocacy leadership style as chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee. Committee reforms enacted in the 1970s (especially the requirement of caucus election by secret ballot) have limited the ability of committee chairmen to pursue personal goals to the exclusion of those of fellow committee and party members (see Smith and Deering, 1984, pp. 169-75). Patman, of course, was among the first to learn this lesson.

or she thinks rank-and-file members care most about.³ Therefore, to the extent that "inside" coalition-building strategies are accessible to empirical investigation, some leaders' appeals to rank-and-file legislators may offer evidence about members' goals that is not subject to the pitfalls of relying solely on members' own explanations of their behavior.

DAN ROSTENKOWSKI AND TAX REFORM

The particular case on which this research note focuses is the leadership strategy employed by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D-Illinois) in assembling a committee coalition in support of comprehensive tax reform in 1985. The analysis of Rostenkowski's coalition-building strategy draws on two main sources: a series of personal interviews conducted by the author with Ways and Means Committee members and staff, and journalists Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and Alan S. Murray's detailed chronicle of the enactment of tax reform, *Shakedown at Gucci Gulch* (1987).⁴

Interviews with Ways and Means Committee members indicate that Rostenkowski fits the type of the pragmatic legislative leader. As one committee member described Rostenkowski's approach to leadership: "He wants to win and does everything he can to make sure legislation can pass." "If anything characterizes him," a second committee member observed, "it's that he wants to win. Substance is less important than the winning." Although some noted Rostenkowski's loyalty to partisan objectives on issues that become defined in highly partisan terms, most committee members characterized the chairman's leadership style as oriented primarily toward building winning coalitions in committee and on the House floor.⁵

A key element of Rostenkowski's leadership style, committee members also agreed, is extensive interaction and consultation with committee members—especially fellow Democrats. As one committee Democrat explained:

Rostenkowski is constantly calling caucuses. He is meeting with us all the time—catching us on the floor—calling us up. The way he keeps us in line is that he knows what his committee members want. . . . Those who are not members of the committee sometimes say he is abrupt; he doesn't talk to them; that he is insensitive. But in fact it's just the opposite. He is very sensitive to members' needs.

³ Arnold (1979, chap. 3) proposes, for example, that coalition leaders for allocational programs may develop strategies based on appeals to members' general-benefit evaluations, local-benefit evaluations, support-trading evaluations, or more commonly, some combination of these.

⁴ A total of twenty members and three committee staff who served during the 1985 tax reform deliberations were interviewed. The interviews were conducted between the spring of 1985 (just before committee hearings on tax reform began) and the summer of 1988. All of those interviewed are promised anonymity.

⁵ Rostenkowski's emphasis on "winning" on the House floor recalls Wilbur D. Mills's similar concern with protecting the committee's record of floor success during Mills's tenure as Ways and Means chairman (see Manley, 1970, pp. 111–15; Fenno, 1973, pp. 114–15).

Although a number of committee members noted that Rostenkowski has shown a willingness to impose sanctions on uncooperative members, others emphasized that the chairman attempts to consult extensively with the rank and file before making a decision. Explained a junior Ways and Means Democrat: "The chairman really works to gain consensus, gain support for his bills. I've had more meetings with the chairman in the first three or four months than I had in three years on Public Works. He's a strong leader, but very personal in his politics." Rostenkowski, then, fits the type of the legislative leader from whom one would expect a coalition-building strategy that is especially sensitive to members' goals.

Interview research on the Ways and Means Committee conducted in the 1960s found that the committee tended to attract members for whom prestige was a primary concern and partisan or policy goals secondary. Committee members were well placed to look out for constituency interests in areas such as taxation, yet (no doubt partly because Ways and Means appointments had traditionally been reserved for members from "safe" seats) few cited constituency service or electoral concerns as primary reasons for joining the committee (Manley, 1970, pp. 53-58, Fenno, 1973, pp. 3-5, 56-57). A more recent comparative committee study by Steven S. Smith and Christopher J. Deering found that prestige is still important in attracting members to the committee, but that more policy-oriented members have been seeking Ways and Means seats since the committee was restructured and its power over committee assignments for House Democrats removed in the 1970s (Smith and Deering, 1984, pp. 90, 95-98). Catherine Rudder has argued that appointments of members from highly competitive districts during the 1970s reform era made some committee members more sensitive to constituency interests than was the norm in the past (1978, 1983), but she has also noted that the fiscal situation during the 1980s has encouraged greater attentiveness by committee members to policy goals such as controlling deficits (1985).

Consistent with these earlier studies indicating that Ways and Means members tend to be attracted to the committee primarily for either prestige and policy reasons, the following analysis shows that appeals to committee members' concerns with prestige and reputation and with advancing good public policy were key elements in Chairman Rostenkowski's coalition-building strategy on the tax reform issue. Confirming that constituency interests remain important for Ways and Means members as for others in Congress, electoral and constituency concerns also figured in Rostenkowski's strategy as committee deliberations on the specific provisions of the tax reform plan proceeded.

BUILDING SUPPORT FOR TAX REFORM ON THE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE

In May 1985, the Reagan administration formally submitted a major tax reform proposal to Congress. The main features of the president's proposal were reductions in both individual and corporate income tax rates, combined with

the curtailment of a number of major individual and corporate tax preferences and deductions. The elimination of preferences weighed heaviest on corporations, which faced an overall tax increase estimated at \$120 billion over five years. Individual taxpayers, under the president's plan, would receive a tax cut estimated at \$147 billion over the same period (Joint Committee on Taxation, July 26, 1985, p. 15). The President insisted that any reform plan enacted in Congress be "revenue neutral"—i.e., neither raise tax revenues nor increase the size of the federal deficit.

Rostenkowski publicly embraced the tax reform effort in a speech to the Economic Club of New York in February 1985. The Ways and Means Committee held hearings on the proposal during the summer of 1985, and amid widespread skepticism that such a comprehensive change could be enacted reported out a tax reform plan in November. In December 1985 the Ways and Means bill passed the House, and Senate approval of an even more radical reform package followed in June 1986. Differences in the two plans were worked out during the summer, and President Reagan signed the Tax Reform Act into law in October 1986.

In interviews, Ways and Means members of both parties emphasized that Rostenkowski's active coalition-building efforts were critical to committee approval of the tax reform package. Said a Democratic member: "He really brought the Democrats along on this. There was no real interest—well maybe from [Donald J.] Pease [D-Ohio] and [Byron L.] Dorgan [D-North Dakota] and one or two others—but most of us did not want to do tax reform." A committee Republican offered a similar view: "I don't know of anybody else who could have gotten a consensus—or *created* a consensus—on a bill given the obstacles in its way at the beginning. There was no political consensus out among the rank and file for a bill." How, then, did Rostenkowski assemble the coalition that voted to report a comprehensive tax reform plan in November 1985?

First, before the Reagan administration proposal was formally submitted in May 1985, Rostenkowski began meeting with small groups of committee Democrats. According to members who participated in these early meetings, Rostenkowski sought to build support on the committee for tax reform by characterizing the forthcoming Reagan administration proposal as a major opportunity to advance good public policy. Said one participant in these meetings:

Most of us had made speeches in favor of tax reform at every civic club. Rostenkowski seized on this and said: "Now you people have been talking about reforming the tax code and making it fairer for the lower income people—the average working person. You will never get a better opportunity to get this than now because I've got the president on board and he's going to be the lead person out there, which gives everyone cover. If you want to get reform you've got to do it under these circumstances. You can't get it when a Democratic president is out there because you will get slaughtered by the Republicans. But we can get it this year."

In describing how Rostenkowski framed the issue, the same member noted "He has told me time and again that he thinks it's awful that young people pay so much in taxes as compared to corporations." A second committee Democrat, who was interviewed in 1985 shortly after one of these early meetings with the chairman, described it as follows: "We are talking about tough decisions—but promoting economic growth and cleaning up the tax system. . . . We concluded that we wanted to come up with a great tax bill. . . . I walked out of there and thought, Jesus, public policy really becomes important!"

Committee hearings on the president's proposal ran from May through late July. As the hearings progressed, Rostenkowski and/or Ways and Means Committee staff met individually with each committee member to gauge support for specific aspects of a reform plan (Birnbau and Murray, 1987, p. 108).

During the weekend of September 7–8, 1985, Rostenkowski also convened a committee retreat outside Washington at Airhe House in rural Virginia. Along with committee members, staff, and a number of high-level Treasury Department officials, the chairman invited a group of economists to discuss the policy effects of tax reform. "We were there for two days of straight B.S. with many of the leading economists in the country," one committee member recalled. "There was nothing else to do—no televisions in the place, no telephones. A lot of the discussion was about what was good for the economy, good for growth, and this and that."

"Finally, at the end," the same member continued, "[Rostenkowski] threw everybody out but the members." In the closed meeting that concluded the retreat, Rostenkowski attempted to galvanize committee support for a reform package by characterizing the issue both as an opportunity to advance good public policy and as one on which the committee members' reputations would be riding. As one Ways and Means member recounted Rostenkowski's appeal: "He said, 'Look, we have an opportunity here to do something historic.' He also said, 'The tax code is not fair.' . . . He told a story about when his daughter was living at home and he picked up her pay stub and saw how much money was being taken out of her salary, and said, 'This just isn't fair.' Tears started coming into his eyes. He said, 'This is not fair and we're going to do something about it.' " Recalled another member: "Airhe House was important in terms of bringing the committee together and really did help to develop a sense of history. He said this was an historic moment, a great opportunity for the committee to recapture some of the glory it had lost because we had lost fights on the floor of the House in years before."⁶

⁶ Richard L. Hall's recent study of participation in committee work on the House Education and Labor Committee indicates that concerns with influence, prestige, or even "making history" may be important for members of other panels as well as for members of "prestige committees" like Ways and Means. "In both formal and informal participation," Hall (1987, p. 116) reports, "one of the strongest motivational influences is the member's desire to make a [personal] mark."

Based on their interviews with Rostenkowski and other committee members, Birnbaum and Murray provide a very similar account of the chairman's pitch to the committee at the Airie House meeting

He reminded them that they had been through a lot together and that if they failed this time it could cast a pall on the committee that might never be removed. He spoke about the need for reform—the chance to bring fairness into the code. He told his committee members about his own daughters, who, he said, were working hard to make ends meet, but who paid more in taxes than some millionaires. Tears came into his eyes at the mention of them. We have an opportunity to catch what little we can in the history books, he said. It's not going to be easy, but it's doable. (Birnbaum and Murray, 1987, p. 117)

Although many members remained less than enthusiastic about comprehensive tax reform, Rostenkowski was able to secure an informal agreement at the Airie House retreat to move ahead to a committee markup that would start from a draft proposal prepared by the majority and minority staffs.

However, when the committee mark-up began in mid-September, a senior majority staffer noted, "it was a whole new ballgame. To maintain support for a reform package, Rostenkowski was forced to shift from a coalition-building strategy stressing opportunities for enhancing prestige and enacting good public policy to a strategy that included accommodating local or group interests of importance to individual committee members. As one committee member described the markup process, "There was an awful lot of protection going on—in terms of protecting what's good for your state, your region, your district. By the count of a staffer who worked closely with the chairman, five of the twenty-eight-member coalition that ultimately approved the committee bill (four Democrats and one Republican) supported the chairman consistently from the outset, the remainder exacted as a condition for support at least some concessions for interests of local or regional concern.

To achieve lower tax rates without increasing budget deficits, a number of major tax preferences had to be eliminated or substantially reduced. One of the preferences slated for reduction in the Ways and Means bill, the deductibility of state and local taxes, proved to be a major obstacle in maintaining a committee coalition in support of tax reform. Ways and Means members from high-tax states in the northeast were strongly opposed to any plan that curtailed deductions for state and local taxes, and they began actively seeking allies among oil state members and others who were concerned about regional interests affected by the plan (Birnbaum and Murray, 1987, pp. 113–16, 128–31). According to a committee aide, New York Republican Raymond McGrath made it clear that his position on the issue reflected electoral concerns. As the staffer recalled it, McGrath told the chairman, "Look, I can't exist out on Long Island unless you give me this." Another committee member explained that he had told Rostenkowski, "unless you allow for the deductibility of state and local taxes, I don't care what you do, I'm not for this."

Seeking to contain defections from the tax reform effort, Rostenkowski worked out an agreement with a group of committee members from the north-east, he would preserve the full deductibility of state and local taxes, and they would support the committee bill. Rostenkowski, a senior committee aide explained, "began meeting with [Thomas] Downey [D-New York], [Charles] Rangel [D-New York], [Barbara] Kennelly [D-Connecticut], and McGrath. He made it clear that state and local would not hold up the bill" (see also Birnbaum and Murray, 1987, p. 134). As one committee member recalled it "He said 'OK, I'm gonna give in to this but now you have to support it [the committee bill]'."

Rostenkowski also encouraged allegiance to the committee bill by allowing members to make some revisions in the plan through informal task forces. As one member noted, "The [preservation of] the second home mortgage deduction came in from a task force. That was one I went after hard because it impacts my state." Rostenkowski also made it clear in the later stages of the markup that those who voted against him would stand to lose out in the drafting of transition rules for the bill—special exceptions to revenue-raising provisions that may be used to confer tax benefits on particular individuals, localities, or industries (Birnbaum and Murray, 1987, pp. 146–47).

Two final aspects of Rostenkowski's coalition-building strategy that were at least partly oriented toward members' electoral concerns were (1) attempting to use the favorable disposition of the press toward tax reform to encourage support for the committee bill, and (2) emphasizing to committee Democrats that they and their party would likely be blamed for killing tax reform if the committee failed to act on the Reagan proposal. When the survival of tax reform appeared threatened in mid-October by a committee vote that substantially expanded tax deductions for banks, the committee was portrayed very unfavorably in a number of editorials and in accounts of the vote that appeared in major newspapers (Birnbaum and Murray, 1987, pp. 124–27). "There was a furor in the press," one member recalled. Apparently anticipating this negative reaction, Rostenkowski told staffers he would let committee members "stew in it for a while," rather than attempting to have the committee reconsider the vote immediately (Birnbaum and Murray, 1987, p. 126). Whether out of concern for reputation in the Washington community or fear of being branded a protector of "special interests" in future elections, some members' support for tax reform appeared to have been reinvigorated by the negative press. As a committee staffer described the press response and its effects on Ways and Means Democrats: "There were some scorching editorials. These guys were being held up to ridicule for caving in, for dropping the ball. That softened the boys up."

In discussing how Rostenkowski kept committee Democrats behind the reform plan, another senior committee aide noted "When we had trouble, when we lost on the bank vote, . . . [the chairman's] argument tended to be

'We can't do this. The Democrats are going to get blamed for killing tax reform. I can hear Ronald Reagan out there right now saying your rates are now 50[%] and I could have lowered them to 35[%]'." Rostenkowski, he explained, "clearly made the political pitch" to committee Democrats, but the chairman's overall approach was described as "always a combination of policy and politics."

The tax reform package was reported favorably by the Ways and Means Committee in November 1985. All twenty-three Democrats supported the committee bill, joined by five of the panel's thirteen Republicans. As the discussion above has shown, the successful coalition-building strategy employed by Chairman Rostenkowski included four basic elements: (1) emphasizing the favorable conditions for advancing good public policy created by the Reagan administration's tax reform proposal, (2) characterizing tax reform as an opportunity to "make history" and as an issue on which committee members' prestige would be riding, (3) accepting some revisions in the reform plan that lessened its impact on constituency interests of individual committee members, and (4) making sure the committee's Democratic members were aware of the risks of being blamed by the press and the partisan opposition if the president's reform plan died in the House.⁷

TAX REFORM AND HOUSE MEMBERS' GOALS

If a congressional leader is closely attuned to the concerns of his or her fellow members, that leader's coalition-building strategy may provide useful evidence about members' goals in relation to the issue or issues on which the leader is seeking to build agreement. The committee coalition-building strategy employed by Chairman Rostenkowski on the tax reform issue provides evidence in support of earlier studies indicating that prestige and policy goals are important for Ways and Means Committee members. The prominence of appeals directed at members' concerns with prestige and good public policy in Rostenkowski's strategy thus supports findings obtained by asking members directly about motivations for joining the committee. Electoral and constituency concerns were also incorporated in the chairman's coalition-building strategy, but as one would expect from previous committee studies, constituency-oriented appeals were by no means the dominant element.

What, if any, are the implications of the findings in this case for conceptualizations of members' goals in purposive theories about congressional politics? One possibility is that the tax reform case—though important as a major economic policy decision—was the result of a convergence of factors so unique or unusual as to offer little of interest to the student of Congress who seeks

⁷ For an interesting discussion of the conditions under which politicians may seek to avoid blame for governmental actions or try to focus it on others, see Weaver, 1988, chap. 2.

generalizations about how the institution works. One might argue, for example, that the high degree of elite and expert consensus that had developed in support of tax reform by 1985 encouraged greater attention by members to policy and prestige considerations than is normally the case in congressional politics—and hence, that it remains reasonable to assume that most members are single-minded reelection seekers.⁸ A more plausible view, given the accumulating empirical evidence on the importance of motivations other than reelection in congressional behavior (see especially, Fenno 1973, 1978; Arnold, 1979, 1981; Smith and Deering, 1984; Derthick and Quirk 1985, II, 1987) is that the tax reform issue evoked policy and reputational concerns that are almost always important to some degree in congressional policymaking and thus merit consideration in purposive theorizing about congressional politics.⁹

It is important to note that this view need not deny the abstract primacy of the reelection goal for most members.¹⁰ Just as most individuals' concern tends to narrow to self-preservation when faced with a life-threatening situation, most members of Congress probably do tend to place first priority on electoral survival when it is thought to be directly at risk. But even if few members appear to feel totally secure about their prospects for reelection (see Fenno, 1978, pp. 10–18), it seems reasonable to assume also that few—with the possible exception of a relatively small group of new members from highly competitive districts, are likely to view their political survival as being at stake on *all* issues *all* the time.¹¹ Most members may feel free much of the time to pursue goals other than reelection. As David E. Price has observed: 'most members of Congress, most of the time, have a great deal of latitude as to how they define their roles and what kind of job they wish to do. If they do not have the latitude, they can often create it, for they have a great deal of control over how their actions are perceived and interpreted' (Price, 1985, p. 136).

⁸ On the politics of the tax reform issue—including the importance of the broad elite consensus that had developed in support of comprehensive reform by 1985—see Verdier, 1988; Burnham and Murray 1987; Coyle and Wildavsky 1987; Strahan forthcoming; chap. 7; Conlan, Brann and Wrightson forthcoming.

⁹ I am indebted to Paul J. Quirk for first suggesting to me this interpretation of the politics of the tax reform case.

¹⁰ This paragraph draws on the discussions of members' goals in Fenno (1978, chaps. 6 and 7) and Derthick and Quirk (1985, chap. 4) as well as on Fiorina's (1974) notion that representatives may be reelection 'maintainers' as well as reelection 'maximizers'.

¹¹ In the case of the Ways and Means Committee—at the time of the tax reform deliberation in 1985 only four of thirty-six Ways and Means members (11%) had won the previous election with less than 60% of the two-party vote [Sam Gibbons (D-Florida), Andy Jacobs (D-Indiana), James R. Jones (D-Oklahoma) and Thomas J. Downey (D-New York)].

CONCLUSION

No claim is being made that the tax reform case offers conclusive evidence one way or the other on how best to conceptualize congressmen's goals. Whether single goal models of congressional politics merely simplify (as all theoretical constructs do), or in fact oversimplify is an empirical question on which more evidence is needed before any final conclusions are drawn. The purpose of this note is to present some findings from a new, less obtrusive approach to seeking out empirical evidence on motivations of House members and to suggest that the attention paid to members' prestige and policy goals by a highly pragmatic leader like Rostenkowski lends some additional empirical support to attempts to conceptualize members' goals in ways that go beyond the assumption that members are single-minded seekers of reelection.

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Voter Turnout in Runoff Elections

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I examine the extent to which voter turnout tends to drop from the primary to the runoff election. Results indicate that turnout declined in almost 77% of all Democratic gubernatorial, senatorial, and congressional runoffs held from 1956 to 1984. The extent of decline is greater in congressional and senatorial runoffs than in gubernatorial runoffs and is especially pronounced in congressional runoffs unaccompanied by gubernatorial or senatorial runoffs. I explore several other determinants of turnout decline, including both contextual and procedural variables. Especially important is the degree of Republican opposition: as the level of Republican viability in a state or constituency increases, so does the relative level of runoff abstention.

A considerable amount of recent debate has centered on the effects of the runoff or dual primary system on political competition in the South.¹ Some scholars have argued, for example, that the runoff operates in a racially discriminatory fashion and was established as a means of restricting black political influence in the South (Kousser, 1984; Simpson, 1987). Others have, however, questioned claims that the runoff system disadvantages either minority (Stanley, 1985, 1987a; Bullock and Johnson, 1985a) or female (Bullock and Johnson, 1985b) candidates.² Using data from 215 runoff elections in Georgia, Bullock and Johnson (1985a) also found little support for the popular "myths" that the initial primary leader usually loses the runoff or that incumbents forced into runoffs almost always lose. Finally, Black and Black (1987) found that the gubernatorial runoff tends to eliminate "weak" frontrunners, while promoting "strong" frontrunners—candidates who win at least 40% of the primary vote and have at least a five percentage point lead over their closest rival.

I am especially grateful to John Huber, William Riker, Harold Stanley, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments.

¹ The runoff system requires that the top two primary candidates meet in a runoff election if no single candidate attains a majority at the first ballot. Nine states currently use the runoff primary: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas. Since 1975, Louisiana has operated under a unique nonpartisan primary system in which candidates from both parties compete at the first ballot; if no candidate receives a majority, the general election is then a runoff between the top two primary finishers.

² Already, several federal court cases have attempted to address the racial intent and effects of the runoff primary. See, for example, *Whitfield v. The Democratic Party of the State of Arkansas* (Eastern District of Arkansas, no. H-86-47).

Although the original purposes of the runoff primary have been debated, clearly one of the reasons for its adoption, following the disappearance of two-party competition in the South, was "to insure that the Democratic nominee was the preference of a majority of voters when given a choice" (Bullock and Johnson, 1985a, p. 938). In practice, of course, this procedure may not always select candidates possessing the desired majority support. As Riker (1982, pp. 76–77) has demonstrated, the runoff method can fail to select Condorcet winners—candidates capable of defeating all other candidates in pairwise competition—when such candidates exist. In a multicandidate initial primary field, the Condorcet winner, who would win any possible runoff, may nonetheless fail to reach the runoff election.

Results such as these generally assume full voter turnout. But levels of turnout can affect the degree to which different voting systems select Condorcet winners. If, for example, turnout tends to decline from the primary to the runoff, then the propensity of the runoff system to select Condorcet winners when they exist, also declines (Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1979). Indeed, to the extent that turnout declines from the primary to the runoff, this procedure may not even satisfy a less stringent desirable feature—never electing a Condorcet "loser," i.e., a candidate who would lose to all others in pairwise voting (Brams and Fishburn, 1983). Computer simulations suggest that the effect of a decline in turnout on the propensity of two-stage majority systems (e.g., runoff) to select Condorcet winners can be significant.³

The practical significance of these theoretical findings, however, is not yet known, in part because there is no systematic empirical evidence comparing first- and second-ballot turnout in runoff elections. In this paper, I seek to address this shortcoming. I begin by examining the possibility that voter turnout tends to decline in runoff elections, using as a sample all Democratic congressional, senatorial, and gubernatorial runoffs from 1956 to 1984. Then I present evidence for several determinants of relative primary and runoff turnout.

VOTER TURNOUT AT THE SECOND BALLOT

As a first step, I will assess the extent to which turnout declines from the initial primary to the runoff election. I define turnout here in terms of the ratio of votes cast in the runoff, for a given office, to the number cast in the primary.

³ With full turnout at both ballots, simulations have shown that, in a three-candidate field, the Condorcet winner will be selected by the runoff method about 96% to 98% of the time such candidates exist (Fishburn, 1986). If, however, turnout at the second ballot drops to 80% (with three candidates and complete turnout at the first ballot), then Gehrlein and Fishburn (1979) estimate that this method selects "global" or "full turnout" Condorcet winners, when they exist, only 82% of the time. In a more realistic example, if turnout at both ballots is 50%, the Condorcet winner is selected about 66% of the time; if first-ballot turnout is 50% but second-ballot turnout drops to 20%, the runoff procedure selects such candidates only about 57% of the time they exist (Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1979, p. 353).

for the same office. This subject has been previously addressed only in a limited or unsystematic fashion. Although Key (1949, p. 419) and Ewing (1953, p. 105) suggested that fewer voters generally participated in runoffs than initial primaries, Bullock (1986)—in the only paper to examine this issue directly—found little support for this contention. Unfortunately, Bullock's sample consisted of only 37 elections in six selected cities where the runoff method was used. Using a similarly small sample of North Carolina elections, Lanier's (1983) findings were quite different: in 18 of 23 primaries where runoffs were held (1950–1982), turnout in the runoff averaged only 82.5% of that in the initial primary.

Table 1 displays ratios of runoff election turnout to initial primary turnout for 186 Democratic congressional, senatorial, and gubernatorial runoffs from 1956 to 1984.⁴ Note first that the vast majority of runoff elections—almost 77% overall—had fewer votes cast in the runoff than in the initial primary, though there is wide variation in turnout decline among the various types of races. In particular, turnout declined to a greater extent in congressional and senatorial runoffs than in gubernatorial runoffs. Only 2.2% of the gubernatorial runoffs drew less than 75% of the votes cast in the initial primary, while nearly 25% of congressional runoffs did. Likewise, turnout in almost 63% of the congressional runoff elections was less than 90% of that in the accompanying initial primary, more than twice the percentage of corresponding gubernatorial runoffs (31.1%). The declines in congressional runoff turnout were especially conspicuous when the congressional race was unaccompanied by a senatorial or gubernatorial runoff: 34.1% of these runoffs had turnout below 75% of initial primary turnout, compared to less than 3% of the congressional runoffs held concurrently with a statewide runoff. Runoff turnout ranged from an average of 95% of initial primary turnout, for gubernatorial runoffs, to 83% for congressional runoffs that did not accompany runoffs for senator or governor. Taken together, the runoffs displayed in table 1 averaged 88% of the turnout in the primary.⁵

Although this information is not provided directly in table 1, even where turnout did increase at the runoff election, the increases were generally much smaller (in absolute terms) than the decreases in turnout. Only 34.9% of those runoffs in which turnout went up were above 110% of the turnout in the initial

⁴ I have focused exclusively on Democratic primaries because the runoff primary is peculiar to the South, where one-party politics—especially at the state level—was the rule for much of the 1956–1984 period. In other words, because southern Republicans won general elections so seldom during this period, there was generally little incentive for voters to turn out at the runoff should one occur. (And, because only rarely did more than two viable Republican candidates enter these primary races, few such runoffs were held.) I have also excluded Alabama congressional runoffs in 1962 and 1964, which were held as at-large races pending redistricting action in accordance with the 1960 Census.

⁵ *t*-tests indicate that all the mean turnout ratios displayed in table 1 are significantly less than unity at the .01 level.

TABLE 1
 TURNOUT IN DEMOCRATIC RUNOFF AND INITIAL PRIMARIES, 1956-1984
 VOTES CAST FOR OFFICE IN RUNOFF ELECTION
 VOTES CAST FOR OFFICE IN INITIAL PRIMARY

Office	Mean	Below 0.75	0.75-0.89	0.90-1.00	Above 1.00	N
Gubernatorial	0.95 (0.10)	2.2%	28.9%	33.3%	35.6%	45
Senatorial	0.87 (0.10)	15.0%	45.0%	30.0%	10.0%	20
Congressional	0.86 (0.20)	24.8%	38.0	16.5%	20.7%	121
Without state- wide race	0.83 (0.22)	34.1%	36.5%	10.6%	18.8%	[85]
With state- wide race	0.94 (0.14)	2.8%	41.6%	30.6%	25.0%	[36]
Total	0.88 (0.18)	16.3%	36.5%	22.1%	23.1%	186

Source: Compiled by the author from selected volumes of *America Votes*, 1956-1984.

Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Congressional runoff elections are divided into those that accompanied gubernatorial and senatorial runoffs and those that did not.

primary. Less than 14% were above 120% of the primary turnout. In sharp contrast, in almost 71% of the runoffs where turnout was lower than in the primary, runoff turnout was less than 90% of that in the primary. Additionally, in almost 37% of these runoffs, turnout was less than 80% of that in the initial primary.

As table 2 illustrates, there is wide variation also in the extent of second ballot turnout drop-off across states. Runoffs in Louisiana had turnout rates that were, on average, 106% of that in the initial primary. Moreover, in only 30.8% of these runoffs (4 of 13) did turnout actually decline at the second ballot. Texas runoffs, on the other hand, averaged only 72% of initial primary turnout, and all saw fewer votes cast in the runoff than in the primary. The average runoff/initial primary turnout ratios for the other states ranged from .83 (South Carolina) to .97 (Mississippi). In all states but Louisiana, however, it was much more likely for turnout to decline, rather than increase, at the runoff election. This finding cannot be explained by the unique runoff system used there (see n. 1), as only one of the Louisiana runoffs in table 2 took place after the imposition of this system in 1975.⁶

⁶ Because none of the subsequent results change when the post-1975 Louisiana observation is omitted, I will continue to include it.

TABLE 2

TURNOUT IN DEMOCRATIC GUBERNATORIAL, SENATORIAL,
AND CONGRESSIONAL RUNOFF ELECTIONS BY STATE, 1956-1984

State	Percentage of Elections With Turnout Decline in Runoff	Mean Ratio of Votes Cast Runoff Election/ Initial Primary	N
Louisiana	30.8%	1.06 (0.10)	13
Georgia	62.5%	0.91 (0.17)	21
North Carolina	66.7%	0.88 (0.13)	15
Alabama	72.2%	0.89 (0.17)	16
Arkansas	78.6%	0.90 (0.17)	14
Oklahoma	81.0%	0.88 (0.15)	21
Florida	81.5%	0.90 (0.13)	27
South Carolina	85.7%	0.83 (0.19)	11
Mississippi	92.9%	0.97 0.25	11
Texas	100.0%	0.72 0.17	26
Total	76.9%	0.88 (0.18)	186

Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.

DETERMINANTS OF SECOND-BALLOT TURNOUT DECLINE

Most factors typically adduced to account for variation in turnout among states or countries—registration laws, partisanship, demographic characteristics, and even region (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Stanley 1987b; Powell, 1986)—remain effectively constant in the short period between a primary and its accompanying runoff election. Why, then, would turnout decline from the primary to the runoff? One answer is that the particular runoff elections held do not always involve the races that led many voters to turn out

at the first ballot. Obviously, far more races are held in the primary than in the runoff, with most outcomes already decided at the initial primary; many voters will choose not to vote in the runoff. That this kind of second-ballot abstention occurs is suggested by the results in table 1: fewer voters participated in congressional runoff elections when no gubernatorial or senatorial runoff was held at the same time.⁷ Another reason to expect lower second-ballot turnout is that many voters may simply be indifferent between the restricted choices offered at the second ballot and thus choose to abstain.

Using survey evidence on participation at the second ballot of French two-stage majority elections, Pierce (1981) found that about half of those who abstained at the second ballot did so deliberately, i.e., because no candidate "suited them" or because the election result seemed predetermined. Abstention for lack of a suitable candidate at the second ballot was, not surprisingly, especially common among voters who could not repeat their first-ballot choices. Following this finding, we would expect relatively higher runoff abstention where the proportion of primary votes received by candidates eliminated at the first ballot is greater. We should also see relatively lower second-ballot turnout where the impending runoff races are deemed less competitive or predetermined. Likewise, first-ballot turnout should be higher (relative to second-ballot turnout) when the primary races are more competitive or closely contested.⁸

In addition to contextual variables such as competitiveness, differences in electoral procedures may also account for some of the variation in turnout across states. Two seem particularly relevant. First is whether a state uses a closed or open primary. Because closed primaries limit primary participation to party registrants—presumably the more interested and motivated participants—they are more likely to see only marginal declines, if any, in runoff turnout. Second, the period of time between the primary and runoff is likely to affect the relative turnout at the second ballot. All things equal, the greater the period between these races, the more likely voter interest in these campaigns is to wane, resulting in low second-ballot turnout.

Table 3 displays initial OLS results on these determinants of relative first and second ballot turnout for Democratic runoffs from 1956 to 1984. The dependent variable in this analysis is runoff turnout as a percentage of initial primary turnout. Competitiveness of a runoff election is defined as the runoff

⁷ The declines are likely to be especially large if, for example, a gubernatorial primary occurs (enhancing first-ballot turnout for the accompanying congressional races) but no gubernatorial runoff is held.

⁸ For evidence linking gubernatorial primary turnout and competitiveness, see Kenney (1983). Close races have also been associated with higher turnout in gubernatorial general elections (Patterson and Caldeira, 1983) and interparty competition has been related to turnout in senatorial primaries (Kenney, 1986).

TABLE 3
SECOND-BALLOT TURNOUT AS A PERCENTAGE OF FIRST-BALLOT
TURNOUT, DEMOCRATIC GUBERNATORIAL, SENATORIAL,
AND CONGRESSIONAL RUNOFFS, 1956-1984

	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error
Contextual variables		
Gubernatorial runoff	6.11	4.13
Congressional runoff	8.11	4.15
Congressional runoff (Alone)	-12.57	3.43
Gubernatorial primary with no runoff	-4.74	3.45
Runoff competitiveness	0.97	1.05
Primary competitiveness	0.26	7.53
Primary vote % won by candidates not qualifying for runoff	0.19	0.09
Procedural variables		
Closed primary	17.06	16.55
Weeks between primary and runoff	6.05	3.07
States		
Arkansas	-7.33	7.31
Florida	16.66	17.10
Georgia	0.10	5.51
Louisiana	45.59	19.24
Mississippi	4.55	5.69
North Carolina	17.59	17.92
Oklahoma	9.41	17.15
South Carolina	-12.19	7.09
Texas	-7.01	5.56
Intercept	91.62	27.47
$R^2 = 0.42$		
Std. Error of estimate	13.56	
N	156	

winner's vote percentage times that of the loser⁹, competitiveness of the initial primary is approximated by the second finisher's vote proportion divided by the first. In addition to the contextual variables and rules outlined earlier, the model also includes dummy variables for each state.¹⁰

⁹ This measure of runoff competitiveness ranges theoretically from 0 (one candidate receiving all the runoff votes) to 2.500 (each candidate receiving an equal share of the votes). The observed range will, of course, be much narrower.

¹⁰ Alabama is excluded to prevent perfect collinearity. Because the data are, in essence, pooled over time and different units (i.e., states), this can be interpreted as the "Least Squares with Dummy Variables" procedure. Including state indicators allows for the possibility of different intercepts across states.

Most of the coefficients are in the expected direction. Congressional runoff unaccompanied by senatorial or gubernatorial runoffs tend to see a greater decline in turnout, the decline also increases with the number of weeks between the primary and runoff. Moreover, as suggested by Pierce's findings on France, each percentage point increase in the primary vote received by candidates not qualifying for the runoff resulted in a .19 percentage point decline in runoff to initial primary turnout. Gubernatorial primaries with no runoff held also tended to depress the turnout percentage, but the effect was not significant by traditional standards. Competitiveness (in either the runoff or primary) has no significant impact on turnout decline, nor does the type of primary system.¹¹ Of the states, only Louisiana has a significantly and substantively different intercept.

One important factor omitted from table 3 is some measure of the extent of Republican opposition. But the fact that turnout drops at all in a Democratic runoff is historically a function of Republican strength (or conversely, Democratic dominance). In the South that V. O. Key (1949) witnessed, election outcomes were almost always decided in the Democratic primary, so that the runoff, if held, generally determined the eventual winner. Because of the Democratic party's dominance, average turnout in southern gubernatorial runoffs—at least when aggregated across states—ran ahead of *both* primary and general election turnout from the 1920s to the 1950s (see Stanley, 1987b, pp. 13–16). As the South has, in recent decades, seen greater two-party competition, the runoff has lost some of its original significance. So the extent of second ballot drop-off should be a function of the one-party dominance in the constituency. Similarly, the few races in which a Republican candidate is likely to win should be more likely to witness turnout declines in the Democratic runoff.

Table 4 reports OLS estimates of the variables in table 3 (minus state dummies), with the addition of several measures of the degree of Republican opposition. First is a conventional measure of interparty competition within states, ranging from 0 (one-party Republican) to 1 (one-party Democratic).¹² Next is an ex-post measure of Republican strength—the Republican vote percentage in the general election for that office. Finally, I include variables indicating whether Republican primaries or runoffs were held. The absence of

¹¹ The results on competitiveness may be due to little variation in these variables. Primaries leading to runoffs are by definition among the most competitive races, and the runoffs in this sample were almost all within the competitive range, i.e., few would have been called "predetermined." (In only 29 of the 186 runoffs (15.6%) did the winning candidate receive more than 60% of the vote.)

¹² The scores for the 1956–1970 period were based on the well-known Ranney (1976) index. For 1971–1984, I used the figures reported in Patterson and Caldeira (1984), developed from the identical procedure used by Ranney. (These scores were unfolded so that they would be measured on the same scale as the Ranney index.) Although this index is not an ideal measure of electoral competition, it should provide a useful initial indicator for my purposes here.

TABLE 4

SECOND-BALLOT TURNOUT AS A PERCENTAGE OF FIRST-BALLOT
TURNOUT, DEMOCRATIC GUBERNATORIAL, SENATORIAL,
AND CONGRESSIONAL RUNOFFS, 1956-1984
(WITH VARIABLES MEASURING REPUBLICAN OPPOSITION INCLUDED)

	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error
Contextual variables		
Gubernatorial runoff	4.95	1.20
Congressional runoff	7.64	4.21
Congressional runoff (Alone)	-10.13	3.32
Gubernatorial primary with no runoff	-8.87	3.14
Runoff competitiveness	1.66	1.11
Primary competitiveness	6.87	7.76
Primary vote % won by candidates not qualifying for runoff	-0.16	0.09
Procedural variables		
Closed primary	7.97	3.14
Weeks between primary and runoff	-3.05	1.27
Republican opposition		
Interparty competition	72.43	22.17
Republican vote % in general election	-0.32	0.09
No Republican primary held \wedge Open primary	-13.32	5.44
Republican runoff held	9.79	5.06
Intercept	17.21	30.51
$R^2 = 0.39$		
Std. Error of estimate = 13.73		
$N = 186$		

Republican primary competition should enhance Democratic initial primary turnout in open primary states, where voters who might otherwise vote in the Republican primary can vote instead in the Democratic primary. Hence, I use an indicator variable, equal to one when there is no Republican primary contestant for the seat and the race is held in an open primary state and zero otherwise.

The coefficient for the interparty competition variable suggests that even within the presumably solid Democratic South, states that tended to be dominated to a greater extent by the Democratic party were more likely to display higher runoff turnout as a percentage of first-ballot turnout. In addition, each percentage point increase in the Republican general election vote was associated with a .32 percentage point drop in the runoff to initial primary turnout.

percentage.¹³ As expected, when Republican primary races for a particular office were not held and open primaries were used, Democratic runoff turnout as a percentage of initial primary turnout tends to decline. Republican runoffs, though quite a rare occurrence, surprisingly led to an increase in the dependent variable. Perhaps this results from the greater Republican primary competition in races leading to runoffs.

The other coefficients in table 4 follow mostly the same pattern as those in table 3. Dropping the state dummies reduces the standard errors of several variables, so that previously imprecise estimates become significant (notably the "Closed primary" and the "Gubernatorial primary with no runoff" measures). More important, however, the results in table 4 suggest that the phenomenon of runoff turnout decline cannot be explained without reference to the degree of Republican opposition faced by southern Democrats.

CONCLUSION

Analyzing a wide range of data, I have found that turnout generally declines from the initial primary to the runoff election. The degree to which turnout drops varies greatly across states and offices contested and, in general, the decline is much greater in congressional and senatorial runoffs than gubernatorial runoffs. The drop-offs are especially precipitous in congressional runoffs that are not held concurrently with statewide runoffs. In addition, these declines are greater when the period between the primary and runoff is longer and when the vote proportion received in the initial primary by candidates not qualifying for the runoff goes up. Perhaps more important, the extent to which turnout falls at the runoff election is a product of the changing nature of southern political competition over the past few decades, namely, the presence of more than token Republican opposition in general elections. The findings on second-ballot turnout suggest the possibility that—at least for some settings or races, the runoff primary may not select majority (or Condorcet) candidates as effectively as its proponents desire.

Nevertheless, these findings are not so strong or unequivocal as to call for the elimination of the runoff primary in the South. Turnout in gubernatorial runoffs, in particular, is arguably not substantively different from initial primary turnout [perhaps because the governorship is considered by voters and candidates alike as the "grand prize" in southern politics (Black and Black 1987)]. And, as several scholars have argued (Stanley, 1985; Black and Black 1987; Lamis, 1984), the runoff, in the absence of strong party organizations in the South, may continue to serve the electoral interests of the Democratic party. Still, the drop in runoff turnout is disconcerting, particularly for con-

¹³ Although the relationship between Republican general election vote (or Republican strength) and the dependent variable is probably nonlinear, scatterplots indicate that the linearity assumption is a useful approximation.

gressional races where no statewide runoff is held and in states where two-party competition is becoming the rule rather than the exception. More generally, the findings in this paper point to the importance of understanding the way the runoff primary operates and provide another dimension on which to judge this method of election.

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Race-Related Differences in Self-Reported and Validated Turnout in 1986

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Black Americans are less likely to participate in politics than white Americans are, but many students of political participation have argued that these differences result solely from racial differences in socioeconomic status. We have questioned these conclusions by analyzing the 1964, 1976, 1978, 1980, and 1984 vote validation studies in which local registration and voting records were used to measure electoral participation. When participation was measured by the vote validation studies, racial differences were reduced after controls were introduced, but whites were still more likely to vote than blacks. The 1986 Survey Research Center-Center for Political Studies (SRC-CPS) vote validation study is used to update our findings. The results are consistent with our previous analyses. The 1986 study does not confirm the finding of U.S. Census Bureau surveys that young blacks were more likely to vote than young whites. However, our analyses do support the basic finding of the bureau that racial differences in electoral participation have declined.

According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1987), the 1986 congressional elections continued a 22-year-long trend toward reducing racial differences in electoral participation. The massive post-election survey conducted by the bureau found that 47.0% of the whites reported voting, whereas 43.2% of the blacks said that they voted.¹ In 1966, when midterm turnout was first studied, whites were 15.3 percentage points more likely to report voting than blacks. In both 1970 and 1974, whites were 12.5 percentage points more likely to report voting, but the difference dropped to 10.1 points in 1978 and to 6.9 points in 1982. The 3.8 percentage point racial difference in reported turnout in 1986

The data for our analyses were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research which bears no responsibility for our analyses or interpretations. Anonymous referees for the *Journal* made helpful suggestions. We wish to thank Phillip H. Pollock III for running our categorical regressions for us.

¹ The typical Census Bureau turnout survey is based upon more than 50,000 households, and voting and registration information is gathered for more than 100,000 individuals.

was not only smaller than that recorded in the five previous midterm surveys, but was also smaller than racial differences in any of the six presidential surveys conducted since the Bureau began its voter participation studies in 1964.

Since the behavior of the young may provide clues about the future, one of the bureau's findings was particularly encouraging for Americans who hope to see racial differences in turnout eliminated. Among respondents below the age of 25, blacks were somewhat more likely to vote than whites. Among whites between the ages of 18 and 24, 21.6% reported voting, whereas among young blacks 25.1% said that they voted. Among the broadly defined group between the ages of 18 and 44, racial differences in turnout were negligible. Among whites of this age, 36.9% reported voting, whereas among blacks 36.4% said that they voted. The bureau considered the finding that young blacks were more likely to vote than young whites to be among the "highlights" of the 1986 survey, and concluded that "Young Blacks 18 to 24 years old moved ahead of Whites in 1986 both in voter turnout and in registration" (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1987, p. 2).

The tendency of young blacks to vote more than young whites was clearly newsworthy. According to Dale Russakoff, writing in the *Washington Post* (October 7, 1987), "Political analysts said the study confirms a trend toward stronger participation by black voters, youths in particular." This increased turnout could lead to greater black influence, and this influence was being demonstrated in "the near-solid opposition of southern Democrats to the Supreme Court nomination of Robert H. Bork." According to Republican strategist Lee Atwater, the relatively high turnout among black youths was "a tribute to Jesse Jackson. These are voters he's been targeting for the last four to five years, and I didn't realize how effective he apparently was" (quoted in Russakoff, 1987).

Students of political participation are by now well aware that there are serious problems in relying upon reported turnout as a measure of electoral participation. These problems are compounded when whites and blacks are compared, since blacks appear to be more likely to overreport voting than whites. Failure to recognize this bias can lead to questionable conclusions. For example, many students of political participation have argued that the lower participation of blacks results solely from their lower socioeconomic status. Thus, although blacks were less likely to participate in politics than whites, controls for socioeconomic status, along with controls for region, could eliminate or even reverse racial differences in political participation.

In two recent studies (Abramson and Claggett, 1984, 1986), we used surveys conducted in 1964, 1976, 1978, 1980, and 1984 by the Survey Research Center and the Center for Political Studies of the University of Michigan to question this conclusion.² We compared the results using the respondents

² The census survey consistently registers lower levels of reported turnout than the SRC-CPS surveys. This difference results partly from the different sampling frames used by the Census Bureau and the SRC. The census surveys are based upon the noninstitutionalized voting-age pop-

reports about their electoral participation with results using individual-level measures of participation based upon direct checks of local registration and voting records—the “vote validation studies.” In 1964, 1976, and 1980 racial differences in reported turnout were eliminated or reversed when joint controls were introduced for region and level of education, and racial differences were reduced substantially in 1984.³ In the 1978 midterm study, joint controls reduced, but failed to eliminate, racial differences in reported electoral participation. On balance, the conventional wisdom was upheld when turnout was measured with self-reported participation.

Substantially different results obtained when the vote validation variable was used to measure electoral participation. In all five surveys, racial differences in validated turnout were substantially greater than differences in reported turnout. Except for the 1980 survey, racial differences remained statistically significant—even when joint controls for region and level of education were introduced. Moreover, even in 1980 whites were between two and seven percentage points more likely to vote than blacks even after joint controls were introduced. In the 1978 midterm study, zero-order differences in validated turnout were greater than in any of the presidential election surveys, and blacks were between fourteen and eighteen points less likely to vote than whites even after joint controls were introduced.

The likelihood that controls will eliminate racial differences in turnout is largely a function of the size of the zero-order differences. The census results suggest that racial differences were small, substantially increasing the chances that controls will eliminate turnout differences between whites and blacks.

dition, whereas the SRC-CPS surveys are based upon the noninstitutionalized politically eligible population. In addition, the Census Bureau is more successful than the SRC in sampling Americans with low socioeconomic status.

The census surveys are based upon interviews conducted about two weeks after the election. During presidential years, the SRC surveys probably exaggerate turnout by conducting a pre-election interview that may stimulate some respondents to vote (see Anderson, Silver, and Abramson, 1988). This problem does not arise with the SRC midterm studies since they rely only upon a postelection interview.

³ Our analysis of the 1984 results was based upon the vote validation data released for analysis in the summer of 1985. In the final release version of these data, which were released in the winter of 1986, some respondents who had originally been classified as not ascertained on the vote validation variable were reclassified as validated nonvoters. Following classification procedures employed by Anderson, Silver, and Abramson (1988) we found that both white and black validated turnout were three points lower than they were with the earlier version of the data. Some of our arguments about the relatively low level of overreporting in 1984 are not supported by the final version of the 1984 vote validation study. However, in the final release version of the data, as in the earlier version, blacks were more likely to overreport voting than whites. White validated turnout was 18.2 percentage points higher than black validated turnout, a result identical with our earlier analysis. We have repeated both our algebraic standardization procedures and our categorical regression techniques with the final version of the vote validation study, and our substantive arguments about controls failing to eliminate racial differences in validated turnout are clearly supported.

Indeed, by working directly with the published Census Bureau results, one can demonstrate that in 1986 controls for level of education substantially reduced the already small racial differences in electoral participation. Assuming blacks had the same levels of formal education as whites, reported turnout among blacks would have been 46.3%—less than a single percentage point below white turnout.⁴

Given known racial biases in reported turnout, however, it is important to determine the size of racial differences when they are measured without relying upon respondents' reports. Therefore, this note has four goals. First, we want to determine whether racial differences in 1986 are actually minimal when measured by actual checks of voting and registration records. Second, we want to see whether racial differences in midterm turnout have been reduced when turnout is measured by the vote validation studies. Third, we want to determine whether controls eliminate racial differences in participation in 1986 when the vote validation measure is employed. Lastly, we want to determine whether the widely reported finding that young blacks voted more often than young whites is supported when one relies upon actual checks of the registration and voting records.

In 1986, as in all five previous vote validation studies, blacks were more likely to overreport voting than whites.⁵ Among whites who said they voted ($N = 909$), 13.0% did not vote according to checks of local registration and voting records, among blacks who said they voted ($N = 151$), 31.8% did not vote according to these checks. However, as Anderson and Silver (1986) note (see also Silver, Anderson, and Abramson, 1986), the percentage of overreporting is partly a function of a group's turnout. Other things being equal, the percentage of reported voters who do not vote will be higher among low turnout groups. As they argue, validated nonvoters constitute the "population at risk" of overreporting. But in 1986, black validated nonvoters were significantly ($p < .001$) more likely to overreport voting than white validated nonvoters. Among the 920 white validated nonvoters, 12.8% claimed to have voted, among the 202 black validated nonvoters, 23.8% said that they voted.


The 1986 vote validation survey therefore replicates the basic finding of all five previous studies, the relationship of race to turnout is higher when electoral participation is measured by the vote validation study. Figure 1 sum-

⁴ This estimate is based upon an algebraic standardization procedure in which we assume that participation for each educational level of blacks was the same as the observed level in the census survey, but assume that the educational levels of blacks were the same as educational levels among whites.

⁵ Our analysis is based upon ICPSR study 8678, which is the second ICPSR edition of the data. We have been assured by the ICPSR that this data set contains the final version of the 1986 vote validation study. To measure validated turnout we employed variable 802, which is the summary variable for the vote validation study. We classified respondents coded 11 and 33 as validated voters, those coded 21, 22, 24, 31, and 32 were classified as validated nonvoters. All other categories were classified as not ascertained.

FIGURE 1

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WHITE AND BLACK TURNOUT AS MEASURED
BY RESPONDENTS' REPORTS AND BY THE VOTE VALIDATION STUDIES
1964, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1984, AND 1986



Source: Surveys conducted by the Survey Research Center and the Center for Political Studies of the University of Michigan.

Note: For details about the 1964, 1976, 1978, and 1980 results, see Abramson and Claggett (1984) and for details about the 1984 results, see Abramson and Claggett (1986) and note 3 of this research note.

^aWhite turnout minus black turnout.

marizes our previous findings, and also presents racial differences in reported and validated turnout for the 1986 survey. When turnout is measured according to the respondents' reports in 1986, whites are only 3.0 percentage points more likely to vote than blacks—a statistically insignificant difference. But when turnout is measured by the vote validation variable, whites are 12.0 percentage points more likely to vote than blacks. Regardless of which measure of turnout is used, racial differences are substantially lower than they were in 1978—the only other midterm election in which a vote validation study was conducted. In that survey, whites were 12.4 percentage points more likely to say they voted than blacks were, and they were 22.4% more likely to vote according to the validation study. Given the much smaller racial differences in the 1986 SRC survey, the prospect that controls will eliminate racial differences seemed substantially greater.

As with our earlier analyses, we determined the extent to which racial differences were reduced by controlling for the fact that blacks were more likely than whites to live in the South and to have lower levels of formal education. Table 1 of this note updates the results of tables 1 and 2 of our article (and

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE WHO SAID THEY VOTED AND PERCENTAGE WHO VOTED ACCORDING TO VOTE VALIDATION
STUDY, BY RACE, REGION, AND LEVEL OF EDUCATION 1986

Method of Measurement	Race	South					Total for South
		8 Grades or Less	Some High School	High School Graduate	Some College	College Graduate	
Respondents Report	White	39 (49)	20 (60)	38 (149)	46 (97)	72 (71)	43 0 (426)
	Black	58 (31)	34 (35)	43 (54)	52 (27)	73 (15)	48 1 (162)
Vote Validation Study	White	31 (49)	15 (59)	29 (139)	39 (87)	65 (68)	35 3 (402)
	Black	41 (29)	26 (34)	20 (50)	24 (25)	60 (15)	30 1 (153)
Outside the South							
Method of Measurement	Race	8 Grades or Less	Some High School	High School Graduate	Some College	College Graduate	Total for Outside the South
							Total for Nation
Respondents Report	White	39 (94)	39 (134)	52 (458)	59 (333)	73 (309)	56 5 (1358)
	Black	71 (17)	32 (25)	47 (60)	62 (34)	65 (20)	52 6 (156)
Vote Validation Study	White	34 (91)	31 (129)	47 (473)	50 (313)	66 (291)	49 7 (1297)
	Black	56 (16)	32 (25)	31 (56)	41 (32)	53 (19)	36 7 (150)
							46 3 (1699)
							34 3 (303)

Source: Surveys conducted by the Survey Research Center and the Center for Political Studies of the University of Michigan

Note: Numbers in parentheses are the totals upon which percentages are based

table 1 of our earlier note) Within each region, the first two rows present reported turnout by race and level of education, whereas the bottom two rows show the percentage who voted when turnout is measured by the vote validation study. Among both races, southerners are less likely to vote than respondents outside the South. Southern whites are 13.5 points less likely to say they voted than nonsouthern whites, whereas southern blacks are 4.5 points less likely to say they voted than nonsouthern blacks. According to the vote validation results, southern whites are 14.4 points less likely to vote than nonsouthern whites, whereas southern blacks are 8.6 points less likely to vote than nonsouthern blacks.

As can be seen by reading across the rows, among whites there is a clear positive relationship between level of education and turnout, regardless of which measure of electoral participation is employed. Among blacks there is also a positive but weak relationship between level of education and both measures of participation. This relationship is weak mainly because both reported and validated turnout are high among blacks with very low levels of education. Indeed, in both regions blacks with low levels of education are more likely to vote than whites with low levels of education.⁹ This result is consistent with the Census Bureau finding that blacks with very low levels of formal education were more likely to report voting than whites with very low educational levels.

Following our earlier analyses, we employed two different methods to determine the extent to which controls for region and level of education reduce the zero-order difference between race and turnout. Table 2 updates table 3 and table 4 of our article (and table 2 of our earlier note) by showing the effects of an algebraic standardization procedure in reducing these differences. Table 3 updates results from table 5 and table 6 of our original article (and table 3 of our earlier note) by showing the effects of these controls in reducing racial differences when categorical regression equations are used to estimate their impact. We present the results of four equations. Equation 1 presents the zero-order difference between white turnout and black turnout, equation 2 presents the results with region introduced as a control, equation 3 presents the results controlling for level of education, while equation 4 presents the results controlling simultaneously for both region and level of education.

Turning to our algebraic standardization results, we see that controls for region reduce 40% of the zero-order difference between white reported turnout and black reported turnout. If controls are introduced for level of education, 90% of the zero-order differences are removed. When joint controls for region

⁹ This relationship is significant, however, only when reported electoral participation is used to measure turnout. We compared blacks and whites who had not graduated from high school. Racial differences are significant outside the South ($p < .05$) and in the nation as a whole ($p < .01$). When the vote validation measure is used to measure turnout, the tendency of blacks with low levels of education to vote more than whites with low educational levels fails to attain conventional levels of significance.

TABLE 2

**ACTUAL AND STANDARDIZED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WHITE AND BLACK
TURNOUT AS MEASURED BY RESPONDENTS' REPORTS AND BY THE VOTE
VALIDATION STUDY 1986**

Method of Measurement	Equation Number	Controls Introduced for Following Variables	White Turnout	Black Turnout	Difference between White Turnout and Black Turnout ^a	Percentage of Racial Differences Accounted for by Standardization Procedures
Respondents Reports	(1)	None	53.3	50.3	3.0	—
	(2)	Region		51.5	1.8	40
	(3)	Level of Education		53.0	0.3	90
	(4)	Region and Level of Education		53.7	-0.4	113
Vote Validation Study	(1)	None	46.3	34.3	12.0	—
	(2)	Region		36.7	9.6	20
	(3)	Level of Education		36.0	10.3	14
	(4)	Region and Level of Education		37.9	8.4	30

Source: Surveys conducted by the Survey Research Center and the Center for Political Studies of the University of Michigan.

Note: For the numbers upon which these estimates are based, see table 1.

^aWhite turnout minus black turnout.

and level of education are introduced, blacks are more likely to report voting than whites. In 1978, whites were still somewhat more likely to report voting (by 4.6 percentage points) even after joint controls for region and level of education were introduced.

When the vote validation variable is used to measure turnout in 1986, zero order differences are substantially greater, and, although they are reduced by controls, whites remain more likely to vote than blacks. Even when joint controls are introduced for region and level of education, whites are 8.4 points more likely to vote than blacks. In 1978, whites were 14.2 points more likely to vote than blacks even after joint controls were introduced.

Our alternative method, which uses categorical regression equations to test for the effects of controls, yields similar results. The categorical regression

TABLE 3

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WHITE AND BLACK TURNOUT AS MEASURED BY RESPONDENTS' REPORTS AND BY THE VOTE VALIDATION STUDY AS ESTIMATED BY CATEGORICAL REGRESSION EQUATIONS (ZERO-ORDER DIFFERENCES AND DIFFERENCES WITH CONTROLS) 1986

Method of Measurement	Equation Number	Controls Introduced for Following Variables	Difference between White Turnout and Black Turnout ^a	Percentage of Racial Differences Accounted for by Controls
Respondents Reports	(1)	None	.030	—
	(2)	Region	-.002	107
	(3)	Level of Education	-.014	147
	(4)	Region and Level of Education	-.042	240
Vote Validation Study	(1)	None	.120**	—
	(2)	Region	.082**	32
	(3)	Level of Education	.054**	30
	(4)	Region and Level of Education	.054	55

Source: Surveys conducted by the Survey Research Center and the Center for Political Studies of the University of Michigan.

Note: Variables coded as follows: Race: -1 = black, 1 = white; Region: -1 = outside the South, 1 = South; Level of Education was treated as a series of four dummy variables with each of the four lower levels of education compared with college graduates. For the numbers upon which these estimates are based, see table 1.

^aWhite turnout minus black turnout. This difference is derived by doubling the size of the estimated regression coefficient since with our dummy variable procedures this coefficient is equal to half the distance between white and black turnout.

*Significant at .05 (based on χ^2 s).

**Significant at .01 (based on χ^2 s).

vantage in reported turnout (turnout in table 3 is presented in terms of proportions) into a 4.2 percentage point black advantage. However, neither of these racial differences is statistically significant. In contrast, in 1978 a strong and significant 12.3 point white advantage was reduced to a 6.4 point advantage, and this latter difference was not statistically significant.

When turnout was measured with the vote validation variable in 1986, joint controls reduce by more than half the original zero-order difference. But black turnout was still lower than white turnout, although the 5.4 point white ad-

turnout was still lower than white turnout, although the 5.4 point white advantage falls just short of statistical significance ($p < .07$). In 1978, on the other hand, joint controls reduced the original zero-order racial difference from 22.4 points to 17.7 points, a difference still significant at the .01 level.

Clearly, the vote validation studies confirm the basic finding that racial differences in turnout have been declining. However, the 1986 validation study suggests that blacks are still somewhat less likely to vote than comparably situated whites. But what of the widely reported finding that young blacks are more likely to vote than young whites?² Here we must certainly tread with caution, since our *N*'s are much smaller than those of the census survey. We found that among whites between the ages of 18 and 24 ($N = 207$), 22.7% reported voting; among young blacks ($N = 46$), 23.9% said that they voted. But once turnout is measured by the vote validation study, young whites are more likely to vote than young blacks. Among young whites ($N = 199$) 19.1% voted, among young blacks ($N = 44$), 13.6% did. Neither of these differences, however, is statistically significant.³ When broader age categories are used it becomes clear that conclusions about age may be affected by relying upon self-reported turnout. Among whites between the ages of 18 and 44 ($N = 1,062$), 42.7% said they voted, among blacks of this age ($N = 188$), 38.8% did. Whites were more likely to say they voted than blacks, but the racial difference is not significant. Strikingly different results are obtained when turnout is measured by the vote validation variable. Among whites between the ages of 18 and 44 ($N = 1,006$), 35.6% voted, among blacks of this age ($N = 179$) only 22.3% did. This 13.3 percentage point difference is unlikely to have occurred by chance ($p < .01$).

Given the small number of cases, it is not practical to introduce controls among the 18- to 24-year-olds, but we did attempt to determine whether controls for region and level of education would reduce or eliminate racial differences in validated turnout among 18- to 44-year-olds. Blacks of this age were more likely to live in the South than whites, and they were more likely to have lower levels of formal education. Controls for region do not reverse the tendency of 18 to 44-year-old blacks to vote less than whites of this age. Outside the South, whites are 12.8 percentage points more likely to vote than blacks ($p < .05$),⁴ in the South, they are 6.5 points more likely to vote (*NS*).⁵ When controls are introduced for level of education, however, the tendency

² We also employed our analyses of age differences in turnout to determine the extent to which the tendency of blacks to vote less than whites results from their youth. Unfortunately, there was only a weak relationship between age and race in the 1986 SRC survey. As a result, controls for age have little effect in reducing racial differences in turnout. According to our age-bracket standardization procedures, only about 5% of the difference between black and white validated turnout results from the tendency of blacks to be younger than whites.

³ Among whites ($N = 760$), 38.9% voted, whereas among blacks ($N = 88$), 26.1% voted.

⁴ Among whites ($N = 246$), 25.2% voted, whereas among blacks ($N = 91$), 18.7% voted.

for whites to vote more than blacks is eliminated among respondents who have not graduated from high school. Blacks who have not graduated from high school are 1.2 percentage points more likely to vote than whites, a difference that is obviously insignificant.¹⁰ But among high school graduates (including respondents with higher levels of education) racial differences persist among the 18- to 44-year-olds. White high school graduates are 13.3 points more likely to vote than black high school graduates — a difference significant at the .01 level.¹¹ Given the small number of cases, it was not practical to introduce joint controls for region and level of education.

The 1986 validation study, especially in conjunction with the five previous vote validation studies, strongly suggests that relative levels of black turnout are inflated when analysts rely solely upon respondents' self-reports. Thus, despite some year-to-year differences, the overall results from the six validation studies show considerable continuity. On the other hand, although we have only two data points, the validation studies suggest that racial differences in midterm turnout have declined, a finding consistent with the U.S. Census Bureau survey results. But the validation study does not support the U.S. Census Bureau's conclusion that young blacks are more likely to vote than young whites. We would be reluctant to accept this conclusion unless it were confirmed by additional evidence that did not rely solely upon respondents' reports.

Despite the gradual decline in racial differences in turnout, blacks were still less likely to vote than comparably situated whites. There is one exception to this generalization, however. Blacks with very low levels of formal education may be more likely to vote than whites with very low levels of education. These differences are clearly revealed in table 1. The tendency of blacks to vote more than whites appears to be particularly marked in the South, since this relationship is found among both of the two lower educational categories and with both measures of electoral participation. Given the small number of cases, however, this reversal does not attain statistical significance. The census survey results reveal that blacks with lower levels of formal education are somewhat more likely to report voting than whites with low levels of education, but the published census results do not present controls for region. Students of turnout should pay particular attention to future survey results to determine whether the tendency of blacks with low levels of education to participate more than poorly educated whites persists. If it does, the reversal will pose an interesting puzzle that may be addressed both with future validation studies as well as reanalyses of the Census Bureau surveys.

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¹⁰ Among whites ($N = 122$) 7.4% voted, whereas among blacks ($N = 35$) 8.6% voted.

¹¹ Among whites ($N = 878$) 39.5% voted, whereas among blacks ($N = 141$) 26.2% voted.

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Review Essay

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Voegelin's Search for Order

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In Search of Order By Eric Voegelin (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987. Pp. 120. \$14.95.)

The torrent of recent publications contains a small gem which has not sufficiently been noticed perhaps by philosophers and political theorists. Eric Voegelin's *In Search of Order*, posthumously published, the slender volume constitutes a fitting epitaph to the author's life-long intellectual journey and pilgrim's progress. As is well known, Voegelin's sprawling opus ranged over the fields of philosophy, politics, anthropology, and history (to mention just a few); probably his most celebrated work so far had been the multi-volume *Order and History*¹ which recounted the "history of order" from the dawn of mankind to the "ecumenic age" and which has justly been acclaimed as a classic of philosophical historiography in our time. *In Search of Order* serves as sequel and capstone to this *magnum opus*—with a twist. The unsuspecting and hurried reader might have expected the volume to yield a final summation, a definitive statement of the author's position regarding order. Yet, as it stands, the volume is a torso and offers no complete doctrine—which aptly matches the author's steadily growing conviction of the unending and unfinished character of his quest (and of any genuine inquiry). In the words of Ellis Sandoz who introduces the volume (p. 1): "The fact that the quest of order is an unfinished story as told by Voegelin is most fitting for, as he insisted, neither reality nor philosophy can be reduced to a system. Thus, the form of the present work can be said to symbolize Voegelin's philosophical vision of history and comprehensive reality as an unfinished tale, one told by God in the reflective language of spiritually gifted men and women open to the mystery of truth."

While revealing as an epitaph, however, the new volume has more than autobiographical significance. Generally speaking, Voegelin's writings cannot narrowly be tied to authorial intent—because of the broader "mystery of truth" in which inquiry proceeds. The reason that, for him, philosophy could not be reduced to a "system" was not resignation or some penchant for ob-

¹ Unless otherwise indicated all page references are to volume 5 of this book.

scientism, but rather the fact that philosophical reflection occurs in a larger historical and ontological framework which can never be exhaustively stated in propositional form. As a participatory act, reflection could not be limited to neutral description but always carried moral-political and broadly "existential" connotations. There can be little doubt that Voegelin's entire opus was an outgrowth of or response to the perceived agonies of our age, as experienced from the vantage of a reflective participant. In heightened form this is also true of *In Search of Order* whose dense formulations and efforts at symbolization are designed to have both diagnostic and therapeutic relevance. As Voegelin himself states in the opening pages (pp. 13–14) "The book is meant to be read"—namely, as "an event in a vast social field of thought and language, of writing and reading about matters which the members of the field believe to be of concern for their existence in truth." The book would basically be pointless unless it had a function or bearing "in a communion of existential concern." In the following I shall first give a condensed synopsis of some of the main themes discussed in the volume. Next, I intend to highlight aspects of the book which seem to me particularly intriguing or fruitful in the context of contemporary discussions in philosophy and political thought. By way of conclusion I shall voice some general questions or reservations—questions which, I believe, are in tune with Voegelin's concerns and especially with his emphasis on the open-ended and unfinishable quality of reflective endeavors.

I

In Search of Order is broadly divided into two parts: the first part dealing with general philosophical themes, the second carrying a more historical-recollective character. The first chapter opens with a basic philosophical problem, namely, the problem of the "beginning" or "*arché*" in any reflective endeavor—which raises immediately all the issues concerning the relation between whole and part, foreground and background, text and context. Drawing on some of his earlier investigations, Voegelin phrases the issues in terms of the status of "consciousness" vis-à-vis reality, a status he finds "paradoxical or ambivalent because it can assume essentially two forms. On the one hand he writes (pp. 15–16), "we speak of consciousness as a something located in human beings in their bodily existence. In relation to this concretely embodied consciousness, reality assumes the position of an object intended" or of an "external thingness" juxtaposed to an intending consciousness. On the other hand, embodied consciousness is itself part of a certain reality—no longer of external thingness but of a background reality which enables consciousness to function, in this second sense, we read, reality is "not an object of consciousness but the something in which consciousness occurs as an event of participation between partners in the community of being." The duality of relations leads Voegelin to the formulation of two types of reality, namely

'thing-reality' and 'It-reality,' and two modes of consciousness called "intentionality" and "luminosity" respectively. As used in the phrase 'It-reality,' the term "it" has not so much ontic-empirical as rather ontological significance: it involves that "mysterious 'it' that also occurs in everyday language in such phrases as 'it rains.' The entire distinction between modes of reality and of consciousness can also be seen as a subject-predicate exchange, in the sense that "reality moves from the position of an intended object to that of a subject, while the consciousness of the human subject intending objects moves to the position of a predicative event in the subject 'reality' as it becomes luminous for its truth."

In the following, the preceding duality is further expanded and complicated by the addition of language—which yields the triple structure of consciousness-reality-language as general framework guiding the volume's inquiries. As Voegelin observes, language can be apprehended either as an empirical body of signs or else as a creative agency bestowing meaning on the world. "Words and their meanings," he writes (p. 17), "are just as much part of the reality to which they refer as the being things are partners in the comprehending reality; language participates in the paradox of a quest that lets reality become luminous for its truth by pursuing truth as a thing intended." The ambivalent character of language is reflected in the distinction between 'concept' and "symbol" and more generally in the differentiation between scientific explanation and understanding or between the natural-mathematical sciences and the humanities. According to Voegelin, neither of the two types of disciplines can claim to capture the complete truth. The representatives of both types, he notes (p. 18), "are right in their pursuit of truth as long as they confine themselves to areas of reality in which the structures of their preference predominate—but they are wrong when they engage in magic dreams of a truth that can be reached by concentrating exclusively on either the intentionality of conceptualizing science or the luminosity of mythic and revelatory symbols."

In trying to illustrate the complex structure of his approach and particularly the paradox of 'beginnings,' Voegelin turns to the creation story as told in Genesis, chapter 1. Reflecting on the role of language in that story ("And God said: 'Let there be light'"), he notes that the spoken word here is "more than a mere sign signifying something": rather, language is endowed with a creative potency or power which "evokes structures in reality by naming them." This power, in turn, is ascribed to God or to the breath or spirit of God (or rather of a plural divinity, *elohim*)—which is a symbolization of the underlying It-reality enabling the world to be. This underlying reality, we are told (pp. 19–22), is "symbolized as the strong movement of a spiritual consciousness imposing form on a formless and non-forming counter-movement—as the tension between a pneumatic, formative force and an at least passively resistant counterforce." Thus, when penning the first lines of their text, the authors

of Genesis, chapter 1 "were conscious of beginning an act of participation in the mysterious Beginning of the It." Cognizant of the difficulties of biblical exegesis, Voegelin immediately seeks to ward off certain "conventional misunderstandings" hampering access to the text. First of all, the symbolism of the creation story must in his view not be "psychologized" or misread as an "anthropomorphism," that is, as "the projection of a human into a divine consciousness"—which would vitiate or muffle the role of the invoked It-reality in the story. More important, the creative happening engendered by the It-reality should be seen as a language-event, as the deed of the "pneumatic word," and not as the simple imposition of a subjective idea on a formless matter construed in terms of thing-reality. In Voegelin's account, the formless waste alluded to in the story was neither a thing nor a mere no-thing; it was not a "thing" if the term denotes "any structure experienced as real in post-creational reality"; it was not nothing, for in this case no "creative evocation of something" would be feasible. Instead of designating an external matter, the formless waste rather preserved the notion of an "originally (co-)generating maternal reality", probably linked with the "Babylonian *tiamat*," the creation story evoked "the mythic meaning of feminine productivity in the act of generation."

According to Voegelin, the creative beginning recounted in Genesis, chapter 1 was not a one-time happening but reverberates through human history seen as experiential openness to the "command of the pneumatic word." As in his earlier writings, he distinguishes between a series of spiritual "epiphanies" throughout history, ranging from Genesis over the patriarchs to the prophets, from Taoist, Hindu, and Buddhist teachings to Greek philosophy and Christianity—each with its distinct and progressively more highly differentiated symbolization of the creative event. Typically, new modes of symbolization are reactions to prevalent but decaying or decayed symbol systems and efforts to provide more elaborate or nuanced expression for the meaning structure of an age. "The quest for truth," we read (pp. 24–26), "is a movement of resistance to the prevalent disorder; it is an effort to attune the concretely disordered existence again to the truth of the It-reality, an attempt to create a new social field of existential order in competition with the fields whose claim to truth has become doubtful." If the attempt is successful in finding symbols which adequately capture "the newly differentiated experience of order," it may then become the beginning and leavening spirit of "a new social field." In large measure, Voegelin adds, the success of this endeavor depends on the ability of the new symbolization to express the "common sense" of a period, that is, its ability to speak not in a distant-alien idiom but with an "authority commonly present in everybody's consciousness". "The appeal will be no more than a private opinion unless the questioner finds in the course of his quest the word (*logos*) that indeed speaks what is common (*xynon*) to the order of man's existence as a partner in the comprehending re-

ality, only if the questioner speaks the common *logos* of reality can he evoke a truly public order."

Attunement to and recovery of "pneumatic" meaning is not simply an act of human invention or fabrication, but neither is it an external intervention cancelling human participation. According to Voegelin, this participatory aspect is captured in the Platonic notion of the "*metaxy*" or of the "between-status" of spiritual life. The search for meaning and truth, he notes (pp. 27–32), "can be a true story only if the questioner participates existentially in the comprehending story told by the It through its creative epiphany of structure." *Metaxy* in this context means the tensional balance between human and divine reality and also between ordinary temporality and eternity. In this sense, Plato came to symbolize ordinary time as "the moving *eikon* of eternity." Precariously lodged at the intersection of immanence and transcendence, *metaxy* signals—in Voegelin's words—"an eruption of order within time in response to an irruption of order from the beyond of time." In Platonic thought, this "beyond of time" was portrayed as a divine-immortal sphere as the "*epeketua* of all being things (*ta onta*)" or as the formative *nous*. In human life and especially in the philosopher's quest for truth, this sphere manifests itself as a "formative force" or as the experienced disclosure or *Parousia* of the formative It-reality in all things—a disclosure imposing on ordinary temporality the dimension of "divine presence." As Voegelin cautions, the Platonic notion should not itself be turned into a rigid doctrine, since it is only one of different historical ways of symbolizing the creative event. Still while recognizing a "plurality" of possible stories and quests, the volume does not endorse a simple historicism or historical relativism. Instead, the different historical formulations are seen as variations on a common theme or as distinct "episodes" occurring within the "same comprehending It-story." Thus the diversity of historical experience can be grasped and understood "as a field of languages, intelligibly symbolizing the truth of reality in conformity with the recognizable structure of the complex."

Although open to human participation, the "beyond of time" cannot or must not become the target of human manipulation or control, where It-reality is instrumentalized or reduced to "thingness." The road is open to disorder and deformation—as history amply attests. In Voegelin's account (pp. 33–37), the millennial quest for order and truth is offset and paralleled by a constant counterpull, namely, the temptation "to deform the Beyond and its formative *Parousia*" by corrupting the beyond into a tool and its *parousia* into the "imposition of a definite form on reality." Throughout history, this temptation occurs in different guises. On the level of historical speculation, deformation takes the shape of a unilinear history assumed to culminate or reach its *telos* in the writer's conception—a type extending "from the Sumerian king-list to Hegel's imperial speculation." Where the assumption prevails that the divine beyond can be directly implemented in a given historical context, we are in

the presence of what Voegelin calls "metastatic speculation"—an ideological outlook which (he says) has remained a constant down to "the metastatic faith-movements of the twentieth century." Where political crisis or calamity becomes particularly pronounced, metastatic belief gives way to "apocalyptic" thought which expects disorder of catastrophic magnitude to be "ended by divine intervention." Where such intervention is not forthcoming, apocalyptic thought in turn is supplemented or replaced by gnosticism, that is, a perspective which construes the state of the world or the cosmos as the result of a corruption or "psychodramatic fall" in the beyond, a condition to be reversed through human action based on a special "pneumatic understanding (*gnosis*). "Thus, alongside the search for truth and the attunement to its order there runs through the centuries a "diversified history of untruth and disorder"—and even a story of 'increasingly conscious resistance to beginnings' (as initiated by the It-reality). In conformity with this antagonism Voegelin distinguishes between "resistance to truth" and 'agreement or disagreement about the optimal symbolization of truth'—and similarly between 'resisters' or 'deformers,' on the one hand, and searching or 'questioning thinkers,' on the other. An extreme case of resistance is 'revolt or rebellion against the *metaxy*, a revolt directed either 'at abolishing reality altogether and escaping into the Beyond' or at "forcing the order of the Beyond into reality"—the latter alternative being the preference of modern gnostics.

Both the search for truth and resistance against it are experiential occurrences in consciousness nurtured by the power of imagination. According to Voegelin (pp. 37–44), imagination is not solely a human faculty but part of the larger *metaxy* or of the consciousness-reality-language framework, in this sense one may say that "through the imaginative power of man the It-reality moves imaginatively toward its truth." Ultimately, the difference between genuine search and resistance can be traced to the stance adopted by consciousness and its imaginative strivings: a stance which is either self-assertive and anthropocentric or else reflectively seasoned, that is, marked by 'reflective distance' and by "remembrance" or recollection of the structure of the *metaxy*. In Platonic thought, the attitude of reflectively distancing remembrance was symbolized as "*anamnesis*", on the other hand, forgetfulness or oblivion of being was expressed by the symbol "*anoia*"—conventionally translated as "folly." The man or resister afflicted with *anoia*—or with the Ciceronian *morbus animi*—is one who does not recall his role as a "partner in the community of being" and as a consequence transforms his searching participation into sheer "self-assertion." Against this background, imagination assumes the status of a "third dimension" of consciousness (alongside intentionality and luminosity) manifesting itself either in reflective remembrance or oblivion. As Voegelin writes "When a thinker, whatever his motives may be, forgets his role as a partner of being" he "can deform the remembered assertive power of imagination in his quest imaginatively into the sole power of

with Imaginative remembrance of the process, the remembrance intended by Plato, implies the potential of imaginative oblivion "

The second part of the volume is an excursus in the history of philosophical thought, with the focus initially being placed on German idealism. In Voegelin's account (pp. 48–51), German philosophy of the time was in large measure countermove to the "deformation of consciousness" brought about by traditional metaphysics and especially by the habit of thinking "in terms of thing-ality"—a habit reinforced by the success of modern natural science and its (partial) legitimation through Kant. As an antidote to this deformation, German thought—starting with Fichte's "System of Science"—turned to the constitutive role of consciousness and particularly to the transcendental self-institution and self-identification of the "I" through an act of "intellectual intuition." In this manner, Voegelin notes, consciousness was essentially cast in the mode of intentionality—to the virtual exclusion of its existential-ontological underpinnings, eclipsing the structure of the *metaxy*, a "nonparticipatory" type of intentionalism tended to usurp the authority of participatory consciousness. As he reminds us, this usurpation was part of a larger historical upheaval manifesting itself concretely in the American, French, and Dutch revolutions, endorsing this upheaval, German philosophy derived much of its élan from the sense of "participating in a world-historic revolution of consciousness." What emerged from this revolutionary ferment was a speculative outlook emphasizing subjectivity and subjective self-constitution—an outlook commonly called "ego philosophy" or "identity philosophy" and which from Voegelin's vantage is a new and aggravated type of self-assertive deformation. In his words (p. 53): "A solidly detailed, historically knowledgeable, comprehensive attack on symbols that have lost their meaning succumbed in German thought to deformation through the desire to dominate in the mode of thing-reality over the experience recovered. His own category of 'reflective distance' is introduced precisely in order to distinguish his approach from the 'symbolism of reflective identity' favored by German idealist philosophy."

The most glaring example of "identitarian" deformation, in Voegelin's view, is Hegel, to whom a long section of the volume is devoted. Relying mainly on the "Preface" and "Introduction" to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Voegelin castigates Hegel's replacement of existential tension by the attempted construction of a "scientific system" and his substitution of "absolute knowledge" or "love of knowledge." What these changes signaled, he states (pp. 54–59), is basically the "abolition of philosophy" accomplished through the exclusion of the "experience of existential consciousness, of existence in the tension of the *metaxy*." This exclusion casts its shadow also on Hegel's dialectic of consciousness, especially on the movement from "first order" to "second order" objects (as outlined in the "Introduction"). As Voegelin comments, "The new object does not arise as a new external object, but through a 'turning around

of consciousness' "—a turning or "*Umkehrung*" which Hegel also describes as "our addition" (*unsere Zutat*). While recognizing a broad affinity between this turning and Plato's *periagoge* (of the prisoner in the cave), the text denounces Hegel's description as basically vitiating the affinity. If we look for the light shining from the Beyond that forces, directly or through a medium, the prisoner to turn, we receive instead the information that the *periagoge* is *unsere Zutat*, our addition or addendum. The *periagoge* is not an answer or response but a self-assertive action. "By excluding the higher light Hegel said to rely only on 'natural' consciousness or on '*natürliche Erkenntnis*' and its deformative application to the It-reality." While assertively taking control or control of the *periagoge*, Hegel's account is claimed to transform or 'transform' the light from beyond into a mere external compulsion, into "*Notwendigkeit*, a necessity that operates behind the back of the prisoner's consciousness and forces 'us' to produce one propositionally deformatively intentionalist shadow in the Cave after another." Seen from this angle, Hegel's presentation in the *Phenomenology* emerges as 'so unbelievably grotesque that one hardly dares to put it into plain language.' Plato's work of a lifetime in exploring the experience of the quest, of its human-divine movement and counter-movements—this overwhelmingly conscious drama of the quest for this reality of consciousness and its luminous symbolization in a philosophical existence, is excluded from the 'experience of consciousness' and relegated to an unconscious necessity 'behind Plato's back.' "

In seeking to explain Hegel's idealist deformation or "imaginative distortion," Voegelin returns (pp. 62–69) to the progressive-revolutionary climate of his age, particularly to the "modern, Protestant principle" of placing the 'world of intellect into one's own mind'—a principle which, in Hegel's hands, contained or comprehended a variety of 'hermetic, apocalyptic, gnostic, Neoplatonic strands' of speculation. What was at the core of this mystical strands was basically a "paraeschatology"—namely, the vision of 'the descent of the Spirit that will achieve what the Petrine and Pauline Christians have not achieved: the ultimately salvational *Parousia* of the beyond in this world'—a vision congruent with the self-assertive and "activist" mentality of modernity. In turn, what stands behind this modernist mentality is the self-obfuscation and oblivion of the divine sphere, the reduction of the term 'God' to a "senseless sound"—a reduction which is the quintessence of modern nihilism and the "authoritative expression of the God-is-dead movement that characterizes a period of Western modernity (now lasting for about two hundred years)." In Hegel's thought, the situation was complicated by his frequent references to *parousia* and the quasi-divine character ascribed to 'absolute knowledge'—although, according to Voegelin, *parousia* here was fundamentally deformed by Hegel's self-assertive speculation. "Importantly, Hegel's identitarian outlook obscured the role of remembering and reflective distance by seeking to bring everything into actual cognitive grasp. As a result—we are told—insight into the paradoxical structure of reality

d history was "self-assertively deformed into a 'thing' to be mastered — surely, the distancing remembrance opening the historical horizon became the instrument of its closure through the pretense that everything worth remembering about the process of truth in reality had been remembered."

In an effort to correct or reverse Hegel's deformed speculations, the volume turns back to earlier historical phases where the search for truth can still be encountered in its "original undeformed" shape — the first stop being Hesiod's *Theogony*. In the opening lines of his poem, Hesiod invokes and praises the Heliconian Muses as the divine mediators of the truth about reality as a whole. In Voegelin's words (pp. 70–74): "The poet experiences the truth of reality as a divine Beyond, not to be grasped by intentional consciousness in *Ansich*, but to be mediated through the *Parousia* of the Muses — to this extent, truth is presented as an 'existential, revelatory event' located in the *metaxy* of divine-human encounter. As the daughters of Mnemosyne (remembrance) from her union with Zeus, the Muses trace their origin to the Olympian or rather 'Jovian Beyond,' and their task is to serve as mnemonic marks, reminding the Olympians of their divinity. In Hesiod's usage, remembrance does not recollect a dead past but a living presence encompassing past and future. Basically, recollection here recalls the 'presence of the beyond' as it is experienced and gains 'the reality of its *Parousia* in the language of the gods.' As Voegelin indicates, however, Hesiod's poem was pre-eminently lodged at the edge of god-talk, pushing to the limit of available symbolization; he showed that 'there are no gods without a Beyond of the gods.' Differently phrased, Hesiod's symbols were still 'compactly divine' without efficiently distinguishing the experiential *parousia* of the gods from 'its beyond' (despite hints pointing in this direction). Steps toward more nuanced differentiation were undertaken by pre-Socratic thinkers and especially by Parmenides, the self-described 'knowing man' (*episthophos*). In the Parmenidean attack on the Homeric-Hesiodian legacy, Voegelin notes (pp. 86–111) the "divine Beyond as the eternal Now" begins to become articulate on its own, while the "being" that was previously predicated of all things (*ta panta*) turns into a 'Being' which is non-synonymous with things. Despite a lingering compactness of his language, Parmenides had become aware of 'the paradox of consciousness' — of the tension between intentionality and luminosity, between thing-reality and It-reality, as well as the complex of consciousness-reality-language in its integrality.' Hesitations and inadequacies of pre-Socratic thought were finally outstripped by Socrates-Plato, with his fully differentiated symbolism of "*Nous-in-Psyché-in-Soma*" — a symbolism combining and reconciling the eternal 'beyond' with temporal 'becoming' or 'non-eternal being' with "nonbeing genesis" (the two poles being further supplemented by the third category of "*chora*" or space).

The concluding section of the study is devoted to a detailed exegesis of Plato's *Timaeus* and its complex symbolization of reality and the cosmos. Pointing to the tensional character of the *metaxy*, Voegelin (pp. 92–94) comments that

in the *Timaeus* "reality is experienced as a tensional oneness in which the poles of the tension carry different weights of reality, while the tension between the poles has its own weight of constancy." He also notes certain "linguistic difficulties" arising from the tensional structure of the symbolization, difficulties which could (and to some extent did) induce Plato to resort to second-order and third-order formulations or meta-discourses in order to counter ontic reification or doctrinal congealment of his symbols. A case in point is the notion of space or *chora* indicating the "unsensed" framework in which all beings appear. Narrowly or reductively construed, the notion seems to impose on all reality, including the framework itself, the "mode of thing-ness." In Voegelin's view, however, this construal has to be completely rejected, for "it would transform luminous symbols, as they emerge from tensional experiences, into intentionalist concepts referring to objects," thereby destroying the "paradoxical structure" of the symbolization. Following Plato, Voegelin (pp. 99-102) interprets "space" not as a thingly structure but as an attribute of "cosmos" which, as a non-thing and as the "*periechon* of all things," makes room for space and all its thingly ingredients. This, however, does not entirely resolve the issue of space, since the quest for truth, guided by It-reality, also is supposed to take "place" somewhere and in some sense. At this point, the volume takes recourse to the imagery of a journey in which thing-reality and its beyond are linked at least metaphorically. "The quest for truth as an event in cosmic reality," we read, "appears to be ultimately the 'place' at which reality reveals itself in its structural complexity of thing-reality and It-reality. The event of the quest is the 'place' at which the bodily located consciousness of man experiences itself both in its thingly existence, that is, moving in the thingly tensions of order-disorder, and in its visionary existence, as a movement toward an unflawed order beyond the order that is awed by the disorder of things."

II

Having journeyed with Voegelin through the pages of his final book, the reader will not easily put it aside. Congruent with the tenor of a participatory methodology, the study offers not an abstract doctrine but a kind of experiential encounter—whose urgency and transformative quality steadily intensifies in the concluding discussion of the *Timaeus*. Meant for posthumous reading, the reference to the "mysterious movement" from an "It-reality through thing-reality toward a Beyond of things" acquires touching biographical annotations—quite apart from showing an uncommon sensitivity for the depth of Plato's ontological speculation. Generally speaking, the interpretation of *Timaeus* confirms Voegelin as one of the finest and most subtle students of Plato in our time—a distinction amply documented already in some of his earlier writings on Greek thought. The analysis of the *metaxy* as a tensional

structure of order-disorder can readily be seen to have crucial philosophical as well as political-theoretical implications. Yet, beyond attesting to his exegetic competence, *In Search of Order* reveals Voegelin as an important speculative thinker in his own right—as is evident in his own efforts at symbolization which, in some cases, transgress the Platonic model in their differentiated nuances. Voegelin is quite explicit about the need to go beyond a mere replication of time-honored teachings. As he says at one point in the text (p. 28), the problems surrounding the “middle” are “not exhausted by the (Platonic) symbolism of the *metaxy*”, the reason for this fact is the continuing character of the creation story, the aspect that “the middle in which we begin as Western philosophers toward the end of the twentieth century, is not the middle in which the authors of Genesis had to begin their story about 500 B C, nor is it the middle in which Plato developed his symbolism.”

In the context of contemporary philosophical discussions, Voegelin's stance toward past formulations or traditional teachings might be called “deconstructive”—although the term would hardly have found his favor. Picking up another contemporary expression, his conception of a tensional structure devoid of linear “beginnings” can be described as “non-” or “anti-foundational,” in the sense of not being rooted in a substantive “*arche*” or a constitutive subjectivity. This anti-foundational quality is particularly evident in the concluding pages of the study devoted to the question of final moorings (pp. 104–106). Might the Platonic “demiurge,” Voegelin asks, be viewed as the Archimedean point through which the tensional structure of the *metaxy* could come to rest or reach its fulfillment? Rejecting this option, he insists that the demiurge is “not an absolute either”, for his action is “experienced and symbolized as a complex of tensions between formative noetic order and non-formative space, between a demiurgic will to create order and the ‘necessary’ obstacle of *chora* that limits the creative will to thingness.” Another way of suspending the tension and reaching stability might be found in the intimate correlation and mutual inherence of the tensional poles of being and becoming, of *nous* and *chora*. Plato at one point considers this possibility, when he likens *nous* to the formative source or “father” of reality and becoming to its “mother”—so that the resolution of the tension might be found in their mutual offspring (to *eiknonos*). Again, however, this symbolism provides no stable foundation because the offspring is precisely the witness and participating exemplar of the tensional *metaxy*. “Man, as part of the offspring, experiences himself not in a state of terminal paralysis but of existential movement, responsively inclined to the pull from either of the two poles”—where the polar dimensions include the “thingly Beyond” of the *chora* and the “divine Beyond” of the *nous*.

The absence of foundations is closely related with Voegelin's distrust of closed philosophical “systems” and finished doctrines (especially doctrines nurtured by ideological-political ambitions). In this respect, his work follows

in the footsteps of Bergson's rejection of "closed" in favor of "open" societies and worldviews, and more generally of existentialist deprecations of philosophical closure. In the new volume (and elsewhere), the distrust extends explicitly to theology seen as a doctrine about God or the gods. "All the gods," he writes in the section on Plato (p. 100), "have to live under the pressure of a divine Beyond that endows them with their divine life while threatening to let them die from their compactness." Moreover, this tensional pressure is portrayed as a "constant in the history of revelation: neither will the gods disappear, nor will the Beyond let them live in peace." These and similar statements are likely to antagonize religious fundamentalists or literalists hostile to "reflective distance"—as happened in the case of earlier passages (such as the provocative phrase in *The New Science of Politics* that "uncertainty is the very essence of Christianity"). As Sandoz judiciously remarks (pp. 6–7): "That there is anything uncertain about their faith came as unwelcome news to dogmatic Christians who reacted angrily to the suggestion, both in 1953 and on later similar occasions." By pursuing the path of reflective meditation, Voegelin is liable to place himself on the wrong side not only of political ideologies and fanatics but also of religious dogmas and philosophical "schools" of thought. In the midst of the intense "dogmatomachy" of our age, Sandoz adds, Voegelin's attempt to recapture reflectively the experiential parameters of civilization made him in varying degrees "the adversary of all parties bent on success in the power struggle and the butt of their uncomprehending and uncaring obloquy when he would not be recruited to their causes."

Distrust of foundations or foundational truth-claims, however, does not place Voegelin into the camp of agnostics or "value-free" empiricists. Ever since his vindication of metaphysics in *The New Science of Politics*, Voegelin's work has stood as a challenge and counterpoint to all forms of positivism, reductive immanentism, and anthropocentrism. In fact, his emphasis on transcendence and the "beyond" sometimes approximates his writing to contemporary counter-discourses stressing rupture, radical "decentering," and "alterity" or heterology. Some passages in the new volume evoke the thought of Emmanuel Levinas—a writer not cited in its pages—particularly his conception of the imperative "call" of otherness. "The experiences of divine, formative presence," Voegelin writes (p. 97), "are events in the *metaxy* of existence, and the symbols engendered by the *Parousia* express divine reality as an *irruption* of ordering force from the Beyond into the existential struggle for order." On other occasions, the volume's formulations carry overtones of negative or dialectical theology—though without any fixed doctrinal commitments. This is especially the case in the distinction between the "divine Beyond" and its manifestation or *parousia* in experience. "The imaginative language of the gods," we read, "can express the presence of reality beyond its presence, but the symbolized *Parousia* of the Beyond does not dissolve the Beyond into its *Parousia* in the experienced tension." Thus, even when the

lyme reveals itself in symbols or in living encounters, "it remains the unveiled divine reality beyond its revelation."

Philosophically, Voegelin's arguments sometimes bear a resemblance to the depth exegesis articulated and practiced by Ricoeur and also to Gadamer's ontological hermeneutics. In many respects, however, his outlook seems to parallel most closely aspects of Heideggerian thought, especially the "fundamental ontology" expounded in *Being and Time*—though there are no signs of overt "influence." Distinctly Heideggerian is the critique or decentering of subjective intentionality and the portrayal of human existence (or *Dasein*) as participant in the disclosure of being. Already the opening pages of *Order and History* developed this broadly "existentialist" theme in opposition to purely spectatorial or epistemological postures. "Man, in his existence," we read there (1956, pp. 1–2), "participates in being"—and this not in an optional manner as if it were an engagement "he could as well leave alone"; instead, man's partnership in being is the essence of his existence, and this essence depends on the whole, of which existence is a part." Despite its traditional vocabulary (essence-existence), the passage evokes Heidegger's claim that *Dasein* is that mode of being for which "being" is the central question. Similarly evocative are references to the "anxiety of existence" and the attack in a later volume of *Order and History* (1974, p. 186), on the "subject-object dichotomy" which is said to be "modeled after the cognitive relation between man and things in the external world" but does not apply to the "event of an experience-articulating-itself." Other themes familiar from *Being and Time* are the notion of "historicity" and the proposal of a "destructive" reading of traditional doctrines, predicated on the recurrent need for resymbolization of decaying symbol systems. Regarding the former notion, *In Search of Order* points to the close correlation of modes of temporality in the course of ontological participation (p. 74): "The participatory story, if remembered in the present of existence, expands into the story of its past and future as the story of the relation between its 'presents' . . . I suspect that the much-discussed problem of 'historicity' has found in Hesiod's Remembrance an analytical symbol difficult to improve upon."

Affinities or resonances of this kind, however, are not restricted to the period of *Being and Time* but extend to later Heideggerian themes. Thus the comments on Hesiod and Parmenides recall Heidegger's rehabilitation of "poetic thinking" and his exegesis of pre-Socratic texts—although for Voegelin Plato remains the paradigmatic classical philosopher. The story of Western metaphysics from Parmenides and Plato to the present is presented by Voegelin largely as a move from participation to "self-assertion," or from participatory to "activist consciousness"—an account which resonates with Heidegger's focus on the growing prominence of subjectivity and human technological mastery over nature. In light of the so-called "overcoming" of metaphysics, the observations in the new volume on the development of philos-

ophy from Plato to Leibniz and beyond deserve careful attention and scrutiny (pp 79–84). Equally suggestive and worth pondering are passages carrying overtones of an “ontic-ontological difference”—as, for instance, the statement that the *metaxy* expresses the experience of existence as located at the intersection or in the “Between” of thing reality and “Beyond-reality.” Particularly striking are formulations reminiscent of some of Heidegger’s later key thoughts, such as the “fourfold” (*Geviert*) and the “appropriative event” (*Er-eignis*). Thus, reflecting on the Platonic categories of *Nous-Psyche-Soma* and Being-Becoming-Space and their mutual interconnections, Voegelin notes (p 92) that “we might arrive at tetradic complexes.” At another point (pp 100–102), the same conclusion is reached with regard to a particular feature of the structure of “consciousness-reality-language” which in some way “forces us to think in the mode of thingness,” this feature being the “third, or fourth kind of being,” that is, the *chora*, space. “The construal of the cosmic creation story in terms of a pre-ontological happening or “gift” letting the world be (“*es gibt*”) is intimated in Voegelin’s comments on the “comprehending symbolism of a Beyond, the *epekema*” and on a “cosmic reality in which the quest for the truth of its order is an event.”

In my view, some of the most intriguing and thought provoking passages in the volume have to do with the character and status of language in the broader context of the *metaxy*. Attacking the fashionable reduction of language to an informational system or an instrument of communication, Voegelin—as indicated—embeds language in the structural complex of ‘consciousness-reality-language.’ “There is no autonomous, nonparadoxical language,” he insists (p 17), “ready to be used by man as a system of signs when he wants to refer to the paradoxical structure of reality and consciousness.” Like human existence, language shares instead in the precarious quest for truth which yields “luminosity” but not univocal cognitive propositions. At a later point in the study the ambivalent status of language is said to be lodged at the crossroads of the sayable and the unsayable, of speech and silence. In the pursuit of truth, we read (p 103) that the questioner’s language reveals itself as “the paradoxical event of the ineffable becoming effable.” This tension of effable-ineffable is the paradox in the structure of meditative language that cannot be dissolved by a speculative meta-language.” In its own way, language testifies to the intersection of the divine and the human, to the *netaxy* of immanent experience and its beyond. “In reflective distance, the questioner experiences his speech as the divine silence breaking creatively forth in the imaginative word that will illuminate the quest as the questioner’s movement of return to the ineffable silence.” In an unpublished manuscript entitled “The Beginning and the Beyond”—written some time before *In Search of Order* (and quoted by Sandoz, p. 10)—Voegelin underscores the non-instrumental character of language and its irreducibly revelatory quality. After commenting on successive historical symbolizations of spiritual epiph-

anies, the manuscript arrives at a notion startling in the context of contemporary linguistics: namely, that of "the sacrality of a language in which the truth of divine reality becomes articulate."

III

Having outlined some of the strengths and promising vistas of Voegelin's study, I need to add some qualifying remarks or afterthoughts—remarks intended not so much as stark objections than as questions or apprehensions congruent with the author's "questioning" disposition. First of all, in a minor key, I note issues of terminology or the chosen vocabulary. Here I find puzzling mainly the centrality assigned to "consciousness" in a work championing ontological participation. Given the prevalent usage of the term, this centrality seems to insert the study into the context of the modern philosophy of consciousness" (or of subjectivity)—an outcome antithetical to Voegelin's ontological concerns and (partially) forestalled by the distinction between intentionality and luminosity. Regarding the latter distinction, additional qualifying comments are in order. It is not so much from the vantage of a "concretely embodied consciousness" that reality assumes the quality of thingness or of an "object intended" but rather from that of a transcendental consciousness (in Husserl's sense). Conversely, the insertion of embodiment into an ongoing happening does not yield a reductive empiricism, nor a new trans-individual "subject-reality" of which consciousness would be a "predicative event." In these and other respects, Voegelin still seems to me too closely wedded to the "subject-object" dualism and its analogues or corollaries. Terminologically confusing along similar lines may be the distinction between "thing-reality" and "It-reality"—particularly in view of Martin Buber's well-known juxtaposition of "I-Thou" and "I-It" relations (where It has the character of thingness). Moreover, used in tandem with the stability of the thing-world, "It-reality" readily acquires unwarranted connotations of compactness (a point to which I shall return).

What surfaces behind these terminological quandaries is a more troublesome issue beleaguering *In Search of Order* (and all of Voegelin's work): namely, the bent to think in dualities and (occasionally) to distend the tensional *metaxy* in favor of self-contained polarities. Dualisms of various sorts are a recurrent feature in the volume, as has repeatedly been noted before. Thus in addition to the opposition between thing-reality and It-reality, we find the dichotomies of things and non-things, of intentionality and luminosity, of narrative and event, of order and disorder, immanence and transcendence, "thinkers" and "resisters." To be sure, recourse to dualities is not by itself problematic, however, to maintain a tensional structure—the poles of the structure must somehow interact or interpenetrate—which militates against their strict conceptual segregation. A case in point is the relation between things and non-things. For, if It-reality is not simply populated by non-things

(or nothing), and if it is supposed to manifest itself somehow in the thing-world, then thing-reality itself cannot simply be composed of reified objects—a consideration which throws into jeopardy the received conception of “things” or at least raises “thinghood” into a question. This state of affairs is obliquely recognized by Voegelin (pp. 103–104) when he refers to Plato’s argument “that ‘the divine’ cannot be discerned by itself alone, there is no participation in ‘the divine’ but through the exploration of the ‘things’ in which it is discerned as formatively present.” To which Voegelin adds ambiguously: “The thing-pole of the ultimate mystery, thus, is not itself a ‘thing’ but a tensional kind of being, responsive to noetic order but imposing the mode of thingness on the Cosmos.” Generally speaking, the volume would have benefited from a more explicit discussion of “things” and non-things, of presence and absence in their relation to different levels of “reality.” Short of this, one would have wished the author to adhere more rigorously to his own insight that “none of the single tensions, or any of their poles, is an absolute entity given to an external observer.”

These observations are directly relevant to the distinction between intentionality and luminosity, where the former relates to intended objects or things, they also affect the opposition between narrative and event—where narrative (obscurely) “refers to reality intended in the mode of thingness.” Easily the most crucial, but also the most difficult and problem-laden distinctions are those juxtaposing order and disorder, truth and untruth, immanence and transcendence. Ever since the time of his earlier writings, Voegelin has tended to identify modernity with secularization and the latter with a progressive immanentism of worldviews. Reacting against the “immanentization of the eschaton,” he stated in a letter of 1943 explicitly that the “decisive problems of philosophy” are “problems of transcendence”—a view he maintained through the years. While valuable as an antidote to positivism, however, deprecation of immanence is fraught with quandaries. If Plato’s argument (cited above) is correct that “the divine” cannot be discerned separately but only through its formative presence in the world or the cosmos, then the dividing line between immanence and transcendence becomes blurred, giving way to a peculiar intersection. Phrased differently, formative presence or *parousia* must and can only happen on the level of immanence—where the latter is no longer simply the opposite of transcendence. Again, this state of affairs is acknowledged by Voegelin in some passages—which, however, tend to remain on the level of *obiter dicta*. Thus, although repeatedly referring to “external things or to the ‘body’ as an entity in the ‘external world,’” he admits at one point that terms like “external” or “transcendent” only make sense in connection with something “internal” or “immanent.” “Such terms as immanent and transcendent, external and internal, this world and the other world, and so forth,” he writes (pp. 10–11), “do not denote objects or their properties but are the language indices arising from the *Metaxy* in the event of its becoming

luminous for the comprehensive reality, its structure and dynamics. The terms are exegetic, not descriptive."

These considerations also seem to apply to the opposition between order and disorder, truth and untruth, and likewise between (truthful) thinkers and resisters. By its very title, *In Search of Order* tends to place a premium on order or orderliness in contradistinction to disorder, chaos, or anarchy. This preference was still more prevalent in earlier volumes of *Order and History*, guided by the assumption that the "history of order" could be traced through clear developmental stages of symbolization (an assumption later seen as too simplistic). Even the new volume at points endorses a simple dichotomous scheme of preferences. "The quest for truth," we read (p. 25), "is a movement of resistance to the prevalent disorder, it is an effort to attune the concretely disordered existence again to the truth of the It-reality." At other points, however, the complexity of the quest and the non-doctrinal status of truth disturb or disorient the preferential hierarchy. As Voegelin notes in his comments on the *Timaeus* (p. 99), the "paradox of order-disorder" seems to attach to "existence in the mode of thingness." But, he adds, "if it attaches to thingness, can there be an order of 'things' free of disorder? Or would the establishment of true order require the abolition of 'things'?" The same disturbance affects the binary opposition of truth and untruth—where the quest for the former implies resistance to the latter—making room instead for a closer correlation of "formative truth and deformative untruth," as Voegelin admits in one instance (p. 37). Clearly, if passages of this kind are taken seriously, doubts arise regarding the clear-cut bifurcation between questioners and "deformers" (or resisters) or between "resistance to truth," on the one hand and agreement or disagreement about the optimal symbolization of truth experienced "on the other" (p. 35). Struck by the polemical tone of the distinction, the reader may wonder apprehensively whether queries addressed at *In Search of Order* are liable to be branded a sign of resistance or else be admitted as legitimate questions in a broadly structured Socratic dialogue.

The issue of order and disorder, of formation and deformation, is closely connected with the general philosophical problem of unity and multiplicity, of sameness and otherness—a problem which is at the heart of Plato's *Timaeus*. Not unexpectedly, the privileging of order over disorder is matched here by a similar set of priorities. In Voegelin's presentation, order is largely the work of the "It-reality," of the attunement of "disordered existence" to the truth of the beyond. Although recognizing the latter's non-thingly status—its nonidentity with any specifiable entity—the volume basically endorses the "oneness" of cosmos and order (thus encouraging at least implicitly its congealment into a stable-univocal "ground"). The notion of a possible plurality of "It-stories" is blandly dismissed as "senseless," with the argument that we experience only one "comprehending reality" beyond the mode of thingness (p. 29). At another point, the Platonic "cosmos" is explicitly con-

strued as unitary or holistic. "The paradigm of the *zoon*, of the living order of reality, is One," we read (pp 95–96) "The phantasy of multiple 'worlds' is incompatible with the experience of the It-reality and, inversely, a reality which engenders a consciousness of itself both intentional and luminous can be only One." Accordingly, the Platonic cosmos is described as "*monogenes*," a perfect reflection of the "*monosis*" of the divine paradigm. Statements to this effect do not prevent Voegelin from introducing important qualifications, such as the qualifying remark that the oneness at issue here is "not numerical, but the experienced oneness of existential tension." More crucially, he observes, oneness should not be confused with "monotheism" in a theological-doctrinal sense. "Can this oneness of divine reality, revealed by the *fides* of the one, comprehending cosmos," he asks (p 98), "be truly symbolized by a numerically One God . . . ? Can the problem indeed be reduced to the generally accepted, numerical cliché of 'monotheism' and 'polytheism'?" Would the numerical cliché not reduce the One God to the same rank as his many more compact confrères and expose him to the same noetic questioning of his divinity as the others?" These considerations lead Voegelin to ponder a possible tension in the divine, a distinction between the "god of the Beginning and the 'god of the End'"—and ultimately to the thought of "an *Ungrund*, or a *Gottheit* beyond the God of dogmatic theology."

Paralleling Plato's *Timaeus*, Voegelin's volume (despite its incompleteness) represents a unified-holistic structure—whose individual facets or details need to be viewed in light of its broader metaphysical-ontological concerns. One such facet which deserves at least brief attention is the treatment of prominent philosophers and leading figures in the history of ideas. In view of the numerous affinities noted above, the cursory allusion to Heidegger in the text—stressing his National-Socialist episode—seems unhelpful as well as ungenerous. Heidegger's thought, one should add, is placed by Voegelin in tandem with Marxian materialism or economism, with both variants being classified as overt deformations of truth: both the former's nationalist populism and Marx's reliance on *Produktionsverhältnisse* are portrayed as mere "games played with the symbol 'Being,'" after that symbol had lost its status in the *metaxy* (p 52). By comparison, however, references to Marx are more hostile and vituperative. Among the followers of Hegel, particularly the Left Hegelians, we are told, imaginary speculation progressively took the place of experiential reflection, in the end, questions concerning "the structure of the speculator's own consciousness" and concerning "the truth it embodied" were shunned and even prohibited (p 50). "This last requirement, necessary to protect the speculative efforts against all-too-obvious questions, was raised to the rank of an explicit postulate by Karl Marx." The passage is not further elucidated in the text. However, the reader is familiar with the so-called "postulate" under the label of the "prohibition of questions" (by Marx), a claim articulated by Voegelin in some of his earlier writings. Unfortunately, the al

leged prohibition is backed up there only by reference to a passage in *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*—a passage which does not in any way curtail or prohibit questioning but rather suggests that concrete questioning is possible only in the context of an existing world, not from an external Archimedean point (a view not too alien to a participatory ontology). As it seems to me, the claimed prohibition marks a descent into ideological polemics, into the very "dogmatomachy" from which Voegelin otherwise seeks to rescue us so valiantly.

Among modern philosophers, none is discussed more extensively and also less judiciously (I believe) than Hegel. Perhaps it is the very proximity between Hegelian dialectics and the "history of order" which prompts critical distancing in this case. My concern here is not to vindicate Hegelian philosophy in all respects, but only to caution against a simplified or reductive exegesis. Clearly, some of Voegelin's points are well taken, and deserve to be pondered by friends and critics of Hegel alike. This is particularly true of the project of "absolute" historical knowledge, a project in which every context or horizon would become rationally transparent and amenable to propositional formulation. As Voegelin observes (p. 64), Hegel went astray in construing "being" as a subject that "unfolds its substance in the historical process dialectically" until it reaches its *eschaton*, its end, in fully articulate conceptualization of its self-consciousness. With a focus on language, a similar argument can be made (p. 103) that the "effable-meffable" tension resists being resolved through a speculative meta-language "of the kind by which Hegel wanted to dissolve the paradoxical identity of identity and non-identity." Beyond this "absolutist" and meta-linguistic bent, however, Hegel's philosophy is too richly nuanced and circumspect to succumb readily to critical charges, especially charges of a polemical sort. Thus, the charge of an oblivion of "remembrance" seems farfetched in the case of a thinker whose image of philosophical reflection was the "owl of Minerva." Similarly, the linkage of Hegel with the later "death-of-God" movement strikes me as implausible—given the metaphysical structure of his thought which has rightly been described as an "onto-theology." (The phrase "senseless sound" occurs in a passage narrowly tailored to questions of concept-formation.) The linkage with modern agnosticism is particularly puzzling in view of the simultaneous ascription to Hegel of a variety of speculative-pneumatic traits, including Protestant neo-Platonic and "gnostic" leanings—the last term being most liberally used throughout the text (so liberally, in fact, as to obstruct careful exegesis).

Easily the most dubious or questionable passages of the text occur in the section dealing with Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. According to Voegelin (pp. 55–56), Hegel was guilty of immanentizing human experience and of restricting the latter to "*natürliche Erkenntnis* in its deformative application to the It-reality"—a restriction which perverted *periagoge* into a product of self-assertive action", simultaneously (and not very consistently), *periagoge*

or *Umkehrung* is also said to be the work of external compulsion, of a necessity operating beyond the range of consciousness. These claims, I believe, are untenable both singly and in combination. The stress on *natürliche Erkenntnis* first of all, neglects that Hegel's *Phenomenology* portrays the path of experience as leading from "natural" to "real" or "absolute" consciousness, both stages or dimensions being modes of human consciousness. As depicted by Hegel, this path of experience—far from being smooth (or immanent)—is arduous and punctuated by a rupture, for this reason the path is also called a "path of despair" or a *via dolorosa* (and "real" consciousness the "golgotha" of experience). The rupture is thematized by Hegel as a "turning around of consciousness" or *Umkehrung*, and the latter is termed "our addition" (*unsere Zutat*)—not because it can be fabricated self-assertively, but because it cannot happen without our participation (a participation which consists precisely not in self-assertion, but in a kind of "letting-be," namely, in letting the *parousia* occur). At the same time, what propels or compels the *Umkehrung* is not some external power—and certainly not the "unconscious" force suggested by Voegelin (in a truly "grotesque" interpretation)—but the movement of real or absolute consciousness as it affects and undermines self-certainty—that is, the complacency of *natürliche Erkenntnis*. As Heidegger writes, in his own exegesis of Hegel's "Introduction" (1970 p. 130): "Our contribution wills the will of the absolute." Thus, "the reversal of consciousness does not add to the absolute any self-assertive supplement on our part. Rather, it restores us to our nature or being which consists in our standing in the *parousia* of the absolute." To which he adds "If the reversal as our contribution is the fulfillment of our essential relation to the absoluteness of the absolute, then our being belongs itself into the *parousia* of the absolute."

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Book Reviews **P**

Book Reviews

Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America By Barry Ames (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. Pp. xiv, 286. \$38.00.)

Barry Ames has put a simple idea and an enormous amount of data to good use in discussing politicians and public policy in Latin America. The idea is that political leaders want to keep their jobs and/or influence. They try to do so by manipulating government expenditures to create "survival coalitions"—particularly in times of crisis. Two data sets are used in an attempt to prove this thesis. The first approach is a cross-national, time series analysis of expenditures of individual presidencies. Ames predicts that a number of "political" and "setting" variables will increase or decrease spending. He uses multiple-regression analysis to confirm or disconfirm his hypotheses (pp. 24–25). Part II of the book applies the theory to Brazil. Chapter 4 identifies patterns of pork-barrel politics in the Brazilian legislature from 1947 to 1964, a period of pluralistic, democratic rule. Chapter 5, entitled "When Soldiers Need Friends," examines expenditure patterns of military governments from 1974 to 1984, a period of transition to more open, democratic government.

The idea that political leaders spend money to gain or maintain power is hardly original and the reader may initially have to suppress a yawn. But like many ideas, it is less simple than it looks. One possibility is macroeconomic stimulation of the economy to produce high employment and high per capita income at election time. This is the theory of the political-business cycle, pioneered by Nordhaus and Tufte. Ames claims (without much evidence) that this strategy is rarely used in Latin America because of unstable, open economies and inadequate technical advice. Rather, Latin American governments spend to recruit and retain followers (p. 11). A second possibility is simple pork-barrel politics. This is largely what Ames discusses in his analysis of the Brazilian legislature between 1947 and 1964, but it is less appropriate to the political dynamics of subsequent military governments. Here, Ames is talking about higher-level trade-offs between ministries and different areas of spending: agriculture, housing, health, military, regions of the country, and wage policy. A third possibility is the thesis explored in the first half of the book, that total government spending for all purposes will vary according to: (1) proximity to elections or military coups, (2) takeover of power by an opposition

party, (3) a government with a working-class base, and (4) the rise or fall of potential budgetary resources. Ames claims to have found expenditure cycles for both elected and military governments, both of which increase spending in attempting to gain popularity (pp. 7-8).

This is a carefully written book and the author demonstrates a broad knowledge of Latin America, going considerably beyond his data base. Nevertheless, some methodological issues require attention. We are told that chapter 1 examines central government expenditures of seventeen Latin American countries between 1947 and 1982. However, Latin America is normally seen as consisting of twenty countries and we are not told which three countries were omitted, or why. Nor are we told why 1947 was chosen as the base year. From the data sources listed in Appendix A, I take it that Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba were the countries left out of the study. This explains why, on page 14, Cuba since 1959 is not listed as one of the administrations backed by working class or lower middle class parties. Other methodological decisions are understandable and are briefly noted, but nevertheless affect the conclusions. For example, (pp. 92-93) the Nicaraguan administration of Luis Somoza (1956-1963) is labeled "social liberal" because governments are classified by *changes* in spending rather than *budgetary shares* of education, health, and the military. Explaining expenditure patterns is the central problem of the book. They are explained in terms of political constraints, financial constraints, and leadership preferences. Leadership preferences, in turn, are of two kinds: survival (keeping power) and substantive (everything else). The problem of determining substantive preferences is finessed by simply *assuming* that during crises (elections, coups) survival preferences will be dominant (p. 4). Ideological explanations are thus seriously considered only in the Brazilian case study. The impact of preferences is also difficult to gauge because the dependent variable is total central government spending rather than some measure of controllable expenditures.

In my judgment, *Political Survival* is an important book with significant implications for the study of public policy and politics in Latin America. For one thing, the substantive conclusions about budgetary trade-offs are interesting although I am not convinced that survival coalitions explain the wide range of phenomena described here. The Brazilian case study helps give the reader something tangible to hang on to. Ames does not present his work as an alternative to the dominant theoretical approaches to political economics in Latin America. However, he argues that scholars using class analysis, dependency theory, and bureaucratic-authoritarian approaches often ignore relevant political survival explanations. This work will have served us well if it stimulates writers of other persuasions to broaden their perspectives.

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Rationing Medicine By Robert H. Blank (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. Pp. 290. \$25.00.)

In 1950, health care in the United States absorbed 4.5% of the gross national product; it is estimated that by the year 2000 health care costs will consume more than 14% of the GNP (p. 10). A growing share of these costs will go to "high-cost curative or rescue technologies" (p. 238) for a relatively small number of people. Robert Blank sees a crisis emerging as we embrace a maximalist approach to medical care (p. 6) and turn to a "technological fix" as a solution to our problems (p. ix). His prescription is three-pronged: we must shift our priorities from expensive curative medicine to preventive medicine, alter exaggerated public expectations about health care (p. 189), and learn to take individual responsibility for the health quality of our life-styles.

Blank's consistently reasonable portrayal of the causes and consequences of the emerging health care crisis sets the problems squarely in the context of the American cultural and political system. It is a culture that equates technology with progress and presumes the legitimacy of an individual's right to health care. Several areas of health care described by Blank underscore the aggressive pursuit of new medical technologies in which our society is now engaged: organ transplants, treatment of seriously ill newborn infants, reproductive techniques, and fetal health monitoring.

In this context, it would make little sense to try to impose fundamental change in medical allocations or, as Blank puts it, to "ration medicine by edict" (p. 248). The preferred approach, Blank argues, is to launch a campaign of public education and evaluation of priorities. Change can come about only with "vigorous public support" (p. 174) and this support must begin before new policy mechanisms are set up. The public must be educated to learn to "curb our demands" (p. 76) and to "counter the technological imperative" (p. 245). In addition, a "heavy dose of individual responsibility" (p. 199) is needed in which persons turn to preventive medicine and stay away from dangerous life-style choices.

Presuming there is "no escape" from making decisions involving the allocation of health care resources, Blank points out the paradoxes and contradictions of our culture that interfere with a rational assessment of the ills and solutions to injustices in our health care system. Decisions about health care will not necessarily be rationally grounded, he warns (p. 19). How can they be rational in a system in which healthy persons in effect subsidize the unhealthy life-styles of others (p. 199), there is "little disincentive for unhealthy behavior" (p. 233), and a majority of the public is happy with the current system of entitlement to health care (p. 28-30)? Moreover, the "blame" for the spiraling public expectations about medical care spreads across the society and includes the media's tendency to feed public fears of diseases (p. 245).

"fragmented policy process" (p. 19); the curious phenomenon of rationing by public relations, in which families plead for transplantable organs; and the power of corporate medicine to sell the most advanced medical facilities and equipment.

Blank resists the temptation to engage in the behavior he criticizes (i.e., turning to technology to resolve the problems of technology) and he is wary about computerized systems of rationing medicine and even new definitions of rationing. Instead, he turns to a disarmingly simple solution of reeducating persons, "reinstitut[ing] the notion of individual responsibility for health" (p. 195), and readjusting our priorities with the national government "framing the dialogue and moderating the demands of the public" (p. 135). Yet he is under no illusion that such value change would be easy in a system where people go to physicians to get cured rather than to prevent illness, claim the right to engage in behavior that endangers their health, are obsessed with prolonging life (p. 7), and applaud third-party insurance coverage that insulates them from the financial implications of their high-cost treatments (p. 6).

This book pursues its call for simplicity in an era of spiraling medical technologies with an evenhandedness that demonstrates the futility of looking for easy solutions. Even in the one area where the author discusses what would be a dramatic change in policy—penalizing persons for an unhealthy life-style by withholding funded medical care from them—he falls short of clear advocacy of this method of rationing. Instead, saying that such rationing is "not beyond imagination," he suggests it as one method of enticing people to take responsibility for their life-style choices (p. 230).

It is testimony to the author's understanding of the American political and cultural system that his prescriptions do not extend beyond the boundaries of what would realistically be possible in our culture. He concludes with an admonition that we assess our values and priorities in "as rational and fair a manner as possible" (p. 252). Rationing, or the weighing of claims by individuals for scarce public resources, has traditionally been done through market mechanisms. This book presents medical rationing as a topic for which individual responsibility can be shared. In so doing it helps take the onus from rationing and brings it to the level of intelligent and nonthreatening discourse. The book effectively identifies an emerging political and ethical dilemma and presents a judicious, long-term method of addressing that dilemma.

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Interpreting the Constitution By Erwin Chemerinsky (New York: Praeger, 1987. Pp. 216. \$38.95).

Chemerinsky is trying with spare prose and in logical fashion to recast the debate over how to interpret the Constitution. Originalists (noninterpretivists)

attempt to confine interpretations by making majority rule and the intent of the framers the central parts of their definition of the American system. Non-originalists (interpretivists) accept only the majority rule criterion, and waste their time trying to make judicial review congruent with majority rule. Both are wrong, the Constitution does not establish or contemplate a system of majority rule. Chemerinsky does not elaborate on this challenge to the major premise of both groups as much as he could, but the wording of the Constitution supports his position.

To refocus the debate, Chemerinsky asks a series of preliminary questions: why should this society be governed by a constitution; should that constitution evolve or remain static; should evolution be by interpretation or by amendment, and who should be the final interpreter of the document (p. 24).² A constitution is for the United States (1) a necessary means of protecting both the structure of government and fundamental rights from social majorities and (2) a symbol uniting the society that it governs. Furthermore, "the Constitution is a powerful antimajoritarian symbol—a statement that there is much that a simple majority of society cannot, and should not change" (p. 26).

Since constitutional change is inevitable, the method by which the Constitution should evolve is the one clear difference between the originalists and the nonoriginalists. The former would limit evolution to the changes embodied in constitutional amendments and the latter would permit some body to interpret the Constitution to bring about change. The very nature of the amendment process convinces Chemerinsky that evolution through interpretation is preferable and, indeed, essential. Amendments are difficult to obtain: they require extraordinary attention by the public, and frequent amendments may sap the symbolic nature of the document (he makes much of the lack of symbolic quality in often-amended state constitutions). In addition, the amendment process would never have worked to give constitutional status to some decisions that the author believes were necessary (e.g., *Brown v. Board of Education*). Evolution through interpretation allows the Constitution to remain abreast of the times and thus to fulfill one of its functions. "If amendments were the only way to change the Constitution, protection against new threats and protection of new minorities and of new rights would require action by a supermajority of society—the minority would be protected from the majority only if a supermajority of society decided to act" (p. 69).

Having gotten this far in the argument, the author has to decide who should be the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution. The federal courts are his not surprising choice. The judiciary is the only branch of government that is insulated from majoritarian pressures. "These choices are best made by an institution whose primary commitment is to the Constitution, not to gaining reelection" (p. 88). Moreover, the process of judicial decision making is better adapted to making such decisions than are the legislative or executive processes. The judiciary is the only branch that must respond to complaints by

the minority or the individual. The use of written, reasoned opinions, the doctrine of *stare decisis*, the adversary process, the role expectations society imposes on the judges all make the judicial process one that is designed to reach conclusions. Therefore, the authoritative arbiter of the Constitution should be the federal judiciary and the Supreme Court in particular.

Constitutional evolution through interpretation by the courts raises the question of limits on the discretion of the judges. The author mentions the standard limits on the power of the courts: deference to the decisions of the other branches, the appointment power of the president, noncompliance with decisions, the amendment power, and so on. The weaknesses of each of these limits is cheerfully acknowledged and then Chemerinsky concludes that "The harms of . . . despotic rule [by the majority] are more to be feared than the overzealous judicial invalidation of legislation" (p. 127). This is a value choice that can be adopted but which will not be accepted by all readers.

The last chapter of the book advances the author's preferred method of constitutional interpretation: "open-ended modernism." The method is "modernist" because it applies enduring values embodied in the Constitution (freedom of speech, privacy, equality, liberty) to contemporary problems and is heavily influenced by contemporary concerns, conditions, and values. It is "open-ended" in the sense that it is capable of being used to implement a variety of moral and political theories . . . (p. 130). It is, therefore, indeterminate in its results: the judges supply the values that go into the interpretations. Open-ended modernism turns out to be what the Supreme Court has been using in its decision making since *Marbury*. The author therefore tells us that the questions that should be at the center of the debate are "What values are worthy of constitutional status? How should those values be applied in particular situations? and Has the Court's result been adequately justified?" (p. 138). Because constitutional law is a debate over values, that debate cannot ignore the views of the framers, but contemporary society's conditions must be given primacy.

Chemerinsky clearly would prefer a court that produced "liberal" decisions. But, having decided that the values must be put into the decisions by the judges, he is willing to gamble that on balance there will be more "good" decisions than "bad" ones. He at least expresses a willingness to live with the indeterminate nature of the process that he is describing.

This book's call for a reorientation of the way we conduct our discussion of the Constitution and its interpretation makes it worth reading and pondering. His arguments are clearly laid out and counter arguments are squarely faced. His copious documentation enables the reader to backtrack into the writings of those he is chiding for asking the wrong questions. Not everyone will be happy with the arguments advanced but those who disagree will have to think through their responses carefully.

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Justice: Views from the Social Sciences. Edited by Ronald L. Cohen (New York: Plenum Publishing Corporation, 1986. Pp. xii, 283. \$32.50 U.S. \$39.00 outside.)

Headed by the editor's introduction, this book includes chapters by seven social scientists. They have concentrated on four questions: (1) the emergence of concepts of justice and injustice in the history of their disciplines; (2) the major controversies that have emerged and that characterize current discussions of justice in their disciplines; (3) the crucial issues that might constitute agendas for future work in their disciplines; and (4) specific aspects of these agendas that would require the perspectives of other disciplines in the social sciences, and the contributions that such work would make to the understanding of issues on these agendas. On the whole, the authors represented devote more attention to the first pair of questions than they do to the second pair. I shall sketch the salient concerns of each chapter and then conclude with an overall evaluation.

In discussing philosophy, Allen Buchanan and Deborah Mathien first outline four major elements in the concept of justice and then, in the heart of the chapter, critically examine three contemporary theories of distributive justice: utilitarianism, Rawls's theory of justice as fairness, and Nozick's libertarianism. They conclude by noting ways in which philosophical theories depend upon assumptions from the social sciences and could benefit from a more explicit use of social scientific methods. Utilitarianism is in need of empirical premises if the principle of utility is to have concrete content, and Rawls, Nozick, and Marxist theorists all assume empirical generalizations which are hotly disputed in the social sciences.

Economist Stephen T. Worland begins with Aristotle, asking whether or how the rules of justice in a market society may achieve the proportionate equality required by commutative justice, the use of private property for the common good, and the reward for merit required by distributive justice. After a critical examination of classical, Marxist, and neoclassical models, Worland concludes that distributive justice cannot be achieved in a market society without "some estimate of relative merit other than that of contribution to production" (p. 76). Here theories like that of Rawls may appear promising, but the moral psychology of capitalist society in fact precludes the implementation of rules of justice.

Representing political studies, Arthur DiQuattro centers his critique upon the "new," more egalitarian liberalism. Deontological conceptions of liberal justice like Rawls's rest upon the assumption of the equal rational capacity of individuals, support for which must have recourse to relevant matters of empirical fact. This is true both of current individual attributes and preferences, and also of potential attributes and preferences under different possible social arrangements. Yet even the more relativistic writings of the new liberals, such as those of Walzer or the later Rawls, use the concept of justice in normative

fashion or give it normative content biased toward the superiority of the liberal form of life.

As a sociologist, Steve Rytina suggests that sociological discussions of justice normally center on theories of equality or inequality, and on the supporting sentiments or normative beliefs which necessarily support the continued existence of these conditions. Within this context Rytina reviews Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, and then discusses structural-functional theory, exchange theory, and the role of contracts and bargains in exchange theory. The current sociological agenda includes investigations of both popular notions of fairness and popular perceptions of injustice. Rytina concludes that if justice is only embodied in cooperative bargains that are fully voluntary, current bargains are more often arbitrary than not.

After a brief review of ways justice has been studied by psychologists, Lita Furby critically discusses current approaches to equity theory, procedural justice, developmental theories, and gender comparisons in perceptions of justice. The latter focus suggests that an ethics of care is a second generalized justice orientation which should be considered along with the domination formulation of justice as fairness. The challenge posed by considerations of particularity and relativism to the traditional emphasis on abstraction and universal principles applies also to the philosophical mainstream. Further work is needed, Furby concludes, on understandings of what constitutes the domain of justice, of entitlements, and of perceptions of injustice.

As was implicitly the case in political studies and in psychology, anthropologists Laura Nader and Andrée Sursock explicitly address the contrast between universality and variety in perceptions of justice. In individualistic societies justice tends to be universalistic and abstract, emphasizing formal equality, whereas in holistic societies it is particularistic, contextual, and situational, emphasizing equity. Some styles of justice seek to right wrongs because they are wrongs intrinsically or by definition, while others right wrongs because reconciliation between the parties is the primary social goal to be promoted. Justice as reciprocity is another anthropological focus, with the values of equity, need, equality, or the achievement of advantage predominant depending upon the type of society and exchange system. Nader and Sursock conclude that universally, although law reflects the need to maintain a given social order, it must also articulate the society's values if it is to be regarded as justice as well as law.

Finally, Karol Soltan, representing justice in public policy, presents a critique of the utilitarian tradition, arguing that the human mind is both more limited and more complex in its capacities than classical utilitarians assumed. The construction of standards that do not involve trade-offs is impossible, as is the construction of a coherent moral theory to summarize all moral judgments. Clearer standards must be developed, with the weight of a given standard being correlated with particular features of each given situation. Soltan

discusses bargaining as intrinsic to a morality of convention and argument on merits as intrinsic to a morality of justice, calling for studies to discover what gives force to moral arguments and what alternatives result from such arguments. He concludes that individuals have second-order preferences for impartial viewpoints that value actions and institutions as ends in themselves. A valuable and recurring theme throughout the book is the tension between the universal and the particular as these are seen through the lenses of each discipline represented. The book is weakest in the fourth area purportedly addressed by its contributors, that of how the agenda of one discipline would benefit from the perspectives of others. Nevertheless, readers can draw their own conclusions from the material presented. The book is likely to prove interesting and suggestive to scholars from many disciplinary backgrounds.

Emily R. Gill, *Bradley University*

Hard Judicial Choices: Federal District Court Judges and State and Local Officials. By Phillip J. Cooper. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. Pp. ix, 374. \$50.00 cloth, \$17.50 paper.)

Notwithstanding, *Hard Judicial Choices* does not examine the cognitive ease or difficulty of decision making by judges or anyone else in political life. Instead Phillip Cooper supplements law and policy literature by providing encyclopedic descriptions of institutional litigation in five major policy arenas: equal housing, school desegregation, mental health treatment, prison conditions, and police street practices. Cooper devotes to each of these a pair of chapters. The first in each pair summarizes the historical background, political data, legal developments, and selected academic literature relevant to each problem. The companion chapter describes in detail a specific case, e.g., *Milliken v. Bradley* (the Detroit busing case) for school desegregation and *Hodes v. Chapman* (the Ohio prison overcrowding case) for prison reform. An introduction and first chapter conceptualize the litigation process in the familiar phases of a lawsuit's chronology, i.e., the trigger, liability, remedy, and post-decree (refinement, implementation, and evaluation) phases. Each case study chapter follows its case through these phases, and the book ends with a twenty-three page chapter summarizing the lessons learned about each case.

Cooper has thus written virtually two books in parallel. The policy background chapters give students with little or no legal or policy knowledge a strong foundation in each area. These textbook-level chapters, for example, review *Plessy*, *Sweatt*, *Brown*, and *Swann* as background for *Milliken* (chapter 9) and explain the exclusionary rule to prepare for *Rizzo v. Goode* (chapter 10). The background chapter on equal housing ranges from a description of the evolution of zoning law as a force perpetuating racial residential exclusion, to

the national politics behind the organizing of HUD in the 1960s, to the inadequacy of mass transportation systems to move inner city workers to new beltway and suburban jobs. Cooper's instinct for the major components of each policy problem is sure. This background enables beginners to follow litigation details with confidence.

The case study chapters and the concluding analysis speak primarily to a graduate student and research audience. Cooper does not assess in any detail the impact of these cases on changes in the lives of citizens. Rather he seeks to increase our understanding of how complex litigation works. He constructs these chapters primarily from public records, supplemented slightly by private interviews and on-site observations, and his exhaustive recounting of the evolution of these cases produces the entirely credible and unsurprising conclusion that litigation is complex, multidimensional, and unpredictable. The book has a "sometimes x, sometimes non-x" tone that accurately depicts political life.

More specifically, Cooper confirms major propositions in the research literature, especially those of Wasby and of Cavanaugh and Sarat, and stresses five findings

- 1 Doctrine and precedent limit judicial discretion and judicial choices in determining liability and shaping remedies more than current legal theory suggests. (While he does not put the matter in these terms, Cooper's trial judges seem repeatedly to use doctrine and precedent to convert hard choices into easy ones.)
- 2 Review by the U.S. Supreme Court of these policy matters is often superficial. Cooper amply demonstrates that the Supreme Court decision in the Detroit busing case "was not based on a careful examination of the record" (p. 122).
- 3 Hard judicial choices do sometimes occur, e.g., when a judge dies after presiding over the liability phase, so that the successor must superintend the remedy phase without the knowledge gained earlier. Judges also face a hard choice when they confront the "deference paradox." "Opinions written in moderate tones in an effort to reduce conflict and accord deference to decision makers may produce a decision which understates the gravity of the violation of law and makes the entire opinion vulnerable to reversal" (p. 332).
- 4 Cases are often filed rather quickly in reaction to political maneuvers by opponents. Attorneys do not necessarily plan them well, and poor planning and tactical errors early on can affect both the content of the remedy and its chances of survival on appeal.
- 5 The remedy phase is not a pure bargaining or exchange process that judges merely facilitate. Trial judges shape core remedies largely by their own choices.

Cooper refuses to impose an evaluative perspective on his descriptions. We get hints but not details of the dynamics of the state and local administrative infighting that occurs when some officials stand to gain if court orders generate increased funding for their operations. We are told that expert witnesses play an especially critical role in institutional litigation (p. 19), but we get no detailed analysis of when and to what degree courts should trust the accuracy and relevance of expert testimony in these policy cases. By looking at these issues primarily as formal legal matters, Cooper excludes interesting dynamics of politics and policy. And it is disappointing to find that long sections of the supposedly introductory materials are transposed, almost word for word into the analytical concluding chapter.

But theory building is not this book's reason for being. Cooper's descriptions add up to a strong argument that the law school view of how litigation works and ought to work is close to the mark. Conservative judges and officials in many cases unhesitatingly treat law as neutral and legitimate commands that lead them to liberal results.

A spirit of positivist liberalism pervades this book, and this spirit allows Cooper to avoid tedious debates about judicial capacity, activism, and self-restraint. Cooper accepts without debate what needn't be debated. Prison conditions, even in 'model facilities' are horribly dehumanizing. The troglodytic racial attitudes of officials in Parma, Ohio, did block black Americans from living where they chose. A due process foundation for legal liability in each of these areas clearly exists, and courts have power to make due process guarantees real. I find it refreshing that Cooper does not bog down in extensive academic theory-building. One of political science's virtues is its capacity to synthesize law, history, aggregate data, and daily political experience into patterns whose descriptive detail and comprehensiveness allow us to draw theoretical and normative conclusions for ourselves. By that standard, this book succeeds.

Lael H. Carter, *University of Georgia*

Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and France. By Russell J. Dalton. (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1988. Pp. xvi, 280. \$14.95 paper.)

Although Dalton explicitly states that this book was intended primarily for use by students in college courses, what he has written is considerably more than one would expect from a work labeled 'textbook.' While he has sought to summarize existing knowledge in the field, he has not simplified the material to any great extent. He presents some fairly sophisticated concepts and analyzes data with methods more complex than tables of percentages. He does

not write down to students. Nonetheless, he covers this material with such clarity that intelligent students should have no difficulty understanding it.

While the aim of the book is synthetic, this does not mean that it simply is a boring rehash of the leading books and articles. Dalton does incorporate the findings of relevant scholars, but goes beyond this with a good bit of secondary analysis of many opinion polls from the four countries concentrated upon, as well as interpreting and assessing the state of current knowledge. He clearly is concerned with developing an argument or theme. This helps to produce one of the book's strengths—very effective organization. The logic which takes the reader through each chapter and from one chapter to the next is compelling and gives a feeling of actually seeing an intelligent mind at work.

Dalton begins by contrasting the idealized view of the democratic citizen with the more "realistic" conception that grew out of the voting studies of the 1950s and 1960s. He takes a dim view of the latter elitist theory, which came to argue that democracy was best served by deferential citizens, who were content to let the knowledgeable leaders they had elected get on with the business of running the country without popular interference. He argues that social change now supports a more activist citizenry.

This leads him to examine, first, orthodox or conventional political participation by citizens and, second, protest action. He seeks to establish the present level of popular involvement in politics, to ascertain whether this is growing or declining, and what social characteristics are associated with what type of political action. And, as the title of the book indicates, all this is done cross-nationally, comparing the four leading Western democracies. While none of the results are surprising, this is a very useful, informative survey for students.

Dalton next examines the value priorities underlying political action. He embraces totally the Inglehart post-materialist approach. Whether you find his argument convincing probably will depend on your feelings about Inglehart's work. In any event, that approach and the type of evidence used to support it get a clear and easily understandable summary.

The chapter on issues summarizes the public's view on socioeconomic, social equality, environmental protection, social, and foreign policy issues. The remainder of the chapter examines the public's ability to think in ideological terms to the extent of being able to place themselves on a left/right scale. Dalton feels the evidence shows that citizens are less likely than in the past to vote automatically, but instead are making more discriminating, well thought-out voting choices.

Thus about half the book has been devoted to citizens—their role in politics and their beliefs. Dalton now shifts the focus to parties and elections. He first describes the party system in each of the four countries covered. He agrees that the Lipset/Rokkan classification scheme was serviceable for some time but that post-materialism requires a new typology. He distinguishes between

the left/right cleavage of the "Old Politics and that of the New Politics." This produces a sociopolitical space divided into four quadrants into which he places the main political actors—not only parties, but also such groups as the women's movement, the police, the civil service—for each country.

Having looked at the party system, he turns to examination of the parties themselves in terms of their clientele. After discussing three main social divisions, he concludes that the New Politics cleavage is of growing importance because "the socioeconomic transformation of advanced industrial societies is weakening class alignments. Similarly, the number of churchgoers available for mobilization by confessional parties is decreasing, leading to a declining influence of religion on voting behavior" (p. 173). He concedes, however, that "the realigning potential of the New Politics cleavage so far has been limited because these values are linked only weakly to specific demographic groups" (p. 174). Nonetheless, an important change is occurring—Electoral politics is moving from cleavages defined by social groups to value and issue cleavages that identify only communities of like-minded individuals (p. 174).

Insofar as social characteristics are losing their ability to determine behavior, "citizen voting behavior is more dependent on the attitudes and perceptions of each individual" (p. 177). This requires explaining the funnel of causality for predicting voting choice. Dalton then assesses the extent to which party identification is in flux and how this relates to the question of partisan dealignment. He finds that current "apartisans" differ from the traditional partisan independents in being sophisticated, well-educated, active citizens, who refuse to identify with a party not out of ignorance or unconcern but because of discontent with what the parties are offering. He argues that issue voting is not necessarily undesirable and can make a positive contribution to democracy. He is concerned, however, that those citizens who are not well-educated may find it increasingly difficult to play any meaningful role in the political process and may be readily manipulated by the unscrupulous.

In examining whether political elites are representative of the citizens, he finds a contrast between the United States and the European democracies. Contrasting electoral and party systems means that in the United States views between elected leaders and their constituents exhibit a good bit of correspondence, while in Europe this is not the case. In the European systems representation occurs at the party level collectively, rather than at the level of the individual legislator. In fact, in some ways centralized, ideological parties of the European type are better designed for representation of supporters than are the amorphous American parties.

Dalton's last chapter looks at the future of democracy and questions whether it is in crisis. He sees declining confidence in Western political systems and feels that parties are insufficiently responsive to the citizens' concerns. While he feels this can be corrected, his conclusion is rather hortatory and stronger on goals than on means of achieving them.

As this summary should make clear, Dalton covers all the key topics and controversies related to mass democracy. He knows the relevant literature well and makes good use of it. Also, it should be noted, although not a surprise, that Chatham House has done a nice job of producing the book. All in all this is a worthwhile book for instructional purposes.

Jorgen Rasmussen, *Iowa State University*

Leadership and Innovation: A Biographical Perspective on Entrepreneurs in Government. Edited by Jameson W. Doig and Erwin C. Hargrove (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987. Pp. ix, 459. \$39.50.)

Jameson Doig and Erwin Hargrove have made a significant contribution to both public administration and organizational theory in their editing of *Leadership and Innovation*. The twelve case studies survey a range of governmental executives who can be characterized as "administrative entrepreneurs," that is, "individuals who held high-level positions during a period of years when their agencies had devised new programs or other significant innovations and who on first inspection appeared to be personally involved both in devising and in implementing those changes" (p. 5). The group ranges from Gifford Pinchot to Robert McNamara and includes agencies as different as the Department of Defense and the General Accounting Office. Most of the agencies are part of the federal executive, and, while most of the agency heads are noncareer officials, all would be characterized as "public servants" rather than "politicians."

"There are here no Julius Caesars or others who believed that they could impose their will on the world" (p. 7). Nevertheless, the individuals studied tried to make a significant difference in the management of their agencies. They were, in the formulation of Philip Selznik, "statesmen," that is, those who can make "the transition from administrative management to institutional leadership" (*Leadership and Administration* [New York: Row and Peterson, 1958], p. 154). Not all of these would-be leaders succeeded. Robert McNamara left the Defense Department personally disillusioned and widely criticized, the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, committed suicide a few weeks after having been forced out of office. None, however, were distinguished simply by time-serving. Doig and Hargrove selected their cases with a delicate eye toward advocates of bureaucratic innovation—administrators who sought to transform the bases of how their agencies performed.

This emphasis on entrepreneurship and the individual is a deliberate effort to redress what the editors see as the "pessimistic view" about the potential for bureaucratic leadership that pervades the political science literature. Herbert Kaufman's *Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs* is cited

specifically for its conclusion that the accomplishments of public officials are modest and incremental, measurable in inches rather than miles. For Doig and Hargrove, this assessment amounts to a form of defeatism that "is likely to convey a message to society's best potential leaders: if you are interested in using your talents and energies to accomplish challenging tasks, government service is not for you" (p. 3). The editors believe that it is important to reclaim individual leadership as an important element of public administration and rather unabashedly seek to rebalance the theoretical scales.

The first category of leadership is identified as "rhetorical" where, through the evocation of symbols, an agency head promotes his political resources and galvanizes public support. Agency and head may become synonyms as with J. Edgar Hoover and the F. B. I. Irwin Hargrove provides a compelling study of David Lilienthal and his passionate commitment to public power and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). As TVA's head during the 1930s and 1940s, Lilienthal articulated the agency's organizational myth. The official *persona* of TVA was that of an efficient agency for regional development and one whose internal decision making was based on "grass-roots democracy." Equaling if not surpassing Lilienthal in zealotry was Admiral Hyman Rickover, the "father of the nuclear Navy." Eugene Lewis analyzes the means by which the embattled Rickover constructed a shield of technological expertise to protect himself from enemies within the Navy hierarchy and to expand the resources available for nuclear engineering and his submarine program. He also developed along the way a new constituency and a public persona which became a marvelous resource. He remained "the no-nonsense guy just trying to do his job despite the public bureaucracy" (p. 115).

A second kind of administrative entrepreneur is skillful in bureaucratic politics. Margaret Wyszomirski describes how Nancy Hanks, when chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) from 1969 to 1977, forged an alliance in support of public culture. The allies included cultural institutions, newly-formed arts service organizations, influential members of Congress and White House staffers. In essence, she argued to President Nixon that public support for the arts was politically a "no lose" especially given the magnitude of the investment. The result was unparalleled growth in the NEA's public funding and influence within the cultural community. Wyszomirski skillfully charts the methods by which Nancy Hanks leveraged the Arts Endowment's small funding into an institutional seal of approval for an array of artistic endeavors. In his study of Marriner Eccles, who ran the Federal Reserve Board during Franklin Roosevelt's administration, Donald Kettl shows a contrasting form of bureaucratic politics. Although not very adept at coalition building, Eccles had a carefully cultivated relationship with President Roosevelt, which was reinforced by his vocal support for the New Deal's political philosophy. "Roosevelt found in Eccles a skillful and vocal defender for expansionary fiscal programs" (p. 331). "By the time Roosevelt began his third

term, Eccles had restored the Federal Reserve to a position of unquestioned prominence and had established himself as an intellectual force of great importance within the administration" (p. 332).

In his study of Austin Tobin and the Port of New York Authority, Jameson Doig asks the central questions that underlie all of the cases included "In view of the many political and economic forces that impinge upon an organization, can the efforts of particular leaders modify the organization's goals and behavior in significant ways? Or, as Herbert Kaufman and others have suggested, do the values and strategies of individual leaders have little influence on their organization's direction" (p. 128)? Based on the biographical perspectives in *Leadership and Innovation*, the answer is yes and no. Doig and Hargrove would have us say yes to the first and no to the second, but the answer overall is yes and no. As the editor tells us, there are two generalizations that can be made from their cases about the *relation* between skill and circumstance to achievement "Achievement is formed by a good match of individual skill and the organizational task attempted. The favorable match of skill to task must be reinforced by favorable historical conditions if there is to be significant achievement" (pp. 13-14).

Leadership and Innovation is an interesting, informative, and intelligent study of the opportunities for leadership within the confines of bureaucratic regularities. The cases are uniformly well researched and well written and adhere to a common analytical framework. The result is a significant increase in our theoretical and practical understanding of how bureaus are ruled.

Kevin V. Mulcahy, *Louisiana State University*

City and Regime in the American Republic By Stephen L. Elkin (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987. Pp. 220. \$35.00 cloth, \$11.95 paper.)

Starting from the premise that two important purposes of a liberal democracy are the protection of individual liberties and fostering the development of a commercial republic, Elkin argues convincingly that our political institutions are the key to achieving a political regime that is both a popular one and one that rests on and promotes a commercial society" (p. 11). In a more practical vein, the author tells us we must continue to question the substantial influence that business interests have in the politics of our cities. Yet, the book is about more than just city politics. Indeed, Elkin thinks of the city as a training ground for citizens, and if a citizenry learns to participate and by that participation limits particularistic interests in city politics, the same can occur at the state and national levels of government. For this author, the key to change in our current political practices is the design of appropriate political institutions that in turn are "formative of the sort of citizenry that is necessary if a commercial republic is to flourish" (p. 11).

One strength of Elkin's book is in grounding his thesis in political philosophy. Elkin returns us to the thought and writings of Tocqueville, Hamilton, Mill, and others to point out that a liberal democracy must be economically stable in order to have a stable political system. However, in promoting economic and political prosperity, we have somehow forgotten that "a commercial republic is not the same thing as a republic dominated by businessmen" (p. 15). The author uses both normative and empirical arguments to show us how far we have strayed from the intentions of our nation's founders. Over the past 200 years, in trying to design political institutions that achieve both equality and efficiency, two cherished norms of political reformers, we have instead built institutions that often achieve the opposite.

As the author pursues the notion that equality and efficiency are compatible norms, he focuses the argument on the increasing dominance of business and economic interests in the political decisions being made in our cities. It is not that this issue has been ignored by academics, citizens, officials, or the media. This author, however, departs from the usual reformist proposals that would legislate limits on economic interests or that would somehow divorce politics from economics. Instead, Elkin wants us to begin to think about the proper role and relationship that should exist between the political process and economic system. Because so many government officials have been captured by the idea that economic development is necessary at almost any cost (especially obvious in our major cities) only an enlightened, informed, and participating citizenry can structure the conditions necessary for reform — reform meaning that we recognize the importance of economic and commercial interests without allowing development concerns to dominate all other issues on the political agenda.

According to the author, political institutions that would achieve both equality and efficiency would be free of systematic bias and would promote the social intelligence necessary for solving collective problems. As evidence of the current failure of our institutions, Elkin urges us to examine empirically our political agendas and the pattern of the results of political decisions. If we would do this sort of examination, he argues that we likely will find systematic bias and an accompanying lack of social intelligence for problem solving. Thus, we could demonstrate that our current political institutions have failed to create conditions that would allow the development of the regime we as citizens actually want.

The strength of this book lies in its approach to the analysis of the relationship between politics and economics and in suggesting that political institutions are the key to forming a citizenry that can limit the overbearing power of economic interests in politics. The weakness of the book is found in the practical suggestions for political institutions that would accomplish necessary changes. Elkin relies on the Rousseauian and Jeffersonian notions of community to establish the relations between citizens, and he suggests that neigh-

borhoods would be the most likely location for the debate that must occur to create the citizen who will establish norms defining the relationship between economics and politics. In fairness to this author, however, we must note that it is not incumbent upon him to design or even to suggest a design for the institutions. As he also states in his concluding chapters, no one person can assume the responsibility for this task. Rather, it is a collective task.

This work is an important and insightful analysis that makes a needed contribution to scholarship concerned with city politics. For those of us who are convinced that local politics is important to our daily lives and that it can be a school for citizenship, Elkin provides a needed analytical framework for directing our attention to the political questions which might begin to inform our research agendas.

Barbara J. Burt-Way, *Arizona State University, West Campus*

Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered By David P. Forsythe (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988. Pp. 224. \$24.00.)

Human rights are at the center of the democratic credo. In his study of this vital area, David P. Forsythe examines the role of the first branch of government in the development of human rights policy from 1973 to 1984. Forsythe's analysis emphasizes power and policy instead of law, thus addressing a scholarly focus imbalance according to the author. Congressional human rights actions are also related to their impact upon the executive branch and on world politics. His study is carefully crafted using a combination of roll call analysis plus interviews, documents, and secondary sources to produce conclusions.

The congressional human rights record has not been consistent historically. In the early 1950s Congress pressured the executive branch to withdraw support for human rights treaties in return for its withdrawal of support for the Bricker amendment to the Constitution. Yet, the author credits the Congress for keeping human rights on the foreign policy agenda during both the Carter and first Reagan administrations. Congressional conservatives and liberals also view the occurrence of human rights abuses differently. Liberals aim their concerns toward military regimes allied to the United States and conservatives concentrate upon human rights abuses in Marxist-oriented political systems.

Differences also exist in the House and Senate on human rights policy. The Republican majority in the Senate during 1981-1986, with few exceptions, was reluctant to criticize the human rights positions of a Republican president. In the House, the Democratic majority possessed a focal point for human rights concerns in its Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organization. In the Senate, no focal point or similar sub-

committee exists. Yet personalities play a more important role than the institutions of the Congress according to Forsythe. One example given is that of Representative Donald M. Fraser of Minnesota who, as chair of a foreign affairs subcommittee, put human rights back on the foreign policy agenda through systematic hearings.

Congressional effectiveness in the human rights area is also a mixed bag. During the period under study, Forsythe demonstrates how an assertive Congress has approved much legislation in the human rights area, while at the same time conceding that the legislative branch has not been able, in numerous cases, to make the executive branch comply with its legislative leads. The Nixon-Kissinger period and Reagan administration come under special criticism here with the author noting that "Kissinger would not implement the law" (p. 102) and Ronald Reagan's presidency is referred to as "imperial" in the human rights area as "it ignored congressional directives when it could" (p. 163).

The President-Congress struggle over human rights is also weighted on the executive side for two additional reasons: the executive branch frequently refuses to compromise with the Congress knowing how difficult it is for its diverse membership to reach a majority vote, and eventual action by the legislative branch usually occurs through compromise, giving the executive branch at least part of what it wishes. Thus, the usual pattern that emerges is for executive branch initiation of human rights measures and for the Congress to then modify those measures. This executive proposal and legislative disposal model is attributed to U.S. foreign policy making in general despite the assertiveness of the Congress during the 1970s.

Country-specific human rights actions by the legislative branch stand out as the form of legislation most dreaded by the executive branch. Forsythe devotes two chapters to this form of human rights legislation. He notes several successes in this area, including El Salvador where the congressional withholding of specific funds forced changes in U.S. policy. Also noted was the influence of journalist Jacobo Timerman's book *Prisoner without a Name, Cell without a Number*, which was circulated in the Congress and helped maintain country-specific legislation on Argentina. More recently, economic sanctions were voted by the Congress on the Republic of South Africa. However, in other countries like Haiti, country-specific legislation has been less effective and the executive branch remains generally opposed to this form of legislation, believing it limits executive maneuverability in foreign affairs.

Although Forsythe's study does not emphasize the role of bipartisanship in the making of human rights policy, the creation of the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) deserves special attention because of its bipartisan and bi-branch character. Following the signing of the Helsinki Accord by thirty-five states in 1975 to promote cooperation and security in Europe, Congress created the CSCE to monitor develop-

ments under the accord. Its membership was composed of both executive and legislative members and it concentrated its attention almost exclusively on human rights.

The CSCE has achieved a modest degree of success in affecting U.S. foreign policy under the accord, especially as guided by the first chair of the commission, Representative Dante Fascell. It has also not met with concerted opposition from the executive branch which always jealously guards its responsibility for the execution of foreign policy. Given the clarity with which Forsythe has demonstrated how an administration may resist congressional actions on human rights even if it is the law, plus the unpredictability of human rights concerns by the Congress in most cases, the need for a bipartisan foreign policy in this vital area seems apparent, but not fully appreciated by the author.

A U.S. foreign policy that places all essential emphasis upon power as identified in this study with the Nixon-Kissinger approach, does in fact lack an important moral component which is part of the domestic political reality. A foreign policy that reflects a human rights concern is a stronger and more accurate expression of the American political culture. For this and other reasons, the author's conclusion that the 'Congress has not done too badly' (p. 174) is correct, as demonstrated in this important study.

Philip J. Briggs *East Stroudsburg University*

Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics. Edited by Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh. (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1988. Pp. 294.)

This book is part of the Sage Modern Politics Series sponsored by the European Consortium for Political Research. It consists of a collection of nine country studies together with an introduction and conclusion. Seven of the country studies are based on presentations made at an ECPR workshop in Barcelona in March 1985. Some papers, including one by Donald Matthews on candidate recruitment for the U.S. Congress, were not included as separate country studies but did provide information on which the editor, Michael Gallagher, could draw in his concluding chapter.

In the introductory chapter, the editors make the point that "candidate selection has often been identified as a crucial part of the political process, but it has received comparatively little attention" (p. 1). Not only has little comparative research been done, there is relatively little information available for most individual countries, with the exception of the United States and possibly a few other political systems.

This book goes a long way toward correcting these deficiencies, and it accomplishes well the four goals the editors have set for themselves: (1) to "provide descriptions of candidate selection in nine countries," (2) to "identify the most important influences on the nature of the candidate selection process," (3) to "establish the consequences of candidate selection," and (4) to "constitute a test of the importance of candidate selection as a topic for research" (p. 4).

As in all edited works, the separate contributions are of uneven quality; however, unlike most of their counterparts, the chapters in this book reflect the efforts of the editors to provide a common framework for presentation, including a similar set of questions. The result is that the goal of comparison among different political systems is achieved to a greater extent than one may have anticipated based on many other, far less successful, efforts at comparative research and analysis.

The common questions raised in each chapter include, but are not limited to: (1) the impact of recruitment patterns described in each country study on the composition of the legislatures; (2) the impact of candidate selection on deputies' behavior, and hence on the nature of the legislature; and (3) the impact on the parties. In the process of answering these questions, a good deal of interesting and useful information emerges.

This information is put together, analyzed, and assessed in the concluding chapter, which, as indicated above, draws not only from the preceding nine country studies but also from numerous other studies of countries in the West, Eastern Europe, and even Africa. Some rather surprising, or in any case, superficially implausible, conclusions are reached. Thus, for example, it is not generally true that the center, i.e., the national executive or party leaders, exercise effective control over the candidate selection process, even in countries with strong party discipline. On the other hand, it is true, as most of us would probably have suspected, that a minority of party members (from less than 1% to less than 35%) and, of course, even smaller proportions of voters (nowhere above 3%) are involved in the selection of parliamentary candidates. The far larger percentage of Americans that participate in nominations is due, of course, to the unique primary system and, in important respects, very different American party system.

In conclusion, this book is a valuable contribution to literature on comparative political parties. It is a must for most academic libraries, and it would be a good selection for a graduate-level seminar on comparative parties, especially Western European parties. I found only one unfortunate error in the country studies: on the first page of the chapter on West Germany, the number of CDU-CSU members is given as 90,000; it should be 900,000.

Arthur B. Gunlicks, *University of Richmond*

The Merit System and Municipal Civil Service: A Fostering of Social Inequality By Frances Gottfried (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988. Pp. 200. \$37.95.)

It has long been recognized that civil service merit systems do not always adequately achieve the value they are meant to accomplish. Public personnel administrators have no infallible methods for measuring applicant qualifications despite the fact that unwarranted precision has frequently been attributed to those techniques. It is also true that screening devices for entry into civil service positions, particularly written examinations, have disproportionately excluded racial minorities. Thus, there has been a tension between mechanisms designed to achieve meritocracy and principles of social equity compatible with representative bureaucracy. Merit systems have shielded the civil service from undue political influence, but they have not produced a bureaucratic work force representative of society at large. The apparent conflict between meritocracy and social equity is addressed here by Frances Gottfried in a work which attacks merit-based civil service systems as they now operate.

Gottfried asserts that "the rigid structure of municipal civil service systems and the principle of meritocracy underlying that system [sic] have contributed to and maintained a system of social inequity" (p. 160). As evidence, the author documents the continued underrepresentation of minorities and women in higher levels of municipal, state, and federal work forces. Gottfried suggests that personnel departments, professional organizations, and public employee unions are beneficiaries of the well-entrenched current structure. She argues that "by restricting entrance in the civil service only to those who meet their own definition of a qualified applicant, the professionals were legitimizing their role as possessor of a unique and socially beneficial skill, thereby enhancing their own social and economic worth" (p. 35). In the author's view, civil service reforms from the nineteenth century and the merit systems which evolved from those reforms have substituted the political manipulation of professionals for the partisan manipulation of political bosses. Values of representation and responsive service delivery have been made subordinate to professionalism.

The book details challenges to the current merit system which have taken the form of affirmative action policies, litigation directed toward discriminatory personnel procedures, and public employment programs such as the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973. According to Gottfried, these efforts have failed to alter the status quo significantly since relatively few minorities and women have made their way to higher ranking and better paying bureaucratic positions. With respect to affirmative action programs, the author cites studies suggesting that attitudes of personnel administrators, union pressure to maintain seniority as a basis for promotion,

attention, and the veterans preference have all presented obstacles to minority and female employment progress. Gottfried acknowledges that the courts have been effective in overturning discriminatory practices in selected cases, but the underrepresentation of minorities or women in certain occupations and grade levels remains a problem. Public employment programs, from the time of the New Deal to the 1970s, designed to assist the structurally unemployed have led to some advances according to Gottfried, but "for the most part these programs have not had a major impact on changing municipal civil service systems to make them more open, less exclusionary structures with greater degree of social equity" (p. 144).

Gottfried's treatment of the civil service employment problems of minorities and women is empirically grounded, but a more thorough review of available literature would help to underscore arguments made in this work. Implicit in the author's position is the assumption that screening devices for promotion or entry into the civil service, such as competitive examinations, are not necessarily valid predictors of subsequent job performance. Much has been written on the subject of civil service examination validity in recent years, but this body of work is not addressed. The author also notes that qualifications for positions are frequently set at artificially high levels, but again, more thorough effort could be made to illustrate and document this assertion.

Because fallible selection and promotion mechanisms work to exclude minorities and women, Gottfried argues that they should be abandoned or significantly altered. But it is not clear what the author would establish in place of the current structure. If previous challenges to the merit system have been largely ineffective, and the author does not irrefutably establish that point, then what exactly are we to do? Gottfried suggests that political patronage systems of the past better served the objective of social equity, and the implication is that patronage would be preferable to our current system. That position, however, is subject to debate. One might question whether the excesses of patronage which were manifest in years past are easier to tolerate than our current attempts at achieving meritocracy and political neutrality.

The fact that minority and female underrepresentation occurs today primarily at higher employment levels may indicate that the problem is as much a product of broader social inequities as it is a function of rigid civil service procedures. Given past patterns of racial and sexual discrimination in this country, we may have to acknowledge - as much as we would wish it otherwise - that we have probably not yet reached the point where the proportion of minorities or women qualified to fill certain positions, legitimately requiring higher levels of education, is equal to their share of the municipal, state, or national population. This view suggests, as the author concedes, that continued progress in pursuing equality of educational opportunity is essential, and I would add that continued use of affirmative employment programs

and a willingness to continue to challenge discriminatory practices in the courts are also necessary.

This work makes a contribution to literature in the field of public personnel administration and to the debate on the adequacy of current merit systems. It should be of interest to those concerned with issues of meritocracy and equal employment opportunity. Minority and female underrepresentation in civil service employment is a problem with probable implications for representation and responsive service delivery, although little reference is made here to the literature on representative bureaucracy. A broader foundation in the relevant literature and a more prescriptive orientation would have enriched this analysis of meritocracy and public employment.

James E. Kellough, *University of Georgia*

The Geopolitics of Super Power. By Colin S. Gray. (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985. Pp. 274. \$26.00.)

Americans have such total disregard for geography that a large majority of the educational institutions have banished this important subject from their curricula. However, those few who care are familiar with the prolific writings of Dr. Colin S. Gray. His numerous exposés of the deadly rivalry between the United States, an insular power, and the Soviet Union, a massive land power as described in his *Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimland, and the Technological Revolution* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1977, p. 67) and his *Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics and the Defense of the West* (New York: National Study Information Center, 1986, p. 81), are well-known. The thesis of these and other works of Gray has been that imperial Russia is a constant threat to the democracies of the world, especially the United States which, in the ultimate analysis, alone bears the burden of stopping the behemoth from realizing its long-cherished goal of global hegemony.

Gray, a long-time advocate of geopolitics and an ardent admirer of Sir Halford Mackinder, develops much of his strategy in his *Geopolitics of the Super Power* with, of course, more detail and scholarly analysis. The central observation of Gray is that 'imperial Russia,' the master of the Heartland, inevitably inheriting the goals of Tsarist rulers, cannot rest until it has gained the mastery of the whole world. And here is the fatal danger for the United States, the leader of the free world whose interests are global. America must stand guard against the perennial threat of the "Soviet imperium."

Gray calls the Heartland "the greatest fortress on earth" (p. 10), but explains that Mackinder did not imply that the Heartland Soviet Union was "destined" to rule the world (p. 11). Gray strongly believes that "the barbarian" could be and must be checked by the superior forces of the United States and its NATO allies.

The author seldom misses the opportunity to vigorously denounce the Soviet expansionists and continuously reminds that the "Soviet commitment to seek military advantage . . . is inalienable" (p. 30). Russia, which "replaces the Mongol Empire" (p. 94), poses a "generic threat" (p. 25) to Western security, an "overwhelming military threat to the U.S. [global] interests" (p. 26). Probably it was too late for Gray to comment on Russia's recent defeat in Afghanistan and its unconditional withdrawal from the neighbor across the border beginning May 15, 1988. Even President Ronald Reagan, "no friend of the evil empire," last May visited Moscow and formalized the INF Treaty, which was almost unanimously endorsed by the United States Senate. Gray could reject such actions as a "quick fix" and naive: they would "not work" (p. 60).

Gray in his work does not anticipate any changes in unchanging Russia; however, there are unmistakable signs of basic changes in Gorbachev's home- and in its *perestroika* (economic restructuring) boosted by *glasnost* even in religion as "Christianity celebrates its millennium in Gorbachev's era of tolerance" (*Newsweek*, 20 June 1988, p. 48).

Gray's two bold assertions that "dictatorship does not admit it has failed" (p. 41) and "Nazi Germany lost the war because of the lack of physical assets" (p. 44) do not stand the test of time. The vastly superior United States miserably lost in Vietnam. Secretary Gorbachev called Afghanistan a "bleeding wound" and admitted to the Hungarian communist leaders: "Almost everything that happened in the Soviet Union between 1928 and 1983 was wrong and must be corrected" (*Reader's Digest*, October 1987, p. 90).

The author disregards the often-repeated charge that the United States is "over-committed" (p. 60), explaining that no cost is too heavy for the containment of the sworn enemy. Gray almost religiously avoids talking about economic consequences of America's constant global preparedness, thereby disregarding eminent observers like Paul Kennedy who, in his well-received *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1985), traces economic changes and military conflicts from 1500 to 2000 and cites, among others, Habsburg monarchs who "steadily over-extended themselves in the course of repeated conflicts and became militarily top-heavy for their weakening economic base" (p. xvii). Kennedy, by examining "Great Power politics over the past five centuries," found there to be "constant interaction between strategy and economics" (p. xvi). Gray would reject such findings because the "ultimate purpose of [American] security policy is not to seek relief from unwanted burdens but to contain Soviet power and influence" (p. 153).

There was probably no need for Gray to devote a separate chapter to "the course of Soviet Empire" inasmuch as he denounced the Russian "imperium" at every opportunity, emphasizing that "the Great Russian imperium cannot help being what it is" (p. 102). The author comes pretty close to calling Russia a warrior nation that inherited the "Mongol Empire," but shies away. "In a

warrior nation," says Joseph Schumpeter, "the Social community is a war community — the will to war and violent expansion rises directly from the people" [Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Imperialism Social Classes* (New York: Meridian Books, 1955, p. 25)] However, in Gray's opinion Russia is not dangerous because of its ideology, it is inherently dangerous. Russia will pursue "territorial and hegemonic possession of goals" (p. 101). Expansion is in the "Russian character and legacy" (p. 101). Therefore, the United States needs to "modernize" its strategic offenses and construct strategic defenses" (p. 141). The cost, again, is no consideration.

To achieve this goal, following the thesis of George F. Kennan, the United States has already adopted the policy of "containment" which has been working satisfactorily, but it is not enough. Gray would like to replace containment with "Dynamic Containment," which would keep America ever ready internally and externally.

The geopolitician rejects the idea of "fortress" America; he counsels against "devolution" because this would force the allies to defend themselves even though they lack the "creative assets" to reorganize "their own defenses" (p. 151).

Gray's last chapter, "Conclusions," does not add anything new except that the author cannot resist repeating his constant theme: "Americans should remember that the Soviet Union is going to be an enemy for a long time to come" (p. 199).

If Gray's geopolitics had made a debut when the "Russians were coming" and when Russia was still an "evil empire," it could perhaps have reached a larger audience. President Reagan now has genuine praise for the Soviet ruler Mikhail Gorbachev; even Margaret Thatcher, the conservative prime minister of the United Kingdom, "can do business with him." Constant repetition makes the book dull reading at places. Also, one misses the much-needed bibliography, but it is fully compensated by an extensive sixty-three pages of notes. Nonetheless, Gray brings some valuable information to American people so ignorant of geopolitics.

G. Bhagat, *University of Mississippi*

Models of Democracy By David Held (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987. Pp. 321. \$35.00 cloth, \$12.95 paper.)

There are nine models of democracy in *Models of Democracy*, beginning with the "classical democracy" of Athens and ending with the author's own model "democratic autonomy." In between, David Held elaborates the categories the late C. B. Macpherson employed in *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* to provide a critical and nearly comprehensive introduction to democratic thought.

Like Macpherson, Held proceeds historically. He begins farther back than Macpherson, however, and he covers far more ground. After the initial chapter on Athens, Held quickly surveys the developments in Western political thought that link classical democracy to the "classic statements of the protective theory of democracy" (p. 61) in the works of James Madison, Jeremy Bentham, and James Mill. Except for one extraordinary claim—that Augustine insisted "that the history of the Church was the march of God in the world" (p. 37, no citation provided)—this survey is clear and well informed.

But the author's real work begins with his discussion of the "protective model" and its successors and rivals. These include two nineteenth century models "developmental democracy" in two variants, and "direct democracy and the end of politics," which grows out of Marx's writings. Then there are four models from our century: "competitive elitism," "pluralism" (classical and neo-), "legal democracy" (democracy according to the New Right) and "participatory democracy" (democracy according to the New Left). In every case, Held's analysis of the model in question is sympathetic but critical, although his sympathy for the "legal democracy" of Hayek, Nozick, and the Thatcherites is clearly strained. In every case, too, Held blends explication with assessment in a crisp, straightforward manner.

Held's discussion of his nine models is noteworthy both for what it does and does not include. He examines a number of writers seldom discussed in books on democratic theory, notably Max Weber, whom Held links with Joseph Schumpeter as an exponent of "competitive elitism." Neo-Marxists also receive a good bit of attention, especially Ralph Miliband, Nicos Poulantzas, and Claus Offe. And Held takes pains to point out that many of those who thought they were advocating democracy—Marxists as well as liberals—failed to incorporate all races and both genders into their models of democracy. As a partial corrective, Held gives special attention to feminism. He devotes six pages to Mary Wollstonecraft's *Vindication of the Rights of Woman* for instance, and more pages to Mill's *Subjection of Women* than to his *On Liberty*.

All this helps to make *Models of Democracy* a rich and distinctive book. Yet all the more reason to wonder at the author's complete neglect of some writers and themes. There is no mention of John Rawls, for instance, or of Kenneth Arrow, Anthony Downs, Mancur Olson, or any of the writers who have brought rational choice theory to bear on problems of democracy. The result is that some of the most significant contributions to recent democratic theory are left out of an introduction to democratic theory.

With these remarkable exceptions, however, *Models of Democracy* is a lucid and even-handed guide to the development of democratic thought. In his last chapter, furthermore, the author has some interesting things to say about "directions in which this development ought, in his view, to continue." Here he takes a stand between the neo-pluralists, especially the Dahl and Dahlblom of recent years, and the neo-Marxists, especially Poulantzas and

Offe, to argue for a model of democracy based on "the principle of autonomy." According to this principle, "*individuals should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own lives, that is, they should enjoy equal rights (and, accordingly, equal obligations) in the specification of the framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of others*" (p. 271, italics in original).

With its emphasis on rights and obligations, this principle seems to follow straight from the liberal tradition. But Held maintains that it requires us "to appreciate the complementarity of liberalism's skepticism about political power and Marxism's skepticism about economic power. To focus exclusively on the former or the latter is to negate the possibility of realizing the principle of autonomy" (p. 274). What we need, then, is to marry the liberal understanding of the state to the Marxist understanding of civil society, for the union of the two will enable us to pursue "a process of 'double democratization' the interdependent transformation of both state and civil society" (p. 283). How is this to be done? How is such a doubly democratized state/society to operate? Held offers only some vague, faintly utopian suggestions, with a promise to deal with these matters fully in a forthcoming work, *The Foundations of Democracy*. Still, he says enough to lead one to look forward to the publication of the promised work.

All in all, *Models of Democracy* is a measured and helpful guide to the development of democratic theory. It is not a work for beginners, though—unless those beginners are willing and able to deal with such rarefied matters as the Miliband-Poulantzas debate. It will be most useful, I suspect, for graduate courses in democratic theory, and least useful for those whom the author hopes to count among his audience: "those who are thinking through questions about democracy for the first time" (p. vi).

Richard Dagger, Arizona State University

The Cunning of Reason. By Martin Hollis. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Pp. vii, 222. \$39.50 cloth, \$12.95 paper.)

Martin Hollis's *The Cunning of Reason* is a joy to read, a pleasure to recommend, but a horror to review. This is a book with a plot (albeit a theoretical one), and it is difficult to say what it is truly about without giving too much away. Added to that is the fact that the book derives much of its persuasive power from the way that answers presented in one chapter serve as unexpected but plausible responses to questions posed in the preceding one. It is therefore difficult to do justice to Hollis's achievement without retreating in its entirety. Given that the book is an extended argument that begins

place and ends up in another altogether unexpected one, it is hard even to begin to describe what the book is about in any concise fashion.

Hollis himself begins with a chapter that states what the book is *not* about, it being either commentary or development of the "cunning of reason" extended by Hegel, whereby world historical individuals, unbeknownst to themselves, work the will of the *Zeitgeist* and turn the engines of history. Indeed, this is not what the book is about, but Hollis does engage in a bit of cunning of his own. Nominally, the book promises to follow (with enthusiasm) the case that can be made for a modern political economy resting on the foundations of self-interested rational choice. Game theory allows the microeconomist to extend this model to situations of interactive decision making among multiple individuals. The program is to understand the instrumentally rational agent as an ideal type that explains those aggregate and cumulative social phenomena with which it is consistent. The hope of the modern political economist is that the extent of such social phenomena will be considerable.

For Hollis, the phrase "cunning of reason" refers to twists in the plot that occur during the execution of this program. These surprises are largely serendipitous for the modern political economist in that axioms of choice succeed, often unexpectedly, in accounting for crucial notions of institutional, political, and norm-governed conduct not lately thought amenable to microeconomic analysis. The "cunning of Hollis" enters, however, in that the theoretic applications lay bare the inadequacy of instrumental rationalism in accounting for some paradigm instances of microeconomic behavior. The theory can be repaired, but doing so requires an extension of psychology and sociology into the traditional turf of economics. The upshot is an "economization" of traditional problems in sociology and political science, but a simultaneous "sociologization" of economics itself.

Now, admittedly, rational choice (understood to include close relatives such as public choice) has been with us for some time now. Many of the key books and papers cited by Hollis date to the 1950s and 1960s. How can there be any real news here? How can we be surprised by microeconomics' attempted colonization of the other social sciences? Is it not, by now, more fashionable to criticize rational choice as a dull-witted and technocratic methodology more suited to the manipulation of bureaucracy (or, even less charitably, to an endless fabrication of publishable, but inconsequential academic tomes) than to advancing our understanding of substantive issues in political economy and social theory? Perhaps, but there is real news in *The Cunning of Reason*, even if it is of a synthetic sort. What Hollis has done is audaciously to restore the rational choice theorist's political economy and its goal of unifying social science, to respectability. He does it by demonstrating that the force of many criticisms of rational choice theory is to suggest modifications in the model of self-interested maximizers, rather than abandonment of the project. Even if we don't have self-interested maximizers at the heart of

the theory after these modifications are made, the political economy that results is nonetheless recognizable as akin to rational choice (at least), and should generate renewed enthusiasm for the fruitfulness of cross-disciplinary inquiry.

Hollis himself, of course, is a philosopher, so this unification of the social sciences is taking place through a philosophical examination of the explanatory adequacy of rational choice as it is put through the paces of the ambitious program Hollis has laid out for it. For the most part, *The Cunning of Reason* sets a new standard among contemporary writers for making philosophy both intelligible and relevant to an educated audience of nonphilosophers. It is really only on one point that a narrowly philosophical point carries much weight in the argument—but that point is, perhaps unfortunately, cited by Hollis himself as crucial to the main theme of the argument. Without wanting to make this problem appear to discredit the book's larger project, or to frighten prospective readers who rightly have little patience for the ponderous semantic disputes for which we philosophers are famous, I would like to devote my remaining paragraphs to Hollis's treatment of it.

In considering a standard prisoner's dilemma, Hollis concludes that mere sharing of information would not move the self-interested rational agents of rational choice theory away from the famed sub-optimal solutions. If these agents are moved only by desires present before the mind at the time of choice, there is no way that they could ever move beyond the temptation to free ride and exploit any cooperative gestures that the other player might make. *If they could* get beyond the initial dilemma, they would learn that trust and cooperation return long-term benefits entirely consistent with self-interest—but Hollis's contention here is that they can never learn to form a desire for long-term benefits requiring short-term sacrifices. Their starting set of desires, so to speak, are all for self-interested gratification.

The prisoner's dilemma requires one to play a strategy that assures less than maximal personal gain—and risks personal disaster (or, at least, the worst outcome). Nonetheless, we learn—in real life—to play such strategies, and we also come to believe that social cooperation returns benefits that adequately compensate us for the less than optimal outcomes we experience from choosing that strategy. In order to learn this, Hollis claims, rational agents must be capable of being moved (once, at least) by reasons, rather than by desires only.

At this point in *The Cunning of Reason*, Hollis launches a rather technical discussion of external and internal reasons, the distinction being that internal reasons succeed in moving an agent to act because they are (in some way) subjectively attached to a desire, while external reasons are objective—at least in the sense that we would count them as good reasons for acting, independently of their being present in the mind of the potential agent. The "internalist" represented in *The Cunning of Reason* by Hume and Bernard Williams might want to suggest that external reasons simply get internalized (or, at

ached to a desire), and that this is how they are capable of motivating action. The "externalist" (represented by Kant and by Hollis himself) notes that the agent must first be motivated to internalize the reason—or make it his own. What could motivate this internalization, they say, other than the external reason itself. As such, Hollis concludes, the self-interested rational agent must be psychologically capable of being moved by reasons, not simply desires. If so, this expands the universe of possible motivations for action enormously since external reasons may not refer to the agent's self-interest—for example, it opens the possibility for altruism—as well as enlightened self-interest.

The important point here is that the psychology of the self-interested maximizer must be more complex than is commonly supposed. If not, groups of these agents would never even be able to arrive at the conventions needed for a market economy to function. The expanded psychology might be Kantian (in the way suggested earlier) but it might still be Humean (if the self-interested maximizer has an intrinsic desire (intermittent, perhaps) to be moved by impersonally rational considerations). Even this is a significant point to score against the narrow, slug-brained version of rationality—but Hollis wants much more. He wants victory for Kant's rationalism against Humean psychology. It is not clear that *The Cunning of Reason* demands such a strong position—particularly given that the Kant/Hume controversy requires a foray into technical philosophy quite at odds with the general tone of the rest of the book.

I am noting a point on which Hollis may have lost a battle—but he is clearly winning the war even here. *The Cunning of Reason* should be widely read by social scientists and philosophers alike. Given that the main theme involves cross-cutting questions about what the social sciences should be doing and what they can hope to achieve, the book ought to be of interest to a very general audience—indeed. The vast majority of readers will learn from it; those who feel that they don't will, I'm sure, be moved to publish a reply.

Paul B. Thompson, Texas A&M University

Bargaining for National Security: The Post-War Disarmament Negotiations

By Lloyd Jensen (Columbia University of South Carolina Press, 1988)

Pp. 311. \$24.95 (cloth.)

One of a series of studies in international relations edited by Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Donald J. Puchala, this book by a professor of political science at Temple University provides a good overview of the arms control negotiations structure and process.

Jensen relies upon a careful study of arms control negotiations documents with some attempt to quantify negotiating behavior in simple fashion. The book offers useful if sometimes crude tables which summarize key elements of negotiations, but a far richer lode of quantification remains untapped.

The power of this book is in its balanced, common sense view of arms control negotiations—no rhetoric, no ideology, no silliness. The book is nicely written and quite intelligible to the layman. Jensen finds that, "While nuclear weapons threaten the survival of the earth, they may have also provided a certain level of international stability by virtue of their deterrent value" (p. 3). The summary of the complex relationship between arms control and deterrence is a useful introduction to the topic and one which grounds the reader in the basic theory of international political behavior.

The most important methodological component of the book, however, is the study of concessionary behavior during negotiations found in chapter 3 and the appendix. Jensen then follows with an analysis of four major arms control negotiations: the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the SALT I negotiations, and the Reagan era negotiations.

Jensen concludes that the search for national security through arms control has generally been disappointing. Arms control negotiations lead to rising expectations but diminished results (p. 245). The failure of three decades of serious Soviet-American arms control negotiations is witness to this disappointment. Jensen suggests numerous reasons for failure in specific negotiations and summarizes in his concluding chapter five major obstacles to any arms control negotiations (pp. 249–51). He concludes that "The best time to stop an arms race involving any weapon system is before work begins on the weapon—at a time before vested interests become committed and before deployment complicates inspection" (p. 181).

The book concludes with twelve general principles of arms control negotiations gleaned from Jensen's analysis (pp. 246–49). These are conventional but sound principles and reflect our limited understanding of these complicated proceedings.

This is a usable and useful text for students of international politics.

Abbott A. Brayton, *Davis & Elkins College*

Ritual, Politics, and Power By David I. Kertzer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. Pp. xi, 235. \$22.50)

David Kertzer begins with the observation that while political rites are ubiquitous, scholars have attributed little significance to them. Evidence for the importance of ritual in contemporary political life is widespread if we would only attend to it, Kertzer points out. His rich examples drawn from a wide range of settings extend the insights of American political scientists such as Edelman, Bennett, and Elder and Cobb in a comparative direction. He addresses important issues concerning how ritual works in building organization, in creating political legitimacy and solidarity, in understanding the political universe. Also covered is the central role of ritual in political conflict and ways in which ritual is central in movements for change.

A commonly held view is that political ritual is a feature of political life in less developed societies, or among unsophisticated groups in the population. This, Kertzer tells us, is naive. Symbolic needs and symbolic interests are real, just as real as material interests. The notion that emotional attachments are the special property only of some political actors is wrong, he argues. Ritual not only meets important needs on occasion, but shapes them as well, affecting how we see the political world, the kinds of demands we make of it, and what pleases and displeases us about it. "Political rites are important in all societies, because political power relations are everywhere expressed and modified through symbolic means of communication," he asserts (p. 178).

While ritual processes are central to the maintenance of a stable political order, the existence of such processes does not guarantee stability. He distinguishes between the claims that ritual action matters in political life, and the less subtle one that only ritual action matters. Consequently, we are pushed to consider when and how ritual action, as opposed to other forces, affects political outcomes, not just to realize that it sometimes does. Unfortunately, Kertzer did not develop this theme very fully.

A major theme of Kertzer's is that ritual plays a central part in political change movements and is not just a force for political conservatism. He illustrates this well and shows ways in which successful change movements all utilize ritual to mobilize followers and to delegitimize existing authorities. Underlying his argument is an elaboration of ways in which rituals, by defining the self in society, create new realities, perceptions, and loyalties, rather than simply reflecting existing understandings and arrangements. His discussion of schema theory points to important underlying cognitive mechanisms at work in linking individuals to collectivities through ritual action. He might have also considered psychoanalytic mechanisms that come into play in the same manner.

Kertzer argues that Durkheim's perspective on rituals is more consistent with an emphasis on change than some have argued because of the primary role he assigns to solidarity achieved through common action not requiring the sharing of beliefs. Consequently, social solidarity does not necessarily give rise to social consensus for the former rests on common actions, common images of the social universe, and common emotional attachments, while the latter rests more specific beliefs.

The centrality of ritual in political life can be seen in cases where it must be created to fill a void. Drawing on Lane's fascinating data from the Soviet Union, as well as other material, Kertzer shows the length to which regimes or movements sometimes go to create rituals around life course events when existing ones are politically unacceptable or unavailable.

At the same time that I heartily recommend this book to those wanting to understand better the central role of symbol and ritual in political life, there are some central issues which Kertzer might have addressed more effectively.

I would like to have seen an even sharper contrast between the rational action (or material interest) model and the symbolic one than Kertzer develops. A central part of the case for any theoretical perspective rests on the argument that it can account for certain results more successfully than another. The structure of Kertzer's argument renders his case too timid.

One reason is the evidence he offers. While he richly illustrates his theoretical points with aptly drawn examples, all are selected *because* they fit the argument. Where are the hard cases, the exceptions which present problems to his perspective? Surely some exist and a consideration of them would add to our understanding. In making his argument about specific political processes such as the creation of political organizations, the course of conflicts or legitimation it would be helpful to understand better, and more clearly how consideration of political ritual is different than, incompatible with, or complementary with other theories of action.

Kertzer tells us much more that we ought to study political ritual than about how to go about doing it. For example, many political scientists will wish Kertzer had more to say about how we are to assess the power of political rituals, a topic he touches on only briefly in the last chapter. His comment that survey and other quantitative data cannot be used to satisfactorily study symbols is too narrow. He gives too few clues on how to attack the important problem of evidence which faces both political scientists and anthropologists studying the role of ritual and symbol in political life in rigorous ways.

Kertzer's book is important for both its insights and its comprehensiveness, raising central theoretical issues—such as the social and psychological origins of ritual action, the ways in which ritual action in human and animal societies are similar and different, and the ways in which rituals can provide a safety valve which reinforces existing authority vs. how ritual can be used by those seeking to overturn that authority. Despite the questions I raise, it is an easy book to recommend for those interested in this rich area.

Marc Howard Ross *Bryn Mawr College*

The Concept of Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution. By John Phillip Reid. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988. Pp. 224. \$25.95)

For more than twenty years, John Phillip Reid has been producing enough books to line an entire library bookshelf. His work is marked not only by weight, but by careful scholarship of the highest degree and a refreshing style so uncharacteristic of many members of the bar. The study at hand is no exception to this distinguished record. It continues his work in constitutional history and theory begun about ten years ago, in particular his more recent *Constitutional History of the American Revolution* trilogy, of which two volumes have so far appeared. Here, in many ways, Reid advances new insights

into the relationship between legal and political theory by focusing, as no other scholar has yet done, on the linkage between the common law and the meaning of liberty in the American revolutionary period

The Concept of Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution concerns a concept, a word really, in a transatlantic context. By the most economical means (his text comprises a mere 122 pages) and in fourteen concise, tightly argued chapters, Reid argues that Americans as well as some sympathetic British understood liberty primarily in terms of their desire to secure freedom against arbitrary governmental power. Liberty possessed neither the meaning it has for us today nor the connotation it would have in the nineteenth century. Reid makes clear that liberty was neither the right to legislative participation nor the right to a zone of privacy.

Rather liberty possessed several negative connotations. Americans and their British sympathizers saw liberty as the opposite of licentiousness, arbitrary rule, slavery. Absent the security that protects us against arbitrary will, power inevitably meant enslavement, not chattel slavery, but the slavery of free men once protected by the British Constitution. Liberty in its eighteenth-century context is better understood, Reid claims, "more accurately as finding law than as promoting political programs" (p. 116). If the Americans could build in a mechanism that would make liberty secure, then they could then have a happy life.

In arguing liberty's negative definitions, Reid performs scholarly surgery which in a different context matches that of J. G. A. Pocock more than a decade ago: he has, perhaps unwittingly, excised John Locke from the center to the periphery (to use Pocock's phrase). This time, however, Locke is not to be replaced by a single individual (for Pocock, it was Machiavelli) but with the common law itself. Reid by no means makes this removal explicit but it is a conclusion that one may logically draw when he suggests that the doctrine of consent was less important than constitutional securities. "The primary aspect of the American whig quarrel with the mother country was constitutional. That fact does not mean that the liberty grievance was secondary, articulated more as a matter of emotional rhetoric, lending color to legal substance, than as a part of the legal substance itself. What must not be forgotten is that liberty and constitutionalism were one in the eighteenth century. Liberty was constitutionalism, and the constitution was liberty" (p. 88).

And yet, while the concept of liberty receives a penetrating analysis, problems of definition remain. Reid insists, for example, on referring to American "constitutional theorists" and to the "American whigs," as if they are some clearly identifiable group or as if we should automatically know who they are. Are they those several writers whom he quotes, and if they are what makes them recognizably whiggish or theoretical? What, in fact, defines a whig, what a constitutional theorist? I would suspect that they are whiggish, but it is not made clear enough. Reid is careful when he deals with his principal term (liberty) but less so when it comes to these equally important concepts.

Moreover, although he does cite some writers with the stature of an Edmund Burke, he derives most of his citations from minor, though admittedly interesting, figures. Very few quotations from major actors on the revolutionary stage grace this work. Most surprisingly, there are none from Thomas Jefferson or Thomas Paine at all. Nor is there even a single mention or a citation of them. On the one hand, this does give the book an authenticity. It reveals ideas of those in society who were not necessarily on center stage. Yet, on the other hand, it seems that it excludes an important part of how the leading historical figures of the revolutionary era conceived of liberty. Could it be that they never thought in the legalistic terms that Reid is claiming? That alone is significant and needs some explanation and analysis. Something may be gained in terms of society's conventional understanding of liberty, but the overall credibility of Reid's argument is weakened.

These final observations are not designed in any way to undermine either the scholarly or the historic significance of this study. Despite its size, it is a major addition to the work of a first-order historian of the law. Indeed, it is a major contribution to our understanding of the role of the common law in this period, something which for too long has been left on the outskirts of scholarly inquiry. As a result, political theorists, historians, and anyone else interested in the American revolutionary period will have to add this slim volume to an ever-growing long list of must-read books on the revolutionary constitutional era of American history.

Jack Fruchtman, Jr. *Fouson State University*

White House Ethics: The History of the Politics of Conflict of Interest Regulation. By Robert N. Roberts. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988. Pp. 215. \$37.95.)

This book makes an important contribution to our understanding of both conflict of interest legislation and ethics enforcement in government. Although it purports to be a historical overview, the book is not a complete history. Roberts sweeps through the first 150 years of the United States in twenty-five pages. He concentrates, and I think rightly for his purposes, on conflict of interest issues from the Truman to the Reagan administrations. In so doing, Roberts provides the reader with a detailed history of the machinations of power and the ever increasing public scrutiny of federal officials since the end of World War II.

Roberts is at his best in describing the major ethics efforts in the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nixon administrations. He has masterfully integrated major scandals in the post-World II era and the legislation and regulations that grew out of them. He also admirably portrays the strong presence of John Macy across the landscape of the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson

Administrations. Macy's guiding hand in the area of ethics reminds the reader how much we owe to this too little-known giant of American politics.

With all of the crafted description in the body of the book, I found it disconcerting to disagree so strongly with many of the conclusions in Roberts's last chapter. The picture Roberts paints of the Federal government's attempts to control conflict of interest is gloomy, but the situation is not as bleak as his portrait might suggest. The author's conclusions are far too sweeping for his research to support. Roberts is clear about his beliefs in the preface of the book when he writes that "efforts to deal with the conflict of interest problem have failed because of a general lack of understanding of how the system developed and as a result of continuing disagreement over what constitutes a prohibited conflict of interest under current rules and regulations" (p. 1).

I would like to suggest that the question of "how" the system developed is far less important than "why." And the answer to the "why" is multifaceted, with political, administrative, legal, and moral dimensions. Roberts is superficially correct in concluding that legislation and executive rules in the area of conflict of interest are heaped one upon the other, often with no rhyme or reason. However, if the focus is on the purpose of the legislation, it is clear that both presidents and legislators believe that dishonesty in government (at least in the bureaucracy) is repugnant. As new forms of corruption are invented, it is not surprising to find legal attempts not only to define these but also to anticipate new iterations. This unfortunately gives rise to regulations and laws which joust at the chimeras of bureaucracy, attempting to eliminate ghost-like ethical issues such as "appearance of conflict of interest." Legislators and administrators tend to overregulate, rather than to try and develop ethical norms. The result is that there are a multitude of agencies with what can arguably be called overlapping responsibilities, e.g., Office of Government Ethics, Inspector General (statutory and otherwise), agency ethics officers, etc. And, because Congress does not trust any entity that it creates, here are the inevitable special and oversight committees.

Roberts' cure for ethical overregulation is the all too mundane solution of centralization. He resurrects Abiam Chaves' thirty-year-old idea of a National Commission of Public Integrity—a proverbial gathering of sage high priests of purity. Roberts should have been a bit more critical of his own conclusions, based on a quite good, but partial history. Perhaps writing this book in light of May and Neustadt's *Thinking in Time* would have caused him to rethink his solution.

Roberts is also concerned that ethics enforcement is being impeded by the multiplicity of agencies responsible for ethics. In fact, there is something elegantly Madisonian about having overlapping responsibilities in the area of ethics. The key to enforcement is admitting the limits of law in imposing ethical behavior, and coordinating the boundaries of ethical standards among the various agencies and committees involved. Codes of ethics are obeyed not because of sanctions, but because of a commitment to shared values.

Apart from the enforcement problem, Roberts identifies an underlying political quandary. The "morality-in-government issue, so often used by the Democrats, is to the Republicans a red herring to divert attention from the real issue—efficiency in government" (p. 198). Thus, morality often appears to be a partisan issue, with Republicans more often getting the brunt of ethics legislation because they actively recruit more individuals from the private sector. Again, Roberts's solution is a National Commission on Public Integrity. Why this would not become a highly charged partisan lightning rod is beyond me. Far from a solution, such a national commission could become a partisan "star chamber."

Roberts is also guilty of failing to distinguish between types of federal employees. An entire generation of students has been educated without any idea that there is a broad difference between career servants, schedule C's, schedule B's, etc. Roberts's study is really only about political appointees, yet conflict of interest legislation has an impact on all civil servants. It would be gratifying to be able to contrast the differences between political appointees and career servants. Empirical data suggest that the latter vary far more widely in their ethical concerns than the former. And if these approximately three million "careerists" were to be contrasted with their ten thousand political counterparts, Roberts might have tempered his conclusions about the impact of ethics legislation on agencies.

Finally, there are several typographical errors which should have been caught: e.g., talking about the Eisenhower administration, "Out of the White House since 1952, the Republicans" (p. 58). "Lester Hill" instead of "Lisle Hill" (p. 64). Sprinkled throughout the book, these take away from Roberts's vivid style.

This is the only current overview of the development of ethics law and regulation. It is well written and critically insightful. Roberts's book will be a major reference tool for students and scholars alike. Although I have qualms with his conclusions, I do not want in any way to suggest that this is anything less than an excellent work which will be a benchmark in public administration for years to come.

In the age of "teflon presidents" and "the sleaze factor," it is pleasant to find someone trying to understand the origins and directions of conflict of interest legislation. Roberts calls on us to take these issues seriously and to understand them in a broad historical and policy context. I do disagree with some of his conclusions, but my objections should be seen as part of an ongoing discourse about the issue and in no way a condemnation. I believe that ethics in public administration is not a "passing fancy." If indeed it is not, anyone interested in policy, normative ethics, and administration will find this book an invaluable resource.

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Sanctity vs. Sovereignty: The United States and the Nationalization of Natural Resource Investments. By Kenneth A. Rodman. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. Pp. xvi + 403. \$45.00.)

Kenneth Rodman travels a familiar road, reassessing the evolution of U.S. policy to protect the property rights of foreign natural resource investments by U.S. firms. The approach is rooted in regime analysis. The narrative spans four decades, starting with the Bolivian nationalization of Standard Oil in 1937 and extending through Jamaica's efforts to tamper with bauxite concessions in the mid-1970s. Overall, this volume provides a thoughtful, incremental extension of current theoretical approaches. The case studies are informative and well-organized expositions presented from a single, consistent perspective. *Sanctity vs. Sovereignty* is what it is: an excellent example of a detailed and quite sophisticated dissertation that has been transformed into an interesting, readable—but not particularly daring book.

To throw new light on his cases, the author first uses regime analysis, which the dust jacket proclaims, 'has become the dominant paradigm in the North American study of international political economy' and assesses the assumption that changing property rights can be attributed primarily to the decline of American economic preeminence. He examines how the 'regime' that governed the resolution of natural resource disputes evolved and explains why it began to crack in the late 1960s. The first 100 pages develop this regime framework in the context of the obsolescing bargain in raw materials, the decentralizing of private economic resources, and the weakening of U.S. economic dominance that colored the outcomes of successive natural resource disputes.

The bulk of the book consists of about twenty well-organized case studies that assess the efforts of developing countries to alter their existing contracts with foreign multinational firms, mostly large oil companies, and the response of the U.S. government to these actions. The cases range from short vignettes to a full chapter on the dispute between Peru and IPC. The major cases involve episodes in Bolivia, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Cuba, and Jamaica in Latin America; Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Algeria, and Libya in the Middle East; and Ceylon (the only case in which the Hickenlooper Amendment was actually applied). The chapters alternate between Latin America and the Middle East as the decades unfold.

The methodology is designed to shed light on debates between radical and statist models about the centrality of corporate interests in U.S. foreign policy in the 'Third World' (p. 4). Professor Rodman explicitly builds on the often conflicting interpretations suggested by Stephen Krasner's *Defending the National Interest* and Charles Lipson's *Standing Guard*.

Professor Rodman traces the evolution of U.S. policy toward natural resource nationalization efforts 'from principle to pragmatism'. He identifies

slow, unified retreat in U.S. policy through three periods: the era of American hegemony, the era of regime stress, and the post-1974 era of regime transformation. Professor Rodman concludes that pragmatism "won out because systemic changes, which made themselves indelibly manifest in the OPEC revolution, demonstrated the costs and inefficacy of economic reversal" (p. 337). He finds that Krasner's contention that increased corporate pragmatism was a result of the U.S. government's unwillingness to intervene on behalf of its firms worked best for the Middle Eastern oil cases. By contrast, Lipson's suggestion that more pragmatic state policies came about because corporate ownership strategies became more accommodating toward economic nationalism was more often the case in the Latin American cases.

It is often unfair to criticize authors for failing to do what they did not attempt, but in focusing so heavily on regime analysis and a plethora of natural resource nationalizations, Professor Rodman ignores some key questions that might have been within his grasp. The author sets up a triangular relationship between the U.S. government, U.S. natural resource firms, and host country governments. But attention to U.S. foreign policy decisions overwhelms analysis of changing or differing host country behavior. What did host countries learn? Before the triumph of OPEC what did developing countries teach each other? Did Latin American and Middle Eastern host countries differ in systematic ways? Did oil firms behave differently than other kinds of natural resource firms? If so, why?

The characterization of the multinational firms is even more blatantly one-sided. Were these firms motivated by anything else but greed to maximize profits at the expense of their hosts? If not, did they deserve support? A more complex view of boardroom politics and of the evolving splits within industry begins to come out in the Peru/IPC dispute, would have enriched the analysis. Professor Rodman makes it appear that firms accommodated national earnings only when they were nationalized and could not evoke U.S. retaliation. Is this accurate? Did Japanese or European firms do any better? Did the major oil companies act in solidarity with each other and with the smaller dependent firms? How did the approach of oil companies and other natural resource firms differ? And, although it is beyond the scope of the present study, a few paragraphs comparing and contrasting the experiences of manufacturing firms in the developing countries would have been welcome. There is a significant literature on these issues which is not visited sufficiently in this analysis.

A final big question is never addressed. Granting that multinational firms were not left without influence by an inevitably obsolescing bargain, why did developing countries resort with less and less frequency to nationalization and expropriation in the 1970s and the 1980s? If the United States became pragmatic and less dominant, why did the instances of nationalizations decline? Why did the developing country push for a New International Economic Or-

der fail? Were there no more firms to nationalize? Did host countries and big business suddenly learn to coexist and even cooperate? Did the decline in new investment, particularly after the increase of debt problems in 1982, diminish the confrontation with foreign investors? Professor Rodman has provided sensible answers to the questions he poses, but he leaves the reader hanging. This volume would have been stronger had he added a final chapter that suggested how the evolution in property rights in the natural resource played itself out during the Carter and Reagan administrations.

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The Causal Theory of Justice. By Karol Edward Soltan. (Berkeley: University of California, 1987. Pp. vii + 265. \$30.00.)

The aim of this original and provocative book is to establish a research program within which the quality of normative arguments can be evaluated empirically (p. xi). More specifically, Soltan seeks to test the persuasive force of arguments that cause people to settle on certain precepts of justice in the distribution of wages. Not any type of argument, but that which is peculiarly normative, possessing the internal properties of consistency and impartiality, and rendered by autonomous persons. Normative arguments are what remain after factors external to moral reasoning—egoism, nonrational influences, threat of sanction stemming from unequal power—have been removed or controlled. If this has a Rawlsian ring to it, that's not surprising since Soltan employs a liberal, nonutilitarian, contractarian framework to test his theory. But Soltan substitutes for the hypothetical choice situation of traditional contract theory strictly designated empirical circumstances that satisfy the relevant internal requirements. His method is thus more empirical than Rawls's and yet more general and systematic than, say, Hochschild's *What Fair?* Soltan's purpose is to work up, or do the groundwork for, a general causal theory of justice.

The focus of attention is on the development of wage systems based on tol evaluation schemes. What kinds of wage inequality do people consent to under conditions conducive to the moral point of view? Which is to ask, in Soltan's terms, which freely considered judgments cause people to accept through a process of appraising objections, certain patterns of wage inequality? The people here consist of managers and workers in large enterprises operating in a market system, and in which (1) a balance of power (workers are unionized) and a willingness to cooperate circumscribe negotiations over (a) evaluation criteria, (2) those with the authority to change the criteria have a incentive to satisfy objections, (3) the negotiating parties are "friendly strangers" moved by considerations of (liberal) justice rather than solidarity.

or love, and (4) the deliberations are public and information is widely available. Especially important is the muting of distorting (external) factors, in particular that of egoism. We want a setting that frustrates the calculation of the balance of costs and benefits attached to different distributive criteria. Soltan characterizes the negotiators as players in a coordination game in which "winning" depends upon each party guessing correctly what the others would agree to. This makes the negotiation more like a cooperative deliberation than a compromise among antagonists. "In such a setting it is as if the potential objectors [to proposed criteria] were behind a veil of ignorance concerning the costs and benefits to them of their objections" (p. 78).

The fewer the objections or grievances that fail to pass scrutiny under these circumstances, the greater the testimony to the normative worth of the *discovered* criteria of job evaluation. It is significant that Soltan says "discovered" and not merely chosen as this fits with an ethics of perfectionism to which Soltan apparently subscribes. The causal theory of justice not only uncovers the persuasive arguments actually used to justify distributive patterns, in so doing, it discovers underlying principles of distributive justice that accord with "natural morality" (p. 198) and that "exist independently of any human agreement or invention" (p. 59). Soltan is not a Kantian constructivist nor is his method purely procedural. When people consent to normative principles under the requisite conditions, they have discovered them. Soltan is short on elaborating his metaethics, but his remarks imply agreement with, e.g., Harsanyi's critical treatment (in *Equality, Liberty, and Perfectionism*) of Rawls's and Mill's choice criterion of value. At any rate, Soltan alleges (without much support, I'm afraid) that the tests of the causal theory of justice are simultaneously empirical and normative.

Soltan's survey of job evaluation schemes used in large enterprises reveals that there is an important normative element in wage inequality. As he rightly argues, this confronts neoclassical economic theory in two ways: (1) market forces, supply and demand schedules, marginal productivity, and all that, fail empirically to explain the structure of wage inequality, as shown in the work of Thurow and Wootton; (2) to the extent that market forces do explicate wage inequality, it is irrelevant from the standpoint of the causal theory whose subject matter is ethical or "internal" considerations. What Soltan tries to show is that job evaluation systems, though constrained by market influences, reward jobs according to two non-market criteria of economic desert: the compensatory and the expressive. The compensatory aspect covers familiar factors like unpleasantness, danger, and mental tension; the expressive aspect—played up by Soltan—incorporates the factors of "importance" and "difficulty," defined operationally and combining to form "seriousness." Here we have one of the more interesting methodological discussions in the book, with Soltan elaborating on measurement problems involved in making good on the ideas "the greater the frequency of error, the greater the difficulty of the task."

and "the greater the cost of errors, the greater the importance of the task" (p. 175).

Soltan's analysis of the moral reasoning behind job evaluation indicates that the seriousness (or "value") of a job determines—in part, the pay it merits. The point being that the "seriousness" part of job evaluation criteria obtains minus the distortive pressure of "external" (including market) considerations and remains after the weighing of compensating factors. "The expressive aspect of economic desert seems to play a far greater role. Jobs that are more important and difficult are held to deserve greater pay as a public and objective expression of a conception of the good" (p. 157). The idea is "that people who do well (in anything) deserve better than people who do poorly" (p. 190) irrespective of market, utilitarian, and compensatory criteria. And as Soltan notes, following Rawls's Aristotelian theory of the good, the most serious jobs are those that are intrinsically rewarding. Isn't the intrinsic reward enough? No, says Soltan, the most serious jobs are more intrinsically rewarding *and* are held (by Soltan, too) to deserve greater pay as a statement of the public hierarchy of value. In this way, perfectionist criteria emerge as consistent with the impersonal operation of markets so "market societies (capitalist or otherwise) have greater moral resources than [their] critics would acknowledge" (p. 199).

This is all very interesting, if not intriguing, and it is set out systematically and with admirable methodological rigor. I finish on a critical note. First, I wonder if the settings Soltan picks adequately approximate conditions conducive to the moral point of view. Historically, job evaluation schemes were introduced by management in response to workers' complaints about arbitrary pay schedules. I'm wary about Soltan's characterization of deliberations over job evaluation, which portrays them as a cooperative endeavor between workers and bosses, involving coordination games and the impassionate Dworkin-like discovery of general principles implicit in policy and precedent. Soltan needs more evidence to refute the view that wage in capitalist enterprise systems result from compromise between antagonists wielding unequal or illegitimate power. Why, for example, do workers in large *self-managed* enterprises agree to wage systems according *equal* pay (hourly rates) to *all* workers, differential seriousness of labor notwithstanding? And why do these workers justify higher pay for managers and unusually skilled employees hired from the outside in terms of the vagaries of market forces (see Edward Greenberg, *Workplace Democracy*)? I suspect that when workers do advocate the marriage of high pay with intrinsically rewarding jobs that they have not done so autonomously, not just because of the exercise of power during negotiations but also because of the ideological hegemony of those classes that benefit most by accentuating the differential worth or "value" of positions typically occupied by their members. Would workers' current views on distribution prevail in the counterfactual situation absent the cultural dominance

tion of those at the pinnacle of the meritocracy? Second, despite a valiant attempt, it is not clear that Soltan has succeeded in separating out the factors of contribution and disutility from the "value" of a job. Finally, if Soltan is right about the connection between pay and the "value" of jobs, his conclusion about the compatibility of markets and the public recognition of value strikes an ambiguous note. Markets, as Soltan grants, impose significant constraints on wage systems. Since these constraints are morally arbitrary, should the state move to redistribute income in light of the moral principles discovered in job evaluation schemes? This only seems to follow logically and it is one of the reasons that market theorists like Friedman and Hayek want nothing to do with the perfectionist ethics of Aristotle, Galston, et al.

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Logic and Politics: Hegel's Philosophy of Right By Peter J. Steinberger (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988. Pp. 254, \$24.00.)

This is a bold and intelligent book. Although it directs itself for the most part to an analytic audience, it contains a number of discussions that should be of interest to political theorists of a variety of persuasions.

Logic and Politics begins with a distinction between what Steinberger calls "accommodationist" and "perfectionist" models of political theorizing, the former typically involving a compromise among the conflicting political "values" of "individual" and "society," the latter a perfected resolution of that conflict. According to Steinberger, the proper vehicle of this compromise, or resolution, is something he calls "conceptual analysis," a term familiar enough to those attuned to recent developments in analytic philosophy. What will be less familiar is the author's claim that conceptual analysis was the method of Hegel himself. This preliminary discussion sets up the author's later sympathetic treatment of the *Philosophy of Right* as an example—perhaps unequalled in its virtuosity—of conceptual analysis of the perfectionist sort, one all the more powerful for managing to escape the utopianism with which perfectionism is usually burdened.

Before turning to the *Philosophy of Right*, Steinberger makes another preliminary stop—Hegel's (Lesser) *Logic*, to which fully a quarter of the book is devoted. The result, as the author makes clear, is not a commentary on the *Logic*, but a highly selective reading that seeks to uncover the principles of what Steinberger calls Hegel's "method," as distinguished from his "metaphysics." Steinberger's discussion of the *Logic* has a straightforwardness and clarity that many, and particularly those new to Hegel, will find quite helpful. As the author reads Hegel, dialectical argument does not "suspend" the rules of conventional logic, as Hegel sometimes seems to claim. Instead, it applies

them in a way that moves beyond the narrow abstraction from content typical of Kantian formalism, through a process in which the inner coherence of concepts that initially appear contradictory is progressively brought to light. As the author notes, this overcoming of the (Kantian) distinction between form and content ultimately rests on the success of Hegel's claim to explain the world (or rationality) as a whole. Given the importance of wholeness to Hegel's enterprise, Steinberger's arguably "unhegelian" separation of the method of the logic from its metaphysics, raises a number of difficulties — as he to some extent concedes. It does, however, allow him to arrive at some useful generalizations about Hegel's overall project. At the same time, his conclusion — that a Hegelian metaphysics in conflict with "the more sensible discoveries of modern philosophy" would be "an obscure . . . collection of assertions worth considering only for antiquarian reasons" (p. 111) — is one that some readers (including this reviewer) will find premature. It also raises the suspicion that for Steinberger Hegel's method is his metaphysics after all, though perhaps not in the way that Hegel himself intended.

The second part of the book aims to apply the principles of Hegelian method (i.e., conceptual analysis) gleaned from the first to the concept of right in order to arrive at a better understanding of Hegel's politics. Through lively discussions of Hegel on property, crime and punishment, morality, marriage, and the constitution of the rational state, the author shows how the institutions that comprise "right" in the full Hegelian sense progressively resolve and overcome the "apparent contradiction between the individual and society" (p. 200). As in the case of the *Logic*, Steinberger's reading of the *Philosophy of Right* is highly selective, and directs itself less to the specific articulations of Hegel's argument than to generalized, partial reconstructions, often with a view to showing how what Hegel says bears upon current academic debate.

The politically sensible Hegel that emerges from Steinberger's reading comes to his appealing moderation by a methodologically radical route. In general, each discussion moves, analytically, from an apparent contradiction between individuals or between individual and community, to their mutual harmonization at a higher level. As such, the argument is clearly put and often enlightening in its details; the discussions of the moral point of view and marriage struck this reviewer as especially illuminating.

To be sure, Steinberger's methodological separation of conceptual analysis (or deduction) and empirical knowledge may finally be more Kantian (or even Fichtean) than Hegelian. (See, for example, his claim that "empirical facts are beside the point" (p. 126), a claim at least arguably in conflict with Hegel's own conciliatory and holistic intentions.) Indeed, Steinberger himself suggests that Hegelian dialectic is best understood as a species of transcendental argument in the Kantian/Strawsonian sense. Similarly, Steinberger's unwillingness to address the vexed question of the relation in Hegel between logic and history, while understandable given the extent of the ground he otherwise

means to cover, has a certain telling effect on his reading of the *Philosophy of Right*, whose difference from the *Logic* would seem to lie precisely in its accommodating history (or "the facts") in a way that the *Logic* taken by itself does not. In short, Steinberger's understanding of the relation between concept and experience as it pertains to politics may ultimately owe less to Hegel than to contemporary thinkers such as Strawson and Rawls.

On balance, however, readers—even those who do not share fully the author's methodological assumptions—will find this a useful and invigorating book, one that brings clearheaded insight to a difficult subject.

Susan Shell, *Boston College*

State Supreme Courts in State and Nation. By G. Alan Tarr and Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. Pp. 283. \$28.50.)

State Supreme Courts is a broad portrait of the place of the states' highest courts within state and national government. Adopting a comparative case study approach, the authors closely examine the past and current roles of the supreme courts in Alabama, Ohio, and New Jersey. They explicitly reject traditional legal treatment of state courts, which is formalistic and hierarchical and focuses too heavily on the presumed separate roles of state and federal courts. But the authors also object to quantitative analyses which compare large numbers of courts and cases. The authors believe too much detail is lost in a "snapshot of state supreme courts, when a moving picture would be more revealing" (p. 5). Their comparative case study approach provides a good picture of the role of the courts in the 1940s and 1950s, recent changes in organization and considerable case law illustrating the doctrinal positions of the state supreme courts in various areas of law. From this perspective, the book has a great deal to offer.

Comparative case studies can make contributions which are different from those of single state histories and multistate quantitative studies. The single case histories provide much detail, but tend to emphasize the uniqueness of individual states, leaving readers hungry to learn if the state is representative of any group of states. The fifty state studies necessarily ignore much information about individual states in order to reveal patterns of behavior and their correlates in all states. The comparative case study seeks to bridge these other approaches. It is a difficult task and in order to be most successful, the research needs to adopt an explicit research design and examine each state in a closely parallel way. Ideally, it will produce insights and nuances concerning previously tested theory and hypotheses, and will generate new theory for future research.

The authors begin their exploration by detailing three sets of relationships which are important for state supreme courts: vertical federalism (relationship with the U. S. Supreme Court), horizontal federalism (links to other state supreme courts—mainly through citation to each other's opinions), and intrastate political relationships (court decisions regarding other branches of government and the courts' development of state judicial policy through their decisions). The role of the courts in developing their own bodies of law separate from the federal courts (new judicial federalism) is an important and relatively new area of research which receives special attention by the authors.

There is some difficulty, however, in applying these themes to the case studies. Instead of explicitly using these three relationships and developing other specific subtopics or relationships which are applied consistently to a three states, the authors delve very heavily into each state's judicial and legal history. They concentrate on key individuals who are portrayed as being almost totally responsible for shaping the modern courts in two of the three states, and they survey major developments in current state law. Until the last chapter, the comparative approach fades as the authors mine the rich store of events and personalities in each of the three states. References to federalism and the independent role of the courts are made, but the reader must work to see the links among the three chapters. The authors' initial perspective that "there is no typical state supreme court" (p. 2) seems to stand in the way of their fully bridging the case study and the multistate comparison. Each state is portrayed as essentially unique and each chapter could stand alone.

The chapter on Alabama focuses heavily on the 1950s and relationships with the U. S. Supreme Court in civil rights and the transformation of that court by former Chief Justice Howell Heflin into a "mainstream" court (p. 264) meaning that it no longer resists the U. S. Supreme Court and that it has adopted innovations pioneered by other courts. But there is no identification of other mainstream courts, preventing further comparison. The Ohio Supreme Court is examined mainly for its extreme partisanship and conflict among the judges. Former Chief Justice Frank D. Celebrezze is the main actor here. It is compared briefly to the Michigan Supreme Court. The New Jersey Supreme Court is noted for its leadership in legal innovation and compared briefly with the California Supreme Court as a nationally visible court. The key role of former Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt in the 1940s and 1950s receives considerable attention. Much of the New Jersey chapter also focuses on the "new judicial federalism," but this concept receives little attention in the Alabama and Ohio chapters.

The final chapter draws on the three case studies to make general statements about state supreme courts. But the earlier discussion of judicial federalism and intrastate relations does not appear. Instead, the authors develop a new concept, the "institutional identity" (pp. 237-42) of each court, a view

which further emphasizes the distinctive character of each court and the importance of key individuals in shaping events. The authors state that the political and legal culture of the individual states is largely responsible for variations among the courts, but the specific factors which account for difference apparently are unique to each state.

State Supreme Courts makes a contribution by alerting the reader that there are particular events and personalities which contribute to variation in American state politics, and the authors produce a book rich in factual detail that is absent in most other judicial studies. But they might have accomplished even more by employing a consistent analytical framework, which would have linked the three case studies more clearly, and similar sets of social, economic, and political variables that could have been shown to operate differently in each state. Perhaps greater use of the social and political context of each state, and the linkage between broader patterns of politics and the courts would have helped account for why certain individuals were able to shape events and how the three courts emerged as three distinctive political institutions.

Henry R. Glick, *The Florida State University*

Toynbee's Philosophy of World History and Politics. By Kenneth W. Thompson. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1955. Pp. 230. \$27.50.)

In some twenty books—ranging from case studies of presidential leadership to the normative roots of the American diplomatic tradition—Kenneth W. Thompson has substantiated the integral link between social ethics and the experience of tragedy and guilt in man's political existence. Like Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau, Thompson builds upon the tradition of a realist philosophy which infuses historiography and political thought with a regard for both the creative and destructive vitalities in human nature. Nobles for the practitioner than the prophet, a meaningful standard of political action derives from the challenge and limitations in relating absolute or universal norms to the contingencies of particular political events. In terms of his international thought, Thompson's realism is conspicuous by his efforts to transcend the tension between the national interest and dedication to principles of justice and established mutualities in the community of nations.

Jacob Burckhardt observed that it is the purpose of history 'to make us not clever for one day but wise forever.' In *Toynbee's Philosophy of World History and Politics*, Thompson alludes to the intellectual problem standing in the way of a theoretical inquiry into the meaning of history. Specifically, the theorist is obliged to differentiate somehow between what is typical and perennial, and what is unique and ephemeral in varying historical situations. A

events are unique in that they happen in a certain way only once and never before or since, yet, the very possibility of theory, as well as the existence of objective standards of political truth, depends upon the rational perception of social forces that are a byproduct of human nature and which, under similar circumstances, manifest themselves in comparable respects.

Thompson's central objective throughout the book is to indicate how the mass of data and "laws" of Toynbee's universal history provide a broad canvas on which to trace interconnections between purpose and interest within alternative conceptions of world order. What makes Toynbee's work of major importance to international thinkers and diplomatic historians is the extent to which his chronicles of past civilizations are informed by many urgent concerns of the present. As Stevenson Professor at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, Toynbee edited and reviewed world events in annual *Surveys* in the decades preceding and following World War II. Thompson argues that the philosopher of history—always mindful of how the unique and recurrent intermingle within and across civilizations—helps us to view the present crisis and its distinct characteristics against a background that safeguards us from parochialism (p. 3). Rather than settle for political prophecy and admitting that the perception of progress and threat is shaped partly by the uniqueness of each historical epoch, Thompson's challenge is to determine which of Toynbee's concepts "have enduring value in our day and which satisfy our curiosity about the past but have little relevance in the present" (p. 3).

Thompson's opening chapter portrays Toynbee's purpose as a reaction against the philosophic relativism, methodological dogmatism, and positivist scientism so prevalent throughout the curriculum of the humanities. Toynbee, for example, seeks to restore the claims of historical imagination and spirituality by integrating yet ultimately transcending empirical and normative categories of analysis in the morphology of civilizations. Thompson brings together arguments from Toynbee's many works, including *A Study of Civilization*, as well as some revealing personal correspondence with the author, to demonstrate how the ideas of creative and emergent evolution permeated the structure of his philosophy of history. Citing the influence of Henri Bergson, Thompson analyzes how the emphasis on impermanence, on purpose in the midst of changing values, and on mind and intuition as the twin progenitors of truth, introduced a new element that eventually dominated Toynbee's historiography.

Building on this philosophical edifice, subsequent chapters identify and develop the congruence between Toynbee's principles of history and the major concepts treated by present-day theorists of world politics. Consideration is devoted to such topics as: the modalities of force and significance of war in ancient and modern civilizations, the relationship between the modern phenomenon of "nationalistic universalism" and alternative forms of political

unity in previous eras, and the methods of diplomacy, balance of power techniques and the interaction of ideology and self-interest in the external conduct of empires and nation states. In a concluding assessment, Thompson cuses on elements of realism and idealism in Toynbee's thought and argues convincingly that his approach to world order calls forth a reexamination of the perils of the nuclear age in which superpower diplomacy is militarized, a zero-sum game of survival. Of particular interest is Toynbee's broad outline of a political settlement that would supply minimal conditions for a voluntary world government.

Ultimately, and as the author suggests, Toynbee raises anew and in a profound way the perennial dilemma of truth in matters political. The political actor, conscious of history, must be aware of the malleability of the human will, yet he must also be aware of the limits of suasion and the need for objective barriers to human will. The statesman's predicament is to choose the elusive right admixture—not only in terms of human nature—permanent such with the relations of its elements ever changing, but also in terms of changing historical circumstances under which those elements of human nature confront each other in the forms of collectivities called nations.

Greg Russell *Louisiana State University*

Coercion. By Alan Wertheimer. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. Pp. vii, 315. \$34.50.)

What do I mean when I say that I was compelled to do something unseemly? What is implied when I announce that my circumstances left me no choice but to pursue an otherwise immoral course of action? With this book, Wertheimer hopes to give us a handle on such questions. More to the point, he proposes to generate a philosophical theory of coercion. Clearly, such a theory would be of considerable value to the field of jurisprudence. There, questions of duress and coercion constantly emerge. But the theory would also be of use outside the courtroom. For the claim that necessity or unpleasant circumstances occasionally compel us to act in an unseemly fashion is well known in politics. The Athenians, for one, resorted to such a plea in their defense of empire. And they were by no means the last to try to excuse or to justify their actions by reference to the circumstances which framed their decisions.

There is no way in the span of a few paragraphs to capture either the scope or the depth of this book. Suffice it to say that Wertheimer begins with a well-known series of problematics. He recognizes that he must address the question of whether my claim to having been coerced is, as common parlance might suggest, an empirical statement which either is or is not true—and which, if true, excuses me. Or, could it be that my plea of having been coerced is a moral assertion that attempts to justify my action? Likewise, he must

some purchase on the relationships among such notions as volition, agency, and freedom. This is complex and heady stuff, and Wertheimer approaches all of it with remarkable acuity and precision.

To construct his theory, Wertheimer opts for what might seem a rather indirect approach. Rather than entering directly into a philosophic mode, he decides to examine first how the law (and specifically Anglo-American law) has dealt with the matter of coercion. The idea here is to see whether jurists have come to an understanding of coercion and duress. Though the answer to this question is complicated, Wertheimer finds that the law, in both its civil and criminal variants, does indeed contain a theory of coercion. This theory is, in Wertheimer's terms, "two-pronged." It states, in brief, that an agent "A coerces B to do X if and only if (1) A's proposal creates a choice situation for B such that B has no reasonable alternative but to do X and (2) it is wrong for A to make such a proposal to B" (p. 172). Wertheimer then goes on to note that the law usually "pays relatively little attention to the choice prong" (p. 172)—that is, to the fact that B finds himself confronting a set of unpleasant options. Instead, in determining the existence of coercion, the law pays greater attention to the character of A's proposal to the "proposal prong." What this implies, as Wertheimer makes clear, is that the jurists' theory of coercion is fundamentally moralized: that the courts' willingness to concede the existence of coercion rests on a set of normative judgments regarding the aptness of A's proposal rather more than it does on an empirical assessment of B's choice situation.

Having built a foundation for further analysis, Wertheimer now shifts into a more explicitly philosophic style. In so doing, he concludes that there is a remarkable harmony between the law's understanding of coercion and that of the right-thinking philosopher. In short, Wertheimer contends that it is indeed the case that the claim that one is coerced is fundamentally a moral statement. In fact, the claim that one has been coerced is not, as some might suppose, an effort to frame an excuse for one's actions. Rather, it is an attempt to justify these acts by saying, in effect, that the "threat" one was under was such as to relieve one of the moral and legal consequences normally attendant on one's apparently unseemly or inappropriate behavior. In short, one can be said to have been coerced into an action when one confronts a real, substantial, and wrongful threat to one's "baseline" expectations such that it is reasonable to say that one's consequent actions were justified.

To repeat, what all this implies is that judgments regarding coercion are, Wertheimer suggests, fundamentally moralized. They depend on answers to such questions as: (1) Were A's proposals wrongful? (2) Did these proposals constitute a threat to B's legitimate expectations? and (3) Was B's response to these threats appropriate? Clearly, these are moral and normative questions, and they can only be answered in moral terms. Now, one consequence of this moral focus is the possibility, given Wertheimer's analysis, that our ev-

yday understanding of coercion, with its focus on the choice situation facing a coerced party, is wrong-headed. As Wertheimer suggests. "It might be ought that, on my account, the preanalytic sense of coercion turns out to be much less interesting than it first seemed. This observation is, I think, substantially correct. There is not much of interest left to the preanalytic sense of coercion. But there is this compensation. The moral issues that take its place are very interesting indeed" (p. 310). Wertheimer is undoubtedly correct when he stresses the interesting nature of the questions posed by his view of coercion. Answering these questions will surely keep both jurists and political philosophers busy. Still, the resilience of the preanalytic view suggests that there may be more to it than Wertheimer's theory captures.

Other concerns also come to mind. For example, Wertheimer is at pains to distance the "exploitation of the oppressed worker by the capitalist" from the notion of coercion. While it is certainly true that the worker may seem to have little choice about whether or not to accept a particular job offered by the capitalist, this does not, Wertheimer avers, mean that the worker is being coerced. As it happens, Wertheimer spends considerable time on this matter, and does so quite effectively. Still, it is unlikely that the Marxist will be convinced. In fact, the Marxist may even suspect that what Wertheimer gives us is less a theory of coercion than a rationalizing reconstruction of prevailing liberal, political conventions.

On a slightly different note, Wertheimer seems disposed to steer clear of those advocates of positive freedom who stress the potential coerciveness of one's own psychological condition and commitments. After all, to accede to his view would be to shift attention away from the "proposal prong" and onto the "choice prong." Yet in his discussion of "morality and voluntariness" Wertheimer recognizes that "Coerced choices are not unwilling, but they are, may be said, *against* one's will" (p. 302) where one's will is understood as emanating from an abiding commitment to certain underlying moral principles of action. Or, as Wertheimer puts it: "One does not act involuntarily merely because one does not *like* the available alternatives . . . One acts involuntarily because one has a deep aversion to having to choose in response to immoral purposes" (p. 302). Now, these last comments would seem to reintroduce into the consideration of coercion those very features of the "choice prong" that Wertheimer's stress on the "proposal prong" meant to eliminate. In the end, though, these are mere quibbles. In fact they are less than that. They are simply matters which one can hope Wertheimer will address again. For his treatment of the concept of coercion is so well done, and has implications so far beyond the scope of the present book, that one can only hope more.

Jack P. Geise, Clarkson University

Interest-Group Politics in France By Frank L. Wilson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Pp. 324. \$39.50.)

What a pleasure to see a well-wrought book in an area crying for new research for twenty-five years. Not since Jean Meynaud's *Nouvelles études sur les groupes de pression en France* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1962) has any scholar attempted a comprehensive evaluation of the role and impact of interest groups—from all interest sectors—on politics in France. Frank L. Wilson's book fills the void, and it does so authoritatively. It is comprehensive in its scope and detail and *bien réfléchi* in its design and argumentation. The book has also been handsomely produced and edited by Cambridge University Press. (Although, in this day of advanced computer typesetting, notes ought to be placed where they belong, at the foot of each page for easy consultation.)

In 1979, Wilson interviewed 99 French interest group leaders—44 elected officers and 55 professional administrators—to explore their attitudes about group-government interactions, the types and frequencies of various political activities of the groups, and their effectiveness. Wilson's list of groups includes a mix of labor, management, agricultural, professional, and special-interest groups. The list was selected with care and is about as good as any list could be that is limited to roughly 100 entries, as this one had to be since Wilson worked alone on the project.

This book is the culmination of ten years of research on interest groups in France, and it is the culminating work of the Wilson-Keeler debate over how accurately pluralism versus neo-corporatism characterizes French politics in general (Frank L. Wilson, "Alternative Models of Interest Intermediation: The Case of France," *British Journal of Political Science*, 12 [April 1982]; "Les groupes d'intérêt sous la 5^e République," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 33 [April 1983]; "French Interest Group Politics: Pluralist or Neo-corporatist?" *American Political Science Review*, 77 [December 1983]; and John I. S. Keeler, "Situating France on the Pluralism-Corporatism Continuum," *Comparative Politics*, 17 [January 1985]; *The Politics of Neocorporatism in France* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1987]). For his part, John Keeler vigorously criticizes Wilson's characterization of the French state as aloof—apparently taking Wilson to mean thereby that the French state is distant and uninterested in interest group affairs. Whether the choice of "aloof" is a felicitous one or not, Wilson clearly does not mean that the French state does not intervene extensively in interest representation. To the contrary, Wilson's book makes an impressive case for an active, highly interventionist state that seldom hesitates to try to structure interest representation to its own advantage. Moreover, more often than not, it succeeds. In both the politics of recognition and the politics of subsidization, the French state has sought to favor friendly and useful groups and to handicap hostile and coun-

everyday understanding of coercion, with its focus on the choice situation facing the coerced party, is wrong-headed. As Wertheimer suggests: "It might be thought that, on my account, the preanalytic sense of coercion turns out to be much less interesting than it first seemed. This observation is, I think, substantially correct. There is not much of interest left to the preanalytic sense of coercion. But there is this compensation. The moral issues that take its place are very interesting indeed" (p. 310). Wertheimer is undoubtedly correct when he stresses the interesting nature of the questions posed by his view of coercion. Answering these questions will surely keep both jurists and political philosophers busy. Still, the resilience of the preanalytic view suggests that there may be more to it than Wertheimer's theory captures.

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terproductive ones. Friendly and hostile, useful and counterproductive are of course defined by the state in terms of its own interests.

In this debate of pluralism or neo-corporatism, Keeler's most valid criticism is that Wilson's preliminary reports of his findings tended to exaggerate the overall pluralism of French interest group/state relations. Keeler, of course, would notice this because his own seminal work on French farmers is focused on an interest sector governed more than any other by patterns of neo-corporatism. In his early reports, Wilson did not adequately point to the role of the French state in determining whether the interest representation of any particular sector would be pluralist, corporatist, or some other variation entirely. Keeler himself has sometimes neglected this all-important feature of interest group/state relations in France. Even his own study of agriculture shows a French state that orchestrates far more from above than it collaborates on equal footing face to face. It also shows a state willing and able to switch from one form of interest representation to another, say from neo-corporatism to pluralism and back again.

With this book, Wilson makes just this argument with great force, thus rectifying most of his earlier analytical shortcomings. Gone is the global characterization of French politics as "limited pluralism." Rather, group life in France is characterized by "extreme pluralism" in the face of an aloof (still perhaps a poorly chosen adjective), interventionist and willful state that uses groups and throws them away like so many disposable diapers.

Naturally, there will be naysayers to dispute this contention. Beside Keeler, Ezra Suleiman (*Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974]) and Harvey Feigenbaum (*The Politics of Public Enterprise* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985]) are two scholars whose seminal works on the French high civil service (Suleiman) and on the politics of making energy policy (Feigenbaum) portray a French state that is fragmented, sometimes captured, and often at odds with itself. Of course, Suleiman's pioneering study was almost exclusively undertaken within the bureaucracy and it is not surprising that turf battles, policy conflicts, and limited knowledge should assume a prominent place in the analysis. French bureaucrats like all bureaucrats spend lots of their time fighting each other and fretting about the future. Likewise, Feigenbaum's superb study still falls prey to the fallacy of generalizing from a single case or sector (energy politics), a problem shared by Keeler as well (agriculture).

To appreciate the significance of Wilson's findings, one must remember that this is a study from the interest groups' perspective, and it pitches the analysis at the macro-level of the interest group universe in France rather than at a meso-level of analysis (a single sector) or a micro-level (a single group). Keeler's study of agriculture and the FNSEA, for example, combines the latter two levels. Either of these may suggest possible generalizations or hypotheses.

es valid for the macro-level, but they can never pretend to actually provide the testing of system-level generalizations or hypotheses.

Wilson's book, on the other hand, does provide important system-level generalizations about interest groups in France. For example, while groups in France have never been healthier in terms of numbers and vibrancy, their political power is circumscribed by a strong state. Interest groups have also not been able to effectively challenge the state's claim to define the general interest. Further, groups in almost every sector are highly fragmented, thus abetting the state's efforts to divide and conquer. The ineffectiveness of groups at dealing with a high-handed state leads to a greater incidence of protest politics.

Wilson portrays a French state that holds groups in a highly reactive posture, and French group leaders define their effectiveness in terms of very limited expectations. By contrast, an active, aggressive interest group universe such as the American holds the government in a reactive posture. In the United States, groups' expectations are consequently much higher, and while there are some spectacular flops in terms of interest groups trying to influence policy, there are myriad undisputed successes as well.

But as system-level analysis, Wilson's book is subject to the problems associated with any macro-level approach. For example, outliers always pose difficulties. Any generalization about a large number and variety of interest groups will inevitably do some violence to individual cases. Wilson is sensitive to the problem and tries to minimize its impact on the overall analysis by providing a great deal of contextual information about many specific groups at every point along his way.

One weakness of this book is not entirely Wilson's fault. Published in late 1987, the argument seriously underestimates the emerging consensus of French business and labor organizations on the importance of competitiveness in the international economy. New concerns for quality and efficiency shared by management and labor are beginning to emerge from the very long *conjuncture de crise économique* that has plagued France for more than ten years and from the looming pressures of the open European economy that will result with the removal of all trade barriers between EEC countries in 1992. (How else can one explain the anomaly of a stock market euphoric upon the return of the socialist Pierre Bérégovoy as finance minister in the 1988 Rocard government?) Wilson's last interviews (the smallest set), however, took place in spring 1984, barely a year after the Socialists had turned to an austerity program which dealt meager hands to labor and fairly championed private enterprise and the importance of entrepreneurial vigor.

A second weakness of the book is imbedded in any choice to rely on attitudinal surveys for the data to be analyzed. Wilson is a sophisticated interviewer of elites, but the old question of whether attitudes shape institutions

more than institutions shape attitudes will not go away. They shape each other, of course, but that does not help us to sort out the most relevant factors and assess their respective weight. Further, most of the rich secondary sources that Wilson relies upon to buttress his analysis are themselves either anecdotal case studies or commentary/analyses rather than studies designed as tests.

What is missing here is any specific testing of conditions of group influence in France, such as that which could be provided by a critical case study. In Feigenbaum's study of energy policymaking, one would expect the oil corporations to exercise more influence than usual because the ministry with which they deal has been historically one of the weakest and because the state's interest in assuring oil stocks in a climate of oil shocks so clearly converged with the interests of the executives of the oil corporations. There is thus a test of nothing. On the other hand, a critical study similar to John Zysman's *Political Strategies for Industrial Order* (Berkeley: University of California Press) would go far toward connecting specific hypotheses of group influence in France to actual conditions. A study which investigated the lack of influence of a well-organized, unified group on a relatively weak, fragmented ministry would constitute a definitive demonstration of Wilson's argument. Likewise, the existence of substantial influence by poorly-organized fragmented groups in the face of a strong, unified ministry would counter it. Such structured case testing might better show the conditions that are associated with groups' influence on the French state.

Nonetheless, Wilson's book is the new authority on interest groups in France, far more than just a "welcome addition to the literature." If Cambridge would publish it in paper, the book's academic audience would include any graduate seminar or upper-division course on either French politics or general interest groups. If it were translated into French, the French would learn much about themselves. This is perhaps the highest compliment of all.

David Wilsford, *University of Oklahoma*

Environmental Policy in the USSR By Charles E. Ziegler (Amherst University of Massachusetts Press, 1987. Pp. xiii, 195. \$25.00.)

According to the Central Committee Theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference, "One of the paramount concerns is to step up efforts to protect the environment and to implement a package of measures to fundamentally improve the ecological situation in the country" (*Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports*, May 27, 1988, 41). Although this statement came as the twenty-first paragraph of a section dealing with economic growth and social development, environmental issues have made the Soviet agenda. Charles Ziegler's study of how this happened contains two books in one — both are worth reading.

Ziegler's major focus is on environmental policy, but he also tests various models of Soviet politics. The text contains six substantive chapters followed by a useful summary and extensive footnotes.

In his initial chapter, Ziegler argues that Marxism's belief in material and technological progress provides the basis for the general Soviet attitude toward environmental policy. This attitude asserted "that Soviet type socialism can—without significant social, economic, or political restructuring—adequately cope with environmental degradation" (p. 6). The remainder of Ziegler's analysis suggests that this viewpoint was not necessarily true.

The official Soviet image of the environment [chapter two] has consistently emphasized a need to transform or modify, to improve on nature's handiwork" (p. 24). The White Sea-Baltic Sea Canal-Baikol-Amur railroad project and the proposal to divert Siberian rivers to Central Asia represent major examples of this attitude. The enormous size of the Soviet Union and a seemingly endless supply of resources along with the party's faith in scientific progress provide additional support for this image. These factors, when combined with censorship of opposing views, the necessity of meeting "the plan" and the growth of departmentalism (the pursuit of narrow interests by bureaucratic units) (p. 34), restricted attempts to safeguard the environment and severely limited attempts to place environmental issues on the political agenda. Moreover, since there have been few incentives for enterprises or higher level bureaucratic interests to preserve environmental resources (officials have been graded on production, not protection) and the average citizen is more concerned about the availability of consumer goods, there have been no major challenges to the official point of view. Even Soviet environmentalists do not question its fundamental values.

How and why, then, have environmental concerns made the political agenda and what does this imply about the nature of the Soviet political process? Here Ziegler introduces his consideration of various models of the Soviet system. Rejecting the totalitarian and group models, Ziegler posits that "the state corporatist model of interest representation more accurately portrays the Soviet domestic policy process, at least in the field of environmental protection" (p. 46). In the state corporatist model, certain interests are granted representation in the decision-making process in return for observing general rules of procedure regarding leadership selection and the articulation of issues, while "the state exercises a dominant influence over the policy agenda" (p. 48).

Environmental policy did not make the agenda until the party leadership realized conservation of resources was necessary for future economic growth. This realization and the crisis over the pollution of Lake Baikal led the party to seek greater input and involvement from a wider public including scientists, writers, various bureaucratic agencies, the press, nature protection societies, and local soviets. Subsequently, although the impact of these groups is limited, the leadership has developed several laws and allocated signifi-

cant funds to promote environmental protection, it has also established various agencies at the national level to monitor progress. The participation of more specialists and nonspecialists provides greater information and legitimacy while maintaining control of the agenda in the hands of the party leadership as the corporatist model implies. Moreover, following Alfred Stepan's notion of inclusionary and exclusionary forms of state corporatism, the model allows for change as the system "includes" relevant groups in the process.

Ziegler considers the legislation itself in chapter four. While numerous laws now exist, they are largely symbolic, espousing ideals which serve to help socialize the public but cannot be attained or effectively enforced. The next chapter explains why. After detailing the wide variety and levels of administrative bodies involved in this process, Ziegler suggests that the involvement of numerous groups, departmentalism, lack of incentives, distortion of information, and local interests all preclude effective coordination. Moreover given its fragmented character and the tendency of particular interests to withhold certain information, Ziegler concludes that a centralized planning system may not necessarily be more efficient than a pluralistic form.

In the last chapter before his summary, Ziegler points out that environmental issues now constitute part of the foreign policy agenda as well, reflecting trends in Soviet-American relations and serving as a possible source of cooperation between East and West and among the members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).

This is a good book—coherent and well written. Anyone concerned about environmental policy or administration in the Soviet Union will find it a valuable resource, especially in terms of the administrative structure or with regard to such issues as air and water pollution. Those interested in the analysis of Soviet politics will find Ziegler's discussion of the corporatist model very useful. In addition, Ziegler frequently places his discussion in a comparative context. This book could be an excellent supplement to basic texts in a Soviet politics course where the instructor wants to devote some time to a particular aspect of domestic policy.

As almost every current review of books on the Soviet Union now states it is unfortunate that Ziegler finished the book prior to some of the recent changes under Gorbachev. While Soviet officials may not have read the text they certainly understand some of Ziegler's conclusions about how their system works. In an interview with *Izvestia* F. T. Morgun, chairman of the newly created State Committee for Environmental Protection, called for an end to "ideological illiteracy" and stated that "the truth must not be warped in the distorting mirror of purely the departmental approach to matters" (*Izvestia*, June 9, 1988, p. 61). When asked if the new committee would overcome the chronic disease of earlier nature conservation organs, namely, lack of coordination in its efforts, impotence in the face of diktat of the departments and virtual lack of the rights?" Morgun urged appointment to the committee.

people who are 'knowledgeable and decisive, courageous and uncompromising' (FBIS, June 9, 1988, p. 63). Perhaps such people, operating under *glasnost* and Gorbachev, may move environmental protection near the top of the agenda.

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The Common Life: Ambiguity, Agreement, and the Structure of Morals. By Burton Zwiebach. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1985. Pp. 216. \$21.95.)

This humane and intelligent critique of rationalist ethics makes heavy demands on its readers, especially those not steeped in the language and methods of analytic philosophy. Nevertheless, all students of political thought would find it worthwhile, since in addition to providing a theory of its own it asks, in effect, 'what it means to theorize' and what a coherent, convincing theory would require. The reader is left to judge how well Zwiebach's own theory meets his stated requirements.

Zwiebach begins from the assumption that there is no knowable, transcendent good on which all rational beings, in principle, could agree. Circumstances force us collectively to create our own values, an undertaking for which the imperatives of a common life are the proper starting point. We arrive at moral judgments by thinking and talking about actions, which themselves are practical attempts to resolve moral conundra. But the formation of moral judgments must not be understood as a deductive process establishing a categorical set of rules, in part because action itself is inherently ambiguous: the intentions that animate a given action are conditioned by guilt, doubt, anxiety, and other varieties of psychic conflict, thus precluding us from characterizing it in the crisp, universally valid terms required by rationalist moral theories (such as those of Rawls and Nozick). Rationalists, Zwiebach charges, make the terms of moral discourse seem far clearer than they in fact are. In consequence, ethics becomes an abstract and ghostly affair, one that sheds little light either on the practical problems of everyday life or on how people actually formulate ethical judgments.

Rather than seeking to eliminate ambiguity or elucidate prescriptive moral truths, the task of reason is to constrain our construction of moral judgments. The moral realm properly operates on the basis of persuasion instead of demonstration, using as its terms of discourse 'referents' that are established in shared experiences but are not capable of being authoritatively defined and determined. Although social convention is admittedly a powerful shaper of these referents, our understanding is not necessarily imprisoned in it, since we can obtain a fresh stock of examples and associations from poetry, story, and other disciplines which fertilize the creative imagination.

If moral actions are ambiguous for Zwiebach, so are moral ideals. These can never appropriately be reified in some hard and fast form, since they must be adapted constantly to meet the demands of new experiences and situations. To utilize the canons of logic to define them in a rigid, preceptual way is to "sanitize" them, emptying them of content and ambiguity and therefore of all usefulness in concrete cases. Not pure practical reason but public consensus is what allows us to gain a measure of objectivity in the construction of moral ideals. Such ideals give us a mood or a temper that guides moral choices and arguments without actually determining their content. Reason's role in this process is to help us fit ideals together and establish their respective boundaries.

Although the realm of the morally acceptable should be rather extensive in Zwiebach's view, it will be necessary at times to narrow its range. Such "closure" of a society's moral rules must be conducted through a gradual, deliberate process of agreement among all members which is constrained by three "structuring principles," seen as the non-architectonic ground, the prerequisite, for moral rule making.

The first of these "public ideals" is *civility*, the need to establish norms designed to prevent the arbitrariness and anarchic violence identified with barbarism. Freedom and equality, the other principles that constrain the agreement process, derive from the "commonality of moral enterprise," or the fact that the task of creating morality must be shared by all of a community's members *qua* "moral actors." *Equality* refers to the ability of every moral actor to affect and engage others on reciprocal terms. This does not require absolute uniformity of condition, but it does entail a dramatic reduction of economic disparities such that no one possesses qualitative and systematic advantages over others that could determine outcomes in the field of action. *Freedom* is the power to act, to create, without which morality is impossible; it can be legitimately employed as a justification for a particular action only when all other moral actors are also capable of exercising it, or when we are striving to enable them to do so. Zwiebach argues that legal, economic, and political measures should be instituted to ensure that all members of a given community are "integrated into the body of moral actors," enjoying an equal capacity to join with others in formulating civil rules, for otherwise those rules are inherently unjustifiable. Our primary obligations and loyalties, in fact, should be directed toward the moral community itself and the structuring principles that sustain it. The moral community of which Zwiebach speaks must not be confused with the state, whose actions are legitimate only to the extent that they conform to the moral ideals worked out through *praxis*. Democracy, Zwiebach acknowledges, is the form of state power most consistent with the principles underlying moral communities. More than any other system, democracy has the potential to be a "civil" society, imposing bounds on society.

conflict without succumbing to the fatal utopian temptation to eliminate conflict entirely in the name of harmony, consistency, or equilibrium

Zwiebach's structuring principles allow him to take aim at various contemporary political positions (libertarian, neo-conservative, communitarian) and also, more importantly, to overcome a problem inherent in anti-foundational thought: In the absence of a universal standpoint (such as natural rights, divine will, or the categorical imperative), on what ground can one possibly criticize a community's established practices? As "second-order" rules—the rules, as it were, governing how rules should be made—the structuring principles allow us to say that if freedom, equality, and civility do not condition a community's rule-making process, its rules are illegitimate no matter what their content or how authoritative they may seem to its members. This strategy is elegant and satisfying on a theoretical level, for it allows us to avoid cultural relativism without affirming some groundless dogmatism as the first principle of political ethics. But its practical usefulness remains open to question. Suppose that we put Zwiebach's structuring principles at the center of our political life. In cases of conflict, should people attach more importance to the principles themselves, or to the concrete norms reached by consensus through procedures consistent with those principles? In other words, are the structuring principles to be understood only as regulative or constitutive values—or are they in fact disguised substantive values which groups must be required to respect in the actual norms that guide their lives? Would people be willing to fight and die to affirm principles that appeal to the head rather than the heart and that cannot, moreover, rely on tradition and custom for support? Would not the weakening of received conventions and opinions that Zwiebach's enterprise presupposes remove what for most people is the chief underpinning of moral conduct, with potentially disastrous results? And wouldn't the foundations of whatever "civility" we have managed to institute thereby be compromised? Perhaps increased attention to the emotional and historical foundations of collective life would have made for a theory more closely attuned to political realities.

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Political Science in the South— Then and Now

Donald S. Vaughan
University of Mississippi

During the 1930s and 1940s, we were a profession of political scientists, but today we are a collection of individual professionals. This assessment of the status of the political science profession in the South by the president of the Southern Political Science Association was the theme of his address to the Association in November of 1965. Although the political scientists during that early period were few in number, they assessed the needs of the region and proceeded collectively to fill the voids. The article draws illustrations of this theme from three areas: teaching, research, and professional development.

Today political science in the South has changed from a profession featuring collaboration to one of intense competition among individuals. The shift has been caused, in part, because the size of the profession has enlarged and it has become more formalized. This concern on the part of the individual, including political scientists and administrators alike, for his or her own well-being has allowed us to lose sight of the objectives of higher education and, consequently, to take the path of least resistance. Our concern for the future must be for the individual student, the profession, and the institutions of higher education.

This article will contrast political science in the South during the late 1920s through the 1940s with political science today. It is my thesis that during the early period we were a profession of political scientists, but today we are a collection of individual professionals.

First, let me set the stage during the early period. It was a remarkable era for political science. There were very few departments of political science. Even in 1945, Bob Rankin only found 219 junior colleges, four-year colleges, and universities which were teaching political science in the South and only thirty-three of them had separate departments of political science. His survey was confined to the eleven states in V. O. Key's South (Rankin 1946, p. 6).

Political science in the South was an area in which there was a void. There were very few Ph.D. programs in the region and all too few students going to graduate school in political science. In the period 1929 to 1946, four state universities in the South granted only twenty-six Ph.D. degrees in political science out of a total of 804 granted throughout the country. In addition four in-state universities granted only twenty-three, a total of forty-nine for the

region or six percent of the nation's total (Preliminary Report, Roscoe C. Martin Papers, Box 1).¹

It was a period during which a small group of political scientists—*not* always the same people—came together, identified needs of the profession and the region, and proceeded consciously to fill the voids they had identified. The result could only have been achieved by political scientists in the region combining into networks and by financial assistance from outside the region. The important fact is that our predecessors did coalesce, and they did obtain financial assistance to fulfill those needs.

NETWORKING AMONG POLITICAL SCIENTISTS—THEN

I would like to make my case by highlighting three examples of networking: one from the area of teaching, one from the area of organized research, and one from the area of professional activities. Because Albert Lepawski once told me that one should write from his background, I will draw my first two cases from public administration. The other involves the formation of the Southern Political Science Association (SPSA). The nature and success of this networking revolved around a few crucial political scientists who played principal roles in these events. Most of these people I knew personally and held in awe. To this then young student, they were giants in the field.

A quotation from Alexander Heard's speech at a Memorial Service for Roscoe C. Martin points up the nature of this networking activity:

During the decisive, malleable years surrounding and following the second World War [Roscoe Martin] did more . . . than any other one person to encourage the development of professional bureaus of public administration, to foster collaborative regional educational programs, to strengthen the Southern Political Science Association and to launch *The Journal of Politics*, to enhance the range of competent graduate instruction, to improve the technical capacities of state and local governments, to sponsor the professional development of students and faculty, and withal, to lift the quality and utility of teaching and research in political science. (Heard, 1972)

SRTP in Public Administration

The Southern Regional Training Program in Public Administration (SRTP) has been widely hailed as one of the most innovative and successful educational programs to have been created and implemented in this century. It was initiated by Roscoe C. Martin of the University of Alabama's Bureau of Public Administration. The proposal for the Program was made by University of Alabama President Raymond R. Paty (1943a) in his request to the General Education Board (GEB) for continued funding of the Bureau of Public Administration at the University of Alabama. The request was dated Feb-

¹ Rankin (1946) found different figures, which may account for the reserved tone of the Martin Foreword, p. viii.

January 24, 1943, and the proposal for the Bureau's budget was accepted by Dr. Albert R. Mann for the GEB in April (Paty, 1943b).

The concept behind the SRTP was reasonably simple in design but more difficult to implement. To fill the void in technical training for the public service at the state and local levels, Martin proposed that three universities in the South cooperate to offer a curriculum in public administration which would utilize the best faculty and specialties at the three institutions. Probably because of the wartime situation which obtained at that time, the three participating universities—Alabama, Tennessee and Georgia—were all on the quarter system (*Journal of Politics*, 1945, p. 123). So the program participant would spend the first summer in an internship with a state agency and then one quarter at each of the three participating institutions. At the conclusion of this swing of the three universities the student would be presented with a Certificate in Public Administration if the student completed the Program successfully. If the student so chose, moreover, he or she could write a thesis at one of the institutions and obtain an M.A. degree (White, 1945-1946, Greene, 1947).

From the time this program began in 1944 until it ended in the late 1970s, there were several significant developments which took place. First, the University of Georgia, saddled with problems of accreditation and with internal organizational strife, withdrew from the Program and was replaced by the University of Kentucky after the first year of operation (Collins, 1985, *JOP* 1945, p. 340). At the beginning of the process, the Fellows would all meet at the University of Alabama to undergo a week of orientation—hearing lectures by authorities and practitioners in the field. It was at this orientation session, moreover, that students were matched with internship agencies. In the Fall Quarter the Fellows were given a thorough introduction to public administration at the University of Alabama. During the Winter Quarter they concentrated on personnel administration and employer-employee relations. Some of these courses were taught by staff members of the Tennessee Valley Authority. At Tennessee the Fellows also were exposed to statistics, and some studied constitutional law. Fiscal administration and regional planning were the twin foci at the University of Kentucky, which boasted one of the leading authorities in public finance, James W. Martin (White, 1946).

Two other events also occurred. In the early 1950s the General Education Board stopped funding this project which was, by this time, firmly on its feet. As a result, the three participating universities picked up the costs of the Program jointly (Kammerer, 1955, p. 10). At some point after the conclusion of World War II, both the University of Alabama and the University of Kentucky shifted from the quarter to the semester system, causing problems for the rotation among the three schools. For a time the administrations of Alabama and Kentucky adjusted their regulations to accommodate the Pro-

gram. Later it was decided to add the University of Florida (where Gladys Kammerer had joined the faculty from Kentucky) and let the student choose from among a bracket of two schools. After a reasonably short trial run, however, this arrangement was abandoned because of regulations of Florida's graduate school, and the Program reverted to its original membership of three institutions.

One of the significant keys to the success of the SRTP was rooted in the Educational Advisers. Howard White, who had had a significant experience with a national internship program, took a leave of absence from Miami University and devoted that year to getting the Program off to a successful start. He was replaced by only three other people: Albert Lepawsky, Robert B. Highsaw, and Coleman B. Ransone, Jr. These people played a large role in the operations of the Program. They were heavily involved in the selection process, in the internship program, in ironing out difficulties which arose from time to time in relations between faculty and Fellows, and in placing the products of the Program.

Obtaining Albert Lepawsky as the first permanent Educational Director for the Program was another of Roscoe Martin's major coups. Like a number of those involved in these collaborative efforts described here, Lepawsky was a product of the University of Chicago's Ph.D. program. He was so good as a matter of fact that his first teaching and research post was at his alma mater. As a student of both Charles Merriam and Leonard White, he helped to conceptualize the American public administration legacy. Although staying in Chicago, he left the University and became the Assistant Director of the Public Administration Clearing House under Louis Brownlow, who had been city manager of Petersburg, Virginia. Together they promoted a 'New Deal for Municipalities' in the nation. Coming from the neighborhood that housed 1313 East Sixtieth Street, Lepawsky brought not only a rich background in public administration to the Program but a very inventive mind which was unfettered by stereotyped thinking. He was talking about the way jet airplanes would affect the organization of Jefferson County (Birmingham, Alabama) before most people knew what a jet airplane was. His energy and his unbounded optimism was tempered, however, by a sense of realism. His tour of duty in this capacity lasted until 1953.

As significant as the Educational Directors were to the Program and as important to its origin and success as Roscoe Martin was, it was the interlocking web of political scientists that enabled the SRTP to carve its name in the annals of American political science. This interlocking took place not only among the institutional representatives of the three universities but also among the members of the Advisory Committee, whose existence gave the Program wisdom, support and national legitimacy.

The institutional representatives, of course, were *ex officio* members of the Advisory Committee. Roscoe C. Martin (Alabama), Lee S. Greene (Iowa),

nessee), and James W. Martin (Kentucky). Fairly quickly Gladys Kammerer replaced Jim Martin for Kentucky, and later York Willbern replaced Roscoe Martin. The other members of the Advisory Committee included Hallie Farmer (Alabama College for Women) and William J. McGlothlin of the Tennessee Valley Authority, later replaced by Lawrence Durisch, about whom we will hear more later (Southern Regional Training Program, 1945). From its very inception the staff of the Tennessee Valley Authority not only gave support to the concept of the SRTP, but it also played a significant role in the development of the curriculum and in the teaching aspects of the Program. It was this group, therefore, that gave strength and credibility to this new venture in training for the public service.

What factors led to the interlocking of political scientists? To answer this question the backgrounds and characteristics of the principal actors in this significant development must be explored.

Roscoe C. Martin. As Alex Heard's eulogy implied, Roscoe Martin was the prime mover behind this collaborative training effort, as well as the research activity to be described below. He was thoroughly a Texan, except in appearance--more closely resembling a British lord than a Texas cowboy or oil baron. He was born in Texas and received his B.A. and M.A. from the University of Texas (Austin, of course, because there were no others parts of UT at that time). On a fellowship he obtained a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, the mecca (at that time) of public administration. Then back he went to the University of Texas, reaching the status of full professor before he left for the University of Alabama in 1937. From 1934-1937 he served as Director of the Texas Bureau of Municipal Research (*APSA Directory*, 1945).

At the University of Alabama, he immediately established a Bureau of Public Administration and shortly thereafter became chair of the Department of Political Science in addition to his directorship. He left Alabama to become professor and chair of the Department of Political Science at Syracuse University and held that position until he retired to a full professorship--the prestigious Maxwell Professor of Political Science--in 1956. He retired completely in 1972. Throughout his career he was a much sought-after visiting professor and lecturer.

His scholastic and professional honors were too numerous to catalog here. A sample of these honors is indicative of his distinction: Phi Beta Kappa, president of the Southern Political Science Association for two years (during wartime), vice president of the American Political Science Association, and president of the American Society for Public Administration. His background also included practitioner and consulting experience in government (*APSA Directory*, 1968).

You need to understand this motivator of collaborative training and research. Providing you with a representative sketch in a short span of time is

almost impossible. As I approached this topic, I was tempted to devote the whole article to Roscoe, but to do so would be to distort the picture of the whole because the others played tremendously important roles, which those of us on the outside can inadequately appreciate. If you think I exaggerate the importance of Roscoe Martin, hear the concluding words of Alex Heard's memorial "In so far as any single individual ever counts, he is a significant creator of the modern American South" (Heard, 1972).

Dr. Martin, as I knew him in those days, was a man driven by a compulsion to make the world better. He was a perfectionist. He was perhaps the best editor I ever knew. He came from a religious family, all of whom attended church regularly, but Roscoe could not afford the time very often to attend religious ceremonies. He liked people, but he also disliked some. He gathered his facts about people judiciously and objectively, but once he had made up his mind, he rarely changed his opinion. He demanded a lot of his colleagues and friends and more of himself. But he was equally compassionate and understanding if you had earned his respect. Moreover, he would promote your cause and, usually, successfully. I doubt that he often admitted mistakes—and he usually did not make them—but when he did so, he apologized in an oblique fashion.

The picture of this eminently successful administrator—yes, and promoter—is developed more appropriately by the eulogy of Emmette Redford:

Starting in college with an interest in history that soon became an interest in government, Roscoe concentrated his thought, energy, and time on knowledge, instruction and service on public affairs with completeness and tenacity perhaps unsurpassed by any contemporary. Nothing less than all that he could give of planned and sustained work satisfied him from student days until the end. He probably budgeted every hour he counted. Mildred. The virtues in its work and in what he exacted from others were commitment, excellence, and integrity of product (Redford, 1972).

This, then, is a brief picture of the originator of the SRIP and the chair of the Advisory Committee.

Lee S. Greene. Lee Greene was probably the most cosmopolitan of the members of the Advisory Committee. This native of a small town in Kansas obtained a Bachelor of Music degree from the University of Kansas and then went abroad as a German American Exchange Fellow and received an A.B. degree from the University of Leipzig. After he returned to these shores, he obtained an M.A. from the University of Wisconsin and then worked as a fellow at the Brookings Institution and, at the same time, worked toward the Ph.D. from Wisconsin. This Phi Beta Kappa continued to rake in the honors and became first a post-doctoral student at the University of Michigan and the next year was a post-doctoral fellow of the Social Science Research Council (APSA Directory, 1948).

Up to this point, I have not described anything that resembles the career

of the other members of the committee. You must remember, however, that Martin and he and others suffered through a depression (thought to end all depressions) and World War II. These circumstances probably dictated, to some extent, the reason why, after obtaining a bachelor's degree, he taught piano, organ, and music theory. It may also account for the fact that while he was working toward the M.A. degree he also served as an assistant in political science at the University of Wisconsin. In 1937 he became a Lecturer at the University of Tennessee; the same year Roscoe Martin joined the University of Alabama. In that year he became the Supervisor of Training in Public Administration at the Tennessee Valley Authority. He achieved the rank of associate professor in 1939 and became acting head of the Department of Political Science at Tennessee in 1942. In 1945 he became professor and director of the Bureau of Public Administration. He became the regular head of the department the following year. In addition to these activities Lee was employed as a practitioner in many different capacities at all three levels of government. In 1964 Greene was named as a Distinguished Service Professor, and in 1971 he relinquished the headship of the department and returned to teaching (*APSA Directory*, 1968 and 1973).

Professionally, Greene labored in the vineyard as hard as anyone. He served on executive councils of the SPSA and the APSA. He was president of the Southern Political Science Association and served as editor of *The Journal of Politics* as well as serving on the editorial board of the *Public Administration Review*.

Greene was a member of the SRTP Advisory Committee from its inception and continued as a member longer than any other person. He also usually served as one of the principal instructors in the Program during the Fellows tour at the University of Tennessee. He was a brilliant theoretician and something of an iconoclast. His narrow piercing eyes tended to penetrate the most difficult of problems. His contributions to political science focused on state and, especially, local problems, and his New Deal orientation toward solutions was not accidental. It was a product of the era in which he lived.

Gladys Kammerer. Gladys Kammerer came from some of the same kinds of backgrounds as other members of the advisory committee, but at a later time. Born in St. Louis and achieving the baccalaureate degree at Washington University in that same city, she obtained her M.A. degree at the University of Wisconsin and her Ph.D. at the University of Chicago. Her honors were numerous. She also achieved Phi Beta Kappa, held fellowships from AUAW for two years and Ford for one. She received grants from the Social Science Research Council and won the Blue Key outstanding teacher award at the University of Florida. Her experience was largely academic—beginning in high school, moving up to Wellesley College, and thence to the University of Kentucky. It was here that she moved in quickly to become the

Kentucky representative on the SRTP Advisory Committee, replacing Jim Martin (*APSA Directory*, 1968).

Gladys Kammerer was one of four prominent women in political science in the South in the 1940s—the two from Florida's State College for Women—Marian Irish and Daisy Parker—and another Missourian, Catheryn Seckler-Hudson, who taught in the "outback of Washington, D C." Gladys, however, made her impact in public and urban administration. She moved successively up the chain to become President of the Southern Political Science Association. She served on the councils of CGEPA (forerunner of NASPAA), APSA twice, and AAUP.²

Clearly Kammerer was a pioneer in the field because of her sex as well as her ability. She was welcomed as one who filled a void which was much needed and sought by political scientists of this "brave new world" after World War II. She gave no quarter in arguing her points and expected none—but it was her ability to persuade and to convince—based on knowledge and facts, that won the day for her. Her ability was recognized by the University of Florida, and in 1958 Florida hired her away from Kentucky as full professor and Director of the Public Administration Clearing House. At this stage she left the SRTP, except for a brief period when Florida attempted to play a role (described above) in it.

Hallie Farmer This pioneering woman was an aberration. As she put it she was a historian who became a political scientist through the backdoor. Born in Anderson, Indiana, she obtained her baccalaureate from Indiana State Teachers College and her M.A. and Ph.D. at the University of Wisconsin. She became a member of a small but very talented faculty, that largely held together through the Depression at Alabama College for Women, as Professor and head of the History Department, and was later to become the first head of the newly created Department of Social Sciences.

Dr. Farmer was a reformer, as well as an educator. She was an early leader of women's movements—serving as first Vice President of the AAUW and state President of the B&P Club.³ She was a successful campaigner for state prison reform, for repeal of the poll tax, and for improvement in the processes of the Alabama Legislature (see also Stetson, 1988).

How her link to the SRTP was established is not entirely clear, but she was there from the beginning. Perhaps it was the proximity of a sister institution to the University of Alabama that brought her to the attention of Roscoe Martin for soon after he arrived in Alabama, he employed Hallie Farmer.

²Abbreviations stand for the following organizations: CGEPA, Conference on Graduate Education in Public Administration, NASPAA, National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration, AAUP, American Association of University Professors.

³Abbreviations stand for the following organizations: AAUW, American Association of University Women and B&PW, Business and Professional Women.

as a summer researcher for the Bureau of Public Administration. Her approach to her *The Legislative Process in Alabama* was brilliant and, perhaps, unique. Each summer she produced a chapter of the book, and Martin packaged it in paperback. At the end, with some updating and slight revision, the widely read and quoted book was completed. Because she was there and because she had wise counsel and tremendous foresight, Martin added her to the Advisory Committee from the beginning. Her students, moreover, constituted important parts of the complement of Fellows over the course of the years.

William J. McLaughlin The contributions of this man were important to the SRTP but brief. After two years, he was replaced as the liaison for the Tennessee Valley Authority by Lawrence Durisch, about whom you will hear more in connection with the research effort. I do not wish to minimize his contributions, because his early efforts were crucial to the success of the Program, but I do not know a lot about the nature of these contributions.

Complementary Programs

The impact of the Southern Regional Training Program in Public Administration cannot be judged solely on the first-year graduate program alone because there were two other developments which made the results even more impressive. In the process of identifying gaps and needs of the South, Martin and others recognized the lack of trained Ph.D.s in public administration. An undated and unsigned "Preliminary Report on Extension of Ph.D. Programs in Political Science at Southern State Universities" discussed the possibility of providing a joint university degree or a single university with an indication that there was some collaboration with other southern universities (Martin Papers, Box 1). In this report the paucity of Ph.D.'s granted between 1929 and 1946 (which I have referred to already) was played up, leaving the obvious conclusion that something needed to be done to remedy this deficiency. Out of some regional conferences that were held came a program to award advanced fellowships to non-southern institutions, and the recipients of the fellowships were required to return to the South and engage in teaching and/or research in public administration for a period of time equal to the time of the grant. Once again the General Education Board agreed to finance this program for a five-year period beginning in 1945. Although not originally designed as a part of the SRTP, the President of the University of Alabama decided to utilize the machinery of the Southern Regional Training Program to direct this new venture which led the effort to be called the Advanced SRTP Program and, according to Egger and Cooper (1949, p. 39) "had the effect of making this phase of the program regional rather than local in character."

The second event was the development of a lecture series by prominent

specialists in public administration. Not only did this series afford the first-year SRTP Fellows an opportunity to 'rub shoulders' with the leading persons in the field, but the lectures resulted in a number of books on public administration and served to fill a void in a much needed theoretical base in this burgeoning field. The first series of lectures was delivered in 1944 and was published the following year as *New Horizons in Public Administration* (1945). The authors of this symposium constituted an impressive array of talent: Leonard D. White, Marshall Dimock, Donald Stone, Gordon Clapp, John Millett, and Arthur W. Macmahon. This first volume was followed by lectures by single individuals: John Gaus, Luther Gulick, James W. Fesler, and Paul Appleby, to name a few. Fortunately, those lectures, even though the SRTP has ceased to exist, continue to this day.

Significance. The significance of these three programs to political science in the South can hardly be overstated. Egger and Cooper in their 1949 assessment of the Alabama Bureau of Public Administration declined to give a final evaluation of the first-year program because it was still in progress, nor will I, but they did say, 'the qualitative standards of the SRTP are, by any standards of comparison, thoroughly adequate' (p. 219). The graduates of the Program seem to me to demonstrate admirably the success of the effort and the value which it rendered to the South. Some of these graduates have become prominent. Bob Denhardt, recent President of the American Society for Public Administration, is one of them. Its graduates number at least two college presidents, several department chairpersons, a number of prominent city managers and chief administrative officers, and so on. Only one or two of the first-year graduates went on to the Advanced Program, but they included Joseph M. Robertson and Daniel R. Grant. Others obtained the Ph.D. by other routes.

It seems to me, however, that the significance of these efforts rests not so much in the products of the programs, even though they have been eminently successful, but it is the fact that Martin and the others in this group recognized a need—a void in education for the public service—and recognized that no single institution at that time could meet that need. The significance, then, is that these institutions, with the help of the TVA, collaborated to fill the void.

SPARC

The second example of networking in the South can be found in the area of organized research. The idealized and original format for this research involved organized research units in each state doing the research on the subject in that state, and these products, then, would be summarized in a volume devoted to a regional view of the problem.

This research effort, however, was to be different from the usual type of

regional research. It was not, for example, to be the kind of research conducted by V. O. Key and Alex Heard, which led to the book entitled *Southern Politics* (1949). The Key study did indeed cover the region, but its research emanated from the campus of the University of Alabama. A single research staff worked from a predetermined outline and the staff fanned out to the various states to gather the material.

Not were the other regional studies of the same nature. (1) Paul Wager's study of subsistence homestead projects, which produced the volume *One Foot in the Soil* (1945), (2) the study sponsored by the Federal Public Housing Authority into the Federal government's public housing program conducted by Rupert B. Vance and Gordon W. Blackwell (1946), (3) Albert Lepawsky's study of governmental planning in the South sponsored by the National Planning Association (1949), (4) a study of taxation of manufacturing in the South by James W. Martin and Glenn D. Morrow (1948). The SPARC studies were different because they involved gathering the principals from the various states together, hammering out the details of the research outlines, and reaching common agreement on the objectives of the various studies.

Three studies were produced under this arrangement. The first of these research efforts focused on natural resource administration (*JOP* 1945, p. 341). Its birth stemmed from a conference of twenty representatives from eight institutions of higher education and the Tennessee Valley Authority held on November 11, 1944 (*JOP* 1944, pp. 486-87). While the details of this process can be determined from the Egger and Cooper (1949) book previously referred to, it is significant for our purposes that it was decided that only representatives of public universities and the Tennessee Valley Authority would be involved. An ad hoc group of Bureaus of Public Administration at four of these institutions—the Institute of Government at the University of North Carolina and the Bureau of Business Research at the University of Kentucky plus the TVA—performed the research. On the completion of the six-state studies—Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee—Lawrence Durisch and Robert Lowry (1949) produced a summary and synthesizing volume for the region.

The consequences of this research went far beyond the immediate research product. This effort was, of course, financed in good part by the General Education Board but the TVA added \$12,000 to G.E.B.'s \$25,000 and each state institution agreed to contribute \$2,000. Only Mississippi, due to its limited resources, was allowed to contribute just \$1,200. Georgia was unable to organize itself for participation in the project (Egger and Cooper, 1949, p. 44).

From these funds Roscoe Martin was able to persuade both the University of Mississippi and the University of South Carolina to establish Bureaus of Public Administration and he was also able to augment the resources of the Tennessee Bureau with these funds. It is not entirely clear the extent to

which Roscoe Martin had a hand in picking the persons who would occupy the crucial roles in the Bureaus at Mississippi and South Carolina, but he either had a direct hand in the selection, as Chris Larsen thinks he did about the South Carolina post, or it became a matter of a set of fortuitous circumstances that landed Bob Highsaw at Mississippi—Martin was trying to establish a Bureau at Mississippi, promised to plow a little seed money into the operation, and Highsaw was just finishing his degree at Harvard. There was no Bureau of Public Administration at Kentucky at that time, so Roscoe Martin used Jim Martin's shop, the Bureau of Business Research (Highsaw 1975, Egger and Cooper, 1949, pp. 45–46, Larsen, 1988).

To discover the connecting threads for three other members of the network is not as difficult as in the case of the SRTP. These connections obviously stemmed from the needs of the natural resources project and the capacity of the discipline. Here we may pause, however, to look briefly at three other members of the network.

James W. Martin Jim Martin has been mentioned before as one who helped get the SRTP started. He exhibited the status and standards of the profession at the time he obtained his higher education; he never completed the Ph.D. but he became perhaps the most highly respected authority in the South on governmental finance, especially state and local finance. As a native of the Muskogee Indian Territory (later called Oklahoma), he obtained an A.B. degree from East Texas Teachers College and an A.M. from George Peabody College. In all he studied at the University of Chicago for four years, but his residence there occurred several years before the other members of the network came along. He taught one summer at Peabody and four years at Emory. Then he moved to the University of Kentucky in 1928, served one year as the Assistant Director and became Director of the Bureau of Business Research the following year. It was in this capacity that he was so highly involved in both of these collaborative efforts (*APSA Directory*, 1948).

Robert B. Highsaw We have already seen that Bob Highsaw was selected to go to Mississippi as its only specialist in public administration. A native of Memphis, where his father was engaged in secondary education, Bob completed his A.B. at Princeton and an M.A. and Ph.D. at Harvard, just as these projects were getting off the ground. While he was working on his dissertation, he taught at Vanderbilt for two years during World War II and then was employed by Louisiana State University, where he had been filling in for professors who were on leave. It was from this position as an associate professor that he went to the University of Mississippi and became the founder and first Director of the Bureau of Public Administration at that institution. In 1955 he moved to the University of Alabama as successor to Albert Lepawsky as Director of the SRTP. Two years later he became the

Director of the Bureau of Public Administration and Head of the Department of Political Science. Prior to his retirement, this holder of a Phi Beta Kappa key became a Distinguished Professor at the University of Alabama. He played a vital role, therefore, in both the teaching and research networks (APSA *Directory*, 1968). As we shall see, he was the author of the summary volume for the third research project of SPARC.

Christian L. Larsen It seems reasonably obvious how Roscoe Martin and Bob Highsaw he was in the region and well known to Martin by the time the need came around. Chris Larsen is another story. According to Chris's version of it, he and Roscoe had met at political science conventions several times and these contacts eventually led to his selection. Larsen's background does not parallel the backgrounds of the others. He was a native of Nebraska and obtained his A.B. degree from the state university in Lincoln. He received his M.A. and his Ph.D. from the University of California. He began his teaching career at Western Reserve University and, indeed, he was at that institution when he was summoned to become the Assistant Director of the new Bureau of Public Administration at the University of South Carolina (George Sherrill retained the title of Director). He left South Carolina four years later to become Director of the Bureau of Public Administration at the University of Maryland for two years, at which time he left to become Head of the Department of Government and Political Science at Sacramento College in California (where he stayed until he retired). He was not, therefore, involved in the third collaborative research project, and neither was the University of South Carolina (APSA *Directory*, 1968; Larsen, 1988).

The second study conducted by the ad hoc group of Bureaus of Public Administration involved technical services available to state and local governments in the southeast and brought in a seventh state, Virginia. The TVA was especially interested in this project, and Lawrence Durisch took the lead. It was to be conducted much in the same fashion as the natural resources study.

It was decided that each of the seven universities participating in the project would prepare a directory for its own state of the national and state agencies providing technical assistance to state and local governments, and an analysis of the use that had been made of technical services by state and local governments. The Tennessee Valley Authority prepared the list of national agencies while each of the participants assembled the list of agencies providing services within the states only (Egger and Cooper, 1949, p. 49).

Financing was carried out in much the same manner as the first regional study: the General Education Board contributed the major portion of the funds, the TVA also put in a substantial amount, and each participating university contributed a stated amount. By the end of 1949 six of the seven Bureaus had produced a Directory, and three of them had printed an Analy-

sis of the use being made of this information at the state and This project did not proceed as rapidly as the first, however, until 1952 that the summary volume for the region, *Local Governments and Industrial Development*, was produced by the TVA to Durisch and Bob Lowry

Weldon Cooper Bringing Virginia into the group of research The Director of the Virginia Bureau of Public Admin Roland Egger, another Phi Beta Kappa from Texas, and he reat enticed Weldon Cooper away from the University of Alabama

Cooper fits the mold we have been seeing He was born in T basketball and obtained his B A degree from Abilene Christi M A from the University of Texas, and obtained his Ph D from sity of Chicago in public administration Before he completed degree, he served as Assistant Director of the University of Tex. Municipal Research under Roscoe Martin and served for a ve Director when Martin left for Alabama The following year Mart Assistant Director of the new Alabama Bureau, a position which til World War II began For the first three years of the war, Cox in the Bureau of the Budget in the Organization and Meth served a year in the Army Air Force, and returned to the Bureau get At the end of the war, Martin brought Cooper back to serve Director for the Jefferson County (Alabama) Survey, which advc the most imaginative solutions to the problems of metropolitan that had been produced (*ASPA Directory*, 1948) If the solutio had been implemented, the nation would have heard more ab mingham study than it did the study of Baton Rouge (Coop 1949)

At the completion of the study, Cooper left Alabama to becor Director of the Bureau of Public Administration at the University In truth he was actually more the Director than the Associate I cause Roland Egger spent most of his time moving from one visi porary assignment to another during that period Cooper became name when Egger moved up to become Chair of the Departmer Affairs in 1956 and Chair of the consolidated Department of Polr in 1957 While still serving as Director, Cooper became Secr Board of Visitors in 1958, and Administrative Assistant to the the University of Virginia in 1959--a position he held for ten y might expect, he also served as Vice President of the Southern ence Association, as one among his many honors (*APSA Director not underestimate the power which this man exercised in the "st son "* He was known as "Mr. Virginia" (Cooper, Mildred, 1988). revelation to see this Texas athlete and something of a maverick bued with the philosophy and lore of Thomas Jefferson

The technical services project had not been completed when Roscoe Martin left for Syracuse University. He was succeeded as Director of the Bureau of Public Administration by York Willbern. One year later Willbern also became Chair of the Department of Political Science.

York Willbern Willbern was another native of Texas. He also was inducted into Phi Beta Kappa. His B.A. was from Southwest Texas State College and both his M.A. and Ph.D. were received from the University of Texas. He managed to obtain the terminal degree before he served in the Army Air Force for two years, depriving him of the need to take advantage of the GI Bill, as it was known, but allowing him to get a jump on most of those who had had to interrupt their education. In 1947 he replaced Joseph M. Ray, another Texan, as Associate Director of Alabama's Bureau of Public Administration, having gone to Alabama initially as an assistant professor in 1946. Among other things he was Editor-in-Chief of *The Public Administration Review* for two years and became President of the national organization ASPA in 1963-64. His interests were catholic. He was an officer in such organizations as the National League of Cities, the American Association of University Professors, and the American Society of Planning Officials. Not only was he a very fine editor and author of professional works, but his students will tell you that he was the best instructor they ever had (*APSA Directory* 1968).

Willbern not only had to wind up the technical services project when he took over the leadership of the ad hoc group of Bureaus, but he also began a new venture in the area of governmental public relations. The task this time was more difficult because the outside funds were beginning to dry up and the organization had to operate on the resources of the individual institutions and the TVA. The states represented for this third project increased in number and the representatives in some cases also changed. Willbern, of course, represented Alabama, and the other states and their representatives were as follows: Kentucky (Kenneth Vanlandingham), Mississippi (Robert Highsaw), North Carolina (Fred Cleaveland), Tennessee (Lee Greene), Virginia (Edward S. Overman), and the usual pair from the TVA—Lawrence L. Durisch and Robert E. Lowry. Two new states were added, however: Georgia represented by Morris W. H. Collins, Jr., and the Florida Public Administration Clearing Service, represented by the ex-SRTP Fellow William F. Larsen.

This project also differed in another way. The state studies were performed but, to my knowledge, none of them was printed. Instead, a summary volume was written by Robert B. Highsaw entitled *Natural Resources and an Informed Public* (1953). Hence, this project was really an offshoot of the first one.

Finally, the meeting at Atlanta, held in Howard Menhem's shop at Georgia Tech, found the participants spending a considerable amount of time trying to come up with a name for the group which would shorten into

an acronym. So the name of Southern Public Administration Research Council—i.e., SPARC—was born. The Highsaw study, unfortunately, was the only research product published specifically under the name of SPARC. Attempts to keep the group together and functioning were futile, and in 1957 Willbern left for a full professorship at Indiana University. In 1965 he became a University Professor (*APSA Directory*, 1973).¹

SPSA

The third illustration of collaborative effort in the Southern Region comes from the political science profession itself: the formation of the Southern Political Science Association. It was the first regional association and is, therefore, the oldest in continuous existence. February, 1989 will mark the sixtieth anniversary of the Association. This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of *The Journal of Politics*. I call your attention to the article in *PS* on "The Genesis of the *Journal of Politics*," by Elizabeth Hughes Clark (1988).

The network which brought the SPSA into being was undoubtedly an east coast network. For all of his protestations that there were plural fathers of the Association, it seems clear that Cullen B. Gosnell (of Emory) had more to do with the beginning of the Association than any other one person. As he describes it in *The Journal of Politics*, he and Robert Rankin (of Duke), and Edward S. Corwin (of Princeton) discussed the possibility of forming a regional political science conference when they were vacationing at High Hampton Inn in 1925. It is likely that a similar organization of economists spurred them into action, and the first meeting was called for Atlanta in February, 1929.

After this organizational meeting was held, a second one was scheduled for the fall of that same year. Hear Gosnell tell it in his own words:

Our first real session came in the fall of 1929. The Association met in Atlanta annually through 1936. The press was very generous with us and this helped us considerably in the early days. On one occasion I planned a dinner for our group at the Biltmore Hotel but when we arrived the economists were eating it (Gosnell 1954, p. 407).

Gosnell concluded this story by saying that "[the economists] truly believed in economy." What Gosnell's story does not record is the fact, according to Manning Dauer, that Gosnell got the Georgia Political Science Association to fold and to merge into the Southern Political Science Association.

In 1929 there were only eight departments of political science in the South: Alabama, Chattanooga, West Virginia, L. S. U., Virginia, Florida State Woman's College, Florida Southern, and Johns Hopkins. This revelation

¹SPARC grew in membership and representatives, but efforts by Lee Greene, Gladys Kammerer, and Albert Sturm through 1965 to keep the group actively involved were futile. Projects to be financed (1) by foundations or (2) from the members' own resources were considered but projects were finalized.

comes as a surprise to many of us. At the organizational meeting in February, there were approximately twenty present, only half of whom were political scientists. Robert Rankin and Robert R. Wilson from Duke, George R. Sherrill from Clemson, E. Baskin Wright and Edmund G. Howe from Alabama, J. W. Manning and Irby Hudson from Vanderbilt, Frank Prescott of the University of Chattanooga, D. W. Knepper of Mississippi State College for Women, and Gosnell (Gosnell, 1954, p. 407).

In 1934, as Gosnell told it, they had some "high brass" for their meeting, including the President of APSA, Walter Shepard. It seems that Shepard and others "looked on our organization with misgivings at first," but evidence indicates that political scientists in the South had long ago changed the minds of the doubters.

I doubt that there are any members of the Association who do not know that the continued success of the Southern Political Science Association was due to Manning Dauer, Jr. In 1937 a few staunch members of the Association had a little meeting in the lobby of the Carolina Inn in Chapel Hill and discussed the formation of a professional journal. In 1933 the Committee on Policy of APSA had given the Southern \$100 with which to publish its proceedings and it renewed this gift for several years. As Clark's article (1988) shows, Roscoe Martin was the chairman of the committee, but it was Manning Dauer and the University of Florida who guaranteed its publication and continued to do so until we made arrangements to have it printed by the University of Texas Press shortly before Mannings death. It is in his honor that we have this year named our first winner of the Manning Dauer Award. Evron Kirkpatrick.

To the members of the Southern Political Science Association not very much needs to be said about Manning Dauer. Unless you are completely new to the organization, you will remember his tall and slightly stooped figure passing out the Secretary-Treasurer's Report and copies of the Constitution at the Business Meeting. You will remember his wise counsel in behalf of the organization and his real affection for the people in it. Above all you will remember that, in some ways, the Southern Political Science Association and *The Journal of Politics* were like children to him. He guided them and he guarded them so that they became symbols of excellence.

Although he was born in North Carolina, Manning was a Floridian. He obtained his A.B. at Gainesville and took a scant three years to obtain his A.M. and Ph.D. from the University of Illinois, but I suspect that he begrudged having to take those three years away from Florida. But it needed to be done and so he did it, just as he served in the Army Air Force for four years (rising to the rank of major). He became Chair of the Department in 1950. One year—1954–55—we let him give up his duties as Secretary-Treasurer and Managing Editor of *The Journal* so that he could be President of the Southern Political Science Association, but when that tour was over,

he returned to his old stand. As you might suppose, he was another of our principals who was eligible to wear the Phi Beta Kappa key (*ASPA Directory*, 1973)

The Components of the Network

What miraculous thing brought this productive network together? As I searched for that common denominator, I began to realize that there was no single factor but a number of factors which provided the strands of the web.

There was obviously the *Texas Connection*. Roscoe Martin, Weldon Cooper, Joe Ray, York Willbern, Roland Egger, Lawrence Durisch, and James Martin were prominent in this network. The book by Rowland Egger and Weldon Cooper, entitled *Research, Education, and Regionalism* (1949) was to be the first of a number of studies of the many bureaus of public administration, spurred on by Virginia's desire to expand and retool its own bureau. This first volume was about the University of Alabama's Bureau. As Egger and Cooper said, "in this story the Alabama Bureau is in the hands not only of its professional colleagues, but of its friends as well" (p. viii). When V. O. Key read the volume, he said that it should have been called "The Saga of Roscoe C. Martin or Texas Fell on Alabama."

There was also an important strand coming from the University of Chicago. Roscoe Martin, Weldon Cooper, Lawrence Durisch, Gladys Kammerer, Jim Martin and Albert Lepawsky. While they were not all there at the same time, as Lepawsky said, Chicago was the center of public administration in those days (1988).

This conclusion leads to another—that the new discipline of public administration also provided ties between individuals. This factor plus the institutionalization of political science into a regional organization (*JOP* 1945, p. 209) provided the opportunity for increased communication and for a relatively closely knit group—aided by the small number of political scientists in the South at that time.

The fact that there were at least eight principals who were Phi Beta Kappas probably was spurious to this investigation, but it may account for some of the dynamism and wisdom which helped to produce these collaborative efforts.

We have established, therefore, that there were a number of connecting threads which produced the web of political scientists. The burning question for me, however, is whether or not the regional character of these efforts was significant. Lee Greene in one of his articles on the Southern Regional Training Program (1947, p. 245) suggested that other regions might use SRTP as a model and try this kind of venture. I am not so sure, however, that Lee may not have been a bit visionary.

The Southern Region had an advantage. First, it was probably more easily

identified as a region than any other in the United States. Second, the "as which President Franklin D. Roosevelt put on the region—as the 'economic problem number one'—probably was not available to any other region (Commager, 1948, p. 577). Third, the boost given to regionalism by Howard W. Odum from North Carolina gave such activity a running start. Finally, the presence of the TVA, staffed by a group of brilliant and progressive professionals who cared about the land and its people, was not and could not be duplicated elsewhere.

Lawrence L. Durisch. In the midst of such notables as David E. Lilienthal and Gordon Clapp, there emerged one professional who probably deserves much credit for some of these achievements as even Roscoe Martin. Lawrence Durisch. Ably assisted by his number two, Robert Lowry, he quietly went about the business of making these collaborative efforts work. His unassuming nature would not allow him to be pushed into the limelight, but he is there nonetheless. He was not a Texan, having been nurtured in Nebraska—including the LLB from Lincoln—but he obtained his MA and PhD from the University of Chicago one year after Martin obtained his. Almost immediately he became associated with the TVA, and in 1938 he became Chief of the Government Research Division. It is not difficult to see, therefore, how valuable he was to these collaborative training and research efforts. He provided wise counsel and some of the financial support (APSA *Directory*, 1948).

Undoubtedly the size of the region—as opposed to the nation—had its advantages. It allowed political scientists to gather in one place and to hammer out a consensus, which made these collaborative projects different. As Brooke Graves tried to do something like this on a national scale. He wanted to get experts to write a textbook on state government in each state and then he was going to write a summary volume. The project was started but never finished. Some state studies were written but most were not. It is true that the original editor died and his replacement was not as enthusiastic as his predecessor, but I suggest that the project was too large to accomplish satisfactorily (Highsaw, 1988). Daniel Elazar and the University of Nebraska Press are trying to do something of this same nature, and we will have to wait and see how successful it is. Even if it comes to completion, however, I submit that it does not approach the kind of project that SPARC produced because it has not been built on consensus. It was built, as I understand it, on a common outline handed to the participants in the various states. To say that it is the same is to miss the *esprit* which was developed among the political scientists who attended those meetings. These were real collaborative efforts built around a consensus of its members. As York Willbern once said, "It was the single most important and uplifting experience I had during my professional career" (Willbern, 1988).

THE RISE OF INDIVIDUALISM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Political science in the South in the 1980s is different from that which has been pictured for the 1930s and 1940s. These differences have tended to produce a collection of individual political scientists, as opposed to the networking which went on in earlier days. The growth and development of higher education generally and political science, in particular, have created an environment which predisposes concern by the individual political scientist for his or her own welfare as opposed to the welfare of the student or the institution of which the political scientist is a part.

The facts are well-known to most of us and need not be belabored here. Only the implications of these environmental changes may not be so highly recognized. First, there are more political scientists today than there were in the 1930s and 1940s. In 1948 there were 337 persons who were members of the American Political Science Association from V. O. Key's South, and when we add the District of Columbia, Kentucky, Maryland, and West Virginia to those eleven states, there were only 788 members (*APSA Directory*, 1948). In 1988 the members from Key's South numbered 1,944 and from the entire area, 2,992 (*APSA Directory*, 1988).

There are other indicators of growth of the political science profession. In 1988, for example, 1,377 individuals—i.e., excluding libraries and other organizations—belonged to the Southern Political Science Association. Of these 750 came from V. O. Key's South, and when the members from the District of Columbia, Maryland, Kentucky, and West Virginia are added, the total membership from the extended South numbers 856 (Carver, 1988). In 1947 SPSA membership amounted to no more than 318 persons (*JOP* 1948, p. 221). Attendance at the 1988 annual meeting of the Association, moreover, exceeded 750 persons.

Not only are there more political scientists in the South today but the void once recognized by Roscoe Martin and the others no longer exists. At least 378 institutions of higher learning offer some political science courses in the extended South (excluding West Virginia), but at least 200 of them have separate departments of political science, under various rubrics. In V. O. Key's eleven southern states there were 178 separate departments, a far cry from the 1930s and 1940s. At least twenty-seven of these 200 departments, including West Virginia University, offer the Ph.D. in political science. In addition, Florida State University also offers a Ph.D. in public administration and both the University of Georgia and George Mason University offer the Doctor of Public Administration (DPA) degree (*Guide to Graduate Study in Political Science*, 1986). Thus, another void has been filled.

These facts plainly demonstrate that the environment of the political scientist in the South has changed. While the growth in political scientists and in departments of political science did not completely eliminate the need for

cooperative relationships between institutions, it did reduce drastically the urgency of the need for such arrangements. It is not too much of an over-simplification to say that it changed the aura of political science in the South from one of collaboration to one of competition—in many instances, intense competition. The competition, in particular, now exists among individuals and, as the discipline of political science became accepted and legitimate, among institutions of higher learning.

We have already seen, therefore, that during the last three or four decades here has been a decided trend toward formalizing and institutionalizing political science. The common American value structure which holds that "bigger is better" has also tended to throw these universities into competition with each other in terms of prestige and visibility.

Let me choose two related areas of our profession to demonstrate how the enlarged and formalized environment has affected the political scientist. These two areas are promotion and tenure. The stimuli of increased numbers, of need for recognition by others in the academic community, and of the formalization of procedures which usually accompanies growth in the institutions themselves have caused universities and colleges to formalize to a high degree the standards for promotion and tenure.

Tenure and Promotion Standards

The traditional criteria of universities in the nation and in the South have been teaching, research, and service. Over the years it has become obvious to those in the academic world that research and publication have become such dominant factors in making tenure and promotion decisions that teaching and service have received very little weight in the conclusions reached. The reasons for this emphasis probably will differ from one institution to the next, but there are common reasons which will be found in a great many universities—universities as opposed to colleges—because research is supposed to be the distinguishing factor between the two types of institutions. One of the most obvious reasons for depending on research as the primary criterion is the fact that publications can be quantified. That they are quantified in many instances without regard to quality does not seem to be an impediment to their utility (Dresch, 1988). This quantification allows administrators to make decisions on tenure and promotion, and they are not usually qualified to make qualitative judgments on publications outside of their area of specialization. Ever lurking in the mind of those making these decisions, of course, is the possibility of suit by the rejected faculty member. Publications are also stressed because they give visibility to the candidate for tenure or promotion and to the institution. Reputation of the institution is extremely dependent on its publication record (Rudder, 1983; Robey, 1982; Klingemann, 1986). Increased reputation of the institution in terms

of graduate study not only brings recognition to the author but to the administrators of the institution because it attests to the success of their administration.

Finally, the employment of publications as the primary determinant allows judgments from specialists in the political science profession from outside the candidate's own institution. This factor provides a guard against favoritism and bias within the candidate's department. It overcomes, it is thought, the inability of the administrator to make qualitative judgments and allows him to compare his institution with the standards of others. This advantage in favor of research and publication as a criterion neglects the fact that professionals—political scientists in this case—are becoming increasingly reluctant to pass judgment on candidates in other institutions or will not give a negative report even when one is called for because of the fear of being sued.

Part of the reason why publications play such a prominent role is due to the difficulty in assessing the quality of the teaching of the candidate. Concerns for academic freedom—legitimate concerns—prevent the monitoring of teaching by the candidate's peers. Student evaluations are of some value but most university instructors recognize the weakness of these instruments. Even though teaching may well be a better way of disseminating the results of research and the spreading of knowledge, it is not an instrument that usually brings recognition to the candidate or the institution outside of the institution itself. Some administrators have been heard to say that good teaching is a given—that it is to be assumed before research and publication is to be considered—but the truth of the matter is that teaching is not given equal weight, much less superior weight, to publication.

Rarely is service given equal weight, even in theory, with teaching and research. Service counted toward tenure and promotion, moreover, is likely to mean only certain kinds of service. Service to one's profession, such as officeholding, will count, and service to outside groups usually will be accepted as credible. Service to one's own institution—i.e., serving as chairman of the department, president of the faculty senate, and so on—does not seem to be accepted by many institutions as a valid contribution of a faculty member. The distinguishing characteristic between these two types of service, once again, seems to be a matter of visibility to the external public and the consequent reputation which accrues to the home institution.

One other factor in appraising the criteria used to award tenure and promotion is the type of research being performed. Organized research causes problems of classification as well as worth. Most institutions will not count organized research as "research" because it is not refereed, even though such research is often more valuable to the community and is more widely read than independent, refereed research. Rather than class it as "research," many institutions categorize it as "service." By so doing organized

search is automatically given less weight than other kinds of research. The publication of textbooks, in many instances, is also not given as much credit toward tenure and promotion as original research, even though successful textbook authors tend to be among the most widely recognized persons in the field. Those persons who deny textbooks equality with other kinds of refereed research do not recognize the fact that these authors are setting the norms for the field by a process of inclusion and exclusion.

If this scenario represents an accurate portrayal of the common practices in the South with regard to tenure and promotion, then it has rather serious consequences for higher education in political science. In the first place, the student is being shortchanged by the placing of an inadequate amount of emphasis on the teaching aspects of the profession. The common allegation that good research is essential to good teaching is true only in moderation. The political scientist who engages in meaningful research and transmits it to his students, or who allows students to engage in part of the research alongside him, does indeed contribute to the teaching of those students. The danger is, however, that the dedicated researcher gives inadequate attention to his or her students and does not prepare lectures and seminars adequately to produce "good" teaching. Even though research is the distinguishing factor between a university and a college (Etzioni, 1964, pp. 14-16), it does not change the fact that the primary objective of any institution of higher learning is teaching, and the focus of the institution's efforts (and those of its faculty) must be on its students. This analysis does not suggest that anyone connected with a university would deny its importance. The obvious conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that faculty and administrators alike are prone to take the easy way out. Since there seems to be difficulty in obtaining an objective assessment of teachers and teaching, they are prone to rationalize its existence and rest the determination on research and publication. They refuse to make subjective judgments for purposes of tenure and promotion—a requisite according to our current knowledge, if teaching is to be accorded its proper role.

The failure of universities to give full credit for service, including institutional service, is potentially more damaging than the reluctance to give more emphasis to teaching. The stance taken by universities which do not give credit (or little credit) for service to the institution itself is almost life-threatening. If the health of the institution is not jeopardized by this failure, it is because the various administrations have been imposing on the good nature of its faculty. A dean who says that we expect a department chairperson to do as much research as other faculty members is living in an unrealistic world.

Throughout the history of political thought in the Western world there has been a marked battle between the individual, on the one hand, and the needs of the community, on the other. In the current world, especially since

the turn of the twentieth century, a third—an intervening—element has entered the equation: the institution. In the 1930s and 1940s it took several institutions in collaboration with each other to produce the result needed. Today, we are dependent on the institutions of higher learning to sense the needs of the individuals and the community and to provide the solution. Someone, however, must operate the institutions and make them work; and those persons must be given credit for making their contributions to education and, in this case, political science. To extract this service from the individual without proper recognition is bordering on the immoral, and to expect the institution to run without this kind of service is inviting mediocrity.

LESSONS FROM THIS LEGACY

What can we learn from contrasting today's behavior with that of the 1930s and 1940s? It seems obvious that the needs of today are not the same as the needs of the earlier period. The lesson is not that we need to coalesce in order to achieve desirable goals. Nor do I argue that certain criteria for promotion and tenure are more important than others. The principal lesson to be learned, it seems to me, is that we should do what we do, as professionals, deliberately and as rationally as possible. A paraphrase of Glendon Schubert's discussion (1957, p. 348) of the psychological realists' approach to decision making seems appropriate: the public interest is served by the self-awareness of political scientists, who play their roles self-consciously and recognize the full implications of their choices. The evidence is reasonably clear that we have not done that.

In the first place, our reverence for research has allowed us to lose sight of the objectives of higher education and of political science. We have allowed research to assume a super status partly because it is easier to specify results and partly because of the difficulty of measuring the other two variables. The same attitude has been absorbed and/or promoted by university administrators to the detriment of students, faculty, and institution. Administrators of these institutions, to be sure, bear only a part of the blame for these failures; we must also bear our share.

There has been an increasing tendency on the part of both individual faculty members and university administrators to play their roles selfishly. I would not argue that Roscoe Martin did not have a fair-sized ego or that he was not concerned with his public image, but he played his role self-consciously and kept his sights on the overall good of the community—the institution, the profession, and the region. To the extent that the Southern Political Science Association is alive and prospering, we have not only perpetuated but improved on our legacy. But in the other senses of this legacy we have not measured up. We need to be concerned about the student, the profession, and the institution. Realizing this change in attitude is no small order. Accomplishing changed results will take a little longer.

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Black Mayors and Police Policies

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This study examines the impact of black mayors on police department policies of interest to black citizens in 105 municipal governments in the United States. The correlates of community oriented policing, minority recruitment, black representation among sworn officers, citizen controls over department policies, and departmental responses to public disorder incidents are examined, and the presence of a black mayor during the time frame in question is found to be associated with both black representation among sworn officers and adoption of citizen controls over the department. The implications of these findings for the study of black mayoral influence are explored.

A substantial body of literature now exists assessing the correlates of black representation in federal, state, and local bureaucracies (Meier and Negro, 1976; Dye and Remick, 1981; Eisinger, 1982), on city school boards (Welch and Karnig, 1978; Robinson and England, 1981), and on city councils (Engstrom and McDonald, 1981; MacManus, 1978; Karnig and Welch, 1982). Consequently, though a number of controversies remain unresolved, we now know quite a bit about the socioeconomic, political, and structural factors which facilitate or impede the representation of blacks in such institutions.

What we still know little about is the impact of black representation on policy. While the symbolic value of black political representation is hardly to be discounted in a system of representative democracy, most advocates for and analysts of black political representation have assumed that increases in such representation ultimately will find expression in public policy. The research issue in this regard concerns whether and to what extent "passive" or descriptive representation (which depends upon representatives' characteristics, such as sex or race) is linked with "active" or substantive representation of the interests of those groups represented.

While active representation can take a variety of forms, such as representative-constituent policy agreement, or service, allocative, or symbolic responsiveness (Eulau and Karps, 1977), most analysts have looked for evidence of the provision of collective benefits to blacks (allocative responsiveness) to suggest the presence of such representation. Case studies have suggested that black officials can and do allocate benefits to the black com-

munity (Keech, 1968, Campbell and Feagin, 1975, Nelson and Meranto, 1977), but, as Eisinger notes (1982, p. 381), "they have not always been able to distinguish with precision those consequences that occurred as a direct function of black power nor have they sorted out in any systematic way alternative or contributing explanations for black gains." Yet attempts to test for a link between passive and active representation of blacks' interests across a large number of jurisdictions have been limited and, with a few notable exceptions (Eisinger, 1982, Meier and England, 1984, Browning Marshall, and Tabb, 1984), have done little to clarify the problem.

Those studies which have looked at the impact of black mayors on policy illustrate some of the difficulties. For example, Keller (1978), in studying public expenditures over several years in three cities with black mayors and three cities with white mayors, concludes that "it is not clear" that black mayors spend more on welfare-type functions or programs. Yet Karnig and Welch (1980) find that black mayors in a sample of 135 cities did spend more for social welfare but spent less for most physical facilities, protective services, and community amenities. Such apparently contradictory findings are common, and critics argue that the fault lies, at least in part, with reliance on expenditures as policy indicators. As Meier and England (1984) note, conceptualization of allocative responsiveness to blacks requires policy indicators which are clearly linked to black wishes or needs and which can be altered or affected by the actions of government officials. Expenditure data have been criticized on both grounds (Schuman and Gruenberg, 1972, Eisinger, 1982, Meier and England, 1984, Ostrom, 1983), as being too dependent on law, history, or economics and thus not subject to short-term influences of government officials, and as requiring "some questionable assumptions about which broad areas are of greater or lesser importance to the black electorate and black politicians" (Eisinger, 1982, p. 382).

A number of analysts have sought to avoid the perils of assigning black interests to expenditure categories by focusing upon the possible link between black officials and employment representation of blacks within the governmental workforce (Dye and Renick, 1981, Eisinger, 1982, see Stein, 1986 on minorities). While still subject to the constraints of law, history, or economics (see Ostrom, 1983, Schneider, 1980, on police employment), public employment is less subject to such influences than are expenditures (Wanat, 1976). Further, employment of blacks is clearly a tangible, unambiguous benefit to those employed and can be of great benefit to the black community in general. A link between black or minority officials and municipal employment of minorities has been established by analysts (see Eisinger, 1982, Stein, 1986), yet we are left with the question as to whether such a link represents simply some contemporary form of a "spoils system" or whether it is part of a broader form of ethnic politics influencing a wide variety of municipal programs and policies. To date, we know very little about whether

under what circumstances black mayors are linked with nonemployment, nonexpenditure policy outputs

Some related research suggests what could be done to examine this question. Meier and England (1984) build on the work of Bullock and Stewart (1979) regarding "second generation discrimination" by exploring the link between black school board representation and black versus white students' involvement in various educational programs. Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) examine the impact of black and Hispanic political incorporation on a variety of policy outputs in ten California cities. However, school governance is quite distinctive and black/white participation ratios are not so readily created in other program arenas, so we can't be sure how the active and passive representation links identified by Meier and England would hold up in regard to black mayors and municipal government policies. Similarly, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb do not look at the impact of black mayors and because of their small sample are not able to control for the potentially confounding effects of a variety of social, economic, and political factors.

BLACK MAYORS AND POLICE POLICIES

This study seeks to explore questions of black mayoral influence in the context of municipal police departments' programs and policies. For some time, urban police departments have been a focus of pressures for policies more responsive to minorities. The possible police role in contributing to or exacerbating racial tensions, triggering riots, blocking legitimate minority aspirations, and shaping minority perceptions of justice and equity in contemporary society have been a subject of interest to broad segments of society at numerous times (Altshuler, 1970; Hahn, 1971; Rossi, Berk, and Eidson, 1974).

Police departments have been accused of blatantly racist and repressive practices in so many black communities (Levine, 1974; Nelson and Meranto, 1977) that it is not surprising that many black mayors have campaigned on explicit pledges to "control" the police by pushing for adoption of specific programs and policies designed to better serve the needs or wishes of the black community. Yet, black mayors have often found it difficult to alter police-minority relations when confronted with socially-polarized, majority-dominated police bureaucracies and unions (e.g., Eisinger, 1980). Programs which have been advanced to enhance police-minority group relations are many and varied and meet with differing levels of support in black communities. Yet, if black mayors are inclined toward the practice of ethnic politics, they should certainly expect to see that inclination manifested in the adoption of at least some police practices, unless other factors intervene.

The sample utilized to test for such a link represents the universe of U.S. municipal police departments employing at least 100 full-time personnel in

cities with a black population equal to at least 5% of the total as of 1970 ($N = 169$).¹ Individual departments were surveyed by mail regarding specific department programs, procedures, and organizational characteristics. One hundred thirty-six departments responded to the survey, complete data for this analysis were obtained for 105 of those (62.1% of the total sample). The final data set includes departments in cities which range in size from 37,000 to 1.6 million (1970 population) and have black populations comprising between 5.2% and 7% of the total population of the city.² A complete list of the cities in which sample departments are located can be found in the appendix, with cities having black mayors during some or all of this period denoted by asterisks.

RESPONSIVE POLICE OUTPUTS

As noted earlier, analysts have experienced difficulties in selecting police indicators which are clearly linked to race and subject to influence by specific elected or appointed officials. Further, few analysts have looked at more than one or a small number of police indicators, thus limiting their ability to generalize about representation. Hence, this analysis seeks to tap an array of police policies widely supported by blacks to see which, if any, appear linked to the presence of a black mayor. In that regard, individual departments were questioned about the presence or absence, as of 1984, of a wide variety of programs and policies as well as basic features of implementation and adoption dates. In addition, departments were asked to provide copies of reports detailing the representation, as of 1984, of blacks in the ranks of full-time sworn officers.³

Table 1 lists the policies considered and their incidence in these departments as of 1984. As is evident, there is considerable variation in the utilization of different programs. Some, such as neighborhood watch programs and formal restrictions on the use of fatal force, have achieved such widespread use as to foreclose their ability to differentiate departments,⁴ while others such as team policing (designed to make police operations more responsive to localized needs),⁵ are not as widely used.

¹The range was selected so as to include departments large enough to provide a full range of police services and have established routines.

²Respondents were compared with non-respondents in terms of department size, city population, geographic region, form of government, and a number of other features. No significant differences were evident, though the sample appears to slightly overrepresent mayor council cities and to underrepresent the very largest cities.

³Employment data are listed on EEO-4 reports filed annually with the Federal government.

⁴Much more subtle differences in the nature of those formal restrictions on the use of fatal force must be charted to differentiate departments.

⁵Team policing provides "an attempt to decentralize the police organization to make it more responsive to the localized needs and interests of neighborhood and community groups."

TABLE 1

PRESENCE OF MINORITY-ORIENTED COMMUNITY OUTREACH PROGRAMS
IN MUNICIPAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 1984

	Number of Departments	Percent of Total (N = 136)	
Police in Minority Neighborhoods	25	21.6	
Development of Neighborhood Watch Programs in Minority Neighborhoods	113	97.4	
Regular Meetings with Minority Groups	98	75.9	
Formal Departmental Restrictions on the Use of Fatal Force	115	99.1	
Creation of Civilian Review Board	16	13.8	
Outfront Offices in Minority Communities	31	26.7	
Use of Integrated or All Black Recruit- ment Teams	67	53.2	
Recruitment Visits to Minority Com- munity Centers	77	61.1	
Advertising Job Openings in Minority News Media	84	66.7	
Providing Pre-exam Counseling and Training to Black Applicants	45	35.7	
Use of Special Selection Standards for Minority Applicants	16	12.7	
Existence of Department AA Plan	81	67.7	
	Minimum	Maximum	%
Black/Nonblack Ratio Among Worn Police Officers (N = 114)	0%	56.4%	11.5

One output which is singled out for examination here is the establishment of a Civilian Review Board to oversee selected police activities. Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) find adoption of such boards in their sample of ten California cities, to be linked to minority incorporation into the dominant governing coalition, noting that minority leaders throughout the country often advocated the creation of civilian review boards as a means of publicizing and investigating incidents of excessive use of force by police (p. 152). As of 1984, less than 15% of the sample cities examined here had a Civilian Review Board in place, fewer than 70% of those had authorization to investigate citizen complaints against the department and fewer than 40%

usually involves stability of patrol through permanent assignment of police teams to small areas in neighborhoods (Johnson, Misner, and Brown 1981, p. 135).

had authorization to review most or all department policies. As an indicator of the extent of citizen oversight into departmental affairs, the Civilian Review Board measure is assigned one point each for the presence of a Civilian Review Board as of 1984, authorization to investigate citizen complaints, and authority to review most or all department policies.

Because so many other programs and policies were considered and many appear to be similar type of policies, correlations between policies were examined for possible patterns of incidence. While some policies are intercorrelated, not all are, so data reduction techniques were employed to search for the presence of clusters of policies. Individual programs were first coded as a zero if the program was not provided at any time between 1975 and 1984, a one if it had been adopted by 1984, a two if it had been in existence since 1980, and a three if it had been adopted as early as 1975. The coding scheme thus assumes that early adoption is a sign of greater responsiveness.^{*}

Factor analysis was employed to indicate appropriate groupings of programs. Two separate factors accounted for 33% and 23% of the variance, respectively, with three different programs loading highly on each factor. No other factors were significant, and the remaining program indicators did not load highly on either of these two factors. The first factor shows high loadings for regular meetings with black community groups, utilization of team policing, and operation of storefront offices in minority communities. It is thus assumed to represent a style of community-oriented policing geared to the specific needs of the black community, an approach to policing that finds strong support in black communities. The second factor clearly represents minority recruitment efforts, with high loadings on the use of integrated recruitment teams, advertising in minority media sources, and provision of pre-exam counseling for minority applicants to the police department. Factor scores are utilized throughout the analysis to represent community oriented policing and minority recruitment efforts.

While demands for more expansive efforts to recruit blacks have been strong, black communities have also pressed demands for immediate tangible results in terms of greater black representation among the ranks of sworn officers. Because so many formal and informal barriers to employment in police departments disproportionately affect black applicants, it has been assumed that much can be done to increase black representation in the ranks of uniformed officers even in the absence of an expanded black applicant pool (Preston, 1977) and black mayors have moved to do just that (Eisinger 1982). Consequently, expanding minority recruitment and increasing black representation are efforts which can be and are pursued simultaneously.

^{*}Similarities to assumptions made by Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) are evident as they code adoption of a Police Civilian Review Board as zero for no board, one for consideration without adoption, and two for consideration and adoption.

with the latter not entirely dependent on the former.⁷ Representation here is measured by the percentage of blacks among the ranks of full-time, sworn police officers as of 1984.⁸

One final dependent variable is included in the analysis to represent a policy which does not engender a clear position from the black community. Police departments generally exercise a fair amount of discretion in handling incidents such as drunk and disorderly, vagrancy, loitering, noise, and similar offenses (known generally as public disorder offenses), and responses can vary from the quite informal (verbal admonitions, driving a drunk home, etc.), somewhat less informal (referral or transport to an appropriate social service agency), to the more formal (official diversion to a public or private program, or arrest). Yet, police and public officials in general get mixed signals from the minority community as to the "appropriate" or desired response to such incidents. Given the crowded housing patterns and unemployment rates in predominantly black communities, blacks are more likely than whites to be part of public disorder incidents. If the usual department policy is one of arrest in such circumstances, critics may (and do) interpret that response as police harassment or discrimination. On the other hand, other members of minority communities (especially the elderly and homeowners) who may be disturbed by incidents of public disorder in the neighborhood, often object to what they perceive as a more lax standard of treatment of such incidents. Consequently, black mayors would have to look to their black community for clearer signals as to how to respond.

Considerable pressures arose during the late sixties and early seventies to "decriminalize" such incidents, and many police departments were constrained by law to handle incidents with informal responses, such as diversion. Departments were queried regarding their usual response to such incidents and any legal constraints on that response,⁹ and the first measure is used as a dependent variable in an analysis which subdivides the sample between those cities with above-average rates of black homeownership (linked to demands for formal responses to public disorder) and those with below-average rates of black homeownership.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Any given set of police policies is likely to emerge as a consequence of a variety of forces internal and external to the police organization. In order to

Further support for this assumption is evident in the low correlation between scores on the minority recruitment factor and actual levels of black representation ($r = -.04$).

While some indicator of parity in representation might be utilized (by dividing black employment of representation by the percentage of blacks in the city), the interest here is to test for such linkages. Further, in many cases, the pressure from black communities has been for more police jobs, not simply the proper share of those jobs.

The legal requirements are included as a control variable in subsequent statistical analyses.

assess the impact of black mayors on police policies across a large number of cities, we must attempt to account for all plausible competing explanations for the presence of any given policy. Consequently, we must consider a variety of community, political, and organizational characteristics associated with police outputs.

Virtually any analysis of responsiveness to black demands assumes that such responsiveness is likely to have some connection with the percentage representation of blacks in a community population, either as a consequence of the sheer weight of demands, the needs which those numbers represent or of the potential electoral mobilization inherent in population shares. The black population percentage in each city as of 1980 is thus included as an indicator of black community characteristics on the assumption that cities with larger proportions of black citizens will be more likely to provide police policies to benefit the black community.

However, it does not seem likely that urban police departments would respond to their black communities as undifferentiated masses, significant only in their size. Studies of both micro- and macro-level providers suggest that service providers at any level are more responsive to certain types of citizens or clients. Agencies and street-level bureaucrats appear to be more receptive to claims from stable, responsible clients (Stone, 1977, Lapsky, 1979), for other reasons, cities may tend to be more responsive to property-taxpayers (Peterson 1981). Given the sociology of urban policing (Skolnick 1966), it seems that police departments might be more likely to respond to the wishes of the black community if that community includes a large number of what are perceived to be stable, responsible citizens (e.g., homeowners). Further, the size of the black homeownership population is likely to provide an essential clue to black mayors and police departments as to how the police should respond to public disorder incidents. The percentage of the black population which are homeowners is thus assumed to be linked to more responsive policies.

Employment studies and studies of police accountability both suggest that an important intervening variable in the translation of black demands into police outputs might be the form of government in the city. After years of research on the question, analysts still assume that "reform" governments are likely to be "sluggish" in responding to newer political forces (Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian, 1981). Those features which professionalize the operations of government under such systems also insulate those operations from external influences, including the influences of elected municipal officers. Some analysts thus see government form acting as a constraint on mayoral influence on city outputs (Kuo, 1973, Karnig and Welch 1980). Saltzstein, 1986), while studies of police accountability similarly have postulated a more limited impact of elected officials on police programs and policies in non-machine or weak-machine settings (see Kahn, 1979). Reform

ism is represented in this analysis as each city's score on a scale representing council-manager form of government, nonpartisan local elections, and mostly or all at-large elections

Because the analysis focuses upon the outputs of a single municipal department, it is necessary to control also for organizational features which might lead to particular outputs. Analysts attest to the considerable autonomy of municipal bureaucracies in general (Lowi, 1967, Sayre and Kaufman, 1965, Banfield and Wilson, 1963), while numerous studies emphasize the singular autonomy of urban police departments in particular (Skolnick, 1966, Nardulli and Stonecash, 1981). A significant component of the literature on police behavior and outputs stresses the importance of internal organizational characteristics and procedures in determining outputs (Skolnick, 1966, Wilson, 1968a, Goldstein, 1977). Within that genre of research, an emphasis on "styles" of policing is clearly evident, with departments arrayed along a continuum between professional and nonprofessional organizations (Skolnick, 1966, Neiderhoffer, 1969, Wilson, 1968b). Operations of professional departments are presumed to be characterized by frequent use of arrests to settle disputes, formalistic applications of the law, low levels of corruption, efficiency in handling routine matters, and high levels of skill in the use of equipment, while less professional departments are presumed to be "more flexible and informal in defining and carrying out their responsibilities" (Henderson, 1975).

Thus, though not a direct measure of police performance, professionalism is presumed to be related significantly to police performance and policy. A wide variety of police department characteristics have been associated with professionalism (Feuille and Juris, 1976, Rudoni, Baker, and Meyer, 1978). An array of such variables were subjected to factor analysis here, producing a single factor with high positive loadings on department reliance on civilian employees, use of numerous entry requirements, higher education requirements for entry-level personnel, and the presence of specialized police personnel functions separate from city personnel systems. Factor scores on this measure are utilized throughout the analysis as indicators of professionalism, with an assumption that professionalism will be associated with a propensity to arrest in public disorder cases, more limited acceptance of community-oriented (i.e., particularistic) policing, and lower levels of minority recruitment and minority representation among sworn officers.¹⁰

Another major organizational characteristic which is presumed to inter-

¹⁰Low levels of minority representation in the sworn ranks is presumed to be an unintended consequence of professionalism. While the universalistic criteria evident in professional departments would limit the effect of overt racism in hiring, the more rigid standards and entry requirements of professional departments are likely to have a disproportionate negative impact on black applicants (Feagin and Feagin, 1978).

vene in the translation of pressures into outputs reflects the extent of organizational insulation from outside influences. Just as reform features serve to buffer the larger municipal organization from the pressure of residents, elected officials, some specific institutional practices of police departments can serve to insulate the department from the influence of residents, elected officials, and the larger municipal bureaucracy. The influence of elected officials, black or white, on police operations is clearly diminished by plac control over appointments and dismissals in the hands of "neutral" managers according to objective standards, with merit appointments and civil service tenure. Highly-developed civil service systems, thus, have been presumed to insulate departments from external pressures (Nardulli and Stoney, 1981; Thompson, 1975; Stem, 1986). Factor analysis was used to identify a single factor indicating departmental insulation from influence through personnel process, with high positive loadings on the extensiveness of police civil service coverage, the restrictiveness of hiring certification rules, the extent of reliance on formal, written exams for ranking candidates. It is assumed that greater insulation provides departments with the capacity to exercise their own preferences in regard to policy, the likely direction that response depends upon which other factors influence department preferences.

Analysts have noted resource constraints as a major limitation on the activity of black mayors "to translate their policy initiatives into policy" (Kar and Welch, 1980, p. 114). Because many, if not all, police policies and programs require resources, some measures of resource availability are needed in the analysis. Resource expenditures, in the form of equipment, personnel, and money, have been linked to several measures of police effectiveness (The Urban Institute, 1972; Skogan, 1976). Larger departments are more likely to be able to redeploy personnel to staff a new program, even if additional positions cannot be obtained.¹¹ Similarly, departments which spend more, relative to the size of the community, are likely to have greater slack resources to use to begin a new program or augment an existing one. Consequently, the log of department size and the per capita expenditures of the

¹¹ Similar arguments could be advanced regarding the potential impact of department growth or decline on programs and policies, especially in the case of minority recruitment and retention. black representation among sworn officers. However, department growth (in terms of employment change from 1976 to 1983) is highly negatively correlated with 1975 department size ($r = -.68$) such that both variables cannot be used in the same equation. A duplicate analysis, with employment change instead of department size in each equation, was performed with nearly identical results to those presented here. In the case of 1984 black representation among sworn officers, then, it does not appear that employment declines are consistently associated with lower representation levels in 1984. It is most likely that employment declines are a function of declines in black employment representation over time in cities rather than in general representation levels at a single point in time.

department as of 1975 are included here on the assumption that greater resources at the beginning of the time period in question (1975-1984) are likely to be positively associated with the adoption during this period of policies responsive to the black community.

An additional variable considered in the case of minority recruitment and employment representation only is the presence or absence of some form of legal pressure to increase minority representation among sworn officers. Legal pressure is coded as a one if the department operated under either a court order or a consent decree affecting minority hiring at any time during the period from 1973 through 1983.

The final independent variable considered in the analysis represents the potential influence of black mayors. Twenty-four cities in the sample had black mayors in office at some time during the ten-year period from 1974 through 1983, five of these had one or more black mayors in office during the entire period. Because it is assumed that opportunities to influence police policies increase with the number of years during which blacks hold office, black mayoral influence is assigned one point for each year during which a black held the position of mayor. The count is adjusted for each dependent variable so that black mayoral presence is counted only for the years preceding adoption of any given policy. Thus, in those cases in which a black did not hold the mayor's office until some time after a particular program or policy had been adopted, black mayoral influence is coded as a zero.

ANALYSIS

Multiple regression analysis is utilized to examine the impact of black community characteristics, government characteristics, departmental characteristics, and black mayors on the various indicators of responsiveness in policing. In the case of police responses to public disorder incidents, two separate regressions are run, one for cities with above-average rates of black homeownership and one for cities with below-average rates. The findings are presented in table 2.

Nearly all of the equations are significant and do provide some insight into the variability of correlates of different police policies and into the role of black mayors.¹⁴ In the aggregate, black mayors appear to exert an influence independent of other factors in only a limited number of cases of police policies examined here. In those cases where the influence of black mayors is not significant, other influences clearly outweigh any potential mayoral influence. Consequently, a closer examination of those outputs which are not linked at the aggregate level to black mayoral influence may suggest some of the limits on that influence.

¹⁴ Though the explained variation is modest in all but a couple of cases, that is not unexpected dealing with programmatic output variables (see Merri and England, 1984).

TABLE 2
IMPACT OF COMMUNITY, POLITICAL, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS ON POLICE POLICIES

Independent Variable	Community-Oriented Policing	Minority Recruitment	Black Representation among Officers	Citizen Control over Department	Usual Response to Public Disorder ^b	
					Cities w/Above-Average Homeownership	Cities w/Below-Average Homeownership
% Black Population	32*	19	59*	04	35*	02
% Black Homeowners	05	04	06	15	09	04
Reformism	04	10	04	02	—	—
Legal Pressure	—	15	06	—	—	06
Department Size	25*	23*	02	10	03	—
Per capita Department Expenditures	11	15	20*	17	10	10
Department Insulation	14	06	02	07	29*	20
Department Professionalism	09	08	16*	21*	07	04
Legal Requirements	—	—	—	—	31*	52*
Black Mayor	13	04	31*	30*	15	19
R ²	22*	23*	77*	20*	37*	19

*Standardized regression coefficients

^b Responses range from -2 (arrest in most cases) to +2 (very informal responses in most cases)

* Significant at .05 or less

Community-oriented approaches to policing, as measured here, appear to be most closely associated with a substantial black percentage in the community and, secondarily, with greater departmental resources in the form of larger numbers of police personnel. The link with black population representation does suggest some attempt to meet black community needs or wishes through these types of programs though it may also suggest that a relatively large black population is required before departments are likely to feel that such particularistic resource expenditures are justified. The correlation with department size similarly suggests that programs which are resource intensive, such as team policing or meetings with minority groups, are also necessarily dependent upon resource availability. Hence, their provision will depend upon the availability of slack personnel resources and will be less susceptible to mayoral influence.

A similar pattern applies to minority recruitment efforts. While the extent of recruitment has little to do with the representation of blacks in the community and is not significantly linked to court pressure, recruitment efforts like community-oriented programs are dependent upon the presence of departmental resources. Larger departments, even those under no legal pressure to do so, are more likely to provide an extensive array of minority recruitment techniques, an act which may have a lot to do with having the personnel to run such programs but which may not mean much in terms of actual representation.

While black mayors also are not linked to specific responses to public disorder incidents, the correlates of alternative responses differ somewhat from the previous examples. First, black homeownership does provide a significant cue as to what response is desired by the black community, but this appears to be true primarily for cities with higher-than-average rates of black homeownership. Only the legal requirements prove significant in explaining police response in cities with below-average rates of homeownership, and the equation in that subsample is insignificant.

For cities with above-average black homeownership, however, the situation is more complex. Legal constraints (which almost always require an informal response) play a significant role but are actually less powerful a predictor than the black population percentage and are only slightly more significant than the extent of police department insulation. Both black population and department insulation are associated with a greater propensity to arrest or otherwise resolve disorder incidents in a formal fashion. Thus, more insulated departments in communities with above-average rates of black homeownership are more likely to treat such incidents as crimes and exercise what might be considered the traditional propensity of police departments to resolve disputes through arrest. Even more important, where high rates of black homeownership are combined with relatively large black populations, departments are much more likely to respond to public dis-

order by arresting the offenders. The cue-giving function served by black population size and homeownership, irrespective of the race of the mayor, this case proves the best predictor of police department action in an ambiguous policy setting. The lack of an independent impact of black mayors on policy response in this case may suggest that black mayors feel more cross pressured in this instance and, when looked at in the aggregate, are somewhat less likely to view their representational responsibilities solely in terms of representing the interests of homeowners, even black ones.

Though black mayors are not significantly associated, in aggregate terms with the policies considered thus far, it is not too surprising to find a link between black mayors and black representation among sworn police. If black mayors focus "on jobs that count" (Eisinger, 1982, p. 387), then they should certainly emphasize high-paying, high-visibility sworn police positions, and if they want to "control the police," creation of a more representative bureaucracy provides a mechanism for asserting internal control (Fanchile 1978). As always, however, the primary determinant of black employment representation is the percentage representation of blacks in the community. Nonetheless, the amount of representation among sworn police accounted for in this fashion (39%) is lower than that explained in studies of general municipal employment (Stein, 1986), indicating the greater restrictiveness of police hiring which impedes the direct translation of population representation into job shares.

Yet, even after controlling for the availability of black recruits, the presence of a black mayor accounts for an additional, significant increment in the representation of blacks among sworn police ranks. Each year a black holds the mayors office translates into a 1.5% higher level of black representation among the ranks of sworn officers, as compared to cities with comparable black populations. Black mayors obviously emphasize black representation in police departments and are associated with higher levels of representation even though they do not, apparently, pursue expanded black recruitment efforts.

The other two variables which are related significantly to employment representation prove to be associated with such shares in a fashion other than that predicted. Contrary to expectations, per capita expenditures are negatively associated with black representation among sworn officers, while professionalism is positively related. However, these may not be anomalous findings at all but rather suggest a need for rethinking the original hypotheses in the context of employment allocations. In such a context, it is important to note that police activity is extremely personnel-intensive, with higher per capita expenditures linked to higher police salaries (Schneider 1980). Thus, departments with high per capita expenditures pay higher salaries, which are most likely more attractive to nonblack applicants. Such a setting

is conducive to a competitive employment arena, in which blacks are more likely to lose out to white applicants.

Similarly, the original hypothesis that the rigidities and higher standards of professional departments would disadvantage blacks to a greater extent than would traditional, informal barriers may underestimate the extent and importance of informal barriers to black representation among sworn officers. The fact that black mayors are linked to increases in black employment without making changes in personnel procedures lends credence to the notion that informal barriers have operated to exclude blacks. If so, professional departments, with their impersonal, impartial standards, would be more likely to fairly represent blacks within their ranks. Additional analysis, accounting for more specific effects of informal barriers and professional procedures, is warranted in regard to this issue.

Another significant impact of black mayoral influence is evident in regard to the presence of citizen controls over the police department. Here the presence of black mayors is the single best predictor of the adoption of Civilian Review Boards with authority to investigate citizen complaints. Further, this relationship appears quite independent of black community characteristics, with no link evident between the size of the black population or the black homeownership rate and citizen control over the police department. In fact, the only significant factor other than black mayoral presence is department professionalism, with more professional departments somewhat more likely to have adopted such provisions by 1954.

Thus, in examining the array of policies considered here, we find statistically significant evidence of black mayoral influence in two cases but not in others. This does not mean that individual black mayors in specific cities did not pursue such policies, but only suggests that there was no clear, consistent connection between the presence of black mayors and the adoption of such policies across a large number of cities during this time frame. The apparent lack of a link between black mayoral power and policy outputs could occur for a variety of reasons—black mayors or black communities might not consider these consistently high-priority issues in all communities; black mayors might not be successful in getting even high-priority policies adopted; or resource or demographic factors simply may be much more important in the aggregate than political power in getting certain kinds of policies adopted.

Numerous analysts have noted significant constraints on mayoral power in general (Kno, 1973) while others have delineated serious limitations on black mayoral power (Karnig and Welch, 1980; Nelson and Meranto, 1977). Given the resource restraints in most municipalities, it perhaps should not be surprising to find no independent influence of black mayors on programs which require significant increases in personnel or other expenditures. Thus, as

was evident here, provision of such resource-intensive programs as community-oriented policing and special minority recruitment efforts should be expected only in departments with sufficient slack resources to pay the costs without diverting resources from other programs.

Resource restraints are not as important in regard to police employment or civilian review mechanisms. Mayors have a variety of ways to encourage hiring of certain groups, through appointment of sympathetic personnel officials and department heads, alteration of personnel policies and rules, or changes in the entire employment climate. Especially where informal practices have inhibited black access to employment, as in police employment, black mayoral pressure and suasion may be sufficient to achieve substantial gains in black representation. With ongoing new hiring and replacement hiring, gains in employment shares may be possible with no specific resource outlays to achieve that outcome.

CONCLUSIONS

This analysis does provide some limited support for the possibility of a practice of a politics of ethnicity in American cities which would include not just provision of divisible benefits, such as jobs, to blacks but also would provide programs and policies of interest to the black community in general. While black mayoral influence is evident here only in regard to black police employment and adoption of Civilian Review Boards, those linkages, when examined in conjunction with policies where black mayoral influence is not significant, suggest a number of features of black mayoral influence and of approaches to studying that influence.

To some extent, analysts who have looked at black representatives' impact on policy outputs across a large number of cities have been seeking to determine whether there is something which can be thought of as a black political agenda in American cities (as has been suggested in some case studies) and to determine the conditions under which that agenda has been or can be achieved. Expenditure data have proven unsatisfactory to test such questions, while employment outputs have allowed for only a partial test. By focusing on police employment and police programs, this analysis has sought to explore these questions in a hotly-contested municipal policy arena where the outlines of a black policy agenda might be expected to be discernable.

The analysis suggests that discerning such an agenda across a large number of cities is difficult. While individual black mayors undoubtedly do respond to black preferences with policy adoptions in specific cities, those responses are sufficiently diverse as not to form a clear pattern when aggregated. Further, many policy alternatives have achieved such currency that they may be

adopted or implemented by police departments in response to stimuli other than the presence of a black mayor

Thus, policies which have been identified as desirable to black communities in general may be provided in various communities simply because the black community is sufficiently large to justify such particularistic service provision or because sufficient resources are available to do so. When aggregated across a large number of cities, the presence of a black mayor in such cases may appear superfluous, constituting neither a necessary nor sufficient impetus to policy adoption.

A somewhat different problem is apparent in those cases in which the preferences of the black community might vary between cities. While police departments in general might be expected to respond more positively to the wishes of stable, "responsible" members of the black community, we shouldn't expect black mayors to define their representational roles in such simple terms. Black mayors may be cross-pressured in circumstances in which community preferences conflict, responding one way in one case and another way in others. Across a large number of cities, we would also expect to find differences between black mayors in their perceptions of their primary representational loyalties, such that responses where preferences vary would cancel one another out when aggregated.

Yet, despite all these difficulties, black mayors are linked, clearly and significantly, to at least two sets of police policy outputs examined here—police employment and the adoption of citizen controls over police department actions. While neither output need require significant resource expenditures, both might be expected to engender significant opposition from some members of the municipal organization and the community. Yet, black mayors apparently are able to overcome any political opposition in regard to at least two policy outputs desired by blacks, lending further support to a linkage between passive and active representation and suggesting that any 'politics of ethnicity' practiced by black mayors may include more than the provision of public sector employment.

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APPENDIX
CITIES HOUSING SAMPLE POLICE DEPARTMENTS

*Birmingham AL	Rockford IL	Winston Salem, NC
Huntsville AL	Springfield IL	Oklahoma City OK
Mobile AL	Anderson, IN	*Cincinnati OH
Montgomery AL	*Gary IN	Columbus OH
Fort Smith AR	South Bend, IN	*Dayton, OH
Bakersfield CA	Des Moines IA	Toledo OH
*Berkeley CA	Topeka KS	Portland OR
*Compton CA	Lexington KY	Erie PA
Fresno CA	Louisville KY	Reading PA
Inglewood CA	Baton Rouge LA	Harrisburg PA
Long Beach CA	*New Orleans LA	Charleston SC
*Oakland CA	Shreveport LA	Greenville SC
Pomona CA	Boston MA	Chattanooga TN
*Richmond CA	Cambridge MA	Knoxville TN
Sacramento CA	*Grand Rapids MI	Nashville TN
San Bernardino CA	*Saginaw MI	Memphis TN
San Diego CA	*Ann Arbor MI	Austin TX
San Francisco CA	Jackson MS	Beaumont TX
Stockton CA	Omaha NE	Dallas TX
Denver CO	Las Vegas NV	Fort Worth TX
*Hartford CT	Elizabeth NJ	Houston TX
Wilmington DE	*Newark NJ	Lubbock TX
*Gainesville FL	*Plainfield NJ	San Antonio TX
Jacksonville FL	Trenton NJ	Waco TX
Miami FL	Buffalo NY	Alexandria VA
Orlando FL	New Rochelle NY	Chesapeake VA
*Tallahassee FL	Niagara Falls NY	Hampton VA
Tampa FL	Rochester NY	Norfolk VA
*West Palm Beach FL	Syracuse NY	*Richmond VA
Albany GA	White Plains NY	*Roanoke VA
*Atlanta GA	Yonkers NY	Virginia Beach VA
*Augusta GA	Charlotte NC	Tacoma WA
*Macon GA	Greensboro NC	Huntington WV
Evanston IL	High Point NC	Racine WI
Peoria IL	*Raleigh NC	Milwaukee WI

*Black mayor in office during some or all of the period 1974-1983

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Generational Replacement, Ethnic Change, and Partisan Support in Israel

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A time-series cohort analysis of Israeli election surveys conducted between 1969 and 1984 is used to estimate the impact of generational replacement and ethnic change on the balance of partisan forces. The analysis demonstrates that two closely related long-term changes made a major contribution to the decline of the Labor Alignment: the growing number of Jews of Asian and African origins—a change that resulted from generational replacement—and the replacement of voters who entered the electorate during a period of dominance by Mapai (Israel Workers Party) with voters who entered the electorate after Herut (Freedom Party) began to emerge as a major political challenge.

Generational replacement continuously transforms all societies. Replacement can play a major role in transforming the political attitudes and behaviors of mass electorates. During the 1930s and 1940s replacement helped make the Democrats the majority party in the United States (Andersen, 1979; Beck, 1974), and during the postwar years replacement was a major force eroding American party loyalties (Abramson, 1983; 1989; Beck, 1984). Replacement benefited the British Labour party during the 1960s (Butler and Stokes, 1974), but it contributed to the erosion of British party loyalties between 1964 and 1974 (Abramson, 1978). On the other hand, during the

The 1969 election survey was provided by the Inter University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan. The 1973, 1977, 1981, and 1984 surveys were provided by the Social Sciences Data Archive at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I am particularly grateful to Asher Arian for making the 1984 election survey available to me by allowing the study to be archived at the Hebrew University. I am also grateful to Michal Peleg for her assistance in archiving the data, to Avraham Diskin for his advice, and to Gil Ashkenasi for his assistance with the data analysis. Harriet Dhanak assisted with the analysis of the 1969 survey. Asher Arian, Cleo H. Cherryholmes, Avraham Diskin, Ada W. Elmster, Eytan Gilboa, Emanuel Gutmann, Robert W. Jackman, Jack H. Knott, Peter Y. Medding, Michal Shamir, Ira Sharkansky, Brian D. Silver, and Mina Zelnach provided helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. Reviews for the *Journal* made helpful suggestions. The data analysis was conducted during the 1987–1988 academic year while I was a Senior Fulbright Fellow in the Department of Political Science at the Hebrew University, and I am grateful to both the Council for International Exchange of Scholars in Washington, DC, and to the United States Israel Educational Foundation in Tel Aviv. None of these institutions or individuals is responsible for my conclusions.

nance with voters who entered the electorate after Herut began to emerge as a strong political challenge.¹

Given the diversity of the countries from which they came, there is great variation among the Ashkenazim and the Sephardim. Despite this diversity, however, there are sharp differences between the electoral behavior of these two broadly defined groups. The Ashkenazim are much more likely to support the Alignment than are the Sephardim. To some extent, these voting patterns result from economic and religious differences, since the Sephardim tend to be poorer and more observant. The Sephardim also tend to have more hawkish attitudes toward peace and security issues. As Shamir and Arian (1983) demonstrate, once controls are introduced for social class, religiosity, and attitudinal variables, differences in voting behavior between the Ashkenazim and Sephardim are reduced, though not eliminated.² Peres and Shemer (1984) maintain that it is not reasonable to expect "controls" for other variables to eliminate partisan differences between the Ashkenazim and Sephardim, since the historical experiences of the Sephardim both in Arab countries and in Israel contribute to their support for the Likud (see also, Yishai, 1982, for a discussion of the reasons that Sephardim tend to support the Likud).

In addition to the impact of ethnicity upon partisanship, young Israelis are less likely to support the Alignment than their elders. In part, these differences also result from ethnic differences, since, as mentioned above, young Israelis are more likely to be Sephardi than are older Israelis.

During the past two decades there has been a substantial increase in the relative size of the Sephardi electorate. In 1969, the Ashkenazim made up 56% of the Jewish electorate.³ The proportion of Ashkenazim fell to 54% in 1973, 52% in 1977, 50% in 1981, and 48% in 1984. By the 1988 election they made up only 45% of the Jewish electorate. In 1969, the Sephardim made up 41% of the Jewish electorate. Their numbers grew to 43% in 1973, 44% in 1977, 45% in 1981, and 46% in 1984. In 1988, they made up 47% of the Jewish electorate, slightly outnumbering voting-age Ashkenazim. Between 1969

¹Arian (1972b) reported the tendency of older voters to support the Alignment, and other scholars have reported this relationship (see Peres, Yuchtman, and Shafat 1975; Peres and Shemer 1984; Shamir 1986). However, there have been no systematic efforts to estimate the impact of generational replacement upon the balance of partisan support.

²Shamir and Arian rely upon regression analyses of three surveys conducted in 1981. Among the control variables they introduce, attitudes toward the return of the territories were the most strongly related to the vote. But even when controls for hawkishness were introduced the Sephardim were significantly more likely to vote for the Likud than Ashkenazi voters were.

³The estimates in this paragraph are based upon my calculations using Israeli census results published in Central Bureau of Statistics 1970b, table B/17, pp. 46-47; 1974b, table B/20, pp. 46-47; 1978, table B/22, pp. 58-59; 1982, table B/23, pp. 58-59; 1985b, table B/24, pp. 72-73. The estimate for the ethnic distribution of the electorate in 1988 is based upon my projections using a table that presents the age and ethnic composition of the Jewish population in 1987 (Central Bureau of Statistics 1988, table B/23, pp. 74-75).

and 1984, Israeli-born Jews with Israeli-born fathers grew from 3% to 6% of the Jewish electorate, and by the 1988 election they made up 8%.⁶ The growth of the Sephardi electorate clearly results from replacement, and occurred despite immigration patterns. During this period four-fifths of the Jews immigrating to Israel have been from Europe or America (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1988, table V/1, pp. 157–58).

Barring massive increases in immigration, the proportion of Israeli-born Jews with Israeli-born fathers will continue to grow indefinitely. Unless there are very high levels of immigration from Europe and America, the ratio of Sephardi to Ashkenazi voters will continue to grow for at least the next two decades.

During the past two decades there has also been a striking change in the cohort composition of the electorate. As a result of generational replacement, the proportion of the adult population that entered the electorate after Mapai's dominance ended grew markedly even during the eleven years between the 1973 and 1984 elections. In 1973, only 12% of the adult Jewish population was too young to have voted in 1969.⁷ By 1977, this proportion had grown to 20%, by 1981 to 31%, and by 1984 to 36%. By the 1988 election 45% of the Jewish adult population was too young to have voted during the Alignment's 1969 triumph. Future generational replacement will be a major factor contributing to the continued growth of the Sephardi electorate and thus may provide an advantage for the Likud. But, as we shall see, the tendency of the young to support the Likud is not merely a function of ethnic differences, for among both Ashkenazi and Sephardi voters the young are more likely to support the Likud. The impact of future replacement will partly depend on the reasons for these age-group differences. The benefits of replacement for the Likud will be smaller if the tendency of young Israelis to support the Likud results from their youth. Young Israelis may then turn to the Alignment as they age. If, on the other hand, these age patterns result from differences in the formative socialization of younger and older Israelis, the tendency of younger cohorts to support the Likud may erode Alignment support in future elections.

AGE AND PARTY SUPPORT

To study the effects of demographic change upon partisan support in Israel, I utilized the surveys of the urban adult Jewish population conducted

⁶ Given the Israeli system of classification, Israeli-born Jews with Israeli-born fathers are classified as having neither European or American origins, nor Asian or African origins.

⁷ The estimates in this paragraph are based upon my calculations using Israeli census results published in Central Bureau of Statistics, 1970b, table B 15, p. 44; 1974b, table u 15, p. 42; 1978, table u/18, p. 54; 1982, table 11/25, p. 52; 1985b, table 11 20, pp. 62–66. The estimate for the cohort composition of the electorate in 1969 is based upon my projections using a table that presents the age group composition of the Jewish population in 1987 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1988, table 11 18, pp. 65–67).

under the direction of Asher Arian during the 1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, and 1984 elections. These surveys have been extensively analyzed by Arian and his colleagues (Arian, 1972a, 1972b, 1973, 1975, 1980, 1983, Arian and Shamir, 1986), and these earlier studies establish a groundwork for a time-series cohort analysis. Moreover, Arian's studies provide the only Israeli survey data over a series of elections that are available for secondary analysis.⁹

Arian's election studies include measures of how the respondents said they planned to vote before the forthcoming Knesset election or how they said they voted shortly after the election. Information about the respondent's age was also collected. However, both the 1969 and 1973 studies coded age according to age-group categories, thus, the cohort categories I employed were determined by the age-group codes used in the 1969 survey, the baseline for my analyses. Following standard Israeli practice, the respondent's ethnicity was classified according to where they were born and where their fathers were born. Before turning to the results among ethnic groups,¹⁰ I will begin by examining the relationship of age to partisan support among the total Jewish urban population.

The basic cohort results are presented in table 1. Following the procedures employed by Shamir and Arian (1983), I focus on the percentage of the 'two party' vote received by the Alignment.¹¹ By reading down each column

⁹Appendix B explains my choice among surveys for each election year. As of this writing, no survey data are available for the 1988 election.

¹⁰For the distribution of the vote by ethnic group in these surveys, see Shamir (1986, p. 27). Shamir presents the results according to five categories, based upon both the respondent's place of birth and their father's place of birth. My original analysis divided the electorate into the same five categories employed by Shamir. However, given the small number of cases, and especially the small number of older respondents who were born in Israel, I present my results according to three categories. I combine respondents born in Europe or America with Israel-born respondents whose fathers were born in Europe or America. Likewise, I combine respondents born in Asia or Africa with Israel-born respondents whose fathers were born in Asia or Africa. Shamir and I both examine Israeli-born respondents whose fathers were born in Israel as a separate category.

¹¹The most successful minor party during these years was the Democratic Movement for Change. The DMC was formed in November 1976 and won fifteen seats in the May 1977 Knesset election. By 1981 the DMC had disintegrated. As the DMC ran in only one election, there is no practical way to use cross-sectional surveys to track its supporters over time. There would be some logic, however, to combining DMC voters with Alignment voters. The DMC's policies toward the territories were similar to the Alignment's, and recall data suggest that about three-fifths of the DMC vote came from 1973 Alignment voters (see Arian, 1985, pp. 145-49). Recall data suggest that in 1981 about two out of five DMC voters supported the Alignment. Since the DMC fared worst among older voters, combining DMC voters with Alignment voters would somewhat weaken the relationship between age and support for the Alignment. On the other hand, Ashkenazi voters were twice as likely to support the DMC as Sephardi voters were, and the relationship between ethnicity and partisan choice is increased by combining DMC and Alignment voters. But combining DMC and Alignment supporters has only a negligible effect

TABLE I
ALIGNMENT PORTION OF THE TWO-PARTY VOTE, BY YEARS OF BIRTH
1969-1984 AMONG URBAN JEWS
STANDARDIZED RESULTS*

Year of Election	1969	1973 ^b	1977 ^c	1981 ^c	1984 ^c
Years of Birth					
1962-1966					40%
1952-1961			22%	31%	37%
1940-1951	51%	43%	31%	39%	53%
1930-1939	60%	52%	42%	51%	57%
1920-1929	63%	61%	40%	59%	56%
1905-1919	67%	67%	55%	61%	69%
Before 1905	69%	69%	46%	77%	
Total ^d	61%	54%	39%	46%	48%

Source: Surveys of the Jewish electorate conducted under the supervision of Asher Arian.

*For the actual survey results, as well as the number of cases upon which the percentages are based, see table A.1.

^bFor 1973 the actual cohort categories are 1939-1953, 1929-1935, 1919-1925, 1909-1915, and before 1909.

^cExcluding respondents who immigrated to Israel after the 1969 election.

^dNot included because there are too few cases.

^eIncluding respondents for whom age was not ascertained.

we can observe the percentage of all Alignment and Likud supporters who supported the Alignment among progressively older cohorts for each survey year. By reading across each row we can observe the percentage supporting the Alignment among each cohort as it ages. Before commenting on the results, I must briefly discuss two methodological problems.

The first problem is the relatively high level of immigration to Israel. Cohort analysts usually assume that they are studying a closed population that is one in which very few persons enter the society from other societies and in which very few leave. They assume that when a cohort is tracked over

time, estimates of the impact of generational replacement upon the decline of the Alignment. Combining DMC and Alignment voters also only negligibly affects my estimate of the impact of the growth of the Sephardi electorate.

I decided not to combine Alignment and DMC voters for three basic reasons. First, although a majority of the DMC vote came from former Alignment voters, it also received substantial support from former Likud voters. Recall data suggest that about one seventh of the DMC voters were 1973 Likud supporters, and that about one in nine DMC voters supported the Likud in 1981. Second, the founders of the DMC were not Alignment politicians, and the DMC did not result from a split from the Alignment. Third, throughout the campaign the DMC voiced its criticism on the Alignment, and after the election it eventually joined a Likud led government. For a discussion of the DMC, see Torgownik 1980.

time its social composition is unchanged. It is widely recognized that "compositional" effects occur as cohorts reach old age since women tend to outlive men and since persons of higher socioeconomic status tend to live longer than those of lower social status. But, apart from the problems caused by studying very old cohorts, the composition of cohorts is assumed to be constant over time. Of course, no society is completely closed, but in most cases one can safely ignore problems of immigration and emigration.

Israel is obviously a highly "open" society. Between 1969 and 1984 280,000 immigrants arrived in Israel, nearly 7% of Israel's 1984 population (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1988, table V/2, p. 159, table II/1, p. 31). If these immigrants have substantially different partisan loyalties than voters who lived in Israel in 1969, cohorts might appear to change their partisan loyalties as a result of immigration. To control for this possibility I have presented results for respondents who were either born in Israel or who immigrated to Israel by 1969.¹¹ There is no way, however, to use these surveys to control for the effects of *emigration* upon the partisan loyalties of cohorts.

A second and more serious problem is that in all these surveys the proportion of respondents who say they plan to vote for the Alignment is higher than the actual percentage of the urban Jewish electorate that voted for the Alignment.¹² Moreover, this bias varies considerably from year to year. This bias may result in part from respondents defecting from the Alignment during the election year. In fact, the one survey (for the 1973 election) that is based entirely upon a postelection interview differs only slightly from the official election results. Overestimating support for the Alignment in 1969, 1973, and 1977 partly results from these surveys oversampling Jews of European and American origins, but even in 1984, when Jews of Asian and African origins were oversampled, the percentage who said they would vote for the Alignment was higher than the percentage that actually voted for the Alignment.

For many purposes this bias does not pose serious problems (Shamir, 1986). However, year-to-year variation in the size of this bias may create a

¹¹ The year in which respondents immigrated to Israel was not included in the 1973 postelection survey. In the 1977, 1981, and 1984 surveys, the year respondents immigrated to Israel was reported (year of aliyah), although regrouped categories were employed. For the 1977 and 1981 surveys I excluded respondents who immigrated after 1967 and for the 1984 survey I excluded respondents who immigrated after 1966.

I conducted a separate analysis of voting behavior among these recent immigrants, but the number of cases is too small to merit a separate discussion. However, most of these recent immigrants are from Europe or America, and including them in a cohort analysis could affect conclusions about change over time among Ashkenazi voters.

¹² Given the problems of relying upon surveys, it is important to use alternative methods to study the relationship of social factors to voting behavior. Ethnic voting can also be studied using aggregate election results (see Diskin, 1984, 1988; Conen, 1984). Aggregate data, however, are of little use for estimating the impact of generational replacement.

false impression of the magnitude (and sometimes the direction) of change among cohorts as they are tracked over time. Therefore, I have standardized the results according to the actual proportion of Alignment support among the urban Jewish population.¹¹ For the basic table that examines the proportion of the Alignment support among the total sample, I standardized the results by dividing the actual share of the urban Jewish vote for the Alignment in each election by the total proportion that reported supporting the Alignment, and multiplying all results by this ratio.¹² Somewhat different procedures, described below, are used to standardize the results for the three basic ethnic groups. The actual survey results, including the number of cases upon which the percentages are based, are presented in appendix A.

Turning to table 1, we see that in every survey year there is a clear tendency for older cohorts to be more supportive of the Alignment than younger cohorts are. A least-squares regression analysis conducted by examining the relationships for each column demonstrates that the percentage supporting Alignment increases .57 percentage points per year of age (based upon mean of the five slope estimates).

To some extent the tendency of older cohorts to be more pro-Alignment results from the differential ethnic composition of the cohorts. For every survey year, the percentage of voters of European and American origins grows with age. But, as I will soon show, the tendency of older cohorts to be more Alignment persists even after controls for ethnic origins are introduced. The tendency of older cohorts to be more supportive of the Alignment did result from aging per se. The Alignment is the established party and supported by voters of higher socioeconomic origins. Perhaps as voters age they become more supportive of the party that is associated with the established social order. Such a thesis would be consistent with the argument advanced by Campbell and his colleagues (1960: p. 166) that the tendency of older Americans to support the Republican Party might result from the respectability of the G. O. P. It should be remembered, however, that Campbell et al. did not find such a life-cycle interpretation particularly plausible, and subsequent analyses suggest that they were correct in favoring a

My estimate of the urban Jewish vote is based upon votes cast in Jewish veteran cities, Jewish new cities, Jewish veteran towns, and Jewish new towns. For the 1969 election I compared Alignment's vote with the vote for the three lists that later formed the Likud—Gahal, Free for, and the State List. The results are provided in Central Bureau of Statistics, 1970a: table p. 59-62; 1974a: table 5, pp. 46-49; 1977: table 7, pp. 47-51; 1981: table 11, pp. 47-49; 1982a: table 11, pp. 91-92.

The two-party vote for the Alignment among the entire electorate is between three and four percentage points more than the Alignment share of the urban Jewish vote. The Alignment receives a very large share of the vote from kibbutzim (collective settlements) and a substantially smaller share of the Arab vote than the Likud.

Of course, in standardizing the observed results according to the actual vote I must assume biases are equally distributed across subgroups.

generational explanation for the tendency of older Americans to support the Republican party (Converse, 1976, Abramson, 1983, 1989)

The tendency of older Israelis to support the Alignment may result from differences between the formative socialization of older and younger voters. In his classic discussion of generations, Mannheim (1928) argued that distinctive formative socialization experiences are most likely to occur during late adolescence and early adulthood. My review of the evidence suggests that formative partisan experiences are most likely to occur during the first few elections in which a voter participates. We do not have adequate data to determine at what age Israelis have formative socialization experiences but there is some evidence that Israelis between the ages of twenty and twenty-four have less stable partisan loyalties than older Israelis do.¹⁷ Of course even older voters can change their partisan loyalties,¹⁸ but distinctive generational experiences often leave their imprint upon the electorate for decades.

Israelis have witnessed many dramatic political events, but the most important changes were those brought about by the Six Day War in 1967. The crisis preceding the war helped legitimize Herut, and its outcome made Herut's policies more relevant to the electorate. For many years the Herut's legitimacy was questioned by the Mapai leadership. David Ben-Gurion maintained that every party was a potential member of his coalition governments except two: the Communists and Herut. But shortly before the Six Day War, Gahal (a combination of Herut and the Liberal Party) joined a National Unity Government, and Menachem Begin, the Herut leader, became a minister. Begin left the government in 1970, well before the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and his party did not suffer the onus of allowing Israel to be surprised by the Egyptian and Syrian attack. As Ariari and Shamir (1983) pp. 144-45) argue, 'Twenty-five years after independence, a sizable portion of the electorate did not know of the stigma that Begin had carried. The intergroup fights of the past generation busied older people and scholars but not the man on the street. His conceptual world of politics was different and with generational change the role of the right and the Likud changed

¹⁷ Ariari's 1973 study included a small panel. Of the 1939 respondents interviewed in May 1973, 100 were reinterviewed in September. In both surveys respondents were asked how they planned to vote in the forthcoming Knesset election. My analysis of this panel shows that among respondents who expressed a preference in both surveys ($N = 255$) 73% planned to support the same list in both May and September. Among respondents between the ages of twenty and twenty-four ($N = 22$) only 55% planned to support the same list in both months.

¹⁸ Israelis above the age of thirty-nine appear to have more stable partisan attachments than younger Israelis. As we saw above, Ariari's 1973 panel study suggests that Israelis below the age of twenty-five have relatively changeable partisan preferences. Among respondents between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-nine ($N = 82$) 71% had the same partisan preference in both May 1973 and September 1973. Among respondents above the age of thirty-nine ($N = 173$) 77% supported the same list in both months.

The Six Day War changed Israel's foreign policy agenda and made Herut's territorial goals relevant to the electorate. Herut wanted a state that included all of Eretz Israel (the Land of Israel) including both banks of the Jordan River. Before the Six Day War these territorial ambitions may have seemed too grandiose to merit serious attention, but after the war the future of the newly acquired territories became the key political issue. Although Israelis are deeply divided, a sizable portion of the public opposes returning any of these territories. But although the new policy agenda may have aided the Israeli right, it took ten years and three elections before the Alignment was driven from power.

A generational interpretation for age-group differences appears to be supported by the clear demarcation in levels of Alignment support between the cohort born between 1930 and 1939 and the cohort born between 1940 and 1951. Over the five elections the 1940-1951 cohort was on average nine percentage points less likely to support the Alignment. Assuming that formative partisan experiences occur during early adulthood, members of the 1930-1939 cohort experienced formative socialization by the mid-1960s. Most members of the 1940-1951 cohort experienced formative socialization between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s.

Of course, this evidence is not definitive, but there are other patterns that render a life-cycle interpretation for age-group differences implausible. If a life-cycle explanation were correct, we would expect cohorts to grow more supportive of the Alignment as they age. This is not the case, as a direct comparison of the 1969 with the 1984 results will show. Although there are small gains in Alignment support among two cohorts, two cohorts register a slight decline in Alignment support. By conducting a least-squares regression analysis across each row we can utilize all the available data points to measure partisan change as each cohort ages. An estimate based upon the mean for all five cohorts that can be tracked for a decade or more reveals that between 1969 and 1984 support for the Alignment actually declined slightly (6 percentage points per annum) as cohorts aged.

Once again, these results do not provide definitive evidence against a life-cycle interpretation or definitive support for a generational interpretation. As cohorts age, they are not only subjected to the effects of aging, but to the social and political events of the times. These "period" effects could in principle prevent life-cycle effects from emerging, at least in any absolute form. Here were obviously period effects that substantially weakened the Alignment between 1969 and 1977, and that led to a partial recovery in 1981 and 1984. These effects were registered among all five cohorts that can be tracked from 1969 through 1977, as well as among all five cohorts that can be tracked from 1977 through 1984.

¹ Estimates of change over time using this procedure were first employed by Converse (1976).

Even though we cannot definitely demonstrate that there are generational differences in the formative socialization of the differing cohorts, it is clear that the biological processes of generational replacement have changed the composition of the Israeli electorate. It is an inevitable biological fact that cohorts enter society through birth and supplant older cohorts as they die. During the last two decades these biological processes have been the major mechanism for changing the cohort composition of Israeli society. According to my calculations based upon Israeli census data (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1985b, table II/25, pp. 72-73), as of 1984, 74% of the Jewish electorate that was too young to have voted in 1969 had been born in Israel. And, although emigration is a major problem for Israeli society, the vast majority of older Israelis who departed the electorate left as a result of death.

It is clear that generational replacement contributed to the erosion of Alignment support. The two cohorts that entered the electorate after 1966 consistently register the lowest support for the Alignment. Moreover, support for the Alignment is consistently highest among the two older cohorts that have greatly diminished through death.

I have demonstrated elsewhere that one can estimate the effects of generational replacement through a simple algebraic standardization procedure (Abramson, 1983, pp. 60-61). One can compare the observed survey results with a hypothetical electorate in which no generational replacement has occurred. The hypothetical electorate is created by two basic steps. First, cohorts that entered the electorate after the first survey year are excluded from the calculations. This step adjusts for the effects of new cohorts entering the electorate, but it does not account for the differential death rates among the cohorts that were in the electorate when the time series began. To account for differential death rates one must algebraically immortalize the older cohorts. This is accomplished by multiplying the observed result for each cohort by the proportion of respondents among each cohort when the time series began. The sum of these products provides an estimate of what the results would have been if there had been no generational replacement. The actual results for surveys conducted over fifteen years must reflect the impact of replacement. By comparing the observed results with the results that control for replacement effects, we can estimate the impact of replacement upon the observed trend.

Generational replacement can lead to six different outcomes (Abramson 1983, pp. 62-64). One outcome is for replacement to have no effect. Given the observed relationships between age and support for the Alignment, however, replacement must have an effect since my procedures remove the cohorts born after 1951, which always have relatively low levels of Alignment support, and increase the size of the older cohorts with high levels of support for the Alignment. In principle, however, all five of the remaining effects can occur. If we found an increase in support for the Alignment among the elect


torate, the estimated result with replacement effects removed must show a greater increase. Replacement would be *impeding* the trend toward the Alignment. If we found no change in support for the Alignment over time, the estimated result with replacement effects removed must be for Alignment support to increase. Replacement would be *preventing* a trend toward the Alignment. On the other hand, when support for the Alignment declines over time, three results are possible. After the effects of replacement are removed, there may be an increase in support for the Alignment. In such a case, replacement may be *reversing* a trend toward the Alignment. When replacement effects are removed, Alignment support may still decline, but not as much as the actual decline. In that case, replacement has *contributed* to the decline in Alignment support. When replacement effects are removed, there may be no change in overall levels of Alignment support. In that case, replacement has *created* the trend away from the Alignment.

My estimate of the effects of replacement are presented in figure 1. The solid line shows the standardized level of Alignment support, while the broken line presents my estimate of what Alignment support would have been if there had been no replacement.

As we can see, Alignment support fell markedly between 1969 and 1977, but the decline would have been somewhat less if there had been no replacement. Replacement, therefore, made a small contribution to the decline in Alignment support. By 1981 replacement had been occurring for over a decade, and the effects of replacement were greater. Alignment support fell fifteen points between 1969 and 1981. If there had been no replacement, support would have declined six percentage points. Two-fifths of the overall decline in Alignment support would have occurred even if there had been no replacement. On the other hand, three-fifths of the decline resulted from replacement. During the fifteen years between 1969 and 1984, support for the Alignment fell thirteen percentage points. If there had been no replacement, the Alignment's share of the two-party vote would have fallen only a single percentage point.¹⁸ These findings suggest that over 90% of the decline of the Alignment resulted from replacement. While undue precision should not be attached to these estimates, to a very large extent the erosion of Alignment support appears to have resulted from the entry of new cohorts into the electorate and the diminution of the older cohorts through death. As we shall see, however, the impact of replacement results from a complex pattern of relationships among the Ashkenazi and Sephardi electorates, as well as from the differential ethnic composition of the cohorts that have entered and departed the electorate.

¹⁸ To estimate what Alignment support would have been in 1984 among the cohort born before 1907, I relied upon the standardized percentage of Alignment supporters among the cohort born between 1905 and 1919.

FIGURE 1
ALIGNMENT PORTION OF THE TWO-PARTY VOTE, 1969-1984
(AMONG URBAN JEWS)



Source: Surveys of the Jewish electorate conducted under the supervision of Asher Arian.

^a Assuming that no cohorts born after 1951 entered the electorate and that older cohorts do not diminish through death. The standardized percentage supporting the Alignment for each cohort is presented in table 1. For the actual survey results, as well as the number of cases upon which the percentages are based, see table A.1.

AGE, ETHNICITY, AND PARTY SUPPORT

Table 2 presents the percentage of the two-party vote for the Alignment by years of birth among voters with European or American origins, while table 3 presents the results among voters with Asian or African origins. These tables employ the same cohort categories used in table 1. Table 4 presents the results for Israeli-born respondents whose fathers were also born in Israel. Given the small number of respondents in this category, and given the very small number of older respondents, I divided the results into three basic cohorts. In all three tables, I have presented the standardized results. In standardizing the results for the three groups, I first estimated what party support would be if the percentage of Jews sampled among these three groups corresponded to the actual distribution of these groups among the adult Jewish population. The actual percentage of urban Jewish voters who supported the Alignment is divided by this adjusted result. Standardized levels of Alignment support are calculated by multiplying the observed results by this ratio. The actual survey results, including the number of cases upon which these percentages are based, are presented in appendix A.

TABLE 2

ALIGNMENT PORTION OF THE TWO-PARTY VOTE, BY YEARS OF BIRTH
1969-1984 AMONG URBAN JEWS OF EUROPEAN OR AMERICAN ORIGINS
STANDARDIZED RESULTS^a

Year of Election	1969	1973 ^b	1977 ^c	1981 ^d	1984 ^e
Years of Birth					
1962-1966					56%
1952-1961			31%	54%	66%
1940-1951	59%	49%	43%	58%	78%
1930-1939	66%	61%	54%	71%	71%
1920-1929	69%	63%	48%	61%	73%
1905-1919	68%	71%	59%	67%	70%
Before 1905	69%	73%	51%	77%	^d
Total ^f	66%	61%	50%	62%	71%

Source: Surveys of the Jewish electorate conducted under the supervision of Asher Arian.

^aFor the actual survey results, as well as the number of cases upon which the percentages are based, see table A 2.

^bFor 1973 the actual cohort categories are 1939-1953, 1929-1938, 1919-1928, 1909-1918 and before 1909.

^cExcluding respondents who immigrated to Israel after the 1969 election.

^dNot included because there are too few cases.

^eIncluding respondents for whom age was not ascertained.

TABLE 3

ALIGNMENT PORTION OF THE TWO-PARTY VOTE, BY YEARS OF BIRTH
1969-1984 AMONG URBAN JEWS OF ASIAN OR AFRICAN ORIGINS
STANDARDIZED RESULTS^a

Year of Election	1969	1973 ^b	1977 ^c	1981	1984
Years of Birth					
1962-1966					23%
1952-1961			18%	17%	18%
1940-1951	46%	39%	23%	28%	26%
1930-1939	59%	44%	33%	36%	40%
1920-1929	58%	66%	28%	60%	29%
1905-1919	66%	57%	37%	33%	38%
Before 1905	54%	66%	42%	^d	^d
Total ^f	56%	45%	26%	29%	24%

Source: Surveys of the Jewish electorate conducted under the supervision of Asher Arian.

^aFor the actual survey results, as well as the number of cases upon which the percentages are based, see table A 3.

^bFor 1973 the actual cohort categories are 1939-1953, 1929-1938, 1919-1928, 1909-1918 and before 1909.

^cExcluding respondents who immigrated to Israel after the 1969 election.

^dNot included because there are too few cases.

^eIncluding respondents for whom age was not ascertained.

TABLE 4
ALIGNMENT PORTION OF THE TWO-PARTY VOTE, BY YEARS OF BIRTH
1969-1984 AMONG URBAN JEWS BORN IN ISRAEL
WHOSE FATHERS WERE BORN IN ISRAEL
STANDARDIZED RESULTS^a

Year of Election	1969	1973 ^b	1977	1981	1984
Years of Birth					
After 1951			7%	41%	53%
1940-1951	36%	42%	28%	17%	42%
Before 1940	32%	51%	42%	46%	37%
Total ^c	33%	46%	29%	40%	48%

Source: Surveys of the Jewish electorate conducted under the supervision of Asher Arian.

^a For the actual survey results, as well as the number of cases upon which the percentages are based, see table A-4.

^b For 1973 the actual cohort categories are 1939-1953 and before 1939.

^c Including respondents for whom age was not ascertained.

By reading down each column of tables 2 and 3, we find that among both the Ashkenazi and the Sephardi population there is a tendency for older cohorts to be more supportive of the Alignment than younger cohorts are. A least-squares regression analysis among respondents with European or American origins shows that support for the Alignment increased .32 percentage points per year of age, while among respondents with Asian or African origins support for the Alignment increased .55 percentage points per year of age. Clearly, the tendency for older voters to support the Alignment persists even when controls for ethnicity are introduced. However, the relationship in table 2 is substantially weaker than the relationship for the total population, and the relationship in table 3 is slightly weaker, suggesting that the age-Alignment relationship among the total Jewish electorate results partly from differences in the ethnic composition of the cohorts. As can be seen in table 4, there is no consistent relationship between age and support for the Alignment among Israeli-born respondents whose fathers were born in Israel.

Table 1 revealed a sharp difference between the 1940-1951 cohort and the 1930-1939 cohort. These differences are also found among Ashkenazi voters. Between 1969 and 1981 the 1940-1951 cohort was on average eleven percentage points less likely to support the Alignment. However, this tendency for the 1940-1951 cohort to support the Likud is reversed in the 1984 survey, when this age group registered the highest level of support for the Alignment. This reversal, however, is based upon only sixty-eight cases, and further evidence is needed to determine whether this increased support for the Alignment is meaningful.

When we track cohorts over time by reading across each row we find in


creases in Alignment support. A direct comparison of cohorts sampled in 1984 with the same birth cohorts sampled fifteen years earlier shows an increase in Alignment support among all four cohorts, but except among the 1940-1951 cohort this increase is small. For this cohort a least-squares regression analysis shows an increase in Alignment support of 1.16 percentage points per year of age. An increase in Alignment support over time is also found among the cohort born between 1930 and 1939 (5.1 percentage points per year). The three older cohorts register virtually no change in Alignment support as they move through the life cycle. A bottom line estimate based upon the mean for all five cohorts that can be tracked for a decade or more reveals that support for the Alignment increased at .36 percentage points per year. This increase is very close to the cross-sectional relationship between age and support for the Alignment, so a bottom-line estimate is consistent with a life-cycle interpretation for age group differences. But it is readily apparent that short-term forces have affected the development of partisan support. All cohorts responded to the period effects that weakened the Alignment between 1969 and 1977, and which led to a rebound between 1977 and 1984. In fact, the substantial rebound in Alignment support among the 1952-1961 cohort should be particularly encouraging for the Alignment.

Despite a rebound in Alignment support among young Ashkenazi voters, the two youngest cohorts register lower than average levels of support for the Alignment. Thus, the entry of these cohorts into the electorate has tended to lower overall levels of Alignment support among the Ashkenazim. On the other hand, the slight age gains among the cohorts already in the electorate tended to offset the effects of these younger cohorts entering the electorate. Figure 2 presents my estimate of the impact of replacement among the Ashkenazi electorate. As with figure 1, the solid line shows the standardized percentage of Alignment support, whereas the broken line shows what Alignment support would have been if there had been no generational replacement. As we can see, replacement has had relatively small effects among the Ashkenazim. Replacement had a small effect in contributing to the decline of the Alignment between 1969 and 1977. Between 1969 and 1981 there was a four point decline in Alignment support. If there had been no replacement, support for the Alignment would have been the same in 1981 as it was in 1969. Replacement therefore appears to have created a small erosion in Alignment support during these twelve years. Between 1969 and 1984 there was a five-point increase in overall levels of support for the Alignment. If there had been no generational replacement, overall support for the Alignment would have increased seven percentage points.¹⁰ Thus, the results suggest that replacement had a small effect in slowing down a

¹⁰ To estimate what Alignment support would have been in 1984 among the cohort born before 1905, I relied upon the standardized percentage of Alignment supporters among the cohort born between 1905 and 1919.

FIGURE 2

ALIGNMENT PORTION OF THE TWO-PARTY VOTE 1969-1984
(AMONG URBAN JEWS OF EUROPEAN OR AMERICAN ORIGINS)



Source: Surveys of the Jewish electorate conducted under the supervision of Asher Aron.

^a Assuming that no cohorts born after 1951 entered the electorate and that older cohorts do not diminish through death. The standardized percentage supporting the Alignment for each cohort is presented in table 2. For the actual survey results, as well as the number of cases upon which the percentages are based, see table A-2.

trend toward the Alignment. On balance, however, the impact of replacement among the Ashkenazim has been small, mainly because age-group differences themselves are relatively small.

Cohort differences are substantially greater among Jews of Asian and African origins. The tendency for the 1940-1951 cohort to have lower levels of Alignment support than the 1930-1939 cohort is found in all five survey years. Over the five elections, the 1940-1951 cohort is on average ten percentage points less likely to support the Alignment. When cohorts are tracked across time as they age, there is no tendency for support for the Alignment to increase with age. All cohorts register substantially lower levels of support for the Alignment in 1984 than they did in 1969. A least squares regression analysis conducted for the four cohorts that can be tracked for a full decade or more demonstrates that, on average, support for the Alignment fell 1.60 percentage points per year of age. Declining support for the Alignment almost certainly results from period effects that depressed Labor support among all the cohorts between 1969 and 1977. However, in


like the Ashkenazim, the Sephardim do not register increases in Alignment support between 1977 and 1984.

Support for the Alignment is very low among Sephardim who entered the electorate after 1969. Moreover, the older cohorts with relatively high levels of Alignment support have diminished through death. However, since all Sephardi cohorts moved toward the Likud, it is apparent that support for the Alignment would have declined even if there had been no generational replacement. Figure 3 clearly demonstrates that replacement contributed to the decline in Alignment support. As with the two previous examples, replacement played a small role in contributing to the decline in Alignment support between 1969 and 1977. But by 1981, when the ongoing effects of replacement had occurred for a full decade, these effects are more sizable. Between 1969 and 1981, support for the Alignment fell twenty-seven percentage points. If there had been no replacement, support for the Alignment would have dropped eighteen points.²⁰ Two-thirds of the decline in Alignment support would have occurred even if there had been no replacement; the remaining third results from generational replacement. Between 1969 and 1984, support for the Alignment fell by thirty-two percentage points. If cohorts born after 1951 had not entered the electorate, and if older cohorts had not diminished through death, overall levels of Alignment support would have declined twenty-three percentage points. Just over seven-tenths of the Alignment's decline would have occurred even if there had been no generational replacement. On the other hand, more than a fourth of the decline in Alignment support among the Sephardim resulted from replacement.

As we saw when discussing the total electorate, a large part of the Alignment decline during these fifteen years resulted from replacement. Among Jews of European or American origins, replacement had only a very small effect upon overall levels of Alignment support, and among Jews of Asian or African origins it had a relatively modest impact. These results are not contradictory, however. Rather, they demonstrate that the impact of generational replacement results from a combination of seven factors: (a) the entry into the electorate of young Ashkenazi voters with relatively low levels of Alignment support; (b) the diminution of older Ashkenazi cohorts with high levels of Alignment support; (c) the entry into the electorate of young Sephardi voters with very low levels of Alignment support; (d) the diminution of older Sephardi cohorts with relatively high levels of Alignment support; (e) the relative stability of Alignment support among Ashkenazi cohorts

²⁰ To estimate what Alignment support would have been in 1981 among the cohort born before 1905, I relied upon the standardized percentage of Alignment supporters among the cohort born between 1905 and 1919. Likewise, for my 1984 estimate, I relied upon the standardized percentage of Alignment supporters among the 1905-1919 cohort.

FIGURE 4
ALIGNMENT PORTION OF THE TWO-PARTY VOTE 1969-1984
(AMONG URBAN JEWS)



Source: Surveys of the Jewish electorate conducted under the supervision of Asher Aron.

^a Assuming that the ethnic distribution of the Jewish electorate did not change after 1969: 56% of European or American origins; 41% of Asian or African origins; 3% Israeli born with Israeli born fathers. For the standardized percentage supporting the Alignment among these three groups, see tables 2 through 4. For the actual survey results, as well as the number of responses upon which the percentages are based, see tables A.2 through A.4.

Sephardi voters by gaining strength among Arab voters. In the 1985 election, Arabs made up fourteen percent of the electorate²¹ and the percentage of Israeli Arabs is growing more rapidly than the percentage of Sephardim (Diskin, 1985). In close elections, the Arab vote can easily tip the balance of power between the Likud and the Alignment. However, a large share of the Arab vote is cast for non-Zionist parties that have never participated in governmental coalitions. As a result of the Arab uprising in the territories, the percentage of Arabs voting for non-Zionist parties increased in 1985. Arab support for the Alignment could grow in future elections, but it would seem overly optimistic for Alignment leaders to place much confidence in the Arab vote compensating for losses among the Sephardim.

Although the importance of ethnicity may wane in future elections, these results suggest that it will be difficult for the Alignment to oust the Likud unless it can make gains among Sephardi voters. To understand better how

²¹ Based upon my estimates using Central Bureau of Statistics, 1988, table II.15, pp. 65-67.

the Alignment might regain support among Sephardi voters or how the Likud can retain that support, one must go beyond the data presented in this article. It is important to examine the reasons large ethnic differences emerged in Israel, and to explain why the Alignment fares so poorly among young Sephardim. Future research will need to examine the relationship of age and ethnicity to attitudinal differences to gain a better understanding of why ethnic and cohort differences emerged. These analyses will be demanding, for it seems unlikely that these differences result from attitudes toward a single issue. For example, Shamir's (1986) analysis of Arian's 1973, 1977, 1981, and 1984 surveys strongly suggests that attitudes toward territorial compromise contributed to the decline of the Alignment, but her analysis also demonstrates that controls for hawkishness do not eliminate the tendency for the Sephardim to be more supportive of the Likud than Ashkenazi voters are. My analysis of Arian's 1984 survey demonstrates that Sephardim who entered the electorate after the 1969 election are somewhat more opposed to territorial compromise than older Sephardim, but it also shows that controls for hawkishness do not eliminate the tendency for young Sephardim to be more supportive of the Likud than older Sephardi voters.

Of course, the future of Israeli party politics depends upon many factors other than demographic change. The wide fluctuations from election to election during the past two decades clearly attest to the importance of short-term political factors. But while we cannot predict future political developments, this article has clearly demonstrated the importance of demographic change. In particular, this article has shown how generational replacement can alter the balance of partisan forces in competitive party systems. It also demonstrates the complexity of demographic change in a society with strong ethnic differences.

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APPENDIX A

ACTUAL SURVEY RESULTS AND THE NUMBER OF CASES UPON WHICH PERCENTAGES ARE BASED

TABLE A-1

ALIGNMENT PORTION OF THE TWO-PARTY VOTE, BY YEARS OF BIRTH 1969-1984 (AMONG URBAN JEWS^a)

Year of Election	1969	1973 ^b	1977 ^c	1981 ^c	1984 ^c
Years of Birth					
1962-1966					44% (119) ^d
1952-1961			30% (88)	36% (125)	41% (189)
1940-1951	62% (241)	45% (298)	43% (155)	46% (156)	59% (174)
1930-1939	73% (220)	54% (121)	58% (86)	60% (119)	63% (81)
1920-1929	76% (219)	63% (114)	55% (93)	69% (72)	62% (58)
1905-1919	81% (261)	69% (100)	76% (137)	72% (64)	76% (49)
Before 1905	84% (57)	72% (79)	64% (28)	90% (10)	100% (5)
Total ^e	74% (1028)	56% (717)	54% (593)	54% (551)	53% (698)
Actual result for urban Jewish voters ^f	61%	54%	39%	46%	48%

Source: Surveys of the Jewish electorate conducted under the supervision of Asher Arian.

^aPercentage of the Alignment and Likud supporters who support the Alignment. For 1969 I present the percentage of Alignment, Free Center, and Gahal supporters who support the Alignment.

^bFor 1973 the actual cohort categories are 1939-1953, 1929-1938, 1919-1928, 1909-1918, and before 1909.

^cExcluding respondents who immigrated to Israel after the 1969 election.

^dNumbers in parentheses are the totals upon which percentages are based.

^eIncluding respondents for whom age was not ascertained.

^fBased upon official election statistics (see note 13).

TABLE A-2

ALIGNMENT PORTION OF THE TWO-PARTY VOTE, BY YEARS OF BIRTH
1969-1984 (AMONG URBAN JEWS OF EUROPEAN OR AMERICAN ORIGINS^a)

Year of Election	1969	1973 ^b	1977 ^c	1981 ^c	1984 ^c
Years of Birth					
1962-1966					67% (24) ^d
1952-1961			46% (26)	62% (39)	79% (34)
1940-1951	70% (125)	50% (161)	59% (61)	67% (66)	94% (68)
1930-1939	79% (103)	62% (68)	74% (31)	82% (51)	85% (34)
1920-1929	82% (115)	64% (75)	65% (60)	70% (50)	87% (30)
1905-1919	81% (220)	72% (81)	80% (110)	77% (52)	84% (32)
Before 1905	83% (76)	74% (66)	70% (20)	89% (9)	100% (5)
Total ^e	79% (669)	62% (457)	69% (313)	72% (269)	85% (234)

Source: Surveys of the Jewish electorate conducted under the supervision of Asher Arian.

^aPercentage of the Alignment and Likud supporters who support the Alignment. For 1969 I present the percentage of Alignment, Free Center, and Gahal supporters who support the Alignment.

^bFor 1973 the actual cohort categories are 1939-1953, 1929-1938, 1919-1928, 1909-1918 and before 1909.

^cExcluding respondents who immigrated to Israel after the 1969 election.

^dNumbers in parentheses are the totals upon which percentages are based.

^eIncluding respondents for whom age was not ascertained.

TABLE A-3

ALIGNMENT PORTION OF THE TWO-PARTY VOTE, BY YEARS OF BIRTH
1969-1984 (AMONG URBAN JEWS OF ASIAN OR AFRICAN ORIGINS^a)

Year of Election	1969	1973 ^b	1977	1981	1984
Years of Birth					
1962-1966					28% (61) ^d
1952-1961			25% (51)	20% (71)	22% (114)
1940-1951	55% (100)	39% (99)	32% (79)	32% (85)	31% (78)
1930-1939	71% (102)	45% (38)	45% (47)	42% (57)	48% (40)
1920-1929	69% (65)	67% (24)	38% (26)	69% (16)	35% (20)
1905-1919	79% (38)	58% (12)	50% (20)	38% (8)	46% (13)
Before 1905	100% (9)	67% (6)	57% (7)	1 (1)	0
Total ^e	67% (314)	46% (181)	36% (231)	35% (241)	29% (335)

Source: Surveys of the Jewish electorate conducted under the supervision of Asher Arian.

^aPercentage of the Alignment and Likud supporters who support the Alignment. For 1969 I present the percentage of Alignment, Free Center, and Gahal supporters who support the Alignment.

^bFor 1973 the actual cohort categories are 1939-1953, 1929-1938, 1919-1928, 1909-1918 and before 1909.

^cExcluding respondents who immigrated to Israel after the 1969 election.

^dNumbers in parentheses are the totals upon which percentages are based.

^eIncluding respondents for whom age was not ascertained.

TABLE A-4

**ALIGNMENT PORTION OF THE TWO-PARTY VOTE, BY YEARS OF BIRTH
1969-1984 (AMONG URBAN JEWS BORN IN ISRAEL
WHOSE FATHERS WERE BORN IN ISRAEL.)**

Year of Election	1969	1973 ^b	1977	1981	1984
Years of Birth					
After 1951			9% (11)	47% (15)	63% (65)
1940-1951	43% (14)	43% (35)	38% (11)	20% (5)	50% (20)
Before 1940	38% (24)	52% (31)	58% (19)	53% (15)	44% (9)
Total ^d	39% (38)	47% (66)	40% (41)	46% (35)	57% (98)

Source: Surveys of the Jewish electorate conducted under the supervision of Asher Arian.

^aPercentage of the Alignment and Likud supporters who support the Alignment. For 1969 present the percentage of Alignment, Free Center, and Gahal supporters who support the Alignment.

^bFor 1973 the actual cohort categories are 1939-1953 and before 1939.

^cNumbers in parentheses are the totals upon which percentages are based.

^dIncluding respondents for whom age was not ascertained.

APPENDIX B

CHOICE OF SURVEYS

In principle, cohort analysts should use all available surveys. When surveys are divided into cohort categories, the number of cases often becomes relatively small, and by using a larger number of surveys one can maximize the number of cases. Practical considerations, however, often lead cohort analysts to select among available surveys. In every election except 1984, Arian's studies include three or more surveys. However, in every case one of the surveys clearly seemed better for my purposes than the others.

It should be noted at the outset that all of the Arian surveys for 1969, 1973, and 1977 were conducted by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, Jerusalem, and that the surveys conducted by the Institute were designed as representative samples of the urban adult Jewish population. These surveys are discussed in previously published work (Arian, 1972a, 1972b, 1973, 1975, 1980) and an extensive discussion of the 1969 survey is found in the code book provided by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI. In 1981, Arian began to utilize surveys conducted by the Dahaf Research Institute, Tel Aviv. These surveys are discussed in Arian (1983) and Arian and Shamir (1986). The Dahaf surveys are designed to be representative samples of the adult Jewish population, excluding residents of kibbutzim (collective settlements).

For the 1969 study, three surveys were conducted. I relied upon the sur-

vey of 1825 respondents conducted during October, November and December, which was carried out both before and after the election (October 28). This survey was substantially closer to the actual election results among the Jewish urban population than the pre-election surveys conducted in August ($N = 380$) and September-October ($N = 1314$).

For the 1973 election, five surveys were conducted, although the September survey ($N = 548$) was designed as the second wave of a panel. My cohort analyses relied upon the post-election survey of 1066 respondents conducted in January 1974. The results for this survey were very close to the actual distribution of the vote for the Jewish urban population. Although the survey conducted in May 1973 was larger ($N = 1939$), the percentage supporting the Alignment was substantially higher than the percentage that voted for the Alignment in the actual election (December 31). The pre-election surveys conducted in November and December were close to the actual election result, but they were based upon only 642 and 530 respondents, respectively. Although my basic analyses rely upon the January 1974 survey, I also employed the May and September surveys for a panel analysis that examined the overtime stability of partisan preferences.

In 1977 four surveys were conducted. I employed the survey conducted in March 1977 for two basic reasons. First, with 1372 respondents it was substantially larger than the surveys conducted in April ($N = 497$), May ($N = 485$), and in June ($N = 465$). Second, it was the only one of these surveys to provide information about the actual year of age of each respondent, whereas the smaller surveys provided age in age-group categories that made tracking comparable birth cohorts across time difficult. It should be noted, however, that the percentage of respondents who said they would support the Alignment in the March survey was substantially higher than the percentage that actually voted for the Alignment in the actual election held on May 17.

Three surveys were conducted in 1981. I employed the survey of 1088 respondents conducted in April, although it was somewhat smaller than the surveys conducted in March ($N = 1249$) or in June ($N = 1237$). (The election was held on June 30.) This survey was used because it was conducted by the Israel Institute, and thus the sampling frame was more comparable to the previous Arian election surveys. The March and June surveys were both conducted by Dahaf. As noted above, the surveys conducted by the Israel Institute were based upon the urban adult Jewish population, whereas the Dahaf surveys were based upon the adult Jewish population, excluding Jews residing on kibbutzim. To increase comparability between the Dahaf surveys and the earlier surveys, one must exclude respondents sampled on *moshavim* (workers' and cooperative settlements) from the analysis.

In 1984 Arian's study was based upon a single survey of 1259 respondents conducted by Dahaf. The survey was conducted in early July, about two weeks before the election on July 23. In my analysis, I excluded 40 respon-

dents living on moshavim (three percent of the total sample) to increase comparability with the previous four surveys I employed. It should be noted, however, that there are other differences between the sampling procedures used by Dahaf and those used by the Israel Institute. This is apparent since all four of the earlier surveys undersample the Sephardi population (although this bias is very small in the 1981 survey), whereas the Dahaf survey oversamples Sephardim. (All five surveys oversample Israeli-born Jews with Israeli-born fathers, although this bias is somewhat greater in the Dahaf survey.) To some extent, however, the shift in sampling frame from the Israel Institute surveys to the Dahaf survey is compensated for by the standardization procedures I use to adjust the observed results to the actual distribution of the vote among the urban Jewish population.

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Liberalism, Privacy, and Autonomy

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The prominence the right to privacy now commands in American public law is largely attributable to the efforts of one man: Louis D. Brandeis. His role in the formulation and development of this right—and its relationship to the liberalism of the Framers and the contemporary doctrine of autonomy as expounded by Laurence Tribe—are reconsidered. Brandeis' own understanding of the right to privacy is contrary to the former, and distinguishable from the latter, a variant of the right to privacy more social than private.

The introduction of the right to privacy and the prominence it now commands in American public law are largely attributable to the efforts of one man: Louis D. Brandeis (Westin, 1968, p. 330). Brandeis's affirmation of the right to privacy's priority in a democratic society is so sublime and so persuasive that his words are habitually invoked by judges championing the modern view of privacy (or what I shall call hereafter, autonomy). His interpretation of the right to privacy, however, has been forgotten. In the hands of his disciples the right to privacy has become a right to autonomy, and the place once assigned to secrecy and seclusion usurped by an insistence upon publicity and self-expression. Thus, personal privacy has been said to include "petitioners' rights to pursue an open rather than a clandestine personal relationship" (*Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library*, 1978, p. 1055). This development is not only contrary to Brandeis's intention, but contrary to the conception of good character implicit in Brandeis's own formulation of the right to privacy.

Brandeis's pronouncements on the right to privacy mark the transition

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Kelly v. Johnson, 1976, p. 251; *Roe v. Wade*, 1973, p. 213; *Belle Terre v. Boraas*, 1974, p. 10; *Cohen v. California*, 1971, p. 24; *Stanley v. Georgia*, 1965, p. 784. For a succinct and fascinating review of the infusion of autonomy into constitutional thought, see Smith, 1982, pp. 185–92.

There are no satisfactory definitions of privacy and autonomy; see Henkin, 1974, p. 1419; Smith, 1982, pp. 193–94; and indeed these terms are rarely rigorously defined (cf. Murphy, Feinberg, and Harris, 1986, pp. 27–29, 940–1002, 1081). Both privacy and autonomy have been

from the liberalism of the Framers to the liberalism of today, belonging neither to the one nor to the other. Their reconsideration may help to highlight the path American liberalism has taken, from the age of the political to the age of the private to the age of the social.

Technological developments alone cannot account for the introduction and evolution of the right to privacy, the transformation of American law was inspired primarily by changes in the theoretical presuppositions of liberalism. The three versions of liberalism I shall discuss, that of the Framers, Brandeis, and Tribe, differ from one another with respect to three theoretical issues: their analysis of man, and in particular of the relation between reason and passion, their justification for the distinction between public and private, and their assessment of the importance of property rights in a liberal society.

To secure the blessings of peace, prosperity, and liberty to their posterity, the Framers articulated a version of liberalism intended to reconcile man's reason—the most exalted faculty of his soul—with his passions—and especially with those passions whose grip on the human heart is such that they have been known to overwhelm or distort the exercise of his reason. Convinced that such a reconciliation could not be effected by insisting upon the absolute subordination of passion to reason, the Framers were ready to offer some accommodations to the former for the sake of maintaining the theoretical and political predominance of the latter. Life was thus divided into two realms: one public and one private, too political to believe that the line separating these two realms could ever be perfectly distinct, they struck the balance

said to encompass one's right to be free of unwarranted governmental intrusion into fundamental or intimate matters (sometimes said to include religion, education, property, marriage, procreation, sex, sexual orientation, reputation, dress and demeanor, possession and enjoyment of pornography, bodily integrity, and familial relationships); one's right to repose from unwanted noises and odors; one's right to sanctuary from public and private surveillance; one's right to limit disclosure of matters deemed private or personal; one's right to the integrity of one's personality; one's right to be master of the identity one creates in the world; one's right to procedural protections against the denial of public entitlements; one's right to choose to perform certain acts or undergo particular experiences.

It is difficult to discern the common element which underlies the definitions offered; the privacy has been called "the most comprehensive of rights" and as such it resists definition and circumscription. In lieu of defining privacy and autonomy with reference to their substantive matter, an approach I believe is doomed to failure, I have focused instead upon their underlying presupposition—that the law should endeavor to protect Americans in their emotions and sensations. Privacy tries to do this by emphasizing concealment and seclusion—that is, through the creation of a private realm immune to public observation; its principal concern is the emotional harm the individual suffers when his private and social activities become, contrary to his wish, a topic of public conversation. Autonomy, however, is more intent upon publicity and self-expression; it is less respectful of the dichotomy of public and private, and apt to engender a desire to remake political reality and public mores.

as to preserve the right of the state to restrict the public expression of passions inimical to the cultivation of man's reason. Respect for property rights, broadly conceived, was not only considered essential to the maintenance of the boundary line separating public from private but was also seen as a mechanism for effecting the emancipation, domestication, and civilization of man's passions.

In the version of liberalism expounded by Brandeis, the moral ambiguity of the passions, the fragility of man's reason, and the potential for conflict between the two is deemphasized—if not forgotten, not only is the subordination of passion to reason abandoned but the progress of civilization itself is equated with society's ever increasing regard for human emotions (and not with the development of human reason). The reconciliation of reason and passion is achieved not by recourse to any principle affirming the superiority of one to the other or by a mechanism such as property but by endeavoring to darken the boundary line separating what is public from what is private or to put it another way, by paying less attention to the mutual influence of public and private. In lieu of the indirect constraints upon the expression of man's passions sanctioned by the Framers, Brandeis assumes that man can be left alone—that his public and private lives can be rigidly compartmentalized.

But why, Tribe wonders, should man be asked to restrict the expression of his personality or the satisfaction of his passions to private forums? Why should the dictates of reason be preferred to the dictates of passion in public or in private? Does not the power of reason reside in its capacity to demonstrate the insufficiency of reason itself? Once the disharmony of reason and passion became apparent and the mutual influence of public and private was rediscovered, the conception of good character and the dichotomy of public and private essential to Brandeis's own formulation of the right to privacy could no longer be maintained. The socialization of the right to privacy became inevitable—and the doctrine of property a vehicle for the expression (and not as the Framers had hoped for the restraint) of man's personality and passions (Smith 1985 pp. 161–165, 289 n. 64).

LIBERALISM AND THE STATUS OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

In *Olmstead v. United States* (1928, p. 475) Justice Brandeis, speaking in dissent, called the right to privacy—or more specifically, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the Court, was unimpressed, but Brandeis's dissent endured: an appeal to the wisdom of another day—and today, the right to privacy is so highly regarded that Americans can scarcely imagine life without it (Tribe 1978, p. 889; Fried 1984, pp. 203–205, 207–209; Bloustein, 1984, p. 163). While its definition, derivation, and scope have been and remain the subject of considerable controversy, its priority is not

But where did it come from? And can it be anchored in the liberalism of the Framers as Justice Brandeis apparently assumed?

The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men (*Olmstead v. U.S.* 1928, p. 476).

Is the right to privacy but a synonym for the right to pursue happiness?² Had the Framers believed, as Brandeis mistakenly assumes, that government has a duty to protect Americans in their emotions and sensations, they would not have been so determined to restrict the pursuit of happiness to activities in accord with reason. Were the argument of the Declaration of Independence utterly indifferent to the beliefs men profess and the emotions they indulge its author would never have nourished the hope that it might become a signal—arousing men to burst the chains [of] monkish ignorance and superstition (Jefferson, 1979, p. 12). Given the Founders' understanding of a limited constitution as a device for creating a public sphere and protecting a sphere of private rights and private pursuits, the absence of a single reference to a general right to privacy in the writings of the Founders, the text of the Constitution, the Congressional debates over ratification of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, or in the state constitutions of the period may seem surprising.³ Its omission, however, was quite consistent with their understanding of the nature of the political community which, however respectful of private rights and private pursuits it may be, is fundamentally a collection of citizens, and not a conglomeration of private individuals. To have recognized a general right to privacy, a right to be let alone unattached to a more specific natural or legal right, would have damaged that sense of citizenship or civic spirit indispensable to the integrity and welfare of the political community. The Founders were reluctant to countenance, even in theory, the right of an individual to step back too far from public life. And yet, so integral to our way of thinking has the right to privacy become, that we inevitably find it lurking behind the political philosophy of the Framers, an unspoken premise which can alone provide unity and coherence to rights otherwise separate and unrelated.

² For a most persuasive argument that it is not, see Smith 1962, pp. 176–81.

³ The implausibility of Justice Douglas's derivation of the right to privacy in *Griswold v. Connecticut* is widely acknowledged (Henkin 1974, pp. 1420–22). Even Laurence Tribe, one of the right to privacy's most ardent champions, is skeptical, criticizing both the Constitution for being silent on those aspects of self which must be allowed to flourish if we are to promote the fullest development of human faculties and ensure the greatest breadth to personal liberty, and Brandeis for assuming that the right to privacy could be established without recourse to substantive due process (Tribe 1978, pp. 893–94).

That the Constitution affords considerable protection to rights which can, in principle, be subsumed under the rubric of a right to privacy is undeniable. The Warren and Burger Courts, for example, have found privacy or autonomy interests not only, as one might expect, implicit in cases involving Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights,⁶ or in attempts by the government to regulate sexual activity and abortion,⁷ but also in such unlikely places as the confines of the free exercise clause,⁸ the scope of the "speech" protected by the First Amendment,⁹ and the procedural due process rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.¹⁰ While the Court has yet to articulate a general theory of autonomy, it has been urged to do so (Smith 1982, pp. 204-205; Breckenridge, 1970). But before proceeding down this path, it may be useful to pause and ask ourselves why the Framers had nothing to say about the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.¹¹ Perhaps their failure to articulate a right to privacy was not a mere oversight, but a sign of its inconsistency with their understanding of the nature of civil and religious liberty.

It is by no means easy to distinguish the rationale for civil and religious liberty articulated by the Framers from the one embraced by the courts and scholars of our day. The rift is subtle and frequently obscured by our tendency to employ a common language, albeit to a different effect (Smith 1982, p. 177). While the liberal dichotomy of public and private is still critical to our efforts to determine the scope of civil and religious liberty, the presuppositions which now guide those efforts are decidedly less political than those of the Framers. Overly impressed by the power of the state and heretofore more apt to affirm the fragility of the individual, contemporary derivations of the boundary line are often determined by private considerations, by psychological assumptions regarding the prerequisites for man's self-development and emotional well-being. Political considerations, such as how the constitutional protection to be accorded various manifestations of privacy contributes to the morality and well-being of republican government, are seldom discussed; in its stead, one finds a celebration of the

The word "private" appears only once in the Constitution, in the Fifth Amendment, where it is followed by the word "property." Although autonomy has been said to represent the essence of the Framers' constitutionalism (Murphy, Fleming, and Harris 1986, pp. 27-29), there is no evidence to suggest the Framers ever used the term.

See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland (1979), p. 735; Katz v. U.S. (1967), p. 347; *Miranda v. Arizona* (1966), pp. 436-460.

See, e.g., *Griswold v. Connecticut* (1965), pp. 459-482, 86; *Eisenstadt v. Baird* (1972), 405 U.S. 438; *Roe v. Wade* (1973), pp. 113-152, 56; *Carey v. Population Services Int'l* (1977), pp. 675-61 (90).

See, e.g., *Thomas v. Review Bd.* (1981), p. 707; *Wisconsin v. Yoder* (1972), p. 205; *U.S. v. Brown* (1965), p. 163; *Sherbert v. Verner* (1963), p. 398.

See, e.g., *First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti* (1978), pp. 765-77; *Cohen v. California* (1971), p. 15; *Shelton v. Georgia* (1965), pp. 557-565; *NAACP v. Alabama* (1958), pp. 449-460, 62.

¹¹ Goldberger v. Kelly (1970), p. 254.

neutral state, an association which presumes, but need not officially concern itself with, the maintenance of the morality and republican character of its citizenry. Unless man is free to express himself, free to define for himself, with little or no guidance from the state, what is required for his self-development and emotional well-being, he will die (Thoreau, 1962, p. 97). Were the unveiling of his personality stifled, were his personality bent to conform to the dictates of another or the expression of that personality restricted to activities in accord with reason, he would be a living human being in name only. Civil and religious liberty is essential to the happiness of man so understood, it is an indispensable vehicle for the expression of his personality, part and parcel of his right to privacy, his right to be let alone.

Critical to the Framers' vindication of civil and religious liberty is the denial that man is essentially a private or autonomous being, their approach to the dichotomy of public and private is surprisingly political, and profoundly attentive to the public consequences of seemingly private behavior. Freedom of speech was protected not because of its importance to the self-development and emotional well-being of the individual but for its contribution to the discovery of the truth and to the preservation and progress of republican government (Smith, 1982, 178-79). The weakness of human reason, its tendency to succumb to momentary whims and passions, meant that it was not only necessary to teach Americans to revere their civil liberties but that it was incumbent upon the state to devise ways to elevate the level of discourse, for example, by fashioning legal doctrines whose enforcement might serve to remind Americans that liberty without civility is self-destructive. To deny the protection of law to certain forms of emotive discourse was not a sign of one's opposition to individual liberty and republican government but proof of one's commitment to it. To extend the protection of law to vulgarity, to uncivil or symbolic discourse calculated to appeal to our emotions to the detriment of our reason (Cohen v. California, 1971) would not have been considered evidence of the advancement of our civil liberties but a sign of our blindness to the baneful effects of passion. The Framers' recognition of the political and moral ambiguity of the passions has no contemporary parallel. Of the two causes of faction—passion and interest, their political analysis was more tolerant of the latter, principally because individuals devoted to the satisfaction of their private interests were thought to be somewhat more amenable to the governance and discipline of reason. Their willingness to forbid the expression and satisfaction of those "passions most unfriendly to order and concord" is evident from Madison's remark in *Federalist* 49 (1961, p. 343): "But it is the reason of the public alone, that ought to control and regulate the government. The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the government." To have suggested that man should be free to ignore the dictates of human reason, that the state in the name of privacy or autonomy should assist those who endeavor to close their

minds to arguments and opinions at odds with their own, would have been unimaginable.¹¹

Nowhere is the contrast between the contemporary celebration of privacy and its disparagement by the Framers more pronounced than in their respective treatment of religious liberty. The most common justification today for religious liberty is the autonomy and sovereignty of the individual (Murphy, Fleming, and Harris, 1986, p. 1002). But to the Framers, every man, whether or not he is prepared to acknowledge it, is born subject to God's authority and with a duty to his Creator. It is because that duty "can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force and violence [that] the religion of every man must be left to the conviction of every man." It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent in order of time and degree of obligation to the claims of Civil Society. Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governor of the Universe' (Madison, 1973, p. 9).

When religious liberty is derived from man's original duty to his Creator, it cannot be subsumed under the rubric of privacy or autonomy. It is because no man is altogether free to do as he pleases that no man can be asked to surrender to another the right to decide what is necessary for his salvation (Locke, 1947, pp. 25, 39-53). Once the derivation of religious liberty is properly understood, neither Locke's refusal to extend toleration to those who deny the being of God, nor Jefferson's readiness to sanction the right of a jury to give less weight to the testimony of an avowed atheist can be dismissed as inconsistent or contradictory (Locke, 1947, p. 58; Jefferson, 1979, p. 46-50).¹² Intrinsic to the brand of republicanism the Framers established is the denial of the sovereignty of man, and his subordination to a higher law, if not a higher being.

Recognition of a natural right of conscience is not synonymous with respect for the feelings, emotions, and sensations of man. To the Framers, having witnessed firsthand the injustices perpetrated by religious zealotry, it could have seemed preposterous to protect Americans in their emotions and sensations irrespective of their contribution to the triumph of reason. As long as the perpetuation of the liberal state was thought to depend upon its ability to secure itself against 'men governed by bad passions' (Jefferson,

See, e.g., *Wisconsin v. Yoder* (1972, pp. 205-225). In *Yoder*, Chief Justice Burger invoked the authority of Jefferson to justify granting the Amish an exemption to Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law. The authority of the state was thus used to shield the Amish from exposure to ideas and practices at odds with their own. Either the Court does not believe 'it is error alone which needs the support of government' (Jefferson, 1979, p. 49), and if so, a modification of its clear and present danger test is in order, or it is determined to frustrate the replacement of error by truth.

¹² For an alternative, and to my mind less persuasive, reading of the views of the Framers, cf. *ibid.* (1963, pp. 159-63).

1979, p. 49), words such as license, superstition, immorality, foolishness, and barbarism were readily and unashamedly invoked to justify the right of the state to forbid conduct now considered private.

In constitutional law, the heyday of this approach is symbolized by such decisions as *Reynolds v. United States* and *Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire*. In *Reynolds* the reach of the free exercise clause was determined not by considering the individual's private assessment of the importance of the prohibited practice to his spiritual and emotional well-being, but by recognizing the right of the state to prohibit religiously inspired conduct provided the state's motives were secular, and its objectives reasonable. Thus the existence of a 'reasonable secular state objective'—in this case, preservation of the morals of the community—was sufficient to justify prohibiting the Mormons from practicing polygamy despite their belief that such behavior, when economically feasible, was mandated by God and indispensable to their eternal salvation. To have granted the Mormons an exemption from the application of this law would be to make the professed doctrines of religious beliefs superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. (*Reynolds v. U.S.* 1898 pp. 163–64, 166–67.)

In *Chaplinsky* Justice Murphy (a Catholic and a renowned libertarian speaking for the Court, observed that

There are certain well defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These involved the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting, 'fighting' words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. (*Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire* 1959 pp. 571–72.)

Note the absence of any allusion to the contribution the prohibited remarks might have made to the self-development and emotional well-being of the individual who uttered them. In *Chaplinsky* speech is confined to civil and rational discourse, and judged with reference to its contribution to the political and intellectual welfare of the state. Neither here nor in *Reynolds* is the purpose of the state restricted to the preservation of peace; in both cases the state is treated as a moral entity with spiritual (albeit nonreligious) objectives. Murphy's assertion that these prohibitions "have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem" could not be more categorical. For reasons I shall consider shortly, Americans are no longer confident of their right to enforce a public morality (*Reynolds*) and a public civility (*Chaplinsky*), and are now skeptical of their capacity to distinguish morality from immorality and civility from incivility.¹¹

¹¹ Many capacity to make such distinctions is not as limited as the Court would often have us believe. See, e.g., *Bethel School District v. Fraser* (1986) pp. 3165–66; in *Bethel* however

Unwilling to give the passions free rein by justifying them in their own right, the Framers were content to subordinate privacy, a domain in which the passions are especially potent, to property—a partly natural partly civil institution somewhat more amenable to the governance and discipline of reason. Property, as Madison defined it, denoted more than man's dominion over the external things of the world; it also included "the property which individuals have in their opinions, their religion, their passions, and their faculties." The security of property so understood is threatened not only "where an excess of power prevails," but also "where there is an excess of liberty," a sober reminder of the Scylla and Charybdis popular governments must learn to navigate (Madison 1973 pp. 243–46).

Property, a more political category, is preferred to privacy perhaps because it more adequately expresses what one might reasonably claim to be one's own. Not only does man have property in his passions, but even privacy itself is transformed into "that sacred property which Heaven kindly reserved to [man] in that small repose that could be spared from the supply of his necessities . . . {that} hallowed remnant of time which ought to relieve [his] fatigues and soothe [his] cares" (Madison 1973 pp. 245–46). To the Framers, the right to property broadly understood was "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."

The Framers were well aware of the need to protect the satisfaction of those passions essential to the pursuit of happiness. The difficulty was to find a way to do so without simultaneously emancipating those passions destructive of public morality and individual happiness. By treating the passions as a form of property, they hoped to restrict their indulgence to certain private forums ("a man's home is his castle") and associations (e.g., his synagogue or church) or, in those cases in which public expression was appropriate and desirable, to ensure that it would be judged and sanctioned according to its political and social utility—its contribution to the public—and not merely the individual's welfare. The existence of such private forums and associations, to

the force of the Court's acknowledgment that "the fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic system disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly insulting to others," is undercut by its insistence that instruction in the "shared values of a civilized order" be confined to the halls and classrooms of our public schools. The double standard the Court has sanctioned (civility for children, incivility for adults) is apt, as every parent knows, to undermine the very values the Court would have us learn. See also *ECU v. Pacific* 1975 pp. 745–47; Smith (1982) pp. 196–197.

*The right to privacy is undoubtedly an attempt, at least in part, to recover some of the breadth originally implicit in the Founders' understanding of property. The implications of the right to privacy, however, are such that a return to the original understanding of property would be preferable. Property so understood, however, would not encompass a woman's right to an abortion. There is no right to hold property in a human being, whether or not a fetus is a human being, or at what point it should be so considered, is a matter for Congress to decide under the powers granted to it by section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.

which state access was limited by virtue of the terms of the Fourth Amendment) supplemented by the recognition of some private property rights even in public forums was considered sufficient to guard against improper use of the state's coercive power to invade the private. And by recognizing the state's right to judge and prohibit some public manifestations of passion, its role as moral preceptor would be preserved, and, help to deter the kind of improper private conduct which could not and should not be subject to criminal prosecution

RISE AND DECLINE OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

To the Framers, reason was a formidable obstacle to the civil and religious oppression which arises from the emancipation of the passions. But to their descendants, their invocation of human reason is merely a convenient excuse for oppression, and their reduction of liberty to rationality shallow and frustrating (Smith, 1982, p. 180). Similarly, Americans are apt to find their concern for the survival of the liberal state exaggerated, it is not the integrity of the state, but that of the individual which is now said to be especially in need of protection and encouragement.¹⁵ As the conditions essential to the preservation of the liberal state were pared down, the definition of the public was narrowed proportionately. For religion, this development has meant that the existence of a legitimate secular objective is no longer sufficient to justify the uniform application of civil law. Significant burdens upon free exercise now require a showing of a compelling state interest (*Sherbert v. Verner*, 1963, p. 398). And with respect to freedom of speech, the categories of prohibited speech have been redefined and their definitions narrowed considerably to give greater weight to modes of expression one would be hard pressed to defend as rational or politically useful.

The roots of this romantic individualism can be discerned in the writings of Rousseau, Mill, Emerson, and Thoreau, in Mill, for example, it manifests itself in the right of the individual to be let alone.¹⁶ "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right" (Mill, 1975, pp. 10-11). Here the scope of the state is

¹⁵See e.g., Mill (1975, p. 29). Ironically, these celebrations of individuality are often linked to the author's denigration of man: his nature is assumed to be such that he is simply too weak not to succumb to persecution. How much more exalted the liberal understanding of man is reflected in its conviction that persecution is ineffectual (cf. Jefferson, 1979, p. 45; Locke, 1947, pp. 26-27).

¹⁶The teachings of these authors and the influence of Mill and Emerson upon Brandeis are more thoroughly reviewed in Smith (1985, pp. 52-56, 97-102).

simultaneously reduced to guarding against physical injury to its citizenry, and expanded, if only by implication, to the promotion of "human development in its richest diversity" (Mill quoting Von Humboldt, 1975, p. 2)

Freedom, Mill tells us, is pursuing our own good in our own way, and so defined, it is obviously essential to the well-being of the individual (Mill, 1975, pp. 14, 53). But Mill cannot leave it at that. He is obliged to explain how society benefits from the diversity the public expression of our individuality fosters (an argument which is often said to have inspired Brandeis's concurrence in *Whitney v. California*).¹⁷ When society suppresses the expression of unpopular opinions, everyone loses, irrespective of the truth or falsity of the opinion suppressed. "If the opinion is right [mankind is] deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth produced by its collision with error" (Mill, 1975, p. 18). But if Mill is right, if diversity is essential to individual and social progress, then such progress is jeopardized whenever anyone shies away from making a public expression of his opinions and his personality. Recognition of the right to privacy, so understood, signifies more than a mere readjustment of the boundary line between public and private; it represents an effort to combat the traditional association of privacy with secrecy. If "the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is robbing the human race," would it not be theft to conceal one's thoughts and behavior from the eyes of others (Mill, 1975, p. 18)? To do so would be to deprive ourselves of the conditions critical to the development of our individuality and to society's pursuit of the truth. Publicity, Mill's antidote to mindless conformity, is essential to the cultivation of man's individuality. When manuscripts are left unpublished, the clash of ideas is incomplete, and the author, his audience, and society suffer.

While Mill would certainly not have condoned the use of force to compel an individual to reveal his innermost thoughts, he would probably have applauded the creation of a climate of opinion which encourages individuals "to let it all hang out." Man's sense of shame, the product of a subtle form of societal tyranny, is a barrier to the liberation of his soul. A man who wishes to be wise must be prepared to express his thoughts and passions publicly, however tentative or embarrassing they may be (Mill, 1975, pp. 10, 21, 32-33, 51, 61, 63-64).

In American public law, the premier champion of the right to privacy is Louis D. Brandeis. "By arguing for its recognition in first amendment, fourth amendment, and, common law adjudication, [Brandeis] demonstrated that

¹⁷ Brandeis's formulation of the right to privacy is more traditional than Mill's, both, however, argue for a right to privacy on grounds of public goods, an approach reminiscent of the Framers and more political than that of their disciples.

for him it was the seminal value of just government. His statements are cited repeatedly by judges championing the modern view of autonomy" (Smith 1982, p. 184).

While a private attorney, Brandeis coauthored an 1890 *Harvard Law Review* article entitled "The Right to Privacy." In it, he advocated recognition of a right to privacy as part of the law of torts, as such, it would entail "recognition of the legal value of sensations," and permit an individual to seek damages from and/or injunctions against those who injure his feelings by publicizing the acts and sayings of a man in his social and domestic relations (Brandeis and Warren, 1890, pp. 193, 214, 219). Thirty-seven years later in *Olmstead v. United States*, Brandeis elevated its status still further by numbering it among our Constitutional rights, as such, it would protect every individual against intrusion by the government. The right to be let alone, he trumpeted, is "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men" (*Olmstead v. U.S.*, 1928, p. 478). Together, the law review article and his *Olmstead* dissent stand for a truly comprehensive right to privacy, a barrier against public as well as private intrusion.

To combat contemporary misconceptions concerning the nature of the right Brandeis advocated, I propose to consider anew his exposition of the right to privacy. Not only is its contemporary variant, autonomy, contrary to the political philosophy of the Framers, but it must also be distinguished from the approach taken by Justice Brandeis, whose 1890 law review article and *Olmstead* dissent are less supportive of the doctrine of autonomy than is commonly acknowledged. In accordance with the procedure adopted by the justice himself, my analysis is divided into two parts: privacy as a barrier to public discussion of one's social and domestic life, and privacy as a barrier to state surveillance of an individual's clandestine activities.

The law review article was inspired and provoked by the indignities Mrs. Samuel D. Warren, the wife of Brandeis's law partner, suffered at the hands of the Boston press. The daughter of a prominent senator and the wife of a wealthy young lawyer and paper manufacturer, her elaborate parties attracted considerable press coverage often "in highly personal and embarrassing detail" (Prosser, 1964, p. 104). Unfortunately, no specific legal remedy was readily available to redress injuries of this sort. "Our hope," Brandeis observed in a letter to his future wife, "is to make more people see that invasions of privacy are not necessarily borne." Of course many people desire to be insulted, "court" the insult as it were. The most, perhaps, that we can accomplish is a back-fire, as the woodmen or prairie-men do" (LDB to Alice Goldmark, Dec. 28, 1890, quoted in Mason 1946, p. 70).

Prior to 1890 privacy had never been treated as an independent legal right, whatever legal protection it had received had been as a consequence of its association with other, more familiar legal rights—the right to property and its offspring, the laws of nuisance, trespass, and defamation, or under

the rubric of family law and domestic relations. While the definition of property had already been expanded to cover tangible as well as intangible property, "works of literature and art, good will, trade secrets, and trademarks" (Brandeis and Warren, 1890, p. 195), what Brandeis and his coauthor Samuel Warren sought was something more, a legal remedy for injured feelings, even in the absence of a specific or tangential property interest.

Their objective was to bring the right to privacy out into the open—to sever once and for all its association with property—by persuading the legal profession to acknowledge its independence and significance within common law adjudication. According to Dean Roscoe Pound, their article did "nothing less than add a chapter to our law" (quoted in Mason, 1946, p. 70). It is justly celebrated for its novelty—at times only grudgingly conceded by its authors, who are ready to forswear originality in order to facilitate acceptance of the doctrine they propound (Brandeis and Warren, 1890, pp. 193–95, 213, n. 1). The right to privacy is not, they insist, a new principle; it is merely the application of an old principle ("That the individual shall have full protection in person and property") to new facts—and specifically to the advance of technology whose discoveries and inventions have made it easier to invade "the sacred precincts of private and domestic life" (Brandeis and Warren, 1890, pp. 193–195). Heretofore, one's portrait could not be represented on canvas or on film without one's consent (the state of technology having required the individual to remain still for some time); one's private conversations could not be heard (or recorded) unless the intruder were physically present; nor were there newspapers of mass circulation eager to expose one's private life to public observation.

But the heart of the article is a highly creative rereading of the case law, both English and American, leading to the conclusion that many of the decisions in which privacy is treated and protected as an aspect of property cannot really be justified on the basis of the proprietary interest cited by the court; and because the results are justifiable solely on the basis of a right to privacy, the case law—as it already exists—is proof of its legal status. To cite but two of their examples, the law now affords protection against unauthorized publication of a letter even when the letter itself is devoid of literary merit. While it certainly makes sense to invoke property rights to punish the unauthorized "reproduction of literary and artistic compositions," the proprietary interest disappears when the production is without merit, and its publication of interest to others only because of its capacity to embarrass and injure the feelings of its author or others mentioned therein (Brandeis and Warren, 1890, pp. 199–200). And so in *Prince Albert v. Strange*, an English court not only prohibited reproduction of the etchings made by Prince Albert and Queen Victoria, but publication of a catalog verbally summarizing their subject matter (Brandeis and Warren, 1890, p. 202).

The real crime, Brandeis and Warren argue, was not the appropriation of

monies rightfully belonging to Prince Albert and Queen Victoria, but the injury to their feelings stemming from the act of publication itself. Where there is no intent to publish, there can be no pecuniary (or property) interest, if only because no monetary value can be assigned to a letter or a catalog of etchings the author(s) would never have consented to have published. Whatever value these works have cannot be measured by the monies their publication might bring, but must be measured instead by the pain and suffering their publication would have occasioned (Brandeis and Warren, 1890, p. 203).

To explain why the law should be defined anew, why men deserve protection against mental anguish, the history of civilization is briefly (and misleadingly) reviewed. Originally, liberty was narrowly conceived, if not confined to freedom from physical restraint. "Later there came recognition of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect" (Brandeis and Warren 1890, p. 193). The right to life gradually becomes the right to enjoy life, and since men cannot enjoy life unless they are left alone, the right to life necessarily includes the right to privacy. The advance of civilization is thus equated with the enhancement of the legal status of the right to privacy, an assertion which may be confirmed, or so they say, by observing the development of the common law, where the action of battery was eventually supplemented by that of assault, and by the creation of new legal categories, such as the law of nuisance and defamation—further evidence of society's ever increasing "regard for human emotions" (Brandeis and Warren, 1890, p. 194).

the protection against actual bodily injury was extended to prohibit mere attempts to do such injury—that is, the putting another in fear of such injury. From the action of battery grew that of assault. Much later there came a qualified protection of the individual against offensive noises and odors, against dust and smoke, and excessive vibration. The law of nuisance was developed. So regard for human emotions soon extended the scope of personal immunity beyond the body of the individual. His reputation—the standing among his fellowmen—was considered, and the law of slander and libel arose. This development of the law was inevitable. The intense intellectual and emotional life, and the heightening of sensations which came with the advance of civilization, made it clear to men that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and profit of life lay in physical things (Brandeis and Warren, 1890, pp. 194–95).

Brandeis and Warren's assertion that the right to privacy is predicated upon a new view of the nature of man, a new understanding of what happiness requires is correct; unfortunately, its legal and philosophical significance is obscured by the authors' misrepresentation of the history of civilization in general, and of the development of the common law in particular. To cite but one example, the law of defamation is at least as old as the Bible, and is to be found among the Greeks as well as the Romans (Newell, 1898, pp. 1–18). The capacity of words to injure, and the magnitude of the pain and suffering their abuse provokes is hardly a recent discovery.

Whether the more "spiritual" categories of the common law constitute an implicit recognition of the legal value of sensations is dubious. Assault, libel,

sance, and defamation were traditionally perceived as a threat to domestic tranquillity, to the peace and order of the commonwealth. Citizens so injured are apt to take the law into their own hands, to punish the malefactors themselves, if not for the existence of a civil remedy. Consider, for example, the Statute of Westminster and the Statutes of Richard II in which slander and libel are specifically prohibited because of their tendency to incite domestic discord (Newell, 1898, pp. 20–23). It is not respect for the passions themselves, but a prudent and political concern for the consequences of the passions engendered in those who find themselves the object of slander and libel which gave rise to the law of defamation.

The subordination of privacy to property—even in cases where its protection in this manner is somewhat illogical—may not be a sign of barbarism or even indifference to man's spiritual nature and the injuries to which it is prone. It may stem instead from a civilized awareness of the ambiguity of the passions, certainly their capacity to enhance the quality of our lives: to remind men that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and profit of life lay in physical things "must be balanced against their tendency to beget injustice to ourselves and to society. Whether or not 'the heightening of sensations [signals] . . . the advance of civilization' " it is well to recall that the emancipation of the passions may also serve to encourage self-indulgence (the pursuit of physical things) to the detriment of man's spiritual life: his intellect and his sensitivity to the well-being of others. Once the right to life becomes the right to enjoy life, the state may have difficulty denying men the right to engage in activities injurious to the feelings of others, particularly once those activities have become a source of profit or entertainment to those who pursue them. People who gossip, for example, usually enjoy doing so. There is every reason to believe that the readers of the *Saturday Evening Gazette* enjoyed reading about the festivities which took place in Mrs. Warren's home. The publicity her parties attracted was not, I suspect, the result of the editor's desire to injure the feelings of Mrs. Warren or her guests, but rather an attempt to respond to the passions of his readers, to arouse and satisfy the insatiable curiosity of those Bostonians unlikely to be invited to her parties.

In "The Right to Privacy," one finds a romantic conception of liberty, an argument on behalf of the principle of "inviolate personality," in which personality is now said to include man's thoughts as well as his sensations. The right to privacy is thus "part of the more general right to the immunity of the person, — [sic] the right to one's personality" (Brandeis and Warren, 1890, pp. 205, 207–211). In time, it has come to mean that men must not only be free to express themselves in private settings, but free to do so in ways traditionally disallowed by the state, and more importantly, free to offer public manifestations of their autonomy without fear of criminal prosecution, loss of employment, or forfeiture of public respect. Whether Brandeis and Warren would have endorsed the socialization of privacy, as their disciples so confidently assume, is doubtful. The original purpose of the right to privacy was

to restrict what can be said, and what can be published, and to impose a legal penalty upon those who publicize the private activities of individuals in a way that injures their feelings. His aim was not to protect the "expression of our feelings," but to protect us against those who would injure our feelings. Privacy is understood traditionally, as a retreat from the public arena. As such it is associated with seclusion and concealment, with an individual's efforts to avoid becoming a topic of public conversation, not with the right of the individual to do as he pleases in public (e.g., to wear clothing intended to arouse the attention of others, *Cohen v. California*, 1971). Indeed, the limits such a doctrine imposes upon freedom of speech are significant, for according to Brandeis, when speech is used to invade our privacy, truth is no defense, and the absence of malice no excuse (Brandeis and Warren 1890, p. 218). It is a pity that Brandeis's denunciation of gossip—and his defense of 'propriety and decency,'—are so infrequently cited.

The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious. . . . To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. . . . Not is the harm wrought by such invasions confined to the suffering of those who may be made the subjects of journalistic or other enterprise. . . . Each crop of unseemly gossip thus harvested becomes the seed of more—and in direct proportion to its circulation—results in a lowering of social standards and of morality. Even gossip apparently harmless when widely and persistently circulated is potent for evil. It both belittles and perverts. It belittles by inverting the relative importance of things, thus dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations of a people. . . . Easy of comprehension, appealing to the weak side of human nature. . . . it usurps the place of interest in brains capable of other things. Triviality destroys at once robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling. No enthusiasm can flourish, no generous impulse can survive under its blighting influence. (Brandeis and Warren 1890, p. 196)

In this passage, Brandeis's romanticism is tempered by his regard for social standards and morality—and by a subtle and keen appreciation of the state's interest in the quality of our public discourse. He stands opposed to the trivialization of our public life because it destroys "at once robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling." Not vulgarity—no matter how dear its expression may be to the development of the personality of the individual who utters it—but robust thoughts delicately expressed is what commands Brandeis's respect, and is deserving of the law's encouragement. The marketplace of ideas is insufficient to preserve and to protect the quality of our public life, by appealing to the weak side of human nature: the base and trivial have been known to triumph over every generous impulse.

If man's spiritual nature merits legal protection, it is because words which do not lead to bodily injury can still represent a clear, if not present, danger to the welfare of society. Gossip injures not only its immediate objects, but society as a whole "by inverting the relative importance of things [and] thus dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations of a people." To his credit, Brandeis

condemns triviality, an indication that even speech which inflicts no physical injury cannot always be excused by invoking the right to privacy.

Unfortunately, Brandeis badly misjudged the power of the romantic conception of liberty he so eloquently propounded—particularly its tendency to bring about a state of affairs in which triviality is often irresistible: deliberation is apt to be overwhelmed by passion—and thought—robust or otherwise—is diminished in status. Unlike his disciples, his rediscovery of man's spiritual nature never led him to forget that society has moral (or spiritual) interests as well, interests which the law must protect if only to guard against the debasement of our personality. Thus—the right to free speech—the right to teach and the right of assembly are—subject to restriction—if the particular restriction proposed is required in order to protect the state from destruction or from serious injury—political, economic or *moral* (emphasis added) *Whitney v. California*, 1927, p. 373.

His efforts to make room for a more expansive and romantic conception of liberty were never intended to flourish at the expense of man's capacity for deliberation—let alone to sever the connection the Framers had sought to establish between reason and discourse. Unfortunately, the synthesis of romanticism and liberalism Brandeis achieved in *Whitney* was too fragile to be maintained. Although Brandeis still insists that the deliberative forces ought to prevail (*Whitney v. California*, 1927, p. 373) there is no longer any principle he can invoke to explain why the dictates of reason ought to be preferred to the dictates of passion. His synthesis is dependent upon habits of liberty or self-restraint; it cannot justify—and therefore cannot sustain. Once the First Amendment was understood to encompass emotive as well as rational discourse—a development Brandeis facilitated by insisting that the final end of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties—and by numbering among those faculties our feelings and sensations—it became impossible to justify the traditional—and heretofore unquestioned—exceptions to First Amendment doctrine designed to maintain the quality of our public life by guarding the civility of our public discourse. If speech may be suppressed only when the injury it threatens is both serious and imminent, then the gradual lowering of social standards and of morality—that emotive and uncivil discourse tends to bring about—is apt to go unchecked. Whatever its merits as applied to subversive advocacy, the approach Brandeis sets forth in *Whitney* affords society little—if any—protection against subtler dangers appealing to the weak side of human nature. Let us not forget that the remedy for gossip Brandeis had proposed in 1890 was not more speech (cf. *Whitney v. California*, 1927, p. 377) but a legally enforced silence—the chilling effect of an invigorated right to privacy.

The more traditional elements of Brandeis's analysis were eventually jettisoned by his disciples in the name of autonomy and self-expression. But recognition of man's spiritual nature—especially when it entails the reduction

of the state to a purely physical entity designed to keep the peace, is not evidence of the progress of civilization, but of the denigration of man whose reason is now said to be too weak to generate principled distinctions in matters of taste and style and is ironically invoked instead in order to deny the rationality of belief in principled distinctions altogether ("one man's vulgarity is another's lyric," *Cohen v. California*, 1971, p. 25). The individual is thus free to do as he pleases, the state more reluctant to guard the quality of our public life by punishing some public and some private manifestations of autonomy, and society less disposed to undermine the individual's self-respect by branding his way of life irrational, trivial, and unworthy of a free man.

To Brandeis, the right to privacy is the right to conceal elements of our being from society at large. But to Laurence Tribe, his intellectual heir, privacy so defined is insufficient to guard the dignity of man. In lieu of privacy Tribe would have us speak of autonomy. Privacy is unduly narrow, suggesting an inward sense of self only; autonomy is more expansive, suggesting an outward as well as an inward sense of self. Because men care what others think about them, their happiness and their dignity depends upon their ability to project one identity rather than another, and ultimately to control their public image. The essence of autonomy as Tribe envisions it has little to do with anonymity. It is not that one wishes "not to be known" as a user of drugs, what men crave is not anonymity, but publicity—a public reputation as one who does not use drugs (Tribe, 1978, pp. 886–88). Privacy so understood is a form of public expression.¹⁴ In *Eisenstadt v. Baird*, *Roe v. Wade*, and *Stanley v. Georgia*, the Court did not merely affirm the privacy of the marital bedroom, or the privacy of one's body, or even the right of a man to decide what books to read or what films to watch in the privacy of his own home. Baird could not be punished for giving a contraceptive device to a woman at a public lecture. Stanley, I am confident, could not be punished if he carried or read an obscene book in broad daylight in Central Park. Ms. Roe sought her abortion openly, publicly" (Henkin, 1974, p. 1424).

To appreciate the gulf that separates Brandeis's approach to privacy from its contemporary variant, one need only compare Brandeis's determination to use the law to guard against the "lowering of social standards and of morality" with the indifference displayed by the Court in *Stanley v. Georgia*. While the government is entitled to forbid the sale of obscenity, according to the Court, it cannot punish those who purchase it, or once purchased deprive any individual of his right to possess it. This is, I believe, the only instance in which the government is permitted to forbid sale, presumably because of the damage its distribution does to society, but not ownership because of the importance of its possession to the individual. The govern-

¹⁴How little regard the more traditional forms of privacy have been accorded by the Court is discussed in Posner (1979, 200–209, 214).

ment has the right to do its best to prevent the dissemination of obscenity by punishing those who wish to distribute it, but no right 'to control the moral content of a person's thoughts' (Stanley v Georgia, 1965, p. 565).

In Stanley, the Court concluded that the government had only a slight interest in "protect[ing] the individual's mind from the effect of obscenity" (Stanley v Georgia, 1965, p. 565), and presumably no interest in combatting 'triviality [whenever it] destroys . . . robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling.' The Court, its pious invocations of Justice Brandeis notwithstanding, was loath to describe Stanley's enterprise as trivial; it is rather an expression of his inviolate personality—a consequence of "his right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home" (Stanley v Georgia, 1965, p. 565). Had the statute in Stanley been upheld, it would have led, Tribe insists, 'either to a flattening or to a repression of Stanley's inner self' (Tribe, 1978, p. 907). Since this 'flattening' or 'repression' of Stanley's inner self would also occur were Stanley denied the opportunity to purchase obscenity, it is easy to understand why Justice Marshall—who delivered the opinion of the Court in Stanley—has subsequently argued that 'it is disingenuous to contend that Stanley's conviction was reversed because his home rather than his person or luggage was the locus of a search'—and moreover why Justices Marshall and Brennan are now prepared to overturn laws forbidding the sale and distribution of obscenity to 'a willing adult recipient' (U.S. v. Reidel, 1971, p. 360; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 1973, pp. 85–86, n. 9). Although their logic is impeccable, the Court has been reluctant to follow their lead. Unfortunately, their reluctance to countenance Stanley's extension does not suggest disapproval of Stanley's behavior: no one—or so it seems—is ready to criticize Stanley for having chosen to express his personality in this way. Unlike Brandeis, we are less disturbed by activities 'appealing to the weak side of human nature.' Our devotion to autonomy has weakened our belief in morality and the legal distinctions it once sanctioned: the well-defined and narrowly limited classes of behavior that Justice Murphy thought it permissible to forbid are now so limited and so apt to be honored in the breach that even a Pollyanna would be hard pressed to think it possible to prosecute anyone for their violation.

Man's ability to resist the flattening or repression of his inner self is threatened by society's belief in an objective morality. Thus society must be persuaded to renounce its right to judge the morality of its members lest men like Stanley feel themselves compelled to repress their inner selves, to conceal their thoughts and tastes, and confine the expression of their true personality to a private, secluded arena. While respect for personality is at the root of both privacy and autonomy, autonomy's celebration of unbridled self-realization eventually leads it to jettison the distinction between public and private; privacy must be socialized lest man's self-respect and the integrity of his inner self be harmed by the persistence of a tension between his public

and private persona "To compel a person to appear in a way that he or she finds offensive," Laurence Tribe (1978, p. 961) has argued, "is an invasion and falsification of self." If one's appearance merits such extensive protection, certainly the expression of one's inner self deserves no less. "A man has a right to be employed, to be trusted, to be loved, to be revered" (Tribe quoting J. Douglas quoting Emerson in *Barsky v. Board of Regents*, 1978, p. 951), a right every man enjoys apparently regardless of how he behaves and presumably even while hurling obscenities at his neighbor.

Lest this analysis of autonomy and the sort of behavior it sanctions seem extreme and unwarranted, I commend to the reader's attention Tribe's criticism of laws prohibiting the use of marijuana (an unjustified attempt by society to regulate the way the mind processes data) as well as his suggestion that laws prohibiting polygamy, adultery, bestiality, and group sex may well represent unconstitutional restraints upon the liberty of the individual (Tribe, 1978, pp. 908-10, 943-44, 947, 967; Mill, 1975, pp. 86-91). Autonomy leads us to defer to the individual's untutored, selfish, and frequently unenlightened perception of what his own happiness requires, unlike privacy which is apt to be more respectful and solicitous of the feelings of others, if only because it mandates a public and a private persona—a dualism autonomy endeavors to overcome. But this dualism is apt to endure only so long as privacy is tied to private property—to the notion of certain constitutionally protected areas and its public expression subject to the traditional moral and legal constraints. Once the connection between privacy and private property—the most appropriate forum for its expression—is severed, the underlying antagonism between privacy and autonomy is easily observed.

In *Olmstead*, for example, the Court was faced with the task of applying the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to technological developments anticipated by the Framers. With the invention of wiretapping, it suddenly became possible for the government to eavesdrop on conversations conducted from the privacy of one's home or office. To gather evidence against suspected bootleggers, the government did just that for a period of approximately five months. Was wiretapping a search and seizure? Was the use of evidence so obtained for the purpose of a criminal prosecution a violation of one's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination? Chief Justice Taft thought not, holding the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure applied only to tangible objects seized as a result of a forcible or stealthy entrance onto the defendant's property. Since the conversations recorded were intangible, and the wiretaps attached to wires beyond the defendant's property, neither the Fourth nor the Fifth (the telephone conversations were voluntary, they did not occur at the behest of the government) Amendments were violated. Today *Olmstead* is honored not for its holding—it was overturned in 1967 (*Katz v. U.S.*, 1967)—but for Brandeis's dissent, for his celebration of the right to be let alone, a passage previously quoted at length.

Justice Butler had dissented as well, but rested his dissent on the violation of the property rights of the defendants. "The contracts between telephone companies and users contemplate the private use of the facilities employed in the service" (*Olmstead v. U.S.*, 1928, p. 487). While in use, the phone lines were in effect the private property of the defendants, so much so that the attachment of wiretaps, no matter where they were located, was tantamount to forcible entry, and therefore a violation of their civil rights.

What makes Brandeis's dissent so memorable is his refusal to countenance the continued subordination of privacy to property—or to settle for the protection of privacy in the guise of property. The protection guaranteed by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments cannot be fully comprehended under the rubric of property; it "is much broader in scope." It is nothing less than "the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men" (*Olmstead v. U.S.*, 1928, p. 478). Lest Brandeis's celebration of privacy be confused with the doctrine of autonomy—and in particular its contemporary application to contraception and abortion—it is well to note that Brandeis justifies his adaptation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to modern conditions by invoking *Buck v. Bell*, an infamous decision in which Justice Holmes—speaking for the Court, including Justice Brandeis (only Justice Butler dissented)—declared "three generations of imbeciles are enough"—and then proceeded to uphold the right of the state to sterilize the mentally feeble—a telling indication of how restrictive Brandeis's understanding of the right to privacy was. "We have likewise held that general limitations on the powers of government . . . do not forbid the United States or the states from meeting modern conditions by regulations which a century ago—or even half a century ago—would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive." (*Buck v. Bell*, 274 U.S. 200 (*Olmstead v. U.S.*, 1928, p. 472).

To Brandeis, the impropriety of the government's behavior in *Olmstead* was compounded by the fact that the evidence used against the defendants was secured in violation of a Washington state law forbidding the use of wiretaps. "Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. . . . Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." (*Olmstead v. U.S.*, 1928, p. 485).

To permit either the government or the individual to become a law unto themselves (the literal meaning of autonomy) is to invite anarchy. To demand that the government profess moral relativism is to ignore its role as moral preceptor. In *Olmstead* the scope of the right to privacy is tempered by Brandeis's respect for a government of laws, and for the salutary limits it imposes upon itself as well as the citizenry. Unfortunately, the language Brandeis em-

plays is easily misinterpreted, and as a consequence has lent itself to developments upon which the justice himself would probably have frowned.

Brandeis's approach to privacy is more traditional than is commonly acknowledged. He sought to guarantee the right of the individual to retire from public life, at least temporarily, and having done so to seek solace and spiritual renewal within the confines of his domestic circle (Brandeis and Warren, 1890, p. 196). It is a far cry from what privacy has come to mean—the right to behave in public with little if any regard for the feelings of others. The two realms Brandeis envisioned, one public and one private, each with their own rules and regulations, were quickly reduced to one as a result of the success of Brandeis's campaign to liberate privacy from its subjection to property. Once the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment was assigned to people and not places, and the doctrine of "constitutionally protected areas" abandoned (see *Katz v. U.S.*, 1967), an individual could no longer be required to alter his behavior as he travels from one location (e.g., a home) to another (e.g., a courtroom lobby).

CONCLUSION

Autonomy, as its more thoughtful exponents well know, is an attempt to establish the right of the individual to express his personality regardless of the place or circumstances in which he chooses to do so. To ensure that individuals will feel free to exercise this right, it is supplemented by a doctrine designed to guarantee to every man the respect of others however he behaves. Thus it speaks of a 'right to dignity'—'Am I not what I am' to some degree in virtue of what others think and feel me to be' (Tribbe quoting I. Berlin, 1978, p. 966). And if I am, then my dignity necessarily depends upon what others think of me. If prevailing social mores should compel me to conceal from the world who I am or to alter the way in which I express my personality, my dignity is apt to suffer. In this way, privacy is subsumed by its public expression. . . . harms existing only in the eye or mind of the voluntary beholder cannot justify restriction of otherwise protected behavior. It is worth noting that this is so not because the beholder wrongs the actor in the very process of learning of the offensive activity, for the actor in most of these cases wishes to be beheld' (Tribbe, 1978, pp. 981–82).

What autonomy craves is not privacy—it has little, if anything to do with concealment—but social acceptance. The autonomous person wants to be seen. No case illustrates this development better than *Cohen v. California*. The reader will no doubt wonder why I have repeatedly insisted upon treating *Cohen* under the rubric of autonomy rather than freedom of speech. I have done so because the issue in *Cohen* was never the right of the plaintiff to oppose the draft, or to communicate his opposition to others, but the offensiveness of his words, the vulgarity he used to convey his message. Had

the words "Down with the Draft" been stitched instead upon the back of his jacket, he would never have been prosecuted. Moreover, the words he chose probably offended the very people whose support would have been essential to the timely achievement of his objective. Had the Court required Cohen to confine himself to civilized discourse, the marketplace of ideas would not have suffered, and indeed, I suspect the effectiveness of his discourse would have been enhanced. If the use of vulgarity was necessary, it was not because of its utility to the polity, or its contribution to the success of the cause Cohen wished to advance, but because of its importance to Cohen, its role as a vehicle for the expression of his personality irrespective of its effect on others or on the success of his cause.

This is certainly not what Justice Brandeis had in mind. Privacy is apt to suffer somewhat when it is protected under the guise of property, but, it suffers even more when it is protected under the guise of autonomy.

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Party Identification and Political Adaptation of American Migrants in Australia

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The study of international migrants reveals processes of political resocialization that include translation, expansion, and replacement of prior political learning. This paper demonstrates that American party identification influences the political adaptation of American migrants in Australia by affecting both whether or not they adopt an Australian party identification and the particular parties they select. However, political ideology is an even more important factor in selecting a new party identification and, in particular, leads some American Democrats to choose a more conservative party, and some American Republicans a more liberal one, in Australia. People who were weak partisans in the United States are more likely than others to relinquish their American partisanship once in Australia. Over and above these individual-level variables, the political environment is also influential: migrants tend to favor parties that have been electorally more successful in the Australian state in which they live. These and other findings suggest that both American partisanship and overall political ideology play key roles in helping migrants to adapt politically to their new environments, and that new political learning is generally dependent upon previously established political attitudes. Nevertheless, migrants' political adaptation is also affected by the political context of the new residence.

MIGRATION AND POLITICAL RESOCIALIZATION

Movement of individuals from one location to another frequently poses problems of adjustment, assimilation, and social integration, whether the movement is within or between countries. Many economic, social, cultural,

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and political ties are weakened or ruptured by such moves, creating needs for accommodation or replacement. One of the most basic environments requiring migrant adjustment is a new political system. With only a few notable exceptions (e.g., Black, 1982, 1987; Black, Niemi, and Powell, 1987; Gitelman, 1982; Wilson, 1973), however, students of migration have paid little attention to political resocialization.

While "political resocialization" can involve many types of changes in political attitudes and behavior, the prefix "re-" implies that some sort of competitive replacement process operates. As Gecas (1981, p. 192) has characterized this view, "the old self must 'die' before the new self can emerge." In the context of political party resocialization, this model suggests that attachments to the new polity are achieved at the expense of weakening attachments to the old. In this paper, we present some evidence that does support this *replacement* model of political resocialization. However, we also find support for a complementary view of political resocialization that involves *translation* and *expansion* of the existing political self-concept. We believe these latter processes are particularly likely to occur when individuals are adapting to a different but not radically discrepant political system.

In this analysis, based on a survey of American migrants in Australia, we examine the adoption of an Australian partisanship as an indicator of attachment to a new polity, and people's current feelings about the partisanship they had while living in the United States as an indicator of the strength of their continuing attachment to a former polity. The main independent variables are American party identification prior to migration, political ideology, and the political environment of the area in which the migrant resided at the time of the interview. The major dependent variables are adoption of an Australian party identification and retention of American partisanship after migration. As a whole, the analysis is designed to clarify processes of "resocialization" and the personal significance of partisanship.

When considering the development of new political attitudes in migrant populations, there are reasons for hypothesizing different types of effects about the influence of political attitudes already held. For example, if the original and new political systems differ substantially, the degree of transferability of old attitudes to the new system may be quite limited. In addition, as the replacement model assumes, when people migrate they sometimes attempt to make a "fresh start," and old political attitudes and behaviors are among the characteristics that may be targeted for change. Or—whether they are particularly aware of it or not—the new political environment may exert an influence on their attitudes and behavior. For example, Brown (1981, 1988) investigated political attitudes and behavior among migrants within the United States, whom he defined as people moving across at least one county boundary. He found that when people move to areas that differ politically from those from which they came, both voting be-

havior and party identification tend to become more similar to those in the new location. Pressures toward resocialization should be even greater for international migrants, because the new political context will usually differ substantially more.

On the other hand, even when people develop new political attitudes, their old patterns may persist and influence the course of this new learning. Thus, individuals who were heavily participant in their former system, for example, have been found to be more inclined to seek out opportunities to participate in the new system (Wilson, 1973; Black, 1987). This type of relationship illustrates translation of previously established patterns.

While previous research does not suggest that country of origin is a strong influence on post-migration political adaptation (Black, 1987), we began with the assumption that there were sufficient similarities between the United States and Australia to facilitate resocialization. On the one hand, the Australian political system is parliamentary, and part of the British Commonwealth, and in those respects it is fundamentally different from that of the United States. However, the royal presence is not very strong in Australia and in other ways the systems appear quite similar to casual observers. For example, the division of powers among branches of government, the range and domain of party ideologies, and the overall extent of governmental services. Perhaps most pertinent for our present analysis, the role of party identification in orienting Australians to the political system has been said to "bear an astonishing resemblance" to its role in the United States (Aitken, 1977, p. 41). These political similarities are reinforced by the common language and historical origins, the similarity of many core social values and experiences, the long-term alliance between the countries, and the frequent identification of Australia in American social ideology as some sort of extension of the American frontier. Indeed, the expectation and perception of wholesale similarity between the systems is so strong that many American migrants are astonished when they stumble on the fact that Australia has a Bill of Rights. To Americans settling in Australia, the overall similarity of the systems makes their prior political attitudes seem quite relevant for adaptation to their new political culture. Under these conditions, we would expect to find strong tendencies for translating one's prior political attitudes into the terminology of the new party system and for expanding one's political self-concept to include new political objects.

SAMPLE

Between July and November of 1978, we interviewed 290 American migrants in Australia, of approximately 50,000 estimated to be living there that year (less than 1/2 of 1% of the total Australian population). Our samples were drawn with the cooperation and assistance of the Australian Dep-

ment of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (DIEA), according to a procedure of mediated access. The overall response rate for all samples was 61%.¹

Our sampling plan was designed to produce three separate random samples, plus a fourth sample (Occupationals) that included everyone in the frame. Each of the three random samples was stratified by sex and state of residence in Australia. All samples were limited to *native-born American who were U.S. citizens at the time of entry to Australia*. The samples were constructed as follows:

New Settlers—This sample was drawn randomly from a master list of Americans who arrived in Australia as "settlers" (i.e., with "permanent resident" visas) at any time between January 1977 and March 1978 (number in our sample = 110).

Occupationals—All persons on the DIEA list of New Settlers who had *not* fallen into the New Settler sample *and* whose visa types indicated that they were admitted to Australia on the basis of particular occupational skills, were defined as a special "Occupational" subsample. We attempted to interview all persons in this group, which can be thought of as a purposive subsample of New Settlers defined by their occupational qualifications (number in our sample = 46).

Status Changers—This sample was drawn randomly from a list of Americans who arrived in Australia as "temporary residents" at any time in the past, but who applied for and were granted "permanent resident" visas between January 1977 and March 1978 (number in our sample = 43) and

Citizenship Changers—This sample was drawn randomly from a list of

¹ The DIEA drew samples of migrants from the categories of their records described in the text according to procedures that we specified after consultation with them. The migrants in the groups from which we sampled had provided current address information at the time of their last contact with the department. Eligibility within each sampling frame was defined primarily as having been born in the United States (or its possessions and territories) and being or having been an American citizen. Persons younger than eighteen were excluded, and, because of funding limitations, only one adult member (the first arrived or oldest) was designated as eligible in cases of family groups.

A letter prepared by us and printed on the letterhead of the Australian National University (where we were Visiting Fellows) was mailed to sampled persons. The letter explained the study and its sponsorship, and requested the recipient's participation. Included with the letter were a reply form on which persons willing to be interviewed were to enter their name and address, and telephone number, and a stamped envelope addressed to us at the Australian National University. The letter, reply form, and return envelope were enclosed in a DIEA cover envelope. We are very grateful to the DIEA, and especially to Mr. Tony Fortey, then chief migration officer of the Population Research Section, for their encouragement and assistance.

Discounting letters that were returned to the DIEA because of nondelivery (to people who had moved and left no forwarding address, returned to America, etc.), the total effective size of the designated sample was 478. Of this total, we received 299 reply forms from people who agreed to be interviewed. We subsequently interviewed 290 of these people, resulting in a net overall response rate of 61%. Interviews lasted an average of three and one-half hours.

Americans who had been granted Australian citizenship between January 1974 and March 1978. These individuals had been living in Australia for varying numbers of years prior to their change of citizenship (number in our sample = 91).

Our intention in diversifying the sampling frames was to study subgroups of American migrants that would be theoretically meaningful for exploring the fundamental nature of national commitment and citizenship decision making. It seemed reasonable to think that individuals included within these sampling frames would encompass a wide range of variation along a hypothesized continuum of commitment to Australia (or, read conversely, to the United States). New Settlers were assumed to be least committed, Citizenship Changers to be most committed, and Status Changers to be intermediate.

One additional technical point about the sample should be mentioned. Because the proportions of New Settlers, Occupationals, Status Changers, and Citizenship Changers in the American *population* in Australia are quite different from their proportions in our *sample*, it is *generally* not appropriate to combine the separate subsamples in order to talk about 'all Americans in Australia in these four groups.' For example, since World War II, only about 12% of all Americans who have remained in Australia as settlers eventually changed their citizenship, yet Citizenship Changers make up 31% of our combined sample. So, in order to present our findings in a meaningful way, we most often give them separately for each of the samples. This strategy also reveals the diversity that exists among American migrants in Australia. Nevertheless, *where differences among the subsamples are slight*, it is appropriate to combine them in one overall analysis. We usually follow this procedure when relationships are consistent for all samples. Occasionally we focus on a particular sample where differences among them seem theoretically meaningful.

MIGRATION, PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Party identification helps individuals orient themselves to the larger political system. Loyalty and commitment to a party tend to immunize individuals against favorable information about other parties. While parties in

Assume, for example, that a difference of means test among the four groups fails to reject the null hypothesis that these subsamples came from the same population. The logical conclusion would be that it is appropriate to treat them as having been drawn from one and the same population. Therefore, we do this when the findings suggest that the groups are not significantly different on the variables involved in a particular analysis. We are grateful to Professor Leshe Kish for discussing this general problem with us and for this particular insight. Because our sampling plan was designed to represent subpopulations of American migrants who occupy the theoretically meaningful positions on a hypothesized continuum of national commitment, we have

different political systems would not be structurally competitive, they might be psychologically so. One might therefore hypothesize that the stronger are migrants' original party identifications, the more resistant they will be to the development of new partisan attachments or the weakening of the old ones. On the other hand, by giving individuals a stake in electoral outcomes, party identification increases political interest and involvement. If, because of migration or for some other reason, a new set of political parties becomes relevant, individuals who have a prior party identification might be more likely than those who lack a partisan background to adopt a new partisanship rather than "sitting out" the political battles.

Because party identification can play this dual role—increasing attachment to a *particular* party but also increasing involvement in political life more *generally*—it is not clear how it might affect the political adaptation of those who cross political boundaries, either by moving from one political subdivision of a nation to another (insofar as party systems differ between them), or by international migration.

Party Identification in the Migrant Samples

We measured recalled party identification in the United States with variants of the standard questions used in the American election studies. Retention or relinquishment of that American partisanship was gauged by asking respondents if they currently felt the same way as they had in the United States. The party identification questions were

F4. *While you were living in the United States, did you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?*

(If Republican or Democrat to F4)

F4a. *Did you think of yourself as a strong (Republican/Democrat) or a not very strong (Republican/Democrat)?*

F4b. *Do you still think of yourself as a (Republican/Democrat) or have you stopped thinking of yourself this way?*

(If Independent to F4)

F4c. *Did you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or to the Democratic party?*

F4d. *Do you still think of yourself as an Independent, or have you stopped thinking of yourself this way?*

not attempted to weight the subsamples according to their proportions in the total population. To do so might lead to the erroneous impression that the weighted sample represents the American population in Australia. Strictly speaking, of course, our findings can be general only to the kinds of American settlers we have actually sampled. (The most notable group omitted from our sample design is American settlers who arrived in Australia prior to 1977, on permanent resident visas, never changed their legal immigrant status, and remain in the country.) When we present findings for our "combined samples," we do so for more parsimonious reporting and for the greater stability associated with larger sample sizes. The combined sample may be thought of as representing various subpopulations of American immigrants whose status in Australia has undergone recent definition or change.

We used the standard seven-point scale (Strong Republican, Weak Republican, Independent leaning Republican, Independent with no partisan leaning, Independent leaning Democratic, Weak Democrat, and Strong Democrat) for American party identification. Either F4b or F4d (whichever was appropriate for the particular respondent) was used as an indicator of whether or not the individual had retained his or her American partisanship or sense of independence after moving to Australia. In some parts of our analysis, we focus only on *strength* of identification, rather than on strength and direction together. In those cases, we "fold" the seven-point party identification scale to form four categories of intensity: Independents with no partisan leanings, Independents who lean in either direction, weak identifiers, and strong identifiers.¹ For these purposes, those who did not find the question meaningful because they considered themselves neither party identifiers nor Independents are combined with the Independent non-leaners in the weakest strength of identification category (11% of the total sample, and between 2% and 14% of the separate samples responded this way).

Accuracy of Recalled American Party Identification. Our reliance on recall questions to measure American party identification deserves special attention. While the issues involved are complex, we must limit our discussion here to some general points of immediate relevance. Conceptually, we view recalled party identification as part of "autobiographical memory," defined as memory for information related to the self (Brewer, 1986). Information about the self can be scaled along a continuum from core to peripheral, the former constituting the more enduring and important components of the self-concept, while the latter are more transient (cf. Marcus and Kunda, 1986). Core components of the self-concept generally are "chronically accessible" from memory for characterizing the self (Higgins, King, and Mayin, 1982), while the accessibility of peripheral components is situationally dependent. Further, core components of the self-concept are likely to be stored in "semantic" memory, while peripheral components are stored in "episodic" memory. Episodic memory "receives and stores information about temporally dated episodes or events, and temporal-spatial relations among these events" while semantic memory consists of a person's organized knowledge about verbal symbols, their meanings, referents, and relationships, and is not discretely time-dated (Tulving, 1972, pp. 385-86). We interpret party identification to be one such verbal symbol.

¹This procedure assumes that the measure of party identification is unidimensional, that the Strong Democrat and Strong Republican categories represent the extremes, and that the Independent-Independent position is the neutral mid point. Asher (1983) discusses some of the problems associated with these assumptions.

Our questions about past American party identification were designed to measure those core aspects of self that are part of semantic memory. For example, the question wording, "While you were living in the United States did you usually think of yourself . . .," in effect, asks respondents to use life-long frame of reference rather than to recall the exact partisanship they had at a particular discrete point in time, which might be more situationally dependent and therefore remembered as an episode.

In assessing whether our data present serious problems of recall, we first looked at actual responses to the party identification questions. Fourteen percent of our respondents made comments that prompted our coders to fill out "coding problem forms" to report extra information. These comments demonstrate *not* that respondents had difficulty in remembering the American partisanship but rather that they recalled special events or feelings that in some way confirmed or qualified their usual partisanship (as we would expect for reports of core components of the self-concept stored in "semantic" memory), and they wanted us to understand their views accurately. The following are illustrative comments (with U.S. party identification brackets):

[Strong Democrat] " . . . even though I was only 12 [when I first left United States], because Mom and Dad were strong Democrats."

[Weak Democrat] "I'm more an idealistic liberal than committed to party," "if the Republican candidate was better, I'd have voted for him," "a Southern Democrat voting Republican in national elections".

[Independent Democrat] "I voted for Eisenhower in the '50s but was Democrat by 1960, then Independent by 1966, and would probably stay Independent." "I'm keen on the individual. I supported W. Morris [sic], Harry [sic] Jackson, Ronald Reagan. I thought Nixon was lousy and in the U.S. there is not as much difference between the parties here".

[pure Independent] "I'm a registered Republican but also a Democrat depends on what's going on . . ."

[Independent Republican] "I was a Republican until '76 then became Democrat after Carter was elected".

[Weak Republican] "I never voted but certain things made me a Republican—I thought Nixon was pretty bad and Mr. Ford did a good job of straightening things out very well. I favor the Republicans because of good business influence".

[Strong Republican] "I was a Democrat at one time, then I switched in '67 or '68."

⁴The quote is taken verbatim from our interview. We have no way of knowing whether respondent misremembered the names or the interviewer, an American who had lived in Germany for many years, recorded them incorrectly. Assuming they are indeed errors of recall, "error" certainly pales in light of the detail of the recollection.

We also examined our data for evidence of memory loss about U.S. party identification as a function of time in Australia. Specifically, we looked at the relationships between years in Australia and "don't know" or other problematic responses to the American party identification question, and between years in Australia and "feeling differently" now about one's American partisanship. In both cases, there is no relationship.

The distinction we drew above between semantic and episodic memory becomes particularly useful in light of analyses by Reiter (1980) and Niemi, Katz, and Newman (1980), who argue that recall fallibility leads to substantial error in the reconstruction of past partisanship. However, these investigators used questions that asked respondents whether and when they had ever thought of themselves as having a party identification *different from their current one*. In contrast to our concerns for measuring core, life-long (or at least long-term) party identification, the critical inquiries of these studies refer to the recall of *episodic* partisanship. This task is much more difficult than ours. While we requested people merely to recall their general, more or less stable, life-long pattern of American party identification, the recall questions used by these investigators require memory searches for possible transient departures, along with dates. As we suggest above, the core aspects of partisan identification are likely to be recalled with considerably greater accuracy than is the partisanship a person had in a particular year, which we know may be influenced by contemporaneous political events and voting behavior that are not as reliably accessible to recall.

The importance of this distinction is highlighted when we note that the Niemi group's conclusion about the failure of the party identification recall questions is based largely on recall problems of the minority of respondents who report having *changed* their party identifications. The data they present show, however, that based on actual contemporaneous measurement, three-quarters of respondents did *not* change their party identification (p. 640), and that 96.1% of these stable respondents reported *accurately* that they did not change (p. 642).

Moreover, while Niemi and colleagues do not report details on the reliability of recalled party identification within subgroups of their samples, they do suggest that groups that are more interested in politics have somewhat better recall (p. 641). This relationship has direct implications for the reliability of our measures because respondents in our survey of American migrants are generally much more politicized than the average member of the American electorate. For example, between 27% and 41% of each of our samples reported having worked "for a candidate or in some other kind of political campaign," compared to only 6% of respondents in the 1978 American National Election Study who worked for a party or candidate.

On the basis of these considerations, we believe it is reasonable to have relatively high confidence in the accuracy of our data on recalled American

TABLE 2

**AUSTRALIAN PARTY IDENTIFICATION OF THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL
POPULATION AND OF AMERICAN MIGRANTS IN AUSTRALIA, 1978**

	Aust Pop *	Combined Samples	Citizen Changers	Status Changers	New Settlers	Occupational
National Country	5%	1%	3%	2%	0%	0%
Liberal	37	26	28	21	32	13
Democratic Labor	1	1	1	2	0	0
Australia	0	1	2	0	0	0
Aust Democrats	4	9	12	9	4	13
Labor	42	23	36	30	13	17
Don't Know	0	6	0	0	11	9
Other	1	0	0	0	0	0
No Party						
Identification	10	33	16	35	41	48
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	(686)	(290)	(91)	(43)	(110)	(46)

*Source: Australian national survey conducted by Dr B. Healey, University of Melbourne, cited in Kemp, 1979, p. 30. The question used by Healey was: 'Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Liberal Party, National Country Party, Labor (A.L.P.), D.L.P., Australian Democrat or Communist?' Apart from Healey's inclusion of the Communist Party in his question, which in any event is not mentioned by many respondents, this question is quite similar to our F15, given in the text.

latter two groups, who had lived in the country for the shortest time (often for only a few months), had already adopted an Australian partisanship, confirms the general disposition toward political activity among these American migrants, and suggests the utility that party identification can have in helping people adapt to a new country and make sense of a changed political environment, even when they are not enfranchised.

There also seems to be a reasonably strong relationship between the simple fact of having had *any* party identification in the United States and adopting an Australian party identification. Our data show that strong or weak party identifiers are most likely to adopt an Australian party identification, Independent leaners are somewhat less likely, and pure Independents or those with no U.S. preference are least likely to identify with an Australian party. These relationships are shown in table 3 for both the separate subsamples and the combined sample. While there are some intransitivities overall, each relationship suggests the same pattern.³

³Combining weak and strong identifiers, and comparing them to a group composed of all Independents and those with no preference, the correlations are: for Citizenship Changers, $\gamma = .61$, $r = .26$, $p < .01$; for New Settlers, $\gamma = .29$, $r = .15$, $p = .06$; for Status

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE OF MIGRANTS WHO REPORT HAVING AN AUSTRALIAN PARTY IDENTIFICATION* BY STRENGTH OF AMERICAN PARTY IDENTIFICATION (FOR SUB-SAMPLES AND FOR THE COMBINED SAMPLE)

Sample	No Pref or Ind	Indep Leaners	Weak Ident	Strong Ident	r	p
Citizenship Changers	77% (13)	65% (22)	91% (35)	90% (21)	20	03
New Settlers	36% (25)	45% (29)	58% (36)	50% (20)	13	09
Status Changers	30% (10)	69% (13)	78% (18)	100% (2)	40	< 01
Occupationals	25% (8)	39% (18)	50% (10)	60% (10)	23	06
Combined Samples	43% (56)	54% (52)	73% (94)	70% (53)	22	< 01

*Includes all Australian parties e.g. 90% of Citizenship Changers who report that they were strong supporters of either the Democratic or Republican party when they were living in the United States identify with some Australian party while 10% of this group has no Australian party identification

These data also shed light on the controversy in the literature on American party identification over whether 'independent leaners' are disguised partisans. Table 3 shows that in *each* of our four samples, the weak identifiers with either US party are *more* likely than the Independent leaners to adopt an Australian partisanship. If adopting an Australian partisanship is interpreted correctly as an indicator of politicization, then these data suggest that weak identifiers are more involved than Independent leaners in politics generally and partisanship specifically, and support the traditional interpretation of the party identification scale.

Changers gamma = .57 $r = .29$ $p = .03$ and for Occupationals gamma = .40 $r = .20$ $p = .09$. For the combined samples gamma = .45 $r = .23$ $p = .001$.

Because many of the results reported here are based on multivariate subdivisions of the migrant samples, each of which is small to begin with, it is appropriate to be cautious in interpretation to guard against mistaking chance fluctuations with small numbers of cases for real effects. For this reason, we report significance levels for each subsample as well as for the combined samples. While the best assurance of the validity of our findings will be independent replications based on larger samples, the reader should note that the repetition of a finding in several of our samples is, in effect, a type of replication, since all samples except Occupationals were drawn completely independently of each other and from separately defined populations. Even if the results do not reach commonly accepted levels of significance in one or more of the subsamples (which may result from the small N s involved), one can draw confidence from the consistent pattern in the data. In discussing this type of problem, Blalock makes the point this way:

In effect, if a relationship comes out roughly the same each time but the probabilities of the separate results are each greater than .05, we still may ask ourselves how likely such a combination of outcomes would be if there were no relationships in any of the tables. (Blalock 1972 pp. 309-10)

*Which Australian Parties Do American Migrants Choose?*⁹

Among Australian parties of contemporary electoral significance, at the time of our field work the Labor Party was clearly the most left-wing ideologically. While the Liberal Party was certainly far to its right, it is difficult to establish an unambiguous left-right ordering of the remaining parties. Most are reform movements or other offshoots of current or former parties, and they sometimes stand to the left of these parties on particular issues and to the right on others. On some issues, the interests or appeals of the party do not lend themselves to left-right positional interpretations. Nevertheless, it is useful here to array the Australian parties in a rough right-to-left order as follows: Country⁹—Liberal—Democratic Labor—Australia—Australian Democrats—Labor (as they are listed in table 2).¹⁰

Compared to the Australian population as a whole, our samples are somewhat less likely to favor the Labor Party. (This is a very crude comparison, however, since American migrants differ markedly from the total Australian population (as well as from the American) with respect to many characteristics known to be related to partisanship, such as age, education, income, etc.) Omitting the 'Don't Know' and 'No party identification' categories shown in table 2, 41% of the Australian population and 42% of our combined samples favor the Liberals, while 46% of the Australian population and 35% of our combined sample favor Labor. At the same time, omitting the 'No party identification' category from the American party division shown in table 1, only 33% of our sample had any Republican Party identification in

⁹In 1982 the National Country Party changed its name to the National Party.

¹⁰Not all observers would agree with this particular ordering. Based on survey evidence on ideological perceptions of Australian voters, Atkin (1977, p. 82) concludes that "[t]he variety of preference orderings is so great . . . that it makes nonsense of the view that there is a single underlying dimension to party choice in Australia. The Australian party system . . . it is clear . . . occupies a multi-dimensional space." In Atkin's data, collected in the late 1960s, the Liberal Party was identified as being farthest to the right by 60% of the sample, while the Country Party was so identified by 17% and the DLP by 16%. Sixty-one percent placed the Australian Labor Party as farthest to the left, while 28% chose the Communist Party, which is of no contemporary electoral significance. These responses represent substantially less agreement than occurs in Great Britain, where 95% consider the Conservatives as the most right-wing party and the Labor Party as most left wing (pp. 77-78).

Among scholars, Alford (1963) and many Australian political scientists (Atkin, 1977, p. 79) would place the Country Party farthest to the right, followed by the Liberal Party, the DLP, and the Labor Party. This accords with our informal observations for the period of the late 1970s when our interviews were conducted. The Australia Party was originally the Liberal Reform Group; it sees itself in centrist terms, although ideologically it has much in common with the social justice ideals of the parties on the left (Richmond, 1978, pp. 344-51). The Australian Democrats also grew out of the Liberal Party and have been described as "a viable non-Labor alternative for middle-class voters disenchanted with the Liberal government" (Reynolds, 1974, p. 136).

Strong, Weak, and Independent leaning partisans), while 58% identify as Democrats. Given the considerable dominance of Democrats over Liberals in the American party identifications, the relatively large number of Liberals in our samples requires further explanation.

Additional clues about the seemingly disproportionate number of Liberals in the sample are provided in the relationship between American party identification and Australian party identification, which reveals from the American partisan groups the Australian Liberal contingent has been identified. Table 4 presents the full cross-tabulation of Australian by American party identification for the combined sample only, since the relationships between Australian and American party identification are quite similar across each of the subsamples.¹¹

The correlation between American and Australian party identifications indicates an overall ideological continuity in the party identifications that migrants adopt in Australia. Republicans are more likely to identify with Australian parties of the right and Democrats with Australian parties of the left. These continuities reflect the ability of actors on a new political terrain to translate their prior ideological lines into the language of Australian party labels.

However, table 4 also shows that the relationship between American and Australian party identification is not fully symmetrical. First, Republicans are somewhat less likely to make ideologically inconsistent identifications with the (liberal) Labor Party than Democrats are with the (conservative) Liberal Party. For example, *excluding those who have no Australian party identification*, only 13% of individuals in the three Republican groups identify with the Labor Party, whereas 21% of those in the three Democratic groups identify with the Labor Party. Conversely, Republicans are considerably more likely to make the ideologically consistent identification with the Liberal Party than Democrats are with the Labor Party. Again *excluding those with no Australian party identification*, 76% of individuals in the three Republican partisan groups became Liberals while only 57% of those in the Democratic groups identify with Labor. Given the much larger number of Democrats than Republicans in our samples, the Liberal Party is ideologically disproportionately advantaged and the Labor Party disproportionately disadvantaged by these patterns. What could account for this disparity?

¹¹ Citizenship Changers: gamma = .36, Pearson's $r = .35$, $p < .001$; for New Settlers, the gamma values are .67, .52, $p < .001$; for Status Changers, .54, .53, $p = .002$; and for Occupational Changers, .71, .57, $p = .005$. The statistics report the correlations between the seven-category American party identification scale and the six-category Australian party identification scale. Australian parties arranged as in table 2. The category "No Australian Party Identification" is omitted.

TABLE 4

AUSTRALIAN PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY AMERICAN PARTY
IDENTIFICATION FOR COMBINED MIGRANT SAMPLES

Australian Party Identification	American Party Identification						
	Strong Rep	Weak Rep	Ind Rep	Ind Ind & No Pref	Ind Dem	Weak Dem	Strong Dem
National Country Party	0%	0%	4%	2%	3%	0%	0%
Liberal Party	54	54	52	20	12	11	19
D L P	0	0	1	0	0	0	3
Australia Party	0	0	0	2	2	0	0
Australian Dems	0	8	1	9	7	13	13
Labor Party	14	14	0	11	25	47	36
No Aust Party Identification	32	24	36	57	51	29	29
Totals	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	(22)	(37)	(25)	(56)	(57)	(62)	(31)

Note: Statistics excluding the "No Australian party identification" category: gamma = .48, $r = .46$, $p < .001$.

Party "Misidentification" Due to Misunderstanding Australian Party Names This problem has two facets: the relative lack of attraction for Democrats of the Labor Party, and the stronger than expected attractiveness of the Liberal Party. Regarding the first of these, we note that in his study of *British* migrants in Australia, Wilson (1973, pp. 114-17) also found a fall-off in support for the Australian Labor Party among those who should have been its natural supporters, migrants who identified with the British Labour Party. Wilson believes that negative perceptions of the *organizational competence* of the Australian Labor Party are primarily responsible for the fall off of supporters among his British migrants.

Regarding the second part of this problem, we wondered at first whether the relative popularity of the Liberals among Democrats in our samples could have resulted at least partly from a semantically-induced misunderstanding of the ideological position of the Liberal Party in Australia, particularly among the most recent migrants. Americans in Australia are sometimes understandably confused by the Australian party nomenclature. In the context of American party politics, the term "liberal" refers to parties or ideologies on the left side of the political spectrum. However, in the British system, "liberal" tends to have a centrist rather than a leftist connotation, and in Australia (as we discussed above), the Liberal Party is the more *conservative* of the two major parties. If they understand this, American migrants relatively quickly identify the Liberals as similar to American Republicans and the Labor Party as a more left-wing version of the American Democratic

Party However, among the newly arrived, this clarification may not yet have occurred

We tested the "misidentification" hypothesis with a question about understanding national problems in Australia and found some support for it.¹² In the combined samples, only 10% of Democrats who said they understand Australian politics "very well" identify as Liberals, whereas 27% of Democrats who reported they understand Australian problems "not so well" or only "moderately well" reported a Liberal identification (gamma = $-.53$, Pearson's $r = -.18$, $p = .03$, only those Democrats with some Australian party identification are included). The role of "misidentification" in the adoption of a new party identification is an interesting example of how the carry-over of old political frames of reference may interfere with appropriate learning in new political environments. As we shall see, however, it turns out not to be the most important reason for the attraction of the Liberal Party for American Democrats.

IDEOLOGY AND PARTY CHOICE

In addition to "misidentification," there is also an important substantive hypothesis to explain Australian party choice among American Democrats: for Democrats who are relatively conservative, a shift from the American Democratic Party to the Australian Liberals may represent an adaptive movement to a party that is more ideologically congenial than the rather socialistic Labor Party would be. The converse can, of course, be applied to Republicans: in this generally more conservative group, unexpected identifications with the Labor Party may occur primarily among those who are ideologically more liberal. To test these hypotheses, we compared the ideological self-placements of U.S. Democrats who identified with the Liberal Party in Australia with those of U.S. Democrats who identified with the Labor Party, and did the same for U.S. Republicans. Our measure of ideological self-placement was based on the following question:

F24 We hear a lot of talk these days about *liberals* and *conservatives*. We're not referring to the parties, but to *politically liberal or conservative ways of thinking*. Here is a scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

Scale positions were marked 1 = Extremely liberal, 2 = Liberal, 3 = Slightly liberal, 4 = Moderate (middle of the road), 5 = Slightly conservative, 6 = Conservative, 7 = Extremely conservative. Scores were multiplied by 10 to

¹² Understanding of Australian politics was measured by question F14: "Thinking about important national problems in Australia, how well do you feel you can usually *understand* them? Would you say you usually understand them very well, moderately well, or not so well?"

accommodate intermediate positions. The range is from 5 to 75, since a few people felt their ideologies were more extreme than the scale positions given in the question.

The relationships between ideological self-placement and Australian party identification, presented in table 5, clearly show that the individual's personal ideological position is associated with party choice in Australia. For both Democrats and Republicans (except among the Democratic Status Changers, where only two Democrats identified as Liberals), those who identify with the Liberal Party are significantly more conservative in their ideological views than are those who identify with the Labor Party. The ordering of ideology scores places Democratic-Labor identifiers as most liberal (24.2), followed by Republican-Labor identifiers (33.1), Democratic-Liberals (38.9), and Republican-Liberals (48.9). The strength and consistency of these findings suggest that the departures from expected party choices can be better understood as movement to a party more consistent with one's basic political ideology.

To clarify the importance of ideological position relative to "misidentification" among Democrats, we used both ideological self-rating and perceived understanding of Australian politics in multiple regression equations to predict identification with the Liberal versus Labor Party among Democratic identifiers. Understanding of Australian politics has an insignificant beta in all samples, while ideological position emerges as a strong and significant predictor of Australian party identification in the combined sample and for each of the separate samples except Status Changers. Thus, while misunderstanding of Australian politics plays a role in the attractiveness of the Liberal Party for some American Democrats, it is much less important overall than the role of political ideology. An underlying reason why the misunderstanding variable reduces to insignificance in the multiple regression is that there is a modest correlation between it and ideology, such that those Democrats who are most ideologically conservative are also more likely to report having poorer understanding of Australian politics ($r = -.21$, $p = .006$ in the combined samples of Democrats). In the regression analysis, the more powerful of these two correlated variables absorbs the influence of the less important variable.

The Regional Factor for Southern Democrats Having established that the attractiveness of the Liberal Party results from the conservative ideologies of some American Democrats, the question arises of the relationship of this phenomenon to what may be an analogous partisan realignment in the American South. Many conservatives in the South remain Democratic at the state and local level primarily because of family and regional traditions. Once removed from the gravity of these forces by migration, such persons should be even more motivated than those from other regions of the country to affil

TABLE 5
MEAN SCORES ON SELF-RATED LIBERALISM-CONSERVATISM
BY U S AND AUSTRALIAN PARTY IDENTIFICATION *

Sample	Australian Party		Significance of Difference	
	Liberal	Labor	T-Value	1-Tailed Probability
<i>A Democratic Identifiers</i>				
Citizenship Changers	46.7 (6)	27.7 (22)	3.42	.001
New Settlers	37.5 (8)	20.0 (12)	3.51	.002
Status Changers	15.0 (2)	22.7 (11)	-.87	.20
Occupationals	43.3 (3)	22.5 (8)	2.30	.02
Combined Samples	38.9 (19)	24.2 (53)	4.39	< .001
<i>B Republican Identifiers</i>				
Combined Samples	48.9 (44)	33.1 (8)	2.67	.005

*The scores on liberalism-conservatism are based on question F24. The range of scores is from 5 (most liberal) to 75 (most conservative). See text for further detail. For both Democratic and Republican identifiers, Independents leaning toward the party are included. Because so few Republicans identified with the Labor Party, a breakdown of the relationship by sample type in this partisan group was not appropriate.

rate with a party that more closely expresses their conservative political beliefs. Therefore, we also explored whether conservative Democrats from the South were more likely than migrants from other regions of the United States to identify with the Liberal Party.

Using question I.2, "Where did you spend most of your childhood years, say most of the years from ages 5 to 16?" we found, in the Citizenship Changer sample, that Southern childhood socialization did increase the likelihood that Democrats would become Liberals in Australia, over and above the effect of ideology. The correlation, adding Southern origins to ideology for this sample, rose from .56 to a multiple R of .74 ($p < .001$). However, Southern background did not help to explain Liberal identifications among Democrats in the other samples.¹¹ This suggests that among those Citizenship Changers who grew up in the South, there may be a real political "homecoming" in Australia which social pressures might have made psychologically unavailable within the United States party structure.

¹¹For Democratic New Settlers, the multiple R stays at .64; for Democratic Status Changers, the prediction of Australian party is still insignificant; and in the Occupational sample there were no respondents who grew up in the South. For the total sample, the R rises from .46 to .53 (for both, $p < .001$), although most of this increase is clearly due to the contribution of the Citizenship Changer sample. The following states were considered as part of this region: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North and South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.

THE EFFECT OF STATE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

The impact of U.S. Southern origins on party choice of Citizenship Changers in Australia sensitizes us to the importance of political context. The geographic area in which people live, by helping to define the setting in which their political interactions and participation take place, may also affect their choices. Brown (1988, esp. pp. 72-77) discusses the many factors that constitute this local political environment: personal contacts and networks, activity of local political organizations and officeholders, and the local media are among the most prominent. The political context thereby created, by influencing the number, variety, and salience of stimuli favorable or unfavorable to particular parties, may influence people's attitudes as they adapt to a new political environment.

Australia is a useful setting in which to study the impact of political environment because, as a federal system, it has state premiers and legislatures, and state political cultures which vary substantially. The most efficient way to measure the political atmosphere of a state is with its aggregate voting patterns over time. For this purpose, we used state election results for the Australian House of Representatives for the two national elections preceding our interviews: 1975 (Scammon, 1977), and 1977 (Scammon, 1979). A measure of "state political environment" was created for each of the six states and two territories by taking a weighted average of the first preference ballots. Each party's weight was determined by its rank from most liberal (Labor) scored 6, to most conservative (Country Party) scored 1, in the same manner as they are ranked for table 2.¹⁴ The 1975 and 1977 indices thus derived were averaged and the states and territories then ranked from 1 to 8 according to their position on this index.¹⁵

This measure of state political environment is nicely related to choice of Australian party identification by American migrants except among Occupationals, where the relationship is in the wrong direction but nonsignificant. In the other samples, *controlling for both American party identification and self-defined ideology*, the Pearson partial correlations are .22 for Citizenship Changers, .25 for New Settlers, .36 for Status Changers ($p \leq .05$ for each) and .18 in the four combined samples ($p = .008$).¹⁷ Thus, it is clear that local

¹⁴See Penman, 1979, pp. 333-51 for an explanation of Australia's preferential ballot system.

¹⁵The state and territory rankings from most conservative to most liberal are as follows: Northern Territory, Queensland, Western Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, Australian Capital Territory.

¹⁶Note that this is a small sample in which more than half of the respondents had not yet chosen an Australian party (table 2). Thus, the analysis for this sample is based on a small N .

¹⁷The correlation in the combined samples is obviously substantially diminished by the negative correlation among Occupationals.

political environment does influence the choices migrants make, swaying them toward parties that receive more support in the particular area in which they live. Moreover, this environmental factor exerts its influence over and above the choices made in response to the migrants' own political attitudes.

OVERALL IMPACT OF AMERICAN PARTY IDENTIFICATION, IDEOLOGY, AND STATE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

The importance of political ideology in explaining unexpected choices of Australian parties by both Democrats and Republicans, as well as the relationship between local political environment and party choice, naturally raises the question of the relative importance of these variables more generally, compared to American party identification, as influences on Australian party choice. Using Australian party identification as the dependent variable, table 6 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for each variable by sample, and also gives the multiple correlations and regression coefficients for two equations in each sample: one with all three variables and one with the two individual-level variables only.

While the effect of political environment is strong enough to have a significant beta in the combined sample, its effect is not significant in any of the individual samples. We therefore conclude that the individual level variables are of primary importance, although we feel that these results, along with our own work (1981, 1988) and a number of other recent contributions focusing on the impact of the sociopolitical environment, suggest very strongly that more attention should be devoted to studying the impact of political context on individual political behavior.

Among the individual level variables, we conclude that both political ideology and American party identification are very important influences on Australian partisanship. Between the two, political ideology appears to be somewhat more important. Of course, American partisanship and ideology are themselves correlated: for Citizenship Changers, $r = .33$, $p = .001$; New Settlers, $r = .60$, $p < .001$; Status Changers, $r = .39$, $p = .007$; Occupationals, $r = .54$, $p = .001$, and for the total sample, $r = .47$, $p < .001$. These results indicate greater consistency between party identification and political ideology than many studies of American public opinion would suggest, and probably reflect the greater than average political sophistication in these migrant groups.

Overall, our data suggest that pre-migration party identification itself is politicizing, and contributes to more rapid resocialization in a new society, even where the objects of that partisanship differ. This is an important finding in that it would not have been unreasonable to have predicted that prior American partisanship would *insulate* migrants from the attractions of other political parties, and make them *less* available for political mobilization in

TABLE 6

**CORRELATION AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR AUSTRALIAN PARTY
IDENTIFICATION WITH U S PARTY IDENTIFICATION, POLITICAL
IDEOLOGY, AND AUSTRALIAN STATE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT**

	Citizenship Changers	New Settlers	Status Changers	Occupational Occupationals	Combined Samples
U S Party ID with Aust Party ID	38***	52***	53**	57**	46***
Ideology with Aust Party ID	- 44***	- 68***	- 33*	- 66**	- 52***
State Polit Environ with Aust Party ID	25*	26*	44**	- 18	23***
Multiple R with 3 vars	55***	72***	63**	75**	60***
Beta U S Party ID	25*	15	41*	36	26***
Beta Ideology	- 35**	- 58***	- 10	- 48*	- 39***
Beta State Polit Environment	19	18	31	- 28	15*
Multiple R with 2 vars	51***	70***	55*	70**	58***
Beta U S Party ID	26*	17	47*	30	27***
Beta Ideology	- 37***	- 58***	- 15	- 49*	- 40***

*** $p \leq .001$ ** $p \leq .01$ * $p \leq .05$

the new country. However, our data show just the opposite: *immigrants who were already politicized in their native political system are more likely to become politicized in their adopted one.*

Despite the important dissimilarities between the presidential and parliamentary forms of government, and even the occasional confusion caused by the Australian party nomenclature, the strong influence of American party identification and ideological position on Australian party choice suggests that, in the political resocialization of Americans to the Australian political culture, the similarities between the two political systems are more important than the differences. The importance of national analogues in the translation mechanism of political resocialization was also highlighted by the large number of respondents who told us that the excitement generated during the brief Labor government of 1972-1975 (headed by Prime Minister Gough Whitlam) seemed similar to the "Camelot" period of American President John F. Kennedy.

OTHER VARIABLES RELATED TO ADOPTION OF AN AUSTRALIAN PARTISANSHIP

We also hypothesized that migrants would be more likely to adopt an Australian party identification if they were psychologically committed to the migration decisions. Toward the end of our interviews, respondents "

asked to describe their "residence plans" by choosing among the following alternatives, intended to represent differing levels of migration commitment

- 1 I decided from the beginning or shortly afterward to settle in Australia, and I still plan to stay
- 2 I was undecided at the beginning, but after living here a while, I decided to stay
- 3 I was undecided at the beginning, but different things happened that more or less made me a settler, so that I never really had to make a deliberate decision
- 4 I am still quite uncertain whether it would be better for me to stay in Australia or to leave
- 5 I would like to leave Australia, but I am staying here until the right opportunity opens up
- 6 I would like to leave Australia, but my family situation will probably keep me here
- 7 I very much want to leave Australia and I am trying to gain experience that will be useful elsewhere or actively searching for a good opportunity
- 8 I am living in Australia for only a specific period of time, and after that I will definitely leave

Contrary to our expectation however, residence plans were not consistently related to adopting an Australian partisanship. We interpret this lack of relationship to underscore the importance of our findings on partisanship: pre-migration partisanship seems to motivate people to form political attachments in a new country of residence *regardless of whether or not they are committed to remaining there permanently*. We think this occurs because the new party identification helps them make sense of and participate (even vicariously) in the political affairs of the country.

Our findings on the relative rapidity with which Americans adopt an Australian partisanship can be compared to those of Gitelman (1982) in his study of Americans in Israel. Despite the relatively high politicization levels of American migrants in Israel (p. 209) over 60% did *not* identify with an Israeli party at the time they were first interviewed by Gitelman. This important difference between our findings and Gitelman's in the speed of adopting a new partisanship suggests that the perceived similarity of the party systems of the countries of origin and destination may play an important role. Where party systems are more different, as between the United States and Israel, partisan resocialization will be less facilitated than we found it to be in Australia. The more complex, multiparty nature of the Israeli system undoubtedly increases the difficulty of translating preexisting political ideas into the language of the new polity. Nevertheless, the larger proportion of Soviet migrants (58%) in Gitelman's study who identified with an Israeli party, as compared to Americans, suggests that many other individual level factors are at

work, and that facilitation of political adaptation cannot be explained solely by structural similarities between countries of origin and destination

In the second wave of Gitelman's interviews, three years later, two-thirds of the Americans still in Israel did identify with an Israeli party, but Gitelman points out that 60% of these migrants who could be located for second interviews had already identified with an Israeli party when they were interviewed originally. This means that many of those who left had been nonidentifiers. This suggests that party identification, whatever other role it plays, may also indicate more general social integration, and this is shown directly in the strong relationships between measures of Israeli party identification and integration into Israeli society (Gitelman, 1982, pp. 290-91).

Considering social integration in our own study, we examined the relationship between membership in Australian voluntary organizations and adoption of an Australian party identification.¹⁸ For all types of organizations the more extensive a person's memberships, the more likely is the individual to identify with an Australian party.¹⁹ Considering political groups only among Citizenship Changers membership is significantly associated with having an Australian political party identification (the small number of members of Australian political groups in the other samples precluded analysis).²⁰ However, we have no way of establishing the temporal sequence of group memberships and party identification. Most likely there is a mutually supportive relationship.

We also expected that having an Australian spouse would increase a migrant's propensity to adopt an Australian party identification. Respondents married to Australians should experience both more pressures and more opportunities for Australian political socialization, since their spouses could act as direct socializing "agents." This would be consistent with Wilson's (1975) finding that, among both British and Italian migrants in Australia, those whose Australian political participation was higher than their pre-migration levels of participation were considerably more likely to have Australian born spouses. As hypothesized, in all samples migrants who were married to Australians were more likely to be Australian party identifiers. In the combined sample, 72% of respondents with Australian spouses, but only 56% with American spouses, identified with an Australian party ($\gamma = -.34$).

¹⁸We asked respondents whether they belonged to various types of civic and political groups in Australia. For total group memberships, the scoring is for the number of different *types* of groups each respondent belonged to (from 0 through 8), e.g., fraternal, civic, sports, professional, business, etc. For membership in political groups alone, respondents were scored 0 for no membership, 1 for an inactive membership, and 2 for an active membership.

¹⁹In the total sample, $\gamma = .28$, Pearson's $r = .18$, $p = .001$. In the separate samples the relationship is consistently in the same direction, but is significant only for Status Changers.

²⁰Pearson's $r = .19$, $p < .05$.

Pearson's $r = -.16$, $p = .01$) ²¹ These findings support the importance of the primary group in political socialization. As Wilson (1973, p. 93) put it, "[i]n the best tradition of the measles theory of political socialization, then (see Connell, 1967), political interest is 'caught' through close proximity with a significant other person."

Among personal background characteristics, only gender is consistently related to identification with an Australian party. Although the relationships are weak, women are slightly less likely than men to have adopted an Australian partisanship in all samples except Citizenship Changers. ²² However, since women are about as likely as men to report an American party identification while they were living in the States, it is possible that the weaker Australian partisanship of women will be short-lived.

CHANGING PARTISANSHIP: RELINQUISHING AMERICAN PARTY IDENTIFICATION

We have shown that American party identification plays an important role in post-migration political adaptation, specifically in facilitating adoption of an Australian party identification. But what happens to the American partisanship that migrants bring with them to Australia? Recent research in the United States suggests that party identification is not as resistant to change as was once thought. To the extent that American party identification no longer serves as a useful tool for understanding the current political environment, adaptation of American migrants to the Australian political system might also lead to a weakening of the sense of attachment to an American party. This would be consistent with the replacement model of political resocialization. Therefore, we ask how tenacious are American migrants in clinging to their American party identifications, and what are the factors that lead people to retain or relinquish American party identification after migration?

As we would expect, relinquishing American partisanship was most frequent among Citizenship Changers. 54% reported that their thinking about their American partisan loyalty had changed compared to how they felt while living in the United States. Nevertheless, it is a testimony to the enduring personal significance of American party identification, and dramatic evidence of the expansion process of political resocialization, that as many as

²¹ While consistent in direction, the separate sample relationships are not statistically significant; this is due to small N s once we eliminate respondents who are single or are married to citizens of other countries.

²² Pearson r 's of $-.18$, $p = .12$ for Status Changers; $-.17$, $p = .04$ for New Settlers; and $-.20$, $p = .09$ for Occupationals; females are coded 1, males 0. Among Citizenship Changers, the relationship is reversed: females are more likely to have an Australian partisanship ($r = .15$, $p = .04$).

43% of Citizenship Changers reported that they still think "the same way" about their American party identification as they did when they lived in the United States (and were American citizens). This finding is all the more impressive given that this is almost double the number of Citizenship Changers who retain an overall national self-identification as "foremost American" (23%). In the other three samples with lesser commitment to Australia, considerably larger proportions still retained their American partisanship: 73% of Occupationals, 64% of New Settlers, and 60% of Status Changers.²³ However, a certain lability of American party loyalty is indicated by the fact that one-third of the migrants who had arrived only within the previous eighteen months (Occupationals and New Settlers) had already stopped thinking of themselves politically as they had while living in the United States.

While Citizenship Changers have lived in Australia longer, on average than migrants in our other samples, the large difference between this sample and the others in current thinking about themselves in relation to American parties is not caused merely by length of time in Australia, since the direct relationship between year of arrival and propensity to think differently about one's party identification is quite weak.²⁴ Thus, that Citizenship Changers are more likely to have abandoned their prior American party identifications suggests a qualitative difference in affective political ties between those who have taken legal steps to change their national identity through naturalization and those who are still "trying on" a new national residence.

It is noteworthy that migrants tend to retain their American party identification for more time than it takes them to add an Australian partisanship. In each sample, the proportion who think differently now than they did in the United States about their American partisanship is always smaller than the proportion who report identifying with an Australian political party. This suggests that people are reluctant to give up an established part of their political self-concept, even as they expand their political self-images with a new partisan identification. Thus, American migrants in Australia reflect both the general loosening of party ties that occurred in the United States during the 1970s as well as their underlying durability.

As we would expect, strong American party identifiers were much more likely than weak identifiers to report that they still thought "the same way" about their U.S. party identifications. Considering these two groups only in the combined samples, 67% of strong identifiers ($N = 52$), but only 40% of weak identifiers ($N = 96$), retained their American partisanship (gamma =

²³For differences among all four samples, $X^2 = 12.6$, $p = .006$ for difference between Citizenship Changers and the three other samples combined, $X^2 = 10.06$, $p = .002$ (gamma = .43, Pearson's $r = -.21$, $p < .001$).

²⁴Pearson's r between year of arrival and thinking differently about one's American party identification is non-significant in all samples except for Status Changers, in which it is in the wrong direction.

— 52, Pearson's $r = - .26$, $p < .001$) The greater stability of strong partisans is consistent in all four subsamples. Clearly, there is an important difference between strong and weak identifiers in commitment to the American party system.

However, considering all categories of party identification (pure Independents, Independent Leaners, Weak and Strong Identifiers) the relationship between strength of party identification and retention of partisanship is curvilinear (See table 7, where X^2 and eta coefficients are used as summary measures because of the obvious curvilinearity.) While about two-thirds or more of Independents and Strong Identifiers remain attached to their American partisanship, generally fewer than half of Weak Identifiers do.

Insofar as being an "Independent" expresses a lack of commitment to a party in the first place, it is not surprising that so many Independents would feel "the same way" following migration.²⁵ Indeed, since the American party system does not include an Independent party per se, describing oneself as "independent" might be even more appropriate after migration than before, in the physical and social sense of the word. However, there is nothing obvious in the fact of having been a "weak" identifier (other than that very weakness of commitment) that should lead more than half the people in this group to abandon their party identifications. U.S. foreign and domestic policies still affect Americans living abroad, and—except for Citizenship Changers—they can still participate in electoral politics by casting absentee ballots.²⁶ Thus, we interpret the propensity of weak identifiers to cast off this part of their political self-concept as an indication of a general psychological withdrawal from the American political system. Since 76% of weak identifiers who relinquished their American party identification have *also* adopted an Australian partisanship, this pattern clearly illustrates the replacement process of political socialization.

In all samples, women are somewhat more likely than men to have stopped thinking of themselves politically as they did in the United States. The Pearson r 's ranged from .12 to .20, and although the zero-order correlations between gender and relinquishment of American party identification

²⁵Overall, these findings are consistent with Abramson's analysis (1983, pp. 99–105) of the 1972–1976 panel data of the American National Election Studies, in which he shows that strong identifiers are most stable in their partisanship over time. However, Abramson also found that weak identifiers were slightly more stable than independent leaners. While our data suggest that Independents are quite firm in their commitment to that posture, strictly speaking we cannot compare the stability of partisanship of independent leaners and partisans, because our questions on retention of partisanship after migration asked the leaners whether they still thought of themselves as "Independents" without mentioning the partisanship toward which they "leaned," while the partisans were asked whether they still thought of themselves as Democrats or Republicans.

²⁶Indeed, Democrats Abroad has a small official delegate representation at the Democratic Presidential nominating convention.

TABLE 7

PERCENTAGE OF MIGRANTS WHO STILL THINK OF THEMSELVES
 'THE SAME WAY' REGARDING THEIR AMERICAN PARTY IDENTIFICATION
 BY STRENGTH OF IDENTIFICATION*

Sample	Ind	Ind	Leaners	Weak	Strong	χ^2	p	Fda
Citizenship Changers	67%	(3)	71% (21)	16% (32)	55% (20)	18.5	< .001	49
New Settlers	70%	(10)	79% (28)	53% (36)	65% (20)	4.7	.19	22
Status Changers	60%	(5)	62% (13)	56% (18)	100% (2)	1.5	.68	20
Occupationals	86%	(7)	78% (18)	40% (10)	90% (10)	7.8	< .05	42
Combined Samples	72%	(25)	74% (80)	40% (96)	67% (52)	25.4	< .001	32

* See text for wording of questions F4b and F4d. Entries should be read e.g. as follows: among Citizenship Changers, 16% of weak identifiers and 55% of strong identifiers said they still thought of themselves as Republicans or Democrats, and 71% of those who said they were Independents but leaned toward a major party still thought of themselves as Independents. As are somewhat smaller than in table 3 because only those who called themselves independents or party identifiers were asked the follow-up question about whether they still thought of themselves the same way. Those who reported no preference at all and did not call themselves independents as well as a few minor party identifiers were not asked the follow-up question.

were not statistically significant in any individual sample, the relationship reaches significance for the combined samples ($\gamma = .24$, Pearson's $r = .11$, $p = .03$). Coupled with the finding that women were somewhat less likely than men to have adopted an Australian partisanship, this does suggest a somewhat lesser level of political commitment among female migrants as compared to males.

In contrast to our previous finding that *adopting an Australian party identification is unrelated to migration plans*, we find that commitment to the migration decision is moderately related to *relinquishing American partisanship* in all samples except the Occupationals. Migrants who are planning to stay in Australia are more likely to report that they currently think differently about their American partisanship, whereas those who prefer or are planning to return to the States were more likely to continue thinking about themselves "in the same way" as before migration.²² That American party identification is retained or dropped in association with long-term plans for national residence suggests that partisanship is an important part of the sense of national identification.

However, even indirect ties to a migrant's former country can encourage retention of original partisanship. For example, having an American spouse discourages migrants in all samples from dropping their American partisanship, although the relationship is significant only among Status Changers.

²² For Citizenship Changers, $\gamma = -.17$, $r = -.20$, $p = .04$; for Status Changers, $\gamma = -.25$, $r = -.22$, $p = .10$; and among New Settlers, $\gamma = -.40$, $r = -.28$, $p = .00$.

ers, where 77% of those married to another American ($N = 13$) still thought "the same way" about their American party identification, as compared to 44% of those who had married Australians ($N = 16$)²⁰

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Our data show that adults are capable of significant expansion of their political frames of reference. Considering a two variable cross-classification of (1) retention or relinquishment of American partisanship and (2) adoption or not of an Australian partisanship, the modal pattern is to augment the contents of one's political self-concept by *retaining* the prior American partisanship and also *adopting* a new Australian partisanship. This pattern occurs in 38% of the combined samples.²¹

We found that having an American partisanship is related to adopting an Australian partisanship, that there is continuity between specific party identifications in the United States and Australia and that where a new partisanship seems discontinuous, ideological preference influences the new choice. In addition, we have shown that relinquishing American party identification (an indicator of generally weakened commitment to the American political system) depends on its strength. "Thus, the way a migrant becomes politically integrated into a new society as well as the propensity to retain ties to the former society are systematically affected by his or her prior partisanship."

We think our findings support the argument that party identification has fundamental importance in structuring people's political self-concepts. Among other things, we have shown that Americans tend to retain their U.S. partisanship unless they have made definitive plans to reside elsewhere. Moreover, even many people who have changed citizenship still think of themselves in terms of their American party identifications. However, this is only part of a complex story. There are also indications that party identification declines in importance in the self-concept when people are no longer physically resident in the United States. This lability is consistent with other findings that reaction to political events in the United States and voting for opposition candidates can weaken the intensity of party identification (Kinder and Sears, 1985, p. 687). In general, however, we are more impressed with the durability of party identification than with its lability. In an

²⁰ For Status Changers, gamma = .62, $r = .33$, $p = .04$.

²¹ Twenty-two percent retain their American partisanship and do not adopt an Australian, 28% relinquish American but adopt an Australian partisanship, and finally 12% relinquish American partisanship and do not adopt an Australian partisanship.

²² In the larger work in progress on these data, we will report that in the Status Changers sample many sociopolitical attitudes and experiences, such as evaluation of American government and having been victimized by crime in the United States, are related to both adoption of an Australian partisanship and relinquishment of American partisanship.

interesting way, the impact of emigrating from the country may be seen as analogous to voting for an opposition candidate. Both actions seem to stimulate individuals to reassess their party loyalties. In the latter case, it is because the party connects them to a candidate they have rejected, and in the former because it connects them to the political system of the nation which they have, at least physically and temporarily, left behind.

That migrants whose American party identification was Democratic and who are not very knowledgeable about Australian politics sometimes align themselves with the Australian Liberal Party is an interesting example of how old frames of reference can interfere with appropriate political learning in new environments. More important than this relatively infrequent occurrence, however, is the strong influence of personal political ideology on partisan choice. When migrants make unexpected political choices—Democrats with the Liberals or Republicans with Labor—there are underlying ideological commitments that make these choices quite reasonable.

Overall, our data suggest that political "resocialization" depends heavily on attitudes and experiences acquired in a former society and, more generally, that adult political socialization is highly dependent on earlier experiences. Nevertheless, we have also demonstrated instances of significant new learning and adaptation to a new political environment. After an average of approximately only two years in a new society, about half of New Settlers identified with an Australian political party. With an average of approximately three years in Australia, almost two-thirds of Status Changers identified with an Australian party. Given that political scientists generally think about party identification as an important part of the political self-concept, this seems to be a remarkable level of political integration to have occurred in such a short time, all the more so considering that only the Citizenship Changers among our respondents are permitted to vote. Furthermore, many American migrants do not remain in Australia permanently. Thus, the rapidity with which they nevertheless adopt an Australian partisanship suggests that party identification is of considerable practical utility in interpreting and integrating oneself into one's political environment. Moreover, new partisan choices respond to the political tendencies in the new environment, as measured by recent electoral results in migrants' states of residence, showing awareness, responsiveness, and adaptation to local political conditions.

One obviously must be cautious in generalizing from our results to patterns of political adaptation among migrants more generally, whether American or non-American, either in Australia or elsewhere. However, our findings on the impact of prior partisanship on new political learning are consistent with and complement those of Black (1987), who found that among migrants in Toronto, reported interest and participation in the prior country were related to post-migration political interest, participation, and strength of Canadian partisanship. Black's sample included migrants from

four different ethnic-nationality groups and, overall, the results suggest that particular country of origin did not alter the general pattern. However, the differences between our findings in Australia and those of Gitelman in Israel with respect to adoption of a new partisanship suggest that this is a complex problem, and that we need to consider the particular ways in which countries of origin and destination differ, and to have more empirical results from a variety of nations before a comprehensive theory of migrant political adaptation can be developed.

In sum, substantial new political learning, based on migrants' current social experiences, does take place. However, it is quite clear that this new learning takes place most readily among those predisposed by prior attitudes and behavior to continue their participant patterns. Prior socialization provides the seed for new learning, but the current environment provides the culture in which it is nurtured.

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Legislative Calendars and Workload Management in Texas

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There is a well-developed normative model of how state legislatures ought to use calendars to make the management of their workloads more efficient. State legislatures that follow the normative model identify more and less important bills. Presumably, major and minor bills are treated differently – but are they?

This study desegregates the agenda of the Texas Legislature into unimportant, less important, and more important bills as defined by bill placement on calendars. There are systematic differences in the way bills of varying importance are treated. Moreover, the differences are consistent with the contention that calendars can facilitate the more efficient management of legislative workloads.

INTRODUCTION

The empirical study of state legislatures has produced a large and growing literature (Jewell, 1981; Goehlert and Musto, 1985). We know state legislatures are quite diverse in important elements such as size, formal procedures, and the role leaders play in the legislative process. However, there are several findings that seem common across the fifty state legislatures. Comparatively few bills introduced are passed into law. Most bills die in committees or subcommittees. "Clean" bills rarely survive the legislative process; amendments are added by substantive committees and subcommittees, on the floor, and by conference committees. The majority of bills that do pass have final action taken in the last few days of the session.

Another key finding common to the fifty state legislatures is that their workloads are large, complex, and becoming more difficult over time. As does any organization facing difficult tasks with inadequate resources, state legislatures have sought mechanisms to manage their workloads more systematically, efficiently, and rationally. One such procedure that has been

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recommended to all state legislatures is use of a calendar system that clearly distinguishes more important, less important, and unimportant bills

Organizations such as the Citizens Conference of State Legislatures (1971) and the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1985) have recommended the use of calendars as devices for organizing the business of state legislatures. In particular, use of a consent calendar for isolation and expeditious handling of noncontroversial bills has been advocated for all states. As recently as 1985, 36 state legislatures made use of consent calendars in one or both chambers. In addition, 18 state legislatures employed a unique calendar for local bills. The users of local calendars are also users of consent calendar, 38 of 50 legislatures and 60 of 99 chambers use special calendars for bills deemed less important.

In Congress and state legislatures, time and manpower are critically inadequate resources given the size of their agendas. Legislatures want to establish the relative importance of agenda items so more time and energy can be devoted to the more important items. Calendar systems can promote more efficient use of legislative resources to the extent that more important bills receive more extensive, intensive, and critical consideration than do less important bills.

Use of calendars to manage legislative workload by designating more and less important elements is the norm, not an innovative practice. But there has been no systematic empirical analysis to determine whether such legislative procedures achieve their desired results. In general, we know precious little about the extent to which findings documented for the entire legislative workload also hold for different elements of the workload. Most state legislatures use calendars to identify more and less important bills. Presumably, once identified, major and minor bills should be treated differently. But are they?

This study desegregates the agenda of all bills into major and minor bills as defined by state legislators. The research questions are: Does the legislative process documented elsewhere for bills in general apply equally well to more important and less important bills? Are major bills treated differently from minor bills? And does different treatment, if any, contribute to greater legislative efficiency? The empirical focus will be on the sixty-ninth regular session of the Texas Legislature, which convened on January 8 and recessed sine die on May 27, 1985. The Texas House uses both consent and local calendars in a conscious effort to separate consideration of major and minor bills. The source of data is official bill history information collected and published by the Texas Legislative Council (1985). These data permit one to distinguish major from minor bills as defined by the Texas Legislature, and to trace the legislative process and outcome for each of the 4,021 bills submitted.

The Texas Legislative Calendar System

A number of legislative scholars and practitioners have advocated the use of separate calendars and distinct legislative consideration for bills that are either noncontroversial or are narrow in their effect (Illinois Legislative Council, 1952, Burns, 1971, Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, 1971, Gove, Carlson, and Carlson, 1976, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1985). In principle, such uncontested and local bills are of lesser concern to the Legislature as a whole. The suggested procedure is to have special committees screen and identify minor bills. Such bills should come to the floor under rules of a procedure aimed at expediting passage. For example, floor amendment is restricted and debate is limited on these bills. Bills are removed from consent and local calendars should a small number of legislators request it or should debate become lengthy.

The Texas House of Representatives follows this normative model completely. The Texas House has two calendars for minor bills: the local calendar and the consent calendar. Bills must pass a series of tests before they can be put on these calendars for expedited floor consideration. A local bill can affect no more than one of Texas' 254 counties. A notice of a legislator's intention to file a local bill must be published in a newspaper in the affected locality at least 30 days before the bill is introduced (House Study Group, 1985, p. 2). Candidate bills for both the local and consent calendars must be recommended unanimously by the substantive house committee reporting them. Bills so recommended are forwarded not to the regular calendar committee but to the committee on local and consent calendars. If the committee on local and consent calendars decides that a bill does not belong on the local or consent calendar, it forwards the bill to the committee on calendars for placement on one of the major House calendars.

Once a bill has been placed on a local or consent calendar, it may be removed. A bill must be removed from either calendar if contested by five members. In addition, bills placed on local or consent calendars are withdrawn automatically if floor debate exceeds ten minutes (Benton, 1984, p. 144; House Study Group, 1985, p. 9).

Interviews with legislators and their staff confirm that bills appearing on the Texas House local and consent calendars are deemed minor bills by members of the Texas Legislature. These bills are thoroughly screened before they come up for floor consideration. They must be approved both by a House substantive committee and a special House calendar committee for placement on a minor calendar. Furthermore, bills can be quite easily removed from a minor calendar by a small number of representatives. In the case of extended floor debate, a single determined representative can have a bill removed from a minor calendar. Bills on the local calendar affect only a

small part of the state. Bills on the consent calendar are expected to be noncontroversial.

There are three calendars in the Texas House for major bills: emergency, major state, and general state. The House considers bills on these major calendars, in order, each legislative day before it considers bills on the minor calendars. In principle, bills are assigned to one of the major calendars according to the substance of the proposed legislation. In practice, the House Calendar Committee is virtually unlimited in its power to assign major bills to major calendars (the annual appropriations bill and bills the governor designates emergencies that clear substantive committee are supposed to appear on the emergency calendar). The difference between major calendars becomes important only in the final days of the legislative session when time constraints make it impossible to clear all calendars.

Table 1 presents the division of legislative work by major and minor calendars for the sixty-ninth Texas Legislature. A total of 4,021 bills were submitted. The great majority, 68%, died without reaching a House calendar. The Texas Legislature is similar to other state legislatures in its practice of killing bills early in the legislative process, most frequently in committee or subcommittee in the chamber of origin (Tucker, 1987). A total of 1,299 bills appeared on House calendars: 725 (56%) on major calendars, 574 (44%) on minor calendars. In addition, 224 bills were reported out of the House Substantive committee to the House Calendar Committee and died without being assigned to a calendar. Had they been assigned, they almost certainly would have appeared on a major calendar. Thus, a clear majority of bills identifiable as major and minor were major bills.

The overwhelming majority of major bills (87%) appeared on the general state calendar. The overwhelming majority of minor bills (87%) appeared on the consent calendar. Of all bills assigned to House calendars, only 7% appeared on the local calendar. Thus, one may conclude that the major criterion distinguishing major from minor bills is political: the level of conflict the bill is expected to generate within the Legislature. Only a small minority of bills appearing on calendars are assigned on the basis of bill substance.

The balance of this article will trace bills through the Texas legislative process to see if bills of different importance are treated differently. The "unimportant" bills are the 68% that die prior to calendar placement. A substantial number of these are unimportant from the day they are submitted—no action, other than required assignment to committee, is ever taken. Others become unimportant. They die without reaching a calendar because—and when—another bill on the topic is assigned to a calendar. The "less important" bills are the 574 that appear on the two minor calendars. The "more important" bills are those that appear on the major calendars. The chi-square test will be used to assess the extent to which observed distributions differ

TABLE 1
BILLS BY HOUSE CALENDAR

	N	Pct. All Bills	Pct. Bills on Calendars
Bills Submitted	1 021	100	
Bills that Died Prior to Calendar Assignment	2 722	65	
Bills Assigned to House Calendar	1 299	32	
Bills Assigned to Major Calendars	725	15	56
Emergency Calendar	2	0	0
Major State Calendar	93	2	7
General State Calendar	630	16	45
Bills Assigned to Minor Calendar	574	14	44
Local Calendar	55	2	7
Consent Calendar	486	12	37

Note: Texas Legislature, 69th Regular Session, 1985.

significantly from those one would expect from the overall distributions of calendar versus noncalendar bills and major versus minor bills.

Date of Introduction

The Texas Legislature meets in regular biennial sessions of 140 calendar days. There are three substantive periods of bill introduction. Bills may be prefiled by members any time before the beginning of the legislative session. In theory, bills may be prefiled as early as eighteen months before a session begins. In practice, virtually all bills are prefiled during the two-month period after the November election in even-numbered years and before the beginning of the regular session in early January of odd-numbered years.

There are no restrictions on bill introductions prior to and including calendar day sixty of the regular session. After that time, introduction of any bill (except local bills, emergency appropriations, or emergency matters submitted by the governor) is possible only by a suspension of the rules, which requires a four-fifths vote of those present and voting (May, MacCorkle, and Smith, 1979, p. 137; House Study Group, 1985, p. 2). Table 2 identifies bill introduction times for all bills, major bills, and minor bills.

The vast majority of bills (81%) are submitted during the first sixty days of the session. Approximately half are submitted in the final five days of unrestricted introduction (Tucker, 1987, p. 570). Some 11% of bills are prefiled and only 8% are introduced during the final eighty days of the legislative session. Bills that reach calendars are introduced later than bills that do not reach calendars. The chi-square value is significant at the .001 level. This

TABLE 2
WHEN BILLS ARE SUBMITTED

	All Bills Submitted	Bills on Calendars	
		Major Bills	Minor Bills
Prefiled	442 (11%)	75 (10%)	20 (3%)
Day 1-60	3,257 (81%)	590 (81%)	417 (73%)
After Day 60	322 (8%)	60 (8%)	137 (24%)
Total N	4,021	725	574

Note: Texas Legislature, 69th Regular Session, 1985

finding is consistent with the anecdotal observation of legislative staff that bills introduced later are more carefully drafted than are early submissions. Also, those who submit later bills have more time to consult with their colleagues. Thus, one may view the greater success of late submissions as evidence of rational legislative behavior.

Major bills are introduced earlier in the legislative session and minor bills are introduced later in the legislative session. The chi-square value is significant at the .001 level. The differences are substantial in each period of introduction. Ten percent of major bills are prefiled, while only 3% of minor bills are prefiled. From day one through sixty, 81% of major bills are introduced and 73% of minor bills are introduced. During the period of restricted introduction, only 8% of major bills are entered but 24% of minor bills are entered. It is noteworthy that local bills, which can be introduced after day sixty without extraordinary consent, do not dominate the minor bills entered late in the session. On the contrary, 61% of minor bills introduced after the sixtieth day appear on the consent calendar. Of the bills that do win calendar assignment, major bills are introduced significantly earlier than minor bills. Legislators allow themselves more time to consider those items on the agenda they consider most important and controversial. They allocate less time to bills of secondary importance.

Where Bills are Submitted

The Texas House of Representatives consists of 150 members, the Texas Senate has thirty-one members. Given the greater number of representatives, it is not surprising that most bills (63%) originate in the House (Table 3). Since House districts are much smaller than Senate districts, one might speculate that a greater proportion of minor bills would originate in the House and a greater proportion of major bills would originate in the Senate. Such is not the case. House members originate 60% of major bills and 61% of minor bills. Neither chamber specializes in either major or minor bills. Likewise, neither chamber's bills are more likely to win calendar placement. Did

TABLE 3
CHAMBER OF INTRODUCTION

	All Bills Submitted	Bills on Calendars	
		Major Bills	Minor Bills
House	2,524 (63%)	438 (60%)	352 (61%)
Senate	1,497 (37%)	287 (40%)	222 (39%)
Total N	4,021	725	574

Note: Texas Legislature 69th Regular Session 1985

ferences are not statistically significant according to the chi-square tests. This apparent willingness of the chambers to share the workload of major bills can be viewed as an efficient practice. Involving the maximum number of legislators in the early consideration of major bills reduces the likelihood of institutional bottlenecks.

Unique Versus Companion Bills

In addition to allowing joint sponsorship of bills, the rules of the Texas Legislature permit the same bill to be submitted by more than one member. These verbatim identical bills are known as companion bills. In the 1985 session, 654 House bills were companions to 640 Senate bills. Companion bills occur for many reasons. In some cases, companion bills are intended to enhance chance of passage or to speed the legislative process. In other cases, legislators are competing for authorship of a bill. In yet other cases, legislators enter bills unaware that the same bill has been entered by another. Are unique or companion bills more likely to appear on major or on minor calendars?

The analysis presented in table 4 indicates that minor bills are more likely to be unique, and major bills are more likely to have companions. While 26% of minor calendar items have companion bills, 35% of major calendar

TABLE 4
UNIQUENESS OF BILLS

	All Bills Submitted	Bills on Calendars	
		Major Bills	Minor Bills
Companion Bill	654 (16%)	256 (35%)	147 (26%)
Unique Bill	3,367 (84%)	469 (65%)	427 (74%)
Total N	4,021	725	574

Note: Texas Legislature 69th Regular Session 1985

bills have companions. The chi square is significant at the .001 level. The material in table 4 also shows that companion bills are more likely than unique bills to survive the legislative process and gain placement on a calendar. The chi-square value is again significant at the .001 level. Given the greater complexity and potential conflict of major bills, House and Senate sponsors of companion bills cooperate by initiating the legislative process in both chambers. This facilitates more rapid consideration in each chamber and maximizes the probability that most important bills will be reported and passed into law. Companion bills permit members of both chambers to initiate early consideration of the more important items on the legislative agenda.

Committee Workloads

A number of scholars have studied the distribution of bills across legislative committees (Zeller, 1954; Wiggins, 1972; Tantillo, 1968; Burns, 1971; CCSL, 1971; Hamm, 1980; Francis and Riddlesperger, 1982; ACIR, 1985). The dominant finding is that the workload of bills is distributed quite unevenly. Texas government texts report that standing committees in the Texas Legislature also have widely disparate numbers of bills assigned to them (Bedichek and Tannahill, 1982; McCleskey, et al., 1982; Anderson, et al., 1984; Pettus and Bland, 1984).

Table 5 reports the distribution of all bills, major bills, and minor bills across House committees and Senate committees. The coefficient of relative

TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF BILLS ACROSS COMMITTEES
(COEFFICIENT OF RELATIVE VARIATION)
Bills Considered

	All Bills Submitted	Bills on Calendars	
		Major Bills	Minor Bills
House Committees	646	516	1,070
Senate Committees	685	496	1,120
Total N	4,021	725	574
	All Bills Passed	Bills on Calendars	
		Major Bills	Minor Bills
House Committees	685	496	1,120
Senate Committees	668	602	965
Total N	1,024	532	492

Note: Texas Legislature, 69th Regular Session, 1985.

variation is used as the measure of distribution. The higher the coefficient, the greater the concentration of bills in a small number of committees. A coefficient of zero indicates completely even distribution of bills across committees.

A common pattern holds for both all bills assigned to committees and bills ultimately passed by the Legislature. Major bills are much more evenly distributed across committees than are minor bills and all bills. Minor bills tend to be concentrated in committees such as county affairs and judicial affairs that deal with consent and local items. In Texas, the major bills that comprise the most important part of the legislative workload are spread quite evenly across House and Senate committees. Past research that has focused on all bills has understated the division of labor among committees on the most important and time-consuming items of legislation. The substance of the workload is distributed among Texas legislative committees more evenly than a counting of all bills would suggest.

Amendments

Various authors have reported on bill amendments in committees (Lantillo 1968; Hamm and Moncrief 1980), on the floor (Rosenthal 1974; Hamm and Moncrief 1980, 1982; Hamm 1985) and in conference committees (Jewell and Patterson 1977). The literature on aggregate state legislative process tells us two things about amendments. First, the majority of bills that fail of enactment die early in the process. Thus, the majority of bills are not amended. Second, bills that are passed are rarely passed clean, without amendment. Frequency of amendment for all bills for the Texas Legislature, both major and minor, is reported in table 6.

As has been reported for other state legislatures, the majority of bills submitted to the Texas Legislature (67%) do not have amendments adopted. Amendment is part of the screening process. Only 25% of bills submitted pass the Legislature, but more than 66% of amended bills pass.

The majority of bills that die are not amended. However, a majority of bills that reach a House calendar either have been or will be amended.

TABLE 6
AMENDMENTS

	All Bills Submitted	Bills on Calendars	
		Major Bills	Minor Bills
Clean Bills	2,690 (67%)	152 (21%)	243 (42%)
Amended Bills	1,331 (33%)	573 (79%)	331 (58%)
Total A	4,021	725	574

Note: Texas Legislature, 69th Regular Session, 1985.

Major bills and minor bills are treated differently. Only 21% of major bills are clean bills, 42% of minor bills are unamended. Chi-square values for both calendar versus noncalendar and major versus minor bills are significant at the .001 level. Thus, while compromise typifies the large majority of bills that progress along the legislative process and the large majority of bills passed, minor bills are twice as likely to be unamended as major bills. Once again, disaggregation of all agenda items into those deemed more and less important reveals that the Texas Legislature focuses its time and energy on the most important elements of its workload.

Passage and Veto Rates

A substantial literature indicates that most bills submitted to state legislatures fail of enactment (Zeller, 1954, Rakoff and Sarner, 1975, Rosenthal and Forth, 1978, Rosenthal, 1981, Hedlund and Freeman, 1981). We also know most bills that win placement on a calendar ultimately are passed (Hedlund and Hamm, 1977-1978, Tucker, 1985). These generalizations also apply to the Texas Legislature. Only 25% of bills submitted are passed, but 79% of bills that appear on a calendar are passed. Clearly, the calendar process in Texas permits the Legislature to screen and limit its workload.

There are still substantial differences in passage rates for major and minor bills (table 7). The failure rate for major bills is twice that for minor bills: 27% versus 14%. While placement on a minor calendar does not guarantee passage, it does importantly enhance a bill's chances. The chi-square value is significant at the .001 level. This Texas legislative calendar process is quite accurate in identifying noncontroversial elements that will win legislative approval.

Vetoes are infrequent in Texas (Wiggins, 1980). Only about four percent of bills passed are vetoed. The analysis in table 8 shows that major bills and minor bills are equally likely to be vetoed. The chi-square value is not significant. There were no vetoes overridden in the 1985 regular session. Veto overrides rarely occur in Texas because the overwhelming majority of bills

TABLE 7

PASSAGE

	All Bills Submitted	Bills on Calendars	
		Major Bills	Minor Bills
Bills Passed	1,024 (25%)	532 (73%)	492 (86%)
Bills Not Passed	2,997 (75%)	193 (27%)	83 (14%)
Total N	4,021	725	574

Note: Texas Legislature, 69th Regular Session, 1985.

TABLE 8
VETOES

	Bills Passed by Legislature	
	Major Bills	Minor Bills
Bills Vetoed	24 (5%)	20 (4%)
Bills Passed and Not Vetoed	508 (95%)	472 (96%)
Total N	532	492

Note: Texas Legislature: 69th Regular Session, 1985

are passed in the final days of the session. The governor can wait until the session has ended to veto these bills. As a result, the Texas Legislature seldom has the opportunity even to consider overriding vetoes (Tucker, 1985, 1987).

When Final Actions are Taken

The pace of work varies enormously across the state legislatures (Zeller, 1954; Illinois Commission on the Organization of the General Assembly, 1967; Tantillo, 1968; Craft, 1972; Wiggins, 1972; DeClercq, 1977; Tucker, 1985, 1987). The Texas Legislature is much more likely than other legislatures to pass bills into law toward the end of its session (Tucker, 1985). Final decisions to kill and decisions in general are much more evenly distributed over the session, particularly in the period from the end of unrestricted bill introduction to adjournment (Tucker, 1987). Table 9 reports when final actions are taken for all bills, major bills, and minor bills.

Bills that die without reaching a House calendar have final actions relatively earlier in the session than bills that win calendar placement. The chi-square value is significant at the .001 level. Nearly 50% of bills that do reach House calendars have final action taken in the last two weeks of the session. This is equally true for major bills and minor bills. Final actions to pass occur at about the same rate for major and minor bills. Some 22% of major bills are passed in the final two weeks compared with 19% of minor bills. Final decisions to kill bills are made much earlier for minor bills than for major bills. Seventy-nine percent of decisions to kill major bills are made in the final days, only 65% of decisions to kill minor bills are made at that time. The chi-square statistic is significant at a level between .01 and .02.

As noted elsewhere (Tucker, 1985, 1987), the end-of-session logjam of work in the Texas Legislature is large. However, the calendar process permits the least important elements of the workload to be disposed of earliest in the legislative session, and the most important bills to be considered through the final days of the session. When one considers that major bills are

TABLE 9
WHEN FINAL ACTION IS TAKEN
 All Final Actions

	All Bills Submitted	Bills on Calendars	
		Major Bills	Minor Bills
Day 1-126	2 733 (68%)	160 (22%)	123 (21%)
Day 127-140	1,288 (32%)	565 (78%)	451 (79%)
Total N	4 021	725	574

Final Actions to Pass Bills on Calendars		
	Major Bills	Minor Bills
Day 1-126	119 (22%)	94 (19%)
Day 127-140	113 (78%)	398 (81%)
Total N	532	492

Final Actions to Kill Bills on Calendars		
	Major Bills	Minor Bills
Day 1-126	41 (21%)	29 (35%)
Day 127-140	152 (79%)	55 (65%)
Total N	193	82

Note: Texas Legislature, 69th Regular Session, 1985

frequently interrelated (e.g., spending bills are contingent on revenue bills passing such bills into law at the end of the session is seen as efficient and perhaps even necessary).

CONCLUSIONS

Scholars and practitioners have articulated normative guidelines for legislative work to be organized and managed by legislative calendars. More important and less important bills ought to be identified early in the legislative process and should be treated differently. This paper is apparently the first effort to examine empirically the extent to which major and minor bills are treated differently.

Comprehensive data on all bills submitted in the 1985 regular legislative session in Texas were examined. Major and minor bills were identified by the criteria employed by practitioners: calendar placement. Bills that reach legislative calendars are themselves unique. Less than one-third of bills submitted reach a calendar. Bills that reach calendars are more likely to have companions, more likely to be amended, more likely to be passed, and more

likely to have final action taken later in the session than are bills that do not reach calendars

Three ways were identified in which major and minor bills are not treated differently from each other. Major and minor bills are equally likely to

1. originate in a given chamber,
2. be vetoed, and
3. have final action occur toward the end of the legislative session.

Six ways were identified in which the legislative treatment of major and minor bills is substantially different:

1. Major bills are introduced earlier in the session than are minor bills.
Major bills have companion bills more frequently than minor bills do.
Major bills are more evenly distributed across committees; minor bills are more concentrated in a few committees.
Major bills are more frequently amended than are minor bills.
Major bills are more likely to be killed; minor bills are more likely to be passed by the Legislature.
2. Final actions to kill major bills occur later in the session than final actions to kill minor bills.

The Texas Legislature's calendar process meets the normative model advocated by legislative reform. Empirical analysis suggests that these legislative practices have the desired effects on workload management. Bills that die without reaching calendars are treated systematically differently from those that do reach calendars. Major bills and minor bills are treated differently, most importantly, the differences in treatment complement the distinct legislative processes to give major bills longer, more widespread, more intensive, and more critical consideration than minor bills receive. Empirical analysis suggests that legislative reform advocates are correct in their contention that using calendars to differentiate bills by importance can facilitate the efficient management of legislative workload.

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The Politics of Economic Growth, Once Again

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Papers by Lange and Garrett and by Jackman have debated whether the political and economic power of the left influences economic growth in the western industrial democracies. Most recently, Hicks (1988) has concluded that they do—once Lange and Garrett's model is modified, despite my claim to the contrary. This paper shows that there is no evidence for the claim advanced by Hicks. First, I demonstrate that Hicks's elementary revision is misguided and insufficient to salvage the Lange-Garrett hypothesis. Second, I establish that the estimates for his expanded model are not robust, but instead depend entirely on influential observations. Third, I review some crucial theoretical issues that are misconstrued both by Lange and Garrett and by Hicks and suggest an alternative approach to the politics of economic growth.

A series of papers in this journal and elsewhere have debated the politics of economic growth in the western industrial democracies. On the basis of a set of statistical analyses, Lange and Garrett concluded that the key to long-term economic growth is the strength (that is, the centralization and scope) of labor unions, when that strength is accompanied by substantial governmental participation by parties of the left (Lange and Garrett, 1985, 1987; Garrett and Lange, 1986). This they took as evidence for the importance of "neo-corporatist" institutions in economic policy-making.

In a reanalysis of the basic Lange-Garrett model I showed that the estimates are not robust in the face of a minor change in the data set (Jackman, 1987). Instead, they hinge critically on the inclusion of a single influential case—Norway—in the analysis. With Norway included the Lange-Garrett model appears to be supported, with Norway excluded support evaporates completely, as both the estimated coefficients for strength and the overall fit of the model drop precipitously in size.

Recently, Hicks (1988) has argued that, in a slightly modified form, Lange-Garrett estimates are much more robust than my analysis indicates. Specifically, he concludes that where the left is strong politically and economically, it has had a sustained impact on economic growth. Further-

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asserts that this impact is not an artifact of the 1970s oil boom in Norway, and that it is "robust in the presence of several key control variables drawn from economic theory [and a stepwise regression analysis]" (Hicks, 1988, p. 677). Hicks's empirical inquiry proceeds in two stages. In the first, "Elementary Revisions and Reanalyses," he argues that both Lange and Garrett and I misspecified our empirical models. In the second, "Further Revisions and Reanalyses," he introduced a series of additional "control" variables in an effort to demonstrate the robustness of Lange and Garrett's original argument.

My purpose is to show that there is no evidence for the claims advanced by Hicks. First, I demonstrate that his elementary revision is misguided and insufficient to salvage the Lange-Garrett hypothesis. Second, I establish that the estimates for his expanded model are not robust, but instead depend entirely on influential observations. Third, I review some crucial theoretical issues that have been misconstrued both by Lange and Garrett and by Hicks.

THE BASIC MODEL

Lange and Garrett (1985) proposed that economic growth is a multiplicative function of the power of labor unions and parties of the left:

$$\text{Growth} = b_0 + b_1 X_1 + b_2 X_2 + b_3 (X_1 X_2) + e \quad (1)$$

In their original formulation, Growth is the average annual percentage change in gross domestic product (GDP) from 1974-1980 divided by the average annual percentage change in GDP from 1960-1973. This division serves to standardize growth from 1974 to 1980 by the earlier rate of growth. The organizational power of labor unions (X_1) is the product of (a) the percentage of the labor force that is unionized and (b) the degree to which the union movement is centralized, and refers to the years from 1965 to 1980. The power of parties of the left (X_2) is measured by the mean percentage of cabinet portfolios held by parties of the left from 1974 to 1980.¹

Using Lange and Garrett's data for fifteen Western industrial states, the OLS estimates of (1) are

$$\text{Growth} = .814 - .192 X_1 - .278 X_2 + .137 (X_1 X_2) \quad (2)$$

(4.7) (2.0) (2.4) (2.9)

where numbers in parentheses are *t*-ratios, the corrected R^2 is .365, and the *F*-ratio is 3.7. Lange and Garrett took these estimates as empirical evidence for their principal conclusion that growth is a multiplicative function of the power of labor and the left.

¹ Garrett and Lange have more recently pursued additional analyses of the politics of growth in a paper delivered at the 1988 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. However, they have requested that the 1988 paper not be cited or quoted, and, in deference to their wishes, I do not cite or discuss their 1988 paper here.

I demonstrated that these estimates are not robust (Jackman, 1987). And only one case (Norway) excluded, the OLS estimates of (1) are

$$\text{Growth} = \underset{(4.8)}{641} - \underset{(0.9)}{0.68} X_1 - \underset{(1.5)}{1.38} X_2 + \underset{(1.3)}{0.54} (X_1 X_2)$$

where $N = 14$, the corrected R^2 is .000, and the F -ratio is 0.7. In other words, with one case removed the size of all three coefficients is reduced by at least 50% and none of the estimates meets conventional levels of statistical significance.

I also proposed an alternative specification to control for the effect of prior growth. Instead of standardizing the dependent variable, post-1973 growth is regressed on pre-1973 growth and labor/left strength:

$$Y_t = b_0 + b_1 Y_{t-1} + b_2 X_1 + b_3 X_2 + b_4 (X_1 X_2) + e$$

where Y_t is 1974–1980 growth, Y_{t-1} is 1960–1973 growth, and X_1 and X_2 are defined as above. For all fifteen cases, the OLS estimates of (4) are

$$Y_t = \underset{(1.5)}{3.129} + \underset{(1.7)}{.253} Y_{t-1} - \underset{(2.2)}{1.063} X_1 - \underset{(2.4)}{1.433} X_2 + \underset{(2.9)}{.682} (X_1 X_2)$$

where the corrected R^2 is .516 and the F -ratio is 4.7. With Norway moved ($N = 14$), the OLS estimates of (4) are

$$Y_t = \underset{(1.6)}{1.995} + \underset{(2.6)}{.303} Y_{t-1} - \underset{(1.1)}{.492} X_1 - \underset{(1.5)}{.777} X_2 + \underset{(1.4)}{.317} (X_1 X_2)$$

where the corrected R^2 is .557 and the F -ratio is 5.1. Comparing (5) and (6), it is plain that Norway continues to drive the estimates for the labor/left strength coefficients in (5) even with this minor improvement to the model that allows an explicit estimate of the effects of prior growth.

Lange and Garrett's (1987, see also Garrett and Lange, 1986) response to the above was that Norway should not be excluded from the data set because it is an interesting and important case. For example, they asserted that to exclude Norway is to ignore "all the other elements of 'Norwayness' including its distinctive 'corporatist' structures" (1987, p. 258). They went on to claim that "the inclusion of Norway is justified because the case contains information *central to our analysis*" (p. 260, my emphasis).² And they heartened me from the fact that, with Norway excluded, there are no sign reversals. I return to this general issue below.

Hicks concurs with Lange and Garrett: "They present some fair arguments

²There are different ways to read this last sentence. Norway certainly is 'central' to Lange and Garrett's analysis in the sense that when it is excluded, they have no results to report.

³Note that the signs imply that growth will be high when *both* labor and the left are *either* strong or weak. Growth is reduced only when *either* labor or the left are weak. Despite this discussion on this point (Lange and Garrett, 1985, pp. 799–801; Hicks, 1988, pp. 638–85), the implication is peculiar.

for including Norway" (1988, p. 679). But, he also goes on to allow that "the numerous multiple regression equations presented to ballast empirically the Lange-Garrett responses arguably causes them to founder. As soon as Norway is removed from analyses, statistical results, though *directionally* consistent with the Lange-Garrett theory, fall short of any conventional significance level" (1988, p. 680, emphasis in original).

To remedy this last problem, he proposes a modification of the model in equation (4)

All three authors' treatments of adjustment for lagged rates of GDP growth are fundamentally flawed by their neglect of another control variable: the level of technology at the beginning of a growth period. [The] concern for lagged growth rates in the Jackman and Lange-Garrett analyses of growth is rather idiosyncratic. In lieu of compelling arguments for the specificity of their arguments about growth effects of labor/Le ft for strength: the post-1973 period of stagflation. Lange and Garrett and Jackman might have attended more profitably to standardizations/controls for lagged *development* than for lagged rates of economic growth (1988, pp. 680-81, emphasis in original).

The suggestion that the model in (4) is "fundamentally flawed" and "idiosyncratic" is odd, given that it involves a simple lagged dependent variable, a common procedure. All other things equal, we would expect economies that have experienced superior growth in the past to continue to experience better growth in the future. Indeed, Hicks himself allows on the same page that "lagged growth is not necessarily irrelevant to good estimation. Nonetheless, he goes on to estimate a model like (4) in which the level of GDP per capita averaged over 1973 and 1974 is substituted for growth in GDP from 1960 to 1973.¹

The resulting estimates for the three labor/left coefficients all have the correct sign and are more than twice their standard errors, whether or not Norway is included (Hicks, 1988, table 3). Only the estimates for initial GDP per capita are of borderline statistical significance, having a *t*-ratio of 1.36 with Norway included and a *t*-ratio of 1.77 with Norway excluded. However, the size of the three coefficients for labor/left strength drops by 30% on average with Norway excluded. Hicks takes this as strong evidence to favor the Lange-Garrett hypothesis and for the inclusion of Norway.

¹Hicks's figures on the level of per capital GDP are from Summers, Kravis, and Heston (1980). Those figures are estimates of GDP based on national differences in purchasing power rather than exchange rates. While improved estimates are available in Summers and Heston (1984), I report analyses using the original 1980 figures to maximize comparability with Hicks. Substituting the improved for the original figures has no appreciable effect on any of the analyses discussed in this paper. Hicks also notes that he replicated his results by substituting figures on growth from 1974-1982 (available from Garrett and Lange, 1986, p. 520) for those concerning 1974-1980. Employing the same substitution for all of the analyses discussed in this paper has no discernible effect on any of the results. Again, I report analyses using the 1974-1980 growth figures solely to maximize comparability with Hicks.

TABLE 1
REGRESSIONS OF GROWTH (1974-1980) ON PRIOR GROWTH,
GDP PER CAPITA, AND LEFT STRENGTH,
WITH AND WITHOUT NORWAY **

	With Norway	Without Norway
Constant	4.517 (1.8)	3.450 (1.8)
Growth 1960-1973	.199 (1.2)	.246 (1.9)
GDP Per Capita 1973/1974	-.0002 (0.7)	-.0002 (1.0)
Labor Strength (λ_1)	-1.152* (2.3)	-.582 (1.3)
Left Strength (λ_2)	1.605* (2.5)	-.954 (1.7)
Interaction ($\lambda_1 \lambda_2$)	.728* (2.9)	.362 (1.5)
Adjusted R^2	.491	.555
F-ratio	3.7	4.2
N	15	14

* Starred coefficients are more than twice the size of their standard errors

** Main table entries are metric regression coefficients; numbers in parentheses are the *t*-ratios

In view of his remark that lagged growth 'is not necessarily irrelevant' it is curious that Hicks did not also include it along with per capita GDP in his revision of the basic model. The relevant estimates are displayed in table 1. The first column of the table shows the estimates obtained with Norway included. For these figures, we see that the three labor/left coefficients all have the "correct" sign and are statistically significant. In contrast, neither the coefficient for prior growth nor that for per capita GDP is statistically significant. This would appear perfectly consistent with the inferences Hicks draws from panel A of his table 3 and with the Lange-Garrett argument.

But it is also plain from the second column of table 1 that Norway remains an influential case.³ With Norway excluded, all three labor/left coefficients drop precipitously in size and none is statistically significant. In fact, the shift in these coefficients across the two columns of the table is very similar to the shift evident in the corresponding coefficients in equations (5) and (6) above. With the exclusion of Norway, the coefficient for per capita GDP is not changed (but remains slightly smaller than its standard error), while the co-

³ For the distinction between an influential case and an outlier, see Bollen and Jackman (1985, pp. 511-12).

efficient for prior growth increases somewhat in size and is marginally significant (at the .10 level). A comparison of the estimates in the second column of table 1 with those I reported (Jackman, 1987, table 2) shows that Hicks has simply introduced an irrelevant variable (initial level of GDP per capita) into the analysis. Thus, while he labels his analysis a revision, it is simply a restatement of the Lange-Garrett model. This is why the analysis in the first part of Hicks's paper fails to salvage the Lange-Garrett hypothesis, assuming that the issue of robustness is seen as a serious one.

Along with Lange and Garrett, however, Hicks seems to believe that a 'fair' case can be made for retaining an influential case in the analysis *even if it can be demonstrated to be driving the estimates*. As a result, figures such as those in the second column are viewed as having no real bearing on the inquiry. This view betrays a failure to comprehend the rudimentary logic of regression analysis.

Take the simplest case of a univariate distribution with ten cases: five of which have a value of 1, four of which have a value of 2, and the last of which has a value of 20. If we attempt to summarize this distribution by taking its mean, we get a figure of 3.3, which number constitutes an obviously inaccurate summary of the bulk of the data. Regression analysis is an attempt to find the mean values of a dependent variable (the predicted values) across different values of the explanatory variables.⁸ It is employed to describe a set of data as accurately and economically as possible and to give some empirical substance to generalizations. The point should be elementary that a valid empirical generalization is a summary proposition that holds generally across the majority of the cases. Thus, of course, is not an esoteric statistical issue, but one that applies to any empirical analysis that seeks to generalize, regardless of the particular research design employed.

It follows that potentially influential observations warrant careful attention, and this is particularly true for small-sample studies of the type under discussion here. The Lange-Garrett hypothesis is presumably not intended as a theory of Norway, but is instead an attempt to generalize about the causes of economic growth in the industrial democracies. If we had evidence that it fit most of the observations reasonably well, we would be justified in placing some confidence in it. After all, perfect fit is not expected. But if we have evidence that the hypothesis does not fit fourteen of the fifteen cases, then it is not a useful generalization, however interesting the influential case might be from an intuitive or personal point of view.

I do not mean to suggest that once an influential case has been identified the only possible corrective action is to remove it from the analysis. A number of other remedies may often be more appropriate (see Bollen and

⁸ For an excellent discussion of regression analysis in terms of conditional expectations, see Goldberger (1968).

Jackman, 1985). But to proceed naively as if the case(s) were not influential is deceptive. This is the strategy adopted by Garrett and Lange (1986), on the following tenuous grounds. "Where, as in the present case, the analysis is based on something closer to a 'population' of cases rather than a 'sample,' [the best strategy] is to keep outliers in the analysis, they are 'genuine observations' that are 'highly significant and suggestive, and to which we should pay considerable attention'" (p 538). After noting among other things that the "explanatory power" of their model "evaporated to nothing" with Norway excluded (p 539), Garrett and Lange proceeded (pp 540ff) as if their estimates were entirely robust. In fact, they had no results to report. Their estimates did not reflect the prevalent patterns in their data, and whether those data are viewed as a sample or as a population is altogether beside the point.

But Garrett and Lange's intimation that they are working with the population of capitalist democracies is not quite accurate, since their analyses are based on fifteen cases. If we follow Lijphart (1984, table 3.1), there are twenty-one established democracies in all, and even if we exclude those with populations of less than one million (Iceland and Luxembourg), it is not clear why Garrett and Lange did not include Ireland, New Zealand, Switzerland, and perhaps Israel (a non-OECD member) in their analyses. Given the demonstrated sensitivity of those analyses to just one case, and in light of the small *N*, the omission of these cases is unfortunate.

Finally, it is important to understand that the fact that one observation is driving the estimates cannot in itself be taken as evidence that the estimated model fits that particular observation. Thus, the figures in the first column of table 1 do not indicate that the Lange-Garrett argument applies to Norway. Economic growth in that country since 1960 has indeed followed a track that is inconsistent with their model. Although the organizational strength of labor has been relatively stable throughout the period, partisan control of the government has alternated between labor and conservatives (the latter formed two governments, from 1965 to 1971 and from 1981 to 1986). While the Lange-Garrett model implies that growth would be lower under these two conservative governments, this expectation is belied by the available figures on annual Norwegian growth rates. In other words, their model does not even constitute an adequate theory of growth in that country.

HICKS'S EXPANDED MODEL

In the second phase of his analysis, Hicks attempts to show that the Lange-Garrett model is "robust in the presence of several key control variables" (1988, p 677). Seven such variables are considered and a subset of these is selected on the basis of a "forward stepwise procedure executed with

an inclusion criterion of (absolute value of) $t > 1.0$ " (p. 693).² Two sets of calculations are summarized by Hicks in his table 5 (p. 692).

The first row of that table reports estimates based on all fifteen countries, including Norway. The three labor/left coefficient estimates seem to survive in the presence of seven other explanatory variables in this row, which fact Hicks takes as evidence of their robustness. The second row of the table is based on an N of fourteen (Norway is excluded). Again, the three labor/left coefficient estimates apparently survive the inclusion of five additional control variables, which is interpreted as further testimony of robustness. "Support for the Lange-Garrett model *strengthens* when control variables are considered for 1974–1980. *With or without Norway*, parameter estimates for all Lange-Garrett estimates are reasonably signed and, with one minor exception, unambiguously significant. Overall, the longer models fit the data very well, explaining (after adjustment for degrees of freedom) 97.5% of the variation in 1974–1980 GDP growth with Norway included and 87.5% of the variance in 1974–1980 growth with it excluded" (Hicks, 1988, p. 696, my emphasis).

But there is reason for skepticism. The model estimated in the first row of Hicks's table 5 contains eleven parameters (including the constant). Given that it is estimated over only fifteen cases, this means that there are only four degrees of freedom. The second model in his table 5 has nine parameters estimated with fourteen cases, leaving five degrees of freedom. Hicks himself describes the degrees of freedom as "scarce" (p. 693) and takes their scarcity as justification for employing the stepwise procedure.

Leaving the well-known problems of stepwise regression to one side (on which see, e.g., Hanushek and Jackson, 1977, pp. 95–96), the fundamental issue here is that with so few degrees of freedom, Hicks has fitted *individual* parameters for a majority of the cases in his analysis. While this obviously helps maximize the overall fit of the model, it hardly does so elegantly.³ And it certainly conflicts with a primary analytic goal noted earlier, which is to explain general patterns in the data as accurately and *economically* as possible. From a substantive point of view, an explanation that employs ten variables to account for fifteen cases does not constitute much of a generalization, as that term is normally used. Hicks describes his approach as "eclectic" (p. 678), but whatever happened to Occam's razor?

On a practical level, with so few degrees of freedom, the estimates are unlikely to be robust.⁴ Instead, they are liable to exhibit extreme sensitivity

Hicks is inconsistent on this point. If a t ratio of 1.0 is adopted as the standard for variable inclusion, the variable introduced by Hicks (GDP per capita) does not belong in table 1 above.

³A perfect or near-perfect fit will of course remain so even when adjusted for degrees of freedom, especially when there are so few.

⁴It is ironic in this context that Hicks uses all of these control variables precisely to evaluate the robustness of the Lange-Garrett hypothesis.

to mild changes in the data matrix, which is verging on assuming a square shape. Remember that specifying a model that includes $(N - 1)$ explanatory variables will always produce a perfect fit, and the number of explanatory variables in Hicks's model is precariously close to $(N - 1)$.¹⁰ Further, the odds that other cases will become influential increases considerably as the number of such variables approaches $(N - 1)$.

This issue is readily evaluated, using regression diagnostic tools (Bollen and Jackman, 1985). Since it has one more degree of freedom, I focus on the model in the second row of Hicks's table 5 which has nine parameters estimated over fourteen cases. The first column of table 2 contains estimates that reproduce (with slight rounding error) those reported by Hicks. Post-1974 growth is regressed on prior rates of growth, per capita GDP 1973/74, the three labor/left variables, a measure of dependence on foreign oil, gross domestic investment rates as of the early 1970s, and a measure of governmental redistribution of household income.¹¹

The diagnostics reveal that many of the coefficient estimates are particularly sensitive to the presence of Austria in the analysis, which means that Austria is an influential case in Hicks's expanded model. And as can be seen in the second column of table 2, all of the Lange-Garrett coefficients drop substantially with Austria removed: the coefficient for labor union strength is reduced by two-thirds and becomes smaller than its standard error, that for left cabinet strength falls by about one-third but retains a reasonable *t*-ratio, the coefficient for the interaction term drops by two-thirds and is smaller than its standard error. Although I do not display the numbers here, the same thing happens to the labor/left coefficients for the model in the first row of Hicks's table 5 with Norway and Austria removed.

Some may be puzzled that Austria is an influential case in the context of Hicks's expanded model, but not in the simpler models (as in table 1). There

¹⁰ Hicks reports (1988, p. 689, footnote 10) that he performed additional regression analyses with even 'more numerous control variables'.

¹¹ For more information on the last three variables, see Hicks (1988, pp. 690-93). The measure of redistribution is from Hicks and Swank (1984) and is essentially the difference between pre- and post-tax income inequality. The construction of this measure is tortuous, and three problems stand out in particular. First, as Sawyer (1976, p. 14) points out, 'No definitive statements on the relative progressivity of direct taxation can be made [from these differences], because of the different ways in which the changes resulting from direct taxation have been calculated. Second, since pre-tax data were unavailable for Australia, Italy, and the Netherlands, estimates were extrapolated from the relation between pre- and post-tax income Gini coefficients for ten other countries (Hicks and Swank, 1984, p. 268). Third, since data for Austria, Belgium, and Denmark are not available from Hicks and Swank, Hicks (1988, p. 683) extrapolates values for these cases by regressing the Hicks-Swank measure on an updated version of a measure of tax progressivity developed by Hewitt (1977). However, that regression had a coefficient of determination of only .45. Given these issues, Hicks's measure of redistribution is uninterpretable.

TABLE 2

REGRESSIONS OF GROWTH (1974-1980) ON PRIOR GROWTH,
GDP PER CAPITA, LEFT STRENGTH, AND HICKS'S CONTROL VARIABLES
NORWAY EXCLUDED **

	With Austria	Without Austria
Constant	3.865* (.37)	2.606* (.22)
Growth 1960-1973	.354* (.20)	-.303 (.19)
GDP Per Capita 1973/1974	-.0003* (.23)	.0002 (.13)
Labor Strength (X_1)	-.609* (.23)	.209 (.06)
Left Strength (X_2)	-1.682* (.49)	-1.127* (.26)
Interaction ($X_1 X_2$)	.461* (.36)	.162 (.05)
Oil Dependence	-.005 (.12)	-.0006 (.01)
Domestic Investment	.196* (.40)	.178* (.41)
Gov't Redistribution	-.6401* (.27)	.5095* (.23)
Adjusted R^2	.875	.909
F ratio	12.4	16.0
N	14	13

*Starred coefficients are more than twice the size of their standard errors

**Main table entries are matrix regression coefficients; numbers in parentheses are their *t* ratios

is no mystery here. The general point is that the influential status of observations can change from one model to another (Bollen and Jackman, 1985, p. 512), and Hicks's expanded models are radically different from the simpler ones.¹² That they were estimated with so few degrees of freedom makes them especially vulnerable to minor changes in the data matrix. But it is interesting to observe that Garrett and Lange (1986, p. 538) identified Austria along with Norway as distinctive. More remarkable is the following disclosure from Hicks (in reference to the conditional coefficients in his table 4):

With *Norway excluded*, they [the conditional coefficients] provide only limited support for two of the conclusions most stressed by Lange and Garrett (1985): *Without* Norway, union organizational strength (0) has more anti-growth than pro-growth effects. That is, if

¹² Thus, checking the impact of Norway on the parameter estimates as is done by Hicks (1988) does not constitute a thorough test of robustness.

has only one unambiguously significant, positive, *conditional* effect on growth (an ' a^* ' = 0.99 for Austria). Furthermore, union strength has four marginally significant *negative* conditional effects on growth. Moreover, without Norway, Left party governmental strength (P) has *no* solidly positive conditional effects on growth, while it has fully nine unambiguously significant, *negative*, conditional effects on growth. Thus [sic], although the analyses of 1974–1980 growth support the core Lange-Garrett assertion that union growth effects are dependent on Left party strength (or *vice versa* that Left effects are dependent on union ones), they do so with something of an anti-union, anti-Left tilt not present in the Lange and Garrett (1985–1987) and Garrett and Lange (1986) collaborations. Some [sic] 'union' effects and most 'party' effects are anti-growth (Hicks, 1988 pp. 688–89, emphasis in original).

In plain English, Austria is a special case and the results are weak, even by Hicks's own admission.

What conclusions can we draw from table 2? Some might be tempted to ignore the influential cases. Garrett and Lange offer such advice in the context of their earlier analysis, claiming that case removal "would deprive our central argument of a *key* piece of evidence upon which to assess the merits of our hypotheses" (1986 p. 538, my emphasis).¹¹ But I trust it is by now clear that this is bad advice. Estimates that are driven by one or two observations are simply illusory.

Instead, the figures in table 2 demonstrate that Hicks's expanded model is not robust in general, and they undermine the core Lange-Garrett argument in particular. Recall that Hicks's sole purpose in developing that model was to show that the estimated coefficients for this argument are "robust." By this standard, his expanded model must be judged a failure.¹²

THEORETICAL ISSUES

I sketched a theoretical argument to suggest why labor/left strength should be unrelated to growth (Jackman, 1987). The case was developed more fully in Jackman, 1986). Lange and Garrett (1987) claimed that the argument is wrong, and Hicks describes their response as "sufficiently effective . . . that further theoretical debate can be postponed for now" (1988 p. 679). However, all three authors distort elements of my argument and the analyses on which I drew. This is not the place to repeat and extend that argument. Instead, I briefly discuss the main issues that they have misconstrued.

Summarizing radically, I pointed out that hypotheses like Lange and

¹¹This despite the fact that on the same page they quote Anscombe: "We are happier if the regression relation seems to permeate all the observations and does not derive largely from one or two" (Anscombe, 1973, p. 18, my emphasis).

¹²Given the instability of both the basic and expanded models, further calculations of conditional or other effects (as is done in Hicks, 1988, tables 4 and 6) based on the estimates of those models are fruitless.

Garrett's adopt a view of political competition that assumes relatively majoritarian political institutions and responsible (programmatic) parties, and I suggested that these assumptions are implausible.¹⁵ First, in view of work by Lijphart (1984) and others, it is evident that most capitalist democracies have political institutions designed to restrain popular majorities in varying degrees. Second, even where there are majoritarian institutions, there is good reason to anticipate policy convergence by parties, given the work of Downs (1957) and many others in a variety of research traditions (for citations, see Jackman, 1986, pp. 135–42).

Apart from the size and centralization of labor unions, however, Lange and Garrett (1987, pp. 271–72) discard institutional variations in the capitalist democracies as largely irrelevant, and Hicks agrees (1988, p. 679). Political competition is instead seen (albeit implicitly) as assuming the same form in all of these countries, despite considerable variation across them in electoral laws and constitutional arrangements. However, the Lange-Garrett argument is 'society-centered' (Hicks, 1988, p. 679) in the sense that it stresses the importance of voters' preferences on public policy. The connections between those preferences and public policy are consequently critical to the argument, and those connections hinge on electoral laws and political institutions. None of these writers has considered the implications of institutional variety within the democracies for their arguments, preferring the implicit assumption that majoritarianism is the norm.

Turning to the second issue, Lange and Garrett (1987, p. 271) dismissed convergence as an issue on the grounds that Downs' discussion assumes a normal distribution of voter preferences. Now it is true that in its original form the convergence argument did depend on this and other assumptions. But subsequent work has demonstrated that the argument holds more generally (Enelow and Hinich, 1984). For example, Riker and Ordeshook (1973, chaps. 11 and 12) show that convergence is likely even when voter preferences are bimodal. And Calvert (1985) has shown that there is pressure on candidates to converge even when those candidates are motivated by policy concerns and when they lack perfect information about the electoral impact of their programs.

Hicks recognizes the error, but then substitutes another one of his own. According to Hicks, Downsian convergence implies that parties will jump over the policy positions of others. Thus, 'Lange and Garrett might have discredited claims for policy convergence by simply claiming enough ideological and/or voter constraint on parties to prohibit a party from jumping over its opponent's issue positions' (Hicks, 1988, p. 679). But would this dis-

¹⁵Lange and Garrett's argument about competition is a contingent one: the contingency centering on the strength of organized labor. But this contingency has no bearing on the assumptions they make about electoral competition.

credit the argument? Consider what Downs actually said about the role of ideology: "Parties also find ideologies useful in gaining the support of various social groups and in short cutting decisions about which policy will gain the most votes. . . . In our model, it is necessary for each party's ideology to bear a consistent relation to its actions and to develop without repudiating the party's former acts. . . . Though ideologies are never internally contradictory, they may be only loosely integrated, since they are designed to attract many social groups. Their stability over time has both logical and institutional roots which prevent policies from being altered smoothly to fit changing conditions. Thus ideologies cause lags and discontinuities that may cost a party votes" (Downs, 1957, p. 113).¹⁶

In the following chapter, Downs tied this in with convergence: "Political parties cannot move ideologically past each other. . . . Integrity and responsibility create relative immobility, which prevents a party from making ideological leaps over the heads of its neighbors. Thus, ideological movement is restricted to horizontal progress at most up to—and never beyond—the nearest party on either side. Coupled with our device of variable distribution, this attribute of the model nearly always ensures stable equilibrium" (Downs, 1957, pp. 122–23).

It is thus clear that the vision of parties 'jumping over' each others' issue positions has nothing to do with Downs.¹⁷ The proposition about ideological or policy convergence does not imply that parties will converge on the same spot: activists and interest groups ("extremists" in Downs's language) prevent that (Riker and Ordeshook, 1973, p. 350). It simply means that there are substantial pressures toward policy convergence—so that parties come to resemble each other. Calvert (1985) refers to this as "near convergence." In a parallel manner, the idea that parties are primarily motivated by office-seeking criteria does not preclude policy considerations (see, e.g., Schlesinger 1984), despite the contrary implication by Lange and Garrett and by Hicks. Indeed, we would expect mild differences in policies and programs as parties seek to differentiate their product from that of their competitors. The important point about these differences is their mildness. They are differences of

¹⁶ Lange and Garrett (1987, p. 271) approvingly cited Przeworski and Sprague (1985) as evidence against Downs. The latter claim that "The irrelevance of Downs' theory of party competition is due to the assumption that parties encounter an exogenous public. Once we look at party strategies in historical perspective, as a process, we cannot view each election as an event that had no antecedents and would have no subsequent consequences" (1985, p. 119). Given what Anthony Downs actually says, both in the above extract and throughout his book, it appears that Przeworski and Sprague have some other Downs in mind.

¹⁷ Hicks takes the phrase "jumping over" from Riker and Ordeshook (1973, p. 350). As interested readers can verify for themselves, he takes the phrase completely out of context. Riker and Ordeshook provide a useful discussion of the pressures toward and the constraints on convergence.

degree expressed in very general terms, they are typically clouded in ambiguity as parties seek to both satisfy their core constituents and to attract enough voters outside that core to win elections.

Given the above, Hicks's suggestion that the only way to account for the observed minimal to nonexistent effects of different governments on economic growth is to invoke the unrealistic specter of parties jumping all over the policy positions of their opponents is misleading. And his attribution of this view to Downs is wrong.

Two other points need to be made. First, the Lange-Garrett argument assumes that governments of the left (in concert with encompassing unions) pursue distinctive growth-oriented policies. These, along with the alternative but equally distinctive growth policies adopted by conservative governments (not confronted by strong unions) are implicitly seen as exhausting the set of possible effective growth-oriented policies. In other words, only two types of growth strategies are possible. This is a very strong assumption.

Second, as Lange and Garrett recognize, hypotheses like theirs were initially developed to account for 'unemployment and redistributive policies' (1987, p. 257; see also Hicks, 1988, p. 700). They argue that where labor and the left are strong there will be a more progressive transfer of income. In view of this, Hicks's expanded model has an interesting internal contradiction. If arguments like the Lange-Garrett hypothesis can account for both redistribution and growth, then there is no *logical* reason to expect governmental redistribution of household income to be *negatively* related to growth, as claimed by Hicks (1988, table 5).¹⁵

CONCLUSIONS

From the foregoing empirical analyses, the conclusion is inescapable that Hicks's effort to resurrect the Lange-Garrett hypothesis is unsuccessful. His revisions instead suffer from the same kinds of empirical flaws that crippled the original Lange and Garrett analysis. Obviously, we can have no confidence in estimates that are driven by one or two observations and that do not reflect the data as a whole. And there is little to be learned from models in which the number of parameters to be estimated approaches the number of cases. Given the available data, there simply is no evidence that the partisan composition of governments (either by itself or in concert with union strength) has had a pronounced impact on economic growth rates in the countries and years under consideration.

Those who believe that to reject the Lange-Garrett hypothesis is to deny

¹⁵ As I have already pointed out (footnote 11 above), Hicks's actual measure of redistribution is plagued with problems. Hence, his estimated coefficient for this variable cannot be taken at face value.

that politics matters (parties in particular) are invited to entertain a broader and I believe more discerning view of political competition. The alternative takes as its point of departure the proposition that parties and politicians are fundamentally motivated by office-seeking considerations, for the reasons advanced by Schlesinger (1984). This does not preclude policy issues, as I have already indicated: among other things, office seeking requires that parties maintain their core bases of support. But it does mean that policy positions are likely to include symbolic appeals and to be surrounded by considerable ambiguity, simply because winning elections requires parties to appeal to voters beyond their core. Systematic policy differences across parties are thus likely to be minor, even where institutions are closer to the majoritarian than to the "consensual" model described by Lijphart (1984), that is, even where institutions most favor programmatic and decisive party government. Thus, the politics of party competition should not lead us to expect clear partisan effects (conditional on the strength of labor unions or not) on economic growth.

If we are to move ahead in understanding how politics affects growth, I believe we need to direct our attention to the impact of specific policies. For example, governments can influence taxation policy, the supply of money, and public expenditures. How do different political strategies in these areas impinge upon economic growth? What are the effects on growth of public spending on transfer payments to households? Are there tradeoffs with respect to growth between these transfers and public spending on defense, business subsidies, and the like?

In an interesting analysis, Friedland and Sanders (1985) focused on precisely these issues, concluding that policies do matter, but that specific policy mixes are not systematically associated with the partisan composition of governments. However, their study indicates that competitiveness itself counts. Changes in governments appear to stimulate growth, whatever the partisan direction of those changes, which suggests a connection between electoral business cycles and growth. Much remains to be done, but because it focuses on specific policies and competition rather than on blunt differences in partisanship, research along these lines appears to offer a more promising route to enhancing our understanding of the politics of economic growth.

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On the Robustness of the Left Corporatist Model of Economic Growth

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Contrary to claims by Jackman, Hicks's revision of the Lange-Garrett model of 1974–1980 economic growth rates receives robust empirical support from regression analyses of Lange and Garrett's original fifteen cases. Jackman's criticisms of Hicks's (1988) "expanded" model founder once statistically appropriate procedures are used to gauge the stability of Hicks's estimates and statistical tests. Jackman's criticisms of Hicks's "elementary" model come undone once the expository function of the "elementary" model is clarified and the theoretical and empirical merits of Hicks's "catch-up" specification relative to those of Jackman's "mental" specification are elaborated. As for Jackman's two principal theoretical criticisms—that based on a majoritarian consensus conception of government stands up poorly to an examination of the seminal text underlying that conception, while that criticism rooted in the Downsian theoretical tradition appears at best precariously supported by that intellectual lineage.

Criticism of one's work invariably have something constructive to offer, but Robert Jackman's "The Politics of Economic Growth, Once Again" is nearly the exception that proves the rule. Only one of Jackman's three principal sets of criticisms is informative. This is the criticism grounded in his demonstration that the slope estimate for the key Lange-Garrett regressor in Hicks's "expanded" model falls short of statistical significance once both Norway and Austria are removed from among the fifteen cases originally used to estimate that model. This revelation challenges Hicks's (1988) conclusions, and it may serve as a good object lesson on the usefulness of regression diagnostics for averting such eleventh-hour challenges. To quote Anscombe (1973, p. 18), "we are happier if the regression relation seems to fit all observations and does not derive largely from one or two of them." Nevertheless, Jackman (1988) greatly exaggerates the implications of this one revelation when he concludes that Hicks's (1988) "expanded model is not robust" and

We are indebted to John Pitt for his expert assistance with computing.

indeed, that it yields "no evidence for the claims advanced by Hicks"¹ / more realistic view of Hicks's expanded model in light of the rudiments of regression analysis, plus procedures advanced by Mosteller and Tuke² (1977 pp. 133-45) for "assessing stability" where we have few data points (1977, p. 133), indicates that all readers might remain quite happy enough with the robustness of the expanded model."

Jackman's (1989) two other principal criticisms are quite unconstructive. The first, which focuses on Hicks's "elementary" model, seems premised on misreading of relevant economics and econometrics as well as of the (heuristic) purpose of the "elementary" model. The other, which involves theoretical issues purportedly "misconstrued both by Lange and Garrett and by Hicks" (1989 p. 2), is contravened by some of the sources on which it leans most heavily.

Overall, scrutiny of the Social Democratic corporatist model of economic growth in light of Jackman's (1989) latest criticisms deepens confidence in the model's robustness nearly as far as is conceivable with an evidential base of fifteen cases. The proposition that economic growth rates between 1974 and 1980 accelerated where both unions were organizationally strong and Left parties were strong participants in government (Hicks 1988 p. 677) remains more than ever an impetus to new research on the politics of growth.

THE EXPANDED MODEL

Jackman's central empirical assault on the expanded model unfolds as follows: First, he criticizes Hicks's (1988 p. 696) claims for a robust fit of the expanded model to the data. Next, he estimates the expanded model without Norway and, again, without either Norway or Austria. Finally, from figures³ on the key Lange-Garrett (i.e., union and/or Left) variables computed once Norway and Austria had both been omitted, especially ones on the union/Left product term, he jumps to the conclusion of "no evidence" (see Jackman 1989, especially table 2, the Norway excluded. Without Austria equation). In particular, he concludes that the evidence for the Lange-Garrett formulation that strong unions and Left cabinets *interactively* affect economic growth is "simply illusory" that "Hicks's expanded model is not robust in general" and that the figures "undermine the core Lange-Garrett argument."

¹ These conclusions are only compelling if one places an absolute value on maximum happiness—an odd methodological canon. Anscombe's (1973) paper provides warrant for such hedonism and no reason for thinking that "we are happier" means anything but what a straight forward reading implies (e.g., we are *less* happy if the regression does *not* seem to permeate a observations, etc.). A cautionary, not a condemnatory, use of "happier" is entirely clear.

² Lesser criticisms of the expanded model are dealt with in footnote 11.

However, as Norway and Austria are the principal examples of "Social Democratic" (or "Left") "corporatism" during the 1974–1980 period in question, Jackman's removal of both from a mere fifteen cases results in radical truncation of the variance in the key "Left corporatist" variables—in particular, it results in a 40.6% reduction in the variance of the key "Left corporatist" product term from its original fifteen-case level.³ With regard to the partial regression of economic growth on this "Left corporatist" term (" $X_1 \cdot X_2$ " below, "O·P" in Hicks [1988]), this effort is tantamount to a transformation of the operationalized expanded model into a so-called "degenerate" regression (e.g., Hilton, 1976, p. 46). Readers will not be jolted to hear that prospects for statistically significant slopes estimates for a key variable dim when 13% of one's cases and 40% of the variable's variance eschew are removed from a fifteen-case data base. A view of the progressive degradation of estimates resulting from, first, Jackman's quibbles about Norway—the motive for Hicks (1988) bothering with regressions *excluding* Norway—to begin with—and, now, Jackman's difficulties with Austria is presented in the partial plots of figure 1. Here, a blurring of the "fit" between economic growth and " $X_1 \cdot X_2$ " is manifest as we shift attention from panels with relatively more to relatively less variation on the explanatory term " $X_1 \cdot X_2$," especially from panel B to panel C, and, most dramatically, from panel A to panel C.⁴


Jackman's degradation of "Left corporatist" variance might conceivably be excused as a necessary by-product of the identification and extirpation of "influential" cases, if there were no means of assessing estimator stability (or "robustness") in "small-sample" regressions without at the same time assailing it.⁵ However, appropriate means are available in the form of Tukey's

³The variance of the product term for all fifteen Lange-Garrett cases is 13.56, with Norway removed it falls nearly 24% to 10.32; with Austria also removed the variance falls to 8.06—a mere 59.4% of its fifteen-case value.

⁴This is true even though a pattern consistent with the Lange-Garrett-Hicks expectations survives visual inspection of panel C. Also, note that the equations corresponding to panels A, B, and C of figure 1 are equations 2, 3, and 5, respectively, of table 1. (Note, too, that the estimates of table 1, column 1 differ somewhat from those of table 5, row B in Hicks [1988] because of data errors in the analyses table 5 [1988].) Finally, note that for simple comparison and consistency with Jackman, the equation is specified exactly as the equations of Jackman's (1988) table 2. Although Hicks's (1988) equation A from his table 5 implies that this is a misspecified equation, the discrepancies between this equation and the more fully specified one are generally small and of no major consequence for any qualitative conclusions that are salient here. Indeed, the plot in panel A is *less* tight and the degradation entailed by the deletion of Norway and Austria less severe than would have been the case had the more fully specified equation of Hicks's (1988) table 5, row 'A' been employed.

⁵Indeed, Anscombe seems particularly wary of results where "an observation with an outlying x-value were affected by some special circumstance not common to other observations." Thus, were Jackman's case for instability solid on narrowly technical statistical grounds, Jackman's (1987) treatment of Norway as an influential case would be reinforced by the argument

960 19-3 (C) ON INTERACTION TERM (X_1 , X_2) WITH CONTROL FOR
 OTHER VARIABLES IN EQUATIONS OF COLUMNS 2, 3 AND 5 OF TABLE 1 FOR ALL 15 CASES (A) ALL BUT NORWAY (B),
 AND ALL BUT NORWAY AND AUSTRIA (C)



• Key to Cases

- 1 = Australia
- 2 = Austria
- 3 = Belgium
- 4 = Canada
- 5 = Denmark
- 6 = Finland
- 7 = France
- 8 = West Germany
- 9 = Netherlands
- 10 = Italy
- 11 = Japan
- 12 = Norway
- 13 = Sweden
- 14 = United Kingdom
- 15 = United States

•• Metrics are those of original regressand (C) and regressor (X_1 , X_2) after residualization on other variables in a particular regression

"jackknife." This technique, which is nicely described elsewhere (Tukey, 1958, Mosteller and Tukey, 1977, pp. 133-45, Miller, 1974, Achen, 1982, pp. 37-40, Hicks and Swank, 1984), does essentially the following. For a very small observation set of size N (such as ours), it uses information on statistics computed in the N subsets of observations of $N-1$ size to compute new parameter estimates and test statistics.⁸ These have several superior properties relative to conventional OLS procedures, including more realistic (typically *larger*) standard errors and more conservative test-statistics (Mosteller and Tukey, 1977, pp. 133-45, Achen, 1982, pp. 37-40). They allow for an assessment of stability or robustness that takes account of the influences of *each* observation in a set, whether the effect of its inclusion is to buoy or degrade, reinforce or reverse, a particular estimate.⁹

Application of Tukey's 'jackknife' to Jackman's (1989, table 2) informative but, overall, misleading 'Norway Excluded'/'Without Austria' equation is warranted. Statistically, this requires excluding Norway, then estimating fourteen regressions from each of which one of the remaining cases (Australia, Austria, Belgium, etc.) is excluded, and pooling statistical results.¹⁰

Figures for the "jackknife" equation are presented in table 1, column 4. Unlike those based on a simple exclusion of Austria, these yield a statistically significant slope estimate ($t = 2.07$) for the key 'Left corporatist' product term ($X_1 \cdot X_2$). They indicate that the expanded model estimated without Norway may be confidently viewed as stable, despite the few cases and the influential role of Austria (see table 1, column 4, and see Jackman, 1989, table 2, column 2).¹¹ In short, use of Tukey's 'jackknife' indicates that the

that Norway's growth (and its contribution to the Lange-Garrett model) was an artifact of the Norwegian oil boom. Alas, no such argument is presented in Jackman (1989) excepting a spurious one that apparently confuses high values on a theory's explanatory variables with 'special circumstance' (See Jackman, 1989, p. 9, and note 11.)

⁸To implement the 'jackknife' for a particular equation, N observations, and the case of one observation-at-a-time deletions, we reestimate the equation N times. Each reestimation yields a 'pseudo value' B_i for each of its regression parameter estimates B_i (for which case i is excluded), where $B_i = N(B) - (N-1)(B_{(i)})$, and B is the estimate for the N -case equation. The 'jackknife' coefficient B is the arithmetic average of the B_i . Standard errors for B s and degrees of freedom for t tests involving B s are defined in Mosteller and Tukey (1977, pp. 135-36).

⁹For example, Lange-Garrett-Hicks models including slope estimates for their 'Left corporatism' term, attain notably *better* fits with data if *the Netherlands* is excluded.

¹⁰'Jackknife' estimates for the expanded model with all fifteen pre-exclusion cases are also relevant, but it would be overly expedient for us to stress here estimates so immediately supportive of the Lange-Garrett-Hicks model.

¹¹The same is true for an equation like that of column 4 in every respect but the deletion of 'redistribution,' a variable that Jackman (1989, note 11) finds inadequately measured. Returning in more detail to the column 4 findings, they yield an estimate of Labor strength (X_1) that

TABLE 1

REGRESSIONS OF GROWTH (1974-1980) ON PRIOR GROWTH
GDP PER CAPITA, LEFT STRENGTH, AND HICKS'S CONTROL VARIABLES **

	(1) OLS All Cases Additional Controls	(2) OLS All Cases	(3) OLS All With Austria *	(4) Jackknife With Austria *	(5) OLS Without Austria *
Constant	2.033* (2.92)	4.085 (3.53)	3.565* (3.7)	4.81* (2.23)	2.606* (2.2)
Growth 1960-1973	0.273* (2.69)	0.351 (1.90)	0.354 (2.0)	0.642 (1.76)	0.303 (1.9)
GDP Per Capita 1973/1974	0.0003* (3.94)	0.0003* (2.17)	0.0003* (2.3)	0.0004 (1.72)	-.0002 (1.3)
Labor Strength (X)	0.400* (2.70)	6.61* (2.21)	0.609 (2.3)	0.746 (1.53)	-.209 (0.6)
Left Strength (X)	1.812* (5.73)	1.573* (5.38)	1.652* (4.9)	2.174* (3.06)	1.127* (2.6)
Interaction (X - X)	0.436* (6.91)	0.552* (4.26)	0.461* (3.6)	0.643* (2.07)	0.162 (0.5)
Oil Dependence	0.013* (7.36)	0.009* (2.67)	0.005 (1.2)	0.007 (.91)	0.0006 (0.1)
Domestic Investment	0.223* (7.53)	0.211* (3.99)	0.196* (4.0)	0.264* (3.73)	0.175* (4.1)
Govt Redistribution	10.115* (5.60)	7.604* (2.92)	6.401* (2.7)	9.65* (2.03)	5.095* (2.3)
Welfare/GDP	0.031 (1.89)				
Revenues/GDP	2.542 (1.73)				
Adjusted R ²	.978 (15)	.594 (15)	.575 (14)	.554*** (14)	.909 (13)

* Norway excluded

** Starred coefficients are statistically significant at 0.05 test level (for 1-tailed tests for GDP, X, Oil, Investment, Redistribution, Welfare, and Revenues; for 2-tailed for Constant, X, and Growth)

*** Main table entries are metric regression coefficients; numbers in parentheses are their *t*-ratios

**** Computed as adjusted R² for regression of observed values of growth upon predicted values of growth from equation (4)

expanded Hicks model, as estimated on the original Lange-Garrett cases, provides robust statistical support for the Lange-Garrett thesis. Initially, Hicks's (1988) expanded model yielded evidence of a degree of robustness in the face of "control" variables that was quite remarkable for a very small data base, "influential cases" aside.¹⁰ The present reanalysis establishes that Hicks's (1988) expanded model is also robust with regard to that "small pedestal" (Hicks, 1988, p. 701), the original fifteen-case data base itself, on which the Lange-Garrett-Hicks formulations have so far relied for published empirical support.¹¹

THE ELEMENTARY MODEL

Jackman's principal criticism of Hicks's (1988) elementary model is that Hicks was unwarranted in substituting his "catch-up" variable, real per capita GDP, for Jackman's (1989, p. 5) control for lagged economic growth (a "lagged dependent variable," in Jackman's words). Instead, Jackman (1989, pp. 5-6) argues that Hicks should have retained lagged growth in his model. Indeed, he indicates that Hicks should have retained "lagged growth" but

risks nearly to statistical significance and above any discrete deletion level an oil dependence statistic that might merit deletion, and sundry other small shifts in estimates and *t*-statistics. Deletion of λ_1 as its *t*-statistic value exceeds 1.00 would entail increased equation means square error and require the rash assumption that λ_1 's true slope were 0.0; deletion of oil, which would slightly decrease means square error, might be advisable, but it does not notably alter results bearing on λ_1 , λ_2 , or either of its components.

¹⁰Jackman (1989) conflates questions of the robustness of the Lange-Garrett-Hicks model in the face of respecification with ones of the robustness of their model in the face of its alterations of empirical cases and *vice versa*.

¹¹Jackman (1989) is replete with logical fallacies and rhetorical excesses. As regards the expanded model, witness Jackman's use of Hicks's (1988) discussion of the elementary model to buttress his criticism that Austria is "distinctive" and thus a particularly predictable and precarious influential case in the expanded model. Jackman (1989, pp. 12-13) quotes a remarkable disclosure from Hicks (1988, pp. 688-89) to the effect that Austria is a special case and the results are weak (Jackman, 1989, p. 13). However, the discussion from Hicks pertains exclusively to results from the elementary model and as Jackman (1989, p. 12) argues, the influential status of observations can vary from one model to another. A second related excess involves Jackman's assertion that Garrett and Lange (1986, p. 538) identified Austria along with Norway as distinctive. Garrett and Lange (1986, p. 538) note only a type of distinctiveness entirely in keeping with their theory, namely, that Norway has, along with Austria, "the type of system in which we would expect uniformly powerful and coherent labor movements to be based rather than depress economic performance." In short, they claim nothing more than that Norway and Austria are high on the conditions for good "left corporatist" economic growth posited by their theory. Thirdly, Jackman (1989, pp. 7-10, 11) rails against scarce degrees of freedom as if coefficients of determination were not routinely (and *t*-statistics automatically) corrected for degrees of freedom. Finally, without addressing a single detail of Hicks's (1988, p. 693) rationale for his specific use of stepwise regression, Jackman (1989, p. 10) seeks to impugn Hicks's 1988 use of stepwise regression *via* "guilt by association" with the sometimes helpful procedure's loosely held name reputation.

should not, after examination of per capital GDP in its company, have retained the "per capita" variable. This apparently follows for two reasons. For one, inclusion of a lagged dependent variable is "a common procedure" (Jackman, 1989, p. 5). For the other, "growth" receives greater support than the 'per capita' measure once 'GDP growth' and "per capital GDP" are alongside each other in the same elementary equations, and this is so whether or not their data base includes Norway.¹² Jackman (1989, p. 6) concludes that Hicks has simply introduced an irrelevant variable into the analysis "and that his analysis is "simply a restatement of the Lange-Garrett model". The argument is illogical for several reasons.

First, there are strong theoretical reasons for including "per capita GDP" in an elementary model, but there are no such reasons for including "lagged growth". The level of "technology" (or "development") at a beginning of a growth period is now a familiar explanatory factor in economists' models of the causes of economic growth. Moreover, for any income or product measure "IP" (e.g., GDP) used to measure growth, the per capital standardization "IP/population" (e.g., GDP/population) is the conventional measure of development.¹³ Overall, the growth literature from economics provides strong theoretical (as well as empirical) grounds for expecting sizable *negative* effects of earlier economic levels on subsequent economic growth rates. In short, "developmental laggards" imitate effective existing technologies while "leaders" must seek (uncertainly) to devise more effective new technologies (Olson, 1982, chap. 4; Choi, 1983; Pryor, 1985; Baumol, 1986). "Laggards" are expected to "catch-up" while "leaders" are expected to "fall back". However, *no* theory—and no research or methodological precedents besides Jackman's (1987) and Hicks's (1988) consideration of it—warrants specification of "lagged growth" as a cause of growth. As was stated by Hicks (1988), Jackman's argument that "other things equal, we would expect economies that experience superior growth in the past to continue to experience better growth in the future" is "idiosyncratic" (Hicks, 1988, p. 651). Indeed, as production leadership in a period is likely to be the culmination of a recent history of superior growth and as "catch-up" theory predicts negative effects

Specifically, in the equation with Norway, Jackman's lagged growth measure attains a *t* value over Hicks's (1988) threshold level of 1.0 while Hicks's per capita one does not (Jackman, 1989, table 1). In the equation without Norway, growth attains a supposedly adequate *t* statistic of 1.9— in contrast with the "per capita GDP" marginal *t* value of 1.0 (Jackman, 1989, table 1).

Lagged production levels are generally excluded from "production function" models of output and from derivative growth models, and they have also been excluded from traditional Keynesian models of long-term growth (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1978). However, production function models are models of sources of growth (i.e., mappings of the relative weights of *tautologically* necessary flows) and most work until now on both production function and long-term Keynesian growth models precedes the recent innovations of Olson (1982), Pryor (1985), Baumol (1986), and others on "catch-up" effects.

of production levels upon growth, *negative effects of past economic growth upon future growth are indicated by "catch-up" theory*

Secondly, *negative¹ effects of past growth upon future growth are what Jackman (1989) like Hicks (1988), finds once his models attain a fair degree of realism through some addition of statistical controls (e.g., "investment" and "oil")*. Thus, Jackman's (1989) own findings in his "expanded" regressions belie his theoretical rationale for including "lagged growth" in the first place.

Third, *specification of "lagged dependent variables" is not a "common procedure" in models for which the dependent variable measures change*. Certainly, addition of "lagged dependent variables" where dependent variables explicitly measure change, is *not* a "common procedure" in the economic or political science literatures (see, e.g., Christ, 1966, Johnston, 1985 chap. 9, Hucklefeldt et al., 1982). In these literatures, it is *levels* measures (like 'per capita GDP') that are the typical dependent variables for which 'lagged dependent variables' (like lagged "per capita GDP") are commonly specified. When regressands metamorphasize from measures of "levels" (of some "Y") to ones of "change" (in Y), it is measures of the lagged *levels*, not "lagged dependent variables" as such, that are typically retained as regressors in dynamic models (see, e.g., Christ, 1966, chap. 6, Johnston, 1985 chap. 9, Hucklefeldt et al., 1982).

Fourth, *Hicks's (1988) elementary model is an heuristic one*—a useful link backward to the initial Lange-Garrett-Jackman exchange and forward to more realistic specification—for which the theoretical solidity of the "catch up" specification and the pedagogic merits of elegance are primary. Clearly Hicks (1988, p. 689), who deferred consideration of "more fully specified models until his section on the "expanded" model regarded his "elementary" model as too thinly specified for claims about the relevance of any single additional variable to make for pertinent criticism.

Overall, Hicks's elementary model performs its expository function. It provides a theoretically compelling and parsimonious vehicle for the statistical analysis of the core "Left corporatist" formulation, and it provides a simple take-off point for the elaboration of a more adequately specified "expanded model"—indeed, of an expanded model which Jackman's "lagged growth" variable manages to enter, albeit with an unpredicted negative sign. (This indicates that, after statistical controls for such commonplace causes of growth as investment, *a "catch-up" rather than an "inertial" pattern links growth rates in successive periods*.)¹⁴ Also, it bears noting that if we grant Jackman

¹⁴As regards criticisms of the elementary model, one of Jackman's most egregious fallacious excesses is his charge that Hicks "allows on the same page that lagged growth is not necessary and irrelevant to good estimation. Nonetheless, he goes on to estimate a model like (4) in which the level of GDP per capita averaged over 1973 and 1974 is substituted for growth in GDP from 1960 to 1973. Yet consideration of the relevance or irrelevance of lagged growth (along with sundry other controls) follows one section later in Hicks. Further Revisions and Reanalyses

his preferred "elementary" models, "jackknife" estimates for the key interaction term ($X_1 \cdot X_2$) are statistically greater than zero at the 0.05 level.¹ This is so whether the model includes both "lagged growth" and "catch-up" terms, as in table 1, column 2 of Jackman (1988), or includes "lagged growth" alone

THEORY

Jackman (1989) claims that his critics distort elements of his argument and of the analyses from which he drew it. He (Jackman 1989 p. 14) argues:

Summarizing radically . . . hypotheses like Lange and Garrett's adopt a view of political competition that assumes relatively majoritarian political institutions and responsible (programmatic) parties, and I suggest that these assumptions are implausible. First, in view of work by Lijphart (1984) and others, it is evident that most capitalist democracies have political institutions designed to restrain popular majorities in varying degrees. Second, even where there are majoritarian institutions, there is good reason to anticipate policy convergence by parties, given the work of Downs and many others in a variety of research traditions (for citations, see Jackman 1986 pp. 135-42).

These theoretical criticisms are almost entirely off target. On the one hand, Lijphart's (1984) majoritarian-consensus interpretation of democracies as so far elaborated by Lijphart (1984) himself (or Jackman 1985) simply does not bear clearly on economic policy and performance. Lijphart's theorizing is primarily about democratic performance in the sense of degrees, types, and mechanisms of democratic responsiveness broadly construed; it does not centrally address questions of economic policy and performance (Lijphart 1984 pp. 1-4). Where it does allude to such questions, Lijphart (1984) does not stress his distinctive majoritarian-consensus theory of democracy nor stress its principal institutional dimensions (Lijphart 1984 chap. 2). Instead, Lijphart falls back on just the type of class cleavage and class party

1988, where indeed "lagged growth" is incorporated into terms the "expanded model" albeit with a *negative* sign contrary to Jackman's (1989 p. 5) theoretical rationale for consideration, indeed privileged consideration, in the elementary model.¹ A second critical snafu is Jackman's numerically undocumented claim that "while the Lange-Garrett model implies that growth would be lower under these two conservative governments, this expectation is belied by the available figures on annual growth rates." Presumably, Jackman is either referring descriptively to growth figures during the two (1965 to 1971 and 1981 to 1986) periods of conservative government in questions, or he is referring to net party effects in some sophisticated growth model. If the former, the assertion is patently irresponsible, for (1) both periods were marked by international expansion and, consequently, (2) a positive association between each of the periods and economic growth rates is to be expected, although it will be quite spurious as an indication of party impact on growth. If the latter, Jackman should unveil his contribution to original econometric modeling of growth.

¹The appropriate "jackknife" models here are ones computed on the basis of fifteen regressions, one for each possible fourteen-case regression, including that without Norway. The appropriate *t* statistic for the case with both the "lagged growth" and the "catch-up" control is 1.875; that for the shorter equation is 1.826.

theory that Jackman wrongly thinks to be vitiated by Lyphart's majoritarian consensus theory. As Lyphart puts it:

The importance of political influences on economic policies and performances has been confirmed by several studies of the political economic nexus. They show significant differences between economic policies pursued by Leftist-oriented and rightist-oriented governments. The evidence can be summarized in the following statement by Edward Tuftes: "The single most important dimension of variations in macroeconomic performance from one industrialized democracy to another is the location on the left-right spectrum of the governing political party. Party platforms and political ideologies set priorities, help decide policy." (Lyphart, 1984, pp. 131-32)

Lyphart does acknowledge that although "the overall conclusion is that left-right issues are real and pervasive and that they have major policy consequences, this does not mean that they are the same in all countries." However, contrary to Jackman's (1989, pp. 18-19) argument that it is in the presence of majoritarian institutions that "institutions most favor programmatic and decisive party government," Lyphart implies that variations in left-right policy consequences have relatively little relation to the majoritarian/consensus continuum. In particular, the

distance between the political parties on the left-right spectrum appears to be the greatest in the United Kingdom, the Scandinavian countries, Finland, Iceland, Austria, and New Zealand, but most of the other countries also deserve a "high" rating on this dimension in table 8.1. Comparatively small differences are found in the United States, Canada, and Ireland; they are the only three with a "medium" rating. In none of our party systems is the left-right difference so small that it would be justified to conclude that the socio-economic issue dimension is absent or of negligible importance. (Lyphart, 1984, pp. 131-32)

Whereas nine out of twelve of Lyphart's "majoritarian" cases are rated high on "socio-economic" issue dimension (and by implication left-right differences in governments' economic policies and performances), all ten out of ten "consensus" cases are rated "high." In addition, all three cases of less-than-high class and partisan relevance are classified as *majoritarian* cases (Lyphart, 1984, pp. 132, 216).

Lyphart's text not only contradicts Jackman's (1989) claim for the dampening effect of consensus-oriented systems upon party (and class) differences in economic policy and performance. It also argues against Jackman's claims for a radical Downsian convergence of party policies such that we should not "expect clear partisan effects . . . on economic growth" (Jackman, 1989, p. 19). That is to say that Lyphart also weighs in against Jackman's second "convergence" criticism. To freshly quote him: "In none of our party systems is the left-right difference so small that it would be justified to conclude that the socio-economic issue dimension is absent or of negligible importance" (Lyphart, 1984, pp. 131-32). Lyphart (1984) actually reinforces the Lange-Garrett-Hicks claim for the empirical reality of partisan differences of

economic policy. Moreover, this reality is extensively documented elsewhere. Even excluding redistributive/social security policies, which Jackman (1989), p. 17) seems to regard as more sensitive to partisan impacts, this documentation is rapidly growing (see Hibbs, 1986, and Jankowski and Whezen, 1987, on macroeconomic stabilization; Marks, 1986, on incomes policies; Korpi, 1988, and Weede, 1986, on employment policies; Esping-Andersen, 1985, and Przeworski and Wallerstein, 1988, on investment policies). Theoretically, this should be no surprise, as the limitations of "Downsian" convergence theory in theory, as well as in the real world, should now be well known (e.g., Palfrey, 1984; Przeworski and Sprague, 1985; Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988; Lange and Garrett, 1989).¹⁶

In his abstract, Jackman (1989, p. 19) indicates some interest in "an alternative approach to the politics of economic growth." However, although application of institutional theorizing à la Lipphart to the "politics of growth" begs for attention, little help is provided by Jackman. Jackman does (1989, p. 19) exhort scholars to study economic growth effects of "changes in governments" and of *particular* policy instruments. However, the suggestions draw on the "political business cycle" and macroeconomic literatures and are quite uninnovative (see Friedland and Sanders, 1985; Hibbs, 1986; Lange and Garrett, 1985; and Hicks, 1988). Indeed, although Jackman specifically endorses Friedland and Sanders's (1985) analysis of instrument effects, he mistakenly claims that their work concludes that "specific policy mixes are not systematically associated with the partisan composition of government." Friedland and Sanders (1985) neither examine instrument effects of partisan government nor partisan effects of a "Social Democratic corporatist variety." They did pioneer the move to "pooled" designs for comparative analyses of the politics of growth. However, that move—endorsed in the concluding paragraph of Hicks (1988, p. 701)—is integral to several full-fledged research projects on the "politics of growth" that are now in progress. These promise to place future debates over the political causes of economic performance on a more solid, less distracting empirical footing than the one which has underlay claims for and against "Left corporatist" models of economic growth until now.

¹⁶ Jackman (1989, p. 15) opines that "According to Hicks, Downsian convergence theory implies that parties will jump over the policy positions of others." This is extremely odd as Hicks's meaning (we can say confidently) is simply to point out exactly the "Downsian point" that Jackman (1989, pp. 15–16) tries to use against Hicks, namely, that "ideological movement is restricted to horizontal progress at most up to—and never beyond—the nearest policy on the other side" (authors' emphasis). Perhaps because Jackman fails to see that this is a *restriction* on parties' capacities to *vo-yo* around each other and blur platform differences, he wastes nearly two pages decrying "jumping parties" that Hicks (1988, note 3) had mentioned only to preclude from consideration.

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Government Partisanship and Economic Performance: When and How does “Who Governs” Matter?

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This article responds to Jackman's central theoretical and empirical criticisms of our research. First, the policy convergence thesis is far less persuasive than Jackman asserts and there is strong theoretical support for our original argument. Second, the empirical tests presented by Jackman are not as conclusive as he suggests. The Norwegian outlier is better remedied on Jackman's own terms by controlling for oil dependence than by exclusion from the analysis. On this is done the data are more supportive of our thesis. Finally, we suggest that a pooled time series cross-section design may provide better tests for our argument than those presently in debate.

INTRODUCTION

The debate between Jackman (1987, 1989) and ourselves (Lange and Garrett, 1985, 1987) highlights both central theoretical issues concerning the impact of democratic politics on the capitalist economy and important methodological questions about the appropriate empirical tests for evaluating the relative merits of contending positions. This paper responds to Jackman's criticisms of our work on both dimensions.¹

First, we show that, notwithstanding Jackman's assertions to the contrary, there is strong theoretical support for the proposition that the economic policies pursued by governments dominated by parties of the Left and Right—even if they are considered to be fundamentally concerned with reelection—are likely to differ considerably. Furthermore, we assert—in accordance with the theme of our original article—that these policy differences

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¹We do not here presume to engage Jackman's criticisms of the revisions of our work presented by Hicks (1988).

can be expected to have significant consequences for economic growth, but that the nature of these effects is likely to be heavily contingent upon the underlying organizational structure of the labor movement

Second, we argue that the empirical results presented by Jackman do not undermine this thesis. We show that the perturbing effects of the "influential" Norwegian case can be better remedied—on Jackman's own terms—by the inclusion of a control for dependence on imported oil than by the exclusion of Norway from the analysis. Once the effects of oil dependence are taken into account, the data are more supportive of our thesis.

There is no question, however, that these results do not, and cannot, fully resolve the questions in dispute. This paper, and those by Hicks (1988), Hicks and Patterson (1989) and Jackman (1987, 1989) have all relied extensively on our original data set in which the small number of cases invited critique and rebuttal, whatever the theoretical merits of different arguments. It now seems highly desirable that alternative data and methodological approaches be sought that may enable us more conclusively to address the important theoretical issues which this debate has raised. In closing, we suggest more rigorous and systematic tests for our theoretical arguments.

1 Jackman's Critique

Jackman's critiques (1987, 1989) of our argument have two basic elements. Theoretically, he asserts that policy convergence rather than partisan distinctiveness is the norm for government economic strategies in democratic systems, and hence that "who governs" can be expected to have little impact on economic outcomes. Jackman does not analyze the interaction between the partisan composition of government and the organizational structures of unions on which our original argument focused. He maintains that "programmatic political parties are rare and policy convergence is the norm" in democratic systems (Jackman 1987, p. 255) and thus concludes that "who governs" can have little impact on economic performance (regardless of organizational conditions).

The policy convergence thesis has two strands. For plurality electoral systems with two dominant parties, Jackman (1987, p. 255, 1989, pp. 15–16) invokes contributions to the formal theory of party competition that extend Downs's (1957) seminal analysis to voter distributions other than those Downs originally analyzed. With respect to proportional representation-multiparty systems, Jackman (1987, pp. 254–55, 1989, pp. 14–15) argues that the "institutions" of coalition government invariably generate powerful pressures for compromise and consensus that militate heavily against partisan economic policy regimes.²

²For this argument, Jackman cites Lijphart (1984) extensively, but see Hicks and Patterson (1989) on this point. In addition, we raise other theoretical doubts about convergence in these systems below.

Methodologically, Jackman (1987, pp 244–51) asserts that the small sample (fifteen OECD countries) regression analysis used in Lange-Garrett was deeply flawed by the perturbing effects of the influential Norwegian case, and that this case should be removed from the analysis. Jackman also suggests that the Lange-Garrett model was misspecified because it controlled for past growth performance by adjusting the operationalization of the dependent variable (average growth 1974–1980 divided by average growth 1960–1973), rather than by including past growth as a lagged endogenous variable on the right-hand side of the regression equations (Jackman 1987, pp 243–44, 1989, pp 4–5).

2 Party Competition, Electoral and Legislative Institutions, and Political Incentives to Pursue Partisan Economic Strategies

Jackman's basic theoretical contention is that governments are forced by electoral pragmatism and/or by legislative institutions to pursue very similar sets of economic policies. This policy convergence, in turn, is rooted in the idea that all voters desire growth and that, therefore, all governments must provide it. As a result, Jackman maintains, who governs should not be expected to have a significant impact on economic growth.¹

The convergence thesis, however, is far less persuasive and widely supported in the literature than Jackman suggests. There are numerous reasons to believe that parties have considerable incentives to retain distinctive policy profiles. It is also quite plausible that, under certain conditions, they can pursue economic policies consistent with their partisan preferences which will also produce levels of growth that will promote their reelection.

There has recently been much formal theoretic work that questions the policy convergence thesis in plurality electoral systems and instead predicts substantial policy separation. These studies do not, as Jackman (1987, pp 254–55, 1989, pp 15–16) suggests, rely primarily for explanations of nonconvergence on government "ideology" or on the mere existence of "core" electoral constituencies. Instead, some have argued that the pivotal role of party activists in election campaigns leads governments to pursue strategies that reflect activists' preferences (which are likely to be more intensely partisan than those of voters) (Aldrich and McGinnis, 1987; Robertson 1976; Tsebelis 1989). Others have argued that the possibility of abstention due to "alienation" or "indifference" may generate incentives for partisan strategies (Hunich and Ordeshook, 1970).² Still others have asserted

¹It is worth noting that Jackman seems to combine—without explicit consideration, median voter arguments based in Downs and the notion that growth is a valence issue. It should also be underlined that we have never argued that there is an unmediated relationship between the partisanship of government and performance. On both these points, see below.

²There is considerable empirical support for the proposition that the propensity for voters to

that governments are more likely to pursue partisan policies because they represent better electoral "investments" than does courting the swing electorate (Cox et al. 1984).⁵

All these studies argue that pressures external to the pure Downsian model of party competition lead parties to retain distinctive images. They implicitly accept that the logic of electoral competition would lead to convergence were it not for these countervailing factors. Thus, while these arguments suggest that there are problems with the Downsian framework, they do not seek to undermine its basic thrust.

A more fundamental critique of the convergence thesis, however, focuses on the impact of potential third-party entry—and entry deterrence by existing parties—on party strategy. Recent studies argue that—assuming two major parties exist—Downsian policy convergence is not in the interests of either one (Palfrey 1984, Shepsle and Cohen 1988). If both parties converge around the preferences of the median voter, third parties can be expected to enter electoral competition either just to the left or just to the right of them, and hence to squeeze out one of the existing parties by garnering all the votes that would otherwise accrue to it.⁶

Existing parties interested in electoral victory can thus be expected to seek to avoid this unpalatable (from their viewpoints) outcome by differentiating their policy images.⁷ They can do this by diverging from the median voter to the point where they can maximize their prospects for beating their existing opponent while simultaneously deterring third parties from entering—or at least defeating any such parties that chose to compete. Established parties thus search for the policy position that ensures that no potential third party could gain more votes than the existing parties (and hence displace either of them), and at which they would maximize their own poten-

abstain increases the greater the perceived distance (in spatial terms) between their preferences and the policy positions of the party nearest to them, on the one hand, and the smaller the perceived differences between the parties, on the other (Brody 1978, Brody and Grotman 1982, Brody and Page 1973, Weisberg and Grofman 1981). It should also be noted that formal models of the impact of abstentions on party strategy assume that parties are vote rather than plurality maximizers (Hinich and Ordeshook 1970).

⁵ It is argued that governments know far more about the interests of their core supporters than they do about those of swing voters, and hence that, *ceteris paribus*, strategies that will mobilize these voters represent more rational electoral investments than does striving to find policies that will attract the diverse members of the swing electorate.

⁶ Thus, while "Duverger's law" (1953) would hold in some sense—only two parties would be viable in the long run— which two parties would exist in any given time if parties converged to the median voter would be in constant flux.

⁷ We assume that party policy images are the product of policy pronouncements or of the policies pursued while in government and that the two sources of policy image may not be entirely separable. In this connection, see Laver (1986).

tial votes. The optimal points are at the end of the first and third quartiles of the voter preference distribution, far from the median voter.⁸

Recent sophisticated treatments of coalitional dynamics in proportional representation-multiparty systems also challenge the simple assertion that these systems are pervaded by pressures for political compromises, consensual decisions, and convergent policies (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988, Greenberg and Shepsle, 1987, Laver and Schofield, 1989). Austen-Smith and Banks's argument is perhaps the most provocative. They argue that proportional representation will tend to generate multiparty systems in which the policy positions of the two largest parties will diverge to the left and right of the median voter, but in which smaller parties will cluster around this position.⁹ Furthermore, Austen-Smith and Banks observe that there are strong conventions in most countries which grant parties the opportunity to construct coalition governments in descending order of electoral representation. They conclude that the coalitions that ensue are likely to include the largest party and smaller parties—but to exclude the second largest party.¹⁰ Hence policy outputs can be expected to reflect the partisan preferences of the largest party (in proportion to the extent of its representational dominance).¹¹

⁸If parties locate at these points, they would attain at least 37.5% of the total vote regardless of where a third party chose to enter, and they would ensure that no potential third party could gain more than 25% of the vote. Furthermore, under such conditions in a plurality system, no rational voters would follow their sincere preferences and support such a third party, but rather would vote strategically for either of the existing parties. The two existing parties would gain approximately 50% of the vote, thus following Downs's fundamental logic of rational electoral competition. It is important to note that these arguments assume that there are no significant entry barriers for new parties. Under the more realistic assumption that some barriers exist, parties might be tempted to move toward the median, but it is highly improbable that they would place themselves permanently on it.

⁹This assumption is driven by the notion that strategic voters will evaluate the consequences of their behavior not only for which parties will be represented in the legislature, but also for the coalition governments that will ensue. Most simply, they suggest that a number of voters will be dissuaded from voting insincerely for centrist parties (which they do not most prefer) from a fear that such parties would become dominant in coalition governments.

¹⁰The logic is straightforward. The largest party wishes to form the coalition in which its power over policy outcomes will be greatest. It thus is likely first to ask the smallest party to join with it, and will only seek a 'grand coalition' with the second largest party as a last resort. On the other hand, the smallest party has the greatest incentive in accepting the offer to join a coalition, since it will be the last party to be asked to form its own government and hence its best prospect for having some impact on government is to ally with the first possible partner.

¹¹It is important to note that Austen-Smith and Banks assume that party competition is played out on a single left-right dimension (which seems reasonable with respect to economic policies). If, however, parties are considered to bargain on two or more dimensions simultaneously, it is less likely that the policies generated by coalition governments will bear distinctive partisan imprints of the left or right (Laver and Schofield, 1989, pp. 140–91). There may also be parties on the outside flank of the major parties. Their existence, however, would only increase the incentives for policy separation.

In sum, the "entry" and "coalition" arguments represent a powerful theoretical alternative to the policy convergence thesis propounded by Jackman. The dynamics of entry and entry deterrence—as well as the effects of policy preferences, party activists, core electoral constituencies, dangers of abstention, and the "logic" of electoral investments—undermine Jackman's (1989, p. 16) assertion that there are strong pressures for "near convergence" in plurality two-party systems. The electoral and legislative dynamics of proportional representation-multiparty systems may also often belie Jackman's (1989, p. 14) characterization of them as systems pervaded by pressures for compromise, consensus, and convergence. Rather, they may frequently generate "partisan" coalition leaders who may have a marked impact on the types of economic policies their governments enact.

There is, therefore, considerable theoretical basis for the expectation—on which our larger argument as to the interactive effects of government partisanship and labor organization is based—that governments dominated by parties of the left and right will have strong incentives for pursuing partisan economic policies, and hence that there will be policy separation between governments of the left and right.

3 Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Economic Performance

But how much separation? Jackman suggests that economic policy separation should be slight and that cross-national variations in performance are unlikely to be explained by differences in government partisanship. This expectation is rooted on the following assumptions: all governments seek reelection; reelection possibilities are heavily contingent upon a satisfactory level of economic growth; the imperative for stimulating growth invariably overwhelms any incentives for pursuing partisan policies; and there is only a narrow range of policies that will stimulate growth. Thus, even though Jackman argues that "distinctive policies may have a noticeable impact on growth" (Jackman, 1987, p. 255), he nonetheless maintains that government partisanship should have no systematic impact on growth.¹²

We are perfectly willing to assume, with Jackman, that governments are fundamentally interested in reelection,¹³ and that citizens will punish gov-

Jackman also cites approvingly a study by Friedland and Sanders (1985) which demonstrates the differential impact of different policies on economic growth (1987, p. 254; 1989, p. 19). It should be noted, however, that even were Jackman to concede that governments have incentives to pursue partisan-oriented economic policies, he would not expect them to do so for the need to pursue effective economic growth policies would override such incentives.

¹³It is probably more correct to argue that governments' objectives are lexically ordered: they are also interested in furthering policy goals, but they will only pursue them so long as they are not inconsistent with reelection (Frey and Schneider, 1978; Wittman, 1983).

ernments that do not supply satisfactory levels of growth during their tenure in office. But does this mean that governments must forego their partisan objectives and pursue similar sets of growth-stimulating policies?

Not necessarily. Jackman's argument presumes that there is only one macroeconomic policy route to reelectionable growth performance. If this were the case, there would be strong pressures toward economic policy convergence regardless of a party's policy image, and differences in policy and performance would not be systematically related to who governs.

If, however, there are diverse policy routes to similar levels of growth performance (as we will outline)—and if these different policy paths enable governments not only to further their prospects for reelection but also simultaneously to pursue their partisan-preferred economic policies—then the pressures for policy convergence may be significantly reduced.

It is generally assumed—and this is supported by the theoretical arguments about electoral competition presented in the preceding section—that parties of the left and right differ with respect to their preferences about the role government intervention and political mechanisms more generally should play in achieving the goal of high growth.

Governments of the left can be expected to prefer to pursue high growth (as well as low inflation and unemployment) using considerable government intervention—such as demand stimulation, investment subsidies, and labor market intervention—and political bargaining and concertation with organized economic interests. Governments of the right, by contrast, are expected to seek similar outcomes, but primarily through the use of market discipline and incentives and policies that do not impede their operation—such as maintaining the threat of unemployment, avoidance of the “decommodification” of labor (Esping-Andersen, 1985), fiscal and monetary restraint, and so forth.

Each of these partisan-based policy paths would, ideally, produce similar levels of growth and overall performance (combining growth, unemployment, and inflation), although the mixes of unemployment and inflation might be somewhat different. In turn, these would promote the governments' (of both the left and right) prospects for reelection. At the same time, these outcomes would also be consistent with the government parties' partisan interests—such as deterring the entry of third parties, mobilizing electoral support among their core constituencies, satisfying their own ideological predispositions, meeting the demands of party activists, and the like.¹⁴

But all of this presupposes that governments of the left and right can suc-

¹⁴It is worth noting that this is possible partly because what parties need to do to meet their reelection interest vis-a-vis the macroeconomy is to provide satisfactory economic outcomes, whereas party ideologies, activists' pressures or the interests of core constituencies are generally concerned not only with outcomes but also with the policy means by which they are reached.

successfully implement their preferred policy paths and thereby achieve the performance outcomes that promote reelection. We have argued, however, from the outset of this controversy—which Jackman has consistently ignored because he does not believe parties have incentives to be different in the first place—that the successful pursuit of partisan economic policy strategies depends on the existence of institutional conditions, above all in the labor movement, appropriate to them.¹⁵

We do not wish to repeat in detail arguments we have made more extensively elsewhere (Garrett and Lange, 1986, Lange and Garrett, 1985). The thrust of these arguments can, however, be recapitulated briefly. The best performance strategy of the left requires that potential inflationary pressures—that might be generated by sustained low unemployment and extensive welfare provision—be contained through the labor movement's restraint of its potential militancy (and support for government policies intended to induce investment by capital). This restraint is more likely where left governments are allied with encompassing unions. The 'virtuous circle' of evolving cooperation then closes as the success of these policies reinforces the confidence of government, labor and capital in each other.¹⁶ These dynamics are indicative of 'corporatist' political economies.

The interaction between right governments and much weaker labor movements ('weak labor' political economies) is hypothesized to generate similar levels of economic performance, although this interaction is very different from the above 'virtuous circle'. Right governments can be expected simultaneously to achieve their policy goals and to preside over desirable macro-economic outcomes where labor is sufficiently weak to prevent it from using its organizational strength to impede the effective implementation of market-oriented policies. If such conditions exist, sustained economic growth can be promoted with low inflation (Olson, 1982).¹⁷ Furthermore, while these policies may sometimes lead to large job losses in the short term, beneficial outcomes—including low unemployment—are expected over time as economic actors adjust their expectations to the new market conditions (Fischer, 1980; Lucas and Sargent, 1978).

In his current critique, Jackman (1989) makes passing reference to our argument in his footnote 3, arguing that its implication is peculiar. We hope that even our brief exposition here of the underlying argument will clarify again the theoretical bases for the relationships we hypothesize. It should also be noted that we are arguing that the interactive effects of partisanship and organizational conditions are, when congruent, permissive of the economic success of partisan policies. They do not guarantee it.

¹⁶ This argument resembles Axelrod's (1984) more general analysis of the impact of repeated interactions between actors on the evolution of cooperation.

Schott (1984) however, has questioned whether the labor movement in any contemporary capitalist democracy is sufficiently weak to facilitate the pure play of market forces envisaged by Olson and others.

In more "incoherent" systems—in which left governments meet decentralized labor movements or right governments encounter well-organized ones—we expect growth (and inflation and unemployment) performance to be poorer than in either of the preceding cases. If the labor movement is not sufficiently encompassing to deliver restraint of militancy, it can be expected that the partisan-preferred policies of the left would have inflationary consequences because they would lessen the disciplining effect of market mechanisms. In turn, high inflation would reduce the incentive for capitalists to invest, restrict the rate of economic activity, and eventually increase unemployment. On the other hand, powerful right parties who sought to impose market solutions to economic problems on strong labor unions could be expected to suffer a backlash of inflationary labor militancy. Furthermore, it is likely that this confrontational climate might stifle investment, and reduce economic and employment growth.

In sum, governments may be able simultaneously to pursue their partisan preferred policies and to produce satisfactory growth performance, but only when institutional conditions permit. If they seek to impose their partisan preferences when conditions are unpropitious, poorer performance is to be expected.

But why, if the preceding arguments are correct, would one not expect that all parties would adapt their policies to the institutional settings in which they operate, thereby leading us once again to expect similar policy images, policies, and performances, regardless of which party holds office? Why, in other words, would not governments of the left adopt the policies of the right in contexts where those were most likely to be successful, and parties of the right to implement the policies of the left where the latter were likely to produce better performance?

The answer brings us full circle: governments are, in general, unlikely to be able to coopt the policies of their opponents for the political reasons which we discussed earlier: opposition from within their own supporters and activists, and the fear of entry by new parties or of flanking attacks from existing ones.

Furthermore, it is also quite probable that even if governments tried to adopt the policies of the opposition, they would not be very successful in the endeavor. Right governments are unlikely to have the credibility necessary to generate the voluntary restraint of labor militancy, even if they make the kinds of policy promises typically made by leftist parties. Left governments may be more successful vis-à-vis labor in adopting the policies of the right—especially during recessions—but it is not clear that such policies would gain the confidence of capitalists. They might suspect, for instance, that if and when the labor market tightened, left governments would again support resurgent labor. In either case, rational voters might well conclude that the original is better than the imitator, further reducing the incentives for mimicry.

4 *Norway, Oil Dependence, and the Treatment of Influential Cases*

The preceding two sections have presented theoretical arguments that counter Jackman's claims for policy convergence and politically indistinct economic outcomes, and that instead support our original thesis that "who governs" should have a significant impact on growth performance, but that the nature of these effects is likely to be heavily contingent upon the institutional configuration of the labor movements that governments encounter.

Jackman's critiques of our work, however, rest more on methodological grounds than on the theoretical claims we have discussed above. Jackman's central argument is that the inclusion of Norway in our study cannot be justified and that once this case is excluded from the analysis, no empirical support for our hypotheses remains. On the basis of this evidence, Jackman rejects our entire thesis. We will now show that Jackman's empirical tests, and the conclusions he derives from them, are far from definitive. Furthermore, we also wish to make a more general point: that our original data do not permit conclusive testing of our—or alternative—hypotheses, and that future research should seek both to expand the relevant data and to use more sophisticated methodological procedures.

In this section, we argue that Jackman's method of dealing with the influential Norwegian case (exclusion)¹ contradicts his own recommendation for the treatment of such cases. Furthermore, we show that when Norway's influence is controlled by adding an "oil dependence" variable to the analysis, the regression model deployed by Jackman is encouragingly supportive of our broader thesis.

We do not dispute that Norway was an outlier in our original political-organizational interaction models. It is far less clear, however, that the exclusion of this case was the appropriate solution to the problem of its influence on the regressions. Jackman himself asserts that "a number of other remedies may often be more appropriate than case exclusion in the treatment of influential observations" (Jackman, 1989, p. 8). This point is elaborated in a longer methodological article by Bollen and Jackman, to which Jackman often refers in his critiques: "dropping the (influential) case(s)" involves radical surgery, and can be recommended as a last resort only when there are good substantive reasons for it. Instead of routinely following such a procedure, it is more fruitful to determine why the observation is an outlier.

Bollen and Jackman, 1985, p. 538).² Doing so not only may mitigate the influence of individual cases on the analysis, but also may improve the specification of the models examined, and hence provide better tests for the theoretical propositions under investigation.

¹Bollen and Jackman (1985, p. 512) also recommend a number of other procedures for dealing with influential cases and note that outliers may be particularly useful because they point out specification errors which can then be corrected.

In neither of his critiques of our work, however, does Jackman explore any of the alternatives to exclusion for dealing with outliers. Rather, having identified Norway as an influential case, he is content simply to omit Norway from the models, and to base his conclusions on this analysis.

But, on his own terms, Jackman's treatment of the Norwegian case is inadequate. Most importantly, Jackman never includes dependence on imported oil in any of his analyses of our full sample of fifteen countries. This is perplexing for a number of reasons. Our original analysis (Lange and Garrett 1985), additional research we have undertaken (Garrett and Lange, 1986) and our first response to Jackman (Lange and Garrett, 1987), all indicate that dependence on imported sources of oil had substantial deleterious consequences for economic growth in the decade after the 1973 OPEC shock. Furthermore, this finding is also supported by Hicks (1988, p. 692) and Hicks and Patterson (1989, table 1).

Finally, Jackman's (1987) first critique of our work was based precisely on the assertion that Norway's good growth performance was largely attributable to its oil wealth (indeed, he subtitled his critique "Leftist Strength or North Sea Oil?"). He also acknowledged that we discussed the consequences of Norway's oil bounty in our original article, and included an oil dependence variable in our analysis (Jackman, 1987, p. 245).

It would thus seem that Jackman should have sought to reduce Norway's influence on the regressions by controlling for oil dependence, rather than by summarily eliminating the case from the analysis. There is not only strong evidence that dependence on imported oil was a significant determinant of growth across the advanced industrial democracies. It is also apparent that Norway's unique position among the countries in our sample as a net exporter of oil in the period 1974–1980 (Garrett and Lange, 1986, p. 528) may have had a marked impact on its exceptional growth performance since 1974.

Comparison of Jackman's preferred "lagged endogenous growth" model¹ including Norway (equation 1) with a similar model controlling for oil dependence (equation 2), indicates that it was remiss of Jackman not to include oil dependence in his analysis, and that the inclusion of this variable lends credence to our theoretical arguments.

Including Norway, excluding oil dependence

$$\begin{aligned}
 GDP7480 = & 3.04 + 0.27GDP6073 - 1.06LO \\
 & (2.0) \quad (1.8) \quad (2.2) \\
 & - 1.42LC + 0.68LO \cdot LC \\
 & (2.4) \quad (2.9) \\
 \text{adj } R^2 = & .535, F\text{-ratio } 5.0
 \end{aligned}$$

¹We forgo here any comments on the merits of this model in order to use the one most preferred by Jackman. We would draw the reader's attention to our brief comments below and to

Including Norway, including oil dependence

$$\begin{aligned} GDP7480 = & 2.03 + 0.41GDP6073 - 0.12OIL \\ & (1.4) \quad (2.7) \quad (1.8) \\ & - 0.59LO - 0.99LC + 0.46LO \cdot LC \\ & (1.2) \quad (1.7) \quad (1.9) \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

adj R^2 .621, F -ratio 5.6

(figures in parentheses are t -ratios)

where

$GDP7480$ is the av. growth 1974–1980,

$GDP6073$ is the av. growth 1960–1973,

OIL is the dependence on imported oil as % of total energy requirements 1974–1980 (Lange and Garrett 1985, p. 808)

LO is the labor organization index

LC is the % cabinet portfolios held by Left parties 1974–1980 and

$LO \cdot LC$ is a multiplicative interaction term

The inclusion of oil dependence improved the power of the regression model. As we would expect, dependence on imported oil was negatively and statistically significant (at the .1 level) correlated with economic growth 1974–1980. Furthermore, its addition increased by almost ten percentage points the portion of the variance in growth explained, and at a higher level of statistical significance.

The parameter estimates for the $LO \cdot LC$ interaction in equation (2) are closer to our theoretical expectations than those generated by Jackman's method of exclusion (compare [2] with Jackman's [1989] equation 6).²⁰ The $LO \cdot LC$ and $LO \cdot LC'$ coefficients were smaller once oil dependence was controlled for (compare equations [1] and [2]), but the pattern of the results are very similar between the two equations. In addition, the LC and $LO \cdot LC$ coefficients were statistically significant at approximately the .1 level while the t ratio for the LO parameter estimate also exceeded unity.

For present purposes, however, the most important point to note about equation (2) was that the addition of the oil dependence variable greatly reduced Norway's influence on the regression equation. Norway had powerful perturbing effects on equation (1) (see table 1). Its studentized (or standardized) residual was considerably larger than for any of the other cases, and was above the threshold of influence. Furthermore, the absolute values of its $DFITS$ score (reflecting the impact of its exclusion from the analysis on the whole regression model) and its $DFBETAS$ values for the political and organizational variables (denoting the effects of excluding Norway on each of

the critiques of Hicks and Patterson (1989) about the weaknesses in Jackman's use of the lagged rate of growth.

²⁰Jackman's (1989) equations are marginally different from our own. These differences, however, have no impact on the analysis.

these parameter estimates) were well above the relevant thresholds influence

The influence of Norway in equation (2), however, was much weaker, and it would be imprudent to exclude it from the analysis on this basis. Norway's *DFITS* value was marginally above the acceptable level (2.63 compared with the threshold of 2.45), but well below that of Japan (-4.46). Furthermore, much of Norway's influence was felt on oil dependence (*DFBETAS* value -1.29), rather than on the political and organizational variables of primary interest in this debate. Although the *LC* and *LO LC DFBETAS* for Norway were slightly above the influence threshold, it seems that France, Germany and the U.K. were at least as influential on the political and organizational variables.

We do not wish to place too much emphasis on equation (2) as constituting supportive evidence for our thesis. Rather, we wish only strongly to assert that it was unwise for Jackman to reject our argument out of hand on the basis of his reanalysis of our initial results. Furthermore, we consider—especially in the light of the powerful theoretical arguments enunciated earlier in this article—that the results presented above at least warrant further empirical investigation of the effects of “who governs and under what conditions” on economic performance. At the same time, however, our findings once again suggest that there are limitations to the utility of the current data set.

We now will briefly indicate one possible method for overcoming the limitations and generating more rigorous tests for our arguments than we and Hicks and Jackman—have thus far undertaken.

5 Lagged Endogenous Growth and Pooled Time Series-Cross Sectional Analysis

The one modification to our analysis suggested by Jackman is the inclusion of a “lagged endogenous” growth variable to isolate change in growth rate since 1974, instead of manipulating the dependent variable as we previously have done (growth 1974–1980/growth 1960–1973). Jackman (1987, pp. 243–44) argues that the “advantage of the alternative specification is that it allows for an explicit estimate of the effects of earlier growth on subsequent growth. We agree that it is, in principle, desirable accurately to control for the “stickiness” in growth rates alluded to by Jackman (1989, p. 5). But Jackman's particular specification is not satisfactory.

Jackman makes no theoretical argument for the inclusion of growth 1960–1973 in his models. In contrast with Hicks's (1988, p. 688) justification for deploying prior levels of economic development to operationalize the common macroeconomic theme of “catch-up,” Jackman merely asserts that growth rates could be expected to be inertial over time. Furthermore, as

TABLE 1
REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS FOR EQUATIONS 1 AND 2 ($N = 15$)
Equation (1)

Country	R-Student	Hat Matrix	DFITS	GDP _{t-1}	DFBETAS			
					LO	LC	LO	LC
Australia	72	12	26	04	14	12	-16	
Austria	-53	36	-40	-05	15	07	-19	
Belgium	18	36	13	03	10	02	-06	
Canada	-06	20	-03	01	01	01	-01	
Denmark	-1.93	13	-76	-11	-05	-11	-02	
Finland	79	19	38	10	27	07	-16	
France	49	27	29	-11	-19	-15	14	
Germany	1.31	36	98	15	26	80*	-61*	
Italy	57	14	23	-05	-19	-05	-01	
Japan	-1.55	86	-3.77*	-3.00*	00	-52*	24	
Netherlands	15	13	06	01	03	04	-04	
Norway	2.72*	52	2.86*	-43	-1.53*	-1.43*	2.03*	
Sweden	-1.36	36	-1.03	11	41	29	-04	
United Kingdom	-1.26	51	-1.29	34	03	-77*	52*	
United States	-89	49	-57	66*	55*	53*	-47	
Influence								
Thresholds	2.26	1.00	2.24	52	52	52	52	

Equation (2)

Country	R-Student	Hat Matrix	DFITS	GDP _{t-1}	OIL	DFBETAS		
						LO	LC	LO LC
Australia	-09	33	-06	-03	05	04	04	05
Austria	-28	38	-23	00	-05	09	05	11
Belgium	05	36	04	01	00	03	01	02
Canada	96	36	72	-09	48	-03	05	05
Denmark	1.11	38	-57	-29	71*	33	22	36
Finland	57	19	41	10	01	26	08	15
France	1.61	40	1.33	-75*	77*	99*	80*	83
Germany	1.51	36	1.13	14	01	25	84*	60
Italy	97	16	42	-05	16	06	15	07
Japan	-1.83	86	-4.46*	3.06*	02	00	56*	26
Netherlands	25	13	10	01	01	04	05	-05
Norway	1.77	69	2.63*	35	-1.29*	-39	52*	78
Sweden	1.16	38	0.92	19	21	19	32	14
United Kingdom	1.70	51	1.75	31	16	-12	1.02*	69
United States	-84	49	-83	58*	06	49	48	-42
Influence								
Thresholds	2.31	1.00	2.45	52	52	52	52	52

* Cases that exceed influence thresholds in absolute value (see text for the derivation & interpretation of these influence diagnostics)

Hicks and Patterson (1989, p. 6) point out, the parameter estimates for Jackman's lagged growth term are highly unstable. Whereas some of Jackman's results delineate a positive correlation between past growth and growth 1974–1980, the coefficients for this term become negative when past per capita growth is also included (Hicks and Patterson, 1989, table 1, Jackman, 1989, table 2).

Thus, the strongest justification for deploying a lagged growth variable is to isolate changes in growth rates over time. The time control employed by Jackman, however, is very gross: 1974–1980 compared with 1960–1973. A pooled time series, cross-sectional design would appear to be a far better way both to isolate changes in growth rates over time, and more precisely to delineate the effects on them of the interaction between a relatively invariant structural characteristic of national political economies (the organization of labor movements) and a more volatile political variable (control of cabinet governments).

Our argument all along has suggested that the impact on economic growth of changes in "who governs" is contingent upon the underlying organizational conditions in a political economy. The cross-sectional models in debate here can only analyze these effects cross-nationally and with respect to gross aggregations over time (1974–1980 compared with 1960–1973). The utilization of a pooled design would allow us more directly to scrutinize the impact of 'government partisanship'—both across countries at the same time and within individual countries over time—in accordance with the logical thrust of our argument: that the effects of changes in government on growth (both between countries and over time) are conditional upon the structural conditions in which they take place.

Furthermore, pooled analysis has the additional benefit of directly engaging another debate which is theoretically very similar to the present controversy, but which has nonetheless been separated from it on methodological grounds. Scholars have long argued over the consequences of changes in government for economic policies and outcomes within individual countries and accordingly have based their analyses on times series models (Alt, 1985; Beck, 1982; Hibbs, 1977, 1987). The unification of this perspective with the cross-national considerations that have driven our analysis would be highly desirable.

We recognize, however, that the utilization of a pooled design would create its own methodological problems, and that considerable attention would need to be paid to the interpretation of its results.²¹ Nonetheless, it is apparent that such a procedure may facilitate more rigorous testing of our arguments than has thus far been the case.

²¹ For a useful discussion of many of the issues involved, see Stimson (1985).

CONCLUSION

We have sought to establish three basic points that vitiate Jackman's theoretical and methodological critiques of our work. First, contra Jackman, there are powerful theoretical grounds for asserting that "who governs"—contingent upon underlying organizational conditions—has a significant impact on both economic policies and economic outcomes in capitalist democracies. More specifically, (1) there is much reason to believe that governments will pursue distinctive economic policy profiles, (2) even if we accept that growth is a good desired by all governments because they want to be reelected, there are diverse paths to reelectionable growth and these paths may allow governments of the left and right also to serve some of their partisan interests, (3) the possibility of successfully pursuing these partisan paths to growth, however, depends on the existence of compatible institutional conditions in the labor movement.

As a result, we expect theoretically that which party controls government will affect growth performance conditional on the presence of appropriate institutional conditions. This is what we have argued in each of our discussions of this issue. We have never maintained that growth is directly related to the partisanship of government irrespective of institutional context. Quite the contrary. We have always hypothesized that both governments of the left and of the right can be expected to be associated with good growth performance, but only under certain conditions.

Second, Jackman's decision to base his empirical analysis on the exclusion of the Norwegian case—and the categorical rejection of our thesis he inferred from it—was unwarranted. The introduction of a control for dependence on imported oil was a better strategy for mitigating the influence of this case on the regressions. Furthermore, rather than disconfirming our thesis, the results of even his preferred model with oil included were encouraging.

Finally, we suggested that the deployment of a pooled time series cross-sectional design might not only provide a better test for our thesis than the cross-sectional analyses in debate, but also conjoin our work with studies that examine the effects on economic outcomes of changes in government partisanship within individual countries.

This paper has not conclusively substantiated these points. Rather, it has shown that Jackman's categorical rejection of our thesis was imprudent, that further analysis is called for regarding the impact of government partisanship on economic policies and outcomes, and that it is time to undertake strategies to expand the data and methodologies used in these analyses.

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Research Notes

2

3

America Watches "Amerika:" Television Docudrama and Political Attitudes

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This article reports the results of a panel study examining the impact of the 1987 television miniseries *Amerika* on political attitudes and stereotypes. Viewing the docudrama, which ostensibly depicted life in the Midwest ten years after a Soviet takeover of the United States, was associated with significant changes in attitudes concerning Soviet-American relations. These attitudinal changes were consistently in the direction of greater conservatism (for example, viewers became less tolerant of communism and voiced more support for enhanced U.S. military strength). The moderating impact of perceived realism, education, and ideology, as well as the dependent impact of indirect exposure to the series (that is, informal peer discussion and attention to associated media coverage), were also examined. The implications of the results for research on the political impact of entertainment programming are discussed.

Perhaps no television broadcast in history generated as much controversy as the fourteen-and-one-half hour television miniseries *Amerika*, which aired February 15–22, 1987, on the ABC network. Ostensibly portraying life in the Midwest ten years after a Soviet takeover of the United States, producers of the program claimed that it was not an anti-Soviet tract but instead a "civics lesson" on what it means to be American (Waters, 1987). Conservatives thought the program was too lenient in its portrayal of a Soviet occupation (Zoghlin, 1987). Liberal critics assailed the series as "a hate film that evokes fear and hostility toward the Soviets" (Psychologists for Social Responsibility, 1987). In sponsoring the *Amerika* miniseries, ABC was seen as pandering to "right-wing interests who loudly objected to the anti-nuclear message of ABC's *The Day After*" (O'Connor, 1987). Some critics felt that the whole concept of a Soviet-UN takeover would prejudice today's generation of American youngsters (Unger, 1987), while others warned that

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"the danger is that travesties like this (anti-Soviet program) help set the public agenda" (Gitlin, 1986)

These serious claims reflect concerns that the series would have wide-ranging consequences among the viewing public. In the study reported here, we examined the impact of "Amerika" on a variety of political attitudes and beliefs. Although evidence for the agenda-setting and attitude-priming potential of television news programming has been well documented (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Iyengar and Lenart, 1988), the issue of whether entertainment programs such as cinematic docudramas and made-for-television movies have an impact on political beliefs and behavior has been addressed less systematically. However, the "dramatic potency" (Feldman and Sigelman, 1985) of entertainment programs increases the likelihood that viewers will become deeply and vicariously involved in the drama, which in turn may affect attitudes and beliefs.

The available research, with a few exceptions, is only indirectly pertinent to politics because it has focused primarily on emotional or informational consequences. For example, research has indicated that docudramas such as "Roots" (Surlin, 1978) and "The Day After" (French and Van Hoorn, 1986) can exact a high degree of emotional involvement from the television audience. Moreover, the broadcast of "Holocaust" in Europe resulted in greater viewer awareness and factual knowledge of past history (de Bock and van El, 1981; Diem, 1981), while "The Day After" influenced viewers' information about nuclear war (Feldman and Sigelman, 1985). Studies directly concerned with political attitudes have yielded mixed results. For example, Adams et al. (1985) concluded that "The Right Stuff" favorably influenced perceptions of John Glenn during his presidential bid in 1984. French and van Hoorn (1986) found that "The Day After" significantly influenced attitudes about nuclear war but did not lead to changes in political behavior. On the other hand, Ball-Rokeach, Grube, and Rokeach (1981) found no evidence that "Roots II" affected attitudes toward egalitarianism. Similarly, Sigelman and Sigelman (1974) concluded that the movie "The Candidate" did not affect levels of political cynicism.

Most studies of the political impact of entertainment programs have lacked the methodological and theoretical rigor necessary to draw confident conclusions about effects on politically relevant variables. An exceptional study does stand out. Feldman and Sigelman (1985) examined the effects of "The Day After" through a panel survey (in contrast to the more frequently used post-exposure-only sampling), in the context of a carefully developed theoretical argument. Those researchers concluded that "The Day After" had a direct impact on information about nuclear war but not political attitudes, and that the effects of associated media coverage and interpersonal discussion outweighed the effects of direct exposure to the program itself.

In short, there is some evidence that television docudramas can have an

impact on political attitudes. However, it is clear that care must be taken in specifying which beliefs and attitudes are likely to be affected, as well as the conditions governing these effects. With these points in mind, we hypothesized that the impact of the "Amerika" miniseries would be evident along a specific set of political attitudes and beliefs, and also that those effects would be moderated by several factors.

Types of Effects

Social science research has consistently indicated that the media serves to reinforce existing attitudes and feelings and to make salient certain issues, but that it rarely transforms fundamental policy preferences or political behaviors (Kinder and Sears, 1985). Moreover, media presentations generally have their greatest impact on specific attitudes and beliefs related to the central theme of the message, not more general social and political attitudes. Critics and viewers were hard pressed to identify "the" central theme in the "Amerika" series. However, the story line involved life in the Midwest following a noncontested Soviet takeover of the United States, with implications of United Nations complicity in maintaining the occupation. As such, we expected the program to have its effects on attitudes and beliefs relevant to the theme of Soviet-American relations. With this in mind, we included two sets of dependent measures to assess the impact of "Amerika."

Attitudes. The first set of dependent measures includes attitudes about the Soviet Union, communism, American foreign policy, and the United Nations. The series contained oblique messages related to each of these. For example, the United Nations was portrayed as a Soviet puppet organization. In addition, the series also implied that Americans were apathetic and that an initial show of force would have prevented the Soviet takeover. To the extent that these messages were comprehended, accepted, and retained by viewers, we expect the series to affect attitudes related to those themes.

Stereotypes. The second set of dependent measures consists of ratings of the characteristics of Russians and Americans. Cognitively-oriented research on stereotyping (Fiske and Taylor, 1984) tends to view stereotype acquisition as a process of abstraction from available information about specific group members. An alternative approach suggests that stereotypes are acquired through the socialization process (suggested by Lippmann, 1922, when he argued that people do not necessarily develop stereotypes through the "slow and painful process of hypothesis testing," but rather incorporate the "folkways" of their cultural group). Both the cognitive and socialization approaches to stereotyping have merit. Most Americans have stereotypes about Russians (which are considerably more negative than their stereotypes

of Americans as a group), even though they have never met a Russian. That does not mean that new information about specific Russians will be ignored. However, most research and theorizing about social knowledge structures such as stereotypes has emphasized their ability to resist change. People are remarkably adept at distorting the encoding, representation, and retrieval of information to fit preexisting conceptions (Fiske and Taylor, 1984). Thus, we expect that if "Amerika" has any impact on social stereotypes, it will involve strengthening already existing perceptions (positive perceptions of Americans and negative perceptions of Russians).

Conditions Governing the Effects

It is naive to expect a television program to affect all viewers identically. One of the more significant trends in media and communications research has been identifying the conditions that lead some audience members to be affected in one way, and others in another way or not at all (Roberts and MacCoby, 1985). In keeping with this approach, we hypothesized that the effects of "Amerika" would be contingent on the following dimensions:

Type of Exposure. Due to its controversial nature, "Amerika" was widely discussed in the media, and also (we expect) by the general public. As noted above, Feldman and Sigelman (1985) demonstrated that the "byproducts" of a media presentation, such as attention to associated media coverage and interpersonal discussion, can have at least as strong an impact on attitudes and knowledge as direct exposure to the media presentation itself. Additional empirical support for such "indirect" media effects has been documented in news programming research wherein interpersonal channels of communication have been found to play an important role in the public's awareness and understanding of the news (Erbring, Goldenburg, and Miller, 1980; Robinson and Levy, 1986), in survey research on the determinants of tax compliance (Mason, 1987), and in experimental research on the independent effects of direct exposure to, and interpersonal discussion of, political messages (Lenart and McGraw, 1988). Therefore, when considering the impact of docudramas, particularly if they are controversial, a model of media effects that accounts for direct and indirect exposure (including associated media coverage and interpersonal discussion) is necessary.

Perceived Realism. McGuire's (1969) information-processing approach to persuasion stresses the importance of six processing stages: exposure, attention, comprehension, acceptance (or yielding), retention, and behavior. In the fictionalized realm of docudramas, audience acceptance is particularly important. Exposure to, attention to, and comprehension of the message are necessary but not sufficient conditions for maximum attitude change. The viewer must also accept the program in terms of realism and believe that

the fictionalized account "could really happen." Therefore, we expect that the political impact of "Amerika" will be most evident among those who considered the series to be a realistic portrayal of a Soviet takeover.

Political Ideology The furor generated by "Amerika" was essentially ideological. Liberals labelled it anti-Soviet propaganda, whereas conservatives were worried that the Soviets were portrayed in an overly favorable manner. In short, ideological predispositions covaried with professional commentators' interpretation of the underlying message of "Amerika." This pattern is consistent with an impressive body of evidence documenting the extent to which evaluations of social evidence are distorted by preconceived theories and beliefs (Fiske and Taylor 1984). In line with this evidence, we will examine whether ideology moderates the impact of exposure.

Knowledge Finally, we expect that the impact of "Amerika" will be dependent on viewer knowledge. Ivengar, Peters, and Kinder (1982) found that attitude change following news presentations was an inverse function of the level of the viewers' general political knowledge. Those researchers interpreted this result as being due to the ability of the viewer to counterargue with a news presentation: those with less knowledge are less able to counterargue against a persuasive communication. In line with this research, we expect the less knowledgeable (operationalized in terms of education) will be more strongly affected by the series than those with higher levels of knowledge.

METHOD

Sample The data for this study comes from a pair of surveys conducted as part of a class project. The respondents were a nonprobability sample of residents of Long Island, New York. They were contacted in person, and if they agreed to participate, were given a booklet containing the survey materials which they completed themselves. The first survey was completed during the week immediately preceding the showing of "Amerika" (the series was shown on seven nights, from Feb. 15, 1987 to Feb. 22, 1987); a total of 345 interviews were completed. During the week following the telecast of the series, an attempt was made to reinterview all of the first-wave respondents. The analysis reported below are based on the 245 individuals (70% of the original number) who were interviewed in both waves of the study.

Survey Instrument The dependent measures were included on both the pre-series and post-series questionnaires. The first set consisted of twenty-three attitude statements, culled from a variety of international affairs attitude scales (Robinson, Rusk, and Head 1968). Respondents were required to indicate the extent to which they agreed with each statement, on five-

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point scales labeled "strongly agree" and "strongly disagree." The attitude statements from the first wave questionnaire were subjected to a principle-components factor analysis with squared multiple correlations for communality estimates, using orthogonal varimax rotation. Seven factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 were extracted. In defining the factors, a variable was included if its loading was .40 or greater. The individual attitude items and the results of the factor analysis are provided in table 1.

Briefly, "Factor One" includes beliefs that enhanced *U.S. military strength* is necessary to prevent the spread of communism. The second factor consists of statements expressing *tolerance* of communism. The third factor reflects the belief that war should be avoided (*fear of war*). The fourth factor includes the beliefs that noncommunist countries should be our allies, and that good citizens are patriotic. We interpret this factor as reflecting "Cold War" values, that is, values which tap a Free World vs. Communist World conception of foreign policy beliefs. The fifth factor clearly reflects attitudes toward the *United Nations*. The sixth factor reflects the beliefs that the Soviets are behind world terrorism and the United States should not trade with communist countries. We believe that this factor keys into the belief that communists are *not trustworthy*. Finally, "Factor Seven" reflects the belief that Americans are *apathetic* toward communism and do not appreciate the American way of life. Summary scales of each of these seven factors were constructed by averaging each subject's ratings over the equally weighted component items of each factor.

The second set of dependent measures consisted of semantic differential trait adjectives (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957). The respondents were required to indicate the extent to which both Americans and Russians are kind/cruel, fair/unfair, happy/sad, strong/weak, brave/cowardly, honest/dishonest, tolerant/intolerant, valuable/worthless, and peaceful/aggressive. Summary scales, representing the overall favorability of perceptions of Americans and Russians, were created by summing each respondent's rating of these adjectives (the reliability of these scales for both waves of the survey, as assessed by Cronbach's alpha, were in excess of .73).

Demographic variables, including political ideology and education, were assessed on the first wave questionnaire. The final sample constitutes an acceptable demographic approximation of the sampling area, although somewhat younger and better educated. There were equal numbers of males and females, 93% of the sample was white. Sixty-two percent of the sample had some college education, 72% were employed, and 15% were students. Forty percent were under the age of thirty, 17% were over fifty. Forty percent identified themselves as Republicans, 30% as Democrats, and the remainder identified themselves as Independents or claimed no partisan identification.

The second wave questionnaire concluded with several questions about the "Amerika" series. The respondents were asked to indicate the amount of

TABLE 1
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF ATTITUDE ITEMS

Variable	1	2	3	Factor 4	5	6
<i>Factor 1 Military Strength</i>						
23 U S military strength insures peace	71		-		-	-
9 Military strength deters Russian at tempts at world domination	65			-	-	-
17 Communism in Central America threatens our national security	59	-		-	-	-
12 The Communists menace this country and the world in general	42			41	-	-
<i>Factor 2 Tolerance of Communism</i>						
3 We should be open-minded about communism		70				-
5 Our country is no better than many others		65		-		-
16 Better Red than dead		56			-	
15 There is little difference between ordinary Americans and ordinary Russians		45			-	-
13 The Russians can be trusted		47		-		-
<i>Factor 3 Fear of War</i>						
22 The real danger today is war not communism		-	67	-	-	-
21 The U S struggle against communism is immoral if it risks destruction of the human race			65	-		-
11 Under no circumstances should the United States go to war with USSR	-		56	-		
20 United States should go to war to stop communism			57			-
10 Threat of world communism is not important	-		43			-
<i>Factor 4 Cold War Values</i>						
7 We should ally with any country democratic or not if it is strongly anti-communist			-	74		
1 Most important citizen duties are patriotism and loyalty			-	62		
<i>Factor 5 United Nations</i>						
6 We need to support the United Nations in settling international disputes	-				57	
19 The United Nations should be abandoned as unworkable		-	-		85	-

TABLE 1 (*continued*)

FACTOR ANALYSIS OF ATTITUDE ITEMS

Variable	Factor						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8 Every effort should be made for friendly relations with USSR	-	-	-	-	46	-	-
<i>Factor 6 Communists Untrustworthy</i>							
2 Russia is behind much of world terrorism	-	-	-	50	-	77	-
4 United States should not trade with any communist country	-	-	-	-	-	53	-
<i>Factor 7 Americans Apathetic</i>							
14 Young people don't understand communist danger	-	-	-	-	-	-	80
18 Americans take way of life for granted	-	-	-	-	-	-	55

Note: The entries are factor loading coefficients. Only loadings over .4 are included.

time that they had watched the series each night. Forty-seven percent ($n = 115$) did not watch any of the series, whereas 6.5% ($n = 16$) watched all 14.5 hours. Those who viewed at least some of the series averaged 5.57 hours, or a little more than one-third of the entire series. In order to measure attention to associated media coverage, the respondents were asked how much attention they had paid to newspaper or television news discussions of the series. Twenty percent did not pay any attention, 43% reported paying "some" or "a great deal" of attention. They were also asked to what extent they had discussed the series with family, friends, or co-workers. Thirty-six percent did not discuss it at all, whereas 24% reported they had discussed the series with other people "some" or "a great deal." Finally, the respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they believed "Amerika" was realistic. Among those who watched, 34% thought it was "somewhat" or "very" realistic, whereas 48% thought it was "not at all" realistic.

Design Issues. Our design is what Cook and Campbell (1979) label an "untreated control group design with pretest-posttest." Although it is a more powerful and interpretable design than is frequently used in research on the effects of entertainment shows, potential validity threats need to be considered (see also Feldman and Sigelman, 1985). The most serious is the threat of a *self-selection bias*. To what extent are the people who decided to view the series different from those who did not watch it? We compared those who watched at least some of the series with those who did not watch any on a number of major demographic variables. Viewers and nonviewers did not

differ in age, education, party identification, or ideology. The only reliable difference was that women were slightly more likely to watch the series. Similar analyses revealed no differences between those who attended and did not attend to media coverage, or between those who discussed and did not discuss the series with other people. Overall, we could find no evidence that direct or indirect exposure to the series covaried with any other variable that could logically account for attitudinal changes. Moreover, statistically controlling for the first wave attitudes and stereotypes in the model estimation serves to minimize the impact of individual differences due to self-selection on subsequent judgments. A second threat, *contamination bias*, is potentially serious: given all the media controversy, it is possible that detectable changes are due to indirect exposure to the series (via media or peer discussion) rather than exposure to the series itself. However, because this type of "contamination" is of theoretical interest in its own right, we control for indirect exposure in our statistical model.

Statistical Model. In order to assess the impact of "America," we first estimated the following model for each of the nine dependent measures (seven attitude scales and stereotypes of Americans and Russians):

$$Y_{i2} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Viewing} + \beta_2 \text{Media Attention} + \beta_3 \text{Informal Discussion} + \beta_5 Y_{i1} + e$$

To elaborate, Y_{i2} is equal to one of nine dependent measures as measured in the second wave of the survey. *Viewing* is equal to the total amount of time spent watching the series. *Media Attention* and *Informal Discussion* reflect the extent to which the respondent paid attention to associated media coverage and discussed the series with other people, respectively. Finally, Y_{i1} is the dependent variable as measured in the first wave of the survey, permitting an assessment of exposure effects that are independent of preexisting attitudinal differences. Because the lagged dependent variable is included as a predictor, the model was estimated via two-stage least squares regression, with an instrument for the lagged dependent variable substituted in the second stage of the analysis.

Following the estimation of the simple main effect model, additional analyses were done in order to examine the moderating influence of perceived realism, knowledge, and ideology on the impact of direct exposure to the series. Those three variables were dummy coded (with 1 = high perceived realism, college graduates, and political conservatives, respectively). Interaction terms were then created by multiplying each dummy by *Viewing*. The dummy variable and interaction term were included with the basic four predictors in three sets of subsequent analyses.

RESULTS

Table 2 summarizes the results for the basic main effect model. Those data bear out our expectation that the "Amerika" miniseries would have an impact on attitudes about Soviet-American relations. Viewing at least some part of the program was associated with a decidedly conservative shift on five of the seven attitudes. Viewers' "Cold War" values were significantly enhanced, their fear of war was diminished, and a stronger U.S. military posture became more desirable. Furthermore, viewers were significantly less tolerant of communism, and more supportive of the United Nations than were nonviewers.¹

The stereotype results indicate that after viewing the series, stereotypes of Americans were significantly more positive while those of Russians remained unchanged. This pattern is consistent with research indicating that making ingroup/outgroup distinctions salient leads to ingroup enhancement rather than outgroup derogation (Brewer, 1979). Watching the series, according to this logic, resulted in more positive stereotypes of Americans (ingroup enhancement) but not more negative stereotypes of Russians (outgroup derogation).

The estimates of the effects of indirect exposure to the series (that is, attention to associated media coverage and informal discussion) are weaker than the effects due to direct exposure. The one significant effect due to media coverage indicates that those who attended more to television and newspaper coverage of the series were more likely to believe in a strong U.S. military posture to stop the spread of communism. The significant effect involving peer discussion indicates that those who discussed the series with other people were more afraid of war. Although the effects of informal discussion on attitudes are weak, there is an interesting pattern that is worth noting. For four of the five attitudes which were significantly influenced by direct exposure, the direction of the coefficients for discussion is in an *opposite* direction. This is most evident with the fear of war attitudes: viewing the series *diminished* concerns about war, whereas discussing the series with others was associated with an *increased* fear of war. The finding that informal discussion tended to move attitudes in a direction opposite to that of watching the series clearly suggests that the two types of exposure have independent effects.

¹As would be expected, the lagged dependent variables are significantly related to the post-series attitudes and stereotypes, indicating a substantial degree of stability in these judgments. The coefficients for the lagged attitudes are rather large. Inspection of plots of the pre- and post-series attitudes indicate that the post-series attitudes were much more polarized than the same attitudes measured prior to the series. This attitude polarization accounts for the inflated coefficients.

TABLE 2

ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT EXPOSURE TO THE AMERICAN TELEVISION MINI-SERIES

	U.S. Military Strength	Tolerance of Communism	Fear of War	Cold War Values	United Nations	Communist Not Trust- worthy	Apathetic Too	Stereotype of Americans	Stereotype of Russians
Viewing	76*	62*	69*	54*	35*	80	30	25**	03
Media Attention	59*	36	31	02	08	07	25	03	- 13
Interpersonal Discussion	45	13	66*	46	14	11	04	02	- 06
Pre-Series Attitude	135***	269***	296***	300***	158***	157***	212***	73***	51***
Adjusted R ²	55	45	46	54	40	89	29	35	27

Note: The entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (2S.E.). The dependent variables were coded such that higher scores reflect the belief that U.S. military strength should be enhanced, communism should be tolerated, war should be needed, endorsement of Cold War values, support for the United Nations, Communists are not trustworthy, Americans are apathetic, and positive stereotypes of Americans and Russians.

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Table 3 summarizes the results involving the moderating impact of perceived realism, knowledge, and ideology on attitudes and stereotypes (for the sake of brevity, only the coefficients for the interaction and main effect "Viewing" terms are presented). In general, the patterns of results are consistent with our predictions, although the magnitude of the differences are weak. Consider first the results involving perceived realism. First, the impact of direct exposure is generally weaker among those who did not believe the series was realistic (the base group for the "Viewing" variable), as evident by the diminished main effects due to exposure. The significant interaction terms indicate that those who viewed the series and thought it was realistic became significantly more supportive of enhanced U.S. military strength than those viewers who did not believe the series was realistic. Similarly, the "realistic" viewers became more convinced that Communists are not trustworthy.

The data pertaining to the impact of education are consistent with the hypothesis that media effects are dependent on the viewer's ability to counter-argue against persuasive communications (Iyengar et al., 1982). The impact of viewing the series on attitude change is strongest among those who are not college graduates (the base group in this analysis), as evident by the increased magnitude of the "Viewing" coefficients in table 2 relative to those presented in table 1. The two significant interaction terms indicate that less educated viewers became substantially more convinced that Communists are untrustworthy and that Americans are apathetic, in comparison to educated viewers.

Finally, political ideology did not moderate the effects of direct exposure to the series. Indeed, political liberals and independents (the base group in this set of analyses) also demonstrated substantial "conservative" attitude shifts. The fears of the liberal critics appear to have been realized: the show succeeded in swaying political liberals and independents to adopt a more conservative viewpoint on Soviet-American relations. Indeed, the significant Viewing X Ideology interaction effect for the tolerance variable indicates that liberal and independent viewers became even more intolerant of communism than did their conservative viewing counterparts. On the other hand, conservative viewers developed significantly more negative stereotypes of both Americans and Russians than did other viewers.

DISCUSSION

Our analyses have indicated that the "Amerika" miniseries led to significant and predictable changes in political attitudes and stereotypes. The basic results can be summarized quite easily: watching "Amerika" was associated with changes in attitudes about Soviet-American relations in the direction of greater conservatism (for example, less tolerance of communism and greater acceptance of increased military strength). In addition, stereotypes of

TABLE 3

ESTIMATES OF THE MODERATING IMPACT OF PERCEIVED REALISM, EDUCATION, AND IDEOLOGY ON THE EFFECTS OF
DIRECT EXPOSURE TO THE 'AMERIKA' MINI-SERIES

	U.S. Military Strength	Tolerance of Communism	Fear of War	Cold War Values	United Nations	Communist Not Trust worthy	Apathetic Americans	Stereotype of Americans	Stereotype of Russians
Realism ^a	34	39	34	31	36*	24	26	44***	07
Viewing \times Realism	1.23**	53	99	83	01	91*	21	- 42**	- 21
Education ^b	1.00**	69*	77*	69*	56*	27	63*	29*	- 06
Viewing \times Education	49	01	05	27	45	79*	78*	06	24
Ideology ^c	1.02**	1.09**	92**	76**	38*	12	28	37**	19*
Viewing \times Ideology	62	1.32**	66	65	13	28	10	- 29*	- 50**

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (2S1 S). Only the main effect Viewing and interaction terms are presented. The base group for the Viewing effect in each equation is

^aViewers who thought the series was *not* realistic

^bViewers who are not college graduates and

liberal and independent viewers

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Americans became more positive with direct exposure whereas stereotypes of Russians tended not to change. More important, the attitudinal effects involving direct exposure were most evident under certain theoretically meaningful conditions. First, those individuals who believed that the series was a realistic portrayal of a Soviet takeover were particularly likely to be influenced by the series, supporting the hypothesis that acceptance of a message is a critical determinant of attitude change (McGuire, 1969). Second, those with lower levels of education were more likely to be influenced by direct exposure, lending support to the hypothesis that the ability to counterargue mitigates the impact of persuasive appeals (Iyengar et al., 1982).

Finally, and contrary to our expectations, the attitude change of political liberals and independents also moved in a conservative direction. We had expected that the docudrama format in general, and the "Amerika" series in particular, would provide such a mixed array of messages that advocates of certain positions would be able to selectively perceive and retain information that supported initial opinions and feelings (Vallone, Ross, and Lepper, 1985). In retrospect, we believe the conservative shift demonstrated among the liberal and moderate respondents is due to the fact that the series did indeed have a dominant message—namely, that Americans need to be increasingly vigilant against the Soviet threat. We base this conclusion on the findings that in the analyses of the conditions most conducive to attitude change, direct exposure to the series was consistently associated with change in a more conservative direction.

One of the more intriguing results of this study concerns the impact of informal peer discussion on political attitudes. A higher percentage of respondents reported discussing the series with someone (64%) than reported actually watching any of it (53%). What is striking about the peer discussion effects is that the direction of influence consistently *diverged* from that of actually watching the series. In other words, talking about the series with friends, family, and co-workers tended to *counteract* the effects of direct media influence. The results involving the effects of informal discussion are certainly reminiscent of the classic "two-step flow" model of mediated attitude change (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1944), later expanded by Robinson's (1976) analyses suggesting group discussion (rather than a one-way flow of information) is the typical process involved in attitude change. Yet very little is known about the information-processing mechanisms and social influence processes involved in group-mediated attitude change (see Lenart and McGraw, 1988, and Mackuen and Brown, 1987 for discussions). Unfortunately, our results cannot shed any light on the nature of these processes other than to underscore that group discussion about a media presentation is a theoretically meaningful independent determinant of political attitude change.

The politically-significant impact of non-news or entertainment television

programming "should not be taken as cause for puzzlement" (Feldman and Sigelman, 1985). Our results certainly serve to underscore Feldman and Sigelman's call for increased attention to the political impact of prime-time television. Prime-time entertainment programs reach large audiences, and these programs often have an explicit or implicit ideological foundation. As television emerges as the dominant mass medium in American society, it will become increasingly important to consider the impact of the total television environment on political attitudes, beliefs, and behavior.

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PAC Contributions, Lobbying, and Representation

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It is often believed that organized interests purchase access—and, consequently, representation—to members of Congress through PAC contributions. By contributing to representatives from districts where they have little or no organizational strength, groups may shift the representational focus of elected officials away from geographic constituencies to broader functional constituencies based on occupational, industrial, and professional groupings. This paper examines this possibility by assessing the extent to which groups' campaign contributions and lobbying efforts are directed to representatives from districts where groups have little or no organizational presence. The empirical analysis is based on data from a survey of professional lobbyists with organizations that sponsored political action committees during the 1983–1984 election cycle. Results of the analysis indicate that organized interests seldom contribute to and lobby members of the U.S. House of Representatives in the absence of geographic ties to their districts.

INTRODUCTION

Gaining access to decisionmakers is a major objective of all political interest groups. Traditionally, groups have established and maintained access to elected officials through visible organizational connections to their geographic districts (Truman 1951, Bone 1958). Now it increasingly appears that groups achieve access through campaign contributions from their political action committees (e.g., Dunn 1972, Ornstein and Elder, 1978, Herndon, 1982, Berry, 1984, Gopalan 1984, Drew, 1985, Conway 1986, Langbein 1986). Campaign money becomes a substitute for district connections when groups transfer money into districts where they have little or no organizational presence. The extent to which money has replaced district ties is important for understanding the basis of interest group representation in Congress (Alexander 1984).

A general concern that PAC money has separated representatives from their geographic constituencies has been articulated by both scholars and practitioners of politics (for a general review, see Eisemeier and Pollock 1985). Adamany (1980, pp. 596–97), for example, has argued that PACs "create a problem for representative government." These nationally cen-

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tralized institutions compete with local constituents, including those who supply resources, for the attention of public officials " PACs, according to Adamany, "have heightened already serious distortions in American politics," and money centralized in Washington is often targeted to "afford favored access on matters involving direct economic benefits to the givers " Lee Ann Elliot (1980, p. 541), a former PAC staff person and member of the Federal Election Commission, has described PACs as the "precincts of the 80s " She claims "PACs have clearly substituted socioeconomic or occupational groups for geographic or neighborhood associations. Now the ABC Corporation PAC is a socioeconomic precinct along with Precinct 42, a geographic precinct " Senator David Boren, Democrat of Oklahoma, has cautioned "You begin to ask yourself whether we're going to have any grassroots democracy left if PACs finance more than half the campaigns of members of Congress. To me, it is such a threat to democracy" (Pressman, 1985, p. 2445). And Frank Sorauf (1985, p. 613) concludes "we have in the growth of PACs a new and developing representational system, one based on specific occupational or issue loyalties. To some extent it supplements the system of political parties. With the parties function in the local electoral constituency, the PACs work in a more national and functional constituency. Years ago the votes and the resources that elected a candidate came from the same place and the same people. They no longer do."

Most recently, Grenzke (1988) claims that roughly 98% of all PAC money received by congressional incumbents originates outside their geographic districts. This finding, based on an analysis of the geographic source of individual contributions to PACs of \$500 and above, "raises questions," in Grenzke's words, "about the usefulness of continuing to describe the American political system with a narrow, district-based conceptualization of representation."

My purpose in this paper is to assess the extent to which organized interests, by the allocation of campaign money, establish bases of access—and consequently, representation—that they would not have if they depended simply on electoral and other nonmonetary support within geographic districts.¹ This general concern breaks down into two specific questions, and it is these on which I focus. In particular, I ask: How often do special interest groups make campaign contributions to representatives from districts where they have little or no organizational presence?² And, when such contributions are made, how often are they followed-up with lobbying efforts on specific

¹The term "access" has acquired multiple meanings through political academic and journalistic discourse (see Makielski, 1990 for a summary of usages). I use the term here to refer to the ability of lobbyists and other group representatives to talk directly with representatives and their staffs about legislative issues (e.g., Berry, 1984, p. 169). Access in this sense is a precondition for influence, not influence itself.

bills? I address these questions using data from a survey of interest groups with both active lobbying organizations and political action committees. The data consist of evaluations by professional lobbyists of their groups' organizational strength in districts of members of the U. S. House of Representatives, together with reports of the scope and intensity of their lobbying efforts on several major bills from the ninety-ninth Congress. These data were merged with data from the Federal Election Commission on direct contributions to House incumbents during the 1983-1984 election cycle.

HYPOTHESES

Over the years, district connections have proven useful for establishing access because constituency-based groups provide valuable opportunities for reelection-seeking incumbents to keep in touch with their constituents (Fenno, 1978, p. 235). But in the wake of congressional reforms, organizations have had to broaden their operations in order to maintain contact with a larger number of members (see, for example, Davidson, 1986; Rieselbach, 1986, and especially, Schlozman and Tierney, 1986, pp. 302-303). One means of gaining wider access is through campaign contributions. Because campaign money, unlike geographic concentrations of organizational strength, is transferable across districts, contributions seem to be ideal instruments by which groups can broaden their geographic bases of contact and influence, or strengthen existing contacts.

Organizations—corporations, unions, or trade and professional associations—with both active lobbying operations and political action committees may broaden their geographic bases of access by pursuing an *expanding strategy* of allocating contributions and lobbying effort.² Under an expanding strategy, organizations make "outside" contributions—contributions selectively targeted to representatives from districts where they have little or no organizational base—and then follow these contributions with organized lobbying efforts. The purpose of such a strategy is to establish channels of communication and cooperation that would not exist if groups depended only on their organizational resources in representatives' geographic districts. Two actions are necessary to characterize this strategy: outside contributions *and* follow-up lobbying efforts. Outside contributions alone are not sufficient, for groups may make outside contributions simply to assist an incumbent's reelection effort, or to reward past performance, without any intent of establishing access for subsequent lobbying efforts. Only if contributions are followed by lobbying attempts can one be sure that money has expanded a group's geographic base of access.

While it may be necessary at times for groups to seek new connections in

²This is my terminology. I am not aware of its use elsewhere in the literature.

districts where they have little or no organizational presence, contributions may be just as important, or more important, for maintaining or strengthening existing lobbying connections than for initiating new ones (e.g., Malbin, 1980, 1984, pp. 263–64). An alternative to an expanding strategy, then, is a *maintaining strategy*. Under a maintaining strategy, groups make “inside” contributions—contributions to representatives from districts where they have a moderate or strong organizational base—and then follow these contributions with organized lobbying efforts. The purpose of a maintaining strategy is to enhance the visibility of occupational or economic groups within geographic districts where their presence is already visible.

Instead of pursuing a pure strategy of maintenance or expansion, most groups are likely to follow a mixed strategy, where some proportion of their contributions and lobbying are concentrated in districts where they are well-organized and some proportion in districts where they have little or no organization. Still, under a mixed strategy, groups will often assign greater weight to one approach than the other. The emphasis that a group places on a particular approach will be reflected in its contribution and lobbying choices. But, as I will show, some level of expansion could occur simply through a random allocation of resources. As a result, levels of expansion or maintenance resulting from design must be distinguished from those resulting from chance.

Several definitions are necessary to formalize the research hypotheses. Let a_1 be the alternative of contributing and lobbying in a district where the group has little or no organizational presence, and let a_2 be the alternative of contributing and lobbying in a district where the group has a strong organizational presence. Let N be the number of contributions a group makes for which lobbying is certain to follow.¹ Let π be the probability that the group chooses a_1 , and $1 - \pi$ the probability that it chooses a_2 for each of the N allocations. Define a strategy for a group as $s = (\pi, 1 - \pi)$, and let S be the set of possible strategies. For the particular strategy $s = (1, 0)$, the group always expands its influence into new geographic territory, and for $s = (0, 1)$, the group always maintains its influence in established territory.² Whenever $0 < \pi < 1$, the group follows a mixed strategy, sometimes expanding its influence and sometimes maintaining it.

¹Groups may, of course, make contributions with no intent of following them with lobbying. Here, however, I assume that some of the group's contributions are made in anticipation of lobbying and that lobbying always follows. This might occur if an organization's lobbyist is given control over some number—viz., N —contributions.

²A pure expanding strategy will not be feasible if N is larger than the number of districts where the group has a strong organizational presence, and a pure maintaining strategy will not be feasible if N is larger than the number of districts where the group has little or no organizational base. Of the thirty groups analyzed (see table 1) a pure expanding strategy was not feasible for three groups, and the pure maintaining strategy was not feasible for five groups.

One possible mixed strategy is simply to pick a district at random each time the group makes an allocation of money and lobbying. Suppose a group has little or no organizational base in some proportion, p , of all legislative districts, and a moderate or strong organizational base in $q = 1 - p$ proportion of the districts. Then, under the mixed strategy $s = (p, q)$, where $0 < p < 1$, the expected proportion of outside contributions followed by lobbying will be equal to the proportion of districts where the group has little or no organizational base. Since this is the expected outcome that would result if the group chose N districts at random, I define the strategy $s = (p, q)$ as a *random mixed strategy*.

In contrast to a random mixed strategy, the group may pursue strategies where the proportion of outside contributions followed by lobbying is *greater* than the proportion of districts where the group has little or no organizational base. Define this set of strategies as $S_1 = \{s \in S \mid 1 > \pi > p\}$. Since any strategy in S_1 is expected to yield a higher concentration of outside contributions than expected by chance, I define any strategy $s \in S_1$ as an *expanding mixed strategy*. Alternatively, the group may pursue strategies where the proportion of outside contributions followed by lobbying is *less* than the proportion of districts where the group has little or no organizational base. Define this set of strategies as $S_2 = \{s \in S \mid p > \pi > 0\}$. Since any strategy in S_2 is expected to yield a lower concentration of outside contributions than expected by chance, I define any strategy $s \in S_2$ as a *maintaining mixed strategy*.

By employing a random mixed strategy, a group will make some outside contributions, thereby expanding its influence. But since some level of expansion will occur even when making random allocations, evidence of expansion does not necessarily imply that a group has designed its allocations to expand influence. Thus, the statistical problem is to determine whether observed levels of expansion or maintenance differ significantly from what would be expected by chance. I examine two sets of hypotheses: H_{01} : $\pi \leq p$ against H_1 : $\pi > p$, and H_{02} : $\pi \geq p$ against H_2 : $\pi < p$. Under H_{01} , the group employs the random mixed strategy or a maintaining strategy, and under H_{02} , the group employs the random mixed strategy or an expanding strategy. Under H_1 , the group employs a pure expanding or expanding mixed strategy and allocates a larger proportion of its contributions and lobbying effort to districts where it is organizationally weaker than would be expected given the proportion of districts where it is organizationally weak. And under H_2 , the group employs a pure maintaining or maintaining mixed strategy and allocates a larger proportion of its contributions and lobbying in districts where it is organizationally stronger than would be expected given the proportion of districts where it is organizationally strong.

Only the group's distribution of organizational strength and its distribution of contributions and lobbying are observed. Thus, I ask for a sequence of

N allocations, what is the probability of r outside contributions followed by lobbying and $N - r$ inside contributions followed by lobbying given that the proportion of districts where the group has little or no organizational strength is p ? Let X be a discrete random variable denoting some number of outside contributions followed by lobbying, and let x_0 be the observed number of outside contributions followed by lobbying from a particular group. Then

$$Pr(X \leq x_0, N, p) = \sum_{r=0}^{x_0} \binom{N}{r} p^r q^{N-r},$$

assuming allocations are made independently.⁵

For some probability of error, α , the criteria for deciding among the hypotheses are as follows. First, in deciding between H_{01} and H_1 , decide in favor of H_1 if $1 - Pr(X \leq x_0, N, p) \leq \alpha$. Then, for H_2 against H_{02} , decide in favor of H_2 if $Pr(X \leq x_0, N, p) \leq \alpha$.

DATA AND ANALYSIS

I test these hypotheses using data from organizations concerned with one of three bills considered by the ninety-ninth Congress: the wheat, feedgrains, and soybeans provisions of the 1985 farm bill, the Textile and Apparel Trade Enforcement Act, and the taxing provisions of the "superfund" renewal. Professional lobbyists for organizations actively involved with these issues were surveyed by mail. They were asked to assess the extent of their lobbying efforts directed at individual members of the House Agriculture and Ways and Means Committees—the committees with primary jurisdiction over these issues—and to evaluate the strength of their organizations in the geographic districts of each committee member.

The wheat, feedgrains, and soybean provisions of the 1985 farm bill dealt as usual, with loan rates and deficiency payments. But unlike most previous farm bills, the legislation during the ninety-ninth Congress divided agricultural groups into two broad coalitions. One set of groups favored a gradual reduction in loan rates and deficiency payments so that commodity prices would better reflect true market conditions, and the other set favored fixed loan rates and target prices, coupled with strict production controls. The proposed import quota on textile and apparel products produced a cleavage

⁵This assumption implies that the distribution of contributions and lobbying across districts is constrained only by the number of contributions a group has to give and the proportion of districts in which it has a membership base. Any one of the N decisions is assumed not to affect other decisions because of considerations such as electoral need and representatives' previous ideological support or opposition (e.g., McKeough, 1981; Nelson, 1982; Welch, 1980, 1982; Poole and Romer, 1985), or estimates of legislative power or efficiency (e.g., Denzau and Munger, 1986; Grenzke, 1986). These factors may affect contributions that are not followed with lobbying, but the assumption for the N contributions followed by lobbying is that the group cares only about expanding or maintaining its access and influence.

between retail and importing interests, on the one hand, and producers of textile and apparel products, on the other. The bill dealing with how to pay for the cleanup of orphan toxic waste dumps split the business community between oil and chemical producers and general business interests. A coalition headed by the Grocery Manufacturers' Association opposed cleanup efforts funded from a general tax imposed on all manufacturers. Fighting to avoid a concentration of the tax on the oil and chemical industry was a coalition of groups headed by the American Petroleum Institute and the Chemical Manufacturers Association.

I chose these particular bills for a variety of reasons. First, they attracted a multitude of diverse groups both for and against the main provisions of each bill; second, they involved the jurisdictions of two different types of committees—a "constituency" committee, Agriculture, and an "influence" committee, Ways and Means (Fenno 1973); third, they were major issues to which groups assigned high lobbying priority, thereby increasing the likelihood that contributions might be used to facilitate legislative contact and influence; and fourth, two of the bills—the General Farm Bill and the superfund renewal—had been long scheduled for consideration during the ninety-ninth Congress, making it more likely that groups could plan their allocation of campaign contributions in 1984 to facilitate their legislative goals in 1985 if they so desired.

Drawing from the published reports of committee and subcommittee hearings, relevant subject classifications in *Washington Representatives* (Close 1985), and coalitional lists obtained from Washington lobbyists, a master list was assembled of all organizations that were actively involved with these bills or whose interests were directly affected.⁶ Names, addresses, and phone numbers were obtained initially for more than 300 organizations, and each was contacted by telephone in an effort to identify one particular individual who was instrumental in the groups lobbying effort. Some of these individuals were interviewed in person by the author in Washington, but the majority were mailed a short questionnaire.

Lobbyists were asked only about the districts of representatives on the primary jurisdictional committees. (The complete questions for the organizational strength and lobbying items are presented in the appendix.) To ask lobbyists to evaluate organizational strength and lobbying for more than thirty-five to forty representatives seemed prohibitive.⁷ Since the concept of

⁶ Salisbury et al. (1987) have employed some of these same approaches in identifying organizations relevant to particular policy areas. But due to their interest in coalitional patterns in general policy areas rather than specific bills, their approach differed somewhat from the approach employed here.

⁷ One might think that most groups have excellent access to members of committees having regular jurisdiction over issues important to them. The data indicate, however, that most groups have geographic bases of access to only a limited number of committee members, even among agricultural groups, and that there were ample opportunities for groups to use campaign money

lobbying can refer to a diverse set of activities, lobbyists were first asked to indicate the various kinds of lobbying activities in which their organization participated in general, and then to indicate how much effort the organization expended overall on those activities for particular members of the committee. The question on organizational strength, which followed the lobbying question, proved relatively easy for lobbyists to answer. The personal interviews consistently revealed that professional lobbyists possess detailed and thorough knowledge about congressional districts around the country. Typically, they would speak in terms of whether or not the organization "has anything" in one district or another.

Usable questionnaires were obtained from 143 different organizations, of which forty-nine had political action committees registered with the Federal Election Commission. This rate of PAC sponsorship is similar to that found in other research. Gais (1983), for example, reported that 36% of profit-based organizations surveyed in 1980 had political action committees. The present analysis focuses on just thirty of the forty-nine organizations with PACs. These organizations represent a diverse collection of state organizations, national membership groups with state-level or local affiliates, and large corporations, or institutional groups (e.g., Salisbury, 1984).⁵ Excluded from the original forty-nine PACs were eight PACs that did not provide data on either lobbying or organizational strength, eight PACs that made no contributions to members of either committee, and three PACs for which none of their contributions were followed by lobbying efforts.⁶ Of the remaining thirty, thirteen organizations supported or opposed legislation before the Agriculture Committee, eight organizations supported or opposed the proposed quota on textile and apparel products, handled by Ways and Means

to broaden their access to members of these committees. Given the importance of committees to the congressional policy process in general (e.g., Smith and Deering, 1984) and given the close decisions within the committees for the issues under analysis here (both the farm bill and the superfund tax bill emerged from committee only after long and tedious mark-up sessions where the final outcomes were decided by just one vote in Ways and Means and only a few votes in Agriculture) the jurisdictional committees should constitute a strong test of the tendency for groups to extend access through money.

⁵The organizations with PACs included in the analysis were the Alabama Farm Bureau, American Agricultural Movement, American Feed Manufacturers Association, American Meat Institute, Association of General Retail Chains, Atlantic Richfield, Batus Retail Group, Burlington Northern Railroad, Cargill Inc., Congoleum Corporation, Continental Grain Company, Dayton Hudson Corporation, Dow Chemical Company, Farmers Union Central Exchange, K Mart, Manufactured Housing Institute, Monsanto Corporation, Michigan Farm Bureau, National Cattlemen's Association, National Soft Drink Association, National Cotton Council of America, National Farmers Organization, National Farmers Union, Nike Corporation, Oil Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union, Phillips Petroleum Company, Scott Paper Company, Standard Oil Company, Sun Company, Waste Management Inc., and West Point Pepperell Inc.

and nine organizations supported or opposed the broad-based business tax to fund the superfund renewal, also under the jurisdiction of Ways and Means.

Presented in table 1 are the frequencies of N , x_n , and p for each group, together with the estimated binomial probabilities and results of the significance tests. Responses to the lobbying and organizational strength questions were collapsed into two categories: groups were coded as having lobbied a representative when the response was a "great deal of effort" or "moderate effort," and groups were coded as having an organizational presence when the response was either a "strong" or "moderate" base. The value of p is based on a total of forty-three districts for the agricultural groups and thirty-six districts for groups associated with Ways and Means. The value of α was set at .1 for all tests. The first thirteen entries of the table correspond to organizations involved with the commodity provisions, and the remaining entries correspond to organizations active before the Ways and Means Committee.¹⁰

The results of the group-by-group significance tests are convincing in their lack of support for H_1 . The null hypothesis could be rejected in favor of H_1 for only one of the thirty organizations. Among the remaining twenty-nine organizations, there is no statistically significant evidence that they distributed their campaign contributions and subsequent lobbying effort in such a way as to broaden their geographic bases of contact with representatives on the two major committees. Thirteen organizations, in fact, followed none of their outside contributions with lobbying effort. Moreover, since the eight groups excluded from the analysis because $N = 0$ also constitute evidence against H_1 , the evidence against an expanding strategy is substantial.

The evidence against H_1 is not unique to one particular committee, nor dependent on the number of contributions made by groups. One might expect more evidence of an expanding strategy within a powerful committee such as Ways and Means, which exercises unusual influence within the House as a whole, but this is not the case. The results are also not a consequence of analyzing PACs that make just a few contributions.¹¹ The esti-

¹⁰ Hypothesis tests are meaningless when no contributions were given, or when no contributions were followed by lobbying, because the probability of zero outside contributions in zero trials will always be one, regardless of the value of p . Since all of these PACs had opportunities to expand their access to members of the committees through contributions but did not do so, they constitute evidence against H_1 . But since these PACs did not make contributions where they had an existing organizational presence, they also constitute evidence against H_2 . I further discuss the implications of excluding PACs for which N was zero after reviewing the results of the hypothesis tests in the text.

¹¹ Lobbyists were assured that the names of their organizations would not be connected with information about their organizations' lobbying patterns.

¹² Nearly two-thirds of the PACs included in the analysis made total contributions of \$50,000 or more during the 1983-1984 election cycle, compared with roughly just one-fourth of all PACs registered with the FEC.

TABLE 1

PROBABILITIES OF EXPANDING AND MAINTAINING STRATEGIES

Group	N	x_0	p	Cum Prob	Expand Access H_1	Maintain Access H_2
A1	7	2	48	26		
A2	23	4	42	01		*
A3	10	1	28	18		
A4	24	3	33	02		*
A5	8	7	95	34		
A6	15	2	51	003		*
A7	5	0	19	35		
A8	1	0	60	40		
A9	1	0	96	02		*
A10	3	0	65	04		*
A11	17	5	33	49		
A12	31	7	23	58		
A13	4	0	84	0006		*
WM1	3	2	50	88		
WM2	2	0	94	004		*
WM3	6	2	75	04		*
WM4	13	6	69	07		*
WM5	10	0	11	31		
WM6	3	0	08	78		
WM7	7	2	61	09		*
WM8	2	0	92	006		*
WM9	12	4	53	14		
WM10	1	0	19	81		
WM11	7	2	83	002		
WM12	12	4	55	11		*
WM13	5	2	50	14		
WM14	1	1	90	999	*	
WM15	4	0	47	08		*
WM16	5	0	72	002		*
WM17	5	0	42	07		*
Totals	250	56				

Key N total number of contributions followed by a lobbying effort
 x_0 number of outside contributions followed by lobbying effort
p proportion of districts where group has an organizational base of support total number of districts is 43 for Agriculture and 36 for Ways and Means
Prob $Pr(X \leq x_0, N, p)$ from the binomial distribution
Conclude H_1 if $1 - Pr(X \leq x_0, N, p) \leq \alpha$
Conclude H_2 if $Pr(X \leq x_0, N, p) \leq \alpha$

mated probabilities reveal that even small organizations—organizations that make just a few contributions and lobby few members—can provide support for the expanding hypothesis. The one significant case, WM14, for example, made just one contribution that was followed by a lobbying effort, and WM1, which nearly attained the significance necessary to reject H_0 for H_1 , made just three contributions that were followed by lobbying efforts. In general, the estimated probabilities are more sensitive to values of p than to values of N . Organizations with narrow geographic bases of strength generally must follow outside contributions with a lobbying effort in a greater proportion of instances to reject H_0 for H_1 , other things being equal, than organizations with broad geographic strength. For example, x_0/N for A12 is only .22, but its estimated probability of an expanding strategy is higher than that for A5, for which $x_0/N = .88$. A5, however, had many more opportunities to make outside contributions than did A12. The value of p for group A5 is .95, whereas the value of p for group A12 is .23.

Since H_{01} cannot be rejected in favor of an expanding strategy, a test of the null model against a maintaining strategy is appropriate. The tests of H_{02} against H_2 indicate that organizations are much more likely to follow a maintaining strategy than an expanding strategy. H_{02} was rejected in favor of H_2 in fifteen of the thirty tests. Of the thirteen organizations that made no outside contributions followed by lobbying, H_{02} was rejected in favor of H_2 eight times, indicating that these eight groups employed pure maintaining strategies. Support for H_2 holds across both committees and characterizes groups with both broad and narrow geographic strength and many and few contributions.

Despite the compelling evidence in favor of maintenance instead of expansion, neither hypothesis is appropriate for many of the groups. The null hypothesis (H_0) still prevails for the majority of groups, given that groups excluded from the analysis because $N = 0$ also constitute evidence against H_2 . Still, the overall evidence provides virtually no support for the hypothesis that groups single-mindedly pursue an expanding strategy. In contrast, a maintaining strategy is a good characterization of the allocation patterns for about one-half of the groups.

The analysis of lobbying on only these three specific bills may not reveal the extent to which groups in the sample made outside contributions with an eye towards lobbying on other bills. A large proportion of outside contributions might indicate that groups were pursuing expanding strategies on other pieces of legislation. Yet, of the 333 total contributions made by all groups in the sample across both committees, only 113, or 34%, were outside contributions. Even if lobbying followed all 113 contributions—which seems unlikely—contributions are still far more often used to maintain influence than to expand it.

In summary, the analysis shows that seldom—at least on three important issues and two committees from the ninety-ninth Congress—did organized interests generate substantial extraconstituency lobbying pressures on House members through campaign contributions and lobbying efforts. In the vast majority of instances, a group's contributions only supplemented, or reinforced, whatever pressures the group was able to exert through its organizational presence in the representative's district. The thirty organizations analyzed here made outside contributions that were followed by a lobbying effort in only fifty-six instances. In the aggregate, these organizations had 638 opportunities (i.e., outside districts—summing p43 for agricultural groups and p36 for the remaining groups) to expand their geographic contacts with committee members. Given that they exploited these opportunities in less than 9% of the available targets convincingly indicates that these organizations seldom achieve access and representation through campaign money alone.

Evidence from other research. That groups often contribute to representatives from districts where they are organizationally strong is consistent with much of the empirical and theoretical literature on the allocation of PAC contributions. Wright (1985), for example, has argued that some large PACs rely heavily on local activists to raise money and—as a result, contributions are given to local areas of membership strength in order to reward local fundraising efforts. Further empirical evidence of decentralized fundraising among PACs has been found by Eismeier and Pollock (1984, p. 138, 1985, p. 16), by Sabato (1984, p. 53), by Handler and Mulkern (1982, p. 83) in their study of fundraising among corporate PACs, and by Soraul (1985, pp. 602–603), who notes that “the decentralization and dispersion of PAC contributions suggest a sensitivity to the local wishes and initiatives of the many constituencies of most PACs.” And, theoretically, important works by Olson (1971, pp. 62–63), Hardin (1982), and most recently Bendor and Mookherjee (1987), emphasize the importance of decentralization as a means of overcoming collective action problems, problems particularly relevant in PAC fundraising.

Findings from other research, however, suggest both a greater tendency for PAC money to flow across district boundaries and a stronger effect of money on legislative access than what is reported here. Research by Langbein (1986) has shown that the amount of time legislators spend overall with groups during the week is significantly related to aggregate campaign contributions, even when controlling for other influences. This finding is based on analysis of data collected by the Obeys Commission, which, unfortunately, reported only an aggregate measure of the time legislators spent with *all* groups during the week. Thus, it cannot be determined whether groups

might have had access anyway because of their organizational ties to legislators' districts. That groups generally do not make outside contribution does not preclude the possibility that money helps to maintain and to facilitate access within districts. But what Langbein's analysis does not demonstrate is that campaign money secures access for groups where they have little or no organizational presence.

Grenzke's analysis reveals that unusually large individual contributions to PACs are generally not allocated proportionately to the districts in which they originated. This finding pertains only to PAC contributions raised in individual amounts of \$500 or more, as the Federal Election Commission does not report the source of individual contributions to political action committees in lesser amounts. But the vast majority of all individual contributions to PACs are much smaller than \$500. In 1982, for example, all PACs reported receiving only 13 percent of their funds in contributions of \$500 or more (Sorauf, 1985, pp. 597). According to Sorauf, the average contribution from the PACs of the American Medical Association and the National Realtors Association, two of the largest PACs, was about \$30 in 1982. Individual contributions to labor PACs are even lower, in general only about \$14 according to Sabato (1984, p. 60). Only among corporate PACs do contributions ever approach or exceed \$100, and even their average is well below \$500. Thus, whether or not Grenzke's result would hold for the vast majority of money raised by PACs cannot be determined from the available data.

Grenzke's finding, however, is not necessarily incompatible with the results uncovered here. Even if all PAC money is transferred across district boundaries with the same frequency that large contributions are transferred, PACs may simply be transferring money from districts where they are well organized to other districts where they are well-organized. The inability to reject the null hypothesis for many of the organizations in the analysis allows for this possibility. The central point of the analysis conducted here, then, is not that PAC money never flows across district boundaries, but simply that if it does flow across district lines, it tends to flow into districts where groups have an established organizational or representational base.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite recent concerns that political action committees have supplanted geographic representation with representation through occupational or socioeconomic groupings outside their districts, the evidence uncovered here offers only weak support for this claim. To be sure, the financial power of PACs has increased the visibility, and quite possibly the influence, of special occupational and financial interests in American politics, but the representation of those interests in the U.S. House of Representatives still remains

firmly rooted in geographic constituencies. Members of Congress seldom experience financial pressures and lobbying pressures from groups that have little or no economic or organizational claims in their districts. Thus, the representational focus of members of the U.S. House remains fixed on their geographic constituencies (Davidson, 1969).

One should not conclude from this finding that political action committees have had no effect whatsoever on patterns of representation in the U.S. House of Representatives. That groups seldom venture outside their geographic concentrations of strength to influence legislation does not mean that a good deal of socioeconomic or occupational representation does not exist in the U.S. Congress. Under "collective representation" (Weissberg, 1978) groups that have a very weak organizational presence in one district can still be well-represented by legislators from districts where they do have a strong presence. Groups may enhance their collective representation by concentrating their campaign contributions in districts where they have existing representation through an organizational presence. By doing so, special organized interests within congressional districts can improve their access and representation through PACs, perhaps at the expense of organizations without PACs, or unorganized voters. Importantly, though, districts in which groups use money to enhance their presence are virtually always districts where groups have a legitimate presence to begin with. One might view this development as one of greater socioeconomic and occupational representation but this development is a consequence of groups selectively strengthening their geographic ties *within* districts, not establishing new ties in district where they do not have geographic ties.

Finally, evidence that contributions, organization, and lobbying so often go hand-in-hand implies that the impact of any one of these factors on legislative outcomes is very difficult to assess. As a result, coefficients for the effects of campaign contributions on voting when lobbying efforts are not properly controlled (e.g., Kau and Rubin, 1982; Brown, 1983; Frendreis and Waterman, 1985) may be biased. Many studies, however, report quite small effects of money on voting, or effects only on obscure issues (e.g., Chappell 1981; Welch, 1982; Wright, 1985; Evans, 1986; Grenzke, 1986; Jones and Keiser, 1987; Schrodel, 1987). Given that money generally has little effect on voting, contributions are probably best used—as the results here suggest—to reinforce the appearance of existing organizational strength than to "purchase" support in the absence of geographic ties.

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APPENDIX

QUESTION WORDING

I Lobbying

Lobbyists were asked to indicate whether or not their organization engaged in any of eleven different lobbying activities for the particular bill in question, and to indicate the percentage of the organizations *total* lobbying effort devoted to that activity. The eleven activities were as follows: congressional testimony, publication of a policy paper, inclusion of the organization's name with other groups in a letter addressed to representatives, organizing a letter-writing campaign among group members, organizing a telephone campaign for calls to members' district or Washington offices, purchase of advertising in newspapers or other media, arrangement of district-level meetings between representatives and group members, arrangement of meetings in Washington between representatives and group members, personal contacts between representatives and their staffs and the organization's professional lobbyists, and representation through a professional lobbying/law firm in Washington.

After responding to these items, lobbyists were asked the following question:

Of the lobbying activities in this list that were used by your organization, roughly how much effort did your organization expend overall on these activities to enlist or to maintain the support of the following members of the House (Agriculture or Ways and Means Committee)?

	A great deal	Some	Little or none
[Representative's name]	_____	_____	_____

II Organizational strength

Most organizations have stronger bases of political support in some House districts than others. Generally, how would you rate your organization's base of support—either economically, numerically, or in terms of activism and interest—in the districts of the following representatives?

	Strong base	Moderate base	Little or base
[Representative's name]	_____	_____	_____

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The Effects of Primaries and Statewide Races on Voter Turnout

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The decision to vote is affected by two elements of the election context. One is the frequency of elections. Presidential and state primaries divert resources away from the general election and reduce turnout among the peripheral electorate who are most dependent on a mobilization effort. Taken together, spring and fall primaries lowered general election by five percentage points nationwide in the 1976, 1980, and 1984 elections. A second element of context is the attractiveness of statewide offices on the presidential year ballot. Gubernatorial races increase the probability of voting by 6% in those states that still elect governors in presidential years. Thus, the postwar shift of gubernatorial races to the congressional election year is one explanation for declining turnout. Senatorial races do not attract additional voters to the November election. These hypotheses are tested on a pooled sample of the 1976, 1980, and 1984 CPS election studies.

Voting decisions take place in an election context, a fact so obvious that many models of individual vote decisions overlook its importance. This research focuses on two elements of election context that significantly affect decisions to vote. One element is the frequency of elections. The election frequency hypothesis (Boyd, 1981, 1986) holds that the more frequently elections are held, the less likely it is that an individual will vote in any given election. This hypothesis implies a direct connection between the American primary system and general election turnout. States that adopt primaries to select candidates and convention delegates will have a lower general election turnout than caucus/convention states. From this perspective the direct primary movement, a reform designed to further an egalitarian goal of increasing the influence of citizens in the nomination process, has the unintended effect of reducing equality of influence in general elections.

The data were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data were originally collected by the Center for Political Studies of the University of Michigan. Neither the CPS nor the ICPSR bear any responsibility for the analyses presented here. I would especially like to thank Jeffrey A. Lewis of Wesleyan University for his assistance in this research. An earlier version of this note was presented at the 1987 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

ond element of context is the attractiveness of the presidential year in terms of other statewide races. Another reform movement aimed at bringing state and local races from the influence of the presidential race led to shift gubernatorial races to congressional election years. The presidential election now has fewer races to attract voters to the polls. This notes the effects of primaries and statewide races on presidential election in the U.S. elections of 1976, 1980, and 1984.

THE ELECTION FREQUENCY HYPOTHESIS

In the context of a single presidential election year, the source of multiple elections is presidential and state primaries. Among states that hold presidential primaries, some conduct their primaries for state offices separately from the presidential primary. Some Southern and border states hold state primaries as well. These states may hold three primaries and a general election in the same year.

The logic behind the election frequency hypothesis is that frequent elections impose opportunity costs on the campaign and party organizations that act as political intermediaries between candidates and citizens (Boyd 1986).¹ The resources (money and volunteer labor) that are available to all organizations to persuade and mobilize voters are limited. A series of primaries in a state may severely strain scarce resources. Resources devoted to early contests may not be available in the general

election. However, the positive effects on turnout of expenditures of money and effort may dissipate with time. If a primary is held in late winter or early spring, political ads and organizational contacts may be forgotten by the time of the general election. Thus, a corollary of the election frequency hypothesis is that the more distant in time a primary is from the general election, the more negative will be its effect on general election turnout. A further prediction, then, is that spring primaries will depress general election turnout more than fall primaries.

From this perspective the negative effect of party primaries on general election turnout is not likely to surface among the core electorate characterized by high interest and information. The core electorate is likely to vote in both primary and general elections. Rather the effect, if we observe it, will be among the peripheral electorate—those people whose participation is dependent on a high stimulus campaign and a mobilization effort. These voters are least likely to vote in a party primary but may vote in a general election if their interest can be engaged.

The party primary variables in the present study are redefined as indirect

(1986, pp. 93-95) discusses other explanations of the election frequency hypothesis that do not depend on the concept of opportunity costs.

measures of their opportunity costs for the general election. These opportunity costs are not exactly equal to the total candidate expenditures in the primaries. The amount a candidate or party can raise for the primary and general elections is not a fixed sum. Victorious primary candidates can use their electoral success to generate additional support for the general election. And, public funding provides new funding for the presidential race in the general election.

Nevertheless, even if they are not fixed, donations of campaign funds and volunteer time are still limited, particularly in the nonpresidential contests in the ballot that do not benefit from public funding. Some portion of the scarce resources expended in the primaries cannot be replaced. Most particularly, the human resources available to party and campaign organizations may not be replaced if the volunteers grow weary of the effort or suffer the disappointment of having a favored candidate lose in the primary. I assume that the degree to which a primary consumes such resources varies with the number and importance of the offices being contested. This is the basis for the measures of the party primary election calendar variables.

A party primary variable is a summated index composed from the presidential, gubernatorial, senatorial, and congressional races in each state. Each statewide race (presidential, gubernatorial, and senatorial) in each party is weighted equally and is scored .5. For example, if both parties nominate senatorial candidates in a primary, the Senate races add one to the party primary index. A state with nominations for all three statewide races in both parties on the primary ballot would have a total score of three. Each congressional primary race in each party is scored .5 divided by the number of congressional districts in the state, so that if all congressional races in a state were contested in a primary, the sum of the congressional races would equal statewide race.

The primaries are also divided into spring and fall categories in order to test the corollary prediction that primaries more distant in time from the general election have a particularly large impact on the general election. Since almost all primaries take place either before the first week of June or after the middle of August, August 1 is the date that demarcates spring and fall primaries. The measure for spring primaries, when the presidential race may be on the ballot along with the other three statewide races, is continuous and varies between zero and four. Since fall primaries and run-off primaries lack the presidential race, these indices are continuous variables with a theoretical range of zero to three. Of course, the actual scores for run-off primaries are much less than three, and they are zero for the large majority of respondents who live in states that do not have run-off primaries.²

²This measure of a contested primary is not intended to capture the divisiveness of a primary. There is considerable doubt now that the divisiveness of primaries can be measured by the

THE BALLOT ATTRACTIVENESS HYPOTHESIS AND OTHER CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES

The other contextual measures are coded as follows. The pulling effect of senatorial and gubernatorial races on the general election ballot is measured by a dummy variable for each race. Similarly, given the distinctive history and electoral laws in the South and its typically lower general election turnout, the eleven former Confederate states are denoted by a dummy variable. The most important registration law affecting general election turnout is the closing date of registration (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980 and Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko, 1985). The number of days between the legal closing date and the election is coded for each state. Caldeira et al. (1985) find that partisan competition is associated with higher turnout in congressional races. The variable "Safeness of the State" tests this effect in presidential races. The variable is the mean of the percentage lead of the winning presidential candidate compared to his closest competitor in the state in the two preceding elections. A Pacific time zone dummy tests whether residents of those states, who may know the national election results before polls close in their states, turn out in lower rates.

A TEST OF THE MODEL ON THREE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Table 1 presents a test of the full model on all of the respondents from the pooled samples from the 1976-1980 and 1984 American National Election Studies. The pooling of these samples substantially reduces any sampling error flowing from the creation of contextual variables that are uniform for all of the respondents interviewed in a given state in any one election year. The respondents have been reweighted so that elections with a larger sample size do not weigh disproportionately in the test. The new weights are calculated so that weighted pooled sample size equals the original pooled sample size.

The dependent variable is turnout in the general election with survey reports of voting validated by checks against official records. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, the model is tested by a probit analysis. The probit coefficients in table 1 have been transformed so that they have a straightforward interpretation. As transformed, these coefficients are simply the estimated effect on the probability of voting of a one unit change in the independent variable, when this change in the independent variable is mea-

closeness of the primary victory (Kennedy and Rice 1987; Geer 1986; Born 1981; and Ware 1979). My measure of contested primaries is not intended to reflect divisiveness in any case.

³The closing dates are taken from *The Book of the States* published by The Council of State Governments (various years), supplemented by information provided by state election officials.

TABLE 1
CALENDAR EFFECTS IN 1976-1984 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Independent Variable	Transformed Probit Coefficient	T-Value MLE/SF	Predicted % Turnout R When Independent Vari Is	
			Low or No	High o Yes
Socio-Economic Variables				
Age	.014	5.491	56	68
Age Squared	-.00010	-3.992		
Education	.093	14.181	51	72
Length Residence ^{log}	.10	6.256	57	67
Married	.12	7.674	62	66
Nonwhite	-.047	-2.010	62	58
Hispanic	-.067	-1.859	62	56
Unemployed	-.072	-2.530	62	56
Party and Civic Attitudes				
Republican ID	.043	2.777	62	64
Strength of ID	.059	7.760	57	67
External Efficacy	.082	8.715	56	68
Calendar Variables				
Spring Primary	-.039	-3.156	66	62
Fall Primary	-.039	-2.339	63	62
Runoff Primary	.0014	.034		
Other Contextual Variables				
Southern Residence	-.058	-2.895	63	62
Senate Race	.0062	.368		
Gubernatorial Race	.077	3.350	61	62
Closing Date	-.0014	-1.683	61	64
1980 Election	-.017	-.997		
1984 Election	-.028	-1.410		
Safeness of State	-.0018	-1.559		
Pacific Time Zone	.018	.777		
Log like $R^2 = .17$ % Cases Correctly Predicted = 69%				
Log Likelihood = -3140.8 Weighted N = 5416				

Data Source: Pooled 1976, 1980, 1984 ANES Election Studies

Low and high values of the statistically significant independent variables are defined as follows. For continuous and ordinal variables (age, education, length of residence, strength of ID, and external efficacy), low and high values are -1 and $+1$ standard deviations from the mean. For dummy variables (Married, Nonwhite, Hispanic, Unemployed, and Republican ID), the low value is overall grand mean probability of voting and the high value is 1. For the dummy variables Spring Primary, Fall Primary, Southern residence, and Gubernatorial race, the low value is 0 and the high value is the overall grand mean probability of voting. For closing date of registration, low value is 10 and high value is 30. A T value greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 is statistically significant at the .05 level, two tailed.

sured around its mean. For example, people of roughly average age become one percent more likely to vote each year they grow older. The transformed coefficients, then, have the same simple interpretation as ordinary regression coefficients without violating the assumptions of a continuously measured dependent variable.⁴

Probit coefficients are not linear. Changes in small or large values of an independent variable affect the dependent variable less than changes in values closer to the mean. To communicate the impact of typical low and high values, table 1 presents a series of simulations of the predicted effect on turnout of selected low and high values. For most of these variables, low and high are the mean and one (in the case of dummy variables) or -1 and $+1$ standard deviations from the mean (values that bound about two-thirds of a normally distributed set of cases). The important exception to this rule is the ballot and calendar variables, where values are selected to provide estimates of the effect of these variables on turnout nationwide.

BALLOT ATTRACTIVENESS

The effect of gubernatorial races on presidential year turnout is substantial. The transformed probit coefficient indicates that a gubernatorial race increases the voting rate by a significant linear estimate of .05. The post World War II movement toward four-year gubernatorial terms with elections shifted to the congressional election years has probably made a significant contribution to declining presidential year turnout. In 1954, twenty-nine of forty-eight states elected governors in presidential years. In 1982, only thirteen of fifty states still elected governors in presidential years (Jewell and Olson, 1982, p. 47).⁵ In the pooled 1976-1984 ANES election study, only 17% of the respondents lived in states with gubernatorial races on the presidential ballot. Given that only 17% of the respondents could be influenced by a gubernatorial race, the impact of these races on turnout nationwide is necessarily small. The high value for gubernatorial races in table 1 is simply the actual value of the variable. The actual values produce a predicted turnout of 62%, the actual overall validated turnout in the pooled sample. If no state ballot had included a gubernatorial race—the low value—predicted turnout would be 61%. Thus, the limited number of gubernatorial races actually increased national turnout by an average of 1% in each of the 1976-1984 elections. But, we should ask the hypothetical question: What

⁴The transformed probit coefficients were calculated by the HOLTTRAN program that produced these probit models. A method of calculating transformed coefficients is presented in Aldrich and Nelson (1984).

⁵Arkansas has since shifted to a four-year gubernatorial term elected in the congressional election year.

would have been the case if there had been a gubernatorial race in every state in these elections?" The answer is that turnout would have been 67%, or 6% higher than if no state had held a gubernatorial race. Therefore, the removal of gubernatorial races from presidential ballots has almost certainly contributed to declining turnout in postwar elections.

Interestingly, the effect of Senate races on presidential year turnout is insignificant. The explanation may be that both state public employees and candidate and party organizations have much more at stake in the outcome of a governors race than a Senate race. State patronage jobs are an example (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980, pp. 95-101). These stakes may lead state organizations to put greater resources into voter mobilization efforts for gubernatorial races. It may also be true that gubernatorial races attract a different constituency than presidential and senatorial races. If presidential and senatorial races raise similar issues of federal policy, senatorial races may not attract voters independently of the presidential race. However, gubernatorial races may present a number of distinctively state-related issues, such as state taxes and expenditures, and may draw additional voters to the November election.

This finding that gubernatorial elections increase presidential year turnout while senatorial elections do not is not at variance with other studies. This analysis, along with that of Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) are the only studies that have come to my attention that examine the impact of both gubernatorial and senatorial races in presidential years. Wolfinger and Rosenstone also found the effect of Senate races to be insignificant and did not include the variable in their final models. In contrast, they found the effects of gubernatorial races to be positive and significant, although their exceptionally large samples (unlike mine) allowed them to specify that the effect was confined to patronage states (p. 99).

Seemingly contrary findings are, upon examination, not apposite. For example, Conway (1981), Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko (1985) and Gilham (1985) have all examined the effects of gubernatorial and/or senatorial elections in congressional election years, when the presidential race is not on the ballot. In off-year elections, these statewide races are the high stimulus races. One is not examining their incremental effect on a more visible presidential race. It is not surprising, then, that Caldeira et al. found Senate elections to attract voters to the polls in 1978, a congressional election year. (They did not test for gubernatorial races.) Similarly, Gilham examined the effect of the competitiveness of these statewide races on turnout in 1978. While he found that competitive statewide races did draw voters to the polls, he did not systematically distinguish between Senate and gubernatorial races. Rather, he coded the more competitive of the two in each state. Conway found the effect of gubernatorial races to be positive and significant in 1978, but not in 1970 or 1974.

THE EFFECTS OF PRIMARIES

The negative effects of primaries on general election turnout are substantial. The transformed probit coefficient indicates that a single statewide race contested in both parties (a one unit change in the independent variable) in an average spring or fall primary lowers general election turnout by four percentage points. The prediction that primaries will lower general election turnout is well supported. Not confirmed is the prediction that spring primaries reduce turnout more than fall primaries because the positive effects of expenditures on media and organizational contacts in the spring will have dissipated with time. Rather, spring and fall primaries depress general election turnout by an equal amount.

What, we may reasonably wonder, is the combined effect of all the primary races? A good estimate is a comparison of predicted turnout using the actual values for the spring primary variable (the high value in table 1) with the turnout predicted to occur if no state had held a spring primary (the low value). For spring primaries that difference is four percentage points. Thus spring primaries lowered general election turnout by an average of four percentage points nationwide in each of the elections of 1976 through 1984.

Many fewer states schedule their primaries in the fall than in the spring and there are no fall presidential primaries. The actual effect of fall primaries is therefore smaller, as the comparison of high and low values for fall primary races reveal. Nationwide fall primaries reduced general election turnout by an average of one percent in each of these elections.

The coefficient for the very small number of run-off primaries is essentially zero. Ignoring the run-off primaries, the combined effect of the primaries nationwide is the sum of the effects for spring and fall primaries, or a total of 5%.

We may pause to wonder what might happen if election laws were changed with the sole concern of increasing presidential year turnout. Table 2 presents the predicted turnout for extreme values for the spring primary and gubernatorial race variables, compared to the actual values. The table suggests that turnout would jump to 71% if every state held a gubernatorial race and abolished its spring primary—an increase of nine percentage points. In contrast, if no state scheduled a gubernatorial race in the presidential year and all states held a highly contested spring primary, turnout would fall to 55%, 16 percentage points less than 71. Neither extreme scenario has many advocates, but the estimates demonstrate that U.S. election calendars and nomination procedures have a significant effect on general election turnout.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This research supports both the ballot attractiveness and the election frequency hypotheses. Gubernatorial races on a presidential year ballot in-

TABLE 2
PREDICTED TURNOUT BY REAL AND HYPOTHETICAL LEVELS
OF SPRING PRIMARY AND GUBERNATORIAL RACE VARIABLES

Gubernatorial Race	Spring Primary Calendar		
	Spring Primary In Every State*	Average Case In 1976-1984	No Spring Primary In Any State
No Race In Any State	55%	61%	65%
Average Case In 1976-1984	57%	62%	66%
Race In All States	61%	67%	71%

* A value of 3 slightly less than the actual maximum value of 3.2. A score of 3 is equivalent to having in both party primaries a presidential race, congressional races contested in all districts and either a senatorial or a gubernatorial race.

crease voting rates by six percentage points, drawing people to the polls who would not otherwise vote in presidential elections. It is probable, then, that the shift since 1952 of many gubernatorial races to the congressional election years has contributed to declining turnout.

Party primaries depress general election turnout. A single statewide race contested in both parties lowers the probability of voting by four percentage points in a typical spring and fall primary. Overall, spring and fall primaries reduced turnout by about five percentage points in each of the presidential elections of 1976, 1980, and 1984.

Two reform movements, the direct primary and the shift of gubernatorial elections to congressional election years, have had the unfortunate effect of reducing general election turnout. It may well be that other benefits projected by the reforms' supporters justify them in spite of these adverse effects. The shift of gubernatorial races to congressional years may increase turnout in these elections. Party primaries may also provide benefits that offset their negative impact on turnout. For example, Geer (1986) argues that a further set of reforms of presidential primaries would increase the capacity of parties to nominate candidates with broad electoral support. It is not my point, then, that the negative effects of primaries on general election turnout in any way settles the debate on the merits of the expanded use of presidential primaries (cf. Crotty, 1977; Shafer, 1983; Polsby, 1983, and Renter 1985). Nonetheless, the impact of state and presidential primaries on general election turnout is troubling, and the effect ought to be considered in debates on optimal procedures for nominating candidates.

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Book Reviews J

Book Reviews

Balanced Budgets and American Politics. By James D. Savage. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. Pp. xiii + 350. \$27.95.)

Over the history of the Republic, the ideology of a balanced federal budget has maintained a remarkable hold over American politics. No generation has been free from pitched battles over national debt. In this lively and well-written book, James D. Savage contends that the federal deficit must be understood as a primarily political, not an economic, phenomenon whose symbolism has shaped more than two hundred years of American economic policy.

"Throughout American history," Savage writes, "balanced and unbalanced federal budgets have served as powerful and politically evocative symbols of competing visions of government and society" (p. 5). These competing visions, in turn, are rooted in opposing Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian perspectives on the role of the federal government. For Jefferson, a balanced federal budget was a way to forestall expansion of federal power at the expense of state and local governments. For Hamilton, deficits might sometimes be necessary as the federal government promoted economic growth. Since their personal skirmishes, Savage contends, American economic history has swung between Jeffersonian cycles of federal restraint and balanced budgets and Hamiltonian cycles of federal expansion and debt.

The first stage was the Jeffersonian Jacksonian period, in which balanced budgets were a bulwark against corruption. In England, unscrupulous ministers had taken advantage of the opportunities provided by a large public debt--and the government's need to hire employees to collect the necessary revenue to finance it--to engage in widespread patronage. For the Jeffersonians, deficit financing threatened a similar erosion of American standards of democracy, and they furiously resisted temptations for corruption, such as expansion in the number of federal employees, establishment of a national bank, and creation of national public works programs.

The debt issued to finance the Civil War helped replace the Jeffersonians and Jacksonians with Republican rule. The Republicans found a happy coincidence between fiscal necessity and their own policy goals. By imposing large tariffs, they could simultaneously seek balanced budgets and protection of emerging American industries. The revenues that the tariffs generated helped finance domestic improvements, while new federal regulatory commissions eroded the states' control over commerce. Republican balanced-

budget policies helped erode Jeffersonian fears over expanding federal power

"The great irony of Republican party government," Savage points out, "was that the public's fear of unbalanced budgets led to the greatest expansion of federal power yet known in the country's history" (p. 160). The Democrats' New Deal policies "ostensibly sought Jeffersonian ends through a Hamiltonian centralization of governmental power" (p. 163). The gradual embrace of a conscious use of federal deficits to promote full employment enormously enhanced the federal role at the expense of state and local governments. During the 1970s, the economy behaved unpredictably and Jimmy Carter uneasily began separating the Democrats from Keynesian economics. It fell to Ronald Reagan, cast "in the role of Thomas Jefferson" (p. 197), to refurbish balanced-budget rhetoric—paradoxically, of course, as deficits rose to record highs.

For students of American administrative and economic history, much of this book will be nothing new. Indeed, the basic story is already familiar from Leonard D. White's classic administrative histories, Davis Rich Dewey's *Financial History of the United States*, and Herbert Stein's *The Fiscal Revolution in America*. Savage, however, casts important new light on this history, in two ways.

First, he demonstrates the linkage between American political thought especially as embodied in the traditional Jefferson-Hamilton conflict, and deficit rhetoric. The deficit, as he points out, is typically more a political than an economic issue. His detailed history of the issue provides an invaluable background for understanding past struggles and current debates.

Second, he demonstrates a not-at-all-obvious linkage between budgetary politics and federalism. Savage shows how Jefferson hoped that balanced budgets would limit federal power and, hence, maintain the prerogatives of state and local governments. Ever since, debates over federal budgets and federalism have been inextricably intertwined. Savage's perceptive argument helps explain the remarkable power of Reagan's rhetoric of limited federal power, returning programs to state and local governments, and balanced budgets by demonstrating its Jeffersonian roots. Moreover, it helps resolve a Reagan puzzle: how he could maintain his credibility on the budget issue as deficits steadily rose. By Savage's argument, it was the evocative rhetoric more than the fiscal reality that mattered. It is in illustrating this connection between traditional ideas and current policy struggles that Savage makes his strongest contribution.

Two problems mar the book, however. First, Savage ignores the tremendous role that the growth of entitlements has played in driving up federal spending and, therefore, in increasing the deficit. Until the 1970s, as Savage's story makes plain, shifts between the Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian views of the budget came *reactively*, stimulated by forces such as war (such

as the rise of Republicanism following the Civil War) or depression (such as the New Deal). The increase in entitlements and the subsequent rise in the deficit were, on the other hand, the product of an *activist* government. Savage's analysis is curiously silent on this major force in the current deficit struggle.

Second, in chapter 2, Savage arrays and then dismisses the major economic arguments made about the deficit. Savage asserts, correctly, that the economy proved much more resilient in accommodating the Reagan deficits than economists had predicted. However, he leaves the reader with the incorrect impression that the deficit does not matter economically, which is certainly wrong. If the dire predicted effects did not quickly materialize, they still lurk in the background and threaten serious long-term problems. Indeed, the connections between high deficits, the value of the dollar, and the nation's trade deficit threaten long-term economic damage. If huge deficits did not jump up and bite us quickly, they may nevertheless be slowly and quietly gnawing at the next generation's prosperity. Savage's conclusions about "the supposedly economically harmful effects of deficit spending" (p. 53) are the weakest element of this otherwise strong and valuable book.

Donald F. Kettl, *Vanderbilt University*

The Elusive Executive: Discovering Statistical Patterns in the Presidency

By Gary King and Lyn Ragsdale. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1988.
Pp. 526. \$22.95 cloth, \$17.95 paper.)

In this book by Gary King and Lyn Ragsdale, the authors have completed an ambitious project that makes an important contribution to the literature of the American presidency. The ambitiousness of the project is easily documented by the vast amount of information that was collected, coded, and analyzed. The authors interpret the vast quantities of data from a theoretical perspective which they have entitled the "Plural Presidency."

King and Ragsdale argue that the study of the presidency has been plagued on the one hand by an overemphasis on the president (as an individual) as the unit of analysis to the neglect of the collective institution of the presidency. One stated goal of their research was to correct this imbalance by focusing on the organizational aspects of the institution. They say that their approach "contrasts with the focus in much of the presidency literature on specific actions taken by particular individuals and on the image of Presidents as independent, singularly powerful decision makers. Instead, the Presidency should be understood as if it were another Congress - a complex organization of many individuals with diverse goals" (p. 6). In addition, the authors view the study of the presidency as being plagued by the lack of sys-

tematic analysis and the reliance on anecdotal evidence to substantiate generalizations about the presidency. As an alternative to anecdotal based research, King and Ragsdale believe that presidency centered research "should be conducted in a more rigorous, systematic, and when possible, quantitative manner" (p. 483).

In terms of the contribution of this book to the quantitative study of the presidency, the vast wealth of information presented makes it certain that this book will become an often cited source for those of us writing on Washington politics. It provides for the study of the presidency what Ornstein et al. (*Vital Statistics on Congress*, 1984) provided for the study of Congress. Each chapter deals with a different aspect of the presidency and the discussion centers on the approximately thirty tables that accompany each chapter. Some of the tables are based on data that has been published elsewhere while other tables present data available for the first time in an organized form for use by the scholarly community. Among the chapter topics on which data are presented are legislative decisions (including data on presidential requests to Congress, presidential positions on roll-call votes, presidential support scores for different policy areas and presidential vetoes), independent executive actions (treaties, executive agreements, and executive orders), presidential control over administration (presidential appointments and budgets) and three chapters on the public presidency (presidential appearances, public evaluations of presidential performance and presidential elections).

The theoretical foundations of the book are based on the concept of the "Plural Presidency." In contrast to a perspective that focuses primarily on the president as an individual, the Plural Presidency focuses on the entire institution of the presidency, comprised of offices and actors who are "neither monolithic nor unified" (p. 84). These actors develop and maintain their own standard operating procedures, role orientations, and general rules of behavior that govern life within the White House.

The authors in chapter 1 develop the concept of the Plural Presidency and trace the historical development of the institution. The Plural Presidency is defined in terms of four concepts—program complexity, group diversity, organizational diffusion, and incumbents' strategy. The remainder of the book represents an attempt to uncover the patterns of behavior in the Plural Presidency. In terms of presidential decisions, the authors argue persuasively that the sheer volume of decisions made as part of the everyday routine by the myriad of actors who work in the White House establishment conflicts with the view of the president as either chief legislator or as chief executive. Whether one is analyzing legislative decisions or administrative decisions, the message of this book is that the key White House actors to watch are organizational. One weakness of this book is that, told not to

watch the president but to focus on the various organizations that make up the presidency, we do not learn very much about these organizations. The book focuses on the outcomes of decisional processes (number of positions taken, number of bills vetoed, number of executive agreements etc.) and not enough on explaining from an organizational perspective the processes that generate these outcomes. Reading the book several questions emerged that were not adequately dealt with. For example, what are the goals that motivate these organizational actors? What are the constraints under which these organizations operate? Are variations in presidential success (either within a single administration or across administrations) a function of changes within these White House units? In terms of evaluating the presidency from a democratic theory perspective (representation, responsiveness, and accountability), do the decisions that flow from the White House reflect presidential policy preferences or staff preferences or both? Put simply, is the president in control of this elaborate institution? The authors' discussion of the various aspects of the presidency touches on these subjects but unfortunately does not confront them directly. While the book presents a great deal of information, it does not uncover as much of the 'Elusive Executive' as the authors believe. In the end, having raised the reader's consciousness about the plural nature of the White House, the book raises more important questions than it answers.

In sum, this is a book well worth reading and owning. The data presented will 'bail out' many a lecturer who needs to develop a last minute class discussion of some aspect of the presidency. In addition, the discussion of the Plural Presidency will lead readers to ask some important, provocative questions.

Richard Fleisher *Fordham University*

Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice By Larry M. Bartels (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. Pp. xvi, 374. \$45.00 cloth, \$14.95 paper.)

Eagerly awaited by students of the nominating process, this ambitious and imaginative study of momentum is almost certain to become a classic in the field. It is no less likely to generate spirited challenges as scholars work through the assumptions and operations underlying Bartels's major findings. The ensuing dialogue should enrich our collective understanding of presidential nominations.

The book is especially significant as an initial attempt at theory-building. In this vein Bartels rejects any notion of momentum driven entirely by fac-

tors unique to each nominating struggle. The foundation for a theory of momentum, of course, resides in important variables recurring at least in recent nomination battles. According to Bartels, such influences are uncovered by seeking answers to four fundamental questions. First, how do political predispositions (social characteristics, group loyalties, and basic issue stands) affect primary voters as the process unfolds? Second, how quickly does the public learn about candidates relatively unknown before Iowa and New Hampshire? Third, under what circumstances does success in early primaries contribute to success in later ones? And, fourth, what psychological mechanisms underlie these dynamics?

The news media figure in all of these questions, of course, by linking prospective voters to the nomination process. Thus, as Bartels nicely points out, media emphasis on the "horse race" also influences momentum, albeit indirectly. A key construct in this connection is the "recognition threshold" below which unknown candidates cannot establish a significant base. Media hype after an unexpectedly strong showing in Iowa or New Hampshire may quickly resolve this problem for dark-horse candidates, as it did for Jimmy Carter in 1976 and Gary Hart in 1984. Working with 1984 NES "rolling thunder" surveys, Bartels credits three weeks of post-Iowa saturation coverage for having established most of Hart's familiarity with the public. The same coverage also boosted expectations of Hart's nomination chances among divergent segments of the public. This "shared reality" eventually extended to high and low media-exposure respondents, and even infected partisans inclined to project intense pro- or anti-Mondale feelings into estimations of Hart's nomination chances.

Turning to actual support for candidates, the media again play an important role by providing information essential to activation of political predispositions and reduction of uncertainty about candidate chances. According to Bartels, learning candidate positions on issues takes considerable time for most prospective voters. This is particularly significant for instant front-runners like Hart whose initially soft surge of support suffers from greater exposure and eventually declines. In a somewhat different context, political predispositions also largely explain the erratic character of momentum for at least some candidates as they cinch the nomination in later primaries. Which predispositions matter most depends largely on the "political context" — e.g., which candidates and what strategies.

Bartels nicely charts predispositions and expectations in a model defined by the number of major candidates seeking a party's presidential nomination. When two major candidates are in the running, as were Carter and Edward Kennedy in 1980, political predispositions will weigh especially heavy in voter calculations. They matter less and come into play more slowly when the candidate field includes only one major candidate or none at all. Momen-

tum is most powerful in the last instance, when expectations also count the most in influencing voter support

Let us turn from this bare sketch of the book's substance to a brief assessment of its strengths and problems. On the credit side, Bartels does a masterful job in describing the development of the present nominating system, in setting out the limitations of spatial and public choice models for understanding voting in the current system of numerous and sequential state contests, in pointing up the failure of strategic voting, cue-taking, contagion, and simple bandwagon voting models to account for the surge and decline of Hart support in 1984, in comparing primary voters with rank-and-file identifiers, in essaying the likely consequences for the current process of more front-loading or shifting to more regional primaries or to a national primary, and in estimating the outcome had recent nominees been compelled instead to compete in national primaries. (Of course, one must also recognize that the lineup of candidates in nomination battles since 1976 probably would have been drastically different had there been a national primary system.)

On the debit side, many readers will have reservations about Bartels's projections from small, rolling thunder samples, particularly when split into top and bottom quintiles and then simulated. Similarly controversial are chapter four's extrapolations from "feeling thermometer" scores intended to measure simple affect to probabilities of candidate support predicated on elaborate assumptions about responses to the thermometer item. Some like myself would like to know more about the data from "several recent campaigns" included in an otherwise straightforward index of a candidate's probability of winning nomination. And, on a less methodological note, I would quibble with chapter five's treatment of Carter in 1976, Bush in 1980, and Hart in 1984 as three examples of suddenly prominent candidates trying to extend their good fortune by making ambiguous statements on the issues. The generalization fits Carter and Bush much better than Hart, who went to extraordinary lengths to make his stands known to a disinterested press. Recall that Mondale was the candidate who "dared to be cautious." Moreover, in that hectic time of tarmac campaigning immediately after Iowa and New Hampshire, a realistic strategy of getting free media exposure may compel most surviving candidates to speak in general themes rather than specifics. Resort to the latter in such circumstances may signal the desperation of a failing campaign.

In any event, Larry Bartels has written an important work which no serious scholar in the field can overlook. It will frame discussion of nomination politics in the discipline for years to come.

Emmett H. Buell, Jr. *Denison University*

The Party's Just Begun Shaping Political Parties for America's Future By Larry J. Sabato (Boston: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1988 Pp. 261.)
Money in American Elections. By Frank Sorauf. (Boston: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1988 Pp. 416.)

Campaign finance is a difficult topic. It combines two of the most elusive political phenomena to study. Assessing the manner and impact of campaigns requires a great deal of information and analytic craftsmanship. Similarly, if "money is the mother's milk of politics," the chore of locating the source and amount of money involved is indeed gargantuan. Combine these two elements together and pose the problem in the context of elections, political parties, and the scheme of American governance—the result is a Draconian assignment. Professor Frank Sorauf has done an outstanding job of all of the above and then some. Throughout the bulky volume, the author studiously stays faithful to his basic design for the book to "bring what have been disparate materials into a summary and interpretation of what we know about a single subject: the way we finance American election campaigns" (p. vii).

At the beginning, there is a lucid and useful chapter, chronicling the history of campaign finance through the post-Buckley period. This chapter alone would be valuable as source literature for students of campaign finance. Immediately following it, Sorauf diagrams a "bare bones" model of actors and events related to campaign finance in which, among other things, he identifies key relationships among the participants: donors and receivers. This model is used to organize the book, most of the chapters focusing on the actors. The coverage of each one of the actors—individual contributors, PACs, political parties, the media, the Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court, and state and local governments—is very comprehensive, especially for congressional elections. The author draws primarily on the FEC data, supplementing it with such other sources as the Alexander data from 1960 through 1976, the Common Cause releases for 1972 and 1976, and the reports from the official state agencies. All of the sources are gleaned carefully and presented systematically throughout the book so that, when the author presents his conclusions at the end of each topic treated, the content it adds to his evaluation and verdicts is rich and solid. One small example is his discussion of PACs and their political role in elections. PACs, their activities, and limitations are well covered. Most useful in this regard is the author's thoughtful display of data concerning their contributions—to incumbents, challengers, and open-seat candidates for Congress, to candidates by political party, in state campaigns, and others.

Most important, perhaps, is Sorauf's insightful identification of the locus of PACs in the electoral politics in particular and the American political process in general.

The uses of political money grow out of and reflect the configurations of influence in American politics. There were initially both fears and hopes that it might be otherwise—that, for instance, broad coalitions of business and corporate PAC's would form. Just as their parents are fragmented and slow to form coalitions or even communication networks, PAC's also pursue relatively individualistic and separate goals and strategies. It is a separatism borne of a lack of internal cohesion and of their different contribution strategies. Nothing better underscores the individualism of PAC's than their self-professed goal of legislative access, for access, unlike ideology, is a very individual and particularistic goal. Their low-risk, low-benefit, incumbent supporting strategies are extensions of the kinds of strategies organized interests pursue in legislative politics. (p. 338)

There are further constraints of the political context that bring limitations to the influence of PAC money: for example, there are other forms of political influence and political mobilization which political parties increasingly reach for and often succeed in claiming. For, as the author put it, unless campaign finance is linked to other means and avenues of political influence, the money loses part of its potency. In this sense Soraf's book makes a broader and more significant contribution in that it points the way to a rethinking of political parties as intermediary agencies.

Larry Sabato's book on shaping political parties for the future is a concisely written diagnosis of where the party system is today, where its predictable course may lead us, and how the course may be altered. Sabato's book is less a verdict for the future than a prescription for an intervention informed by changing resource constituencies, which includes a discussion of the role of money in elections. The central theme of his work is based on his conviction that we should not go on adding luster to the destructive myths that parties were once all-powerful, that they are now headed straight for oblivion, and that their precipitous and continuing decline is irreversible" (p. 234).

A study based on three national public opinion polls conducted before and after the midterm elections of 1986, Sabato's work reexamines the familiar pessimistic portrayal of the American partisan terrain ("Parties in Crisis," "American Parties in Decline," "The Party's Over") with a keen eye toward identifying the signs and possibilities of reshaping political parties. In the end, he specifically recommends eight party-initiated actions and twelve government assisted reforms—among them, designating ombudsmen and establishing mobile offices, providing nonpolitical services to party members, expanding fundraising and campaign services, increasing unpledged and unbound delegates to the presidential conventions, deregulating the parties, providing tax incentives for small gifts to parties, allocating part of the FEC fund to parties, making straight-party lever and party-column ballots universal, requiring party registration in all states, expanding patronage and other rewards for party work, and granting an annual hour of free time on television and radio to each national and state party. The important fea-

ture of these recommendations and the preceding discussions in which they are rooted is the question of their feasibility, a provocative topic up for discussion anywhere, especially in an advanced undergraduate or a graduate level course

In addition, Sabato's extremely useful discussion of the campaign technocracy that is increasingly absorbed by the parties, especially the Republican Party, will serve as a sophisticated way of pointing out the need to study not only who has how much money in elections, but why and how it is used. For example, the question of the interrelatedness of Sorauf's other influences to Sabato's national institutional advertising campaigns clearly redefines the growing importance of money in a far more complex way.

Both volumes make a significant foray into an important and formidable area of the discipline and both direct us to study the data carefully and, more importantly, with an orientation informed by an accurate and proper reading of historical and contemporary American politics.

Jong O. Ra, *Hollins College*

Critical Elections and Congressional Policy Making By David W. Brady
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988. Pp. 181. \$27.50.)

In an ambitious—and admirably successful—attempt to analyze the linkages among all of the extraordinary political and governmental phenomena that appear during those rare periods of upheaval known as realignments, David Brady in this book adds considerably to our understanding of those eras. The realignment periods chosen are the standard ones—1850s, 1890s, 1930s—and the focus is the House of Representatives. For the most part, the book embellishes rather than contradicts the accepted interpretations of what happened in those critical decades, but in the embellishment the author has assembled much new data on the composition, structure, and behavior of the House during, as well as between, realignments. Indeed, the book belongs on any congressional scholar's reference shelf for its historical statistics alone.

In each of the three realignment periods, the author finds this process summarized on pp. 18–19. A cross-cutting issue arouses intense feeling and dominates the national political debate. The dominant parties take distinctly different positions on the issue. The voters "intentionally remove the incumbent party" in response to the issue. The new majority party is given full control of the government—presidency, Senate, and House—for a sustained period (in each of these cases, fourteen years). In the House, the election sweep produces a high proportion of new members, with accompanying high turnover in membership and chairmanships of standing committees.

which reduces their resistance to non-incremental change. 'The combination of an electoral mandate and greatly reduced committee importance creates the conditions for party government' (p. 19). The new majority party is then able to enact its program, which sets a new course for the nation.

Presenting a wealth of quantitative data, the author documents the nationalization of House elections in the realignment period: the higher turnover rates, and the greater party cohesion; how relatively minor shifts in voting behavior produce enormous changes in the partisan makeup of the House, and how the scale of that change depends on the proportion of competitive seats. Applying this analysis to recent history, he concludes (pp. 164–65) that a realignment would have occurred at some point since the New Deal if so many formerly competitive House seats had not become safe. The other preconditions for realignment were present—declining party loyalty, political turbulence created by new issues, and significant pro-Republican voting shifts—but because the Republicans could not capture the House, they could not execute their mandate and thus solidify their majority position.

This thesis is provocative but less than fully convincing. The three issues that he contends could have produced a realignment if more House seats had been competitive—civil rights, Vietnam, and the Great Society—surely would have failed for other reasons. Civil rights did contribute to party realignment in the South, but in the North the parties did not take issue positions sufficiently different to cause mass changes in party allegiance. Nor did they take distinctly opposed positions on Vietnam. The effect of the Great Society was counter-realignment: it solidified the Democratic majority. In the 1980s, with fewer Democratic safe seats, the House might well have gone Republican. But whether the Republicans would then have become a permanent new majority would have depended upon the voters' reaction when the Reagan program was enacted. Even with the G. O. P. "mandate" substantially carried out in the Reagan years, and the remainder continuously advocated, the Republicans have not become the majority party in the electorate. Moreover, the Reagan measures enacted were the most popular ones—the tax cut, the defense buildup, the get-tough posture in world affairs, the cuts in welfare spending. If these could not produce the necessary shifts in party allegiance, how could the less popular proposals, that the House Democrats blocked, have done so?

The discussion of realignment throughout the book is blurred by definitional fuzziness. On p. 165, the author says flatly that 'a realignment has not occurred since the New Deal era'. But in the next paragraph he refers to 'a full-blown realignment' on the preceding page to 'a clear realignment' and on the following page to 'the full realignment process'. Is realignment all or nothing, then, or are there degrees of magnitude? In a realignment, the voters intentionally remove the incumbent party in response to the ten-

sion of cross-cutting issues" (p. 18) and give the new majority party unified control of the national government. If what has happened in the South since the 1950s is not a realignment, then what is it called? If the Republican party had become the majority after 1980 but the Democrats still controlled the House, that would not have been a realignment either, but what would it have been? Are realignments to be defined by shifts in voter allegiance, or only by electoral and policy results, and only if the *national* government is overturned? Unfortunately, the ambiguity of one ubiquitous word leads sometimes to ambiguous conclusions.

The entire book is testament to the idea that only party government can produce non-incremental change and redirect the course of national affairs, and in his closing pages the author makes the case explicit. He deplores the resistance of the current House to partisan change, which prevents "any variant of responsible government." In the absence of competitive House elections, "Presidents will not carry majorities into office with them, the government will be divided, and "American government will continue to be characterized by drift rather than mastery, and by fragmentation rather than coherence" (p. 181). The unwritten supposition here, of course, is that future presidents will be Republicans, Democratic presidents would surely be blessed with Democratic Houses and Senates and, with the Democratic party more homogenous and cohesive than at any time in at least half a century, the prospect for responsible party government would be bright. But the author may be right in his unspoken assumption, and he is even more certainly correct in his assessment of the consequences.

The book reveals, finally, that the constant striving of publishers to make footnotes inaccessible has reached a new level of ingenuity. To find a citation one must hunt through not one but two appendices—the first to locate the name of the author cited, a second to find the date and full identification of the work.

James L. Sundquist, *The Brookings Institution*

No Longer Disabled: The Federal Courts and the Politics of Social Security Disability. By Susan Gluck Mezey. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1988. Pp. 208. \$37.95.)

Apprehensive about alleged abuses in beneficiary programs and concerned about escalating federal welfare spending, Congress, in 1980, formulated Social Security reform legislation, critically mandating periodic review of the eligibility of Social Security Disability Insurance recipients who had nonpermanent impairments. During President Reagan's first term, the Social Security Administration (SSA) seized upon the latter provision, transforming it

into a conscious instrument of fiscal policy, without regard for the human consequences, critics would vigorously complain. Hundreds of thousands of disability beneficiaries were classified—presumptively, without presentation of evidence—as medically improved, declared ineligible, and stripped from the Social Security rolls. The terminated beneficiaries, aided by a considerable array of advocacy and interest groups, launched an avalanche of individual law suits in the federal courts. Nearly everywhere they succeeded, judges ordering their reinstatement, seeking at the same time to impose review standards upon the SSA that would protect all persons entitled to benefits.

The agency, however, rejected the courts' statutory interpretation of the Social Security amendments and persisted in its "cruel and indefensible administrative processes," thereby precipitating a far-reaching political crisis. The agency's calculated nonacquiescence, the devastating consequences suffered by the vulnerable beneficiaries, and the chaotic conditions that developed in the states, where governors revolted against the SSA and tried to cope with the flood of former beneficiaries who sought to transfer to state welfare programs, aroused widespread public interest and congressional concern. Impelled by these crisis conditions, Congress moved swiftly in 1984, enacting the Social Security Disability Reform Act which imposed upon the SSA the medical improvement standard for disability review that had been widely adopted by the lower federal courts.

These events comprise an extraordinarily rich chapter in contemporary American politics; indeed they serve virtually as a metaphor for the pervasive attack the Reagan administration directed against existing liberal government, using the control over the bureaucracy won in the 1980 election and the deference traditionally accorded to administrative agencies to insulate against counterattack its unwillingness to implement regulatory legislation and its defiance of mandated standards.

In *No Longer Disabled*, published in the Greenwood Press series "Studies in Social Welfare Policy and Programs," Susan Gluck Mezey has sought to render understandable the disability history. In many ways, she has succeeded, presenting an absorbing case study of conflict between a major administrative agency, the SSA, and the lower federal courts as well as sketching an overview of how the reinstated beneficiaries transformed their personal legal victories into public pressure for congressional legislation that would unequivocally establish procedural safeguards for the review process. The "highlighting of the role of the judiciary" (p. 3) provides insight in particular into "the court's limited ability to obtain bureaucratic compliance with its decisions" (p. 16) while SSA obeyed specific orders to reinstate individual beneficiaries, it clung stubbornly to its preferred interpretation of congressional intent and frustrated federal judges could do little to force change in its policy.

So too, Mezey's chapters, notably the last two, inform dramatically about the political impact of bureaucratic intransigence, presenting a clear account of the way Congress, at first oblivious to the possible misuse of its 1980 legislation, reacted to the swelling tide of critical publicity and the emotional constituent response engendered by SSA's nonacquiescence policy.

There exists an even larger contribution, however. Taken all together, Mezey's study illuminates with telling detail the intricate workings of an exceedingly complex system of social welfare legislation, a system which operates within a framework of legislative authorizations and judicial holdings that accord exceptional leeway to administrative discretion in implementing various phases of the agency's mandate. To illustrate, SSA whipsawed administrative law judges, forcing them to choose between their respect for the rule of law as enunciated in the lower federal courts' holdings and the agency's directives requiring compliance with its nonacquiescence policy. This, and many other insights, derive from personal experience. Mezey served in the Social Security Litigation Unit of HHS in 1983, her first position out of law school.

In other ways, however, the case study is less successful than it might have been. Critically, Mezey tries to do too much, with the consequence that the monograph has a diffuse quality and distinctive phenomena are not sufficiently explored. With greater selectivity and concentration, there would have been greater coherence and, probably, more penetrating analytical results. To illustrate, the space devoted to review of discourse about judicial activism as well as numerous technical discussions such as an explanation of collateral estoppel should have been given over to her innovative—but incomplete, analysis of the avenues open to the lower federal courts to obtain enforcement of their statutory interpretations. So too, while Mezey recognizes that the pattern of litigation politics that emerged in the disability history differed markedly from that depicted in the classic interest group literature—hundreds of thousands of individuals, similarly situated but only loosely connected to each other, practically overwhelmed the federal courts—this unique phenomenon is left substantially unexamined. Similarly, while she recognizes that the restored beneficiaries, by vigorously pursuing their grievances, contributed significantly to emerging concepts of individual rights, based on personal claims to federal entitlements, this vital theme is merely identified, not effectively developed.

Perhaps most regrettable, because it deprives the case study of its essential context, Mezey largely disregards the larger political events that inform the disability history, notably, the deliberate assault upon positive government, especially the federal judiciary, which the Reagan administration undertook as a way to undercut "liberal" influence in American politics. Secretary Heckler's calculated nonacquiescence policy was part and parcel of the White House's ideological challenge to the regulatory legislation it found in place and the dominant judicial philosophy in January 1981.

Mezey's case study, in sum, contributes substantially to grasping the essential dynamics of a truly important chapter in contemporary policy formation. Nevertheless, it does not exploit fully the exceptional richness inherent in the Social Security disability crisis, regrettably leaving less developed than the material allows the most unique aspects of that history, at once among the least studied areas in judicial politics.

Stephen B. Wood *University of Rhode Island*

The Politics of the Peace Corps and VISTA. By T. Zane Reeves. (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1985. Pp. x + 215. \$20.95.)

The idea that changes in the policies of the executive branch of government will occur following a general election and the installation of a new president and his appointees is fundamental to the theory of democracy. But what if the new policymakers find resistance to change originating from parts of the "permanent government"? Thus, how much change (if any) is effected by the new leaders is an important question. And how parts of the regular bureaucracy resist changes attempted by the new political leadership when those changes cut against the dominant organizational culture is another. A dominant organizational culture is defined as the "philosophy, ideology, values, beliefs, expectations, and norms" (p. 3) of the organization. Still a third issue is what happens to agencies of government when political appointees of new administrations turn out to be ideologues of the right or the left?

These are the central questions which T. Zane Reeves explores in a longitudinal case study of two organizations — the Peace Corps and VISTA—from the time of their inception in the early and mid 1960s until somewhere in the middle of the Reagan administration. I use the word "somewhere" deliberately since it is not exactly clear in what year the narrative terminates. The author, a former Peace Corps volunteer, is clearly sympathetic to the organizational culture as it existed in the early 1960s in those agencies. It was a "commitment" culture characterized by "clearly defined missions, action orientations, and high employee morale" (p. 5). And although the author acknowledges that the existence of an agency-wide high commitment culture is fairly rare (for a host of reasons), his sympathy for such high commitment cultures unfortunately colors the analysis and the conclusions.

The Peace Corps was created during the Kennedy administration to send American volunteers into poverty-stricken areas of the world. It was to be a single, separate agency, as nonpolitical as possible, and particularly was not to be tied to any aspect of current U.S. foreign policies or programs. In many ways, the Peace Corps represented the height of American idealism as it emerged in the post-World War II era. In a similar vein, VISTA (Volunteers in Service to America) was created in the Johnson Administration as a kind of

"domestic peace corps" to encourage and channel volunteerism at home, except that VISTA was but one of the many agencies that were part of the "War on Poverty."

Shortly after the Peace Corps and VISTA began operations, the growing Vietnam War led to anti-war activity among the Peace Corps volunteers overseas, while state and local interest groups at home let loose howls of protest against some of the projects of VISTA (such as organizing rent strikes). The election of a conservative President Nixon in 1968 set off an intense bureaucratic war within the U.S. government between the newly appointed conservative administrators of these agencies and the "committed" (read "liberal") agency personnel. The weapons of bureaucratic warfare employed by the Nixon appointees as they tried to change the organizational cultures included personnel moves, "reorganization" (into ACTION), budget starvation, and attempts at "re-education" of recalcitrant senior staff. The struggle lasted until the Watergate scandal destroyed the Nixon regime. With the election of President Carter in 1976, a different type of attack on the two agencies was launched by Carter's director of ACTION, Sam Brown, whose policies were of the "New Left" variety (too far left for the organizational culture of the early 1960s). In 1981, the conservative attack began again. Whether from the right or the left, the political leadership of each administration attempted to make the policies and programs of the Peace Corps, for example, responsive to the political ideology of the incumbent administration as interpreted by the newly appointed leadership of the agency. In short, the agencies were counterpunched—right, left, and then right again. Additional confusion was produced by splits within new administrations between centrists and extremists (of both the left and right). And, according to Reeves, by the late 1980s, after twenty years of this, the Peace Corps and VISTA have been left reeling, disorganized and dispirited (p. 153).

The main strength of the book is in the description of the intense bureaucratic politics between ideologues (of both the left and the right) and careerists. Reeves has clearly benefited from "insider" knowledge and accounts, especially for the Peace Corps part of the narrative, and it is a significant addition to the literature of bureaucratic conflict.

There are two serious problems. As the author notes, there is no agreement in American society about what "causes" poverty at home or in other nations. Since there is no agreed-upon causal model, it should not be surprising that there are widespread disagreements about how the problem of poverty should be dealt with. VISTA's efforts at bypassing state and local officials, when combined with "direct action" activities such as rent strikes, probably ensured a short life for the agency, especially as the conservative tide came in. Yet, in the early pages, Reeves argues that "our task is to explore ways of making political appointees less disruptive (even to make them take advantage of their insights) while developing strong commitment cultures in government organizations" (p. 13). This is another version of the old

refrain about how those "bad" political appointees should go away and let the "experts" do their jobs. Conflict in government organizations between political appointees and the permanent bureaucracy is endemic and eternal. If political appointees of newly elected presidents committed to changing previous policies are not to try to change organizational cultures but should instead "be less disruptive," why bother with elections? We can turn government over to self-appointed experts who "know best" and who, not surprisingly, tend to favor the policies developed by themselves in the past. Those policies and programs are now part of the dominant organizational culture.

Resistance to change in bureaucracies is legendary. Conflict over change is especially intense when the ideology of the new political appointees is sharply opposed to the dominant culture. The fact that the old organizational cultures in the Peace Corps and VISTA have been broken up after twenty years of pounding suggests the normative conclusion that elections in the United States do eventually lead to change, even if the "old guard" is appalled. I personally feel that the demise of the Peace Corps is a "bad thing." But, writing as a former appointee to the Department of Defense, I get nervous when academics begin to talk about building "strong commitment cultures." Committed to what? Who decides? How do decisions get made? I can think of two large organizations in which a "commitment culture" of a certain kind might be fairly dangerous. After all, Lt. Col. North and Director Casey were individuals who clearly were members of a "strong commitment culture." My problem is with what Lt. Col. North and Director Casey were committed to.

James Clay Thompson *University of North Carolina at Greensboro*

The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss. By Shadia B. Drury. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988. Pp. xv, 256. \$29.95.)

Surely it is by now widely understood, or at least suspected, that Leo Strauss used the history of political theory to develop and suggest a political philosophy, the essential contents of which were equivalent to Strauss's interpretation of what he termed the teaching and wisdom of classical antiquity. But also understood is that this leaves remarkably unclear Strauss's political philosophy, since what he has to say about the classics, and about the history of political theory more generally, is, on any careful and informed reading, less than transparent. In Strauss's texts, ambiguities and subtleties of many different kinds, are the norm. What is worse, we strongly suspect that all this cleverness has as its purpose masking Strauss's actual beliefs behind a surface or exoteric message. Hence we can never be sure we have understood him correctly, no matter how careful our reading of his work.

How brave, then, is Shadia Drury to claim to have uncovered Strauss's

esoteric philosophy, finding it a "startling" vision, "complete and compelling" yet "formidable and frightening," that only some of his followers, and few other scholars, understand (pp. 4, 12). Such widespread misunderstanding is on Drury's account not due solely to the fact that Strauss's intentions and meaning are less than explicit, but also because his understanding of the ancients is so bizarre. Whereas, for instance, we all know that Plato's Socrates refuted, or at least thought he refuted, Thrasymachus, Strauss's view is that Socrates succeeds only in convincing Thrasymachus to keep his dangerous ideas, which Socrates in fact shares, to himself. Indeed, "Strauss believes that Plato uses Thrasymachus as his mouthpiece," and so Drury believes that "Strauss uses Machiavelli as his mouthpiece" (p. 26). Most of the readers of this review can thus see that, whatever else one makes of Drury's book, it sure is fun, the others can see that it deserves to be "denounced" (p. 17).

Essential elements of Strauss's esoteric teaching, on Drury's informed and careful reading, include the following. The political philosophy of genuine philosophers is their exoteric teaching, underlying which are their esoteric insights and truths. These esoteric or philosophical truths threaten civilization primarily because they establish that popular acceptance of religion and morality is essential to human order and culture, yet have no foundation in heaven or nature; religion and morality are 'pious swindles' without which the human race would perish; there is in truth no God, no unchanging moral law and no support in the universe for justice (pp. 20, 32). Wise philosophers will therefore keep hidden from all but a few the deadly truths of philosophy and will in addition help sustain public morality through their political, i.e. public, philosophy. This is what the wise men of antiquity did; it is what all philosophers should do, it is not what the moderns did.

So Machiavelli's contention that politics must not be subordinated to morality is shocking to Strauss, not because it is untrue, but because it is said openly, to all, this is the kind of truth that needs to be hidden, and the sometimes nasty political prescriptions which this truth permits need to be whispered into the ears of the powerful (chap. 6). Similarly Hobbes, understanding that the good is by nature the pleasurable and that religion is a fraud, thought it permissible to speak these truths, albeit in a transformed and erroneous form: hedonism he thought could provide the foundation of a stable political order, ignoring altogether the ancient understanding that the pursuit of pleasure by all—given the inferior nature of the many and the requirement that they act unnaturally by subordinating their pleasure to the needs of the city—would destroy any civil society, just as Hobbes's public atheism rejects altogether the ancient understanding that religion is necessary to civil society (chap. 7).

This last example is sufficient to show that Drury's position is not that Strauss "really" sides with the moderns. She reviews Strauss's substan-

tive disagreements and dissatisfaction with the moderns and modernity (chaps. 7 and 8), and is clear that his call for a return to the ancients is absolutely genuine. But "the ancients to whom Strauss appeals have been transfigured by Nietzsche," the individual to whom Strauss owes "his greatest intellectual debt" (p. 170). Like Nietzsche, Strauss is a kind of nihilist, one who recognizes that morality is conventional, but also that it is essential to civilization and thus in need, not of supermen but of philosophers, who must in this age replace the dead God with another script for the vulgar (chap. 9).

While Strauss's exoteric teaching thus constitutes some variation on the theme that the wise ought to rule the many in the name of and for the sake of justice, his esoteric teaching is that wise men must gain power in order to construct flexible rules and megalitarian institutions conducive to life, stability, peace, and philosophy and that they use their power and their rhetorical skills, to delude the many into believing that these wholly instrumental rules and institutions are always obligatory because they are by nature just. Drury terms "gentlemen" the followers of Strauss who understand the exoteric but not the esoteric teaching and "philosophers" those who understand both. She is thereby able to explain some of the recent dissensus in the camp of the faithful (chap. 10) as well as their consensus that the city is badly in need of their advice. And she can predict that both kinds of Straussians will "denounce" her book, though for two altogether different reasons! She concludes by returning the favor, denouncing Strauss for seducing young men into thinking that they belong to a special and privileged class of individuals that transcend ordinary humanity and the rules applicable to other people" (chap. 11, p. 193).

Drury has produced a lively, informed, coherent, thoughtful and plausible account of Strauss's meaning. But Strauss's texts are so constructed and his arguments and pronouncements so elusive that a multiplicity of plausible interpretations are possible. Consider for instance Strauss's argument in *Natural Right and History* that there exists "a universally valid hierarchy of ends, but . . . no universally valid rules of action." Drury's interpretation of this and related arguments is that Strauss means to tell (some of) us that rules of conduct are wholly instrumental and completely flexible but an equally plausible interpretation is that Strauss means only to say that, in constructing and judging principles of conduct, we must keep in mind both the natural ends, and the exigencies, of human life.

The difficulties here are so great that we can be sure only that we shall be hearing a good deal more about what Strauss really meant. Drury's opinion regarding the importance of Strauss notwithstanding, this is a development not all of us will welcome equally.

Daniel R. Sabia, Jr. *University of South Carolina*

The Conquest of Politics: Liberal Philosophy in Democratic Times By Benjamin Barber (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988 Pp 220 \$25 00)

This book consists essentially of seven previously published essays (between 1973 and 1985) which have been framed by a critical argument claiming that liberal political philosophy, if not academic political theory in general, has become estranged from politics. Although the essays (dealing with Bertrand Russell, John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Bruce Ackerman, Michael Oakeshott and Alasdair MacIntyre) have been refurbished in light of this argument, the distribution of emphasis is sometimes less than coincidental. The analyses, however, are illuminating and finely crafted, and it would be disingenuous for me to take issue with the basic claim (cf. *Between Philosophy and Politics: the Alienation of Political Theory*, 1986).

Barber argues that despite the proliferation of political philosophy in recent years political understanding has been impoverished. Philosophy, both with a German and Anglo-American pedigree, has narcissistically cast politics in its own image and conflated political reflection and political action. The result has been the "conquest of politics by philosophy" or the elevation of metatheory and epistemology over theory and the displacement of political judgment by hubristic and imperious abstract cognitive standards which speak neither to nor about politics. Liberal theorists, seduced by foundationalism, rationalism, and the quest for certainty about what is true and right, have distanced themselves from politics as both a practice and an object of inquiry and from the indeterminacy and contingency characteristic of public judgments as well as the perceptions and interests of political actors. Absolutism in philosophy threatens democracy in both principle and practice by doing violence to the idea of citizenship and to the autonomy and sovereignty of politics.

As a solution, Barber calls for "a political philosophy of judgment" or a "genuinely *political* philosophy" that "orders our understanding of politics and informs the political judgment necessary to survive in democratic times without eviscerating politics of its essential character" (pp. 193-94). Such a philosophy would eschew foundationalism, without falling into relativism, and recognize that judgment is not simply a "form of reason" and that political judgment is a kind of "public thinking" that emerges from debate between citizens and is thus intrinsically tied to the principal of democracy. It would take its cues from Burke, de Toqueville, and Dewey as well as from contemporary philosophies of praxis such as "pragmatism, phenomenology and hermeneutics."

Barber's somewhat trendy response to the problem and his attempt to think through the issues are less satisfactory than his diagnosis. It would be difficult (at least for me) to quarrel with Barber's insistence that political phi

losophy should look more carefully at actual political judgments rather than pursuing philosophical reconstructions of such judgment. But this is hardly what he does—either here or in *Strong Democracy* (1984) which he suggests follows such a path.

What Barber urges is in fact another philosophical reconstruction. It may arguably be prescriptively preferable and provide a better account of political judgment. Some may believe that pragmatism and hermeneutics are philosophically more correct than rationalism and that such philosophies in some way better reflect the realities of politics and serve democracy. There is certainly a long history of this position in American liberalism and social science. But taking this philosophical stance does not in itself solve either the generic or historical problem of the relationship of philosophy to politics. The real issue here is less a philosophical one than a practical one—the relationship between public and academic discourse.

Barber is correct in noting that political philosophy seldom says anything about the actualities of politics, and he is, in my judgment, correct in attacking its foundationalist propensities. But, despite references to thinkers such as Marx and Nietzsche that imply the contrary, he persists in the idea that the right philosophy is somehow a solution to both the problems of practice and the relationship between theory and practice. As Barber sometimes indicates, the problem with academic political theory is that it does not seem to admit or perceive the difference between philosophy and politics, but his analysis suffers from precisely the same difficulty. If Rawls or Nozick had said something different, would we be politically better off? If more is involved than a controversy within philosophy about the nature of judgment, then it is necessary to demonstrate concretely how and why philosophy in our time and place does, can, or should matter to politics.

John G. Gunnell, *State University of New York at Albany*

The Meaning of Crisis: A Theoretical Introduction. By James O'Connor.
(New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987. Pp. 197. \$34.95 cloth, \$12.95 paper.)

James O'Connor's latest book offers a comprehensive framework for understanding "the contemporary world capitalist crisis." He pursues this rather ambitious goal through a "critical survey of the main currents of . . . crisis theory." O'Connor thereby expounds a "critical theory of crisis theories" that should also provide students with "a handy catalogue of the subject" (p. 1).

His theoretical analysis of the burgeoning crisis literature is structured within a typology that identifies "four kinds of explanation" for the world

capitalist crisis. These are Bourgeois Economics, Neo-Orthodox Marxism, Neo-Marxism, and Post-Marxism. O'Connor does not argue that any of these approaches is more "correct" than the others. He suggests instead that each type of explanation is meaningful only at a particular theoretical "level" and in relation to its specific "subject of explanation."

The category of "bourgeois economics" includes neoclassical, Keynesian and post-Keynesian economic literature. These share a common tendency to explain crises of capitalism at the "level" of exchange relations. The "subject of crisis is thus always the disintegration of 'markets.'" O'Connor's "brief survey" of this vast literature leads him to several conclusions. The first is that market theory continues to regard economics, politics, sociology, and personality "as separate spheres of social action with their own more or less autonomous rules or 'laws of motion.'" It fails to even recognize the historic appearance of an "administered society" in "political capitalism" where the spheres of social life have become intricately intertwined. This makes bourgeois crisis theory "irrelevant at best and reactionary at worst." O'Connor rightly observes that simple marketplace solutions to the crisis are rare: "anything more than calls 'for a return to a mythical past' and celebrations of 'nineteenth-century economic incentives, social goals, and political processes which have long ago self-destructed and metamorphosed into the rawest kind of ideologies'" (pp. 47-48).

Consequently, most of the text is devoted to a survey of the various "Marxisms." O'Connor explicitly articulates his intention "to provide a critique of economic determinism and to demonstrate the explanatory power of neo- and post-Marxist social and social-psychological theory in the realm of material life" (p. 3). The problem of "economic determinism" is identified with a "neo-orthodox Marxism" that includes such diverse thinkers as Baran and Sweezy, Ernest Mandel, Samir Amin, Eric Hobsbawm, and Hans Cleaver.

The common thread in neo-orthodox Marxism is imputed to be its explanation of capitalist crises in terms of "the tendency for the rate of profit to fall." Its central variable is the increasing organic composition of capital (pp. 61, 76-79). Thus, it offers an explanation of capitalist crisis at the level of production or capital accumulation. O'Connor concedes this explanation "doubtless made good sense before the development of the bureaucratic state," but claims that it cannot "grasp the present economic crisis as new" in the sense of demanding new conceptual tools and methods (p. 50, 90-91).

This critique is followed by the sympathetic assessment of a neo-Marxism that is most notably represented by Habermas and Offe. Its most significant advance according to O'Connor is the recognition that "causal lines" do not move in one direction from economics to society, etc. Instead, it articulates a theoretical framework in which "social groups and classes, human intersubjectivity, and personality structures themselves are constituent causes of

well as effects of 'economic crisis' (p. 107). It therefore in principle shifts analysis onto "real" social, political, and personal struggles. Its subject is "capitalist social disintegration" at the level of social and political relations constituted through the state.

His discussion of neo-Marxist 'social and political crisis theory' is in fact the most fruitful part of O'Connor's analysis, if only for one conclusion. O'Connor finds that Offe's systems theory analysis of "capital logic" and Habermas' action theory analysis of 'class struggle logic' are effective ways to organize thoughts and empirical data, but they have no direct political relevance because they are not grounded in the concrete analysis of ideologies, institutions, and the historical conjuncture. Consequently, he argues (much like Jessop, *The Capitalist State* and Carnoy, *State and Political Theory*) that analytic Marxism can never do more than "delineate logical possibilities of crisis." An understanding of "the actual social and ideological forms of modern class struggle and crisis" requires concrete "historical and institutional analysis" of the sort that most Marxists are still unwilling to undertake (p. 139). Such analyses would forge the missing link between our understanding of structures (systems) and real individuals (action).

O'Connor closes his typology with the observation that another element is also missing from our understanding of the relations between structures and motivations. This is a specifically radical concept of 'personality crisis.' O'Connor moves far beyond his usual territory to speculate that wage and commodity forms are the main source of the modern personality crisis. These forms exist as fundamental structures of capitalism and are hence independent "of economic, social, and political crisis tendencies" (p. 167). Consequently, there is no inherent logic which necessitates that personal crises are articulated into social or political struggles. How that occurs and under what conditions that occurs is a subject of which we know very little. In fact, O'Connor can merely point to the psycho-historical post-Marxisms of Jacoby, Foucault, and Richard Lichtman (*The Production of Desire*, 1982) as possible beginnings in this direction.

O'Connor is convinced that "a historical as well as a theoretical coherence emerges from this typology. He finds that each type of explanation is successively more concrete, less deterministic, and more historically interior" than its historico-logical predecessor (p. 2). Each is asserted to comprehend "reality at successively more concrete levels of human experiences" and is therefore "less theoretically abstract and more historically relevant" to the "palpable reality of capitalist daily life" (p. 158-2). The development of crisis theory thus parallels the historical and social development of capitalist crises. It is systematically displaced from economics to society and state, and finally into psycho-cultural contradictions of capitalism which successively intensify the crisis stage.

This is an elegant framework that compels the careful attention of both

Marxist and non-Marxist scholars. However, it is one that must also be questioned on several points. The most significant problem for this reviewer is the mildly disconcerting inconsistency in a metatheory which continually emphasizes the need to do contemporary empirical analyses that incorporate the "real history" of class struggle. There is a bizarre quality to the claim that Habermas offers a "less objectified and formal level of abstraction" from the "palpable reality" of capitalist daily life than E. P. Thompson (who is not even mentioned) or Baran and Sweezy.

In this respect, the typology which structures this theory conceals within its categories (i.e., level and subject of analysis) a methodological disjuncture between empirical-historical approaches to Marxist analysis and analytic-structural approaches. O'Connor, unlike many others, appears acutely aware of the fact that bridging this gap will probably imply a radical paradigmatic shift among Marxist social scientists toward the analysis of "actually existing capitalist institutions and culture." Unfortunately, O'Connor does not even explore the possibility that E. P. Thompson's *Making of the English Working Class* or more recent works by the new labor historians and historical sociologists may supply models for the kind of research agenda implied in his analysis.

Clyde W. Barrow, *Southeastern Massachusetts University*

American Worlds Since Emerson. By David Marr (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988. Pp. 250. \$22.50.)

David Marr is a democrat in search of traces and shadows of democracy in American society and its arts and letters. To uncover the causes of the failure of this nation to realize the democratic dream except in myth and folklore, he excavates those American worlds constructed by celebrated (and not so celebrated) American literati who have followed Ralph Waldo Emerson's counsel, "Build, therefore, your own world."

For many political scientists, the analysis and argumentation in the book will come across as difficult, sometimes esoteric, and idiosyncratic. In other words, it bears the stamp of many years of careful study, many semesters of penetrating lecturing, and many hours of thoughtful writing. A student of American studies at Evergreen State College, Marr has learned well from the Berkeley school critique of American politics and culture (Wolin, Schaar, Jacobson, Thompson, among others) reconstructed by Herbert Reid and myself in 1974 and the Frankfurt school dialectical critique of enlightenment and domination outlined by Horkheimer and Adorno in 1947.

Where it shines, though, is in its dissection of Emersonian philosophy and in its demonstration of its paradigmatic role for succeeding key figures in the American republic of letters. Beginning with a detailed analysis of Emerson's

ideas of nature, culture, and politics, Marr takes the reader through the twists and turns of the nineteenth-century poet-essayist's effort to redeem Nature, as against Culture, as the foundation for his definition of human nature. The value of this philosophical exercise, for Marr, is that Emerson thematizes a critique of culture and Enlightenment thinking which merges with Horkheimer and Adorno's sophisticated criticisms. Its purchase price, however, is extremely high: nothing less than the location of the "environment of freedom" (Richard Poirier's term) within the bosom of nature and the "infinitude of the private man." The cost, in short, is the denial of the public sphere of human existence and the real appropriation of the world through political action. With the negation of politics and the political, Emerson discards history, tradition, social relations, and in effect all those circumstances and elements which make the human self ineluctably an embedded self.

In succeeding chapters, sometimes loosely tied to the themes of the first third of the book and at other times more tightly coupled to its critique of Emersonian philosophy, Marr discloses how Emerson's nature paradigm forms a tradition of discourse influencing the expansionist ambitions of Walt Whitman and his paeans to the American democratic spirit, the critical appropriation of pragmatism and the unsparing critique of "vicious intellectualism" in the tacit political philosophy of William James, the strenuous effort to overcome solipsism in the poetry of Robinson Jeffers, and the self-imposed task of R. F. Blackmur to rehabilitate bourgeois humanism in the age of mass society through the vehicle of modern literature. As Marr amply demonstrates, while those later American writers who walked in Emerson's footsteps presented critical insights into shortcomings of his nature paradigm, all shared with him the presumption that language or mind, rather than politics and historical experience, could create the "liberated place."

Carrying his critical observations into the modern epoch and unfolding both negative and positive perspectives on its "soul-blind worlds" in contemporary fiction, this American studies student explores first the terminus of the belief in the American literary tradition inaugurated by Emerson in the capacity of language to construct the liberated abode of the liberal ego, as epitomized in Joseph Heller's *Catch-22*. He then presents a gracefully reconstructed portrait of Ralph Ellison's quest to transform the Emersonian myth in self-culture "by shedding its anti-politicism and inverting [its] flight from the past into a rationale for self-consciously fashioning a personal identity with the materials of the Emersonian tradition itself." Recognizing Heller's *Catch-22* world as the bureaucratic-totalitarian state, he illustrates how the function of naming things, far from serving as a means of constructing a perfect and self-sufficient world, merely acts as a way of fortifying the structure of domination. Moreover, within this fictive world, the philosophi-

cal problem of other minds—as well as a literary problem emanating from the Emersonian paradigm—becomes both insoluble in its modern age formulation and monstrous in its wider implications. In part, because “the recurring sign of the nineteenth century’s discovery of the other is the Afro-American,” Marr chooses Ellison’s literary and cultural criticism to exhibit how this American writer who happens to be black produces a new self-understanding of the dual soul of the Negro in America and this nation’s continuing crisis in black and white that cuts through those boundaries which define them using literary invention, cultural critique, and laughter.

If we are to overcome the redundantly-caused “social amnesia” contributed to by the Emersonian tradition of infinitude and privacy, Marr concludes, we must find a new school of civic arts and imaginative letters—partly from our populist counter-tradition and its current impulses animating new social movements—to learn from others and to teach ourselves of our embeddedness with others in history, tradition, community, and (yes) language. Only then will the promise of democracy and the hope of radical communitarians like Marr gain new political life and more enriching cultural sustenance and literary expression.

Ernest J. Yanarella *University of Kentucky*

Constitution Making: Conflict and Consensus in the Federal Convention of 1787 By Calvin C. Jillson (New York: Agathon Press, 1988. Pp. 256. \$30.00 cloth. \$15.00 paper.)

Constitution Making is an interesting and carefully constructed re-examination of the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The central concern of the book is to demonstrate the interaction of interest and philosophical principle in the work of the Founding Fathers. “The most important claim Jillson tells us he wants to make for this study is ‘that it has opened an explicit dialogue between the data left by the Convention . . . and the many conflicting interpretations of those data’ (p. 196) advanced by scholars of the convention. His work clearly will challenge numerous scholars to reconsider their interpretations. His study, then, represents a solid contribution to the ongoing effort to establish a plausible, middle-ground interpretation of the convention which takes into account both principle and interest.

Jillson has other aims in this book beyond promoting such a dialogue. One of them involves an effort to characterize the politics of the convention in terms of coalitional politics in which shifts in coalitions were triggered by different levels of constitutional choice. Drawing upon public choice theorists such as Buchanan and Tullock, among others, Jillson identifies two separate levels of constitutional choice at the convention. The “higher” level

had to do with questions of "regime type and of the basic options for institutional design" (p. 15). The "lower" level specified "the ways in which later operational decisions will be made, by whom, and over what range of issues" (p. 15). Other scholars, Jillson contends, have focused on one or the other, looking at both allows us to see that different coalitions formed according to which level of constitutional choice was the topic of debate. Indeed, Jillson concludes that it is appropriate to view the convention as shaped by four distinct coalition realignments (p. 28).

The account of the convention in terms of coalitions realigning as the levels of constitutional choice shifted is not always successful. While there are occasions when a reader will have difficulty connecting Jillson's mass of descriptive material to his theoretical conclusions about the formation and dissolution of coalitions, the problems run deeper than just organization or clarity of writing. As Jillson's own account indicates, the distinction between "higher" and "lower" level design questions is not always evident, nor is it clear exactly why delegates switched from principle to interest or if they were even aware of doing so. Jillson's data bear out his belief that on "higher" level questions, the coalitions tended to reflect unity on philosophical positions, and on "lower" level questions, the coalitions reflected economic and geographic interest (p. 17). But he overlooks the possible effects of such factors as the effects of agenda-setting, committee composition, and leadership on the coalitional realignments.

These omissions assume greater import when we look at the most ambitious of Jillson's aims for this book. He hopes that his examination of the politics of the convention can shed new light upon the democratic politics of our own age. Here Jillson's conclusions seem both forced and exaggerated. For example, he sees the book demonstrating that the "critical realignment model" operates "at all levels of the American political system, from the aggregate level of mass politics, where it was initially discovered and described, to the level of small groups such as the 'American Constitutional Convention'" (p. 197). Clearly he has not explored "all levels" of the American political system, nor has he demonstrated any linkage between the convention and small group politics in the United States today.

While Jillson may have forced the argument beyond its plausible boundaries, and while no clear implications for understanding our politics today may emerge, his book does raise intriguing ideas for further consideration. For example, what is the relationship between everyday politics and the politics of constitution making? Are there distinct features characteristic of one but not the other? A second topic has to do with the interrelationship between principle and interest. The limits of many applications of rational choice theory on this second topic are evident in Jillson's study. The predominant concern is with interest; in fact, Jillson writes as though the delegates resorted to principle when they could not reliably ascertain their inter-

ests This devaluation of the role of principle—principles by definition worth citing in full At the higher level of constitutional choice, questions were decided

with reference to their general assumptions concerning the interplay among nature, political institutions, and the good society This was not because the constitution makers disregarded their personal interests in favor of broader social interests because they were unlikely to see clearly what difference choices concerning constitutional questions would make to them as individuals or to their states and Therefore, the constitution makers *had no alternative* but to base their decisions on expressions regarding the more diffuse and general interests of the community (emphasis added)

Constitution Making demonstrates both the potential and limits of choice interpretations of political events such as the Constitutional Convention This study sheds new light on old questions while raising new questions of both substance and method for our consideration

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The Ethics of Public Service: Resolving Moral Dilemmas in Public Organizations By Kathryn G Denhardt (New York: Greenwood Press, 1997) Pp. x, 197

This book makes a self-conscious attempt to delineate the burgeoning administrative ethics for scholars and teachers Incorporating much recent writing on government ethics, it synthesizes a model of administrative ethics Throughout, Denhardt makes a case for placing individual responsibility at the center of the field

The book draws upon the history of public administration and moral philosophy and is structured around a triad of concerns First, judgments can be made rationally and appropriately within government Second, individuals have moral responsibility for judgments in government and have a duty to interject moral standards critically into government administration Third, administrative ethics must respond to the context of organizational life and the pressures to subvert moral responsibility The book brings these together in its prescriptive model: the ethical administrator should examine in a critical and independent manner the decision standards he or she uses; this reflection should draw upon society's moral order as well as the administrator's obligations to the organization and to others who are affected by the decision (p. 100) Later she fleshes this out as a decision process with the focus on interjecting moral assessments into the decision (pp. 101-10) However, she warns that individuals should not forget personal con-

onto policy, but should raise them in a public manner and persuade others (pp 120-21)

In a discussion aimed at nonphilosophers and heavily dependent upon citations to moral thinkers, she argues that administrative ethics depends upon "the moral order of society." She attacks moral relativism, utilitarianism and most teleological theories as inadequate foundations for administrative ethics. She insists that administrative ethics is impossible without a "higher law" (p 42). Only deontological standards "beyond time" give a solid ground to offset the uncertainty or societal bound limits of teleology or relativism (pp 40-45). The actual norms tend to be vague and varied such as, "liberty, equality and justice" or promise keeping, respect for cooperation and honesty. They come out in jumbled form with little priority and mainly as references to lists other philosophers have developed (pp 42-46). In the end, however, she admits the impossibility of agreement and settles for a moral order where we can find "sufficient agreement" (p 72) under either deontological or teleological assumptions (p 53).

The second focus argues that persons possess distinct moral responsibility for actions in public service. This builds upon the well-trod critique of the traditional politics-administration dichotomy which justified neutral competence and narrow grounds of responsibility. The contemporary administrative ethicists she cites argue that this theory is inadequate to the real discretion and power in office. The pretense of neutrality and the singular focus on instrumental rationality and efficiency lead to self-deception about one's real role.

The book then focuses upon the claim that moral considerations belong in government decisions and persons have the right and duty to introduce them. Often it comes out as a negative plaint that instrumental rationality and efficiency should not dominate decisions. She then argues that public servants should be trained to be more like moral philosophers able to recognize and ventilate moral issues. The last chapter provides an elaborate example to illustrate how public officials can trace out all the obligations at stake and explore options.

Her emphasis upon personal responsibility is supported by the third leg of the triad where she argues that organizational hierarchy and specialization separate individuals from the real consequences of their actions. Concern with promotion, socialization into organization ethos, and a narrow focus on technical competence and rationality blind individuals to their responsibility and subvert independent judgment (pp 86-96). Given her antipathy to organizations, she argues against limiting discretion by tighter rule making and oversight. Instead she advocates developing institutional consciences with ethics boards and codes, protecting whistleblowers better, but above all decentralizing power and responsibility.

Denhardt's interesting synthesis reasonably introduces one evolving school

of administrative ethics. It does not do full justice to the case for tighter administrative scrutiny and accountability of the traditional model. The defense of personal responsibility and critical evaluation in organizations makes a lot of sense as well as the insistence that moral claims belong in public deliberation.

But the book's emphasis upon individual responsibility leaves troubling questions for those of us sympathetic to the approach. First, it needs a better appreciation of the conditional nature of government power. Public responsibility and personal morality have a mediated relation. She places them on a pure continuum with no sense of the bounded limits on personal judgment in office. Officials are entrusted with power on the condition that they obey the law, respect public processes, and act accountably and efficiently. To impose personal judgments is tyranny. This conditional grant of authority should give much greater 'prima facie' moral weight to laws and standards emergent from democratic and governmental deliberation.

Second, the status of norms appropriate for government deliberation needs considerable clarification. Denhardt throws out many norms with no priority or sense of when they should be used. There is little rationale to exclude personal norms which might put family or friends over government or introduce racial or sexual prejudice into deliberations.

Third, Denhardt's insistence that only a universal 'higher law' provides grounds is misplaced. As she ultimately admits, many standards can be used without such sanction. She also shows little awareness of the abusive possibilities of moral zealots inspired by 'higher law' to impose their position while ignoring law and accountability. Additionally, her antipathy to organizations leads her to oversimplify the issue of managing integrity in government. Decentralization can invite corruption and failure in many environments. Sometimes strong centralization, high performance standards, and internalized norms may be the best way to instill integrity and honesty in public performance. The book would be better off with less rigid 'reforms' and a more thoughtful understanding of the possibilities of organizational life.

If one argues that public officials can introduce moral standards, then this must be tied in the strongest possible terms to public openness, debate, and accountability. The book mentions this, but misses its fundamental import. Individual responsibility is vital, but we need better understanding of the appropriate conditions and limits of introducing personal moral judgment into public service. In this sense, the book not only tells us where we are but also points to where we need to go.

J. Patrick Dobel, *University of Washington*

The Road to Vichy 1918-1937 By Yves R. Simon (Revised edition, John Hellman, ed., Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988)

Yves R. Simon (1903-1961) was one of a remarkable group of emigrés from Europe in the late 1930s who did much to bring about a revival of political theory in the United States. Followers of this gifted philosopher have seen to the posthumous publication of various manuscripts (one thinks immediately of Vukan Kucic's editorship of several of Simon's books). The volume presently under review might be dismissed as a *l'œuvre de circonstance* if it did not reveal so clearly the intellectual (and pre-intellectual) virtues of a philosopher who brings his mind to bear upon a pattern of events in which he himself is deeply involved.

The Road to Vichy is a translation of a manuscript Simon completed in French in 1941. It chronicles the decline of France's will to resist the threat of Hitler's Germany. What distinguishes the study is Simon's extraordinary capacity for disinterested judgment of the thinkers and actors—political and intellectual, left and right—Catholic and secular, who together created the climate insuring France's defeat by the Germans in 1941.

Simon is especially severe in judging some of his co-religionists and philosophical allies. He names names and points fingers at some leading figures in French Neo-Thomist circles who were guilty of supporting German National Socialism. Many of Simon's observations on how blind and unintelligent anti-Communism led most of the French Right to gloss over or ignore the atrocities committed by Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany have an uncannily contemporary ring about them. Simon relentlessly exposes the stupidity of the "our enemies' enemies are our friends" approach.

Yves Simon was a thinker of integrity: this means that he cannot be "positioned" along the left-right spectrum. I strongly recommend *The Road to Vichy* for anyone who wants to learn how to react with independence and integrity to the maddening events of our century.

Dante Germino *University of Virginia*

Citizens, Parties and the State By Alan Ware (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987. Pp. xii, 282. \$39.50 hard)

Citizens, Parties and the State is a book about whether parties matter—but it is not just a clone of other studies with that focus. This book goes beyond whether parties matter in a policy sense, and asks the more general question of whether parties matter for democracy. This is, as the author himself suggests, the first major study of this type since the behavioral revolution dissolved an earlier relationship between democratic theory and study of par-

ties. In that sense, it is an attempt to bring together two areas of research that have largely gone their separate ways for decades.

The comprehensive, but well-focused literature review which starts this enterprise would itself be worth the price of the book. But Ware's attempt to mold bits and pieces from disparate literatures into a coherent assessment of parties' impact on democratization assures that this book will be valuable more than its extensive bibliography. In addressing a number of important questions related to parties as democratizing agents, Ware draws arguments and "evidence" from three literatures: traditional democratic theoretical studies of political parties, and rational choice models of voter party behavior, often employing analogies between economic market party competition. In each chapter, the pieces are masterfully worked together by logical argumentation, rejecting many arguments and holding the few survivors as findings and/or as candidates for further examination.

The book begins with discussion of conceptual issues related to parties and "democracy." Rejecting Kenneth Janda's definition of parties as "not general enough," Ware prefers to say that "parties are bodies that seek to exercise some control over a state, and that its members are not simply representatives of a single interest in society." (Unfortunately, this part of the definitional discussion is flawed by an incorrect interpretation of Janda's definition, which Ware pointedly uses as the backdrop for the development of his own. In fact, Janda's definition allows for both types of parties that he suggests it excludes.) As for the concept of democracy, Ware considers "three main elements": interest optimization, civic orientation, and exercise of control. Though some attention is also paid to parties as agents of the first two elements, the greater emphasis of the book is upon the exercise of control, which citizens are able to exercise control in and through parties.

With the exception of chapter two, which deals with the possibility of members exercising control in one-party systems, the focus of the book is on parties as agents of control by citizens in modern liberal democracies, with the further exception of chapter seven, which deals with the possibility of the ability to make a difference in the policies of such regimes. The main focus of the remainder of the book is on the ability to control what goes on within parties. Chapter three deals with party competition as a source of control, chapter four with whether parties tend to be controlled as "public" rather than "private" organizations, chapter five with the impact of participation in parties on "internal will formation", and chapter six with attempts to "democratize" parties through various types of structural reform.

Ware finds that not only do parties in liberal democracies matter in influencing government policy, but while doing so they also have substantial potential for educating citizens and providing meaningful choice to voters, though parties have generally failed the test of significance in providing avenues for effective participation and the means for membership control.

party activities, the author finds sufficient evidence to suggest that at least some parties could potentially do both and also be successful in the electoral arena. These findings and others lead Ware to conclude that "parties in the twentieth century have largely been exemplars of unfulfilled potential. Parties have contributed to the extension of popular control in liberal democracies, but the extent of democracy in these regimes is still rather limited. Equally, parties in these regimes have been, at most, only partly democratized themselves." Furthermore, in chapter eight, the final chapter, Ware analyzes several changing factors in the parties' environments that may affect the democratizing role of parties in the future, and concludes that while there may be a net weakening effect for some parties, others might actually be in better positions to democratize themselves and/or their systems.

While the importance of 'context' in shaping and/or limiting a party's democratizing role is central to chapter eight, it is also an underlying theme throughout the book, most of whose specific findings and general conclusions are stated in terms of context-dependence. Though the book's unevenness in specifying exactly which environmental factors may be relevant to particular relationships can at times be frustrating for the reader, it should also serve as a challenge for additional work in this area.

The book is also uneven in its coverage, though this is understandable given the necessity to rely so heavily on existing literature. The bias in that literature for treating the American and British cases more frequently than others inevitably finds its way into this book as well. Nevertheless, the book is one of the few comparative studies of parties in a broad range of countries, and the author is to be applauded for his ability to draw upon information about so many of them.

In any case, the few flaws in this book are dwarfed by its many strengths. It brings relevant elements from several literatures to bear on one of the most interesting questions that can be asked concerning political parties, and the results are many important findings, conclusions, and directions for future research. This is a book that will be used, and not just read. It will be required reading for my graduate seminar in political parties.

Robert Harmel, *Texas A&M University*

Pluralism, Corporatism, and Confucianism: Political Association and Conflict Regulation in the United States, Europe, and Japan. By Harmon Zeigler (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988. Pp. 249. \$29.95).

Harmon Zeigler has contributed significantly to our understanding of interest group politics in the United States. In this work he extends his concern to encompass much of the rest of the world. The scope of his ambition is identi-

fied in the book's subtitle. He seeks to summarize the available evidence, some of it newly gathered by himself, on why people join voluntary associations and then to assess the effects of different modes of interest representation on national policy outcomes. Some of the book involves theoretical disputation, primarily with Mancur Olson and assorted writers on corporatism. Some of it seeks to understand the forces behind the extraordinary economic successes of the Pacific Rim. Inevitably, in a rather small book of such large design some parts fall short. But there is much of value, some of it new information and some of it the tangy result of a scholar's bold venturing beyond his accustomed terrain. Such undertakings must be applauded if the stifling effects of professional subfield boundaries are to be mitigated.

Having praised Zeigler for his ambition I must nevertheless lament some of the product. The plan of the book is clear, first, a summary of U.S. pluralism, second, a review of European corporatism, third, an analysis of Asian corporatism, especially as practiced in Taiwan, and, finally, an evaluation of the significance of political culture (individualism, confucianism) and modes of interest representation for economic growth and income distribution. Had Zeigler written the book he intended, it would have been a major achievement. In fact, however, the execution falls short.

The first problem arises in the discussion of American pluralism. The focus is entirely on how voluntary associations are created and maintained, not on how they may affect public policy. Indeed, there is no direct assessment of pluralist policy making. The policy process in the United States, the primary example of pluralism, is examined only as an example of a country that ranks low on a corporatism scale. Zeigler acknowledges that corporatism itself has several dimensions, however, so that "low corporatism" is hardly an adequate surrogate for pluralism.

Thus Zeigler's focus turns out to be an evaluation of the impact of corporatism on various outcomes conditions, including particular inflation, unemployment, and/or several forms of inter-class equity. In general, he concludes that corporatist arrangements have contributed to the control of inflation and unemployment but not to the redistribution of wealth. One's confidence in Zeigler's findings must be limited, however, by his reluctance to explain where his data came from or, apparently, to examine any trends over time. Surely, as Zeigler notes at several points, these are immensely complex questions. As he shows, simple bivariate relationships rarely stand up to more sophisticated probing. Nevertheless, despite the generally sensible interpretations offered, one has the feeling that Zeigler's empirical analyses of corporatist system performance are more illustrative than definitive.

Much of the material on Asia, especially on Taiwan, is fresh, having been collected by the author through interviews, elite and mass. Again, there is a focus on why the Taiwanese join voluntary associations, but there are also

interesting data on tensions between those ROC residents who come from the mainland and the indigenous "Formosans." Moreover, Zeigler has interesting things to say about the difference between the "soft corporatism" of Taiwan and the "harder," more state-intrusive economic policies of South Korea. Altogether, the discussion of the several varieties of Pacific Rim corporatism struck a non-expert reviewer as intelligent and insightful. In this part of the book Zeigler considers whether Confucian modes of thought have much to do with recent Asian economic success, and seems generally to conclude with the old Scottish verdict of "not proved."

In his conclusion Zeigler argues that "defining access is what both corporatist and pluralist systems are all about" (p. 190). The portion of his book which deals with Asia does focus mainly on the question of what groups have access and through what mechanisms. Whether and to what extent the joining of voluntary associations, on one side, or the aggregate figures for economic growth, on the other, depend upon access patterns is hardly beyond argument, however, and yet neither question is given much attention in this volume.

My own summary judgment is that Zeigler has tried to do too much, too soon. The issues are more complex than his analysis acknowledges, and the range and diversity of empirical experience across both time and space are greater than his models can address. Further, the conceptual building blocks involved in the effort are sufficiently fuzzy that, despite Zeigler's efforts to clarify some of them, much work remains before the ambitious scope of his undertaking can be realized with anything like full success.

Robert H. Salisbury *Washington University*

Self-Reliance Versus Power Politics: The American and Indian Experiences in Building Nation States. By J. Ann Tickner. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. Pp. xi, 282. \$35.00.)

Empirical social science tends to ignore both history and normative theory. It is pleasant, then, to find that this work of Ann Tickner situates the important and current political issue of self-reliant development in its philosophical and historical context. Her book studies the long-standing conflict between two levels of self-reliant development: the "communitarian," fostering the self-reliance of individuals and small communities, and the "statist," seeking self-reliance within a powerful nation-state. (A third level—self-reliance through regional cooperation—has had little importance historically and so is discussed little.) A theme of the work is the many "contradictions" between the two levels of self-reliance, within capitalist societies: at least, development policies are able to focus on one level of self-reliance only to the neglect of the other(s).

Tickner shows that this conflict appears in philosophy, in the thinking of important political actors, and in public debates over development policy. In philosophy, Tickner contrasts Rousseau's social philosophy with that of the early nineteenth century German economist Friedrich List. She discusses the political thinking of, among others, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Mohandas Gandhi, Jayaprakash Narayan, and Jawaharlal Nehru. In policy debate, she reviews the development proposals within two capitalist societies: the United States 1776–1825 and India 1947–1980. These two case studies demonstrate that the requirements of political survival repeatedly overwhelm the normative ambitions of the communitarians; the lesson is especially striking in the case of Thomas Jefferson, whose early communitarian sentiments gave way, upon his accession to the presidency, to the promotion of state power.

The significance one finds in this work depends on the relative value one assigns the two levels of self-reliance. If one prefers the statist to the communitarian vision, then the book is merely a happy tale of the repeated defeat of a persistent but politically impotent aberration. Statist rationality triumphs, which is nice, but why write a book about it? If one sees the two visions as having equal merit, the analysis is merely a primer in philosophical debate and political maneuvering. The victory of the statist vision is no doubt attributable to favorable circumstances, but one is indifferent to them: one seeks no "lessons" from the history.

The above two positions are not Tickner's, of course. Reading between the lines, we can see that she takes a third attitude: that the communitarian ideal is preferable to, even while defeated by, statist policies. Her approach is even-handed in that she faults communitarians for their ineffectiveness in the world of power politics, but her sympathies clearly lie with them. And this attitude is what gives the work potential significance: her analysis could explain what political circumstances favored communitarian policies (and thus what political openings communitarians should look for or create), and it could explain the forces by which communitarian policies were overthrown or subverted (and thus what defenses their adherents might erect in the future). Tickner's conclusion draws attention to these concerns: "No case has been made here that movement toward a more self-reliant and less conflictual world is impossible, only that such movement is more difficult than its original advocates have maintained" (p. 229).

But if this is Tickner's attitude and basis for the book's latent claim to importance, the analysis is to some degree incomplete or misdirected.

1. Tickner frames the conflict as one between two visions of self-reliance, but it is more accurately framed as a conflict between capitalism and one of the streams of criticism of it. In this frame, the Indian and American choices of capitalist/statist over communitarian development policies then simply re-

flect the domination of capitalism. This implies that Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Adam Smith, not Friedrich List, provide the true contrast with Rousseau. Rousseau wrote to address problems he found in a world he found existing before him, as rationalized by his three great predecessors; List provides neither a break from capitalism nor a serious engagement of Rousseau.

- 2 If the conflict is between an existing capitalist system and its alternatives, Tickner's decision to exclude socialist cases is questionable. She justifies the decision (pp. 3–5) on the grounds that self-reliance policies in capitalist societies have not been closely studied. But given that the communitarian option was obviously very weak in both of Tickner's cases, the work is able to reach only a foregone conclusion. A more pointed analysis would contrast the Indian and American experiences with the experiences of those socialist countries in which self-reliance has had greater success.
- 3 If Tickner is indeed observing the victory of a less over a more preferred way of relating, the political story will not be complete unless it gives some attention to how citizens of the times were induced to choose the worse over the better. I am suggesting—in other words—that Tickner take her own value premises more seriously—as reflecting moral considerations applicable beyond our own time and culture—and apply that belief to her cases by looking for the operation of false consciousness and hegemonic control.
- 4 Finally, the book pays relatively little attention to drawing out (or providing the basis for) the lessons that would make it of intense interest to self-reliance theorists. We should study the Indian and American cases not for the process by which self-reliance movements were overcome but rather for the reasons behind the successes they were able to achieve and the lessons they might provide of political openings today and smarter tactics in the future. Tickner seems to have had these concerns in mind, but her case studies conclude with the bare statements that statists have dominated communalist policies. I look forward to subsequent books and articles for her to draw out the significant lessons these cases can teach us.

Stephen Chilton *University of Minnesota—Duluth*

Outside Moscow. By Donna Bahry. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. Pp. 236. \$30.00.)

For many reasons, political activities in the USSR's fifteen union republics and lesser subnational units received little attention until the last two decades. The Soviet Union's own predisposition to centralism—the Communist

Party's elitism, and the autocratic rule of Stalin drew us toward a model of Soviet politics that largely excluded what was going on "outside Moscow."

Although it is difficult to pinpoint a time when such emphases began to be widely questioned and debated, the publication of such works as Hough's *Soviet Prefects* (1969) heightened interest in the role of subnational units in the making and implementation of policies as well as public and oblast-level variation in political leadership and mass political behavior. In the past two decades, North American, European, Australian, and Israeli authors have made considerable progress in unraveling the enormous diversity of subnational politics in the Soviet Union.

In *Outside Moscow*, Donna Bahry makes important strides in new analyses concerning the allocation of resources at subnational levels in the USSR. Hers is not a broad-ranging work, but rather one that seeks to mine center-periphery relations through the window of the budgetary process. Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative indicators (both primary data and stenographic reports from Party Congresses and Soviet sessions), Bahry attempts to probe the role of union republics and other layers of local authorities in the allocation of resources within the USSR. She argues from the outset that a "local revolution" has taken place in the Soviet Union, a concomitant of which is a greatly enlarged role for subnational units. With more programs to administer, says Bahry, republic and local party and state authorities find themselves on the horns of a dilemma: they occupy a more important role, with attendant demands from above and below, but lack the fiscal autonomy to do much at all about such demands. Moscow's control over revenue and resource-allocation decisions leaves republicans and local leaders no choice but to seek more funds from the center, in what Bahry regards as an ongoing lobbying effort. Bahry wants to mine the degree to which such lobbying really matters for subnational politics, i.e., whether or not they ultimately win or lose in the budgetary process.

Bahry's focus on the budgetary process has positive and negative implications. In concert with other studies utilizing the same or similar data sources, Bahry provides a descriptive portrait of center-periphery relations with quantitative detail that belies any residual belief in the uniformity of centralization of communist systems. The Soviet Union is not, Bahry argues, a political environment wherein commands from Gosplan dictate resource allocations. Central decisions which subnational units increasingly have been made to implement have political price tags that permeate throughout the system.

Some of the problems implicit to Bahry's analysis are those confronting most efforts to address politics in terms of budgets. There are, one can argue, intangible political goods that animate local political life and center-periphery relations as much, if not more than, issues of material resources.

resources Armenians, for example, are not enraged because Nagorno-Karabakh has been inadequately treated from a budgetary standpoint. Neither is fiscal federalism at issue in the Baltic republics. Rather, the values and symbols embedded in national identity "matter" far more than rubles in republican, oblast, or raion current budgets.

Focusing on the subnational unit's lobbying for budgetary growth in national fora—Party Congresses and sessions of the Supreme Soviet—does not account, moreover, for the formation of a "united front" to press for local interests. "Horizontal integration," which Bahry mentions (p. 157) but does not elaborate on, has been discussed widely in literature regarding other communist states. Such a phenomenon should be explored in depth in a book such as this, for in such a process may lie the key to the "success" of subnational units that Bahry is attempting to gauge. Although Bahry makes no claim to have produced a study of political life in any republic or local unit, one wonders how she envisions such political life and the process by which appeals to higher authorities are generated. Who, indeed, decides what to say and to whom appeals should be addressed concerning local budgetary needs?

Areas or regions most successful in their appeals to central authorities, Bahry hypothesizes, will experience rapid budgetary growth (presumably more than predicted by an incremental model). By equating success in budgetary politics with budgetary growth, however, Bahry implicitly raises questions about alternative definitions of political success for subnational political actors. Budgetary stability, or even a lower rate of budgetary decline, may connote success at times of greater national austerity. Some components of budgetary growth may imply success more than others for, as Bahry rightly points out, receiving central investments that enhance a locale's tax-base (i.e., by building local industry) means more for the long-term benefit of that subnational unit.

Bahry is appropriately careful about drawing too many inferences from her data base. She notes, for instance, that "central controls are greater than any simply tally of funds" (p. 42), and uses both qualitative and quantitative information when trying to assess regional influence. Yet how much the business of government has come under republican jurisdiction is sketched only in the broadest outlines by the distribution of expenditures. The "business of [Soviet] government" may be alternatively identified through the nomenclatura—that is, through personnel control.

Efforts by regional leaders to lobby for their constituency are gauged by Bahry through records of Party Congresses and Supreme Soviet sessions, specifically the speeches of subnational elites at such national fora. Issues mentioned in these addresses are categorized and frequencies are tabulated. Bahry finds remarkable consistency (p. 85) over time in subnational agendas.

but only slow and reticent central response. The appeals made by republican and local speakers have, Bahry thinks, a palliative effect on center-periphery relations, if only by providing a safety valve. She finds (in chap. 4) that regional allocations are not affected by political favoritism or status of republican and local leaders, and that incrementalism, levels of development, and other factors have a lot to say about central investments. Bahry's interpretations do not, in other words, suggest that locales can win much through assiduous lobbying efforts.

But, of course, the appeals made at Party Congresses and Supreme Soviet sessions do not constitute lobbying; they are neither part of a competitive political environment nor can they avail themselves of other techniques of influence (media, public associations, etc.) that are much more powerful than speaking at all-union fora. It seems very unlikely, then, that incrementalism and structural determinants would be overcome (unless by a decree from the top) in a system lacking alternative modes of expression.

"Rethinking Politics Below the National Level" (chap. 6) properly draws attention to the inadequacy of a "directed society model" for the USSR given the "myriad appeals from below." Particularly in the Gorbachev era, a much enlarged public political sphere must be examined thoroughly by Western analysis. Donna Bahry's book is a step in that direction.

Yet, one should question whether or not a "local revolution" that Bahry identifies in the USSR has occurred in light of her own data. If the local revolution consists of subnational elites being saddled by more problems, and consequently scrambling for more financial relief from central authorities, the changes might best be labeled as centrally-induced entropy. With the massive central bureaucracy unable to govern, the disability is now weighing down an ill-prepared subnational bureaucracy. The "rise of the republics" to which Bahry refers may be their demise.

Outside Moscow adds a dimension to our view of Soviet politics and reinforces the notion that Soviet federalism is burdened by enormous problems bequeathed from an overbureaucratized center. *Outside Moscow* does not say much about political life outside Moscow—any more than, for example, a book about the transfer of federal funds to an American state (using budgetary data and speeches of that state's representatives in Washington) would tell about political life in that state. Yet, the utility of Donna Bahry's book lies in her description of trends in subnational budgets and central investments, in the preliminary examination of what affects those trends, and in the ways through which republican and local units try to make known their needs for more funding or for different programs. These are worthwhile contributions to an increasingly complex image of Soviet political reality.

Daniel N. Nelson, *University of Kentucky*

The Military and the State in Latin America By Alain Rouquié (Berkeley University of California Press, 1987 Pp ix, 468 \$37.50)

Alain Rouquié provides more information on the modern Latin American military than in any other single volume. The author begins with five chapters on the historical development of the armed forces, emphasizing the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He underscores the time-honored point that professionalization produced institutionalized rather than personalized interventions, not abstention from domestic politics. The interaction between modernization of the military and the state is described. Readers will also welcome an unusual section on the impact of the United States.

Then Rouquié devotes another five chapters to country-by-country situations in the 1970s. That second half of the book covers most of the hemisphere, though it excludes socialist Cuba and Nicaragua. The treatment is subdivided into patrimonial military governments (e.g., Nicaragua under Anastasio Somoza and Paraguay under Alfredo Stroessner), model democracies (Costa Rica, Venezuela, etc.), democracies replaced by terrorist states (Chile, Uruguay), institutionalized military regimes (Brazil, Argentina), and revolutionary dictatorships of the armed forces (Peru). That typology is well conceived and executed. The country synopses are rich and balanced, though not terribly new for specialists.

This study concludes with an analysis of recent transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, including a 1986 epilogue to update the 1982 French edition. Rouquié makes clear the partial and fragile character of demilitarization in the hemisphere. Nevertheless, he expresses hope that the violent cycles of intervention and withdrawal may now become an unpleasant memory.

Time and again, Rouquié bemoans the inadequacy of most theories about Latin America's politicians in uniform. He especially finds broad conceptualizations unsatisfactory when imposed on the wide variety of roles and behaviors exhibited by the caudillos and generals. Indeed, much of the book is dedicated to debunking older generalizations. The author shows, for example, that the military is—of course—not necessarily monolithic, tied to the United States, or controlled by the bourgeoisie.

Instead of cultural, economic, or sociological explanations, he focuses on the functions of the armies themselves. Seeing both the state and the military as relatively autonomous entities, he claims that the armed forces are mainly driven by internal motivations. Rouquié may be correct to cast doubt on more global or structural models. But his insistence on a vast array of types and variables fails to offer any coherent alternative interpretative framework or logical set of causal factors.

While dissatisfied with existing theoretical formulations, this French political scientist does not really confront them. Although discarding the modern-

zation school, he misses the books by John J. Johnson and Edwin Lieuwier which constituted the major contributions of the 1960s. Nevertheless, his coverage of the military's historical evolution rediscovers many of their earlier points. Rouquié also neglects José Nun and the Marxian debate about the influence of the middle class on its sons in the barracks. He is only a bit better at engaging cultural interpreters of authoritarianism such as Richard Morse and Howard Wiarda. Dependency concepts are virtually unmentioned, although some of their tenets seep into the prose. Theories of the state are not discussed. The otherwise useful bibliography also slights some key historiographical items. The omission of Robert Potash's monumental works on the Argentine army seems particularly odd, since Rouquié is an expert on that country.

Most astonishing, however, is the complete absence of any reference to the main intellectual debate in the field in the last fifteen years. It is amazing that anyone could write a book on military rule in Latin America without addressing the bureaucratic authoritarian model of Guillermo O'Donnell. Skirting those issues also allows Rouquié to ignore related contributions by David Collier, James Malloy, and others.

The lack of theoretical involvement will render this volume less attractive to political scientists than to historians. Nevertheless, both groups of scholars will be eager to mine the wealth of empirical descriptions and details. The profession is indebted to Paul E. Sigmund for his translation of a very knowledgeable and insightful survey of the military in Latin American politics.

Paul W. Drake, *University of California, San Diego*

The Politics of Women's Rights. By April Carter. (London and New York: Longman, 1988. Pp. 211.)

The Politics of Women's Rights is a straight-forward account of women's economic and political status in Great Britain since World War II, intended "for the general reader interested in women's rights but not already familiar with the growing literature on women and on feminism" (preface). The goal of April Carter's ambitious book establishes its success and its failing. *The Politics of Women's Rights* is broad in scope and provides a solid introduction to women's condition in Britain, yet provides little analysis or critical summary of its descriptive contents.

Part 1 focuses on "The Position of Women Since 1945," an account of changes in women's employment status, women's rights in the workplace, the rights of immigrant women, women's pension status, women's access to education and vocational training, and women's political and citizenship status. The chronological examination of these changes sets the foundation for the

vestigating how these reforms were effected, and reveals how little British women's second-class economic and political status has been transformed. Women in the United States (Carter's major comparative reference) have been more successful in their struggle for change, and European Economic Community directives on women's rights have been responsible for much of the (modest) progress in Britain.

Identified as major impediments to improvement in women's condition are the electoral system, the judicial system, the party system (primarily but not wholly the Conservatives), the Thatcher governments, and until only very recently, the trade unions. The single-member plurality system in Britain has impeded the nomination and hence election of women to the House of Commons. The judicial system, with its heavy reliance on precedents, the lack of a written Bill of Rights, and a political culture less legalistic than that of the United States, has restricted women's ability to use the court system for redress and as a lever for political change. The dominance of the party system by the Conservatives and Labour has meant the sacrifice of women's rights to other issues. Tory monopoly of the Commons for the last nine years and Margaret Thatcher's economic policies have done much to halt the modest progress under way before 1979. Finally, trade unions, with their strong orientation to an organized industrial male working-class, and with strong emphasis on wages in negotiations, have been inattentive, and often hostile, to the goals of British feminism.

Part II is concerned with the political mobilization for changes in women's status in Britain, with special attention to the Equal Pay Act of 1970 and the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975. Chapter 5 presents specific case studies of the success of the British feminist movement and chapter 6 considers the extent to which legislation in Britain can remedy injustices and inequalities. Carter emphasizes the importance of cross-party coalitions in passing women's rights legislation, but provides little discussion of the connection between the British feminist movement and the legislative process. Implicit in Carter's discussion of the Equal Pay and Sex Discrimination Acts is a criticism of capitalism as a source of economic discrimination against women. Carter identifies mass unemployment, women's concentration in low-paying service-sector jobs, lack of protections for part-time employees, and government concern with how legislation ensuring women's equal economic treatment will impact upon profits as major factors undermining implementation of women's rights legislation. Carter reiterates two important factors supporting legal reforms: 1) the example of the U.S. experience (while limited) in overcoming sex discrimination, and 2) the role of the EEC in mandating changes in British law consistent with the EEC's more progressive policies. Unfortunately, Carter concludes Part II with an unsophisticated and outdated chapter on "Feminist Theory and Social Change." General

readers would have been better served if the author had used feminist theory as an introduction to her competent examination of women's rights and the legislative process, and as a foundation for her discussion of social change

Despite these shortcomings, *The Politics of Women's Rights* succeeds in its purpose. For the general reader, it is a useful introduction to the contemporary politics of women's rights legislation in Britain. For British politics scholars unfamiliar with women's rights, and for women's studies scholars unfamiliar with the British case, Carter's book is a good place to start.

Karen Beckwith, *The College of Wooster*

Making and Marketing Arms: The French Experience and Its Implications for the International System. By Edward A. Kolodziej (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987. Pp. xxv, 518. \$55.00.)

Kolodziej presents a well-documented and persuasive demonstration of the power of the arms industry in France, its ability to insulate itself from national politics in order to sell arms at home and abroad, and the adverse consequences for global security of such a situation. His study should be of equal interest to scholars interested in two topics. Those interested in domestic politics in France or in the nature of the policy-making process in modern democracies may focus on sections dealing with the power of elite civil servants and their industrial counterparts to make policy in the absence of political oversight. Those interested in international security issues and the escalation of risk through technology transfers will be equally pleased with Kolodziej's impressive work. Two initial chapters focus on the history of the arms industry in France through the Fifth Republic, a third chapter focuses on the economic and technological incentives to make and sell arms, two chapters focus on the internal politics of the arms industry and the French state, two chapters focus on foreign policy questions and the spread of arms, and a final chapter discusses the global security implications of the French experience.

Kolodziej's book should join a number of others which have demonstrated the impressive power wielded by prestigious groups of civil servants who dominate many of the largest and most important sectors of the French economy. He shows how a coalition of civil servants from the General Delegation for Armament (DGA) within the Ministry of Defense, other senior administrative officials, and their counterparts in industry are able to dominate public policy-making in their area. In this sense, Kolodziej's study parallels those by American scholars such as Suleiman, Scheinman, and Feigenbaum, or by Frenchmen such as Padioleau, Grémion, and Thoenig. These and other scholars present a picture of elite decision making in France in which poli-

ticians simply do not matter "This oligarchy is largely insulated from daily governmental direction and control and shielded from close public scrutiny Like the *force de dissuasion*, arms sales policy has been gradually depoliticized and bureaucratized under the Fifth Republic" (p xv) The ability of the arms sales community to develop a broad political consensus, and thereby to remove itself from partisan conflict, is one of the most important reasons Kolodziej sees for their success, and one of the most troubling

As in several other areas of French policy-making, the cohesive group of state bureaucrats which dominates the industry has succeeded in convincing others that their policies serve only such national priorities as grandeur, patriotism, economic growth, technological innovation, international competitiveness, and jobs Once this argument has been accepted, questions and criticisms of the industry are muted, if not ignored Political debate focuses on other (and most often, less important) topics Kolodziej points out how successive governments of the Left and the Right in France have followed similar policies of arms transfer This policy is not simply a remnant of Gaullism likely to disappear in the future "Elites across the political spectrum and the French public now accept the arms industry as a national asset It has assumed something of the sacred-cow status of the *force de dissuasion* Support for the arms complex, as for nuclear weapons, has been built from the top down" (p 208) The top-down creation of political consensus is key to the success of the arms industry, and it is based on strong economic arguments as well as on important symbolic images By creating and maintaining this favorable image, Kolodziej demonstrates, the arms industry removes itself from the "heat of partisan debate and the glare of public disclosure" (p 402) Nationalization of the industry does little to alter this problem of democratic control, since it does not change the nature of information flows, performance evaluation, or public accountability (pp 279 ff)

Kolodziej does not discuss other areas of policy-making in France, but his study adds to a literature which shows how many of the most important issues in French politics actually seem to be consensual, and therefore apart from political discussion Taken together, these studies present a new view of French politics and policy-making, one which is much more consensual than previously thought, or where the public fights of the politicians are increasingly seen as irrelevant Politics in France may sometimes be lively, but may often ignore the most important questions Kolodziej provides one of the most important examples of how the big questions in French politics often are the subject of elite consensus If the book stopped here, it would be a valuable source

Kolodziej has another, more central interest in this book which focuses on the international security implications of the French arms industry He notes how the international political economy of the arms industry leads to the ex-

calation of risk, since individual economic incentives force each state to sell more arms of increasing sophistication to a greater number of buyers. Kolodziej presents an impressive range of coherent and well-documented evidence to demonstrate this point, even if the point is not new. As he writes, the short-term rationality of individual states results in the irrationality of global escalation of risk. The domestic incentives to increase arms sales abroad, which are documented in the first sections of the book, are reinforced by an international marketplace which encourages suppliers to furnish arms of increasing sophistication and deadliness. "The developed states, especially those in western Europe, are on an infernal and perpetual treadmill largely of their own creation. Now developing states have achieved various levels of independence in armaments. Arms suppliers, like France, are impelled increasingly to sell quantities of arms of enhanced sophistication and to ease access to military technology in order to compete with other states." (p. 330) Kolodziej does not provide solutions to this problem, but his study points to many of the primary mechanisms through which domestic forces and international economic incentives affect the global security system. By giving extensive treatment both to the domestic and the international incentives to make and sell arms, this book provides an important synthesis of two approaches.

There are many ways in which Kolodziej might have improved his work. Unfortunately, each of the major criticisms which one might level at this book would result in an entirely different study. For example, he might have focused solely on the domestic politics of the arms industry, in which case comparisons with the military-industrial complexes in other countries or with other powerful state bureaucracies in France would have been useful. Similarly, his conclusion focuses on the relationship between individual-level and system-level rationality, and he might have provided a more formal or sophisticated analysis of this topic. Overall, however, Kolodziej provides an important addition to two bodies of literature.

Frank R. Baumgartner, *Texas A&M University*

The Politics of Economic Power in Southern Africa. By Ronald T. Libby.
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987. Pp. xxii, 361.)

The main objective of Libby's book is to challenge orthodox dependency theory's claim that economic relationships between the South African Republic and its neighboring black African states are decisively asymmetrical in favor of South Africa. A reconstruction of these relationships, says Libby, will support his theory that the black African countries are interdependent with rather than simply dependent upon, South Africa.

The book is rich in its detailed description and analysis of the economic history and the unfolding political drama of the subregion. Using a political economic approach, Libby gives an eyewitness exposition of the close similarities between the constraints and opportunities with the Southern African regional market and the differing economic and political capabilities of the main actors for avoiding these constraints and/or taking advantage of the opportunities. His excellent exposition makes two important contributions. First, it takes the student of African political economy beyond the broad generalities to which recent discussions about the impact of the front line states on South Africa's apartheid system have unfortunately been reduced. Second, it serves notice to exponents of that extremist branch of dependency theory for whom black African countries are nothing but passive playgrounds for external influences that domestic politics, especially statism, is well and alive in black Africa.

However, given his intention to disprove that asymmetrical political power exists between the economically dominant South Africa and its weak neighbors, the criterion of validity of the book, unfortunately, does not lie in the merits of its above strength but must be tested on the degree to which it actually exposes convincing mutual vulnerability for both South Africa and its neighbors. In this regard the book receives a mixed review.

On the one hand, the book successfully demonstrates mutual economic vulnerability. The black African countries have not succeeded in cutting the umbilical economic-cords to South Africa. In spite of their stated objective to disengage their economies, the ruling classes in the black African countries come back again and again to tap the foreign earnings of South African migrant labor and the investment and activity of its multinational companies to augment their government earnings and/or to build and boost domestic political support against legitimate opposition. For its part, South Africa must cling to its share of the regional market (for approximately 40% of its total manufactured exports, p. 48) to offset its rising trade deficit with the western countries.

On the other hand, whether economic interdependence can translate directly as mutual political vulnerability has to be based on considerations other than those with which Libby is so impressed. A verification problem in Libby's book revolves around the failure of the author to define rigorously the rather ambiguous terms he is working with such as dependency and interdependence. The criteria for vulnerability to one's regional partners must be assessed in terms of one's demonstrated autonomy in pursuing foreign policy objectives in spite of existing external pressures. Certainly there are political costs to both sides from any violation of their mutual economic interdependence. But are the costs so equal that one can announce the end to dependency in the area? The answer is no.

The political debate between Botha's National Party and the Conservative

Afrikaners Party over whether the regional involvement of South Africa's multinationals is equipping "the Marxist states on her border" (p. 87) with the wherewithal for guerrilla warfare against her does not carry the same implications for its foreign policy as the vulnerability to the black African states over their dependence on South Africa. Both parties in South Africa's domestic debate know very well that neither the emergence nor the continuing strength of the anti-apartheid guerrilla warfare depend on the resources South Africa channels to the front-line states, nor will it die with their curtailment—thanks to its external sponsorship. Thus, this debate does not imply any serious political cost for South Africa's foreign policy strategy to maintain its obnoxious apartheid policy while trading with black African countries.

Conversely, given the prohibitive cost of not trading with South Africa, the black African countries are compelled to abandon their foreign policy objective to destroy apartheid through economic disengagement from Pretoria. In contrast to the black African states, South Africa has never denounced its regional economic interdependence. And in that lies the sharp asymmetry in their degrees of political vulnerability. The harmony between South Africa's regional economic ties and its foreign contrasts sharply with the conflict between the foreign policy objective of the black African states and their regional interdependence with South Africa. For all Pretoria cares, it is just O.K. to relax as the issue of their economic interdependence with her continues to fan the flames of internal power struggles within her neighbors. To the extent that a greed for power forces the ruling elites of the front-line states to play into Pretoria's hands, they fit the comprador class model, i.e., the local branch of the international bourgeoisie without whom, according to dependency theory, peripheral domination by foreign capital is not possible. How one can describe that situation as amounting to equal vulnerability is not clear to me, and I did not find it explained in Libby's book.

Anthony Gadzev, *Texas A&M University*

Statecraft, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy Making: The El Chamizal Dispute. By Alan C. Lamborn and Stephen P. Mumme. (Boulder and London: Westview, 1988. Pp. 211. \$29.50.)

Power and Tactics in International Negotiations: How Weak Nations Bargain with Strong Nations. By William Mark Habeeb. (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins, 1988. Pp. 168. \$25.00.)

How can weak nations bargain successfully with strong nations? What accounts for the apparent paradox that a weak actor sometimes gets much of what it wants in negotiations with a much stronger actor? Neither Alan C.

Lamborn and Stephen P. Mumme nor William Mark Habeeb believe that existing theories of international relations address these important questions adequately.

Lamborn and Mumme argue first that recently released archival material reveals serious flaws in the conventional accounts of the El Chamizal controversy—a dispute between the United States and Mexico over tracts of land located between El Paso, Texas, and Cd. Chihuahua. The traditional explanation is flawed historically, because it assumes wrongly that the Hoover and Kennedy administrations launched the only serious American initiatives to solve the impasse which lasted from 1911 when the dispute began until 1963 when the United States and Mexico finally reached a settlement. Lamborn and Mumme discovered in their archival research that President Truman particularly made several attempts to settle the controversy for reasons and on terms essentially the same as President Kennedy's.

Then why did President Truman fail and President Kennedy succeed? Why too did President Kennedy agree to settle the El Chamizal dispute largely in accordance with Mexico's demands, despite the enormous gap between American and Mexican power? Lamborn and Mumme find theoretically flawed the rational actor/conventional statecraft explanation, "which emphasizes the nation as the primary unit of analysis and views governmental action as a rational choice in the strategic situation in the international environment" (p. 51). Nor, as they see it, do interstate power structures, interstate issue structures, or decisionmakers' perceptions about the future effects of certain possible outcomes on these structures suffice in themselves to account for the outcome of U.S.-Mexican negotiations. Lamborn and Mumme's approach integrates traditional theories of statecraft with Graham Allison's bureaucratic and organizational politics models and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's expected utility theory of strategic choice. Their approach also treats the strategic context of the negotiations and the politics of building domestic coalitions as interacting and contingent variables. Their coalition analysis focuses not only "on finding the key factions that are necessary to create and sustain coalitions" but on decisionmakers' reaction to tradeoffs between strategic and domestic political risk (p. 48).

Lamborn and Mumme demonstrate compellingly that their approach explains the course and outcome of the El Chamizal dispute. President Truman's 1948 initiative to settle the dispute largely on Mexico's terms failed because he would not and perhaps could not expend the significant amount of political capital necessary to persuade key recalcitrant domestic actors to go along. Facing a difficult presidential race against Governor Dewey, Truman declined to provoke a showdown with Texas politicians, particularly Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, whose campaign support he needed badly. Consequently the International Boundary and Water Commission (the IWBC) adamantly opposed

to any settlement which recognized *de jure* or *de facto* the 1911 Arbitration Award of the Chamizal favoring Mexico, succeeded in thwarting the president's initiative. Nor did Truman get much help from his State Department. Historically opposed to any settlement based on the 1911 award, the Department also lacked sufficient incentive to advocate controversial policies over which it had only marginal influence, given the dominant role of the IWBC.

Conversely, President Kennedy succeeded in building and sustaining a domestic coalition in support of his initiative, because he had greater political leverage than Truman and less political constraints. By the early 1960s, Texas politicians had come to support a prompt resolution of the El Chamizal controversy, even on Mexico's terms, because of the adverse effects of the impasse on El Paso's development. Texans also no longer controlled the congressional foreign relations committees, while Vice-President Johnson, a Texan himself, had no peer in his ability to build winning coalitions in the Congress. The Kennedy Administration benefited too from the retirement of IWBC Chairman Charles Lawson, long an intense and effective opponent of a compromise settlement. Meanwhile, the State Department had become strongly supportive of the Kennedy initiatives as it began to link the successful resolution of the dispute with broader American foreign policy objectives.

Lamborn and Mumme's study makes a significant contribution to the literature on power and negotiations. Their analysis illuminates why theories of foreign policy choice must assume a contingent relationship between domestic and strategic variables, that international negotiations require a process of coalition building, within and between states, that decisionmakers' assessments and thresholds of political risk will affect vitally the dynamics of coalition building, domestically and internationally. Lamborn and Mumme also reach some intriguing conclusions about the relationship between power and outcomes in weak states and strong democracies. What prompted the Kennedy administration to settle the El Chamizal dispute largely on Mexico's terms was not a shift in the power balance, where the United States' advantage still remained overwhelming. Instead, President Kennedy was willing to "overpay" the Mexicans on side issues such as the Chamizal in order to attract the support of weaker states in the "twilight struggle" with the Soviet Union (p. 141). Lamborn and Mumme suggest further that the greater the degree of shared interests or values between actors, the lesser the importance of power in explaining outcomes. In their view, the Kennedy administration could take the risk of conceding to Mexico's demands because of a surplus of power which insulated the United States from the consequences of failure of suboptimal choice. Whether Lamborn and Mumme's approach would apply with equal force to negotiations involving more closed, particularly communist, societies as the stronger actor or to disputes involving more vital issues than the El Chamizal remains an open question.

Certainly, Alison's bureaucratic and organizational politics models have less explanatory power for such negotiations, models from which Lamborn and Mumme drew heavily. These are, however, only minor criticisms of a book which presents its findings cautiously and convincingly.

William Mark Habeeb attempts, less successfully, to explain negotiations between weak and strong actors by integrating the interdependence paradigm with traditional theories of power. Drawing from his case studies of the Panama Canal negotiations, U S -Spanish base negotiations, and the Anglo-Icelandic Cod Wars, he argues that outcomes of negotiations between the weak and the strong depend not on the aggregate asymmetries between the actors' total resources and capabilities, but on the "issue power balance: the actor's capabilities and position vis-à-vis another actor in terms of a specific mutual issues" (p. 19). Three variables determine an actor's issue-specific power: control, the actor's ability to impose its preferred outcome unilaterally, commitment, i.e., the extent to which the actor needs the preferred outcome, and, alternatives, the ability of each actor to gain its preferred outcome from a relationship other than with opposing actors.

On the positive side, Habeeb succeeds partially at least in drawing useful distinctions between the aggregate power of states and the power states can bring to bear on negotiations involving a specific issue. He also identifies perceptively the contingent and interactive relationships among his key variables—control, alternatives, and commitment. Alternatives, he points out, can sometimes increase bargaining leverage, but at other times decrease commitment. Greater commitment likewise can work both ways: to increase the tenacity and hence the bargaining strength of an actor, or to weaken an actor's resolve because of its dependency and greater need for settlement. In his case studies, particularly his study of the Panama Canal negotiations, he broadens our understanding of how weak actors can improve their bargaining leverage significantly by raising the cost for strong actors who continue to insist on their preferred outcomes.

Unfortunately, the merits of Habeeb's analysis cannot compensate for its even greater flaws. In the first place, he relies exclusively on secondary sources, which detracts from the credibility of his often controversial conclusions. In the second place, he defines power too broadly as "the way in which actor A uses its resources in a process with actor B so as to bring about changes that cause preferred outcomes in its relationship with B" (p. 15). This obscures the critical distinction between power and influence, or what Lamborn and Mumme call the importance of shared values as distinct from power to explain the outcomes of some negotiations between the weak and the strong. Actually, too, Lamborn and Mumme's framework of analysis provides a more compelling explanation for Habeeb's case studies than Habeeb's framework itself. Consider the Panama Canal negotiations in their final phase during the Carter administration. The problem then was not between

the United States and Panama, which, even by Habeeb's account, reached agreement mainly because the Carter administration's policy of military disengagement from and greater sensitivity to the security of third world nations coincided with Panama's own preferences for the canal. The problem was to persuade a skeptical Congress to neutralize the intense domestic opposition to the Panama Canal Treaty which Ronald Reagan symbolized and aroused. Indeed, Habeeb admits that the Panama Canal Treaty depended largely on the window of opportunity brought about by the Carter administration's outlook and commitment to it, a window which President Reagan might have closed regardless of Panama's bargaining strategy.

In the third place, Habeeb's study promises more than it can deliver, with theoretical and methodological confusion as a consequence. He titles the book, structures his arguments, and presents his conclusions as an analysis generically of how weak nations negotiate with strong ones. His case studies do not support the breadth of the generalizations—a fact which he begins to acknowledge only on the last page of the text (p. 161). What Habeeb ought to have titled the book is how weak nations negotiate with strong democracies with whom they have a considerable degree of shared values and interests. Neither Panama nor Spain was an enemy of the United States. Britain and Iceland were NATO allies! In each of these cases studies, the stronger power had ruled out the use or threat of massive armed force as a serious alternative to resolve the dispute. A broader choice of case studies would have benefited Habeeb's analysis immensely. Would a study of Soviet negotiations with its Eastern European satellites or Soviet-Egyptian negotiations have yielded more circumscribed conclusions? Perhaps Habeeb may have discovered that a weaker state's level of commitment depends mightily on its assessment of whether the stronger power had the will and the capability to use force to achieve its preferred outcome. Panama and Iceland most likely strove for their preferred outcomes so tenaciously partly because they considered it unthinkable that the United States and Great Britain would use force.

Like other advocates of the interdependence paradigm, then, Habeeb tries to explain too much by generalizing from a very narrow and particular set of relationships. This is largely why his study not only fails to improve on but measure up to, the work of Robert Rothstein and others, who emphasize the importance of commitment as a source of a weaker state's power vis-à-vis a stronger state. Paradoxically, Lamborn and Mumme had more modest objectives than Habeeb, but accomplished so much more by a careful, cautious, and disciplined study of primary sources.

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The Origins of Alliances By Stephen M. Walt (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987. Pp. 321. \$32.50.)

One of the primary analytical and theoretical tools that international relations specialists utilize in understanding and explaining the behavior of states is the balance of power. For this reason, the "realist" paradigm, which relies most heavily on the balance among competing conceptualizations, has long dominated the field of study. From the philosophical realism of Hans Morgenthau to the structural "Neo-Realism" of Kenneth Waltz, much of the best theorizing about international politics has centered on an analytical focus on the stratification of capabilities among the aggregation of states as having the greatest amount of explanatory power in analyzing the behavior of individual states.

Recently, a number of Neo-Realist analysts have begun adding complementary conceptualizations to the structural "aggregate capability" explanation of individual state behavior. For example, they may now employ "balance of resolve" (e.g., perceptions of the relative strength of political will during the Cuban Missile Crisis) or "balance of interests" (e.g., the manifest symmetry in national interests in the relative importance of Western and Eastern Europe to the United States and U.S.S.R., respectively) approaches that may have greater explanatory power for particular crises. These theoretical innovations have been developed not so much as a critique of the "aggregate capability" school, but rather as a refinement. In so doing, such analysts have enriched both the theoretical literature of the international relations field and the general understanding of the behavior of states.

Within this context, Stephen Walt has written an important and theoretically significant book that continues in that tradition. Writing from the perspective of a neo-realist, he concentrates not on adversarial relations, which dominate so much of this analytical approach, but on the assumptions flowing from much of the balance-of-power school concerning alliance relations. Specifically, he examines two major conceptualizations, used by analysts and statesmen alike, relating to alliance behavior: *balancing*, which is allying with others against the prevailing threat, and, *bandwagoning*, which is its opposite, an "alignment with the source of danger." These concepts "depict very different worlds": if the former is more common, it is one in which states are more secure, because aggressors will face combined opposition; if the latter predominates, "security is scarce, because successful aggressors will attract additional allies," further rewarding aggression and destabilizing the balance, which may lead to war.

Through utilization of these simple yet analytically rich concepts, Walt systematically examines the behavior of states in the Middle East in the post-World War II era using essentially two levels of analysis: first, that of the

superpowers, which in his opinion often overestimate bandwagoning tendencies and underestimate balancing, and, that of small states in the region which, he argues, are more likely to balance than bandwagon. Through comparing state behavior at these two levels of analysis, he contrasts superpower expectations with actual small state behavior to test a series of postulates implicitly or explicitly embedded in the theoretical literature and assumption of statesmen.

Through his careful application of the concepts to the Middle East, Walt concludes that ideological affinity, superpower penetration of small power and generous amounts of foreign aid are all poor predictors of small state behavior, at least in terms of balancing versus bandwagoning. More provocatively, he argues that the overall patterns of the balance of power between the superpowers are also poor predictors. Small states tend to align according to their perceptions of "proximate threat" to their security, many of which come from regional rivals rather than the superpowers. Walt therefore offers a "balance of threat" hypothesis to explain small state behavior, rather than the concept of the global "balance of power." He believes the latter is often irrelevant to alignment patterns. By overestimating the tendency of small states to bandwagon toward an ascendent power, rather than balance to protect themselves, the superpowers overlook some of the inherent advantages enjoyed by status quo powers and the overwhelming importance small states place on regional rather than global balances. Though he notes some glaring and notable exceptions to the hypothesis, his overall conclusion is that small states demonstrate a far greater proclivity toward balancing than bandwagoning.

Though the work is parsimonious, elegant, theoretically significant, and clearly one of the best recent books on alliances, some bothersome questions remain. First, in this reviewer's opinion, Walt underestimates the role of ideology in alignment patterns, especially on the part of the superpowers. Though he acknowledges that ideology has an effect, he posits such a rigid definition of ideological "influence" that it is unlikely to be found anywhere. In the case of the U.S.S.R., for example, the test is that if ideology is an "important factor" then *any* state it aligns with must be "(1) ruled by a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, (2) following socialist economic policies, or (3) ideologically committed to opposing imperialism" (p. 186). This ignores the diplomatic flexibility demonstrated by the Soviets in their various "united front" tactics, which are justified as short-term expedients to attain long-term ideological goals. Thus to expect the Soviets to demand immediate ideological affinity with every state they align with is an unrealistic standard for judging the role of ideology in their foreign policy. Walt's conclusion that "although the Soviet Union has allied with leftist regimes [in the Middle East] and the United States has not, neither superpower has insisted that its allies follow domestic policies similar to its own" (p. 200) is thus largely irrelevant.

evant, no reasonable standard would predict such rigid behavior on their part. Pointing to such diplomatic flexibility by the superpowers does not explain away the sometimes ideological nature of their foreign policies. It is also stretching it a bit to dismiss U.S.-Israeli ideological affinity, which is often used to justify American support, by distinguishing Israel from the United States by calling it a "welfare-state theocracy" (p. 200). Regardless of the accuracy of this appellation, Israel is a parliamentary democracy and this fact—"the only democracy in its region"—is often pointed to by Americans and Israelis when explaining the alignment. Though this is partly to justify it to the respective publics, it arguably also has a real and profound effect on continued American support for the Jewish state. Think of the possible consequences if Israel were to become a Marxist-Leninist or fascist dictatorship. It is doubtful that the alignment with the United States would continue in anything resembling the same manner, and might not survive at all. Though Walt is correct in saying that ideology is not the only or most important determinant of alignment policy, and I am not sure who would argue that it was, he is guilty of underestimating its importance in *some* alliances. Uncharacteristically, in this area the author seemed to be forcing the facts to fit the framework.

Secondly, though he makes an excellent case for the 'proximate threat' hypothesis, some problems remain. It seems worth noting that the United States is allied with the only nation that is—at least since 1967—a 'proximate threat' to every other nation in the region (excepting Egypt after the Camp David agreement). If small states balance toward the less threatening pole and Israel—with its superpower patrons aid—is the greatest proximate military threat in the region, why then are not all Arab states, excepting Egypt, aligned with the Soviets? Walt acknowledges that 'Israel's Arab opponents have balanced by allying with either the United States or the Soviet Union, but not with one another' (p. 265). He explains this 'anomaly' by an Arab desire to 'pass the buck' to a superpower and the natural tendency of states to ally with distant patrons. But how did the United States, with its massive aid to the Israelis, escape becoming part of the 'proximate threat' that Israel represents? Why do the Arab states have any relations with the United States? Though he attempts to deal with this problem theoretically, it is an inadequate treatment when measured against the high quality of the rest of his analysis. In addition, curiously, his treatment of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is cursory at best. Why did this not send the Arab states rushing to balance with the United States, which he admits was seen as weak and vacillating at the time? There is virtually no attempt to explain this anomaly, a seminal event in the region's history, and one which challenges his hypothesis.

Lastly, though Walt's analysis is careful and sophisticated, his prescriptions for U.S. policy are sure to be controversial. Since foreign aid, attempts

at penetration and ideological solidarity play but small roles in the creation of alliances, he argues, they should play but a small role in U.S. policy. Similarly, since any attempts by the Soviets to increase their influence in the world will be met by small states scrambling to balance with the United States, the latter "can afford to take a relaxed view of most international developments" (p. 282). This represents a kind of reverse "Domino Theory" if one state "falls" to the communists, the others will quickly "fall" toward the United States. The problem is that this policy prescription has all the pitfalls of the mechanistic application of the "Domino Theory" with none of the inherent safeguards. If the "Domino Theory" is wrong, i.e., the dominos do not fall, the United States is still in pretty good shape and in a state of preparedness; if Walt's balancing theory is wrong, i.e., states start to bandwagon, the United States is potentially in deep trouble. Thus the potential costs of following Walt's policy prescriptions are such that it is doubtful decisionmakers would, or should, be willing to take the chance.

Yet, these questions and caveats do not lessen the intellectual value of this book. It is a highly readable, theoretically important work that should be read by all political scientists. For international relations specialists, it is perhaps the most significant work on alliances in the past two decades. This book is highly recommended.

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The Soviet Study of International Relations. By Allen Lynch. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Pp. 197. \$34.50.)

An excellent book, written in part to examine trends identified by William Zimmerman in his pioneering work, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956-67*, Lynch explains the genesis of Soviet theorizing concerning international relations. In doing so, Lynch not only enriches our understanding of Soviet theories, he provides a prism through which Western conceptions and theories may be viewed, enabling us to learn more about our own world views.

Lynch argues that two theses, with accompanying tensions, dominate Soviet theories of international relations. Prescriptive as well as descriptive, one thesis integrates eschatological, mechanistic, deterministic, universal "objective" factors. Economic determinants and class analysis obtain, and the inevitability of socialism is predicted. Political behavior is the consequence of, and explained by, "antagonistic" contradictions existing between society's means and modes of production, which foster classes and subsequent conflict. History is the resolution of antagonistic contradictions through mechanics of the dialectic.

A second thesis emphasizes "subjective" factors: the primacy of politics

probable and conditional variables, indeterminism and voluntarism, with states as leading actors. Although socialism triumphs, centuries may elapse.

Lynch traces the evolution of these two theses through the apocalyptic predictions of Marx, Engels, and Lenin that antagonistic contradictions among capitalist states would lead to war and world-wide proletarian revolution, to Stalin's contribution—"Socialism in One Country." In Stalin's "two camp" doctrine, capitalism pitted against socialism was the salient antagonistic contradiction. Led by the United States and Soviet Union, each developed alliance systems containing "sympathetic socio-economic structures" (p. 19). Conceptually, the two-camp doctrine posited a bipolar world containing incompatible socio-economic systems with the resultant likelihood of war between them.

Yevgeniy Varga (1946), an intellectual progenitor of the second thesis, concluded that the imminent collapse of capitalism was unlikely and war between capitalism and socialism not inevitable. For Varga, only two specific laws of imperialism held: the exchange of free competition for protection and regulation by the state, and the partition of the world into essentially proletarian and bourgeois countries (p. 28). Other conclusions concerning international relations must be the product *only* of critical sociological and empirical analysis.

Examining the significance of the twentieth CPSU Congress (1956), Lynch confirms four trends in Soviet theory first identified by Zimmerman: "[F]irst, the view of international relations as an arena populated by a plurality of corporate actors, with states (as opposed to the two camps) as dominant; second, increasing attention paid to the role of institutions as sources of foreign policy conduct; third, recognition of the non-inevitability of world war in the nuclear age; [and] a marked tendency for Soviet perspectives

to converge with much American analysis" (p. 33). With the 1969 round table of Soviet scholars, organized by Vladimir Gantman of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, the Soviet study of international relations emerged as a legitimate, multi-disciplinary effort freed to a much greater degree, from the ideological straitjacket of Marxist-Leninist catechisms.

Summarizing Soviet views of American systems theorists, Lynch analyzes several Soviet scholars' efforts to elaborate systems theories, particularly Elena Modrzhinskaya, Dimitri Yermolenko, Andrey Kokoshin, and E. A. Ioznyakov. Soviet scholars cannot incorporate Western systems analysis wholesale for danger attaches to authoritative explanations of international relations between capitalist states or between capitalist and socialist states, which also might explain international relations among socialist states. Consequently, Soviet efforts to develop a satisfactory systems theory are often perplexing.

Over time, a discernible conceptual core has emerged. At a fundamental level, the structure of the international system is a multi-level, integrated

system which is bipolar, reflecting in large measure the enormous conventional and nuclear capacities of the United States and U S S R. This system constrains the behavior and limits the choices of states. Central to analyzing constraints is the Soviet concept of the "correlation of forces"—"the distribution of power in the international system at any given time" (p. 94). This correlation is asserted to be moving in favor of socialism. "Objective" factors employed to determine the correlation of forces include economic, military, and technological indices in addition to "subjective" factors such as political consciousness and ideological conviction (p. 93).

To conclude that the correlation of forces is moving in favor of socialism does not mean that the United States has been displaced as the world's most powerful and influential state, instead, since the 1960s, there has been (1) an absolute and relative increase in the Soviet Union's military capacity, (2) the *relative* weakening of the economic position of the United States in relation to its chief capitalist allies, (3) the development of the national-liberation movement, and (4) the decline in American political morale as a result of Vietnam (pp. 97-99).

Although "multipolarity" is acknowledged, Soviet theorists remain unenthusiastic. (1) multiple actors reduce the imperative of the United States to deal directly with the Soviet Union on critical issues, (2) the proliferation of actors increases the possibility of uncontrollable or catalytic events, (3) multipolarity may suggest reduced Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe, and (4) the United States continues to occupy the central position in critical economic-military-political axes (p. 96).

Within a fundamentally bipolar international system, attenuated by multipolarity, critical "subsystems" include "inter-imperialist relations," "inter-socialist relations," with "international organizations" playing an indirect and insignificant role. Although trends suggest imperialist unity resulted from a perceived threat from the socialist camp, detente and multipolarity enhance "class-neutral elements such as geographical position and national interest" and, in the critical European theater at least, afford[s] the Soviet Union a greater space to compete for influence than would be the case in a strictly bipolar international order" (pp. 112-113).

Examination of "inter-socialist relations" or "international relations of a new type" is much more problematic and tortuous. For example, although "class-neutral elements" such as nationalism may play a significant subjective role in inter-imperialist relations, they are less significant in inter-socialist relations because class character overrides in socialist states. Or contradictions within the socialist world are non-antagonistic, "located in (a) differing levels of socio-economic development, (b) differing historical cultural and political conditions, (c) remnants of 'national hatred', and (d) differing geographic positions with corresponding implications for material resources and foreign policy" (p. 123).

Ironically, Soviet conceptions of the "scientific-technical revolution" (STR) have reintegrated "processes which have always lain at the very heart of Marxist-Leninist theory the politization of international economic relations and the interrelationship between foreign policy and domestic politics" (p. 137). With the "military factor," nuclear weapons, as a product of the STR, have attenuated the relationship between war and revolution. With the "economic factor," advances in the STR as well as the "international division of labor," not only force all states to compete economically in order to sustain and enhance their standing, the STR has validated Varga's conclusions concerning the viability of capitalism.

Although very well researched and presented, Lynch's book suffers from difficulties associated with any examination of Soviet theoretical efforts in the social sciences. What are the "real" views of Soviet international relations theorists?

Reasons for these difficulties are twofold. First, Soviet scholars work in collectivities such as research institutes where obvious intellectual advantages to collaborative effort as well as economies of scale are offset by greater constraints on scholarship. Although a full range of views exists within these collective enterprises, public expression usually represents a more conservative, prevailing point of view—a common denominator.

Second, whereas American scholars may engage in theoretical work for its intrinsic value, the instrumental element of Soviet scholarship is compelling, as well as conflicting. To serve policy-making interests, theories should explain, thereby helping inform the leadership. Theories should also support prevailing ideological assumptions. Lynch's work reflects well the intellectual gymnastics and tensions in which Soviet theorists struggle with conflicting ends. Creative consequences lead to conceptual distinctions such as "objective" and "subjective" factors and the "correlation of forces." Emasculating consequences lead to a demigration of "multipolarity" and "polycentrism," and an inability to accord nationalism and pluralism their proper theoretical place.

I hope Lynch will return to this subject soon, particularly as official insistence on *glasnost* enables Soviet theorists to present publicly a more unexpurgated view. I also hope he will allocate greater attention to Eastern European views than he was able to do in the present volume. Lastly, to at least the same extent Zimmerman achieved in his work, I hope Lynch will provide some sense of how, in an instrumental sense, theories of international relations are employed by contending bureaucratic forces to enhance their own domestic position and thus, over the longer term, influence Soviet foreign policy. Nevertheless, this remains a valuable contribution to Soviet studies.

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Evaluating U S Foreign Policy Edited by John A. Vasquez (New York Praeger Publishers, 1986 Pp 241. \$38 95.)

As the editor notes in his introduction, the foreign policies of states have not yet been systematically evaluated by those who study the subject. This book is intended to aid in the development of the capacity of scholars to effectively evaluate a state's foreign policy. In order to achieve this goal, Vasquez asserts that science can assist foreign policy decisionmakers in two ways, by demonstrating knowledge of how and why the world works as it does and by providing feedback about the consequences of foreign policy. According to the editor, a person engaging in evaluation research should specify the criteria a foreign policy should follow and then conduct careful, unbiased studies to determine whether these criteria have been met.

In line with the chief points in his introduction and in order to assist scholars with their evaluations of foreign policy, Vasquez has brought together a number of essays that evaluate the Reagan administration's foreign policy. In the first section, four studies consider Reagan's hard-line stance toward the U S S R. These are Michael Wallace's assessment of several basic assumptions of Reagan's defense policy, Russell Leng's examination of the precepts of political realism, which he considers the administration's outlook, and how these precepts affect crisis bargaining, Louis René Beres' sharp criticism of Reagan's nuclear strategy, and Anatol Rapoport's analysis of the global strategies of the two superpowers that he believes negatively affect the structure, functioning, and evolution of the international system. The second section contains three studies that evaluate specific policies of the Reagan administration. The three are Neil Richardson's examination of the American government's use of economic sanctions in its Soviet policy, E. Thomas Rowe's assessment of the impact of Reagan's human rights policy on nongovernmental organizations working in this area, and Howard Zinn's comparisons of the Reagan administration's policies in Central America with the moral values in the Declaration of Independence in which he finds that America's policy in that region is not moral. Finally, the third and concluding section contains two essays that look toward the evaluation of foreign policy in the future. The first of those essays is by Richard Ashley who explains why liberal positivism is inherently inadequate as a basis for successfully evaluating foreign policy in a scientific manner. He presents an alternative to liberal positivism that he calls a "critical-dialogical approach." The second chapter in the section is by the editor who discusses a taxonomy of foreign policy designed to aid in studying and evaluating foreign policies.

Although the variety of scholarly approaches presented in this volume is admirable, the differences among the contributions are so great in many respects that discussing them as a group is a difficult task. How should these

studies be evaluated? One way would be to evaluate each on its own explicitly stated criteria. This is impossible, however, because the authors do not give the criteria by which their individual works should be evaluated. Furthermore, the contributors appear to have at best only a limited agreement among themselves regarding the overall task of evaluating a state's foreign policy. In fact, going further, Ashley's broad attack on liberal positivism makes it appear doubtful that he approves at all of the work of some of the other contributors. It is clear that each reader will have to determine for himself or herself the appropriate criteria for evaluating each chapter. It is a near-classic understatement to say here that this collection of studies is a "mixed bag."

If the editor's call for objectivity in evaluating foreign policy is taken seriously, then it ought to be asked how objective the authors were in their individual pieces as well as how objective the editor was in his choice of contributions. In regard to the former, the studies by Leng, Richardson, and Rowe, for example, appear to be careful and fair in their procedures and conclusions while in the other direction, Peres and Zinn excoriate the Reagan foreign policy approach from start to finish in colorful, passionate language. Is such passion consonant with 'objective' scholarship? Although there are different views about this, many readers are likely to find at least a couple of the contributions to be highly biased. Moreover, the editor's objectivity is called into question by the fact that every policy examined in his collection of essays is found to be mistaken. This volume certainly looks as though it was designed to show how recent American foreign policy could be criticized and found wanting from a number of viewpoints.

Finally, are the papers dated or still current in their material? And if several are dated, does this affect the validity of their assessments? As this review is being written, the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union have just signed a treaty eliminating intermediate-range missiles in Europe and there is also a good deal of serious talk that next year the two governments will make deep cuts in their arsenals of ICBMs. But if these large cuts in nuclear arms go into effect, the very hard-line policies toward the Soviet Union that several of the contributors have argued are hopelessly flawed failures and may be found later to have contributed in an important manner to what will become this administration's most widely acknowledged foreign policy success. In short, it looks as though major events have overtaken several of the studies and their evaluations.

Despite its weaknesses, this book ought to be read by all students of foreign policy. Although a fair amount of it is unconvincing, at a minimum, it challenges the reader to come to grips with major questions.

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Ethnic Groups and U S Foreign Policy Edited by Mohammed E Ahrari
(New York Greenwood Press, 1987 Pp xxi, 178 \$35 00.)

When are ethnic groups likely to influence U S foreign policy? How influential are they likely to be? The traditional answers are not often and not much, with caveats for a few notably exceptional groups and, even then, with influence restricted to certain issues at certain times. The findings presented here cause us to refine but not fundamentally revise our conception of ethnic groups and foreign policy. This book builds a more complex and varied picture, we can now better specify the characteristics, organizations, issues, and policy and political environments that facilitate or frustrate ethnic group influence on foreign policy.

The volume has eight chapters on groups ranging from the giant of ethnic influence to the least effective. These are bounded by a short analytical introduction and concluding assessments. While every author poses a slightly different analytical question, each provides a complete survey of the groups, their organizational and political history, their issue positions and concerns and their impact on U S foreign policy.

Ahrari's chapter concerns the "Domestic Context of U S Policy toward the Middle East." He examines how pro-Israel groups restrict the influence of pro-Arab groups during agenda setting and formulation stages of the policy process. Factors he investigates in comparing these strongest/weakest competitors include public image stereotypes and the role of mass media. Despite the organizational, political, and media advantages of pro-Israel groups, Ahrari concludes that the most crucial determinant of pro-Israel groups' success lies elsewhere, in the congruence of their objectives with U S and Israeli strategic interests.

Steven L. Spiegel also treats Middle East policy in "Ethnic Politics and the Formulation of U S Policy Toward the Arab Israeli Dispute." He provides an excellent short survey of the pro-Israel lobby: its organization, influence attempts from Truman through Reagan, and reasons for its successes and failures. Like Ahrari, Spiegel also analyzes the relative strength of pro-Arab groups. Both authors find that the pro-Arab lobby has made important gains in recent years, but as Spiegel concludes, they are "still no match for American Jews" (p. 41). Concerning group influence, Spiegel reaffirms existing expectations: ethnic groups exert less influence than other foreign policy determinants, and their "primary influence—when it exists—is on Congress and on public debate" (p. 23).

A third perspective on Middle East policy is provided by Mitchell Bard in "Ethnic Group Influence on Middle East Policy—How and When: The Cases of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and Sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia." He examines formal and informal (indirect) lobbying efforts in terms of the "balance of lobbying power" between pro-Arab and pro-Israel groups.

Bard concludes that both find their influence "constrained by other domestic variables" and that their resources are contingent upon the "political context and issue" (p. 62).

These three chapters provide a comprehensive, detailed look at the giant of ethnic influence on U.S. foreign policy, the pro-Israel lobby, a term all three authors prefer as more inclusive and more accurate than Jewish lobby. The result is a portrait that reveals less success achieved with more effort, and under more contingencies than the general literature leads us to expect. The three chapters are especially valuable in also describing and contrasting the objectives, strategies, resources, and organizational dynamics of pro-Arab groups. The remaining five chapters deal with groups that receive far less attention in the foreign policy process literature.

Blacks are the focus of Ronald W. Walters's "African-American Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy toward South Africa." He asks why, given the relative size of this group and its impact on domestic policy and in electoral politics, their influence on foreign policy toward Africa in general and South Africa in particular is so low. Noting recent gains in elite mobilization, including black ambassadors in important posts and in organizational development of TransAfrica, Walters concludes that a major limit on their influence is the low priority of Africa issues for key policymakers.

Polish-Americans are treated by Z. A. Kurszewski in "The Polish American Congress, East-West Issues, and the Formulation of American Foreign Policy." This chapter focuses on organizational development and changes in the Polish American Congress, particularly from World War II through the Helsinki Accords. Kurszewski like Walters explores the connection between voting strength and group influence. For Polish-Americans, he finds some potential electoral clout for some twenty Senators and twenty-four congressional districts, but he emphasizes the limited regional nature of this linkage.

Rudolfo O. de la Garza presents a study of U.S. Foreign Policy and the Mexican-American Political Agenda. He begins with a question similar to Walters's: "Why, given the size and electoral strength of this group, is its influence on foreign policy much less than in domestic politics?" This author provides a more explicit analytical framework than the others where he highlights the role and resources of ethnic groups as foreign policy actors. Unlike Walters's finding, the main limit de la Garza finds is the low saliency of Latin American policy issues among Mexican-Americans, among the ethnic constituency rather than policymakers. He finds neither a substantive cultural, nor political basis for expecting "a more active Mexican-American role" (p. 112).

A contrasting perspective on Latin American policy is provided by Damian J. Fernandez in "From Little Havana to Washington, D.C.: Cuban-Americans and U.S. Foreign Policy." This group, like the pro-Israel lobby,

has exhibited a strong and continuing commitment to exert influence on foreign policy. Fernandez explains reasons for the successes and failures of Cuban-Americans, primarily during the Carter and Reagan administrations. These comparisons highlight differences in ideological environment and the fact that each administration reached out to a different segment of the Cuban-American community. He finds that influence is dependent upon a coincidence of world views between the ethnic group and the administration. "Convergence of interest," he states, "is the key variable"; in fact, he argues persuasively that ethnic group influence is "dependent and variable instead of independent and constant" (pp. 116, 132).

Robert J. Thompson and Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr. survey "Irish-Americans in the American Foreign-Policy-Making Process." Since this is "perhaps the oldest and most enduring" of the early immigrants (p. 135), this survey of organizational development—especially of the variety of Irish-American organizations—resources, and issue concerns must cover considerable ground. The authors find only limited effectiveness for this group, depending on the difficult nature of their issues, organizational weaknesses, and changes in the American political system.

As an edited volume, this book exhibits the natural diversity of methodology, analytical approach, and level of analysis that multiple authors use. Some chapters include more recent evidence than others; the Cuban-American study, for example, closes with 1985. But for research on this subject, on which one scholar is not likely to be competent, virtue lies in including a sufficient number of different ethnic groups and therefore authors. Ahrari tries to pull together some common themes and general tendencies in his concluding chapter. This attempt achieves less than the sum of the parts. Many readers will be disappointed that so few cross-group and cross-issue comparisons are provided. Readers really must intensively examine all of the chapters to gain the rich diversity of the authors' findings. Ahrari does present, however, several interesting summary points. Most important is his assessment that the "growing hyperpluralism of the American polity is also enabling the ethnic groups to pick up the pace of their activities *without necessarily enhancing their influence*" (emphasis added, p. 155). Also important is the finding that ethnic group influence is more a function of reaching out by executive and legislative actors, for allies than of groups persuading policymakers to advocate their goals. These studies document an influence pattern in which the key dynamic involves policymakers reaching out, seeking allies to include in supportive coalitions. These studies also confirm the importance of ideology and beliefs as determinants of influence. Ahrari concludes that "congruence of strategic interests" is a key variable (p. 156) which sometimes facilitates and sometimes limits opportunities for ethnic groups to influence U.S. foreign policy.

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Articles



Moving Beyond Fear: Rousseau and Kant on Cosmopolitan Education

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Recent attention to the role that education can play in averting the danger of war has raised anew the question of the relationship between education and character formation. Contemporary peace educators seem to rely chiefly on enlightened fear. Immanuel Kant's writings offer both a diagnosis of the psychological causes of war and a proposal for dealing with them through a new scheme of education. If the passionate desire for honor is the problem, Kant argues, the moral love of honor — in other words, the attachment to human dignity — is the solution. Education can serve to connect honor and morality. Yet Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose *Emile* arguably inspires much of Kant's moral psychology, suggests that true cosmopolitanism is too rare to be a reasonable political goal. The disagreement between the two turns on whether morality is innate or must be constructed in human beings out of other elements.

1 THE PERPETUATION OF PEACE AND THE CULTIVATION OF CHARACTER

Recently, as attention has focused on the arms race, educators in many fields have considered how they can help end that race and securely establish peace. From this concern a decentralized movement aiming at what it calls "peace education" has arisen. In a short time, it has accomplished much: the National Education Association and the Educators for Social Responsibility have developed curriculum units for elementary and secondary schools; universities have "peace studies" programs; and special issues of professional journals have been devoted to the subject (Ryerson 1986; Sloan 1983a; Young 1981).

While it would be misleading to say that all peace educators agree on everything, many agree that if we learn about the dangers of nuclear war and

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the interdependence of nations, we will try to end the arms race. They believe or hope that properly induced fear will produce a new generation of world citizens who will try to establish world peace (Berman 1983, Schell 1983). In other words, like Hobbes, peace educators believe that in promoting peace "[t]he Passion to be reckoned upon, is Fear," and that enlightenment can be used both to engender and to direct this fear (Hobbes 1968, 200, 378–85, 407–408, 728–29).

Yet, relying on fear is problematical. It may demoralize or disable, producing surrender to a tyrant, not action on behalf of a decent, peaceful world order. If fear leads to action, it may not be pacific, some may try to eliminate their threatening opponents rather than nuclear weapons. Lastly, we may doubt that fear can guarantee peace in the long run: as the threat becomes more remote, the fear it causes may become less intense, finally giving way once again, to other passions.

Some peace educators concede that if there is to be 'perpetual peace' another foundation must be laid (La Farge 1987, Sloan 1983b). But given what they regard as the pressing task of inculcating enlightened fear, they have not thought about this next step.

Inasmuch as intellectual history seems to be repeating itself, we may be able to learn something from it. The most prominent and tireless proponent of perpetual peace in the early eighteenth century, the Abbé de Saint Pierre, approaches the subject in a manner quite similar to that of the peace education movement. Like the peace educators, he assumes that his audience—in this case, monarchs—are much more interested in peacefully enjoying what they have than in acquiring more. He assumes, in other words, that they are more fearful than ambitious or spirited and that this fear, once enlightened, will lead them to support an alliance guaranteeing the status quo. Following Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the Abbé's editor and critic, Immanuel Kant recognizes that fear and ambition in themselves are simply forms of self-interest and that the balance between them is inherently unstable. Unless everyone—monarchs and subjects or citizens—is made positively devoted to peace, any international order will degenerate into self-seeking.

Kant knows that enlightenment alone cannot produce that devotion: a certain human type must be cultivated. The problems of his time are, he argues, due to the fact that "culture, considered as the genuine education of man as man and citizen, has perhaps not even begun properly, much less been completed." Along with the discipline, cultivation, and civilization promoted by current schemes of education, "moralization" is required (Funkt

¹ For Saint Pierre's proposal, cf. Castel 1927, and Perkins 1959. For Rousseau's critique of Rousseau 1927. In general, cf. Hinsley 1967, 40–61, and von Raumer 1952. On Kant's familiarity with these works, cf. Kant 1970a, 47, and Kant 1970b, 92, along with Borries 1925, 220; Natorp 1924, 22–23, and Vorlaender 1919a, 15.

1979, Kant 1963, 62, Kant 1913, 800, Kant 1974a, 186).² We must ask how this goal can best be accomplished, considering first which of our traits make us prone to conflict. Having identified these traits, we can think about how to overcome them. We must begin, then, with an account of human psychology.

II THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SOURCES OF CONFLICT

Kant seems at first not to offer a consistent account of why we engage in conflict, speaking of both "the warlike inclination of those in power" and "the depravity of human nature," which is "largely concealed by governmental constraints in law-governed civil society" but "displayed without disguise" in international affairs (Kant 1970c, 95–103). Either some people—the emphatically political types who hold power—are warlike, or all are.

This difficulty can be resolved by considering Kant's analysis of why states go to war. Rulers are tempted to go to war, he says, not because they are inherently different from their subjects, but because they personally have much to gain and little to lose. If they had to share the burdens of war with their subjects, they too would seem to be pacific. The difference between ruler and ruled depends on political position, not on character. The pacifism often attributed to republican or democratic peoples is as contingent as the aggressiveness of ambitious leaders.

Indeed, Kant knows that there still are societies where the warlike inclination is widespread and martial virtue is praised. For some, courage is not a means of national defense, but an end in itself, for whose display wars may be initiated (Kant 1970c, 111–12, Kant 1960a, 28n). Underlying this attachment to war is the desire for honor (*Ehrtrieb*).

Now, someone might argue that this problem will eventually disappear. With the rise of the commercial republic and its "bourgeois populace," "commercial courage" will replace the "warlike courage" associated with "the concept of honor among the old martial nobility." Two arguments can be advanced against this claim, however. First, the desire to gain distinction in war is not just a thing of the past, for it prevails in societies not yet altered by the enlightenment (Kant 1970c, 111, Kant 1960a, 28n). Such countries could, by the "generosity" of nature or of some developed nation, acquire modern weapons and threaten the security of others.

More importantly, the characteristics that have replaced martial valor are not simply conducive to the creation and maintenance of a peaceful order.

²I have often changed translations from the German and, where none is available, have made my own.

³Cf. Kant 1979a, 152–61 and Kant 1970c, 114. For a discussion of the kind of institutional arrangement that would lead a republic to be pacific, cf. Madison 1973, 250–53. For a treatment of "commercial courage," cf. Tocqueville 1969, 402–403, 622–23.

Even if people are now more pacific, they are not immune to considerations of national honor and the bellicose appeals of leaders. The force of this argument is obvious from the popular responses to the U.S. "rescue mission" to Grenada and to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands.⁴ There is no simple institutional solution to the problem of perpetual peace.

Hence Kant argues that it must be and is possible to provide cosmopolitan substitutes for, or to transform, the passions that incline us to war. To understand his position, we must examine his account of the desire for honor.

In his view, our natural bodily needs are simple, we seek peace and gratification, which seem largely to be within the reach of each of us (Kant 1970a: 45, Kant 1960a, 85, Kowalewski 1924, 276). Absent a complicating factor, it seems possible for human beings to be quite independent of one another: freedom and gratification seem to be consistent with one another.

Yet, this condition cannot be sustained, for we have other needs as well. Thus, a person has "an inclination to *live in society*," since he feels in this state more like a man, that is, he feels able to develop his natural capacities. Here, satisfying desires becomes complicated, for people become concerned with their reputations. This concern has two powerful natural sources. First "[t]he inclination to freedom is the most vehement of all inclinations in natural man—in a state where men cannot help making mutual claims on one another." Once we have contact with others, we want to be independent and to have nothing to do with them. We do not want our happiness to depend on "the opinion or power of others" (Kant 1970a: 44, Kant 1974a: 135, Kant 1913, 736, 785–86, 790, 854–55).

This longing cannot be satisfied, partly because it conflicts with one of the "strongest impulses of nature"—sexual love. In Kant's view, this passion compromises our independence when it is mixed with or affected by reason and imagination, making its satisfaction more complicated and more pleasant. When this occurs, sexual desire, whose satisfaction yields a transient and intense sensual pleasure, becomes sexual love—the response to which is a more uniform and moderate pleasure in the imagination. Women and men are no longer one another's interchangeable "sex objects," but rather human beings with particular preferences who can give or withhold consent. To gain this consent, each needs to persuade the other; each must be concerned with

⁴ Cf. also Alexander Hamilton's (1961) discussion of "the paradox of perpetual peace" between the States in *Federalist* #6.

⁵ Kant seems to distinguish the inclination to live in society from sexual love—we are not social beings only because we are sexual beings. Still, the dependence that arises from human sexuality can be regarded as the most extreme example of that which arises from human sociability. Both challenge our longing for freedom and both lead us to be concerned with honor. According to Kant, we seek honor to make our freedom more secure—to promote our own welfare insofar as it depends upon other people—and to bring those we prefer to prefer us in turn. Cf. Kant 1913: 788 and Kant 1942: 163–64.

the other's opinion and hence with his or her own reputation (Kant 1974a, 142, Kant 1963, 56–57, Kant 1913, 784, 860, Nichols 1986, 201)

Thus, our two most powerful natural inclinations contradict one another: we desire independence but seek to become dependent. We try to resolve this contradiction by gaining enough power to command the assent of others, controlling rather than depending upon their wills. We seek to realize "the idea of power combined with freedom" by which alone ends in general can be attained.² The things which seem to command the respect and cooperation of others are honor, wealth, and power (Kant 1974a, 135–137–38, Kant 1913, 856). We hope that by having them we can reestablish our independence, bending others to our will instead of being subject to their whims. But rather than resolving the contradiction between freedom and dependence, this apparent solution hides and deepens it. Our attempt to satisfy these needs makes us subject to others: for these powers are simply new needs which we cannot satisfy by ourselves.

In Kant's view, this attempt to regain independence creates problems, first of all for each of us. The attachments to honor, power, and possessions tend to become passions, so that we pursue them "not for the independence to which we believe they contribute, but for their own sake." Once we forget the general end, we have no principle to regulate our pursuit of them. A passion is thus "an inclination that prevents reason from comparing it with the totality of all our inclinations when we are making a choice." We no longer consider what mix of pleasures will make us happy. Reason does not serve the general pursuit of happiness but is rather enslaved to a particular passion (Kant 1974a, 120–21, 133).

Passions also blind us to the consequences of the single-minded pursuit they dictate. We can so insist on being honored by others that we offend them, demanding that they abase themselves in order to raise us up; of course, they will not comply and may even seek to humiliate us, denying us the honor we ardently seek (Kant 1964a, 135–36, Kant 1974a, 75–81, 134, Kowalewski 1924, 273–75).

Along with this pragmatic critique, Kant offers a moral critique of passionate people: they do not accord themselves or others the dignity they deserve. They enslave themselves for the sake of their ends and treat others only as a means. Passionate lovers of honor abjectly depend on others' opinions and on the accidents enabling them to win acclaim. If they cannot sustain their accomplishments or lose the talents that won them honor, they will sink as low as they once were high. Their sense of dignity depends wholly on accidents. They value themselves only to the extent to which they are hon-

²As Kant (1913, 860) says: "Because . . . the capacity to satisfy any and all inclinations has unlimited utility, its value in our imagination becomes limitless, and it is through this that inclinations become passions."

ored. In addition, they do not care for their fellows except as sources of honor. Whatever passionate lovers of honor do to or with others, they do merely to satisfy their desire (Kant 1913, 485, 487–88, Kant 1975, 667).

Furthermore, passionate people cannot easily liberate and moralize themselves, for passions are settled dispositions which, in effect, coopt their reason. As Kant says, “passions . . . are consistent with the calmest reflection so that they need not be thoughtless, like affects, . . . but tend to get themselves rooted and can coexist even with subtle reasoning” (1974a, 120–21, 133, 134). Until passionate people become aware of the conflict between reason and inclination, they cannot begin to cultivate moral virtue.

Besides posing pragmatic and moral problems for individuals, the passion for honor causes political problems, such as competition. Passionate lovers of honor are not satisfied if all receive it. Their honor depends on comparison: not with some absolute standard, but with the abilities and achievements of others; they are satisfied only by a feeling of superiority. Since we all desire at least some honor, we are reluctant to accord it to others at our own expense. Since, moreover, honor and superiority are closely connected, someone could choose conflict to demonstrate his or her superiority over others and hence win honor (Kant 1974b, 41, Kant 1970c, 111, Kant 1913, 545; Kowalewski 1924, 274–75).

Now, we might argue that this account of the harmful consequences of the love of honor best describes the motives and behavior of aristocrats who seek distinction solely in war. Those who seek honor in the more pacific pursuit of wealth or of petty advantages over others pose a different problem. In one respect, the difficulty is less that they always seek war than that they do nothing positively to foster peace. They will not give up seeking petty advantages in order to become part of a cosmopolitan order. The commercial spirit itself is generally unsociable. . . . Of course, since such people could be unwilling to make the sacrifices necessary to prosecute a war, their indifference could support a precarious peace. But since this selfish attachment to peace and comfort has no necessary connection with any principle supporting international cooperation, it is unreliable. Indeed, Kant implies that such vain people are especially subject to attempts to arouse “national pride,” for such efforts “already presume [the existence of] a spirit of seeking advantage.” While aristocrats make a point of individual pride, vain bourgeois seek superiority however they can, either individually or collectively. As few have the talent to compete successfully for honor or advantage, the collective arrogance of “national folly” may be an attractive alternative to many. The vainglory of the few may wane, only to be replaced by the collective vanity of the many (Kant 1913, 480–81, 489, 591, 783, Kant 1974, 177n, Kant 1970c, 100). The world would still be far from the attainment of perpetual peace.

If the various human types who ordinarily predominate are unlikely to be receptive to cosmopolitanism or actively to support the perpetuation of a cosmopolitan order, Kant must provide the outline of a cosmopolitan personality and show how it can be brought into being.

III KANT'S CONCEPT OF COSMOPOLITAN EDUCATION

Kant's proposed education is avowedly "cosmopolitan," aiming at "the universal good and the perfection to which humanity is destined and for which it also has a disposition" (Kant 1960b, 15).⁷ He advocates a process aiming successively, at four goals: discipline, the acquisition of a trade, "cleverness," and morality.

He repeatedly says that "[m]an is an animal that needs . . . a master." Without discipline, we would remain wild and unsuited for any further education. We must become accustomed to living according to rules given by reason. In the best case, we could all rule ourselves, but for a child it is impossible. Until it can control the anarchy of its own desires, someone must do so for it. Discipline is thus a negative propaedeutic for any further education (Kant 1913, 609, 621, 644, 652, 782, 785; Kant 1979b, 249; Kant 1960b, 2-5, 26).

Of course, further education is necessary for subjecting people to rational restraint does not prepare them to be citizens. They may be docile subjects, but they are not yet ready to be co-legislative citizens of a republic, for they cannot maintain their legal independence. Without a trade enabling them to produce goods for "public sale," they must depend on others for their livelihood. Unable to acquire the material requisites of independence, they cannot judge and will freely for themselves. We all need instruction in a trade so as to be able to acquire this legally-recognizable independence (Kant 1970b, 74-79; Kant 1965, 79; Kant 1960b, 18-19, 69-70).

This stage is also insufficient. We need only think of the charitable industries that train and employ the mentally handicapped to realize that an obedient and skilled worker is not necessarily capable of taking care of himself or herself or of participating in self-government. No amount of manual dexterity will avail one who lacks cleverness (*Klugheit*). Without this faculty for getting along with others and making their way in the world—for "using [their] fellow men for [their] own ends"—they will soon be exploited or enslaved. The formal capacity for independence—signified by the possession of a skill for producing goods for the market—must be supplemented by a sense of how this capacity can be effectively used. Once we acquire this cleverness, we will be able "to turn civil society to [our] purposes and to accommodate [ourselves] to it" (Kant 1960b, 15, 19, 30-31, 95-96; Kant 1913

⁷On the reliability of this text, cf. Weisskopf 1970.

800–801, Kant 1964b, 83n) This, Kant says, is what it means to be educated as a citizen.

We may ask if someone so trained is not a better *bourgeois* than *citoyen*. Such people may be hard to deprive of their rights but may regard fellow “citizens” only as potential means to their ends. To combat this attitude such a person must also be educated as a “patriot,” who “regards himself as authorized to protect the rights of the commonwealth by laws of the general will, but not to submit it to his personal use at his own absolute pleasure. Patriots are equal “member[s] of a state” not [subjects]” or despots; they regard their fellow citizens as siblings (Kant 1970b, 74, Kant 1934, 498–511). This attitude is best cultivated in a public school, where students are more likely to learn to measure their powers with those of others and to know the limits imposed upon them by the rights of others. The child perceives that the rules which restrain it are applied to all children—accustoming itself to obeying universal rules. Thus “[p]ublic education is the best school for future citizens” (Kant 1913, 519; Kant 1960b, 15, 25–29, 86; Kant 1979a, 167–69).

Throughout this process the Kantian educator cannot lose sight of the end of human growth and development: the capacity for freedom. This is no mean task. One of the greatest problems of education is how to unite submission to the necessary *restraint* with the child’s capacity to make use of his freedom. How can this problem be solved? We have seen that early in a child’s life, it can only be restrained. As soon as possible, however, other means of gaining obedience should be attempted. As the child grows older it begins to show signs of a longing to be honored and loved. This desire makes it possible to employ a range of new educational techniques: it should thus “be cultivated as much as possible.” Instead of viewing a transgression as connected with physical pain or deprivation (should they be so unfortunate as to be caught), youths should learn to view it as a denigration of their dignity, as a failure to live up to their potential. A transgression would then be connected with a loss of the esteem of others, but—more importantly—with a loss of self-esteem (Kant 1960b, 27–83, 84–87–89, Kant 1979b, 46–47). This attachment should be closely connected to the educator’s efforts to promote the youth’s love of virtue.

Kant offers a lengthy account of this love of honor, arguing that it is the constant companion of virtue. The connection works as follows: unlike people who passionately desire honor and positively pursue it, noble lovers of honor seek mainly to avoid dishonor. This crucial difference follows from the fact that the latter compare themselves to an absolute and immutable standard—not to the status of others. Their standard is the moral law, from their subjection to which they gain a sense of their dignity as human beings and a sense of humility in seeing how far short of moral perfection they fall.

Then pride in their moral potential leads them to try to hinder their animal desires from dominating pure practical reason in their character and to refuse to yield anything to others in their assessment of their own worth. To the extent that they are satisfied that they are doing all they can to fulfill the moral law, they need not depend on the opinions of others for an affirmation of their own dignity; with this internal standard they are the only judges they need. They will neither dishonor themselves nor let others dishonor them.⁸

In fact, this sense of worth is the psychological *sine qua non* of the cultivation and practice of moral virtue. Only when people feel that they owe it to themselves to live up to their potential will they try rationally to control their desires, not just to increase their pleasure, but also to assert their inner dignity. Keeping themselves under control does not necessarily lead to "objectively" praiseworthy acts, but it can help them avoid those which incur blame. Their aversion to falling short of their potential and dishonoring themselves is reinforced by their sense of the great distance between their present condition and the moral perfection of which they are in principle capable. Knowing the sublime heights to which they can, and should, ascend, they cannot be satisfied with anything less. The humility attending this recognition should also prevent them from arrogantly demanding more respect from others than they deserve and than the others ought properly to give (Kant 1974c, 195; Kant 1964a, 132, 134).

Kant thus takes an inclination that might otherwise threaten moral autonomy, not to mention peace, and turns it into not only a propaedeutic to morality, but also a constituent part of our moral character. Elicited by an education that emphasize[s] above all the *shamefulness* of vice, not its *harmfulness* (to the agent himself), the moral love of honor can replace its divisive aristocratic and bourgeois counterparts (Kant 1964a, 156).

Now, Kant's prescriptions for implementing this education are rather sketchy; he freely admits (1913, 617) that the art of education is still in its childhood. But his analysis of the love of honor is nonetheless suggestive. In the first place, much of the educational process should be negative, concerned with avoiding such morally destructive developments as the growth of vanity. Thus praise should be meted out sparingly and should never be given for anything frivolous. Indeed, the emphasis should be quite heavily on avoiding shame rather than on winning honor. According to Kant, "Virtue is not pure when its motive is taken from the winning of honor. But it is not made impure when the motive is taken from the dishonor that accompanies the loss of honor." While honor all too often depends on the ap-

⁸ Cf. Kant 1974a, 125; Kant 1979b, 215; Kant 1974b, 41; Kant 1974c, 194, 95; Kant 1975, 609; and Kant 1964a, 101, 135.

plause of others, we can be ashamed of ourselves. A Kantian education would thus stress self-control above all else (Kant 1960b, 94, 106, 108, Kant 1934a, 137, Kant 1974c, 222–23).⁹

Kant's account seems, however, to be open to a serious objection. To the extent that morality is tied through education to pride and shame, it might seem no longer to be autonomous. Both the education and the inclinations seem to call moral freedom into question. But, in the first place, Kant insists that these feelings are immediately associated with consciousness of the moral law, "which of itself finds entrance into the mind and gains reluctant reverence (though not always obedience)." This reverence "is a feeling produced by an intellectual cause" and, indeed, "the sole genuine moral feeling" (Kant 1956, 76, 88, 89). Both our shame as subjects falling short of this law's demands and our pride as its authors follow directly from our consciousness of the moral law. These feelings contribute to heteronomy only if they supplant or precede this consciousness.

So long, then, as educators focus first and foremost on the moral law—appealing to pride and shame only in connection with it—they are unlikely to fall into this trap. The feelings will arise more or less "naturally" as the youths are made conscious of the law they have within themselves. Of course, it remains necessary to avoid simple indoctrination in moral education. Thus, Kant's "catechetical method" treads a fine line between the "dogmatic method" and the "method of dialogue." Given the sources of confusion in themselves and in society, most students need some guidance. Left simply to their own devices, they would probably be misled or mislead themselves. Still, the content of the moral law "can be developed from ordinary human reason"; it is immanent in each student's thinking and need only be elicited by the teacher's questions. As essentially a "midwife," the teacher does not compromise or foreclose the possibility of the student's freedom. Having been brought to clarity by a variety of questions, they can then adopt for themselves the moral law (Kant 1960b, 112, Kant 1964a, 150–51, Kant 1964b, 72–73).

In sum, if it is carefully conducted by a teacher who already knows the moral law, moral education does not—either in itself or through its connection with proper pride—make moral freedom impossible. Although it is in principle unnecessary—indeed, it relies on the fact that we are all innately capable of hearing and heeding the call of morality—it is helpful in practice.

⁹Kant would thus probably favor an educational honor code such as that in force at the University of Virginia, the germ of which can be found in Thomas Jefferson's "Rockfish Gap Report." It may well be questioned whether fear after a certain age is a motive to which we should have ordinary recourse. The human character is susceptible to other incentives to correct conduct. Pride of character, laudable ambition, and moral dispositions are innate correctives of the indiscretions of that lively age. "Jefferson proceeds to suggest the possibility of establishing a police exercised by the students themselves, under proper direction [which] has been tried with some success in some countries." (Jefferson 1973: 334 and n).

especially to the extent that we wish to promote the greatest and most widespread possible development of true morality (Wood 1970, 76–78)

And as it becomes widespread, this love of honor can have salutary political consequences. Because the honor we seek depends on an absolute standard, our pursuit of it need not lead to competition. Not only can all win honor, but one's honor need not imply another's dishonor. Thus, this love of honor can easily be reconciled with equality. In Kant's view, we can know only that we are all equally subject to a moral standard, we cannot know certainly whether anyone lives up to its demands. External conformity to the moral law says nothing about a person's intentions: he or she may do the right thing for the wrong reason. If we take at face value one person's claim that he or she acted morally, we must accept everyone's claim. Anyone who demands respect because of conscientious conformity to the moral law must accord everyone the same respect. As Kant says: "There is nothing unjust or unreasonable in self-esteem: we do no harm to another if we consider ourselves equal to him in our estimation. Of course, true pride is accompanied by a certain humility. If we acknowledge our subjection to the moral law and recognize how far from perfection we are, we will not demand too much of others" (Kant 1960a: 56–57, Kant 1964b: 74–75, Kant 1979b: 127, Kant 1974c, 195: 224–25).

Pride in our infinite worth, engendered by a moral transformation of our love of honor, can replace both aristocratic and bourgeois competitiveness. Those educated in this way would be good citizens of their states and of the world: peace could then be perpetuated. If Kant is right, peace educators ought to think about the cultivation of character in a way resembling that described earlier.¹⁰

We may well doubt the practicability of Kant's scheme, at least in our situation. After all, for peace to be perpetuated by education, it must already exist.¹¹ Before then, no regime concerned about its survival will undermine the spirited devotion of its citizens. How Kant hopes to attain that end is a story best reserved for another time, for it requires an inquiry into his understanding of history and of how intellectuals can affect political life. We can be better served now by an investigation of the reasonableness of the educational project in and of itself. Is it really possible to educate a class of cosmopolitans?

IV. THE ROUSSEAU-KANT CONNECTION

We can approach this question by examining the relationship between Rousseau's and Kant's accounts of education. While the latter clearly not only

¹⁰For a recent example of this sort of thinking, albeit one that focuses on "drawing out" individual uniqueness as a way of cultivating self-esteem and human dignity, cf. Reardon 1978: 35.

¹¹Cf. below 824.

admires the former but also borrows heavily from his psychology of conflict, the differences between the two accounts serve to raise questions about the practicability of Kant's recommendation (Vorlaender 1919b).

A cursory analysis of the two reveals the similarity of their treatments of love of honor. Like Kant, Rousseau argues that our natural needs are simple: naturally, man's "desires do not exceed his physical needs," extending only to "food, a female, and rest." Like Kant, for Rousseau the extension of human needs and the complication of human life follows upon entry into society, which awakens *amour-propre*, an exaggerated self-love intimately bound up with the opinions of others. In society, they agree, each person becomes enslaved to the whims of others. And in seeking the preference of others, each person asks the impossible. As Rousseau says, "*amour-propre*, which makes comparisons, is never content and never could be—because this sentiment, preferring ourselves to others, also demands others to prefer us to themselves, which is impossible."¹² Once this point is reached, conflict is inevitable. If we are to live in peace, we must be freed from our unhealthy dependency on one another.

Despite their agreement on many points, the two differ on how to resolve this problem. Both argue that "cosmopolitan" education is necessary, but their schemes differ markedly. For Kant, cosmopolitan education must proceed in public schools; for Rousseau, it must be conducted privately. Rousseau's cosmopolitan is Emile, who, because of his education, believes that it is best that he depend as little as possible on anything, including the assistance and forbearance of others. He lacks the degree of *amour-propre* characteristic of others: "[H]is education . . . , not having fomented *amour-propre* and a high opinion of himself, has diverted him from seeking his pleasures in domination and in another's unhappiness" (Rousseau 1978a: 251). He is as free as can be from the needs that would enslave him and require that he enslave others. Hence he is unlikely to seek conflict either for its own sake or for the sake of goods he does not value.

He is, moreover, so little a simple patriot or nationalist that he spends two years choosing where he will live—only to conclude that "I shall begin by not depending on [the fortune my parents left me]. I shall loosen all the bonds which attach me to it . . . Rich or poor, I shall be free. I shall not be free in this or that land, in this or that region. I shall be free everywhere on earth. All the chains of opinion are broken for me . . ." (Rousseau 1978a, 472). As he believes he can live anywhere, he is a cosmopolitan (Rousseau 1978a: 451).

Emile is clearly the product of an extraordinary education, requiring the continuous and undivided attention of a most subtle tutor. No such education could be undertaken by an ordinary public school teacher. Whatever its

¹²For Rousseau, cf. Rousseau 1986: 150, 164, 173–76, 180, 183, 187; Rousseau 1978a: 82, 53, 212–15, 233, 471, and Schwartz 1984: 16, 22, 27, 32, 81. For Kant, cf. above: 812–14.

virtues, *Emile* cannot serve as the basis of a political project of cosmopolitan education. Hence Kant (1942, 29) cannot simply borrow Rousseau's model: "It is unnatural that a person spend the greater part of his life teaching a child how it should lead its life. For this reason, tutors like Jean Jacques are artifices. . . . It is fitting that a person spend his life teaching as many how to live as will make the sacrifice of his own life worthwhile. Schools are therefore necessary. No 'altruist' with a political aim would wish merely to be a tutor like Jean-Jacques, who can give only one education" (Rousseau 1978a: 51). Only as the basis of a widely effective educational system would Rousseau's scheme be attractive to those like Kant who have political hopes. Thus, Kant (1942, 29) wishes that Rousseau had shown how schools could arise out of [*Emile*].

Of course, Rousseau does not intend in *Emile* to provide for a system of public education, insisting that "[p]ublic instruction no longer exists and can no longer exist, because where there is no longer fatherland, there can no longer be citizens." In *Emile* at least, a treatment of this topic "has nothing to do with my subject . . . one cannot make both [a man and a citizen] at the same time" (Rousseau 1978a: 39–40). The difference between educating *Emile* and educating citizens is that in the one case the aim is to rear a young man who comes as close as can be, in civil society, to the independence and unity of natural man, while in the other it is to "denature" people, to transform "each individual, who by himself is a perfect and solitary whole, into a part of a larger whole from which this individual receives, in a sense, his life and his being, [to alter] man's constitution in order to strengthen it, [and to substitute] a partial and moral existence for the physical and independent existence we have all received from nature." Public education aims at creating citizens, who are utterly devoted to their homeland, love their fellow citizens, and treat foreigners harshly; they are hardly citizens of the world.

We must ask two questions: can Kant have it both of Rousseau's ways, joining *Emile*'s moral independence and autonomy to the citizen's devotion to the commonweal? Can such civic affections as are possible be extended to encompass the whole world? Now, *Emile* does become a citizen, choosing after his travels to live at home, but his political concerns follow from his attachment to, and responsibility for, Sophie and the family he hopes to have. He may be able to maintain himself anywhere, but he is not so sure of his ability independently to take care of his family. His attachment to his wife and children will always precede and qualify his concern of the common good.

In other words, if individuals are connected to the political order through "ben" (more or less natural) affection for their families, citizenship in a par-

¹ Cf. Bloom 1986: 76–77; Masters 1968: 11–12; Rousseau 1978a: 39–40; Rousseau 1978b: 68; and Schwartz 1984: 48–49.

ticular regime may be a conditional quality.¹⁴ People who are citizens largely because they are parents and spouses cannot be expected readily to sacrifice, or even to risk, their private affections for the common good.

But if the family is the basis of civil society, why is it necessary that society be restricted within so narrow a compass? Why could not cosmopolitanism follow as directly from the concerns of parenthood as participation in a narrower political order (La Farge 1987, 125–71)? Rousseau would be dubious of this possibility, as he is of cosmopolitanism altogether. It is usually, he argues, more a cover for self-love than a real solicitude for the welfare of all others. We ought to “[d]istrust those cosmopolitans who go to great length in their books to discover duties they do not deign to fulfill around them. A philosopher loves the Tartars so as to be spared having to love his neighbors” (Rousseau 1978a, 39, Rousseau 1978d, 162). The effort of reason and imagination required to extend our affections beyond a small circle may have an unexpected consequence: instead of making us cosmopolitans, it may make us individualists. By explaining away our intense affections for some in order to persuade us to feel them for all, our preceptors may lead us to conclude that our only “reasonable” affection is for ourselves.

We may be able to take another path to cosmopolitanism, starting from Rousseau’s claim that the “two principles prior to reason” in our souls are self-love and pity. Before the genesis of “conjugal love and Paternal love” only pity can, in a limited way, qualify self-love. Because it is by compassion for sufferers that we experience our common vulnerability and become attached to our species, this sentiment could be the basis for cosmopolitanism. But pity is often weak, yielding to stronger passions like self-love and the love for others. The attachment to particular human beings will almost always overcome the attachment to the human race.¹⁵ Also, in most civilized cases this general sentiment is stronger the more narrowly it is focused. As Rousseau (1978c, 219) says, “It seems that the sentiment of humanity evaporates and weakens as it is extended over the whole world, and that we can’t be moved by calamities in Tartary or Japan as we are by those of a European people. Interest and commiseration must in some way be confined and compressed to be activated.” We can more easily take the imaginative leap of sympathy when those who suffer are like us. Instead of combatting naturally narrow affections, compassion commonly follows their lead (Orwin 1980: 327–29).

Thus “natural commiseration . . . no longer dwells but in a few great Cosmopolitan souls who cross the imaginary barriers that separate Peoples and . . . embrace the whole of Mankind in their benevolence” (Rousseau 1986

¹⁴Cf. Bloom 1978: 27; Kelly 1987: 141–42; Masters 1968: 13; Rousseau 1978a: 362–63, 173; and Schwartz 1984, 50–52.

¹⁵Cf. Bloom 1978, 17–20; Masters 1968: 50–51; Rousseau 1986: 132, 161–62, 174; and Rousseau 1978a: 214–15, 221–25.

184) They are not likely to be patriots, parents, or lovers. Having "taken on the sad job of telling the truth to men," they live somehow apart from their fellows, unable to take the time to "cultivate their friendship in sweet association . . ." (Rousseau 1978a, 474). If this is true cosmopolitanism, it is hard to see how it is sufficient to perpetuate a peaceful world order.

However attractive this life is to some, it is unlikely to be popular. In Rousseau's view, most must choose between self-love and love for others. We are more likely to be taken outside ourselves and attached to a larger society through the family or another "domestic circle" (Kelly 1987, 145–47, 162). This seems at best to lead to affection for a limited rather than a global, political order. Without another way to overcome vanity and promote sociability, it is hard to see how Kant can sustain his advocacy of cosmopolitanism.

He can do so because he disagrees with Rousseau on a crucial point. While for Rousseau the desire for honor is a relative sentiment connected with opinion, this is not entirely true for Kant. For him, the love of honor is more than merely a "true [child] of love and leisure" (Rousseau 1986, 175); it has an independent source in the human psyche, enabling us to pursue honor without either coming into conflict with others or becoming slaves of public opinion. And it is on this sentiment, as we have seen, that Kant's program for public moral education depends.

Also, the "natural" human inclination to live in society seems at least potentially to disjoin its scope from the (more limited) scope of human affections. The society in which we are inclined to live is one that offers us the most room for the development and exercise of our faculties. Given our moral potential, this must ultimately be, in Kant's view, a universal ethical commonwealth.¹⁶

Finally, our common sense of dignity in being subject to the moral law helps us overcome—or at least accommodate—the differences which might otherwise irreconcilably separate us. We can see that our common traits are much more important morally than what distinguishes us. Because we can moralize our previous particularistic attachments, fitting them into a moral framework—the "kingdom of ends"—we need never wholly abandon them. While "[n]o generally valid principle of legislation can be based on [anyone's particular conception of] happiness, 'any possible' generally valid principle" must be compatible with a variety of tastes and inclinations. After all, moral people do not simply abandon their pursuit of happiness for the sake of morality; rather, they expect to be able to unite morality and happiness. For this reason, Kantian cosmopolitanism can be combined with a certain sort of attachment to a particular nation or political order: it does not simply require the abandonment of the nation-state. A person can be moral and maintain his

¹⁶Cf. above, 812, and Kant 1960a, 85–100.

roots in a particular community. Someone who is 'a patriot out of principle is a cosmopolitan' (Kant 1913, 873).¹⁷

We may conclude, then, that the disagreement between Kant and Rousseau over the possibility and desirability of an extensive project of cosmopolitan education turns on an answer to the following question: Does ordinary morality derive primarily from a transformation of some human passion, as Rousseau believes, or do we have an innate moral capacity, as Kant (1960a, 31, 117, 149) asserts? In the first case—allegiance to most regimes will follow from attachment to a family, and the latter will condition and restrict the scope of the former. True cosmopolitanism will be a rare development of pity, restricted to people like Rousseau and Kant and not obviously very effective politically. In the second—everyone is in principle capable of cosmopolitan morality, and public moral education can contribute to its realization. But we all remain very far—nay, infinitely far—from the moral perfection that would enable us actually to constitute ourselves as members of a kingdom of ends. Whether or how the progressive realization of an infinitely distant—and hence unattainable—goal is a prudent political intention is a question that must be reserved for another time.

Still, it is one that peace educators must ask themselves: for if fear is an unreliable basis for a comprehensive and perpetual peace, then something else must eventually replace it. If there is no adequate and practicable cosmopolitan substitute, we may have to learn to live with, if not necessarily to love, 'the bomb.' And even if there is such a substitute, prudent statesmanship may have a more substantial and legitimate role to play than peace educators seem willing to concede. Kant himself argues that successful cosmopolitan education can only follow from the willing support of the authorities and that it is not reasonable to expect such support until the concrete political situation permits or even demands it. He calls those who insist prematurely on such measures 'despotic moralists' (Kant 1970a, 51, Kant 1979a, 167, 169, Kant 1970c, 119). A realistic education for peace would enable citizens to understand and appreciate the steps taken by political leaders in the short term that promote the long-term goal. For Kant (1974a, 3)

'Cf. Kant 1970b, 80; Kant 1913, 591; Kant 1964b, 61, 102; and Meyer 1926, 198, 200. Nichols (1986, 205) overstates the rational and universalistic character of Kant's conception of the moral law: absolutely denying to moral people 'any private interests or passions.'

Kant's expectation or hope is that eventually states will become culturally diverse: 'nature's law regarding a people of the same race . . . is not to let their characters constantly and progressively approach one another in likeness . . . but instead to diversify to infinity the members of the same stock and even of the same clan, in both their bodily and their spiritual traits. The state should protect only the private sphere, putting [citizens] in the position of making themselves happy in every way. And as moral cultivation becomes more and more possible, national character may give way to individual character, as people come to govern themselves in accordance with moral principle—to determine themselves as individuals—national idiosyncrasies may fade' (Kant 1913, 511, 850, 853; Kant 1934b, 560; Kant 1974a, 174, 185).

anthropology or knowledge of human nature from "a *pragmatic* point of view"—that is, knowledge of what man as a free agent makes, or can or should make, of himself—is perfectly consistent with cosmopolitanism. In order to make human beings and the world better, we must first learn and teach about them as they are.

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Strategies in Certiorari Voting on the United States Supreme Court

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Do justices on the United States Supreme Court pursue strategies in their certiorari voting? We inspected seven terms from the Vinson, Warren, and Burger Courts and discovered that justices use the error-correcting, prediction, and majority strategies, particularly when the strategies are consistent with each other. Such use is not indiscriminate but usually is tempered by the presence of adverse conditions.

We also investigated the error-correcting and prediction strategies through the focus of liberal and conservative justices in liberal and conservative courts. These two strategies and their combination work best for conservative justices in conservative courts. Liberal justices in liberal courts are substantially more grant-prone than conservative justices in conservative courts.

A number of Supreme Court scholars have maintained that justices pursue various strategies in their certiorari voting (e.g., Baum 1989: 99–101). Such strategies need not be the sole or even the most important determinant of the certiorari voting of the justices. Indeed, Baum (1989: 95–104) lists and explores five other variables. In his discussion, however, Baum contends that strategies are important. Three possible strategies may be suggested: the error-correcting, prediction, and majority strategies. In this paper, we will investigate these three strategies.

CERTIORARI STRATEGIES

The Error-Correcting Strategy

The error-correcting strategy assumes a direct, positive relationship between voting to grant certiorari and voting to reverse at the final vote on the merits. Baum (1985: 97) maintains that "a justice who sees a court of appeals decision as wrong will be more likely to vote for acceptance of the case than is a colleague who views the court of appeals' judgment as correct."

Ulmer (1972) assumed this relationship and also assumed a relationship between voting to deny certiorari and voting to affirm at the final vote. He investigated the certiorari behavior of 11 justices in the 1947 to 1956 era and

concluded that these justices pursued the error correcting strategy. Baum (1979, 111), unimpressed with Ulmer's findings, argued that "the conception of a close linkage between case-screening decisions and decisions on the merits must be rejected for the 1947–1956 Supreme Court."¹ Subsequently Provine (1980, 108) and Palmer (1982), also relying on 1947 to 1956 certiorari data, asserted that the error correcting strategy motivated the behavior of the justices on the Court.

The error correcting strategy could be counterproductive if a justice voted to grant certiorari because he wanted to reverse the lower court and then was outvoted on the merits vote. Clearly, a decision contrary to his position at the lower court would be preferable to such a decision at the level of the U.S. Supreme Court. Thus, it may make sense for a justice to follow this strategy only when the outcome favored will win at the final vote. This suggests a second strategy.

The Prediction Strategy

The prediction strategy assumes a direct positive relationship between voting to grant certiorari and being a member of the winning coalition at the final vote on the merits. One of the justices on the Burger Court asserted that he was following this strategy. "If I suspected a good decision by the lower court would be affirmed, making its application nationwide, I'd probably vote to grant. [On the other hand,] a decision may seem outrageously wrong to me but if I thought the Court would affirm it, then I'd vote to deny. I'd much prefer bad law to remain the law of the Eighth Circuit of the State of Michigan than to have it become the law of the land." (*Time Magazine*, 77).

Whether the justices on the Court generally pursue this strategy is uncertain. Provine (1980, 130) maintained that justices do not routinely calculate probable outcomes on the merits in deciding whether or not to vote for review. Palmer (1982), on the other hand, concluded that the prediction strategy motivated the behavior of the justices on the Supreme Court in the 1947 to 1956 era and Brenner (1979) argued that in this period "pivotal justices who favored the affirm outcome" employed this strategy.

¹ Indeed, if one computes gammas for the 11 justices examined by Ulmer (1972, 442), one discovers that only five justices (Black, Jackson, Douglas, Vinson, and Warren) achieved a level of .40, while the other six failed to attain this level. The scores of the 11 justices ranged from .58 (Black) and .50 (Jackson) to .08 (Clark) and .03 (Harlan).

Brenner (1979) investigated the 1946 to 1955 period and discovered that when there were four votes to grant certiorari, justices who voted for certiorari and wished to affirm the decision of the lower court were more successful than justices who voted for certiorari and wished to reverse that decision. Brenner argued that the justices who sought to affirm voted for certiorari after calculating that they had "an excellent chance of winning," while the justices who sought to reverse had "so much to gain and so little to lose that it was not worth their time and effort to calculate their chances of winning" (1979, 653). Brenner's findings can be explained by the error

Although justices at the certiorari stage usually can predict accurately the outcome of the final vote on the merits, they will be inaccurate at various times. The certiorari vote, after all, is cast prior to oral argument, prior to the Court's discussion in conference of the merits of the case, and prior to the writing of the various opinions. This suggests a third strategy.

The Majority Strategy

We shall designate this final strategy the majority strategy, although Baum who discussed this strategy (1977), did not use this term. Baum (1977, 32) surmised that liberal justices in a liberal court would be more likely to vote to hear cases than their conservative colleagues in that same court. Similarly, conservative justices on a conservative court can be expected to vote to hear cases more often than their liberal colleagues. The majority strategy assumes that liberal courts are likely to render liberal decisions and conservative courts likely to hand down conservative decisions. Baum (1977) investigated the California Supreme Court for the 1972 and 1974 terms and failed to find support for this strategy. No one has systematically tested the majority strategy for the United States Supreme Court.

At least three arguments can be suggested for examining these strategies in greater detail. First, the evidence for their presence is inconclusive. This is particularly true regarding the prediction and majority strategies. Second, all the previous studies focus on the 1946 to 1957 period. This was a salient period in Supreme Court history, but there is no reason to believe that certiorari behavior in that era is necessarily representative of certiorari behavior in other eras. Most important, the 1946 to 1957 period fails to include a single term where a majority of the justices on the Court were liberal (as evidenced by the nonunanimous vote). Yet, it is conceivable that liberal justices pursue different strategies at the certiorari stage when they are in the majority on the Court than when they are in the minority. Indeed, the majority strategy makes this point and cannot be tested unless both liberal and conservative courts are investigated. Third, the scholars who conducted the previous research tested the strategies separately, ignoring possible conflicts and compatibilities between them (e.g., Is a justice who wants to reverse but is likely to lose likely to grant certiorari?)

correcting strategy. When there are only four votes to grant certiorari, the affirm outcome is more likely to win because justices who vote to deny certiorari are likely to affirm. This explanation seems preferable to the one offered by Brenner because the error correcting strategy only requires a justice to decide whether he or she favors the decision of the lower court prior to voting for certiorari, while the prediction strategy included in Brenner's analysis requires a justice to make this evaluation and also to calculate whether the outcome she or he supports is likely to win at the final vote on the merits.

One might argue regarding most certiorari votes that it does not make any difference how an individual justice will vote, for certiorari would be granted or denied whether that justice votes to grant or deny. But prior to conferences the individual justice usually will not know whether this situation prevails.¹ The safe way to proceed is to assume that his vote might be pivotal, that is, that it might determine the Court's certiorari decision. It is true, of course, that a justice could wait until the conference to ascertain whether, in fact, his vote is pivotal. But a justice who regularly behaved in this way would be perceived by his colleagues as indecisive and few justices would tolerate being so viewed. Indeed, beginning with the Hughes Court each justice received an agenda of the certiorari petitions to be discussed in conference and recorded a tentative certiorari vote on that agenda (Stewart 1979, 17; Abraham 1980, 207; Abraham 19 July 1984, private communication).

We will focus on two basic questions in this study: (1) Do justices employ these three strategies?² and (2) Does the kind of Court (liberal or conservative) influence the strategies used? We will be concerned with two votes cast by the justices: (1) the vote to grant or to deny certiorari and (2) the final vote on the merits.

DATA AND MEASURES

We investigated seven U S Supreme Court terms: (1) the 1950 and 1952 terms (Vinson Court, treated as a 'conservative' Court, i.e. a Court in which a majority of the justices on the Court were 'conservative' as defined below), (2) the 1963, 1965, and 1967 terms (Warren Court, considered a 'liberal' Court), and (3) the 1972 and 1974 terms (Burger Court, classified as a 'conservative' Court).

Liberal justices were defined as justices who obtained an ideological support score (ISS) of .67 or above in the nonunanimous cases contained in both Schubert's (1974) 'C' and 'E' scales or their equivalent in the Burger Court. The ISS is simply the percentage of votes for the liberal outcome. Conservative justices were defined as justices who secured an ideological support score of .37 or below in both scales. A .37 cutoff point was used because it is necessary to do so to obtain courts in which the majority of the justices were conservative. Thus, while .33 may constitute an ideal breakpoint, .37 is the actual breakpoint. Justices who scored above .37 and below .67 in one or both scales were classified as moderates.³ We used ideological support scores

¹ This is true even after 1972, when the certiorari pool was established, for certiorari pool justices are not required to vote the way the pool recommends.

² These justices were excluded from further study because we wanted to include only justices who might pursue all three strategies, and moderate justices, by definition, cannot employ the majority strategy.

(ISS) for the term in question to classify the justices in that term. ISSs were computed by using data from Ryan and Tate's (1980) dataset.⁵

The certiorari vote data were collected by one of the authors of this study from the docket books of Justices Harold Burton, Tom Clark, and William Brennan. Burton's and Brennan's docket books are located in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, while Clark's are housed in the Tarleton Law Library of The University of Texas at Austin. The final votes were obtained either from the Burton and Clark docket books or (in the post-Clark period) from *U.S. Reports, Lawyers Edition*.

The pairs of votes from any justice were not used if they could not be coded as 'certiorari granted' or 'certiorari denied' and 'affirm' or 'reverse'. 'Reverse' includes 'remand,' 'vacate,' 'reverse,' or any combination of these three. If after the vote on certiorari the writ of certiorari was dismissed as 'improvidently granted' as moot or for some other reason that case was excluded. If certiorari was voted on twice (usually because the case was held over to the next term) the second vote was used. Cases in which there was no majority at the final vote were omitted. Memorandum decisions were excluded but per curiam decisions were used.⁶

ANALYSIS

In testing these three strategies, two aspects of our dataset should be noted. First, only cases in which certiorari was granted by the Court were selected. We shall not treat cases in which certiorari was denied because these cases cannot be used to test whether the error correcting and prediction strategies were pursued. Second, we included cases in which the vote to grant certiorari was unanimous. There is no reason to exclude these cases. These two aspects help produce a mean grant rate of 71.0%. In other words, in 71% of the votes the justices voted to grant cert. As a consequence, we

In the 1950 and 1952 terms, six justices were conservative (Clark, Vinson, Reed, Burton, Jackson, Minton), two liberal (Douglas, Black), and one moderate (Frankfurter). The equivalent data for the other terms are: 1963 - conservative (Harlan), liberal (Goldberg, Brennan, Warren, Black, Douglas), moderate (White, Stewart, Clark); 1965 - conservative (Stewart, Harlan), liberal (Fortas, Warren, Brennan, Black, Douglas), moderate (White, Clark); 1967 - conservative (Harlan), liberal (Marshall, Warren, Brennan, Fortas, Douglas), moderate (Black, White, Stewart); and 1972 and 1974 - conservative (White, Powell, Blackmun, Burger, Rehnquist), liberal (Brennan, Marshall, Douglas), moderate (Stewart).

⁵We classified justices as conservative and liberal based upon the C and L scales. These are the only scales that can be used for this purpose. Ryan and Tate (1980: 11) tell us that over two-thirds of the nonunanimous decisions handed down by the Court since 1946 fell into one of these two scales. But we do not limit our examination of strategies to cases included in these two scales because we are interested in the pursuit of strategies in all cases when certiorari was granted.

⁶Indeed, excluding them will bias the results in favor of finding support for the pursuit of the strategies. Including them, therefore, makes for a more conservative test.

expect justices who vote to affirm, who lose, or who are in the minority will have a lower grant rate than the Court mean of 71.0%² and justices who vote to reverse, who win, or who are in the majority will have a higher grant rate. We believe that comparing grant rates is a better test of the presence or absence of the strategies than using a measure of association such as gamma which may be strongly influenced by these skewed distributions. The three strategies suggest three hypotheses:

H1 Justices who vote to reverse at the final vote on the merits will have a higher grant rate on certiorari than the Court mean, while justices who vote to affirm will have a lower grant rate. (The error correcting strategy.)

H2 Justices who win at the final vote on the merits will have a higher grant rate on certiorari than the Court mean, while justices who lose will have a lower grant rate. (The prediction strategy.)

H3 Justices who are in the majority in the term in question will have a higher grant rate on certiorari than the Court mean, while justices who are in the minority will have a lower grant rate. (The majority strategy.)

Table 1 displays the various grant rates for each of the three strategies. The grant rate for those justices who voted to reverse is 77.7% which is somewhat higher than the Court mean of 71.0%. Justices who voted to affirm secured a grant rate of 59.1% which is substantially lower than the Court average. Thus, the error correcting strategy, as predicted in the first hypothesis, is present on the Court.

Winning and losing at the final vote, the conditions central to the prediction strategy, also produced the expected results. Justices who won obtained a grant rate of 74.6% which is slightly higher than the Court mean. Conversely, justices who lost garnered a grant rate of 54.5%, substantially lower than the Court average.

Finally, majority justices received a grant rate of 75.9% and minority justices secured a grant rate of 60.4%. Both rates are different from the Court mean and each is in the direction predicted. These findings support the third hypothesis.

The possibility of a justice pursuing more than one strategy at a time is also explored in table 1. Using the error correcting in combination with the prediction strategy results in a grant rate of 77.3% for those justices who won and voted to reverse and a rate of 39.1% for those justices who lost and voted to affirm. Combining error correcting and majority strategies results in a grant rate of 80.7% for those justices who reversed and were in the majority and a rate of 46.7% for those justices who affirmed and were in the minority.

²The mean grant and deny rates for certiorari are derived from the actions of the Court as a whole which includes liberal, conservative, and moderate justices. These means are treated as the best estimates of the population means and are used in calculating the *Z* scores appearing in the tables accompanying this article.

TABLE I
GRANT RATES OF STRATEGIES

Strategy	Condition	Grant Rate	Z Score ^a	N
Error Correcting	Reverse	77.7%	7.00	224
	Affirm	59.1%	-8.75	1111
Prediction	Win	74.6%	4.23	284*
	Lose	54.5%	-8.24	511
Majority	Majority	75.9%	5.31	2116
	Minority	60.4%	-7.17	943
Error Correcting and Prediction	Reverse-Win	77.3%	6.30	2061
	Affirm-Lose	39.1%	-12.77	330
Error Correcting and Majority	Reverse-Majority	80.7%	8.73	1668
	Affirm-Minority	46.7%	-10.25	366
Prediction and Majority	Win-Majority	77.6%	6.79	2151
	Lose-Minority	49.8%	-7.80	279
All Three	Reverse-Win-Majority	81.0%	8.75	1575
	Affirm-Lose-Minority	30.3%	-12.20	155

^a All the grant rates in this table are significantly different from the Court mean of 71.0% at the .05 level. The Court mean grant rate is used as the best estimate of the population mean grant rate in the computation of Z scores.

Finally, those justices who won and were in the majority secured a grant rate of 77.6%, while those justices who lost and were in the minority obtained a grant rate of 49.8%. All the double strategies produce better results than the single strategies.

Even more impressive results are obtained when the three strategies are used simultaneously. In this circumstance the grant rate for majority justices who voted to reverse at the final vote and who won is 81.0%, while the grant rate for minority justices who affirmed and lost is 30.3%.

Thus far, when two or three strategies have been combined we have investigated behavior associated with higher grant rates separately from behavior relating to lower grant rates. "Reversing," for example, was combined with "winning" and being in the "majority." But we are also interested in knowing the various grant rates when one condition associated with a higher grant rate is combined with another condition associated with a lower grant rate. We wish, for example, to combine "affirm" and "winning." We expect that

H4 Combinations of two or more conditions associated with high grant rates will produce higher grant rates than combinations of two or more conditions, one of which is associated with a low grant rate.

The converse is also expected

H5 Combinations of two or more conditions associated with low grant rates will produce lower grant rates than combinations of two or more conditions, one of which is associated with a high grant rate.

Table 2 depicts the grant rates for the 18 relevant comparisons. This table shows that in 16 of the 18 circumstances (89%) these two hypotheses are supported. In the other two situations (i.e., the mixed strategy of reverse-lose as compared to the consistent strategy of reverse-win and the mixed strategy of reverse-lose-majority as compared to the consistent strategy of reverse-win-majority) the grant rates are not significantly different. (See table 2 for the Z scores.)

In the previous discussion we focused on the majority strategy as an aggregate strategy. It, of course, consists of liberal justices and conservative justices voting in liberal and conservative courts. Table 3 displays the grant rates for the error correcting and prediction strategies and also for their combination for each type of justice and court.¹⁰

Table 3 shows that it is only for conservative justices in conservative courts that each strategy and their combination works as predicted. For conservative justices in conservative courts who reverse-who win or the combination of reverse and win, the grant rate is somewhat higher than the Court mean. For conservative justices in conservative courts who affirm-who lose or the combination of affirm and lose, the grant rate is substantially lower.

The liberal justice in the liberal court behaves quite differently. These justices are grant prone.¹¹ Affirming on merits, losing at the final vote on merits, and the combination of affirming and losing are conditions which, according to the error correcting and prediction strategies, should generate lower than average grant rates. But the grant rates associated with these conditions for the liberal justices in the liberal courts are not significantly lower than the Court mean. Also the conditions associated, once again according to the strategies, with higher grant rates, i.e., reversing, winning, and their combination, produce substantially higher grant rates for these justices than the Court mean. Reversing ($Z = 1.74$), winning ($Z = 3.53$), and reversing and winning ($Z = 2.08$) generate higher grant rates for liberal justices in liberal courts than for conservative justices in conservative courts.

Table 3 also shows that liberal justices in conservative courts as well as conservative justices in liberal courts vote substantially less often for cer-

¹⁰In presenting these results, three measurement problems should be noted. First, the number of liberal or conservative justices in any given term is small. The reason for this phenomenon is that the Court consists of only nine justices and in each of these terms one or more of the justices were moderates. Second, the grant rates in the liberal and conservative courts differ. In the three liberal courts, the rate is 73.4% and in the four conservative courts the rate is 69.1% but the latter includes two Vinson terms with a grant rate of 74.1% and two Burger terms with a grant rate of 64.3%. Third, in some of the terms the size of the majority was much larger than in other terms. As a consequence, it would be easier for majority justices both to follow the majority strategy and to predict a win.

¹¹In making this statement, and all subsequent statements regarding the grant proneness of the liberal justices, we, of course, are only referring to those cases in which the Court granted certiorari. We have not tested whether liberal justices are more grant prone regarding all certiorari petitions.

TABLE 2
GRANT RATES OF STRATEGIES

Strategy	Condition	Grant Rate	Z Score ^a	N
<u>Error Correcting and Prediction</u>				
Reverse-Win (both conditions associated with high grant rate)		77.3%		2061
Reverse-Lose (one condition associated with low grant rate)		82.1%	1.37	181
Affirm-Win (one condition associated with low grant rate)		67.5%	5.15 ^b	751
Affirm-Lose (both conditions associated with low grant rate)		39.1%		330
Affirm-Win (one condition associated with high grant rate)		67.5%	9.54 ^b	784
Reverse-Lose (one condition associated with high grant rate)		82.1%	10.30 ^b	181
<u>Error Correcting and Majority</u>				
Reverse-Majority (both conditions associated with high grant rate)		80.7%		1668
Reverse-Minority (one condition associated with low grant rate)		69.2%	5.25 ^b	577
Affirm-Majority (one condition associated with low grant rate)		65.1%	7.51 ^b	718
Affirm-Minority (both conditions associated with low grant rate)		46.7%		400
Affirm-Majority (one condition associated with high grant rate)		65.1%	6.36 ^b	18
Reverse-Minority (one condition associated with high grant rate)		69.2%	7.42 ^b	577
<u>Prediction and Majority</u>				
Win-Majority (both conditions associated with high grant rate)		77.6%		218
Lose-Majority (one condition associated with low grant rate)		60.0%	5.65 ^b	181

TABLE 2
(continued)

Strategy	Condition	Grant Rate	Z Score ^a	N
<u>Prediction and Majority</u>				
Win-Minority (one condition associated with low grant rate)		64.9%	-6.31 ^b	664
Lose-Minority (both conditions associated with low grant rate)		49.5%		279
Lose-Majority (one condition associated with high grant rate)		60.0%	2.54 ^b	235
Win-Minority (one condition associated with high grant rate)		64.9%	4.66 ^b	664
<u>All Three</u>				
Reverse Win-Majority (all conditions associated with high grant rate)		51.0%		1578
Reverse Win-Minority (one condition associated with low grant rate)		65.4%	-6.61	455
Reverse Lose-Majority (one condition associated with low grant rate)		75.6%	1.10	90
Affirm Win-Majority (one condition associated with low grant rate)		68.7%	5.68 ^b	605
Affirm-Lose-Minority (all conditions associated with low grant rate)		30.3%		155
Affirm Win-Minority (one condition associated with high grant rate)		63.5%	-7.00 ^b	151
Affirm-Lose-Majority (one condition associated with high grant rate)		70.3%	5.97	145
Reverse-Lose-Minority (one condition associated with high grant rate)		55.3%	10.09 ^b	94

^aThe Court mean grant rate is used as the best estimate of the population mean grant rate in the computation of Z scores.

^bThis grant rate is significantly different from the criterion grant rate—the first grant rate appearing in each block—at the .05 level.

TABLE 3

**GRANT RATES FOR ERROR CORRECTING AND PREDICTION
STRATEGIES BY TYPES OF JUSTICES AND TYPES OF COURTS**

Strategy Conditions	<i>Conservative Courts</i>		<i>Liberal Courts</i>	
	Conservative Justice	Liberal Justice	Liberal Justice	Conservative Justice
Error Correcting				
Reverse	79.0% ^a	70.8%	82.9% ^a	64.7% ^a
N	942	424	726	153
Z	5.41	-.09	7.07	-1.72
Affirm	62.1% ^a	42.5% ^a	72.0%	55.5% ^a
N	523	247	225	119
Z	-4.49	-9.87	.33	-3.73
Prediction				
Win	74.8% ^a	64.2% ^a	81.8% ^a	66.4%
N	1304	450	877	214
Z	3.02	-3.18	7.05	-1.48
Lose	58.4% ^a	52.5% ^a	63.5%	39.7% ^a
N	161	221	74	58
Z	-3.52	-6.06	1.42	-5.25
Error Correcting and Prediction				
Reverse-Win	78.9% ^a	65.7% ^a	83.7% ^a	64.9%
N	889	335	689	148
Z	5.19	-2.14	7.35	1.64
Affirm-Lose	47.2% ^a	27.3% ^a	59.5%	37.7% ^a
N	108	132	37	53
Z	-5.45	-11.06	1.54	5.34

^aGrant rate is significantly different from the Court mean of 71.0% at the .05 level. The Court mean is used as the best estimate of the population mean when computing the Z scores.

tionari in all six of the situations suggested by the error correcting and prediction strategies. Although being in the minority suppresses the grant rates of these justices under reverse, win, or reverse and win conditions, these grant rates are still markedly higher than the rates associated with affirming losing, and affirming and losing.

Not surprisingly, there is one exception to the similar patterns of the two kinds of justices. Liberal justices in conservative courts are much more likely to vote grant, reverse, and lose than conservative justices in liberal courts. Our dataset shows that there were 151 cases in which a (liberal or conservative) justice voted "grant-reverse-lose." Forty-five percent of these cases ($N = 68$) either involved liberal justices in liberal courts or conservative justices in conservative courts. Fifty-five percent of the 151 cases ($N = 83$) involved liberal justices in conservative courts, while only 2% of these cases

($N = 3$) involved conservative justices in liberal courts. The contrast between the behavior of the liberal and conservative justices in "grant-reverse-lose" cases is another indication that the liberal justices were much more grant prone (or, perhaps, that they fight harder than conservative justices for lost causes) ¹¹

CONCLUSION

In an important article Caldeira and Wright (1988) investigated the determinants of certiorari voting in the 1982 term of the Court. They focused on Court, instead of individual, certiorari voting, attempted to include all the variables associated with such voting, and sought to ascertain how much each variable contributed to the Court's decision. One of the four most important variables, in the conservative court they studied, was that the lower court decided the case in a liberal direction. This finding is not only consistent with the error correcting strategy (which they recognize) but is also consistent with the prediction and majority strategies.

It is valuable not only to ascertain the variables associated with specific behavior but also to investigate one or more of these variables in depth. We have done so in this article, focusing on the individual level. We have documented the presence of the three strategies. We have discovered that double strategies produce better results than the single strategies, while even more impressive results are exhibited when the three strategies are used simultaneously. Further, the use of these three strategies is not indiscriminate but usually is influenced by the presence of adverse conditions.

These strategies and their combinations are found most consistently among conservative justices in conservative courts. Liberal justices, in general, seem more grant prone than the strategies would suggest.

At least two caveats to these findings should be noted. As previously mentioned, this study neither pertains to cases in which certiorari was denied nor does it explore any possible strategies pursued by moderate justices. We

¹¹Our analysis might be flawed if the four strategy variables we examine (winning/losing, reversing/affirming, majority/minority, granting/denying) actually duplicate or overlap one another. This would be similar to the problem of multicollinearity found in multiple regression analysis. We, therefore, used a hierarchical loglinear analysis to determine which strategy variables are required to produce the best fitting model for the data. In such a procedure, the strategies themselves are depicted by second-order effects. For all terms studied there are significant second through fourth-order effects. This finding is evidence of the presence of the strategies and evidence that the strategies work in combination with one another. When conservative and liberal courts are examined separately, the general findings hold for the conservative courts. Liberal courts do not have significant fourth-order effects but do have at least some significant third-order effects. Thus, we have documented that associations between the four strategy variables exist and that each should be retained in the analysis. In short, multicollinearity is not a problem with this analysis.

do not know, therefore, what strategies, if any, guide the behavior of the justices under these other circumstances

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Citizen Responses to Dissatisfaction in Urban Communities: A Partial Test of a General Model

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In this paper, we evaluate the Exit-Voice-Loyalty-and-Neglect (EVLN)¹ model of citizen responses to dissatisfaction developed by Lyons and Lowery (1986). After summarizing its key propositions, we test the model with data gathered from 10 separate surveys of citizens living in matched pairs of independent cities and neighborhoods. Considerable support is found for a respecified version of the EVLN model, support that is then used to develop an integrated understanding of citizen responses to dissatisfaction with public services in urban communities.

INTRODUCTION

For 30 years, social scientists have examined disparate responses to dissatisfaction with local governmental services. Perhaps the most cited is the work of Tiebout (1956) which focused on "exit" or "voting with one's feet." But other responses were examined as well, including rioting (Sears and McConahay 1973), citizen contacting of officials (Sharp 1986, Mladenka 1978), and withdrawal/exclusion from local participation (Bachrach and Baratz 1970). While each of these behaviors is important in its own right, there was a critical need for a more general model of how each of these responses to dissatisfaction related to one another and how citizens choose among them.

The basic outlines of such a general model have appeared more recently. Among the most useful contributions are those of Orbell and Uno (1972) and Sharp (1982, 1984a, 1984b, 1984c, 1986) who turned to the work of Hirschman (1970) in an effort to conceptually relate three broad response types—"exit," "voice," and "loyalty." Building on these analyses and the work of several social psychologists (Rusbult, Zembrodt, and Gunn 1982, Rusbult

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and Zembrodt 1983, Farrell 1983, Farrell and Rusbult 1985), Lyons and Lowery (1986) introduced the additional notion of "neglect" to form a fourfold typology of responses, and developed a model of how citizens select among these responses when they become dissatisfied.


Unfortunately, little effort has been made to test these more general models. The tests that have been conducted (Orbell and Uno 1972, Sharp 1982, 1984a, 1984b, 1984c, 1986) proved to be of limited scope or based on data that were inadequate to the task of directly confronting many of the key theoretical assumptions in the literature (see Lyons and Lowery 1986: 322-26). For instance, Sharp's work attempts to assess some of the individual level propositions of the general model with both HUD national survey data and data from individual city surveys of citizens in Wichita and Kansas City. But her necessary reliance on secondary analysis of the HUD data unfortunately precluded consideration of more than a limited number of the propositions of the general model. And the individual studies of Wichita and Kansas City citizens precluded examination of how individuals respond under varying institutional arrangements, an issue that is central to the literature. Finally, no one has tested the most comprehensive model developed by Lyons and Lowery (1986) with its fourfold classification of response type and its ancillary model of how citizens chose among them.

The purpose of this study is to present a set of findings based on a unique data set designed to test both the individual and institutional level propositions of the general model developed by Lyons and Lowery (1986). The first section of the paper summarizes the key characteristics and hypotheses of that model. We then discuss the data gathered from 10 separate surveys of citizens living in five matched pairs of neighborhoods located in two different urban areas along with how the key concepts of the model are operationalized. The results of tests of a respecified version of the Lyons and Lowery Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect [EVLN] model are discussed in the following sections of the paper. Finally, the results are discussed in light of an integrated understanding of citizen responses to dissatisfaction in urban communities.

SUMMARY OF THE BASIC MODEL

A full description and explanation of the model can be found in Lyons and Lowery (1986). The model consists of (a) the four types of possible responses to dissatisfaction with local tax-service packages, (b) the two dimensions along which these four types of responses can be arranged, and (c) a set of conditions hypothesized to affect the likelihood of a citizen engaging in behaviors or attitudes associated with the four types of responses to dissatisfaction. Figure 1 summarizes the four types of responses and provides some examples of behaviors and attitudes that are associated with each. It also

FIGURE 1
DIMENSIONS OF RESPONSE TO DISSATISFACTION,
RESPONSE TYPES, AND ILLUSTRATIVE BEHAVIORS



identifies the two dimensions along which the four types of responses can be arrayed—active/passive and constructive/destructive—along with the manner in which exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect differ in terms of these dimensions

Table 1 summarizes the hypothesized relationships between the three basic conditions or determinants and the four possible types of response to dissatisfaction set forth in the Lyons and Lowery (1986) model. The first condition is *prior satisfaction*. Attitudes about the way in which government performed in the past (e.g., prior satisfaction) are hypothesized to structure citizen responses to current dissatisfaction. Those who were satisfied in the past are expected to choose some form of positive response—voice or loyalty—based on the experience-grounded expectation that government will remedy or can be induced to remedy the problem causing the current dissatisfaction. Previous dissatisfaction, on the other hand, is hypothesized to structure destructive types of responses—exit or neglect—as citizens face continuing or new sources of current dissatisfaction. Past experience in such cases provides little foundation for expecting government to remedy the source of dissatisfaction.

TABLE 1

HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PROPENSITY TO INVOKE EV
RESPONSES AND THE DETERMINANTS OF RESPONSES FOR THE
ORIGINAL AND RESPECIFIED LYONS/LOWERY MODEL.*

Determinants of Response	Response to Dissatisfaction			
	Exit	Voice	Loyalty	Neglect
Prior Satisfaction	—	+	+	—
<i>Relative Dissatisfaction</i>	+	+	—	+
Investments	—	+	+	—
Alternatives	+	+	—	

* The *Relative Dissatisfaction* variable, along with the signs shown for that variable, are substituted for Prior Satisfaction in the respecified version of the model.

Tangible (e.g., homeownership) and social/psychological *investments* in the neighborhood or local community are also hypothesized to increase probability of opting for positive types of responses—loyalty and voice. Thus, highly invested individuals would be expected to want to preserve positive relationship with their local government to protect their investments. The absence of such investments, on the other hand, is expected to encourage individuals to choose exit or neglect—the destructive responses to dissatisfaction. With no investments to protect, there is little reason to preserve a positive relationship with the local government.

Finally, the presence of *alternatives* (viz., having a Tiebout-type of local institutional environment characterized by numerous units of local government offering differing tax/service packages) is expected to enhance the use of the active types of responses—exit and voice. One cannot ‘vote with one’s feet’ if there is nowhere else to go. Furthermore, according to Hirschman (1970) and those who have examined this model in the context of public-private job situations and personal relationships, alternatives are necessary to make voice credible. In contrast, the absence of alternatives or the existence of impediments to exercising their use (e.g., poverty or racism) tend to force citizens into more passive responses.

The final component of the basic model is *current dissatisfaction*. In the original model, current dissatisfaction was specified as an interactive term that was expected to intensify the effects of the three major determinants of response—prior satisfaction, investments, and alternatives. Quite simply, there is no reason to invoke a response to dissatisfaction unless one is dissatisfied. Although more will be said about this in the discussion of findings, it should be noted that Lyons and Lowery (1986, 334) conceded that there may be other ways to deal with the specification of the current dissatisfaction

term of the model, particularly in situations where it is impossible to establish a baseline from which such intensification effects can be computed.

This integrated model links theoretically a number of formally disparate and independent behaviors and attitudes associated with local political participation as responses to dissatisfaction. It also links theoretically the several responses to dissatisfaction in such a way that a discrete set of variables—alternatives, investments, prior satisfaction, and current dissatisfaction—can be used to identify how individual citizens select among them. But to be fully credible as a general theory of response to dissatisfaction, the model must be empirically evaluated.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND SITES

To test this model, survey data must be gathered from individuals living in a variety of discrete, spatially defined socioeconomic communities or neighborhoods in urban settings with varying forms of local governmental arrangements. More specifically, efforts must be made to integrate the individual-level focus of many of the concepts in the model with what Lyons and Lowery (1986, 337–43) referred to as the level of correspondence between the spatial contours of these discrete socioeconomic worlds and the boundaries of local governmental jurisdictions.

Since urban areas tend to be characterized by a high degree of spatial clustering by race, income, ethnicity, and life-styles, high levels of correspondence between these spatially defined communities and the boundaries of local political jurisdictions is likely to also mean high levels of governmental fragmentation. This, in turn, increases the probabilities of finding alternative tax-service packages within that particular urban area as well as the likelihood that many of these political jurisdictions will be quite homogenous in terms of socioeconomic characteristics. Conversely, low correspondence situations reduce the number of alternatives in the Tiebout sense of the term. They also tend to increase the proportion of citizens who find themselves living in local political jurisdictions that serve a number of different spatially defined communities.

Ideally, researchers would have sufficient resources to sample a wide variety of discrete communities located in numerous urban settings. This would allow us to control for varying levels of correspondence, as well as surveying a sufficient number of individuals to control for the kinds of nonsituational determinants of political participation found in the more traditional literature, including those arising from individual predispositions, social and economic status, and cultural factors. We have focused on five different types of spatially defined socioeconomic communities operating in two quite different urban areas. One of these urban areas has a highly fragmented political

system, while the other operates under a single consolidated form of local government.

We chose Louisville-Jefferson County and Lexington-Fayette County, Kentucky. Louisville-Jefferson County, with a population (1980) of 685,000 contains more than 90 units of general purpose local government (i.e., incorporated municipalities). It is, therefore, prototypical of the kind of governmentally fragmented urban environments found in most of the older industrial centers of the nation. On the other hand, Lexington-Fayette County (1980 population of 204,000), with its 14-year-old consolidated city-county government (Lyons 1977), provides a research environment where individuals are served by a local governmental entity that embraces a wide variety of spatially defined socioeconomic worlds. While perhaps unusual in terms of its form of local government, the Lexington setting does allow us to study citizen responses to dissatisfaction in a noncorrespondence situation similar to those found in many of the burgeoning urban areas in the Sun Belt where, through either annexation or consolidation, governmental fragmentation scores tend to be much lower.

We examined the available census data on all of the incorporated municipalities in Jefferson County other than Louisville along with tract and block data for various sections of Lexington-Fayette County to identify five distinct, spatially defined socioeconomic communities in each of these two urban areas. The five communities varied in terms of such factors as SES, race, age, and levels of familism versus nonfamilism.¹ The only major difference is that the "boundaries" of the five communities in the Louisville-Jefferson County setting also happen to correspond to the official boundaries of an incorporated municipality whereas in Lexington their demographic "mirror images" are located in a larger governmental context that embraces a wide variety of socioeconomic communities.

Households located within each of these 10 areas were identified from the

¹ Although socioeconomic status is a very relative term, the definitions used in this case were based on conventions related to household income and education. Familism and nonfamilism were determined on the basis of census data indicating the presence or absence of children in a majority of households. (See Lyons and Engstrom 1971 for a discussion of survey versus aggregate measures of familistic versus nonfamilistic life-styles.) Although it is possible to identify neighborhoods or subcommunities composed of younger, nonfamilistic households, the decision was made in this instance to focus on spatially defined nonfamilistic areas that also happen to be composed of relatively large numbers of persons more than 65 years of age. Such a strategy not only allows us to include nonfamilistic life-styles in the study, but also to introduce more variation on the age dimension of defining social worlds.

Two factors were held relatively constant in selecting the five communities in both research settings: type of dwelling and occupancy status. All of the incorporated cities in the Louisville-Jefferson County setting were predominantly single-unit in terms of dwelling type and are heavily owner-occupied. Although the theoretical import of these factors is perhaps open to more speculation given the current housing market, traditional wisdom would suggest that they be

Municipal Directory published by R. L. Polk for each of the urban areas in question.² Approximately 300 households were selected in each of the 10 communities to provide a total of approximately 3,000 potential respondents for this study. In four instances—two in the Lexington area and two in the Louisville area—the number of households with listed telephone numbers was less than or equal to our desired figure of 300. In these cases, the University of Kentucky Research Center (UKSRC) which was engaged to conduct the telephone interviews for this study was instructed to survey the universe of households. In the other six cases, the UKSRC was instructed to use random sampling techniques to identify the 300 households with listed telephone numbers to be surveyed. In all cases, random selection tables were used by the UKSRC to select the adult in each household to be interviewed. A total of 2,867 households were contacted for this study. After deleting persons who refused to be interviewed or who reported that their household was not located in the particular local governmental jurisdiction in question, the UKSRC was able to complete a total of 2,016 interviews for a response rate of 70.3%.

controlled for. The defining characteristics that were sought for the five matched pairs of research sites were as follows:

CHARACTERISTICS OF MATCHED CITIES NEIGHBORHOODS

Lexington-Fayette Neighborhood (Consolidated)	Louisville-Jefferson Independent City (Fragmented)	Characterization
Blueberry	Minor Lane Heights	Moderate to low SES, younger, more familialistic, predominantly white
Chino	Beechwood Village	Moderate to low SES, more elderly, less familialistic, predominantly white
Stonewall	Barbourmead	Moderate to high SES, middle age, more familialistic, predominantly white
Crestwood/Shadeland	Windy Hills	Moderate to high SES, more elderly, less familialistic, predominantly white
Green Acres	Newburg	Moderate to low SES, younger, more familialistic, predominantly black

A simple random digit dialing technique was not a viable option since telephone numbers including the first three prefix numbers are rarely assigned on the basis of areas that conform to the kinds of spatial considerations that were imperative for this project.

TABLE 2
DIFFERENCE IN MEANS/PROPORTIONS FOR PAIRED
RESEARCH SITES FOR SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

Research Site	Demographic Variables						
	Age	Educ	Income	Race	Occu	Rent/Own	NKids
Lex Blueberry	41.2	4.59	2.88	1.08	1.14	1.90	1.80
Lou Minor Lane	43.6	3.15*	2.30*	1.01*	3.20*	1.92	1.90
Lex Stonewall	51.2	5.47	1.92	1.04	4.75	1.98	1.72
Lou Barbourmeade	49.9	5.42	1.88	1.04	4.94	1.99	1.70
Lex Crestwood	54.9	5.50	3.57	1.00	5.14	1.94	1.44
Lou Windy Hills	56.4	5.35	4.14*	1.05*	4.56*	1.98*	1.48
Lex Chimot	52.8	5.59	3.39	1.00	4.79	1.75	1.55
Lou Beechwood	53.4	5.05*	3.21	1.00	4.98	1.91*	1.52
Lex Green Acres	44.9	3.46	2.33	1.88	3.28	1.82	1.91
Lou Newburg	43.8	3.52	2.16	1.93	3.17	1.86	1.93

* = difference significant at $p < .05$

Variables: Age = number of years since birth; Education: 1 = 8 years of school or less; 2 = 9-11 years; 3 = completed high school; 4 = high school plus business or technical training; 5 = some college; 6 = completed college; 7 = graduate or professional school beyond college; Total Household Income: 0 = \$10,000; 1 = \$10k-\$20k; 2 = \$20k-\$30k; 3 = \$30k-\$40k; 4 = \$40k-\$50k; 5 = \$50k-\$60k; 6 = \$60k-\$70k; 7 = \$70k-\$80k; 8 = \$80k-\$90k; 9 = \$90k-\$100k; 10 = \$100k or more; Race: 1 = white; 2 = black; Occupation: 1 = laborer/machine operator; 2 = clerical or retail sales; 3 = skilled technician; 4 = manager or supervisor; 5 = owner or chief executive officer; 6 = professional; Rent/Own: 1 = rent; 2 = own; NKids = number of children under 18 living at home.

To assess whether the five matched pairs of socioeconomic communities selected on the basis of 1980 census data were in fact comparable pairs of research sites, tests of the differences in means or proportions were performed using data from the telephone surveys concerning such demographic traits as age, income, education, race, homeownership status, and the number of children under 18 years of age living at home. For the most part, the differences were small and not significant, providing good support for our matching procedures.¹

¹As noted in table 2, however, some statistically discernible differences were observed to the extreme criterion level of .01. For example, significant differences in racial composition were found in three of the matched pairs of social worlds even though we had selected our survey sites to be predominantly white or predominantly black. In all three cases, however, the racial composition of the paired social worlds was as predicted from the 1980 census data: they were predominantly and overwhelmingly white or black despite statistically significant differences in proportions computed from information given by respondents. Simply put, in each case, one of

Aside from its practicality, there are several other advantages in using these two particular research settings. First, both research sites share the same, broad cultural milieu based on Elazar's (1972) classification scheme. Second, the school systems in both Louisville-Jefferson County and Lexington-Fayette County are consolidated. This factor allows us to focus squarely on the impacts of institutional structure on tax-service packages other than education. Third, both research sites are in the same state, thereby holding constant such factors as state/local fiscal centralization, tax reliance, and legal requirements pertaining to the provision of local tax-service packages. And fourth, the use of the matched sets allows us to employ two levels of control for extraneous influences in our examination of the relationships specified by the model. In addition to introducing individual-level controls for the impact of the standard socioeconomic determinants of political behavior directly into the models, we can compare coefficients across matched pairs of surveys where the mean levels of these variables will be held relatively constant.

VARIABLES AND MEASURES

With the exception of the Exit-Move and Exit-Privatization variables, all of the dependent variables used in this study are additive indexes. 'Voice' for example, as seen in appendix A, is constructed with six standard indicators of political participation with reference to local government (reliability $\alpha = .69$). Specifically, the items focused on the respondents' prior activities aimed at solving local problems, including attending meetings, belonging to neighborhood organizations, contacting officials, signing or circulating petitions, and talking to neighbors.

the matched pair of sites had somewhat more white (or black) respondents than the other, though both, as expected, had very, very few. Similar arguments can be made for the significant differences observed for most of our other nominal and ordinal measures of demographic variables. The only interval level measures tested were age and number of children under 18, neither of which evidenced discernible differences in means across the matched pairs of research sites.

¹Aside from the measure of Exit-Privatization, which is exclusively related to the governmental arena, all of these measures were designed to provide us with governmentally relevant analogs to the kinds of measures used by other social scientists to capture the notions of Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect in a variety of other contexts, including job and interpersonal relationships. (See Farrell 1983; Rusbult et al. 1982; Rusbult and Zembrodt 1983; and Farrell and Rusbult 1985.) The measures used in these previous efforts had been tested for both reliability and validity using a variety of techniques including multidimensional scaling and construct validity. In addition, the governmental analogs for at least two of our dependent variables kept looking very similar to the items used to construct indices to measure such related political science concepts as political trust and local political efficacy (Abramson 1983; Balch 1974), both of which have been operationalized and tested for reliability using items very close to those included in our measures of Loyalty and Neglect respectively.

Five items were used to tap feelings of Loyalty. As noted in appendix A, the five items included feelings of trust, a willingness to defend the local government, faith that problems will work out, a belief in the honesty of local officials, and a feeling that citizens are often too quick to blame local officials when things go wrong (reliability $\alpha = .72$).

Four items—belief that you can't fight city hall, not caring what happens in local government and politics, thinking it not worth paying attention to local issues, and believing that it is useless to complain to officials—were combined to form our Neglect index ($\alpha = .69$).

Exit-Move is a dichotomous indicator derived from responses to three questions, which necessitates the use of Probit rather than OLS regression. First, all respondents were asked how likely they were to move in the next two or three years. Those indicating "definitely will move" or "probably will move" were then asked if the move would entail leaving their current local governmental jurisdiction. Those answering "Yes" to this question were then asked "What are the two or three most important reasons you will or might move out of (name of local government)?" Those making any mention of taxes, local government services, or anything pertaining to local government performance were coded as "regime-government" type of reasons for moving. All other reasons (e.g., job, divorce, health, retirement, get closer to or further away from relatives, etc.) were coded as "personal-economic" type reasons.

To be coded as an "exiter" for this study, a respondent had to give a "Yes" response to the first two questions *and* mention a "regime-government" type of reason in response to the last question. This is admittedly a much more stringent measure of Exit than used in any other study that we know of, including those by Sharp (1984c) and Orbel and Uno (1972). However, it has the great advantage of tapping precisely the conditions that underlie the notion of exit as set forth by Tiebout (1956). Moving for reasons other than what we have called "regime-government" reasons does not satisfy the condition of his interpretation that citizens use exit and locational choices to shop for an optimal package of public goods at the lowest possible costs in a competitive "market" of differing tax-service packages within a given urban area. Moving because of a job transfer, to avoid or be near relatives, or to get closer to one's place of work is not a form of Tiebout exit behavior.

As suggested in the original presentation of the basic model (Lyons and Lowery 1986, 332), "some forms of service privatization might be viewed as a more specific or targeted form of exit." To examine this variation on the exit theme, we constructed an indicator to tap the extent to which citizens have considered privatizing some public service they are currently receiving. As seen in appendix A, respondents were first asked if they had ever considered privately contracting for a *current* service. Those answering "Yes" were then asked to identify the service. These responses were scored "garbage collection," "private security service," and "other," with virtually all of the re-

sponses falling in the first two categories. The responses from these two questions were then combined to produce an indicator recording the number of current services the respondent had considered privatizing: zero, one, or two.³ Given the limited number of values for this measure, Probit was again used to estimate the model for Exit-Privatization as a form of exit response to dissatisfaction.

Two of the three independent variables of substantive interest in the model are also multi-item additive indexes. Prior Satisfaction, as noted in appendix A, is based on two items: a question focusing on evaluations of the performance of city governments in past years and a question focusing on satisfaction with city services in past years ($\alpha = .72$).

Five items were combined to tap the concept of Social Investments (Invest-Social) in the local community, our second independent variable. These five items focused on degree of attachment to the community: how sorry the respondent would be to leave the city; the number of friends that live in the city; the number of relatives who live in the city; and length of residence ($\alpha = .53$). It should be noted that renter/homeowner status did not correlate highly with the items included in the indicator Invest-Social. However, since homeownership has been traditionally viewed as a form of investment in a community, we included the Invest-Home (i.e., rent-own) item as a separate investment variable in the regression equations to be presented.⁴

Alternatives, the third EVLN independent variable, is an objective measure of whether respondents have a realistic opportunity to find another local governmental jurisdiction within the general urban area. The design of this study and the choices that were made regarding research sites provided a clear opportunity to solicit responses from those who lived in a very fragmented and, thus, alternative-rich political environment—Louisville-Jefferson County—versus those who lived under an alternative-poor, consolidated form of government—the Lexington-Fayette County.

In the original presentation of the model, these three variables—Investments, Prior Satisfaction, and Alternatives—were expected to enter the model in interaction with level of Current Dissatisfaction. As seen in appendix A, the

³Again, education, which is perhaps the most frequently privatized local service in the United States, was not included in this study because there is no variation in terms of the governmental/institutional format for education in these two urban areas. Since citizens in both the greater Louisville and Lexington areas are served by consolidated city-county school districts, it would be impossible to sort out the differing effects of being able to exercise the Exit Move option under conditions of alternative public school systems versus the Exit via the Privatization route. It would be most interesting to examine this question with data from appropriate types of fragmented versus consolidated systems affecting education.

⁴What is perhaps more curious is that none of the items pertaining to children (i.e., number of children, number of children in school, or number of children in public school) correlated well with the items on the Invest-Social scale. We have no basis for explaining this, but it may indicate that caution should be used when using such data to measure the notion of investments.

measure of Current Dissatisfaction was constructed with two indicators that are very similar to those used to construct the Prior Satisfaction indicator but addressing *current* services, rather than *past* services ($\alpha = .81$).

Finally, we turn to the control variables. The EVLN model explicitly focuses on the situations in which individuals find themselves in accounting for patterns of response to dissatisfying conditions. The traditional participation literature, in contrast, generally has not been attentive to the situational determinants of participation (Orbell and Uno 1972, 475; Lyons and Lowery 1986, 328–30), focusing instead on demographic and psychological factors that predispose individuals to participate. To evaluate the EVLN interpretation, we must control for the forces that are identified in this larger political participation literature that work to encourage or discourage citizen participation behaviors. Initially, four standard items developed by Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954) were considered for inclusion in an indicator of general Political Efficacy. Although there is some controversy over what the traditional four items measure (see Abramson 1983), the two items shown in appendix A produced an alpha of .68, and this two-item index constitutes our general efficacy indicator.⁷ Gender is a straightforward dichotomous measure. The remaining control variables—Education, Income, Age, and Race—were coded as indicated in notes accompanying table 2.

RESPECIFYING THE MODEL

As noted previously, the original version of the Lyons and Lowery model included Current Dissatisfaction as an interactive term that would have an intensification effect on the various types of responses to dissatisfaction. This recommendation assumed knowledge of a "baseline propensity to exit, voice, loyalty, and/or neglect" (Lyons and Lowery 1986, 334). Ascertaining the kind of "baseline propensity" needed to include current dissatisfaction as a simple interactive term is difficult—some might argue impossible, to accomplish without the benefit of panel wave data. Indeed, when we entered Current Dissatisfaction as an interaction term without the kind of information needed to establish such a baseline propensity, the coefficients became very unstable. The standard errors increased relative to other specifications of the model and the coefficients became very sensitive to even the most minor further changes in specification. The most plausible source of the problem appeared to be high collinearity compounded by the absence of an appropriate measure of baseline propensities to engage in exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect from which to compute the intensification effects of the interactive term.

In an effort to capture the essence of the "baseline" notion suggested in

⁷ The two items that are used are the same two items that are consistently found in the literature to be related to the notion of "external efficacy" (see Abramson 1983, 135–45).

the original model using the kind of cross-sectional survey data generated for this study, we created a measure of Relative Dissatisfaction derived from the responses to the items used to create the original Prior Satisfaction variable and the two-item index of Current Dissatisfaction. Examination of these two indexes allowed us to identify four sets of respondents. Thus, Reldis ranges from a low score of 1 assigned to those who expressed satisfaction with local government services and performance in both the past and the present through a score of 4, which indicates what turned out to be the most extreme form of dissatisfaction—namely those who were reasonably well satisfied in the past but who were now dissatisfied. In between are those who were somewhat dissatisfied in the past but are now satisfied and those who were ironically dissatisfied both past and present. While this particular measure—less than ideal,⁵ it does combine both current dissatisfaction and prior satisfaction by looking at the former *relative* to the latter.

It must be emphasized, however, that the substitution of this variable for Prior Satisfaction constitutes a significant change in the model. By focusing on Relative Dissatisfaction from the past to the present rather than Prior Satisfaction, we are giving primary emphasis to the way in which the current relative dissatisfaction of citizens shapes their behaviors. This has two major implications for the model.

First, we are no longer able to conceptualize Loyalty as an explicit response to dissatisfaction. Without distinct indicators of both Prior Satisfaction and Current Dissatisfaction in the model, we are not able to distinguish the two very different forms of loyalty: *loyalty as response to dissatisfaction* and *loyalty as the default condition of the satisfied citizen*. Loyalty as passive support on the part of the satisfied citizen is a conceptually distinct behavior from Loyalty as a response to dissatisfaction. When citizens are satisfied with city services, passive Loyalty of the good citizenship type would be expected to be a default form of behavior separate from the four responses to dissatisfaction. Measures of both Prior Satisfaction and Current Dissatisfaction must be included if we are to distinguish these two very different forms of Loyalty.

If both measures of satisfaction were included in the model, we would expect loyalty as a response to dissatisfaction to be indicated by high prior satisfaction and high current dissatisfaction. In contrast, high levels of loyalty

⁵ The most obvious problem is that the indicator is at best ordinal. However, we believed that this measure was theoretically superior to its two major alternatives: a simple difference measure and a simple multiplicative interaction term. The former would not have allowed us to distinguish between those who had a mild decline from a previous condition of high satisfaction and those who had a mild decline from a previous condition of low satisfaction. The response hypotheses associated with these two conditions are quite different, but a simple difference measure would have assigned both the same relative dissatisfaction score. A simple multiplicative interaction term would have similarly failed to distinguish those who had low current dissatisfaction but high prior satisfaction and those who had high current dissatisfaction but low prior satisfaction. Thus, our ordinal measure was considered theoretically superior.

as passive support would be associated with low levels of current dissatisfaction. But by combining the measures of Prior Satisfaction and Current Dissatisfaction, we are inevitably mixing the two responses and very likely giving weight to the latter type of loyalty (i.e., loyalty as passive support of satisfied citizens). Given this redefinition of Loyalty, and in contrast to the expectations outlined in table 1, our revised specification would lead us to expect that there will be a *negative* relationship between Reldis and Loyalty. (See the signs for the respecified version of the model using Relative Dissatisfaction shown in italics in table 1.)

Second, because the focus of Reldis is more heavily weighted toward the current state of dissatisfaction than prior satisfaction, expectations regarding the "satisfaction" term in the model must also change for Exit, and Neglect. (The sign for Voice is expected to remain positive.) Thus, as shown in table 1, it is hypothesized that there will be a *positive* relationship between Relative Dissatisfaction and Exit, Voice, and Neglect. Those who have become more dissatisfied in the present relative to the past should respond by invoking higher levels of the behaviors and attitudes associated with these responses. Such a prediction is quite consistent with the original theoretical view of the role of current dissatisfaction in the model and with much of the literature (e.g., Orbell and Uno 1972, Sharp 1984b, 1984c). Individuals must perceive problems or be dissatisfied with the current state of affairs before they are likely to expend the time, energy, and resources to engage in what we have called responses to dissatisfaction.

FINDINGS

Table 3 presents the OLS and Probit estimates for the basic models using all respondents and controlling for income, education, age, gender, race, and political efficacy. While we will examine separate subanalyses of the matched pairs of sites, the results across these sets were, for the most part, very similar. For convenience, then, we initially combine the 10 surveys to highlight the general empirical findings on the EVLN model.

With a few noteworthy exceptions, the results of the OLS regression and Probit analyses are quite consistent with the hypothesized relationships summarized in table 1 for our respecified model. This is especially true if we ignore for the moment the coefficients for the homeownership form of the investment measure (Invest-Home) and the results for the privatization form of exit (Exit-Priv). In general, the homeowner investment variable generated only weak results relative to the social investment indicator (Invest-Social) of the concept of investment. And the privatization form of exit is, as we will see, quite distinct from the traditional Tiebout exit response of voting with one's feet. Thus, ignoring these somewhat special cases for the moment, we are left with 12 coefficients in the upper half of table 3 that correspond to the

TABLE 3
ESTIMATES FOR RESPECIFIED EVLN MODEL

Variable	Response to Dissatisfaction				
	Exit-Move ¹	Exit-Priv ¹	Voice ²	Loyalty ²	Neglect ²
EVLN Variables					
Reldis	16 (.08) ³	19** (.05)	39** (.05)	121** (.06)	39** (.05)
Invest-Social	-14* (.06)	.02 (.03)	17** (.03)	25** (.03)	-11** (.02)
Invest-Home	-20 (.32)	20 (.19)	68** (.17)	.01 (.20)	-.04 (.16)
Alternatives	23 (.21)	-45** (.10)	.05 (.10)	70** (.12)	20* (.09)
Control Variables					
Education	-17* (.07)	.04 (.03)	22** (.03)	-14** (.04)	-10** (.03)
Income	.02 (.06)	12** (.02)	12** (.03)	.08* (.03)	-.02 (.03)
Age	.01 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.02** (.00)	-.00 (.00)
Gender	.07 (.15)	.00 (.08)	-.07 (.09)	25** (.10)	.08 (.08)
Race	-43 (.32)	-23 (.15)	.07 (.14)	-28 (.16)	43** (.13)
Efficacy	21 (.12)	10 (.07)	.06 (.07)	22** (.08)	49** (.06)
Constant	64	145	335	1118	1087
R ²	.22	.14	.16	.39	.20
Adjusted R ²			.15	.39	.19
N	1383	1383	1167	1167	1167

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

¹Estimated with Probit

²Estimated with OLS Regression; coefficients are unstandardized

³Figures in parentheses are standard errors

12 hypothesized relationships for the respecified model shown in table 1. Ten of these 12 coefficients are signed as expected and eight of these are significant.

Of the three EVLN independent variables, Invest-Social generated the strongest results: all four of the coefficients are both signed as expected and meet the .05 criterion level. Those with high levels of investment, all other things being equal, are more likely to exercise Voice and Loyalty when faced with dissatisfaction than are their more poorly invested neighbors. In contrast, those with few investments are more likely to invoke the Exit and Neglect responses to dissatisfaction.

The support for the Relative Dissatisfaction term of the model is nearly as strong. Keeping in mind that respecification of the model altered our expectations about the signs of the dissatisfaction term of the model, all four of the Reldis coefficients are correctly signed, albeit that for Exit-Move is not significant.

The weakest results were generated for Alternatives. Only the alternatives coefficient for Neglect is both signed as hypothesized and significant at the .05 level. The Alternatives coefficient for Exit-Move is correctly signed, but the coefficient is only slightly larger than its standard error. The Alternatives coefficients for both Voice and Loyalty are incorrectly signed, and that for Loyalty is significant at the .01 level. These results deserve to be examined in more detail.

The very weak negative coefficient for Alternatives in the Voice model is troubling given the large body of theory suggesting that alternatives must be available to make voice credible (Hirschman 1970, Kenyon 1984, Oakerson, Parks, and Bell 1987). To further investigate this, we conducted subanalyses of the five pairs of surveys.

These results were generated from models including all of the controls used in the results presented in table 3. For convenience, however, we only report the EVLN coefficients in tables 4 through 6. As expected, the coefficients of the control variables were considerably attenuated because our research sites were intentionally matched for socioeconomic similarity which significantly reduces the variances of the controls.

More consistent with expectations, the Alternatives coefficient is positive for three of the five matched sites in the Voice model, and two of these are significant at the .01 level (see table 4). Neither of the two negative coefficients were discernibly different from zero. In short, the negligible negative coefficient for all respondents reported in table 3 is likely the result of some mediating effect associated with the different socioeconomic composition of the five types of communities. But given the results in table 4, we feel more confident in maintaining the theoretically grounded view that alternatives and voice are positively related. At minimum, we would argue that this view is still valid across comparable, if not always across different, socioeconomic worlds.⁹

The other anomaly in table 3 concerns the relationship between Alternatives and Loyalty. Based on the work by Hirschman (1970) and research on

⁹The subanalysis for the Voice model shown in table 4 reveals another minor problem. The coefficient for Invest Home in the Voice model is strong (.78) for all respondents, yet rather weak for four of the five pairs of communities. The reason for this is rather clear. Very few of our respondents are renters (see note #1). However, there are enough renters in the total set of respondents to produce some statistically meaningful overall variance in the Invest-Home variable. Little variance was observed in four of the five paired research sites since most of our few renters happened to reside in the communities covered in Pair #1.

TABLE 4

ESTIMATES FOR RESPECTED VOICE MODEL BY PAIRED RESEARCH SITES¹

Dependent Variable	Paired Research Sites ²					
	All Respondents	Pair #1	Pair #2	Pair #3	Pair #4	Pair #5
his	.39** (.05) ³	.47** (.11)	.38** (.10)	.28 (.15)	.45** (.13)	.23* (.11)
st-Social	.17** (.03)	.26** (.06)	.15** (.05)	.20** (.06)	.25** (.07)	.11 (.06)
st-Home	.68** (.17)	.79* (.36)	.23 (.107)	.30 (.33)	.27 (.67)	.28 (.35)
natives	.05 (.10)	.95** (.24)	.30** (.07)	.08 (.25)	.08 (.24)	.19 (.29)
Adjusted R ²	.16	.27	.14	.12	.14	.20
	.15	.24	.11	.08	.10	.15
	1167	248	262	245	224	187

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

These estimates were generated with equations including all of the control variables predicted in table 4 included. Those wishing to examine the complete results for the controls should write to the authors.

The matched pairs are in order presented in table 2.

Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

TABLE 5

ESTIMATES FOR RESPECTED LOYALTY MODEL
BY PAIRED RESEARCH SITES

Dependent Variable	Paired Research Sites ²					
	All Respondents	Pair #1	Pair #2	Pair #3	Pair #4	Pair #5
his	.121** (.06)	.126** (.13)	.136** (.12)	.100** (.15)	.102** (.13)	.136** (.16)
st-Social	.25** (.03)	.31** (.07)	.17** (.07)	.20** (.06)	.29** (.07)	.27** (.09)
st-Home	.01 (.20)	.32 (.42)	-.149 (.133)	.25 (.33)	.05 (.66)	-.35 (.50)
natives	.70** (.12)	.73** (.28)	.32 (.26)	.111** (.24)	.83** (.24)	.19 (.40)
Adjusted R ²	.39	.43	.38	.39	.38	.38
	.39	.40	.36	.36	.36	.34
	1167	248	262	245	224	187

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

These estimates were generated with equations including all of the control variables predicted in table 4 included. Those wishing to examine the complete results for the controls should write to the authors.

The matched pairs are in order presented in table 2.

Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

TABLE 6
ESTIMATES FOR RESPECIFIED NEGLECT MODEL
BY PAIRED RESEARCH SITES¹

Independent EVLN Variable	Paired Research Sites ²					
	All Respondents	Pair #1	Pair #2	Pair #3	Pair #4	Pair #5
Beldis	.39** (.05) ³	.37** (.11)	.38** (.10)	.40 (.14)	.20 (.11)	.39* (.10)
Invest-Social	-.11** (.02)	-.17** (.05)	.02 (.05)	-.15** (.06)	-.16** (.06)	.06 (.06)
Invest-Home	-.04 (.16)	-.20 (.34)	-.23 (.105)	.15 (.31)	.81 (.56)	.13 (.32)
Alternatives	-.20* (.09)	-.01 (.23)	.00 (.20)	-.51* (.23)	-.11 (.21)	.06 (.26)
<i>R</i> ²	.20	.22	.17	.18	.13	.15
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	.19	.18	.13	.14	.09	.13
<i>N</i>	1167	248	262	245	224	157

* = $p < .05$ ** = $p < .01$

¹These estimates were generated with equations including all of the control variables presented in table 4 included. Those wishing to examine the complete results for the controls should write to the authors.

²The matched pairs are in order presented in table 2.

³Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

responses to dissatisfaction in job and personal relationship situations, it was originally hypothesized that the presence of alternatives would tend to reduce levels of loyalty. But in the case of local government situations, the opposite seems to be the case. The Alternatives coefficient in the Loyalty model is both positive and significant. We examined a number of possible explanations for this finding.

One possibility is that this result is not all that surprising given the argument that having numerous alternatives in the Tiebout sense of the term is measured by residing in a community with many small, homogeneous political jurisdictions like those drawn from the Louisville-Jefferson County setting. These types of local jurisdictions, we have been repeatedly told by public choice advocates, are precisely the kinds of political worlds that are likely to evidence strong *psychological attachments* on the part of the citizen to his or her city of residence. If psychological attachment is systematically higher under the high Alternatives condition, then Alternatives may be confounded with our Invest-Social variable, with both assessing the higher degree of attachment expected to be found in Tiebout-like arrangements.

To assess this explanation, we conducted difference of means tests on an abbreviated version of the Invest-Social index across the five pairs of re-

sites. This shortened index (Invest-Psychological) consists of two of the items in the original index—the first two items on attachment to the jurisdiction and the degree to which the respondent would be sorry to leave that jurisdiction. Only these items were considered because they directly address the psychological attachment focus of the public choice argument, while having family and friends and long-term residence in a city seem to be less immediately relevant to this account of our anomalous

public choice expectations were *not* supported. Mean attachment is lower in all of the Lexington-Fayette neighborhoods than it is in their corresponding Louisville-Jefferson neighborhoods. Moreover, four of those differences are significant at the .01 level. It seems that the respondents from the fragmented jurisdictions are considerably *less* attached to their cities than their counterparts in the consolidated city-county jurisdiction.¹⁰ Thus, this account of the unexpected Alternatives coefficient in the Loyalty model does seem especially plausible.

A second and similar interpretation would also suggest that the strong positive Alternatives coefficient is to be expected since proponents of the public choice model have long argued that citizen satisfaction with services is higher in smaller, more homogeneous communities (Lowery and Lyons 1989). If satisfaction with public services is systematically higher in the high alternatives condition, then our measure of Alternatives may be confounded with our Relative Dissatisfaction variable, with both assessing a positive relationship between high satisfaction and Loyalty as ritual support for public institutions.

To test this account, we conducted difference of means tests for Current Dissatisfaction across the matched pairs of research sites. These results indicate that there is a strong relationship between Alternatives and Current Dissatisfaction. Sharp mean differences in dissatisfaction were observed by jurisdictional types for all five matched pairs. But in only two cases was dissatisfaction with government services higher in the consolidated Lexington setting, while the opposite pattern was found for the three remaining pairs of research sites. A similar pattern was found when we examined the relationship between Alternatives and Relative Dissatisfaction. Relative Dissatisfaction was higher among all Louisville area respondents and significantly higher for respondents from the fragmented Louisville setting in four of our five matched pairs of research sites. While these findings suggest that local and even quite neighborhood-specific factors may be

involved. Lowery and Lyons (1989) in another study based on these same data, discovered an overwhelming majority ($N = 71.8\%$) of respondents in all five Louisville sites claimed that the county government and not their small incorporated municipality was the most important of local government in their daily lives. This also runs counter to expectations based on the public choice model.

more important than institutional formats in accounting for variations in levels of dissatisfaction, they do not support the argument that the positive coefficient for Alternatives in the Loyalty model is a function confounding our measure of Loyalty with our Relative Dissatisfaction variable.

A third explanation based on the Tiebout model might be that citizens living in those settings where there are a lot of alternative local jurisdictions with differing tax-service packages have already voted with their feet, whereas those who are dissatisfied in the consolidated setting have no choice but to stay put unless they wish to move out of the area entirely. This could result in finding more satisfied loyalists in high-alternative settings producing a positive relationship between Loyalty and Alternatives in a cross-sectional study like this one.

Although this argument incorporates our contention that a different interpretation must be given to the notion of Loyalty in our respecified model, it is also subject to question in light of the findings presented earlier concerning the levels of dissatisfaction found in our two research settings. If the positive coefficient between Alternatives and Loyalty is merely a function of having conducted our surveys at a point in time after most dissatisfied citizens had moved to a more satisfactory situation in the Louisville setting, then we should have found higher levels of overall and site-specific satisfaction among our Louisville area respondents.

We still believe, however, that the seemingly anomalous Alternatives coefficient in the Loyalty model is tied to the reinterpretation of the meaning of Loyalty that was suggested when the basic EVLN model was respecified. Specifically, the original model conceptualized Loyalty as a response to dissatisfaction—passively and hopefully waiting for conditions to improve. The respecified version of the model, on the other hand, interprets Loyalty as the ritualistic default position of the satisfied citizen.

So how does one account for the stronger expressions of Loyalty stated in these terms coming from respondents living in an environment where the levels of satisfaction are comparatively lower? One answer may be that the passive type of loyalty displayed by satisfied citizens may extend to the point where such citizens do not seriously evaluate the kinds of constraints on potential responses that might be evoked were they to become dissatisfied. A person who is satisfied might not seriously weigh the costs of engaging in such costly options as moving. In such situations, the existence of alternatives may simply reinforce the rose-glow engendered by their satisfaction with the status quo. Thus, those living in systems with lots of options and who are basically satisfied are more likely to exhibit the kinds of attitudes and responses that are tapped by our measure of Loyalty than their equally satisfied counterparts living in a governmental environment where few options exist. While we are not able to directly test this interpretation, we will return to it in the conclusion of the analysis.

Subanalyses of paired research sites similar to those shown in table 4 to assess the anomalous Alternatives coefficient in the Voice model were also conducted for Loyalty and Neglect. (Given the small number of cases reporting Exit-Move and Exit-Priv behaviors, subanalyses could not be conducted for these two responses.) The results of the analyses for Loyalty and Neglect are reported in tables 5 and 6, and serve in combination with table 3 to highlight an important qualification in our findings.

While the results of these subanalyses generally support the conclusion drawn from the findings reported for the combined surveys, they also illustrate the weakness of several of the relationships posited by the model. Briefly, there are only two cases in these three tables where a coefficient is *both* correctly signed and significant across all five paired research sites and the full set of respondents. The variables identified by the EVLN model do matter, but clearly they do not strictly govern responses to dissatisfaction. Thus, while the model is generally supported by these results, we would strongly caution against expecting dramatic and/or inevitable changes in behavior upon natural or manipulated changes in the values of the EVLN independent variables. This is especially true for Alternatives: improving alternatives by adopting Tiebout-like institutional arrangements may have some positive impact on the use of voice and Tiebout exiting, but the differences would likely be very small and inconsistent.

Finally, some attention should be given to the differences between the two types of Exit that are observed in table 3. Although we found very few respondents who met our test for being classified as a Tiebout type of exiter (i.e., $n = 21$), a finding that is interesting in its own right given the great faith placed on this response to dissatisfaction by numerous public choice analysts (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961; Bish 1971; Bish and Ostrom 1973), the size and direction of the Probit coefficients shown for our three determinates in the classic Exit model are as expected. The prototypical exiter in the Tiebout sense tends to be relatively dissatisfied, has weak investments in the community, and has numerous alternatives as a consequence of living in an urban environment characterized by high levels of governmental fragmentation.

The privatization version of the exit model, however, operates quite differently from the one based on the work of Tiebout. Like Tiebout-type exiters, those who turn to the private sector for some services also tend to be relatively dissatisfied, as indicated by the positive and significant Relative Dissatisfaction coefficient in the second column of table 3. However, Alternatives in the Tiebout sense seems to have exactly the opposite effect in the Exit-Privatization model than it had in the Exit-Move model: the coefficient is negative instead of positive and significant at the .01 level. Further, home ownership is the only kind of Investment that seems to matter in the case of Exit-Privatization.

The reason for the latter seems intuitively clear. Although homeownership can be seen as a constraint on making a decision to move in search of a more satisfactory tax-service package, it can also be viewed as a strong incentive for soliciting such property-oriented services as additional security or trash collection from the private sector. The reasons for the strong negative coefficient for Alternatives in the Exit-Privatization model are not so clear. On the one hand it can be argued that the opportunity to consider the privatization of such things as garbage collection and private security systems is not affected by Alternatives as defined in this study. But it is also possible to understand how opting for privatization might prove to be negatively related to the availability of alternatives in the Tiebout sense of that term. Indeed, privatization might be viewed as an effort by individuals to create their own alternatives to current government services that become especially important when the dissatisfied citizen has no jurisdictional alternatives to consider (Oakerson, Parks, and Bell 1987, Lowery and Lyons 1989).

DISCUSSION


In sum, the results provide consistent support for many components of the EVLN model. However, the results are in some cases weak, and perhaps more important, we were unable to isolate both the magnitude of reliance on and the determinants of Loyalty as a response to dissatisfaction. In general, though, the results compare quite favorably to both more conventional models of local participation that emphasize individual predispositions arising from psychological and socio-demographic forces and tests of the EVLN model in employment and romantic situations.

Nevertheless, the system that emerges from this test of the model is somewhat different from that suggested by Lyons and Lowery (1986). Loyalty as a response to dissatisfaction is missing from the system, if still viable theoretically. Moreover, individual contracting as an alternative to current public services must now be viewed as a distinct form of response to dissatisfaction.

To better conceptualize these changes, as well as to highlight the general contributions of this analysis, we can compare this system to one developed by Orbell and Uno (1972, 486) in their innovative, first attempt to develop a general model of response to dissatisfaction. Based in their empirical analysis, they posited a decision-tree conceptualization of response, with three response types: exit, voice, and passivity. They then posited several decision points focusing on responses to such questions as "can voice work for me" and "can exit work for me." In contrast, the analysis presented here suggests a more complex decision-tree of the type seen in figure 2.

This alternative decision-tree differs from the one presented by Orbell and Uno in two important respects. First, the range of possible response types is more complex. In addition to voice and exit, privatization is added.

FIGURE 2
A SEQUENTIAL CHOICE MODEL OF RESPONSE TO DISSATISFACTION



a viable response to dissatisfaction. Moreover, their passivity response is broken into two components—neglect and loyalty as good citizenship—that have fundamentally different meanings for citizens' relationship with their local government. Missing from even this model, however, is a third form of passive response that is theoretically viable—loyalty as a response to dissatisfaction. The second difference is a substitution of a few specific questions about the citizen's situation for Orbell and Uno's less precise queries about whether one of several response types will work. While many of their examples clearly speak to the issues raised in our concepts of investments

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APPENDIX A

MULTI-ITEM VARIABLES

Variable Name	Items/Questions Included	Mpl
Voice	<p>Have you ever attended a meeting or meetings called to discuss problems in your neighborhood or local community? Yes/No</p> <p>Have you ever belonged to any organization attempting to solve problems in your neighborhood or local community? Yes/No</p> <p>Have you ever helped to organize a petition drive regarding problems in your neighborhood or local community? Yes/No</p> <p>Have you ever telephoned or written to an elected official or agency of the (name of local government) regarding problems in your neighborhood or local community? Yes/No</p> <p>Have you ever signed a petition regarding any particular problem in your neighborhood or local community? Yes/No</p> <p>Have you ever met informally with neighbors to work on solving problems concerning local government services in your neighborhood or local community? Yes/No</p>	
Loyalty	Generally speaking, how much do you trust the officials of the (name of local government) to do the "right thing" about problems that may arise in the community?	

	<p>Almost Always Most of Time Only Sometimes or Almost Never?</p> <p>If someone criticized the overall performance of the <i>name of local government</i> during a conversation how strongly would you defend the government? Very Strongly Somewhat Strongly Not Very Strongly Not Defend At All?</p> <p>Do you Strongly Agree Agree Disagree or Strongly Disagree with the following statements?</p> <p>Problems with public services in <i>name of local government</i> usually work themselves out</p> <p>People are too quick to blame local officials when things go wrong in <i>name of local government</i></p> <p>As far as people like me are concerned the best thing to do is to believe in the honesty and wisdom of those who run the <i>name of local government</i></p>	72
Neglect	<p>Do you Strongly Agree Agree Disagree or Strongly Disagree with the following statements?</p> <p>When there are problems like garbage in the streets or potholes in the roads it is useless to complain to officials of the <i>name of local government</i></p> <p>I don't care what happens in the <i>name of local government</i> government or politics as long as things are OK for me and my family</p> <p>The <i>name of local government</i> doesn't care about people like me</p> <p>It's not worth paying attention to issues facing the <i>name of local government</i> because all the local politicians care about is serving their own interests</p>	69
Invest Social	<p>How long have you lived in <i>name of local government</i>?</p> <p>Has it been Less Than a Year One to Five Years Six to Ten Years More Than Ten Years</p> <p>How many of your friends live in your immediate neighborhood? None A Few More Than Half Almost All</p> <p>How many of your relatives live in your immediate neighborhood? None A Few More Than Half Almost All?</p> <p>Suppose that for some reason you had to move away from the area you now live in how sorry or pleased would you be to leave? Very Sorry Somewhat Sorry Not Sorry At All?</p> <p>Do you feel a Strong Moderate or Weak attachment to living in <i>name of local government</i>?</p>	55
Curtis	<p>OK let's talk a bit about how you CURRENTLY feel about the overall performance of the <i>name of local government</i>. Would you say that you are currently Very</p>	

Satisfied, Satisfied Dissatisfied or Very Dissatisfied
with the way the (name of local government) is doing
its job?

In general, how good a job do you feel the (name of
local government) is currently doing in providing
services—Would you say that it is doing an Excellent
Good, Fair or Poor job?

51

Prsat

Now I'd like you to try and recall how you felt about the
services provided by the (name of local government)
in past years. Would say that in past years you were
generally Very Satisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied or
Very Dissatisfied with the way the (name of local
government) did its job?

Regardless of how you may feel right now, how would
you rate the overall performance of the (name of local
government) in past years? Would you say that in past
years its overall performance was Excellent Good, Fair
or Poor?

7b

Poleff

Do you Agree or Disagree with the following
statements?

I don't think that public officials in this country care
very much about what people like me think.

People like me don't have any say about what the
government does.

65

Voting in Gubernatorial Succession Referenda: The Incumbency Cue

Lee Sigelman
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This paper examines the proposition that the role played by the incumbent governor is a key factor shaping public support or opposition in constitutional referenda on the right of governors to succeed themselves in office. To the extent that the incumbent governor has played a leading role in the referendum campaign, many voters should support a succession amendment in order to keep the governor in office while many others should oppose a succession amendment in order to drive the governor out of office. If the governor's role in the referendum campaign has been less visible, appraisals of the governor should have a lesser impact on the voters. Survey data from Kentucky, North Carolina, and Mississippi are used to test this interpretation which performs quite well.

The party- and candidate-centered cues that shape voters' decisions in many elections are ostensibly absent in referenda, which by definition focus on issues, not candidates. Why, then, do people vote as they do in referenda? Although much attention has been brought to bear on this question (see e.g., Butler and Ranney 1978, Cornwell, Goodman, and Swanson 1975, Magleby 1984, Nilson and Bjorklund 1986, Pierce, Valen, and Luthaug 1983), our understanding of referendum voting remains incomplete. In an attempt to determine whether, under certain conditions, the differences between voting in partisan, candidate contests and in nonpartisan, non-candidate referenda may be more imagined than real, this paper undertakes a three-state analysis of voting in referenda on the right of governors to succeed themselves in office.

THE SUCCESSION ISSUE

Since 1960, 13 states (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South

Thanks are due to Thad Beyle and Malcolm Jewell for their helpful advice, and to Rubyanne Andress for invaluable research assistance. Jane D. Brown of the University of North Carolina, Susan E. Howell of the University of New Orleans, Timothy Johnson of the University of Kentucky, Peter McGeoch of Market Opinion Research, and Stephen Shaffer of Mississippi State University generously made available the data employed in this analysis.

Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia), all of which had barred their governors from succeeding themselves, have instituted two-term re-eligibility provisions. Southern states dominate this list simply because most of the states that once imposed one-term restrictions were southern.¹ During the same period, four states (Hawaii, Kansas, Nebraska, and Nevada) placed new two-term restrictions on previously unrestricted governors, and another state (New Mexico) replaced a two-term limitation with a single-term one. However, in three of these states (Kansas, Nebraska, and New Mexico) the re-eligibility restriction was imposed in tandem with a lengthening of the governor's term from two to four years, a package viewed in every instance as strengthening the governorship, and in 1986 New Mexico's voters re-instituted the two-term limit. Of the 15 states that limited the governor to a single term in 1960, only two (Kentucky and Virginia) currently do so, the succession issue has not been seriously raised in Virginia in recent years, while in Kentucky succession measures were rejected by the voters in 1981 and by the legislature in 1988.

INCUMBENT-BASED VOTING IN SUCCESSION REFERENDA: A CONTEXTUAL INTERPRETATION

It has been said of referendum voting in general that 'If at any point the parties develop a strong interest in the issue, it can be expected that referendum voting patterns will to a considerable extent resemble those operative in partisan elections' (Thomas 1968, 129, see also Mueller 1969: 1206-1207). Consistent with this idea, prior studies of political influences on 'nonpartisan' elections have focused on the *partisan* patterning of the vote. For example, Pierce et al. (1983) describe partisanship as 'the primary force' shaping voting decisions in the British and Norwegian referenda on membership in the European Community. Similarly, Squire and Smith (1988) conclude that, contrary to the reformist impulse that led to the attempt to insulate such elections from partisan forces, partisan cues are a key factor in California judicial retention elections.

On the other hand, it is generally conceded that party identification plays a key role in only the occasional referendum, as David Magleby has written: 'In candidate contests, party identification acts as a standing decision and a simplifying device. In contrast, only a few issues covered by ballot propositions have the kind of standing decision so typical of candidate contests' (1984, 172).

Unfortunately, understanding of the politics of referendum voting has not progressed very far beyond this point. In a representative analysis, Nelson

¹For an excellent (though now outdated) overview of reeligibility restrictions at the federal and state levels from colonial times onward, see Kallenbach (1952); some useful historical perspectives can also be gleaned from Benjamin (1985).

and Bjorklund (1986) classify referenda as "party-structured," "group-structured," or "unstructured," a categorization that logically excludes the possibility that factors other than parties or interest groups can decisively affect referendum outcomes

Gubernatorial succession referenda provide a context for exploring the operation of what is, in essence, an *incumbency cue* in nonpartisan elections. Governors are normally "either the initiators or among the strongest and most vociferous supporters" of state constitutional amendments in general (Sabato, 1978, 65), and even more so of succession amendments, the outcomes of which directly affect the political future of any governor pondering a reelection bid. For this reason, governors have sometimes tried to cast succession referenda as votes of confidence in themselves—a course of action openly advocated in 1986 by the state Democratic chairman in Mississippi who said of the upcoming succession campaign: "If I were Bill Allam, I'd make it a referendum on Bill Allam" (Succession in Mississippi, 16 March 1986). However, governors who become so overtly involved run the risk of fostering the impression that they are motivated less by the merits of the ballot proposition than by blatant self-interest. Recognizing this danger, many governors have tried to remain behind the scenes rather than leading the charge.

The premise underlying this analysis is that voters' assessments of how well the incumbent governor has been performing can, *under certain conditions*, become the dominant factor in their decision to support or oppose a succession amendment. The typical succession referendum is a very low-stimulus event about which citizens are minimally interested and informed. Seeking some meaningful guidepost on the issue, many citizens may latch onto the governor, reasoning that supporting a succession amendment will help keep a governor they like in office—or that opposing it will help drive a governor they dislike out of office. Under such circumstances, voting in a succession referendum becomes indistinguishable from voting in many partisan, candidate-based elections—in that both are shaped by evaluations of the incumbent.

However, under different conditions the decision to vote for or against a succession amendment may be well insulated from assessments of the governor, though even then such evaluations are unlikely to be *entirely* inconsequential. Reflecting a tendency to personalize abstract issues, some voters may be influenced by their opinion even of a governor who has done nothing at all on behalf of a succession amendment. But governors who campaign actively on behalf of a succession amendment forge a cognitive link in the voter's mind between themselves and the succession issue. It is this link that has the potential to transform the succession vote into a vote of confidence in the governor.

A 1985 charter revision referendum in New Orleans is a case in point.

Mayor Ernest N. "Dutch" Morial, legally barred from serving a third term, spearheaded a drive to change the city charter to permit him to serve again. Behind slogans like "Keep Our Great Mayor," the charter revision drive bore all the marks of a reelection campaign (Marcus 19 Oct. 1985), and the coalitions supporting and opposing charter revision left no doubt that Morial himself was the main issue, pro or con. According to a survey of registered voters conducted just before the referendum, almost everyone (99%) who disapproved of Morial's performance as mayor opposed charter revision. Only the mayor's staunchest supporters—those who strongly approved of his job performance—favored charter revision, by a three-to-one ratio, 80% of those who approved of Morial's performance, but not strongly, opposed the third-term provision. Morial's widespread popularity was not sufficient to turn the tide in his favor, since his close identification with the issue mobilized opposition even more than it activated support.²

Because the New Orleans charter revision campaign was explicitly billed as a fight to keep Morial in office, it is no wonder that voting patterns so closely reflected appraisals of the mayor. The unanswerable question is how closely the New Orleans charter revision vote would have reflected assessments of Morial had he *not* become the issue in the campaign. We cannot remake history to find out, but we can examine voting decisions in a series of statewide referenda in which the incumbent's role ranged from relative uninvolvedness to active leadership.

THE THREE REFERENDA

The analyses reported here focus on gubernatorial succession referenda in the three states (Kentucky, Mississippi, and North Carolina) for which individual-level data on support for gubernatorial succession are available. Fortunately, these three states cover the full range of gubernatorial involvement in the succession issue. The purpose of the analysis is to determine whether voters' assessments of the incumbent governor have had a differential impact on their support for succession in these states. But first, it is necessary to describe the role each governor played in the succession campaign.

North Carolina

On November 8, 1977, voters in North Carolina approved, by a margin of 52.5% to 47.5%, a constitutional amendment permitting Governor James Hunt and his successors to serve a second consecutive term. That vote was widely interpreted as a major political victory for Governor Hunt. The one-term limitation had been a firmly entrenched tradition until the newly

²These figures are from the UNO POLL, Mayor's Race Panel Survey conducted October 1–10, 1985. The UNO Poll is a triennial telephone survey of registered voters in New Orleans directed by Susan E. Howell of the Department of Political Science, University of New Orleans.

elected Hunt unexpectedly cajoled the legislature into putting the issue before the voters. His persuasiveness was enhanced by the landslide victory he had won just a few months earlier and by the public esteem he enjoyed. During his first year in office two-thirds of the respondents in a statewide Carolina Poll gave him a positive job rating, and only 6% said he was doing a poor job.¹ In the words of a long-time political observer, the legislators who put succession on the ballot "weren't voting on a principle which most of them opposed. They were voting on a popular governor with 45 months to go in office" (Snider 1984, 45).

It may have been Hunt's popularity that convinced the legislature to put the succession amendment on the ballot, but his statewide political organization seems to have been what secured the amendment's passage. Every inch the organization man, Hunt had long cultivated political alliances throughout the state, capitalizing on contacts established during his high school, college, and law school apprenticeship in state Democratic politics. His organization, which reached into every one of North Carolina's 100 counties, was the key to his rise to power, and after he became governor it provided the means of rallying the party and the public behind him.

During the lackluster referendum campaign, Hunt remained aloof from the fray, "hoping to depersonalize the matter" (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 29 Oct. 1977: 2314) and thereby to avoid the appearance of self-promotion. Opponents of the amendment could not agree on how to attack it. Some wanted to assail Hunt for his apparent opportunism, but others, leery of his popularity, wanted to downplay the connection between Hunt and the amendment. The pro-succession campaign was carefully packaged to avoid overtly partisan appeals, except in heavily Democratic counties, where it was feared that a bipartisan campaign would be ineffective (Donsky 6 Nov. 1977). Because both proponents and opponents of the measure avoided incendiary tactics, the issue generated very little public interest, and a survey conducted by the Democratic Party approximately two weeks before the referendum uncovered no widespread perception that the amendment was part of a Hunt power drive (Donsky 6 Nov. 1977). On November 8, fewer than 600 thousand North Carolinians went to the polls, scarcely a quarter of the turnout eight years later in Hunt's bitter Senate race against Jesse Helms.

Kentucky

Four years later on November 3, 1981, voters in Kentucky resoundingly rejected by a margin of 61% to 39% a succession amendment for which Governor John Y. Brown, Jr., had vigorously campaigned. The North Carolina and Kentucky succession campaigns differed in several respects, reflecting the roles and personalities of Governors Hunt and Brown. In contrast to

¹On the Carolina Poll, see note 6 below.

Hunt, Brown, who had been swept into office on the wave of a media-based campaign that bypassed regular party channels, had no functioning statewide organization. Moreover, whereas Hunt personified steadiness, reliability, and personal probity, Brown's image was that of a jet-setting wheeler-dealer, and he and his glamorous wife were widely viewed as "over-ambitious, tasteless self-promoters" (Peirce and Hagstrom 1983, 390).

Six months before the referendum, 62% of those expressing an opinion in a statewide University of Kentucky Survey Research Center (UKSRC) poll favored permitting Kentucky governors to succeed themselves.⁴ Hoping to solidify these sentiments, pro-amendment forces, in a fashion typical of Brown, undertook "the most extensive campaign on an amendment in the state's history" (Johnson, 2 Nov. 1981). 'Kentuckians FOR the Amendment' worked feverishly, targeting most of its \$360 thousand budget on a high-powered media campaign. In contrast, the anti-amendment "Committee for Kentucky" spent only \$24 thousand (Brammer, 8 Dec. 1981, Holwerk, 1 Nov. 1981) on a campaign so low-profile that it escaped the notice of all but the most determined followers of Kentucky politics. Visibility was no problem for the pro-amendment side especially after the Browns, concerned about the public indifference they sensed toward the amendment, launched a statewide tour and media blitz.

The Browns' active entry into the succession campaign transformed succession into *the* issue of Kentucky politics. The governor recognized that in thrusting himself into the pro-amendment campaign he ran the risk of fostering an impression of self-promotion (Holwerk, 1 Nov. 1981). He could have dispelled this impression by disavowing any intention to stand for reelection if the succession measure passed, as some of his advisers urged him to do. But he wanted to keep his options open, and repeatedly refused to issue a Shermansque statement, thereby inviting suspicions that his support for the amendment was only the opening volley in a projected reelection campaign. Thus, the succession campaign, already politically charged, quickly took on "the aura of a gubernatorial campaign" (Brammer, 19 Oct. 1981). The pros and cons of the amendment paled amidst charges and countercharges about how good a job Brown was doing as governor. Brown himself often played on this very theme, conceding that he had turned succession into a vote on himself and concluding that "Whether I like it or not, it will be a referendum on my administration" (Myerson, 1 Nov. 1981, Ryan, 1 Nov. 1981).⁵

⁴On the UKSRC Poll, see note 6 below.

⁵After the votes had been counted, Brown understandably backed away from this interpretation saying, "I do like to think that this is not a rejection of my administration. The co-chairman of 'Kentuckians FOR the Amendment' went even further, portraying the amendment's defeat as a rejection of almost everyone except Brown. "The voters feared Governor Brown's successors might not be as honest and forthright as Governor Brown. Therefore, they were disturbed. They were also disturbed that past governors had abused their power." (Wilson, 4 Nov. 1981).

Mississippi

Five years after the Kentucky referendum, on November 4, 1986, a gubernatorial succession amendment carried 75% of the vote in Mississippi, giving Governor William Allain a chance to run again in 1987 (an opportunity he ultimately eschewed). In North Carolina and Kentucky, succession had been virtually a nonissue prior to the intervention of governors Hunt and Brown, but in Mississippi the issue had a venerable past. Earlier attempts to put the measure on the ballot had died in the House Constitution Committee, whose chairman opposed succession (McIntosh, 26 Oct. 1986). In 1986, however, apparently swayed by the argument that a one-term governor would not oversee an effective economic development program, the committee chairman finally relented (Davis, 8 Jan. 1986).

The amendment won endorsements from groups spanning the state's political spectrum. A number of development-oriented organizations, most notably the Mississippi Economic Council, worked for its passage as did the Mississippi AFL-CIO. Every living former governor and every major state constitutional officer supported it, and the state Democratic and Republican parties vied to outdo one another in advocating it. Governor Allain spoke on the measure's behalf but avoided the limelight. When the amendment was still being considered by the legislature, Allain urged that he be excluded from the amendment's coverage—a stark contrast to Brown's insistence that he himself be protected by the amendment. Allain was not excluded, but he did repeatedly declare that his support for succession was not a prelude to a reelection campaign. The credibility of this avowal was enhanced by his earlier declaration, after an extraordinarily acrimonious general election campaign, that he would never again run for office. Unlike Hunt and Brown, Allain formed no organization for the amendment, avoided twisting arms, and consciously “lay low” (Davis, 9 Jan. 1986; McIntosh, 26 Oct. 1986). Succession in Mississippi, far from becoming a hot political issue, was so widely supported that the issue became—in the words of one editorialist—a “yawner” (Salter, 12 Oct. 1986). It excited little public interest and was greeted on November 4 by extremely low voter turnout.

Summary

In sum, the three succession campaigns unfolded very differently. In North Carolina, Governor Hunt got the measure on the ballot and orchestrated the pro-amendment campaign but steadfastly avoided the limelight. In Kentucky, Governor Brown essentially *was* the succession campaign. In Mississippi, Governor Allain was only a face in the crowd of those working for the amendment's passage.

These varying campaign contexts suggest distinctive configurations of support and opposition to succession in the three states. Where—as in Missis-

issippi, the governor played a minimal role in the succession campaign, assessments of his job performance should have had relatively little impact on support for the succession amendment. Where, as in North Carolina and Kentucky prior to Governor Brown's takeover of the pro-succession campaign, the governor played an important but limited role in the succession movement, assessments of his performance should have had a greater impact. And where, as in the latter stages of the Kentucky campaign, the governor publicly led the fight for succession, support for the amendment should have been very closely tied to assessments of the governor's performance.

TESTING THE INTERPRETATION

The test of this interpretation consists of using survey data from North Carolina, Kentucky, and Mississippi to fit nearly identical models of support for succession in the three states. The North Carolina data are from a statewide survey conducted about three weeks before the 1977 referendum vote. The Kentucky data are from a spring 1981 statewide poll and another statewide survey conducted that fall just after the referendum vote. The Mississippi data are from a February 1986 statewide survey conducted by the Survey Research Unit of the Social Science Research Center at Mississippi State University.⁶

The dependent variable is the respondent's intended or (in the case of the post-election Kentucky survey) reported vote for or against the succession amendment. The primary independent variable is the respondent's appraisal of the incumbent governor. In North Carolina, the gubernatorial popularity item was "On the whole, do you think Governor Hunt has done a good or a bad job so far as governor?" with responses coded as "poor," "mixed," "good." A more standard item was employed in Kentucky and Mississippi: "How would you rate the job John Y. Brown is doing as Governor—excellent, good, fair, or poor?", and "I'm going to ask you to rate the job performance of a few political figures and institutions. Rate each of them as excellent, good, fair, or poor. What about the performance of Governor Allan

As a means of fleshing out the model and controlling for factors that con

⁶ The North Carolina survey data were supplied by Jane D. Brown, director. Interviews for these statewide surveys were selected via random digit dialing with sample sizes of 477 in 1977 and 509 in 1983. The Kentucky data were supplied by Timothy Johnson of the University of Kentucky Survey Research Center. Like the Carolina Poll, the University of Kentucky Survey Research Center Poll selects interviewees statewide via random digit dialing; the spring and fall of 1981 surveys had sample sizes of 750 and 684, respectively. The Mississippi data were furnished by Stephen Shaffer, director of the Survey Research Unit at Mississippi State University. This statewide telephone survey had 611 respondents; the sample was weighted by demographic characteristics to correct for the underrepresentation of the types of Mississippians who do not have telephones.

confound the relationship between evaluations of the governor and support for gubernatorial succession, several other variables were introduced as predictors of support for succession, these included race, sex, age, education, income, party identification, and political ideology.¹

FINDINGS

Just how great an impact did evaluations of the governor's job performance have on support for a succession amendment? Table 1a breaks down support for succession in each state according to evaluations of the incumbent governor. Here we can glimpse some intriguing patterns. But a more definitive answer to this question is given in the next two sections of the table.

Table 1b summarizes a series of Probit analyses of the impact of assessments of gubernatorial performance and the other variables in the explanatory model. The demographic variables in the model perform rather indifferently as predictors of support for succession amendments, as does political ideology. In three of the four tests, age emerged as a significant predictor with older voters being less likely to favor succession, however, in no case did age have a truly appreciable impact on the chances of favoring succession. In all three of these traditionally Democratic states, Republicans were significantly less enthusiastic about the succession amendment than Democrats were, even with the effect of evaluations of the governor held constant. More importantly for present purposes, entirely apart from the effect of partisanship, in each state support for the incumbent governor had a significant effect on support for the constitutional amendment.

Table 1c translates the Probit coefficients from table 1b into the estimated probability that a voter with certain specified characteristics would support the succession amendment. These probability estimates focus on a voter with a set of personal characteristics that would make him reasonably typical of the citizens of the three states. The purpose of these estimates is to illustrate the impact of evaluations of the governor, holding constant all the other variables in the model. This "baseline" voter is a 42-year-old white male high school graduate with a family income of \$25 thousand, politically, he is a moderate and a Democrat. In order to see what bearing his assessment of the governor would have had on his support for the constitutional amendment, we first assume that he gave the governor the lowest performance rating possible, "poor," and calculate his probability of favoring succession. We then progressively relax this assumption until the voter is assumed to have awarded the governor a job rating of "excellent" (or, for North Carolinians, "good"). The independent effect of assessments of the incumbent's job per-

¹ The control variables should be self-explanatory. The North Carolina survey did not include income or ideology variables. For ideology, "liberal" served as the reference category. For party identification, "Democrat" was the reference category.

TABLE 1
BIVARIATE AND MULTIVARIATE FINDINGS CONCERNING
SUCCESSION SUPPORT

	North Carolina 1977	Kentucky Spring 1981	Fall 1981	Mississippi 1986
A Support for Succession by Rating of Governor				
Rating of Governor	Proportion Favoring Succession			
Lowest	36	35	08	57
Second lowest	59	54	29	75
Second highest	—	69	52	58
Highest	70	84	82	91
B Probit Analysis Summary				
Predictor	Probit Coefficient (sig.)			
Constant	-.62	.55	-.98	1.20
White	.08	.24	-.64	.70***
Male	.24	.06	.01	.17
Age	-.01*	.02***	-.01*	.01
Education	.02	-.07	.04	.04
Income	NA	-.00	-.00	.00
Republican	-.51**	-.25*	-.42*	.93***
Independent	-.58**	-.01	.03	-.41*
Other Party	-.07	.06	-.51	.43
Conservative	NA	-.03	-.42	.20
Moderate	NA	.22	-.23	.00
No Ideology	NA	-.05	-.70**	.11
Governor's Job Rating	.72**	.17***	.81***	.49***
Number of cases	322	544	301	463
Chi-square/df	28/8***	69/12***	84/12***	63/12***
Correctly predicted	67%	69%	70%	81%
C Probit-Projected Probability of Succession Support for a Typical Respondent, by Rating of the Incumbent Governor				
Rating of Governor	Projected Likelihood of Supporting Succession			
Lowest	53	48	10	77
Second lowest	67	66	32	59
Second highest	—	81	64	96
Highest	79	91	88	99

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. All significance tests are one-tailed. The "typical" respondent is a 42-year-old white male with 12 years of education and an income of \$25 thousand who identifies as a Democrat and as an ideological moderate.

formance can then be gauged from the differences among the various probability estimates for the baseline individual

Consistent with the breakdowns in table 1a, these probability estimates indicate that in all four instances there was an appreciable incumbent-based differential in support for the succession amendment. Even when evaluations of the governor mattered least (in Mississippi), they mattered a good deal, accounting for a 22 percentage point gap in support for succession. Thus, even though in three of the four instances controlling for other relevant factors closes the gap somewhat between supporters and opponents of the governor, a substantial gap still remains.

Let us now examine these gaps more closely. In Mississippi, where the governor played a far less visible role in the succession campaign than his counterparts in North Carolina and Kentucky, a weaker connection would be expected between voters' appraisals of the governor and their support for the succession amendment. Table 1 reveals that support for the amendment was, to some extent, aligned with evaluations of Governor Allam's job performance, nine of every 10 of those who considered Allam an 'excellent' governor, but fewer than 6 of every 10 who considered him a 'poor' governor, expressed support for the succession amendment. A difference of this magnitude cannot be dismissed as inconsequential. Still, in looking across the columns of tables 1a and 1c (particularly the latter) we see that support for the amendment was very widespread even among the governor's most severe critics. We also see that—consistent with expectations—the incumbent-based gap in support for succession was smaller in Mississippi than it was in the other two states.

Of course, the survey upon which the Mississippi calculations are based was conducted in February 1986, almost 10 months before the actual referendum. How confident should we be that as election day drew near, the link between support for the incumbent and the amendment did not become stronger? Fortunately for our purposes, in July 1986 Market Opinion Research conducted a statewide poll for the Mississippi Republican Party. Although this dataset is not in the public domain, Market Opinion Research graciously provided a cross-tabulation of the relationship between evaluations of Governor Allam and support for the succession amendment.⁸ This cross-tabulation indicates that—if anything, the relationship between evaluations of the governor and support for the amendment weakened as the referendum approached, in July, support for the amendment stood at approximately 65% among those who disapproved of Allam's performance and at approximately 80% among those who approved. Thus, late in the summer when the outcome of the referendum had for all intents and purposes been

⁸The Market Opinion Research data are from a July 1986 statewide telephone survey of 500 Mississippians conducted for the Mississippi Republican Party.

decided, the differential in support for succession between those friendly and unfriendly to Allam was only 15 percentage points—less than had been observed in the February survey.

This brings us to the “intermediate” cases of North Carolina in 1977 and Kentucky in the spring of 1981. In light of Governor Hunt’s crucial veiled role in the North Carolina succession campaign, the link between evaluations of the governor and support for succession should have been somewhat stronger there than in Mississippi. The same should be true in Kentucky prior to the Browns’ complete takeover of the succession campaign in the summer of 1981.

In both cases, table 1 reveals that the governors’ job ratings significantly affected positions on the succession issue. When pressed to explain their position on the referendum issue, only 3% of the Carolina Poll respondents who supported or were uncertain about reeligibility, and only 6% of those who opposed it made any explicit reference to Governor Hunt. On the surface, then, Hunt did not appear to be the predominant factor in the succession vote. But beneath the surface, the situation was rather different: support for succession was in fact aligned with evaluations of the governor.

Of those who believed that Governor Hunt was doing a “good” job, 75% favored the amendment, but only 36% who believed he was doing a “poor” job did so. In table 1c, we see that when other relevant factors including party identification are held constant at typical levels, the impact of evaluations of the governor declines somewhat. For one thing, the gap in succession support between the baseline North Carolinian who gave Hunt a positive rating and his exact counterpart who gave Hunt a negative rating is 19 percentage points. For another, even for the latter the probability of supporting succession is projected to surpass 50%. Accordingly, opinion of Governor Hunt cannot be said to have played a decisive role in the outcome of the North Carolina referendum. Still, the observed gap is wide enough for it to be said that the governor figured prominently in the voting calculus in North Carolina.

On two occasions since the 1977 referendum, Carolina Poll interviews have been queried about the provision for gubernatorial succession. In 1982, more than five years after the referendum, 66.7% of those who expressed an opinion said that the governor *should* be permitted to run for a second four-year term—a balance of opinion virtually unchanged from the 65–35 margin among opinionated respondents in October 1977. Two years later, after Republican Governor James G. Martin had replaced Democrat Hunt and the idea of reimposing a single-term limitation had surfaced, 63% of those with an opinion opposed such a reimposition. Allowing for the variant wording of the 1977, 1983, and 1985 survey items and for the changing political context of North Carolina state government from 1977 to 1985, these

ponses bespeak a remarkable continuity of support for the right of North Carolina governors to succeed themselves.

From the late 1970s through the mid-1980s more than six North Carolinians in 10 who had an opinion were in favor of letting their governor serve a second term. In 1983, just as had been the case in 1977, support for gubernatorial reeligibility was closely linked to appraisals of Governor Hunt with the percentage voicing support for reeligibility ranging from only 19% among those who considered Hunt's performance 'poor' to 63% among those who considered him an 'excellent' governor. Unfortunately, no gubernatorial popularity question was asked in the 1985 survey, so it is impossible to say with certainty whether appraisals of Governor Martin helped shape opposition to the reimposition of a single-term limit. However, it is noteworthy that while in 1977 and again in 1983 Democrats were more likely to support reeligibility than Republicans were (by 72% to 58% in 1977 and by 71% to 62% in 1983) in 1985 the shoe was on the other foot. With a Republican now serving as governor, reeligibility was supported by only 59% of the Democrats but by 67% of the Republicans. So in very short order the partisan differential in support for gubernatorial reeligibility flip-flopped, with Republicans becoming more protective of the right of governors to succeed themselves than were Democrats, among whom the appeal of the idea began to wane as soon as James Hunt moved out of the Governors' Mansion.

A somewhat more pronounced incumbent-based gap is evident in the spring 1981 Kentucky responses. According to table 1a, the same stamstep pattern that characterized support for succession in North Carolina cropped up in the early stages of the Kentucky campaign. That is, just as in North Carolina, approximately one of every three Kentuckians who gave the governor the lowest rating expressed support for succession, but support for succession rose progressively as a function of opinions of the governor. As a result, those who felt that Governor Brown was doing an 'excellent' job were more than twice as likely as those who rated his performance 'poor' to say they planned to vote for the succession amendment. Holding other relevant factors constant reduces this gap, as table 1c shows, but even so there is a 43 percentage point difference in the probability that a typical Kentuckian would favor succession—a difference attributable solely to opinions of the governor.

In Kentucky, then, the impact of the incumbency factor was more pronounced than it was in North Carolina, but in neither state was opposition to the succession amendment widespread enough among the governor's opponents to imperil the amendment's prospects for passage. Overall, these two cases occupy the expected middle ground between a minimal impact, as in Mississippi, and a more pronounced one which we are about to observe.

Finally, table 1 provides strong evidence of the primacy of the bency factor in the latter stages of the Kentucky campaign. Interv after the referendum, only one Kentuckian in 10 who disdained Brown recalled voting for the succession measure. But more than every 10 of those who considered Brown an excellent governor saw voted for the succession amendment. Nor is this gap diminished when relevant factors are held constant, if anything, as table 1c indicates. The opposite is the case.

Why, then, did the ballot measure fail in Kentucky? From May 1980, only voters who considered Brown an excellent governor remained steadfast in their support for the amendment, while support fell by approximately one-quarter among voters who rated Brown a good governor, virtually in half among those who considered him only a fair governor, and dropped to rock bottom among those who saw him as a poor governor. The causative factor was clearly the heightened association between the governor and support for the succession amendment. In the Kentucky results, then, we see a clear-cut case of incumbent-based support for a constitutional referendum, just as was predicted.

CONCLUSION

It is well to bear in mind that findings based on the experience of these states, spaced over a decade, must be regarded as suggestive rather than definitive. The fact that these are all southern or border states is also true, though less so than it might have been two decades ago, in light of the increasing convergence of politics in these states and elsewhere. With these constraints, this analysis of the succession referenda in North Carolina, Kentucky, and Mississippi bears out the general proposition that the succession issue can, under some circumstances, be reaffirmation of support for or opposition to the incumbent governor.

By charging directly into the fray, Kentucky's Governor Brown had a very strong tie between support for himself and for the succession amendment. In North Carolina, Governor Hunt studiously avoided being drawn directly into the succession battle, but votes on the issue were influenced by feelings about him. Even in Mississippi, where Governor Brown played a very minor role in the succession campaign, support for the measure was, to some extent, aligned with evaluations of the governor. It would seem, then, that the governor's emergence as a cue for voters

*Brown's popularity also slipped a bit during the summer of 1981 apparently as a result of his poorly received efforts to have the head football coach at the University of Kentucky. However, the decline in Brown's job ratings was far too slight to account for the lack of support for the succession amendment. Rather, it was clearly the great strengthening between Brown's job rating and voters' position on succession that doomed the amendment.

cession referenda is inevitable. However, the hands-off approach adopted by Hunt and Allain obviously paid greater dividends for the amendment than did the interventionist strategy of Brown, and the fact that it did says something important about the nature of the incumbent cue.

Governor Brown successfully yoked the succession amendment to himself in the eyes of his admirers and his detractors alike. Support for the amendment was already aligned with approval of the governor, but Brown's active involvement in the succession campaign strengthened this link. Unfortunately for the amendment, what this accomplished was not at all what Brown had in mind since the close alignment between support for the governor and for the amendment was the key ingredient in the amendment's defeat. This episode thus belies Magleby's (1984, 169) dictum that in initiatives and referenda "the side that defines the issue will win the election." Brown defined the issue, transforming the referendum into a vote of confidence on his administration. But this tactic backfired, inadvertently activating new opposition to the amendment instead of rallying new support.

This particular instance, reinforced by the 1985 New Orleans charter revision vote, may contain an important lesson about the *limits* of opinion leadership in nonpartisan campaigns. The Kentucky succession referendum can be seen as a "real-world" manifestation of the experimentally-based finding that when a leader endorses a course of action, support for the action can be so undermined among the leader's opponents that the endorsement amounts, in effect, to a "kiss of death" for the policy (Sigelman and Sigelman 1981). So while governors can influence referendum outcomes, they can do so for better *or for worse*. Would-be opinion leaders, like governors, would do well to shy away from actively attempting to mold public opinion unless they can count on a large enough mass of their followers shifting over to their position to counterbalance the drop-off in support for their position they risk incurring among their opponents. If a large pool of the leader's followers have not yet adopted the leader's position, then the leader's activity might spark sufficient gains within this constituency to more than offset the erosion of support that is likely to occur among the leader's opponents. However, if the leader's pool of supporters is not very large or if these supporters are already committed to the leader's position, then the "kiss of death" phenomenon might be expected to take precedence since some portion of the leader's opponents, taking the leader's position as a negative cue, will be drawn away from any position to which the leader is visibly tied.

These speculations reach well beyond the specific cases examined here. The immediate lesson of these cases is that progressively more active campaigning by a governor on behalf of a succession amendment brings the governor himself increasingly into play as a determinant of the referendum outcome. We can only speculate about the consequences when chief executives enter the fray when their own interests are not directly at stake, though

such actions seem unlikely on their face to prompt a backlash. Nor can we be certain of what the effects would be if a governor who was deliberately remaining aloof from the battle were somehow to emerge as the central issue, though this scenario holds great potential for transforming the succession vote into a referendum on the governor. Analyses of cases not considered here will be required in order to speak to these and related issues. For the moment, however, it seems clear that accounts of why people vote as they do in referenda and why ballot measures succeed or fail would often do well to take this contextual factor of gubernatorial involvement into account.

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Doing the Politically Right Thing: Results, Behavior, and Vote Trading

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The current understanding of vote trading assumes legislators' payoffs vary only with results—the motions enacted or defeated by their votes. This characterization is not supported by evidence from the modern Congress. This paper specifies a model of vote trading in which legislators' payoffs are a function of results and voting behavior. Analysis of this game amends the standard wisdom about voting and vote trading in two areas: the existence of a nonempty core and the conditions under which sophisticated voting produces an outcome in the core.

This paper analyzes vote trading among legislators who are *behavior-motivated*, that is, legislators whose preferences across outcomes are a function of results (the motions enacted in each outcome) and behavior (how they vote in each outcome). This specification reflects empirical evidence (Mayhew 1974, Fenno 1978, Fiorina 1983, Kingdon 1981) about legislators in the modern Congress. In contrast, previous analyses of vote trading (a notable exception is Koford 1982) have assumed legislators are *result-motivated* with preferences that depend only on results. By changing the specification of legislators' motivations, this paper amends the standard wisdom about voting and vote trading in two areas: the stability of outcomes produced by trades and the conditions under which sophisticated voting produces an outcome in the core.

The analysis shows that if legislators are behavior-motivated, feasible vote trades can lead to outcomes in the core of the vote trading "game." In contrast, analyses which assume legislators are result-motivated conclude that when trades are possible, the core is empty (see Miller 1977 for a review).¹ However, if legislators care about behavior as well as results, vote trades can be "stable" in the sense that no coalition of legislators is willing and able to make an additional trade which yields a different outcome.

This existence result for a nonempty core provides an explanation for the observed stability of real-world trades. Moreover, this explanation does not

John Aldrich, Robert Bates, Richard Fenno, Evelyn Fink, James Granato, Gary Jacobson, Kenneth Koford, William Lowry, Nicholas Miller, Terry Moe, Richard Niemi, and numerous referees can, individually and collectively, claim credit for improvements. Some insights and all remaining errors accrue to the author.

depend on exogenous legislative institutions such as conference committees (Ferejohn 1984) or rules of procedure (Enelow 1986)

The analysis also shows that a behavior-motivated legislator can be unwilling to trade votes even though he and his constituents prefer the package of motions enacted by the trade to the package enacted if the trade does not occur. This result sets limits on Buchanan and Tullock's (1962) and Tullock's (1981) assertion that vote trades provide a mechanism for legislators (such as congressmen) to make market-like "bargains" which improve constituent welfare.

This paper also supplies an exception to the finding of McKelvey and Niemi (1978) that the use of multistage sophisticated strategies yields the Condorcet winner, if one exists. In a game where behavior-motivated legislators create outcomes by voting on two motions, multistage sophisticated strategies are not sufficient to yield an outcome in the core. So, by using a better specification of legislators' payoff functions, this paper uncovers a greater role for collective action and coordination as a means to achieve core outcomes in legislatures such as the modern Congress.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, I will specify a "voting game" in which legislators vote on two motions and characterize vote trades in this game. Then, I will show that the core is empty when legislators are result-motivated, but that it may be nonempty given behavior-motivated legislators. The final two sections summarize the results and implications of the analysis, and suggest directions for future research.

A VOTING GAME

In this section, I characterize a game in which n legislators (n odd) incur payoffs by voting on two motions, 1 and 2. The game is assumed to be cooperative: legislators can precommit to a strategy choice.¹ Legislator i 's strategy is an $s_i = (s_{i1}, s_{i2})$ giving his vote (yea or nay) on motions 1 and 2. If $s_{ik} = 1$, legislator i votes yea on motion k ; if $s_{ik} = 0$, legislator i votes nay. Thus, a legislator i who votes for motion 1 and against motion 2 uses the strategy $(1, 0)$. A legislator's vote on each motion is assumed to be separable. Define $s \in S$ as a vector of s_i . Given s , a motion k is enacted if $m = (n + 1)/2$ or more legislators choose $s_{ik} = 1$ (vote yea), and defeated otherwise.

Legislator i 's payoff $v_i(s)$ is defined as follows. First, he receives the quantity p_{ik} if motion k is enacted. At the margin, if $p_{ik} > 0$ the legislator prefers enactment, if $p_{ik} < 0$ he prefers defeat, and if $p_{ik} = 0$ he is indifferent. Legislator i also receives the quantity t_{ik} if $s_{ik} = 1$ (he votes for k) and the quantity

¹This assumption allows vote trading to be modeled as a single-shot game without considering how trades are sustained given legislators' incentives to renege. Allowing precommitment also focuses attention on *coalitions*—how a group of legislators can improve their payoffs by coordinating their votes. For a further discussion, see Ordeshook (1986, chaps. 3 and 9) and Schwartz (1986, chap. 11).

FIGURE 1

LEGISLATOR *i*'S PAYOFFS GIVEN HIS STRATEGY AND
ENACTMENT OR DEFEAT OF MOTIONS 1 AND 2

	Both enacted	1 enacted 2 defeated	1 defeated 2 enacted	Both defeated
(1 1)	$p_1 + t^{u_{i1}} + p_2 + t^{u_{i2}}$	$p_1 + t^{u_{i1}} + t^{u_{i2}}$	$t^{u_{i1}} + p_2 + t^{u_{i2}}$	$t^{u_{i1}} + t^{u_{i2}}$
(1 0)	$p_1 + t^{u_{i1}} + p_2 + t^{n_{i2}}$	$p_1 + t^{u_{i1}} + t^{n_{i2}}$	$t^{u_{i1}} + p_2 + t^{n_{i2}}$	$t^{u_{i1}} + t^{n_{i2}}$
(0 1)	$p_1 + t^{n_{i1}} + p_2 + t^{u_{i2}}$	$p_1 + t^{n_{i1}} + t^{u_{i2}}$	$t^{n_{i1}} + p_2 + t^{u_{i2}}$	$t^{n_{i1}} + t^{u_{i2}}$
(0 0)	$p_1 + t^{n_{i1}} + p_2 + t^{n_{i2}}$	$p_1 + t^{n_{i1}} + t^{n_{i2}}$	$t^{n_{i1}} + p_2 + t^{n_{i2}}$	$t^{n_{i1}} + t^{n_{i2}}$

Note: The legislator's strategy is given as (number 1, number 2). The first number *i* gives his vote on motion 1 (1 = yea, 0 = nay), while the second number gives his vote on motion 2.

t_{ik}^n if $s_{ik} = 0$ (he votes nay, on *k*). Holding all else equal, a legislator with $t_{ik}^u > t_{ik}^n$ prefers to vote for motion *k*, a legislator with $t_{ik}^u < t_{ik}^n$ prefers to vote against motion *k*, and a legislator with $t_{ik}^u = t_{ik}^n$ is indifferent. The set *V* contains all vectors *t* of $t_i(s)$.

Figure 1 gives legislator *i*'s payoff $t_i(s)$ as a function of his strategy and the strategy of other legislators. For example, suppose legislator *i* votes (1, 0): motion 1 is enacted, and motion 2 defeated. Legislator *i* receives the payoff $p_{i1} + t_{i1}^u + t_{i2}^n$ as shown in the row 2, column 2 cell of Figure 1.

This analysis uses restrictions on p_{ik} , t_{ik}^u , and t_{ik}^n to define two types of legislators. The first type is *result-motivated* legislators, whose payoff varies with the enactment or defeat of motions but not with how they vote. The second type is *behavior-motivated* legislators, whose payoff varies with the enactment of motions and with their voting behavior.

This result-behavior distinction is made for two reasons. First, to show that the result-motivated construction is not consistent with empirical evidence from the modern Congress. Mainly, congressmen appear to be behavior-motivated. Second, to show that the feasibility and stability conditions for trades are sensitive to the definition of legislators' payoffs.

A *result-motivated* legislator *i* has $t_{ik}^u = t_{ik}^n = 0$ and either $p_{ik} > 0$ or $p_{ik} = 0$ on each motion *k*.²

Previous models of vote trading assume legislators are result-motivated. In these models, legislator *i* prefers outcome *s* to *s'* if and only if he prefers

²Note the assumption that a result-motivated legislator strictly prefers (at the margin) either enactment or defeat of a motion *k*. This assumption is made to simplify the analysis, and could be relaxed without altering the conclusions of this paper.

³This assumption is made in Riker and Brams (1973), Schwartz (1975: 103), Koehler (1975: 955), Uslander and Davis (1975: p. 930), Bernholtz (1976: 74-75), Miller (1977, 53), Fackow (1986: 197-98), and Tullock (1981: 191).

the package of motions enacted in s to the package enacted in s' . For example, if both motions are enacted in outcome s and both are defeated in s' legislator i prefers s to s' iff $p_{i1} + p_{i2} > 0$. The 'iff' condition requires the legislator's payoffs u_{ik}^s and $u_{ik}^{s'}$ to be equal on each motion k . I go further and assume result-motivated legislators have $u_{ik}^s = u_{ik}^{s'} = 0$.

A *behavior-motivated* legislator i is assumed to have either $p_{ik} > 0$ and $u_{ik}^s > u_{ik}^{s'}$ or $p_{ik} < 0$ and $u_{ik}^s < u_{ik}^{s'}$ on a motion k .⁴ Thus the legislators' payoffs in s and s' and his preference between the outcomes are a function of both results and behavior.

This specification of behavior-motivated legislators is drawn from research on the modern Congress (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1975; Fiorina 1983; Kingdon 1981). These authors conclude that congressmen work to achieve their reelection goal by doing things which increase constituent evaluations of their performance in office. However, constituents form evaluations of their congressmen by observing his behavior (how he votes) as well as results (which motions are enacted). Thus, a legislator's payoff varies with behavior and results because his constituents use both factors to evaluate him.

Both result-motivated and behavior-motivated legislators have separable preferences across S . If legislator i has $p_{i1} = 0$ holding all else constant he prefers an s where motion 1 is enacted to an s' where motion 1 is defeated. A behavior-motivated legislator i with $u_{i1}^s = 0$ prefers, at the margin, an s where he votes for motion k over an s' where he votes nay on k . A result-motivated legislator would be indifferent in this case.

VOTE TRADES IN THE VOTING GAME

The voting game $\Gamma = (N, S, V)$ becomes a vote trading game given two assumptions about motions 1 and 2.

A1. Neither motion attracts majority support.

A2. A majority of legislators are willing to trade votes to enact the motions.

Formally, define γ_k as the set of legislators with $p_{ik} > 0$ on motion k . A legislator in γ_k has $u_{ik}^s > u_{ik}^{s'}$ if he is behavior-motivated and $u_{ik}^s = u_{ik}^{s'} = 0$ if he is result-motivated. Define λ_k as the set of legislators with $p_{ik} < 0$ on motion k . A legislator in λ_k has $u_{ik}^s < u_{ik}^{s'}$ if he is behavior-motivated and $u_{ik}^s = u_{ik}^{s'} = 0$ if he is result-motivated. By construction, $\gamma_k \cup \lambda_k = N$ and $\gamma_k \cap \lambda_k = \emptyset$. Holding all else constant, legislators who prefer an s where motion k is enacted to an s' where motion k is defeated are in γ_k . Therefore, legislators in

⁴ The payoffs of behavior motivated legislators are restricted such that if they prefer enactment of a motion k ($p_{ik} > 0$) they also receive a higher payoff from voting for the motion rather than against it ($u_{ik}^s > u_{ik}^{s'}$). Similarly, if they prefer defeat ($p_{ik} < 0$) they also prefer to vote against it ($u_{ik}^s < u_{ik}^{s'}$). Again, this assumption is made to simplify the analysis and could be relaxed without altering this paper's conclusions.

Y_k are labeled "supporters" of motion k . Legislators who prefer s' to s are X_k , and labeled "opponents" of motion k .

The strategy where a legislator i votes for motions he supports and against motions he opposes is labeled his "MSS" strategy because it is multistage sophisticated (McKelvey and Niemi 1978) in a voting game where binding agreements are impossible (Niemi, personal communication). Intuitively, the outcome in which legislators do not coordinate their strategies (i.e., trade votes) is the outcome in which all legislators use their MSS strategies. This outcome is denoted s' .

Given these sets, Assumption 1 can be stated formally

$$A1 \quad |Y_1| < m \text{ and } |Y_2| < m$$

Given Assumption 1, both motions will be defeated if legislators do not coordinate their strategy choices (i.e., if they use their MSS strategies) because neither motion attracts majority support.

Assumption 2 states that a majority of legislators are willing to trade votes to enact motions 1 and 2. Define the set T as legislators whose payoffs satisfy the following condition

$$p_{i1} + r_{i1}^* + p_{i2} + r_{i2}^* > v_i(s')$$

The set T contains legislators who prefer an outcome (denoted s') when they vote for both motions and both motions are enacted to the no-coordination outcome s' . If T is majority-sized or better, the members of T can produce s' by coordinating their strategies. In this case, Assumption 2 can be rewritten in terms of condition (1), which assigns legislators into set T .

$$A2 \quad |T| \geq m$$

In words, Assumption 2 gives the conditions under which a trade which enacts motions 1 and 2 is *feasible* in the voting game $\Gamma = (N, S, V)$.

Table 1 gives an example of a voting game involving three result-motivated legislators which satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2.

In this game, the outcome s' has legislator 1 voting (1,0), legislator 2 voting (0,1), and legislator 3 voting (0,0). Thus, both motions will be defeated in s' and each legislator i receives the payoff $v_i(s') = 0$.

However, legislators 1 and 2 can improve their payoffs by switching to (1,1) and thereby enacting both motions. In s' , legislator 1 receives $-4 + -1 = -5$, and legislator 2 receives $-1 + 3 = 2$.

Table 2 gives an example of a voting game satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2 for three behavior-motivated legislators. Again, legislator 1 votes (1,0), legislator 2 votes (0,1), and legislator 3 votes (0,0) in s' . Both motions are defeated in s' . Legislators' payoffs in s' are $v_1(s') = 1 + 1 = 2$, $v_2(s') = 1 + 1 = 2$, and $v_3(s') = 2 + 2 = 4$.

Again, given the payoffs in table 2, legislators 1 and 2 can enact both motions

TABLE 1
A FEASIBLE VOTE TRADE
AMONG THREE RESULT-MOTIVATED LEGISLATORS

Legislator	Motion 1			Motion 2		
	p_{i1}	v_{i1}	u_{i1}	p_{i2}	v_{i2}	u_{i2}
1	4	0	0	-1	0	0
2	-1	0	0	3	0	0
3	-2	0	0	-2	0	0

TABLE 2
A FEASIBLE VOTE TRADE
AMONG THREE BEHAVIOR-MOTIVATED LEGISLATORS

Legislator	Motion 1			Motion 2		
	p_{i1}	v_{i1}	u_{i1}	p_{i2}	v_{i2}	u_{i2}
1	4	1	1	1	1	1
2	-1	-1	1	4	1	-1
3	-2	-2	2	-2	-2	2

tions by voting (1,1), and both legislators receive a higher payoff (4 + -1 + 1 + -1 = 3) if they vote (1,1) no matter how legislator 3 votes

This specification of the feasibility conditions for vote trades suggests a critical difference between result-motivated and behavior-motivated legislators. For a result-motivated legislator, votes are a means to an end: if he prefers the results (the motions enacted) in one outcome over the results in another, he is always willing to cast whatever votes are required to produce the former outcome. In contrast, a behavior-motivated legislator may prefer the results in one outcome to results in another, yet be unwilling to cast the votes required to produce the former outcome.

Consider the result-motivated legislators in table 1. Legislators 1 and 2 prefer an outcome s where motions 1 and 2 are enacted to an s' where both are defeated. Since the legislators incur no additional costs based on how they vote, they are willing to trade votes to achieve outcome s .

Now consider the behavior-motivated legislators in table 3. Holding their voting behavior constant, legislators 1 and 2 prefer an outcome s where motions 1 and 2 are enacted to an outcome s' where neither are. However, they are unwilling to trade votes to enact the motions. Legislators 1 and 2 can enact motions 1 and 2 by using the strategy (1,1), yielding a payoff of 3 for each. However, the legislators are better off using their MSS strategies—(1,0) for legislator 1 and (0,1) for legislator 2—which produces an outcome s' where both motions are defeated, but where each legislator receives a payoff of 4.

TABLE 3
AN INFEASIBLE VOTE TRADE
AMONG THREE BEHAVIOR-MOTIVATED LEGISLATORS

Legislator	Motion 1			Motion 2		
	p_{i1}	$t^{u_{i1}}$	$t^{u_{i1}}$	p_{i2}	$t^{u_{i2}}$	$t^{u_{i2}}$
1	4	2	-2	-1	2	2
2	-1	-2	2	4	2	2
3	-2	-2	2	2	2	2

The point is simple: if behavior matters, a legislator's preferences about results do not translate into a willingness to cast the votes required to produce a preferred result. This paradox can arise even if the legislator agrees with his constituents about desirability of legislative proposals.

THE CORE OF THE VOTING GAME

In the voting game $\Gamma = (N, S, V)$ the core contains all outcomes s for which no coalition C can coordinate their strategies such that, no matter how other legislators vote, the members of C receive a higher payoff in the resulting new outcome s' than in s .⁵

One point should be noted and emphasized: *given behavior-motivated legislators who can precommit to strategy choices, the outcome produced when legislators use their MSS strategies need not be in the core.* In contrast McKelvey and Niemi (1978) show that in majority-rule voting games in which precommitment is impossible, the use of multistage sophisticated strategies yields the Condorcet winner, if one exists.

Consider table 2, which gives payoffs for three behavior-motivated legislators. The outcome s' where legislators use MSS strategies—(1,0) for legislator 1, (0,1) for legislator 2, and (0,0) for legislator 3—is not in the core. In particular, legislators 1 and 2 can unilaterally improve their payoffs if they switch to the strategy (1,1). Moreover, the outcome s' where legislators 1 and 2 switch strategies and legislator 3 still chooses (0,0) is in the core (this point will be established later). Yet legislators 1 and 2 do not use their MSS strategies in s' . Thus, given behavior-motivated legislators, the core may be nonempty but not contain the outcome where players use their MSS strategies.

⁵Formally, if $s_C \in S^C$ are the strategies of a coalition C in N , $s_{N-C} \in S^{N-C}$ are the strategies of legislators not in C , and s' is any outcome where members of C use strategies given by s_C and legislators not in C use a feasible $s_{N-C} \in S^{N-C}$, the core contains all s such that there exists no C and $s_C' \in S^C$ such that $u_i(s_C') > u_i(s)$ for all $i \in C$ and all $s_{N-C} \in S^{N-C}$. This definition mirrors that of Ordeshook (1986: 340–41).

BEHAVIOR-MOTIVATED LEGISLATORS AND THE CORE

This section will show that in the voting game $\Gamma = (N, S, V)$ under Assumptions 1 and 2 (a) given result-motivated legislators the core is empty, but (b) given behavior-motivated legislators the core may contain an outcome produced by a vote trade. Point (a) will be proved formally; point (b) by example.

Point (a) is well known (see Miller 1977). Proposition One gives this result for the voting game $\Gamma = (N, S, V)$:

Proposition One In the voting game $\Gamma = (N, S, V)$ where assumptions 1 and 2 hold, legislators are result motivated, and a vote trade which enacts both motions is feasible, the core is empty.

Informally, if legislators are result-motivated, for any outcome produced by a trade there exists a group of legislators who—regardless of what other legislators do—are willing and able to make a further trade which enacts a different package of motions. Under these conditions, outcomes are stable only because of additional constraints on legislator behavior—such as sanctions controlled by party leaders or rules of procedure. For a further discussion, see Enelow (1986), Ferejohn (1984) or Miller (1977).

However, if legislators are result-motivated, the core may contain an outcome in which legislators trade votes. In addition, the core may not contain the outcome where legislators use their MSS strategies. Both results hold for the three-legislator example in table 2. Figure 2 gives the payoff matrix for this example.

In figure 2, legislator 1 is the row player, legislator 2 is the column player, and legislator 3's strategy varies across matrices. Each legislator has four possible strategies, so there are $4^3 = 64$ possible outcomes.

Given the payoffs in table 2, it was shown previously that the outcome s where legislators use their MSS strategies— $(1, 0)$ for legislator 1, $(0, 1)$ for legislator 2, and $(0, 0)$ for legislator 3—is not in the core. This outcome is the second row, third column cell of the southeast matrix of figure 2.

However, the core contains the outcome s' where legislators 1 and 2 vote 1) and legislator 3 votes $(0, 0)$. This outcome is the first row, first column cell of the southeast matrix of figure 2. In this outcome, legislators 1 and 2 vote from their MSS strategies in order to trade votes and enact motions 1 and 2, while legislator 3 uses his MSS strategy and votes against both motions.

Outcome s' is in the core because no coalition (containing one, two, or all three legislators) can switch their strategies to unilaterally improve their payoffs over what they receive in s' . I will sketch the proof of this assertion. There are three two-legislator coalitions: $\{1, 2\}$, $\{1, 3\}$, and $\{2, 3\}$. The only outcome legislators in $\{1, 2\}$ prefer to s' is an s where motions 1 and 2 are

FIGURE 2

A VOTING GAME WITH
A VOTE TRADE IN THE CORE

		Legislator 2						Legislator 2			
		(1,1)	(1,0)	(0,1)	(0,0)			(1,1)	(1,0)	(0,1)	(0,0)
Leg 1	(1,1)	3,3 -8	3,1 -8	3,5 -8	3,3 -8	Leg 1	(1,1)	3,3 -4	4,-3 -2	3,5 -4	4,1 2
	(1,0)	5,3 -8	6,-3 -6	5,5 -8	6,-1 -6		(1,0)	6,-1 2	6,-3 -2	6,1 -2	6,1 2
	(0,1)	1,3 -8	1,1 -8	-3,6 -6	-3,4 -6		(0,1)	1,3 -4	2,-3 2	-3,6 -2	-2,0 0
	(0,0)	3,3 -8	4,-3 -6	-1,6 -6	0,0 4		(0,0)	4,-1 -2	4,-3 -2	0,2 0	0,0 0
Legislator 3 (1,1)						Legislator 3 (1,0)					
		Legislator 2						Legislator 2			
		(1,1)	(1,0)	(0,1)	(0,0)			(1,1)	(1,0)	(0,1)	(0,0)
Leg 1	(1,1)	3,3 -4	3,1 -4	-1,6 -2	-1,4 -2	Leg 1	(1,1)	3,3 0	4,-3 2	-1,6 2	0,0 4
	(1,0)	5,3 -4	6,-3 -2	1,6 -2	2,0 0		(1,0)	6,-1 2	6,-3 2	2,2 4	2,0 4
	(0,1)	-3,4 -2	-3,2 -2	-3,6 -2	-3,4 -2		(0,1)	-3,4 2	2,-2 4	-3,6 2	-2,0 4
	(0,0)	-1,4 -2	0,-2 0	-1,6 -2	0,0 0		(0,0)	0,0 4	0,-2 4	0,2 4	0,0 4
Legislator 3 (0,1)						Legislator 3 (0,0)					

Notes

- 1) A legislator's strategy is given as (number, number). The first number gives his vote on motion 1 (1 = yes, 0 = no) and the second number gives his vote on motion 2.
- 2) Payoffs in each cell are legislator 1, legislator 2 in the first row, and legislator 3 in the second row.
- 3) Values of p_{ik} , v_{ik} , and c_{ik} for each legislator i and motion k are in table 2.

enacted but where the legislators use their MSS strategies. This outcome is row 2, column 3 of the northwest matrix in figure 2. However, legislators in $\{1,2\}$ cannot achieve s^* by themselves; legislator 3 must vote (1,1). Therefore, s^* is not vulnerable to the coalition $\{1,2\}$.

Now consider the coalition $\{1,3\}$. Holding behavior constant, legislators 1 and 3 prefer an s^* in which motion 1 is enacted and motion 2 defeated to the

outcome s^* . The members of $\{1,3\}$ can produce s^+ by voting $(1,0)$. However, in all such outcomes (the second row of the northeast matrix in figure 2), legislator 3 receives a lower payoff (-2) than in s^* (0). Thus the coalition $\{1,3\}$ cannot improve on s^* . Similarly, the $\{2,3\}$ coalition is also unable to guarantee an s^+ which legislator 3 prefers to s^* .

Finally, no legislator acting by himself can produce an outcome preferable to s^* . Legislator 1 prefers an s^+ where he uses his MSS strategy and either both motions are enacted or only motion 1 is enacted. Legislator 2 prefers an s^+ where he uses his MSS strategy and both motions are enacted or only motion 2 is enacted. However, neither legislator can produce these outcomes by himself. Legislator 3 cannot unilaterally improve on s^* because he already uses his MSS strategy there. In addition, because s^* is Pareto-optimal, it is not vulnerable to the coalition of the whole, $\{1,2,3\}$.

In sum, the outcome s^* , where legislators 1 and 2 trade votes, is in the core: no coalition of legislators can unilaterally change their behavior to produce an outcome they prefer to s^* .

The most interesting feature of this example is that legislator 3 is unwilling to "cut his losses" by trading votes with either legislator 1 or 2. An example is a trade between legislators 1 and 3 which produces an outcome s^+ . At first glance, legislator 3 should want to trade: he opposes both motions, both are enacted in s^* , but only motion 1 is enacted in s^+ . This intuition would be true if legislator 3 were result-motivated. However, because he is behavior-motivated, legislator 3 is unwilling to trade with legislator 1. Legislator 3 prefers the *results* in s^+ compared with s^* but is unwilling to cast the votes needed to produce s^+ . *This result can arise even if legislator 3 and his constituents oppose both motions.* In that case, legislator 3's failure to trade yields a suboptimal result for himself and his constituents.

A possible real-world example of the situation described in figure 2 is the case of the 1964 Food Stamp—Farm Price Supports vote trade (Ripley 1975: 79–81). The two motions were enacted by a trade between Northern and Southern Democrats over the objections of Republican legislators (who along with their constituents) opposed both motions. Models of vote trading which assume result-motivated legislators (e.g., Ferejohn 1984) suggest that the Republicans could improve their payoff by offering a "blocking trade" to the Southern Democrats, whereby the Republicans would vote for farm supports if the Southern Democrats refused to vote for food stamps. In this way, Republicans and their constituents would suffer the enactment of only one bad motion rather than two. The Republicans could also offer a trade to Northern Democrats that would enact food stamps and defeat farm supports. Yet there is no evidence that the Republicans offered to trade with either group. Why not?

Figure 2 suggests an explanation. If the Republicans were behavior-motivated, they would have incurred behavior-based costs by voting for food

stamps or farm supports. If these costs were high enough, the Republicans were in the position of legislator 3 in figure 2; they had no incentive to trade votes with either group of Democrats, even though a "blocking trade" would have produced a result that Republicans and their constituents preferred to the results of the trade between the Democrats.

CONCLUSION

Previous models of vote trading assume legislators are result-motivated. Empirical evidence suggests that assuming legislators are behavior-motivated is more accurate. This paper has analyzed vote trading among behavior-motivated legislators. The analysis has shown that when legislators are behavior-motivated, feasible vote trades are not necessarily unstable. Put another way, vote trades involving payoff-maximizing, behavior-motivated legislators can lead to outcomes in the core. Second, if there is an outcome in the core, the use of multistage sophisticated strategies will not necessarily produce that outcome.

DISCUSSION

By identifying and correcting a misspecification of legislators' payoffs used in previous models of vote trading, this paper suggests new expectations about the frequency of vote trading and the problems involved with building a vote trading coalition. The results also suggest the need for a better understanding of the link between constituent preferences and legislator performance in modern American politics.

First of all, this analysis has indicated that vote trades will occur less frequently than previous work has indicated. Compared with result-motivated legislators, behavior-motivated legislators incur additional (behavior-based) costs when they trade votes. Thus, trades are less likely to be feasible and, therefore, less likely to occur when legislators are behavior-motivated compared with the result-motivated case.

In addition, since behavior-motivated legislators incur costs by *participating* in a trade, they have an incentive to "free ride" on other legislators willing to trade votes. This incentive does not exist given result-motivated legislators. Thus, in order to avoid behavior-based costs and the free-ride problem, behavior-motivated legislators face a considerable incentive to "package" motions in committee and enact them as an omnibus proposal rather than using a vote trade to enact the motions on the floor.

The analysis also shows that if legislators are behavior-motivated, agreements to trade votes are more likely to be stable (yield outcomes in the core) than previously understood. This stability, if it exists, solves one problem for advocates of a feasible vote trade: they need not worry about legislators "defecting" to another coalition which promises to enact a different package of

motions. However, the existence of behavior-based costs gives proponents a new problem: getting enough legislators to agree to trade votes given their incentive to free-ride.

Overall, this paper has identified another example of the peculiar 'responsiveness' which occurs in American national politics. As the analysis shows, a constituent strategy of rewarding legislators for behavior as well as results may not supply legislators with the incentive to make vote trades which improve constituent welfare. Similar results have been identified in recent analyses of strategic voting (Denzau, Riker, and Shepsle 1985) and 'pork barrel' politics (Niou and Ordeshook 1985). Thus, this paper has brought our understanding of vote trading into line with current explanations of other legislative phenomena.

In addition, comparison of this paper with the Niou and Ordeshook paper suggests a promising direction for further research. This paper's analysis of vote trading has cited empirical evidence which identifies constituent 'myopia' as the source of suboptimal legislator behavior. In contrast, Niou and Ordeshook (1985: 256-58) explain inefficiencies in the enactment of 'pork barrel' projects as the result of rational, self-interested behavior by perfectly-informed citizens. This distinction suggests two questions: How well-informed are real-world constituents about different aspects of the legislative process? What is the relationship between constituent information levels, the standards constituents use to evaluate their legislators' performance in office, and actual legislator performance? Analysis of legislator-constituent relations within an asymmetric information framework (Kreps and Wilson 1982; Austen-Smith and Riker 1987) may provide a better understanding of the forces behind suboptimal legislator behavior in many areas, as well as suggest how to make legislators more responsive to constituent interests. For a first-cut at such an analysis, see Bianco (1988).

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APPENDIX I

Proof of Proposition One. It is sufficient to show for outcomes s where neither, one, or both motions are enacted, some group of legislators who prefer another outcome can produce it by themselves.

No outcome s' where neither motion is enacted is in the core because the trade enacting both motions is feasible: legislators in I can trade votes and produce a preferable outcome s' where both motions are enacted.

No outcome s where both motions are enacted is in the core because a majority of legislators prefer an outcome s' where only motion 1 is enacted and can produce it by themselves. Since a majority have $p_{11} > 0$, a majority

receives a higher payoff in s^+ than in s , and thus prefers s^+ to s . By the same reasoning, a majority also prefers an s^+ where only motion 2 is enacted to s .

No outcome s^+ where only motion 1 or only motion 2 is enacted is in the core. Since a majority have $p_{11} < 0$ and a majority have $p_{12} < 0$, a majority prefers s^+ to either s^1 and can produce it by themselves.

Thus, the core is empty given result-motivated legislators and a feasible trade.

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Decision Making in the Canadian Supreme Court: Extending the Personal Attributes Model across Nations

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Theory-based personal attributes models of the civil rights and liberties and economics decision making of the Canadian Supreme Court justices serving from 1949–1985 are developed from Lipset and Rokkans (1967) approach to explaining mass political behavior. The models show both behaviors to be influenced by Quebec/non-Quebec regional origins and religious affiliation, political party, being appointed by the last *laissez faire* Liberal Prime Minister, King, and having judicial and political experience. The models are reasonably potent statistically. Their most important attributes capture crucial dimensions in contemporary Canadian politics, region, and party, and also have implications for the cross-national study of judicial behavior.

This study develops theory-based personal attribute models of the decision making of the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada from 1949 to 1985. The models tap the most basic social and political dimensions of Canadian national politics, and have significant implications for cross-national research in judicial behavior.

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES AS EXPLANATIONS

The consensus of the judicial politics field by the 1970s was that personal attribute models of judicial decision making were likely to be at best only moderately successful. A compelling theoretical rationale for this conclusion was offered (see Grossman, 1966, for example). Nevertheless, Ulmer (1973) produced results that indicated that further efforts to develop social background/personal attribute models of judicial behavior were in order. Subsequently, Tate (1981) produced personal attribute models of the civil rights and liberties and economics decision making of the postwar U.S. Supreme

Some of the data used in this analysis were gathered with the assistance of a grant from the Canadian Faculty Enrichment Programme of the Canadian government. We are grateful for this assistance. However, only the authors are responsible for the uses made of that data and the conclusions of this article.

Court justices that were statistically impressive and based on reasonable theoretical grounds. Recently, Ulmer (1986) found evidence that successful personal attribute models of judicial behavior may be time bound, i.e., a model that explains the justices' decision making well in one historical era may have very poor explanatory power in another.

Ulmer's recent findings offer an important but not unanticipated or illogical, qualification to the personal attributes-decision making hypothesis: personal attribute models, particularly the *same* personal attribute models, may not be expected to be equally appropriate and statistically powerful in all judicial decision-making settings. If there are likely to be differences across time, there are also likely to be differences across courts in the same judicial hierarchy and across courts in different national political cultures. There has been some research on the applicability of the personal attributes hypothesis to courts at different levels in the American political system and across time.¹ But there has been very little on courts outside the United States (but see Tate 1972, Hensley 1968, and portions of the work by Kawashima 1969 and Danelski 1969) and none on the Canadian Supreme Court.

THE CANADIAN SUPREME COURT AND CANADIAN POLITICS

The Canadian Supreme Court was in the past assumed to be of little policy significance in national politics. This lack of significance reflected the narrow, literalist interpretation of the Court's duties shared by its justices as much as it did the relative supremacy of Parliament and the limited constitutional role the Court was expected to play. While those who studied the Court's political role often agreed that it acted so as to minimize its policy significance, others (see Cheffins 1966, Fouts 1969) argued that the Court had a role in Canadian politics that required the exercise of substantial discretion regardless of how its judges chose to define their political functions.

Whatever the self- or institutionally-imposed limitations on the policy significance and decision-making discretion of the Canadian Supreme Court in the past, these limitations are largely irrelevant now because the Canadian Supreme Court is a textbook example of a court in transition from an essentially adjudicatory role to a more politically influential role (Morton 1986, 1; see also Baar and Baar 1986). This transformation has been taking place at least since the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council in 1949, but its pace has quickened greatly after the reforms contained in the Constitution Act of 1982. That act "severely qualifies if it does not actually extinguish the tradition of parliamentary supremacy in Canada" and has caused the Supreme Court "to evolve toward a much more explicit and influential role in the Canadian regime" (Morton 1986, 3). Understanding future Canadian politics

¹See Schmidhauser (1961, 1962) in addition to Ulmer (1986).

and policymaking will require a much better understanding of the politics of the Supreme Court and the behavior of its justices than has been assumed to be required in the past

CASE AND VOTING DATA

Nonunanimous Decisions

We have gathered data on all the Canadian Supreme Court's nonunanimous decisions reported in the *Canadian Law Reports* from the termination of the right of appeal to the Privy Council in 1949 through the first half of the 1985 calendar year. Nonunanimous decisions are used because they mark the territory of dissensus among the justices of a collegial court; they are the cases on which the justices are unable to reach agreement on a single policy outcome, despite constant institutional pressures to do so, the cases in which presumably learned and well-intentioned jurists can see at least two alternative interpretations of the law, at least two competing policy options (see Pritchett 1948, Schubert 1965, 1974, Tate 1981). Unanimous cases, by contrast, mark the Court's consensus; they tell us nothing about the options available to judges deciding a true policy controversy.² Including unanimous cases in the analysis would merely reduce the variances of the dependent variables but would have no impact on our ability to characterize and explain judicial decision making.

Coding the Decisions

The Canadian Supreme Court decided 804 cases nonunanimously from 1949 to 1985, 25.13% of the total of 3,199 cases reported. Each nonunanimous formal decision handed down was classified according to the major substantive issues raised in the case (e.g., civil rights and liberties, economics, fiscal claims, etc.). The outcome of each case was classified as being pro or con the "liberal" interest in the case. We restrict our attention to nonunanimous decisions raising civil rights and liberties or economics issues only. Such cases constituted 75.3% (606 of 804) of the Court's nonunanimous decision making. They probably constitute an even larger majority of the cases with the most significant policy consequences.

In civil rights and liberties cases, the liberal interest is always assumed to be represented by the party asserting a claim to a particular right or liberty which it has been allegedly unjustly denied. In economic decisions, the liberal interest is always the party that is less economically privileged in conflicts between nongovernmental parties and is presumed to be government.

²This does not mean that unanimous cases have only unimportant policy consequences. Some unanimous decisions are unanimous *precisely* because a Court fears the implementation and compliance consequences of the appearance of disagreement on a very important issue.

TABLE 1

LIBERALISM OF CANADIAN SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 1949-1985

Name	Civil Rights/ Liberties		Economics		Name	Civil Rights/ Liberties		Economics	
	%	N	%	N		%	N	%	N
Binfret	35.3	17	37.0	27	Hall	75.5	66	68.7	83
Kerwin	43.1	58	45.3	64	Spence	71.5	149	67.6	148
Laschereau	36.4	99	43.0	86	Pigeon	23.7	114	41.7	114
Rand	55.6	45	50.7	67	Laskin	80.2	116	75.5	94
Kellock	44.0	25	47.5	40	Dickson	69.6	115	46.6	58
Estey, J. W.	68.0	25	35.0	40	Betz	34.9	106	40.8	49
Locke	50.0	60	42.4	85	De Grandpre	24.4	41	41.7	24
Cartwright	71.2	132	62.9	143	Estey, W. Z.	58.5	65	66.7	30
Fauteaux	25.6	133	36.8	106	Pratt	28.0	25	35.7	14
Abbott	26.8	112	37.6	101	MacIntyre	43.2	44	64.7	17
Nolan	*	4	*	4	Choumard	48.4	31	*	9
Martland	27.5	193	35.3	167	Lamer	57.1	28	*	7
Judson	26.8	164	37.7	154	Wilson	66.7	15	*	1
Ritchie	37.4	198	37.2	172					
					Mean	47.4		47.9	
					Standard Deviation	18.5		12.9	

* Fewer than 10 votes.

in conflict involving government regulation of business. While these assumptions may be challenged in individual cases, we would argue that they represent well what are generally understood to be liberal policy positions in North American political parlance.

The Canadian Supreme Court leaned slightly in the conservative direction in its civil rights and liberties and economics cases since 1949. In civil rights and liberties cases, it was 43.0% liberal (in 309 cases); in economics cases it was 47.8% liberal (in 297 cases). These results provide a standard of comparison for the equivalent percentages for the voting of the individual justices to which we now turn.

Individual Justice Behaviors

Table 1 presents the individual measures of the voting behavior of the justices of the Canadian Supreme Court that are to be analyzed: the percentage of all the votes each justice cast that supported the liberal outcome direction in civil rights and liberties and in economics cases. Civil rights and liberties liberalism and economics liberalism are distinctive behaviors, but they are also moderately closely related: the simple r^2 for their relationship is .55.¹

¹Their correlation in the United States was similar, if a bit stronger: $r^2 = .63$ (see Tate 1981).

The Canadian Supreme Court justices varied substantially in their voting behavior. The standard deviations for the voting measures reveal that the justices differed more on civil rights and liberties than on economics questions. The civil rights and liberties scores vary from Justice Pigeon's low of 23.7% to Chief Justice Laskin's high of 80.2%. The economics scores range from Justice J. W. Estey's 35.0% to Laskin's high of 75.5%.

EXPLAINING JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING BEHAVIORS IN NATIONAL SUPREME COURTS

Theory and Operationalization

What outline should models of the decision making of national supreme court justices exhibit? The answer depends, initially, upon whether one tries to develop a model that is theoretically appealing, regardless of its operationalizability, or a model that is as theoretically appealing as possible, given a requirement that its concepts all be operationalizable. Gibson (1983) has, for example, suggested an appealing and comprehensive model of judicial decision making that includes personality, role, and work groups factors, in addition to personal attributes. But it is difficult to imagine how such a model can be operationalized and its coefficients estimated empirically for the judges of many courts, especially for the justices of national supreme courts, the most dramatic judicial policymaking bodies (see Tate 1981: 364–66).

Personal attribute models have the advantage of operationalizability. Their theoretical appeal is more debatable. What is needed is a conceptualization to make their use in what are essentially judicial voting behavior models more consistent and theoretically appealing.

Personal Attributes and the Mass Behavior Literature

Judicial politics scholars have been unwilling to grant to personal attribute (social background) factors the status that they have historically been granted in the mass political behavior literature. Nevertheless, that literature can give us some clues as to how personal attribute variables might be systematically related to politics in different nations in ways that should affect judicial as well as mass political behavior.

Most influential work on the dimensions that affect mass voting behavior (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, see also the articles edited by Rose 1974 and Merkl 1980, 614–67) suggests that contemporary Western democratic politics is structured along a number of "cleavages" that emerged in and shaped the development of the Western European nation states: *industrial class*, *religion*, *urban/rural*, *center/periphery*, differences in *language*, *region*, and *ethnicity*, and *moral or cultural* differences associated with life-style.

The cleavages just identified must be qualified in two ways before they can all serve as relevant personal attribute dimensions for structuring the analysis of the political behavior of national supreme judiciaries. First, Lapset and Rokkan have defined two kinds of cleavages: (1) those, like class, that can be operationalized by relatively common indicators (occupational status, education, income, perceived class status) across nations and (2) those, like center-periphery and moral-cultural differences, that must be operationalized by indicators that are specific to a national political culture. Second, it is clear that some of these cleavages, while still theoretically relevant, are likely to be of little empirical significance in analyzing the behavior of national supreme court judges because these persons will represent such a narrow socioeconomic elite that they will exhibit little variance on the relevant indicators. Examples of such cleavages are justices' social class⁴ and, at least for most courts for now, gender.

Keeping these qualifications in mind, we could do worse as students of judicial politics than systematically to include those social cleavage measures that are relevant to mass partisan and policy choice into our models of judicial policy choice. Doing so will keep personal attribute models consistent with the structure of politics in the society and provide an anchor for theorizing based on such models.

Personal attribute models, like mass behavior models, will be incomplete if they do not include more than measures of the most important social cleavages in a political system. Political decision making is an activity in which experience and adult socialization counts. Personal attribute models for national courts should also include measures of the most crucial components of adult socialization: *career experiences* and *political involvement and partisanship*. Career and political experience measures tapping the variety of opportunities typically available to attorneys across societies will very likely be relevant to explaining the decision making of most justices.

STRUCTURE OF A CANADIAN PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES MODEL

The structure of the Canadian political system and previous studies of Canadian judicial behavior suggest the likely importance of the following factors in explaining Canadian judicial decision making:

Social Cleavage Measures

Region and Language. Justices from Quebec and the western provinces (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia) share distinctive political cultures which should cause them to vote more conservatively than

⁴That American Supreme Court justices lack variance on such attributes was demonstrated in Schmidhauser's (1959) classic 'collective portrait.'

justices from Ontario and the Atlantic provinces. The Quebec/non-Quebec regional dichotomy is also highly collinear with the French/non-French native language and the civil law education/noncivil law education dichotomies that represent alternative, potentially relevant personal attributes of Canadian Supreme Court justices. Thus, when one describes a relationship based on Quebec/non-Quebec regional origins, one is also describing the relationship one would find for the principal Canadian linguistic and legal system cleavages.

Western Canada, as much or more than the western United States, is a region still close to the frontier. Its political culture is characterized by a rugged individualism that should encourage conservative values in both civil rights and liberties and economics.

Religion. Catholicism has been associated largely with liberal values and voting behavior in Canada, just as in the United States. Thus, we hypothesize that Canadian Catholic justices will vote differently from their non-Catholic counterparts. However, the fact is that Catholic members of the Canadian Supreme Court are also mostly from Quebec, and Quebec origins are hypothesized to have a conservative impact on the justices' decision making. Statistically, it will be difficult to distinguish religious from regional effects. We devise a measurement strategy to deal with this problem below.

Career Experience

Professional Background. The Canadian legal profession may be divided into two distinctive groups: private practitioners and professors and judges. We hypothesize that justices whose primary career was in private practice will vote more conservatively than those whose career was spent mostly in the teaching of law or in the lower judiciary. Private practitioners are, after all, business people whose well-being depends largely upon their service to wealthy and powerful interests; they are rarely likely to be litigating for the kinds of people favored by liberal civil rights and liberties or economics decisions. Professors and judges, on the other hand, have a professional responsibility to consider all sides of legal issues, and are not directly dependent upon service to the wealthy and powerful.

Judicial Experience. Following U.S. findings (Tate 1981), we hypothesize that judicial experience per se will be positively related to judicial liberalism. The rationale for this expectation has just been stated: experience as a judge puts a lawyer in a position to consider all sides of litigated issues.

Political Experience. Because political activity involves one in interaction with the mass public which should make one more sympathetic to liberal attitudes on many political issues, we hypothesize that justices with political

experience, i.e., experience in elective or party politics, will be more liberal than justices without it

Partisanship Measures

Party Because Canadian justices usually do not openly profess party identifications, political party might not be a likely candidate to influence their political behavior, even though it influences mass behavior. In fact, existing research suggests that prime ministers overwhelmingly appoint Supreme Court members who share their party affiliation (Adams and Cavaluzzo 1969, 77-79). We suspect they do not do this unthinkingly.³ Thus, we hypothesize that the appointees of Liberal prime ministers will be more liberal than the appointees of Progressive Conservative prime ministers.

Appointing Prime Minister U.S. research (Tate 1961; Carp and Rowland 1983) has found that the appointing president is a very useful predictor of judicial voting behavior. Many U.S. presidents express clear policy goals to be served by their judicial appointees. The identity of the appointing president can serve as a personal attribute surrogate for the policy intentions of these presidents in an appropriate statistical model. There is less evidence that Canadian prime ministers have sought consciously to use their judicial appointments as policy tools, but we still hypothesize that the appointees of one or more prime ministers will behave distinctively differently from their colleagues. For statistical reasons, we are only able to include indicators of appointment by Prime Ministers King and Trudeau in our analysis.⁴ Reflecting their different positions in the history and development of the Liberal party, we hypothesize that the appointees of Prime Minister King will be more conservative and those of Prime Minister Trudeau more liberal than those of other prime ministers, other things being equal.

METHOD

The impact of the personal attributes just discussed on the two Canadian Supreme Court justice voting behavior measures presented in table 1 will be

³ Adams and Cavaluzzo note that their results tend to confirm the belief of many Canadians that appointments to the Supreme Court are political gifts given to old party faithful (1969: 77). They also note that prime ministers profess to adhere to the practice of appointing party faithful somewhat regretfully, but find it a practice they are forced to continue. Adams and Cavaluzzo reserve judgment as to the possible effects of party on judicial decision making (79).

⁴ The appointees of Prime Ministers King and Trudeau are the only justices numerous enough to make their dummy variables suitable for use in the regression analysis. King appointed 27% of the justices analyzed here, Trudeau, 35%. No other justice appointed is much as 15% of the total. Dummy variables with such extreme marginal distributions are problematic for use in regression equations. As a result, the appointees of all other prime ministers constitute the reference group in the initial equations.

assessed using weighted least-squares analysis.⁷ We make the categorically measured personal attribute variables suitable for use in regression equations by converting them into dichotomies appropriate for dummy variable regression. Table 2 summarizes the operationalization of the personal attribute variables used as predictors of the justices' civil rights and liberties and economics liberalism. With one exception, it is straightforward and requires no comment.

The exception is the "Non-Quebec/Catholic Index." Quebec regional origins and Catholicism are collinear, as we noted: their simple r^2 was .55 for the 26 justices in the civil rights and liberties analysis and .49 for the 23 justices in the economics analysis. Quebec origins demonstrated the expected negative relationship with judicial liberalism. Our preliminary analyses also make it clear that, controlling for region, Catholicism had the expected positive relationship with judicial liberalism. Negative simple correlations between Catholicism and liberalism were in fact due to the negative suppressor effect of Quebec origins on Catholicism. To solve the problem of the collinearity of Quebec origins and Catholicism and to properly represent the relationships between Quebec regional origins, Catholicism, and judicial liberalism, we created the Non-Quebec/Catholic Index detailed in table 2. The index is scored so that higher values are expected to be associated with liberalism. This is the reason for its somewhat inelegant designation as the "Non-Quebec/Catholic" Index.

Two initial weighted least-squares equations were calculated in which the natural logarithms of the dependent variables⁸ were regressed on indicators of region and religion (Non-Quebec/Catholic Index, West), private practice experience, judicial experience, political experience, prime minister's party identification (Liberal), and appointing prime minister (King, Trudeau). The equations thus produced confirmed our hypotheses concerning the effects of Quebec origins and Catholicism, Liberal party identification, political and judicial experience, and being appointed by Prime Minister King.⁹

On the other hand, our hypotheses concerning the impacts of western origins, private practice experience, and being appointed by Prime Minister

⁷The dependent variable scores are the voting percentages for the individual justices, not based on numbers of decisions that vary considerably. In such circumstances, weighted least squares (WLS) is preferable to ordinary least squares (OLS). The equations in table 3 have been weighted by the square root of the number of decisions on which the individual voting percentages are based (see Haushek and Jackson 1977: 160-63). We have used WLS in this instance because it is the more appropriate method; in fact, there are only minor differences between the OLS and WLS results.

⁸The positively-skewed distributions of the dependent variables (civil rights and liberties liberalism skewness = .32; economic liberalism skewness = .93) made logarithmic transformations desirable.

⁹The coefficient for King appointee was initially marginally significant ($p = .11$) due to its collinearity with Trudeau appointee (simple r for the two was $-.678$).

TABLE 2
OPERATIONALIZATIONS OF PERSONAL ATTRIBUTE VARIABLES

Variable	Operationalization
<u>Social Cleavage Measures</u>	
Non-Quebec/Catholic Index	Quebec Protestants = 1 Quebec Catholics = 2 Non-Quebec Protestants = 3 Non-Quebec Catholics = 4
Western Origins	West (Western provinces) = 2 Other provinces = 1
<u>Career Experiences</u>	
Private Practice	Engaged in private practice = 2 Others = 1
Judicial Experience	Number of years of judicial experience
Political Experience	Some political experience = 2 Others = 1
<u>Partisanship Measures</u>	
Party	Appointing Prime Ministers party is Liberal = 2 Conservative = 1
Appointing Prime Minister	King = 2 Others = 1 Trudeau = 2 Others = 1

Trudeau were not confirmed for either dependent variable, one-tailed tests of the significance of their regression coefficients clearly failed.¹⁰ In the case of western regional origins, hindsight might suggest that the tradition of "prairie populism" which is also characteristic of the Canadian west might offset any impact of western rugged individualism. Or it could be that the Quebec/Non-Quebec regional distinction is so important that it captures any explanatory potential that might have been otherwise attributed to regional differences. Similarly, judicial and political experience may capture any explanatory potential possessed by private practice experience. Our expectations concerning the appointment objectives of Prime Minister Trudeau were simply incorrect: his appointees were not significantly different in their judicial liberalism from those of other prime ministers, once other factors were accounted for.

The personal attributes theory based on an expansion of the Lipset and Rokkan social cleavages arguments is a complex one. While it would have been most encouraging if all the hypotheses we generated from it were con-

¹⁰For the civil rights and liberties model, the probabilities of the regression coefficients for western origins and Trudeau appointee were .77 and .52, respectively, while that for private practice experience had the wrong sign. Similarly, for economics the coefficient probabilities were: western origins = .25, Trudeau appointee = .53, private practice = wrong sign.

firmed, it is certainly not surprising that some were not. Because the initial regression equations computed to test the whole set of hypotheses contained three insignificant predictors representing failed hypotheses, it was necessary to reduce them to eliminate inflation of the standard errors of the variables which did perform according to hypothesis, but were multicollinear with the nonsignificant predictors, and to correct the inflation of the coefficient of multiple determination due to the impact of the latter. After we eliminated the three nonsignificant predictor variables, the equations which resulted are summarized in table 3.¹¹

FINDINGS

The models that result from the elimination from our original equations of the variables for which our hypotheses failed should be regarded as partial

¹¹ For reference, the correlation matrices for the reported equations are reproduced below.

FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES LIBERALISM (LOGGED) ANALYSIS (N = 26)

	Judicial Experience	Political Experience	Party Affiliation	King Appointee	Civil Liberties
Non-Quebec/ Catholic Index	270	- 426	- 389	144	553
Judicial Experience	1 000	- 354	- 017	- 123	374
Political Experience		1 000	238	409	053
Party Affiliation			1 000	269	243
King Appointee				1 000	083

FOR THE ECONOMICS LIBERALISM (LOGGED) ANALYSIS (N = 23)

	Judicial Experience	Political Experience	Party Affiliation	King Appointee	Economics
Non-Quebec/ Catholic Index	255	- 393	380	131	432
Judicial Experience	1 000	- 333	061	- 103	391
Political Experience		1 000	256	450	207
Party Affiliation			1 000	338	256
King Appointee				1 000	173

TABLE 3
PERSONAL ATTRIBUTE MODELS* OF
CANADIAN SUPREME COURT JUSTICE LIBERALISM

Civil Rights and Liberties (Logged)				Economics (Logged)			
Dependent Variable	B	Beta Weight	p	Independent Variable	B	Beta Weight	p
Quebec/Catholic Index	.61	.99	.00**	Non-Quebec/Catholic Index	.12	.75	.00
Liberal Party	.63	.62	.00	Liberal Party	.37	.56	.00
Appointee of King	-.40	-.39	.02	King Appointee	-.26	-.48	.01
Political experience	.51	.46	.01	Political Experience	.21	.32	.09
Judicial experience	.02	.23	.08	Judicial Experience	.01	.26	.09
(Intercept)	.83		.08	(Intercept)	2.41		.00
10.81 ($df = 5, 20$), $p(F) = .00$				$F = 8.12$ $df = 5, 17$ $p(F) = .00$			
.73 Adj. $R^2 = .66$				$R^2 = .70$ Adj. $R^2 = .62$			

*Equations are weighted by the square root of the number of cases on which the individual β percentages are based.

.00 indicates a probability of less than .01 (rounded).

confirmations of the full personal attributes theory with which we began – or maps as exploratory models whose relationships need to be tested again with new data before they are accepted as confirmed. However they are rejected, the models are instructive concerning the possible roots of Canadian judicial decision making.

Civil Rights and Liberties Model

The left panel of table 3 depicts the civil rights and liberties liberalism of Canadian Supreme Court justices as a function of not being from Quebec, being Catholic, years of judicial experience, having some political experience, being an appointee of Prime Minister King, and being appointed by a Liberal prime minister. The most *conservative* possible predicted score is 3.20, that for a non-Catholic, Quebecois, politically inexperienced appointee of a Conservative prime minister who had no judicial experience. The most *liberal* score predicted is that for the non-Quebecois, Catholic, politically experienced appointee of a Liberal prime minister other than King who had the maximum number of years of judicial experience prior to appointment (empirically, 20 years in our sample).

Judicial experience is significant at $p = .08$ in this equation – but it was highly significant in the original equation used to determine which hypotheses were confirmed.

The R^2 for this equation is .73,¹¹ somewhat less than that for the seven variable model reported by Tate (1981) for the civil rights and liberties voting choice of the postwar U.S. Supreme Court justices, and all but identical to that reported by Ulmer (1986) for a three-variable model of the "Support for Government" behavior of the U.S. Supreme Court justices in the 1936–1968 period. It indicates the substantial relevance of personal attributes in explaining the civil rights and liberties behavior of Canadian justices.

Economics Liberalism

The equation in the second panel of table 3 depicts economics liberalism as a product of the same influences as civil rights and liberties liberalism: non-Quebec origins, Catholicism, being appointed by a Liberal prime minister, not being appointed by Prime Minister King, and having political and judicial experience.¹² As above, the justice predicted to be most economically conservative is a non-Catholic Quebecer with no political or judicial experience appointed by a Conservative prime minister, and the justice predicted to be most liberal is a Catholic appointee of a Liberal prime minister other than King who does not hail from Quebec and has judicial and political experience.

The economics liberalism equation explains 70% of the variance¹³ with five independent variables. Tate's (1981) model of the economics decision making of the postwar U.S. Supreme Court justices achieved a similar result but with seven predictors. Statistically, the R^2 for the economics liberalism equation will almost certainly have to be smaller than that for the civil rights and liberties equation because there is simply less variance to be explained in economics as opposed to civil rights and liberties liberalism (see table 1).

Model Comparison

Given the moderate collinearity ($r^2 = .55$) between civil rights and liberties and economics liberalism, the similarities and differences between the economics and civil rights and liberties models are both necessary and intriguing. The two equations reveal a common positive influence for non-Quebec origins and Catholicism, Liberal party affiliation, and judicial and political experience on judicial liberalism, and a common negative influence of being an appointee of Prime Minister King, once other influences are controlled. In both cases, the non-Quebec/Catholic index has the greatest relative impact on the dependent variable, followed by Liberal party prime min-

¹¹ The adjusted R^2 of .66 indicates that a portion of this explained variance is due to the relatively limited degrees of freedom of the model, an inevitable result of our small N .

¹² The impacts of political and judicial experience are significant only at .09 in this equation.

¹³ Again, the adjusted R^2 is lower at .62, indicating the equation is partly the beneficiary of limited degrees of freedom.

isterial appointment. In other words, the most important social cleavages in Canadian society have the greatest influence on Supreme Court justice behavior, with the most important *political* cleavage next in relative impact. The presence of a King appointee in both equations suggests the importance of the intentions of the appointing officer, at least under some circumstances.

The two additional variables that are significant (at .10 or better) in both liberalism models reflect the positive influence of experience in government and politics (judicial and/or political experience) on our dependent behaviors. The exercise of civil rights and liberties is vital to democratic practice and represents a crucial policy focus for democratic government. Many would argue that the support for social and economic equality represented by economic liberalism is equally central to democratic government. It is revealing that experience in politics and government increases the willingness of a justice to grant the claims of disadvantaged parties in both types of decisions.

CANADIAN MODELS AND CROSS-NATIONAL MODELS

The personal attribute models presented in this analysis represent theoretically informed explanations of the policy behaviors of the justices of the Canadian Supreme Court. While some of the hypotheses derived from an expansion of Lipsset and Rokkum's social cleavages theory were not confirmed, the attribute hypotheses that are most important in our revised explanations measure crucial dimensions in contemporary Canadian politics. They also have implications for models of the policy behaviors of the justices of other national supreme courts. The conservatizing effect of the Quebec political and legal culture comes through clearly for the Canadian justices. The analogous South/non-South regional cleavage has been shown to influence judicial behavior in the U.S. Supreme Court (Tate 1951) and similarly analogous cleavages may be expected to be important in other nations. Catholicism, though it interacts in Canada with regional origins, shows for the justices' civil rights and liberties and economics behavior the same liberalizing influence that it does in the United States *and* for civil rights and liberties liberalism, in the Philippines" (see Tate 1972). Religious cleavages should be investigated as sources of the differences in judicial behaviors elsewhere.

Contrary to public mythology, political party turns out to be a consistent predictor of judicial liberalism in Canada, just as it is in the United States. It should be expected to be relevant in other national supreme courts as well.

The two equations also indicate, tentatively, that the two varieties of Canadian judicial liberalism are partially the result of different patterns of adult socialization and experience. Having political and/or judicial experience

¹⁶The dependent variable in Tate's Philippine analysis was "pro criminal defendants ratio," a subcomponent of civil rights and liberties liberalism.

produces greater liberalism on civil rights and liberties and economics issues in Canada. Political experience is related to civil rights and liberties in the same way in the Philippines as it is in Canada (Tate 1972). But in the United States, political experience is related only to economics, not civil rights and liberties liberalism. On the other hand, judicial experience is related positively to both varieties of liberalism examined by Tate (1981) in the United States. Thus, relationships between career experiences and judicial behavior will be subject to variations across national boundaries. Whether these variations can be easily explained remains to be demonstrated.

In Canada, being an appointee of the last of the "laissez faire Liberal" prime ministers, King, decreases judicial liberalism in both civil rights and liberties and economics. That only King's appointees were distinctive enough in their voting to have the dummy variable representing their appointing prime minister included in the models sets the Canadian models off from their U.S. counterparts (see Tate 1981) and does suggest that prime ministers may not have been as outcome-oriented in their Supreme Court appointments as U.S. presidents. Whether such outcome orientations will be common or uncommon in other nations remains to be investigated.

Our results suggest that decision making in the Canadian Supreme Court reflects the same influences that shape Canadian politics outside that Court. They also indicate that additional comparative explanatory studies of supreme court decision making in other nations are in order: we may have restricted the development of a social science of the judicial process more than we realize by our continuing fixation on the U.S. judiciary.

Analysts who concentrate on clearly-defined classes of personal-attribute variables like Lipset and Rokkan's social cleavages and measures of the opportunity structure and experiences of adult careers and political involvement will be better able to avoid the kind of ad hoc, atheoretical explorations into judicial voting behavior and related decision behaviors that make replication of analysis and cumulation of findings elusive goals in the development of theories of judicial politics and behavior.

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Candidate Traits and Voter Inferences: An Experimental Study

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This paper examines to what extent, and in what ways, voters are willing to go beyond the information given—when that information consists of either a candidate's personal traits or his issue positions—to make broader candidate assessments. Based on an experiment in which students were given either personal trait *or* issue information about candidates for president, we find strong evidence for voter inferences from traits to issues and vice versa (although there is greater inference from issues than from traits). Finally, we find that, although inferences are frequently made, they are often idiosyncratic. Only in particular cases (i.e., relating candidates' compassion with his support of government providing jobs) do different types of respondents make the same inferences (a finding which is also borne out by the 1984 NES).

At almost any point in a political campaign, voters will lack important knowledge about a candidate's issue positions or personality traits. These gaps must be filled in, or ignored. In this paper we explore to what extent, and in what ways, voters are willing to go beyond known candidate personal traits and issue positions, to fill in missing information, and to make broader candidate assessments. Using experimental and National Election Survey (NES) data, we show that voters do make inferences about candidates' traits and issue positions from the information they possess, and that such inferences are based on implicit theories of politics and human nature.

SCHEMAS IN POLITICAL INFERENCE

For many years the dominant view in social psychology (and in political science) held that people are driven by needs and desires—e.g., for self-

Some of the data used in this paper are from the 1984 National Election Study conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan, made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Neither the collectors of the data nor the consortium are responsible for the analysis and interpretations presented here. The authors would like to acknowledge the very helpful comments of David Dossler, Fritz Griesen, Marc Ross, Kelly Shaver, and the editors on earlier versions of this article, as well as the help of Clyde Haulman in carrying out the experiment.

esteem (Katz, Sarnoff, and McClintock 1956), social approval (Newcomb 1943), cognitive consistency (McGuire 1966)—which impinge on, and greatly distort, their perceptions and attributions

More recently, this view has been challenged by a model (actually a set of related models, deriving from schema and attribution theory) which sees individuals as "intuitive scientists." Possessing limited resources, these "intuitive scientists" try to make sense out of a complex world (Kelley 1967, Jones and Davis 1965, Markus and Zajonc 1985). While affective considerations continue to play a role in attributions (see Nisbett and Ross 1980), they compete with a variety of other, cognitively based considerations. As a result, the incentive for misperception is far less than under the earlier models.¹ Under these more recent models, voters still lack important information, but they possess "subjective 'theories' [schemas] about how the social world operates" (Markus and Zajonc 1985, 145).² By linking together specific traits, issue positions, and behavior patterns, these theories provide the individual with the ability to infer information about a wide range of attributes and phenomena, based on a limited number of cues. For example, someone who believes that compassionate individuals are socially committed can infer one of these attributes from the other. Without such a theory, inferences from compassionate to socially committed, or vice versa, are unlikely.

By making inferences from schemas, voters order and add meaning to a political environment that is usually quite complex and ambiguous and about which they could not possibly gain enough experiential information in everyday life, to make the judgments required.³ They actively assimilate new information with the old, using schemas and cognitive inferences as short-cuts to perceive the world (Conover and Feldman 1986).

¹Even though much of the resulting literature is concerned with flaws in the cognitive processes of these intuitive scientists (Nisbett and Ross 1980, Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982), the research emphasis has shifted from concerns with the single motivation towards cognitive consistency to motivations to control and understand the environment (Pittman and Heller 1987: 470).

²Schemas are of very different types depending on the object of the implicit theory: persons, self, social or political roles, and sequence of events to name the four most common, but all these schemas contain a theory comprised of a set of postulates that allows the individual to make relevant inferences about the object in question. Here, we are most concerned with person schemas.

³Both implicit personality theories and prototypes are very similar to schemas. Prototypes are "abstract set[s] of features commonly associated with members of a category" (Cantor 1981: 81). Like person and role schemas, prototypes are "fuzzy categories" which allow for inferences to be made after an individual or object is categorized using a prototype (Cantor and Mischel 1979). "Implicit personality theory" is even closer to person schemas than prototypes, since it represents the "perceivers assumptions about the interrelationship among traits" (when each trait is assumed to be a low level schema) (Markus and Zajonc 1985, 147). Although there are differences among these three constructs, all are higher level cognitive structures which provide cues for inferences. Therefore, we will not make distinctions among them here.

But precisely which inferences will be made? Hearing that someone is liberal will not cause us to infer that the person possesses all traits we have ever encountered in liberal individuals. Rather, traits and behaviors will be inferred as a function of their momentary accessibility. The degree of accessibility is related to a person's expectation that a concept is to be encountered, the person's motivation to search for information related to the concept, and the recency and frequency of the concept's activation (Higgins and King 1981). For example, because traits and issue positions are frequently mentioned during a campaign, voters will more easily make inferences about a candidate's competence and issue stand on defense during an election year than during a nonelection year when these same traits and issue positions are mentioned sporadically, and, in the same election campaign, the frequent mention of a candidate's competence or issue stand on defense will make inferences about this trait or issue far easier than for traits or issues less often mentioned. In addition, voters particularly concerned about the environment will be more motivated to make environment-related inferences from other issue positions and traits than voters less concerned about environmental matters.

The ways that relationships among concepts determine accessibility is more complex. Concepts, such as issue positions and candidate traits, are tied to one another by stronger or weaker links. The strength of these links is the product of both long-term factors (i.e., how frequently the concepts are mentioned together) and short-term factors (i.e., how recently the concepts have been linked together). A concept's accessibility is enhanced by the activation of a related concept. How much the activation of a particular concept enhances the accessibility of other concepts is determined by the strength of the link between concepts (Wyer and Carlston 1979) and the number of concepts linked to the originally activated concept (i.e., the more links, the less effect for any one). For example, since "conservative" and "supports tax cuts" are often mentioned together in news stories and in political rhetoric, the link between them should be strong, so that the mention of one will lead to an inference of the other. In addition, if few other concepts are linked to "conservative," the likelihood that its mention will evoke "supports tax cuts" is high.

The process of inference outlined above proceeds under the assumption inherent in schematic and other cognitive approaches that individuals make attributions and inferences in order to "render the social world predictable and controllable" (Pittman and Heller 1987: 468). Inferences are therefore particularly likely to be made when the individual has little information about the attitude object (Koltuv 1962, Ostrom, Lingle, Pryor, and Geva 1980), and when a choice involving the attitude object is imminent (Higgins and Bargh 1987, 387). These conditions are particularly well met in low visibility elections, as well as in the early days of higher visibility election cam-

paigns (including presidential campaigns). In this case, voters are beginning to form impressions, based on limited information, about new candidates about whom they will shortly have to make an electoral judgment. As intuitive scientists, they are not simply using inferences to make themselves feel more supportive of their chosen candidate. Rather, voters are trying to understand a complex political world using limited information (Pittman and Heller 1987).

For example, not much information was available on Donald Rumsfeld when the 1988 campaign began.¹ However, the media described him as "an excellent administrator." Because one trait (good administrator) triggers a representation in the perceiver's mind of other traits that have been associated with it in the past (e.g., hardworking, competent, organized), the voter may go beyond the original description and conclude that Rumsfeld is also hardworking and a competent organizer.

But what is the nature of such inferences? Should we expect specific trait and issue position schemas to be completely separate? Most research has concentrated on inferences made from specific trait to specific trait (Conover 1981), and from party or general ideology to issue positions (Feldman and Conover 1983). Although Conover (1981, 434) suggests that voters are expected to distinguish attributes pertaining to *policy* questions from those classified as *image* attributes, this does not mean that these two domains are totally unrelated. As Cantor and Mischel (1979) show, prototypes in person perception include personality traits, ideological considerations, and behaviors, all linked together. For example, the prototype (or schema) for the socially committed individual includes environmental issue concerns, antiwar attitudes and behavior, and involvement in child abuse causes, as well as high levels of religiosity (Cantor and Mischel 1979).

Traits can then become bases of inference to candidates' issue positions, and similarly candidate issue positions should imply particular candidate traits. Even the most highly educated and politically sophisticated voters often seem very concerned about issues of personality and character. Is the candidate moral, competent, reckless? (Miller, Wattenburg, and Malanchuk 1986, Lau 1986). Such judgments about personality imply potential actions and policy positions of the candidate. Personality traits may even prevent or make more likely, a president's taking policy positions which may ultimately threaten war. As Benjamin Page (1978, 232-33) notes, "in an age of nuclear weapons, no aspect of electoral outcomes is more important than the personality of the president."

That inferences may be made both from trait to issues and from issues to

¹Rumsfeld, a former secretary of defense under Gerald Ford, entered and left the 1988 Republican nomination chase without creating a ripple.

traits does not imply that the two inferential processes are the same, nor that each occurs with equal frequency. Since the amount of activation resulting from accessing a concept is spread over all the other concepts linked to it (in proportion to the strength of the links), relationships between concepts can also be asymmetric. Wyer and Carlston (1979-95) suggest that the number of inferences associated with a concept decreases as the concept becomes more abstract since paths are weaker from more to less abstract concepts. Since candidate traits tend to be more abstract than specific issue positions (see Kinder and Sears 1985, 690), inferences should be made more frequently from issue position to trait than the reverse.

Traits are also more often accessed than are political issue positions. One thinks about one's own political issue positions and the political issue positions of others mainly at election time, and even then politics is only marginally important. Even shortly before the 1984 election, only 28-3% of the American public were 'very much interested' (as opposed to being 'somewhat' or 'not very' interested) in the presidential campaign (NES 1986). On the other hand, the 'fundamental attribution error' (i.e. individuals view the behavior of others as determined by enduring traits rather than situational factors) insures that trait inferences will be made frequently in one's day-to-day life. The same cannot be said of political issue positions. As a result, based on both frequency and recency of activation (Higgins and King 1981), traits should be more accessible than issue positions. Finally, trait inferences may have a motivational edge as well. Since trait inferences 'make behavior understandable, predictable, and controllable, they are the type of attribution both common-sense psychology and scientific psychology find satisfying' (Heider 1958: 46).

If inferences from issues to traits are more frequent than the reverse, then this has implications for political campaigns and for the political system. Compared with campaigns which directly focus on traits, those emphasizing issues will bring a bonus in terms of greater inferential appeals. This advantage is particularly important since the inferences that people make, going beyond what they see, in an advertisement for example, are actually better remembered than the actual facts presented in the ad (Fiske and Taylor 1984). If one can emphasize an issue that has consistently accessible links with particular targeted traits, it can, therefore, be more effective than a straight trait appeal. Much recent negative advertising (e.g., the pledge of allegiance controversy in the 1988 presidential campaign) has taken advantage of this sort of potential. After Bush pointed out that Dukakis had vetoed

¹Even in a formal sense, trait alternatives are easier to understand than issue alternatives. On competence, for instance, the extremes are quite obvious and form a simple continuum from competent to incompetent, while on jobs or trade there are a large number of discrete alternatives involving several different dimensions of judgment.

a law mandating that teachers lead students in the pledge of allegiance, Dukakis had a difficult time supporting his issue position, but even more difficulty overcoming the negative inference that he was insufficiently patriotic.

To summarize, we hypothesize first, that individuals will make inferences not only from issue to issue, or from trait to trait, but from issues to traits and vice versa. The specific inferences made will be based on the accessibility of the concepts involved, and on the individual's schemas. Second, although inferences will be made in both directions, we expect to find that they will be more often made from issue to trait than from trait to issue. Third, inferences will be more frequent when the candidate is less well known. Finally, although the content of such inferences is dependent on the particular individual's prototype or schema, in cases where particular schemas are widely accepted, inferences should be consistent across respondents.

METHODS

We used an experimental technique to test our four hypotheses. Subjects were drawn from introductory American government and introductory economics classes at William and Mary ($N = 228$), and surveys were administered in February and March of 1987. Each student read stories, between one-half and three-quarters of a page long, dealing with either trait or issue position information about two 1988 presidential candidates of different parties. The articles on the candidates—Bruce Babbitt (D), Joe Biden (D), Robert Dole (R), and Donald Rumsfeld (R)—were written by the experimenters who condensed and combined information presented in various journals and newspapers, including *The Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, and *Congressional Quarterly*. Our choice of candidates was guided by the desire to use candidates about whom most student respondents were probably ignorant. Robert Dole, a better known candidate, was included to test our hypothesis that inferences would be less frequent for better known candidates.⁶

Subjects were then divided into four groups. Subjects in group one read articles about Babbitt's and Rumsfeld's traits, group two read articles about Dole's and Biden's traits, group three read articles about Babbitt's and Rumsfeld's issue positions, and group four members read articles about Dole's and Biden's issue positions. Each subject also received a questionnaire attached behind the two stories which asked the respondents about issue positions and trait evaluations for all four candidates. To ensure comparability across groups, those groups reading about candidate traits an-

⁶Of those who did not read about Dole, 59% could still give an overall evaluation of him more than double the percentage for any of the other three candidates under the control condition.

swered the trait questions first, and those reading about issues answered the issue questions first

Respondents rated each candidate on a six-point scale (strongly favors, favors, slightly favors, slightly opposes, opposes, and strongly opposes, with a separate DK option) on four issues: federal programs to provide job opportunities for the unemployed and a fair standard of living for all, a constitutional amendment to ban abortion except when the mother's life is endangered, U.S. military involvement in friendly countries to prevent the takeover by Marxist forces, and giving greater independence in foreign policy decisions to the president. Respondents also rated all four candidates on a five-point scale, from outstanding to poor (again with a separate DK option) on traits of competence, leadership, integrity, and compassion, which were selected based on Donald Kinder's factor analysis (1986: 245) of the 1984 election study pilot survey from July 1983. The final page of the questionnaire was the same for all four groups and asked the subjects to place themselves and each of the four candidates on a liberal-conservative scale and a party identification scale.

Based on our design, those respondents reading nothing about Babbitt or Dole served as the control group for those reading about either issues or traits for those two candidates, and correspondingly, those groups not reading about Biden nor Rumsfeld served as the control group for those respondents who did read about these two candidates. For example, we compute the amount of issue-to-trait inference by taking the average percentage of respondents making trait attributions after reading the issue story on a given candidate, and subtracting from this number the average percentage of control group respondents (those reading nothing about the candidate) making trait attributions. Since issue stories avoided mention of candidate traits, any additional trait information over that possessed by the control group is a product of political inference.

FINDINGS

The Extent of Political Inferences

The results of our experiment reported in table 1 indicate that there are strong links between issues and traits, and that respondents are making trait-to-issue inferences. In fact, considering that our trait write-ups did not mention issue positions, the amount of cross-modality inference was impressive. For example, of those who did read about Biden, only 17.4% on average were able to rate him on an issue, while more than 60% of those who read only his trait stories were able to do so ($p < .05$). The results for Babbitt and Rumsfeld are almost identical to those for Biden. In both cases, subjects

TABLE 1
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS RATING CANDIDATE ON ISSUES
BY CANDIDATE STORY EXPOSURE

	Babbitt	Candidate Being Rated		Dole
		Rumsfeld	Biden	
Candidate Story Exposure				
A Candidate traits	60.5 (42)	55.2 (42)	60.5 (59)	66.2 (59)
B No exposure to candidate	17.0 (116)	11.8 (116)	17.4 (103)	37.5 (10)
C Exposure effect (A-B)	43.5	43.4	43.1	27.7

Note: All differences (row C) are significant at the .05 level; number of cases are given in parentheses.

TABLE 2
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS RATING CANDIDATE ON TRAITS
BY CANDIDATE STORY EXPOSURE

	Babbitt	Candidate Being Rated		Dole
		Rumsfeld	Biden	
Candidate Story Exposure				
A Candidate issues	81.2 (61)	80.7 (61)	82.0 (57)	84.2 (57)
B No exposure to candidate	23.0 (116)	17.0 (116)	20.6 (103)	55.3 (10)
C Exposure effect (A-B)	58.2	63.7	61.4	28.9

Note: All differences (Row C) are significant at the .05 level; number of cases are given in parentheses.

reading about a candidate's traits were more than 40% more likely to rate that candidate on an issue than those who read nothing about the candidate ($p < .05$).

As hypothesized, inferences for the better known Dole were at a lower level than for the other three candidates. Even so, those reading about his trait characteristics were almost 30% more likely to place him on issues than those who had read nothing about him.²

Our hypotheses regarding issue-to-trait inferences are also well supported (see table 2). An average of 82.0% of those who read about Biden's issue positions were able to place him on a given trait compared with 20.6% of those who had not read anything about him at all. This difference of 61.4% is al

²Differences between the level of inference for Dole and that for each of the other three candidates are all significant at the .05 level.

t identical to the corresponding difference of 58.2% for Babbitt and 7% for Rumsfeld (for all three, $p < .05$). Once again, the difference of 3% for Dole is smaller, though still significant ($p < .05$).

In order to test the hypothesis that there is more inference from issues to traits than from traits to issues, we need to compare the inference effects in tables 1 and 2. We show this comparison in the top section of table 3. Looking at rows A and B in table 3, it is clear that there is more inference on issues to traits than from traits to issues. For example, on average 2% more respondents reading about Babbitt's issue positions make attributions about his traits than is true of the control group. On the other hand, those reading about Babbitt's traits are only 43.5% more likely to make attributions about his issue positions than control group respondents who know nothing about him. This means that 14.7% ($p < .05$) more individuals make inferences from issues to traits than vice versa. For Rumsfeld and Dole, the differences are even greater—20.3% ($p < .05$) and 17.7% ($p < .05$) respectively.⁸

The ease of making trait inferences is suggested by the fact that respondents reading about a candidate's issue positions *only* are almost as willing to attribute trait characteristics to candidates—as are those respondents reading about traits directly. Comparing rows C and D of table 3, we see that for all three candidates the level of trait attribution is similar (on no case as great as 1%) for those reading issue stories and for those reading trait stories about a particular candidate. This contrasts with issue position attributions where those reading issue stories about a candidate are much more likely (by between 19.4% and 32.0%) to make issue attributions (even about issues they did not read about) than are those reading trait stories about the same candidate (table 3, rows E and F).

It is important to note that the differences between the levels of trait and issue inferences are not a function of differences in pre-experiment knowledge in the two domains. For the three less well-known candidates, respondents who did not read about a candidate at all (the control groups) were *not* significantly more likely to rate that candidate on traits than on issues. (Control groups are, on average, only 4.8% [$p > .05$] more likely to give trait responses than issue responses.) If what we are seeing is merely that respondents had more knowledge of candidate traits than issue positions before the

There is also slightly more issue to trait inference than trait to issue inference for Dole. The difference (1.2%) is statistically insignificant ($p = .20$). However, the very high level of trait attribution (55.3%) compared with the level of issue attribution (37.5%) among control group members explains why there is so little difference in issue to trait and trait to issue inference in case of Dole. There is simply far less room for improvement in trait attributions and thus the greater absolute inference effect for traits (even more impressive: Howard, Rumsfeld, and Sheffield 1949: 284–89).

TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCES IN INFERENCE EFFECTS

	Babbitt	Candidate Being Rated		Dole
		Rumsfeld	Biden	
A Issue-to-trait inference	58.2	63.7	61.4	28.9
B Trait-to-issue inference	43.5	43.4	43.1	27.7
Difference in inferences (A - B)	14.7*	20.3*	17.7*	1.2
C Average percentage making trait ratings (trait exposure)	92.9 (42)	93.5 (42)	86.9 (59)	91.5 (5)
D Average percentage making trait ratings (issue exposure)	81.2 (61)	80.7 (61)	82.0 (57)	84.2 (5)
Difference in trait ratings (C - D)	11.7	12.8*	4.9	7.3
E Average percentage making issue ratings (issue exposure)	90.2 (61)	74.6 (61)	92.5 (57)	93.4 (5)
F Average percentage making issue ratings (trait exposure)	60.5 (42)	55.2 (42)	60.5 (59)	66.2 (5)
Difference in trait ratings (E - F)	29.7*	19.4*	32.0*	27.2*

* $p < .05$

NOTE: In table 3, rows A and D are taken from table 2 (rows C and B respectively). Rows B and F are taken from table 1 (rows C and B respectively). Row C reports the average percentage in the trait exposure group giving trait ratings for the candidates. Row E reports the average percentage in the issue exposure group giving issue ratings for the candidates. Number of cases is given in parentheses.

experiment, we should find a substantially greater trait knowledge than issue position knowledge among control group respondents. Since we do not, our inference hypothesis is strongly supported.

We find further support for the role of accessibility in explaining the higher percentages of inferences from issue positions to traits, when we examine our findings for Robert Dole. If voters in the real world find it easier to acquire trait knowledge of candidates (through inference if need be) than issue knowledge, we should find that for better known candidates (those for whom the intuitive scientist has already obtained sufficient information with which to make a tentative judgment, and for whom he may feel little reason to gather more information), there should be substantially higher levels of trait knowledge than issue knowledge."

This is exactly what we find in comparing the levels of Dole trait and issue attributions among respondents who are exposed to neither issue nor trait information in our experiment. Comparing row B in table 1 with row B III

*As discussed earlier, this is not the case for the other three candidates, nor should we expect it to be. In these cases, individuals lack prior knowledge about the candidates and have had little or no incentive to make inferences. In fact, what is most striking for the three less well known figures is the absolutely low level of both issue and trait attributions.

table 2, we see that, whereas for the other three candidates trait responses surpass issue responses among the respective control group respondents by not more than 6.0% ($p > .10$), for the Dole control group the difference is 17.8% ($p < .05$). As one is exposed to a candidate, trait knowledge develops more rapidly and reaches a higher level than does issue knowledge.¹⁰

Altogether, we find strong evidence for our first three hypotheses. First, cross-modality inferences between traits and issues are very common, second, the level of inference from issue positions to traits consistently exceeds the level of trait-to-issue inferences, and third, the level of inferences is greater for the three less well-known candidates. In general, the fact that respondents are consistently willing and able to go beyond the data given, to fill in a wide range of missing data via inferences from traits to issue positions and vice versa, offers further support for the intuitive scientist approach.

Content of Inferences

But if people make cross-modality inferences, what exactly are the inferences they make? Do the same stimuli (candidate issue positions or traits) produce similar inferences across individuals? In essence, these questions relate to the ways that people see the political world, the schematic packages and prototypes that exist in individuals' minds, and how these packages get there.

If voters simply infer that candidates with desirable traits hold the same issue positions as they do, or that candidates with the same issue positions as the voter have desirable traits (as selective perception theory holds), then although inferences are being made by voters, these inferences are not so dispassionate as our model implies. On the other hand, if we find that individuals with different issue positions and candidate preferences will, given the same candidate traits, draw the same inferences about the candidate issue positions (and vice versa), then we have strong evidence for conceiving of people as intuitive scientists who make inferences based on widely held schematic patterns.

For example, assume that two voters agree that a candidate is competent. They can make very different inferences to other traits and issue positions depending on the contents of their respective schemas. For some voters, a competent president is one who is willing to increase taxes in order to balance the budget, while for others competence means a president who can

¹⁰ Data from the pre-election wave of the 1984 NES survey offer further support for the prevalence of trait information in comparison with issue position information. An average of 95.5% of all respondents were able to describe Reagan in terms of the 17 traits asked about. On the other hand, an average of 16.1% were unable to place themselves, let alone the candidates, on the seven issues included in the survey, and another 22.8% placed themselves at the exact center position. The smallest percentage of respondents unable to place themselves was still almost three times as great as the average percentage unable to link Reagan to traits.

balance the budget without resorting to tax increases. Only where schemas are based on commonly held theories will we find consistency of inference across individuals, although in both cases individuals are making different inferences due to different schemas rather than selective perception.

Using both the 1984 National Election Study and our experiment, we will show that consistent inferences do occur in at least some cases. Tentatively we expected to find four sets of consistent issue position-trait links involving consensual schemas. First, we expected respondents to perceive more compassionate candidates to be more likely to support 'job training opportunities for the unemployed and a fair standard of living for all'. We also expected that respondents would believe that a competent individual would desire greater autonomy for himself as president, and therefore, would desire greater independence for action in foreign policy. With less confidence we anticipated that a constitutional amendment to ban abortion should relate to compassion (while recognizing the difficulty of determining the direction) and since Kinder's (1986) factor analysis of candidate traits found that leadership and strength loaded on the same dimension, that U.S. military intervention might relate to leadership.

To test our hypotheses using our experimental data, we correlated the candidate's trait rating with the candidate's issue rating. *In only one case were our results consistent across candidates.* For all four candidates, there was a strongly significant ($p < .001$) zero-order correlation between compassion and providing job training and a fair standard of living. The zero-order correlations ranged from a low of .40 for Dole to a high of .67 for Babbitt with a mean of .50. In no other case (of the 15 other possible relationships) were the correlations for even three of the four candidates significant at the .05 level.

Although our failure to find consistent issue position-trait links in three of four cases is somewhat surprising, there are legitimate inferential alternatives to the ones we suggested. For example, it is not unreasonable to think that respondents would believe that a strong leader would use his persuasive and leadership abilities in negotiations to get his way on foreign policy issues, rather than relying on military strength. Similarly, respondents could believe that compassion related to either the unborn child or the mother and draw the appropriate inference. In the nonpolitical world, we are more often confronted with consistent links between traits and attitudes, but because contact with the political world is less frequent, political schemas are neither so commonly held nor so well defined.¹¹ It is important to

¹¹ In fact, for the 16 correlations between each of the four issues and each of the four traits, the mean zero-order correlation for the four candidates never exceeds .15 except for the compassion-jobs correlation.

¹² There is also suggestive evidence internal to our study that consistent schemas involving candidate issue positions (which are specific to politics) are less common than are those involv-

though, that even idiosyncratic schemas provide the same time and saving benefits for the voter as those schemas that are more widely

on our positive finding on compassion and jobs might simply suggest partisanship or other biasing factors might be at work. Individuals may project their own attitudes on favored candidates (and the opposite sides on the opposition candidate) or else misperceive favored candidates when they disagree with the voter (Brody and Page 1972). If so, a respondent's issue or trait attributions would simply reflect the respondent's issue position in combination with the affect felt toward the candidate or party. Then, controlling for respondent's overall evaluation of the particular candidate, partisanship, position on the jobs issue, and for the interaction between the evaluation of the candidate and the respondent's own issue position (the product of the two) should eliminate the zero-order relationship.

However, taking the fourth order partial correlation, we continue to find highly significant correlations between compassion and jobs programs

(01) ranging from .34 (for Dole) to .67 (for Babbitt) with .35 for Biden, .37 for Rumsfeld—almost as strong as the zero-order correlations. Clearly, we are not seeing the results of projection but rather of consensual ideal schemas.

Experiments with students always raise questions about generalizability. In fact, the 1984 National Election Study asked questions about both compassion and jobs, allowing us to retest and confirm our hypothesis with a much more representative data set. For Reagan, there is a strong zero-order relationship between compassion and the jobs question ($r = .36$, $p < .001$). In addition, the relationship remains significant when we control for the thermometer rating and for partisanship, as well as for the interaction (and for respondent's own position on the jobs issue) (fourth order partial $r = .23$, $p < .001$). The zero-order relationship for Mondale is .19 ($p < .05$), and the fourth order partial is almost identical to that for Reagan ($r = .23$, $p < .001$).¹³ Given the differences in control between an experiment

and the NES (which exist apart from politics), Respondents reading issue stories only showed overall consistency (mean intercorrelations of traits across all four candidates for all six traits) of .36 ($p < .05$) while those reading only trait stories show an average issue consistency of .19 ($p < .05$).

There was only one other NES trait-issue position pair very similar to those in our experiments.

Respondents were asked how well "provides strong leadership," describes a candidate when asked about the candidate's support for U.S. involvement in the internal affairs of other American countries. The NES results for these two questions reinforce the negative experimental results. In fact, in the NES study the direction of relationship is not even the same for Mondale and Reagan (for Mondale $r = .09$, $p < .01$; for Reagan $r = -.13$, $p < .01$). Thus, strength of leadership is associated with foreign involvement for Mondale; the reverse is for Reagan.

with unknown candidates and a survey with the two well-known presidential candidates, the similarity of results is striking

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Using both experimental and survey data, we find clear support for the first three hypotheses. First, individuals are ready and able to make inferences about both candidate traits and candidate issue positions. Second, there is an asymmetry in the direction of inference with experimental subjects consistently more likely to make inferences from issues to traits than vice versa. Finally, inferences for the less well-known candidates (Babitt, and Rumsfeld) were much more common regarding traits than for better known Dole. These findings support the revisionist view that inferences are more than mere rationalizations (Miller, Wattenburg, and Miller, 1986).

For elections involving candidates with minimal previous public exposure (in particular, those involved in early presidential primary elections), these findings are of particular relevance. Because a very high percentage of voters will at least be exposed to media coverage of, if not direct contact with, familiar candidates on whom they will have to pass electoral judgment, they can expect a great deal of political inference to result.

On the other hand, the content of inference is more idiosyncratic. Contrary to our hypothesis, in only one case (i.e., jobs and compassion) are traits and issue positions inferred from one another in a consistent way. This is partly a function of the fact that schemas develop through association (Markus and Zajonc 1985). Consistent trait and issue associations are likely to result only when individuals are exposed to a common source of information (e.g., television), which emphasizes such associations. Furthermore, when these associations are reinforced, by the media or otherwise, they will remain strong. Such conditions are met when a particular issue or trait dominates the news, and its relationship to other issues and traits is emphasized. Once an issue leaves the news, however, its salience and its links to other issues and attributes diminish, and inferences about it become idiosyncratic. Therefore, our failure to find consistent schematic links between issues and traits, with one exception, is not surprising. Were we to repeat the experiment in a year or two, we might well find a different (or several different) set of consistent schematic links.

But, what does the lack of consistent correlations between traits and issues mean for the individual and for the political system? First, the lack of consistency does not diminish the role that inferences play in developing a particular individual's knowledge about political candidates. Idiosyncratic schemas provide the same benefits for the voter as those that are more widely held, but from the perspective of a candidate running for office, idiosyncratic schemas mean less predictability about the effects of issue and image position.

during the campaign. Voters are, therefore, less subject to manipulation by the candidates.

The one case of schematic links that we did find, jobs and compassion, is important in the current political context. Reagan was a candidate who was viewed as compassionate, yet he was also cutting social programs. By viewing Reagan as relatively compassionate, a sizeable portion of the American electorate was able to discount his willingness to undercut the 'safety net' and to assume that the cuts he was instituting were not going to have the serious repercussions that his opponents claimed.

Much work obviously remains to be done in order to determine the conditions under which consistent political schemas develop. How much information about candidates is necessary before schematic representation is relevant? What factors are responsible for the development of consistent schemas, such as we found with jobs and compassion? Is it merely that an issue that is both simple, long-lasting, and widely discussed in a particular year (as with fairness) will come to show consistent associations with other important factors (like jobs) or is there a level of salience for schemas which, once reached, insures their long-term persistence?

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Class, Status, and Support for Government Aid to Disadvantaged Groups

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The literature describing ideological orientations of Americans is complex and enigmatic. It is largely organized around two seemingly incompatible theories. Much of the controversy pertains to people in the highest stratum. The "class polarization" thesis describes them as economically conservative. The "class inversion" thesis maintains they are liberal. The debate is highly influenced by the choice of definitions and indicators. Most prior research fails to distinguish between types of strata (class and status) and between different types of liberal-conservative beliefs. This paper shows seemingly contradictory theories can be made compatible by basing one theory on class and the other on status. Pooled data from the 1976, 1990, and 1994 NES surveys is used to estimate the effects of class and status on attitudes toward general welfare and aid to minorities. Controls are provided for race, party identification, and type of occupation. Together class and status provide a more comprehensive explanation of issue positions than does either concept alone. However, the variables explain only a small proportion of the ideological division between Republicans and Democrats.

The ideological orientations of Americans are complex. Much disagreement exists about the orientations of the upper stratum, the people who are the most politically involved and influential in American politics. Traditionally they have been portrayed as "conservative." More recently a growing segment has been described as "liberal." The discrepancy exposes a larger controversy about the relationship between social stratification and liberal-conservative beliefs in the United States. This paper attempts to bring some order to the debate. Two competing views are assessed: the "class polarization" and "class inversion" theses. The theories project contrary issue orientations within the upper stratum. It will be shown that either theory can be supported (or refuted) given the right data. Disparate findings are attributed to differences in the conceptualization and measure-

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ment of strata and ideology. What appear to be contradictory theories are compatible arguments, one based on class and the other on status. Together both theories provide a better explanation of ideological orientations than does either one alone.

The *class polarization thesis* describes a "conservative" upper stratum that opposes government programs intended to reduce social and economic inequalities and a "liberal" lower stratum which supports such policies. Classical Marxists (Marx 1959) envision this outcome, assuming inequalities between capitalists and workers will increase with economic development, intensifying class conflict, class consciousness, and ideological polarization. The conservative bent of the upper stratum is well documented (e.g. Hamilton 1972, Erickson, Luttbeg and Tedin 1980, 154-57, Lipset 1981, Holloway and George 1986, 72). However, there are serious problems with the class polarization thesis.

The extreme level of class conflict envisioned by Marx has not occurred in the United States, nor is it likely. Conditions which have radicalized the lower and upper strata in other nations are less common in America (Alford 1963, Hamilton 1972, Lipset 1981, Galie 1983). The institutionalization of collective bargaining, a two-party system, the absence of extreme overlapping divisions (other than race and strata), the relative absence of major economic and political upheavals and a high standard of living have moderated the relationship between social stratification and left-right thinking. The highest recorded incidence of class polarization occurred during the Great Depression (Campbell et al. 1960, 346, Schlozman and Verba 1979, 125-27). Much weaker evidence exists for the decades following World War II (Alford 1963, 101, Hamilton 1972, 188-225, Verba and Nie 1972, 267-98).

Most Americans do not think of politics in terms of abstract liberal-conservative ideologies (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979, 365f, Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1978, Klingemann 1979, 258-72, Smith 1980). This is particularly true of the lower, less well-educated stratum and manual workers generally. Although many identify themselves as members of the "working class," there is little evidence of a working class consciousness or ideology defined as perceptions of a common class interest, a perceived conflict of interest with more advantaged classes, a rejection of the economic reward system as illegitimate, and a readiness to use collective political action (Jackman and Jackman 1983, 201-209, Schlozman and Verba 1979, 21-23, 115-27). Ideological thinking is much more prevalent among better educated, more affluent Americans. However, the upper stratum is not uniformly conservative as suggested by the class polarization theory.

The *class inversion thesis* depicts an end to class polarization. It is a response to contemporary polls which suggests growing economic conservatism among manual workers and greater liberalism among the upper stratum (Harris 1973, 35f, Inglehart 1977, 180f, Nie et al. 1979, 260-63, Ladd

1982, 100) Proponents of the class inversion theory attribute these trends to advanced industrialization.¹ According to the theory, increased economic liberalism within the highest stratum is due to a 'new upper class' of professionals and managers (Kristol 1972, Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1977, Ladd and Hadley 1978, Gouldner 1979, Bruce-Briggs 1979, McAdams 1987). Advanced industrialization has increased the ranks of the new upper class and reduced the relative size of the traditionally conservative "old upper class," independent entrepreneurs (Gilbert and Kahl 1982, 74-78, Wright and Martin 1987). This has contributed to a growing ideological division within the upper stratum and an aggregate decline in the economic conservatism of the upper stratum as a whole. The growth of a middle income, skilled manual worker force has produced an ideological split among manual workers, between the relatively affluent and economically conservative and those who are poor and liberal while increasing the aggregate conservatism of manual workers. Aggregate statistics suggest an end to class conflict. They conceal significant polarization within each stratum. Some scholars believe the division within the upper stratum is sufficiently great to have created a 'class inversion' in which a significant segment of better-off Americans is now far to the left of the average citizen and most white manual workers (Bell 1973, Ladd and Hadley 1978: 95, Lipset 1981: 8, 503-21).

There are problems with the class inversion thesis. Galie (1983) dismisses it and the polarization thesis, suggesting that class conflict is less influenced by the current stage of industrialization than by the unique national stories. Others suggest the 'liberal establishment' is a much smaller segment of the upper stratum, and it is more conservative than depicted by inversion theorists (Hamilton 1972, Bell 1979, Bazelon 1979, Brint 1984). Studies purporting the shift from polarization to inversion are limited by incomparable, often ambiguous survey questions. Most of the evidence is based on party identification and voting behavior, not respondents' positions on ideological issues. In the United States, these are poor measures of liberal-conservative thinking. The Republican party is relatively homogeneous and conservative, but the Democratic party remains a broad based, ideologically diverse coalition (Nie et al. 1979: 194ff.).

Survey questions on issue positions provide more appropriate evidence of ideological thinking, yet many of those used to document a class inversion are ambiguous. They confound different types of liberal and conservative thinking. At least two broad types of issues are discernible in this literature:

¹ The term, 'advanced industrialization' is typically used to refer to a number of related technological, economic, and social changes. The most prominent are: the growth of capital intensive technology, a more affluent and skilled work force, an expanding service sector and knowledge industry, and the displacement of individually owned enterprises by joint stock owned managerial controlled corporations.

(1) an *economic equality dimension* (government programs to aid disadvantaged groups) and (2) an *individual rights dimension* (government guarantee of civil liberties). Each type has important subdimensions. This paper will contrast opinions on two types of equality issues: *general social welfare* and *aid to minorities*. There is little question that the upper stratum, regardless of party affiliation, is relatively liberal on questions of individual freedom and civil liberties.² The real controversy pertains to their positions on economic equality issues.

The principal thesis of this paper is that theoretical discord and seeming conflicting research findings are due, in part, to differences in definition and measurement. Social stratification and liberal-conservative ideology are multidimensional concepts. Focus on different dimensions leads to contrary conclusions. Studies describing a conservative upper stratum usually define "strata" in terms of *class* and "ideology" in terms of government aid to disadvantaged groups. Most studies reporting a liberal upper stratum are limited to measures of *status*, and they generally include measures of noneconomic issues. This study will show the upper stratum to be an ideologically diverse lot characterized by extremes of both economic conservatism and economic liberalism. The greatest divergence of American public opinion on the role of government in reducing inequalities exists *within* the upper stratum. Under certain conditions, higher status is associated with economic liberalism, whereas higher class correlates with economic conservatism. Together, class and status provide a better account of issue positions than does either concept alone. Yet, neither accounts for the wide divergence of views within the upper stratum. The effects of class and status are highly conditioned by race, occupation, party identification, and the type of economic issue.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the importance of distinction between class and status, and different types of liberal-conservative thinking, when addressing the relationship between stratification and ideology. For this reason, "class" and "status" will be subsumed under the more general term, "stratification." Subsequent references to competing theories will refer to "strata polarization" and "strata inversion." I will show that either thesis can be supported (or refuted) by altering the definitions of strata and ideology. The discussion will proceed with an examination of the theoretical

² Studies which mix survey questions measuring individual rights and economic issues have muddled efforts to resolve the polarization-inversion controversy. However, the support of the upper strata for individual rights is well documented. See Stonfler (1955), Prothro and Cline (1960), Lane (1962), McClosky (1964: 17-56), Lawrence (1976), and Nunn et al. (1978). An apparent exception is Sullivan et al. (1978) who report a relatively modest but statistically significant bivariate correlation between tolerance and education (.31). Their multivariate analysis estimates education to have a small indirect effect on tolerance through selective personality attributes and political beliefs. The reliability of the estimate is suspect given the problem of multicollinearity—a high correlation between education and "social status" (p. 225).

significance of class and status, including a summary of earlier research findings. The propositions are then tested with pooled data from the 1976, 1980, and 1984 National Election Studies (NES) surveys.

LITERATURE REVIEW

There are two major traditions in the conceptualization of social stratification: (1) class and (2) status (Wright et al. 1977, 1982, 1987; Robinson and Kelly 1979). Originating with Weber (1946: 186–93), the *status tradition* describes continuous socioeconomic strata, generally identified by education, income, and occupational prestige (Duncan 1961). The *class tradition* defines sharper, discrete categories in terms of ownership and control of the means of production and authority within the work place. Marx distinguishes between those who own the means of production and employ others ("bourgeoisie" and capitalists) and their employees (the proletariat). Dahrendorf (1959: 165–73) further differentiates employees who exercise authority over others in the work place (managers) from those who do not (non-managers). Still finer categories identify various mixes of these classes, for example, middle management (which manages and is managed), petty bourgeoisie (who own their own means of production but do not employ others), and semiautonomous, highly skilled employees (professionals).

The distinction between status and class is essential to understanding people's positions on economic issues. Ideology regularly is explained in terms of subjective self-interests, typically those shared with others of the same stratum. Estimates of the interests vary with the definition of strata. It is baffling when one tests theories of class with measures of status or vice versa. Yet, most research assessing class theories is based on status indica-

¹ The literature reflects this confusion.

Findings Based on Status

The evidence of a strata inversion is limited to status indicators and is largely confined to Democratic identifiers (Verba and Nie 1972, 1999; Ladd and Hadley 1978). This appears to reflect a self-selection process where

lower status liberals identify with the more liberal Democratic party and lower status conservatives prefer the more conservative Republican party.

There are some exceptions, but they fall far short of a comprehensive treatment of class and are, Ladd and Hadley (1978), Brint (1984), and McAdams (1987) make major contributions to the subject, but they lump together professionals with managers, ignoring Dahrendorf's conception of class. There is also a tendency to use indices which confound economic and noneconomic issues. Robinson and Kelley (1979) provide an excellent analysis of the relationship between class, subjective class identification, and party vote, but they do not measure status or ideology, nor are they interested in the relative merits of the strata polarization and strata con-

Some challenge the validity of findings that higher status is associated with economic liberalism (e.g., Hamilton 1972). Others question the interpretation of the association—whether higher status contributes to economic liberalism.

This is apparent in the literature on income. It is generally believed that higher income contributes to economic conservatism since redistributive policies directly threaten the economic interests of the affluent. Most research shows economic conservatism increases with family income (Verba and Nie 1972, Hamilton 1972, McAdams 1987). However, Inglehart suggests that, under certain conditions, affluence may allow economic liberalism (1977, 180, 1981, 895). He challenges the assumption that economic views are determined solely by narrow, material interests. Based on Maslow's (1954) theory of motivation, he argues affluence contributes to a sense of material security which decreases the relative importance of material values while heightening nonmaterial ("post-material") concerns. For example, affluent whites in the suburbs may be less directly threatened by government aid to inner cities than are white manual workers who compete with minorities for jobs and housing. The affluent are said to better afford compassion and charity. Some nonmaterial values may encourage economic liberalism. For example, Lane (1965) attributes liberalism among affluent college students with "the need to be liked." Presumably it leads them to identify with and support benevolent government programs. Perhaps their motive is not so much to be liked by others, but to think well of themselves. Altruism satisfies that need. Under some conditions, affluence may afford altruism.

The significance of education for economic liberalism is equally complex. The data are mixed. Part of the reason is the close correlation between income and education. When income is controlled, college education has been shown to be associated with economic liberalism. Advanced education is generally believed to contribute to support for government largess to the needy (Kristol 1972, Bell 1973, Robinson and Kelley 1977, Ladd and Hadley 1978, 185f, Gouldner 1979, McAdams 1987). Kirkpatrick (1979) contends college education promotes critical analytical skills, evaluation based on abstract, often ideal frameworks and a belief in the efficacy of reason. Such traits are said to foster discontent with an imperfect world and faith in the ability of humans to remedy it. The link between college education and economic liberalism is greatest in the humanities and social sciences where the curricula are explicitly directed toward social and political problems and where course work affects one's capacity to empathize with people different from, or less fortunate than, oneself. On some larger and more prestigious campuses, these orientations are reinforced by liberal faculty and student cultures (Ladd and Lipset 1975, 215).

There is, however, another side to this argument. Knowledgeable people on both the left and the right have the critical faculties to identify imperfections

tions in both society and government. The same type of critical mentality which contributes for some to attacks on the "business establishment" and the "military-industrial complex" for others may produce critiques of the "liberal establishment" and the "welfare state."

These conflicting views make it difficult to predict the effects of education. On average, however, an advanced education appears likely to contribute to liberal thinking. One reason is that it helps people to differentiate among objects of political support (Easton 1965). Poorly educated, uninformed citizens tend to have broad-based, diffuse support for the political system. They fail to distinguish between government leaders, the regime, and their country. The result is a knee jerk, patriotic conservatism which defends the status quo and all things labeled "American." By contributing to differentiated belief systems and analytical thinking, advanced education is likely to increase tolerance for deviancy and legitimize dissent.

Findings Based on Social Class

Despite occasional references to a liberal consensus among the "men at the top" (Dye 1979, Dye and Zeigler 1981), it is difficult to believe that most higher status, self-employed people or business managers constitute—or are in any way part of, the "liberal establishment." Marx and Dahrendorf's argument that they are not is supported by empirical evidence (Brint 1984). Independent businessmen have good reason to be suspicious of big government. Regulations, taxes, and welfare are perceived as direct threats to the work incentive and profits. Self-made men and women are unlikely to be sympathetic with the poor. Having worked for what they have and having succeeded, it is difficult for them to empathize with the disadvantaged groups.

The ideological orientations of managers are more equivocal. For example, whereas Dahrendorf (1959, 173–76), Hamilton (1972), and Robinson and Kelly (1979) portray them as economically conservative, the Ehrenreichs (1977), Dye (1979), Dye and Zeigler (1981), and Ladd and Hadley (1978, 93–111, 184–88) lump them together with professionals as liberal. The truth may lie somewhere in between. Managers can be expected to be less economically conservative than the self-employed, but more conservative than those who have no responsibility for running the firm.

Several factors are likely to moderate the economic conservatism of managers. Most do not own major shares of their firm. Many are in middle and lower management. They are in no way members of an upper class. As employees, managers are less likely to identify with the firm than owners. Typically they did not inherit any part of the business nor will they pass it on to their progeny. Government interventions are less likely to be perceived as direct threats to themselves or their families. The impersonal nature of

larger firms, the drawing of a salary and the prospect of being demoted, passed over for promotion, or fired all further separate managers from owners.

On the other hand, corporate managers are unlikely economic liberals. Higher level management is "big business." Managers run the firm and supervise other employees. They are responsible for the firm's successes and failures. Their incomes are relatively large and are often directly dependent (in salaries, stock options, and bonuses) on profits. Although they may identify with the business to the same degree as owners of family-run enterprises, they are more likely than nonsupervisory personnel to identify with the business community and, as successful members of that community, internalize its principal values: private property, free enterprise, hard work, and individual initiative (Katznelson and Kesselman 1975, 72-74).

Class-Status Interactions

The empirical literature is generally silent on the joint significance of class and status for ideology. Because the polarization and inversion theories, i.e., to different types of strata (class and status) both may be valid. Together they provide a potentially better explanation of ideological beliefs than either theory alone: the combination of high status and high class may be associated with economic conservatism, whereas high status and low class may lead to liberalism. That is, better educated, affluent owners and, to a lesser extent, managers are expected to be conservative, while better educated, more affluent employees with no supervisory responsibilities, are hypothesized to be liberal. Brint (1984: 54-56) reports such interaction effects. There are two reasons for believing the combination of high status and lower class contributes to liberal thinking. First, status-class inconsistency may create a sense of relative deprivation similar to that reported for status inconsistency (Gurr 1970, 109-13). Here individual merit (evidenced by education) combined with little authority or control on the job may promote feelings of being disadvantaged and create empathy for the disadvantaged generally. Second, the alleged liberal effects of material security and college education are more likely among people whose security does not depend directly on profits: those who do not own or manage the firm.

• *Other Economic Factors: Type of Occupation*

Type of occupation influences people's positions on economic issues and may condition the effects of class and status. Strata inversion theorists generally assume that semiautonomous professionals are most liberal. This appears to be true of only certain industries. Employment in profit-making businesses is expected to promote conservative values. However, the non-profit sector of the economy (public and not-for-profit organizations) may

t, even occasionally encourage, liberal attitudes. Some government bureaucrats may have a direct interest in big government—their jobs (Lizman and Verba 1979, 336, McAdams 1987). In addition, they are familiar with, and perhaps more committed to, solving social problems. The knowledge and health-care industries have a disproportionate interest in not-for-profit occupations. The knowledge industry encourages the critical intellectual thinking cultivated in college (Ladd and Hadley-Bell 1973, Huntington 1974: 85). At the heart of the knowledge industry are the scientific community, the teaching profession, and the national media. Employment in the health-care industry involves a nurturing which can foster concern for medical and related problems of the poor: physicians, registered nurses, therapists, social workers—and those generations who aid and care for the ill—the dispossessed—and the very old—are likely to be knowledgeable about the nutritional and health needs of materially disadvantaged groups. Like teachers and scientists, they often benefit from government spending on health and education (Gouldner 1979: 39).

In summary, the existing literature provides several, albeit sometimes contradictory, reasons for expecting class and status to separately and jointly influence who supports or opposes government aid to the needy. These expectations are likely to be conditioned by other variables, including type of education.

METHODOLOGY

Estimating the effects of class and status on ideology is complicated by missing data.¹ This requires an extraordinary large sample. The analysis of 1976 is conducted on a pooled data set combining respondents from the 1980, and 1984 National Election Studies ($N = 6,119$). All are national probability samples of Americans 18 years and older. Because class is not measured in 1976, estimates of its effects are limited to pooled data for 1980–1984 ($N = 3,871$).

Five types of independent variables are measured: class, status, occupation, party identification, and race. There are multiple indicators of status and occupation. Party identification, race, and occupation are treated as con-

1. The primary sources of missing data are: (1) unanswered questions; (2) questions asked for part of the sample; and (3) respondents who are not employed outside the home. Housewives and students with no other occupation, volunteers for less than 20 hours a week, those unemployed, and the permanently disabled are excluded from most of the analysis. Subsampling on party, race, and status further reduces the N . Depending on the number of independent variables, with listwise deletions, the working N for all three years is between 1,991–554. For the two-year data set, when only white respondents are analyzed, the working N is between 830 and 1,151. A special subsample of high status whites has a working N between 406 and 406.

trol variables in estimating the effects of status and class. A control for race will determine the degree to which higher status whites support aid to minorities. The control for party is suggested by literature locating the status inversion almost entirely within the Democratic party. I am also interested in whether the ideological divisions between parties can be explained by status and class. Partisanship is operationalized with the NES Party Identification scale.⁵

Three types of occupation are measured. U.S. census occupational codes distinguish between administrative, professional, clerical, sales, and manual work. Of primary interests are *professional occupations* since they are alleged to constitute the majority of higher status liberals. Census codes are also used to identify respondents employed in *industries* believed to foster liberal sentiments: knowledge and health care.⁶ A further distinction is made between those who work in the profit and nonprofit *sectors*. This is measured by two questions. The first, asked in 1980 and 1984, identifies respondents in "public administration."⁷ The second question, asked only in 1984, distinguishes respondents employed by government, not-for-profit organizations and profit-making businesses. Government and not-for-profit jobs constitute the nonprofit sector.

Social status is measured by three conventional indicators: annual family income, years of formal education, and occupational prestige (using Duncan's SEI scores). The estimated effects of the three status variables on ideology will be examined separately and together in a *composite socioeconomic status (SES) index*.⁸

The 1980 and 1984 NES surveys contain two questions which measure social class. They distinguish between *owners* (people who say they are self-employed) and *employees* (those who work for others) and, among employees, between *supervisors* (people who indicate they supervise others as a regular part of their jobs) and *nonsupervisors* (those who have no supervisory responsibilities). Answers to these questions form a composite variable, *relationship to the workplace*. Relationship to the workplace does not

⁵ Democrats and Republicans are operationalized as 'strong' and 'weak' identifiers and those who 'lean' toward the party.

⁶The 'knowledge industry' is operationalized as scientists, college professors, K-12 teachers, writers, editors, and reporters. The 'health-care industry' is defined as physicians, nurses, therapists, and social workers.

⁷The method of estimating occupational prestige changed between 1976 and 1984 (see Stevens and Cho 1985). For the pooled data, the correlations of the head of household's SEI scores with the head's education and family income are .61 and .39 respectively. The correlation between the head's education and family income is .46. While factor analysis demonstrates a common dimension, the moderate correlations among the separate indicators suggests each has a unique component. The common dimension is measured by a composite socioeconomic index indicating household status. It is created by standardizing the three components, multiplying them by their factor scores on a common factor and summing the products.

TABLE 1
RELATIONSHIP TO THE WORK PLACE BY OCCUPATION (ENTIRE SAMPLE)^a

Relationship to the Work Place	Type of Occupation ^b				Total
	Administration & Management	Professional & Kindred Work	Clerical & Sales	Manual Labor	
Self-Employed	32.2%	11.9%	4.1%	12.1%	12.9%
Employees					
Supervisors	61.2	36.4	25.6	25.5	32.3
Non-Supervisors	6.6	51.7	70.2	62.4	54.8
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N	(348)	(478)	(605)	(711)	(2,609)

Source: A pooled sample of the 1980 and 1984 NES surveys of Americans 18 years and older.

^aStatistical Significance: $P < .0000$.

^bRespondents' occupations are classified in terms of U.S. Census codes.

capture the full meaning of the concept conceived by Marx and Dahrendorf.⁵ However, it is far superior to indicators of "class" found in most research. This may be seen by cross-classifying it with the most common measure: U.S. occupational codes. Table 1 shows the two variables measure very different attributes. Relationship to the workplace differentiates ownership, control, and subordination *within* occupational categories. Although most respondents classified by the census code as administrators or managers report they supervise others, 39% do not. Most of these are self-employed (32%). About seven percent are nonsupervisory employees. In addition a small, but significant proportion (4% to 12%) of people in the remaining oc-

⁵Relationship to the work place does not identify the most powerful segments of the upper class. The very rich, as well as owners, presidents, vice presidents, and boards of directors of America's largest corporations represent only a tiny fraction of the American public which can not be identified even with large representative samples. It is difficult to obtain a sufficient number of the very wealthy for reliable analysis. For example, only 14% of Americans in 1980 lived in households which earned \$35,000 or more a year, an income which barely is classified as "highly affluent." For 1984 the proportion is 24%. The variable "relationship to the work place" does not separate capitalists from petty bourgeoisie. Only about half of the self-employed individuals in the sample have employees and most of those report fewer than a dozen. It cannot distinguish owners who have inherited their wealth from newly propertied, upwardly mobile respondents. Nor does it capture Wrights et al. (1982) distinction between "managers" (decision makers who exercise broad authority within the work place) and "supervisors" (nondecision makers who exercise only task authority). Further, it cannot determine the degree of autonomy among nonsupervisory employees, for example, closely regulated clerical, sales, and factory workers are lumped together with largely unsupervised professionals (see Wright and Martin 1987 for superior measures). Yet, given all these deficiencies, relationship to the work place is a far better indicator of class than the status and occupational variables normally employed. By using theoretically based, conceptually distinct measures, these data permit the estimation of separate class and status effects.

occupations are self-employed and a still larger proportion (25% to 36%) have supervisory responsibilities.

The dependent variable, positions on public aid to the needy, is measured by four questions asking whether government should "ensure jobs and a good standard of living, improve the social and economic positions of blacks and other minorities, provide public health and educational services, and integrate schools to ensure equal education." For each of the three samples these variables load on a single factor which explains approximately half their common variance. The alpha coefficients are also satisfactory.¹⁰ Weighted composite indices were constructed for each year by multiplying the variables by their factor scores and summing the products. The indices were combined in the pooled data set to form the *total government aid index*.

As expected, variables addressing government assistance to blacks (busing and aid to minorities) load on the same factor with more general welfare variables (job guarantees, health and educational services). By the late 1960s the issue of 'minority rights' had become closely identified with 'government welfare' in both public policy and popular attitudes (Nie et al. 1979: 123f.). Nevertheless, it is advisable to study the separate effects of minority aid and general aid issues on the relationship between stratification and ideological beliefs. They distinguish two types of 'liberalism': (1) limited government help to 'the deserving poor,' those with a clear history of discrimination (e.g., blacks) and (2) more general support for the 'welfare state.' Therefore, variables comprising the total government aid index are further divided into a *minority aid index* (busing and aid to minorities) and a *general*

¹⁰For each question, respondents were asked to indicate their position on an issue measured by a seven-point scale, ranging from 1 (extreme liberal) to 7 (extreme conservative). The scales are anchored on either end by two contrary statements. For 1980 and 1984 the options are:

1. The government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living vs. The government should just let each person get ahead on his own.

2. The government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minority groups, even if it means giving them preferential treatment vs. The government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves.

3. It is important for the government to continue the services it now provides even if it means no reduction in spending vs. The government should provide fewer services such as health and education to reduce spending. (In 1976 item 3 is replaced by: There should be a government insurance program which would cover all medical and hospital expenses.

vs. Medical expenses should be paid by individuals and through private insurance like Blue Cross.)

4. Achieving racial integration is so important that it justifies busing school children out of their neighborhoods vs. Keep children in their own neighborhoods.

¹¹The variances explained by the common factor are: 1976: .48-2%, 1980: .50-9%, 1984: .45-6%. The alpha coefficients are respectively: .65, .68, and .60. For the pooled data, alpha: .64.

aid index (jobs, health and educational services). The effects of status and class will be estimated for all three dependent variables.

DATA ANALYSIS

Two types of analysis are used to estimate the effects of class and status. The first compares average government aid scores for various combinations of independent variables. The issue indices have been standardized to ease comparison. Each has a mean of 0.0 and a standard deviation equal to 1.0. The more positive the score, the more conservative is the position, whereas more negative scores indicate more liberal positions. Hierarchical Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) estimates the statistical significance of differences between means. Second, Forward Multiple Regression provides an alternative method to verify the initial results and estimate the total explained variance.

Social Status

Figure 1 displays the relationship between positions on total government aid and socioeconomic status. It plots average issue scores across six strata.¹¹ Means are reported for the entire sample and separately for Republicans and Democrats. Relevant statistics are at the bottom of the figure. The data are equivocal. They support either theory, depending upon the respondents' party identification. Democrats provide strong evidence of a strata inversion. Those with the lowest and highest status are relatively quite liberal, averaging one-half standard deviations or more below the sample mean ($- .71$ and $-.57$). The Republicans display a modest polarization, higher status is associated with greater conservatism between the second and fourth strata, topping off at about one-half standard deviation above the sample mean. The pattern for the entire sample reflects these contrary partisan relationships; there is a positive relationship between status and conservatism with a slight inversion among the highest status group.

Most significant is the ideological divide between the highest status Democrats and Republicans. They differ by over a standard deviation (.105). This 'partisan polarization' is far more pronounced than the differences between strata within either party. Used with the N s at the bottom of the figure, the data show the majority of higher status whites identify with the Republican party and are opposed to government aid, but that a large minority are liberal Democrats.

The pronounced economic liberalism of the lower stratum in figure 1 is

¹¹ The choice of six categories is a compromise between having a sufficient number of strata to detect a curvilinear relationship and enough cases within each strata to afford reliable results. The categories were assigned equal N s prior to listwise deletion. Higher status respondents are more likely to answer all four issue questions.

FIGURE 1

ENTIRE SAMPLE AVERAGE GOVERNMENT AID SCORES BY STATUS AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION




FIGURE 1 (continued)

Relevant Statistics	Statistical Significance (<i>F</i> -Tests)		F TA	Ns for each strata						Total N
	Between Groups	Dev from Linearity								
Entire Sample	0000	0000	19	288	356	404	461	498	547	2554
Democrats	0000	0000	22	184	202	206	228	201	201	1222
Republicans	0004	0374	18	76	101	145	165	234	291	1015

Source: A pooled sample of the 1976, 1980, and 1984 NES Surveys of Americans 18 years and older.

due to minority respondents. Blacks have substantively more negative scores, regardless of their status, averaging 1.21 standard deviations below the sample mean.¹² Figure 2 replicates figure 1, removing blacks from the analysis. There is a marked decline in support for public assistance among the lower stratum. High status white Democrats are far more liberal than middle and lower status whites within either party. In short, figures 1 and 2 provide evidence for both the strata polarization and strata inversion theories. This is because the association between status and liberal-conservative thinking is highly conditioned by party identification. Consistent with the polarization thesis, there is sharp division in support for government aid between liberal blacks, who are disproportionately of lower status and who overwhelmingly identify with the Democratic party, and a conservative majority of higher status whites which identifies with the Republican party. Consistent with the inversion thesis, higher status white Democrats are much more supportive of government aid than lower status whites in either party.

Figure 3 takes the analysis a step further by distinguishing general and from minority aid. Type of issue is of fundamental importance for the relationship between status and issue orientation. Among Republicans, status polarization is limited to general aid issues. Among Democrats, status inversion is confined to minority aid. For Republicans, there is a monotonic positive association for general aid beginning in the second stratum at the sample mean (.00) and capping in the highest stratum about two-thirds of a standard deviation above the mean (.65). Republicans of different strata show little variation in minority aid, though the highest stratum reveals a slight inversion. Democrats present a very different picture. There is little discernible pattern for general aid (at best a weak inversion) and a strong negative relationship, starting at the fourth stratum, for minority aid. For both types of

¹² Blacks score uniformly liberal across all strata (whether defined in terms of status or class). Their average scores on general aid and minority aid are respectively -.95 and -1.22.

FIGURE 2

WHITE RESPONDENTS AVERAGE GOVERNMENT AID SCORES BY STATUS AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION




FIGURE 2 (continued)

Relevant Statistics	Statistical Significance (F-Tests)		F	TA	Ns for each strata						Total N
	Between Groups	Dev from Linearity									
Democrats	0000	0000	21		119	154	162	201	183	179	998
Republicans	0000	0230	17		70	97	141	160	233	289	993

Source: A pooled sample of the 1976, 1980, and 1984 NES Surveys of Americans 18 years and older.

issues the largest differences in ideological thinking are between high status Democrats and Republicans.

Status and Class

There is a twofold explanation for the partisan polarization among higher status respondents. First, better educated individuals generally give more ideologically consistent responses to survey questions (Nie et al. 1979: chap. 8; Klingemann 1979). This accounts for ideological extremes in the upper stratum, but not the division between liberals and conservatives. The latter is consistent with a second prospect: that *both* the strata polarization and the strata inversion theories are true: that is, the 'old' upper stratum (self-employed entrepreneurs) is economically conservative and a significant segment of the 'new' upper stratum (mostly professionals) is liberal. This is essentially the position of strata inversion theorists: except most include managers in their description of liberals and blur the distinction between class and status. Class differences may help explain the divergent ideological orientations among higher status Republicans and Democrats respondents.

Table 2 shows the association of status and class with the government aid indices for white respondents, while controlling for party identification. To simplify the presentation status is dichotomized. The two categories are: (1) low to moderate status (the first five strata in figure 3) and (2) high status (the top stratum in figure 3 where there is the greatest partisan polarization).

The data for status replicates the patterns in figure 3. There are significant status-party interactions. Higher status is associated with liberal attitudes on minority aid, but only among Democrats. It is associated with conservatism on general aid, but only among Republicans. The expected positive association between class and economic conservatism is confirmed for general aid (independently of status and party affiliation) but for minority aid it is limited to higher status Democrats. For these groups, self-employed respondents are the most conservative and among employees, supervisors are more conservative (or less liberal) than nonsupervisors. The expected status-

FIGURE 3

WHITE RESPONDENTS' AVERAGE GENERAL AID AND MINORITY AID
SCORES BY STATUS AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION




FIGURE 3 (continued)

Relevant Statistics	Statistical Significance (F-Tests)		T	Ns for each strata								Total N
	Between Groups	Dev. from Linearity										
Democrats— General	0011	0010	14	148	182	187	219	196	183		1115	
Democrats— Minority	0000	0000	27	156	197	212	246	210	206		1227	
Republicans— General	0000	1743	24	86	108	157	177	248	303		1079	
Republicans Minority	0316	0531	10	95	122	173	190	261	317		1158	

Source: A pooled sample of the 1976, 1980, and 1984 NES Surveys of Americans 18 years and older.

class interaction appears very strongly for Democrats, but not for Republicans. High status, white Democratic employees who have no supervisory responsibilities are the most supportive of minority assistance (-59 ; higher status Democratic supervisors are also very supportive (-55). Both are moderately liberal on general aid (-27 , -22). Among Republicans, higher status owners and supervisors are highly opposed to general aid (54 and 53) and slightly more conservative than the average respondent on minority aid (12 , 27). In short, the combination of a high status and lower class best accounts for Democrats' liberal positions on minority aid, while the combination of high status and high class locates Republicans who oppose general aid.

Party identification is by far the best predictor of issue position. First, the estimated effects of status and class depend on party. Second, partisanship is more uniquely associated with issue position. This may be observed from the analysis of variance and by comparing Republicans and Democrats of comparable status and class. Republicans are consistently much more conservative, scoring significantly above the sample mean, regardless of strata. Although there is empirical support for both the strata polarization and inversion theories, neither class nor status can account for the extent of partisan polarization in the highest stratum.

Multiple regression has also been employed to estimate the effects of status and class. It produces slightly different results. The first three columns in table 3 present estimates from equations predicting all respondents' positions on government aid. They list standardized regression coefficients (and in parentheses their statistical significance) for race, class, status, party identification, and a composite variable measuring party-status interaction. Only significant coefficients are reported. The three equations produce simi-

TABLE 2

WHITE RESPONDENTS' AVERAGE GOVERNMENT AID SCORES
BY SOCIAL STATUS RELATIONSHIP TO THE WORK PLACE
AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Average Scores ^a	Self		Democrat		Self		Republican	
	Employed	Unemployed	Supervisor	Non-supervisor	Employed	Unemployed	Supervisor	Non-supervisor
TOTAL GOVERNMENT AID								
Low to Moderate Status	04 (32)		06 (112)	22 (200)	68 (60)		43 (125)	38 (146)
High Status	08 (6)		44 (30)	62 (41)	58 (14)		67 (62)	49 (46)
GENERAL AID								
Low to Moderate Status	03 (40)		17 (122)	31 (223)	74 (62)		41 (132)	32 (163)
High Status	08 (6)		22 (30)	27 (42)	54 (14)		83 (64)	61 (47)
MINORITY AID								
Low to Moderate Status	06 (38)		10 (128)	01 (247)	43 (69)		36 (138)	32 (177)
High Status	16 (6)		55 (33)	59 (43)	12 (14)		27 (67)	24 (48)
Statistical Significance: ANOVA ^b								
			Total Government Aid		General Aid		Minority Aid	
			Prob. SS		Prob. SS		Prob. SS	
Relationship to the Work Place			006 (6.76)		000 (11.12)		226 (2.00)	
Socioeconomic Status			293 (7.1)		004 (5.84)		000 (23.46)	
Party Identification			000 (98.79)		000 (108.29)		000 (44.19)	
Status-Party Interaction			000 (5.83)		019 (3.81)		000 (14.97)	
Total Variance Explained			000 (27.02)		000 (152.03)		000 (86.00)	

Source: Pooled samples of 1980 and 1984 NES surveys of Americans 18 years and older.

^aAverage standardized score for each status class category. The more positive the score the more conservative the group is relative to the average respondent; the more negative the score the more liberal the group. The number of respondents in each group is enclosed in parentheses.

TABLE 3

MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODELS PREDICTING ISSUE POSITION^a

Predictors	Total Aids ^b		Future Sample		Predictors	Higher Status Whites	
	General Aids	Minority Aids ^c	General Aids	Minority Aids		General Aids	Minority Aids
Race	40 (0.000)	21 (0.000)	39 (0.000)	Class	18 (0.110)	ns	ns
Class	08 (0.0079)	08 (0.031)	07 (0.004)	Education	ns	17 (0.0165)	ns
Status	14 (0.000)	18 (0.037)	23 (0.005)	Income	ns	ns	ns
Party	ns	ns	ns	Census Code	ns	ns	ns
Party Status	65 (0.000)	15 (0.000)	43 (0.000)	Industry Code	ns	ns	ns
Interaction				Sector code	ns	ns	ns
R ²	75 (1)	52 (27)	49 (24)		25 (07)	30 (09)	

Source: A pooled sample of the 1980 and 1984 NES surveys of American 18 years and older.

^aStandardized Regression coefficients and unpaired *t* tests of their significance levels.

^bEquation 1: $y = a + b_1 \text{white} + b_2 \text{class} + b_3 \text{status} + b_4 \text{Republican} + b_5 \text{Republican} \times \text{status}$

Equation 2: $y = a + b_1 \text{white} + b_2 \text{class} + b_3 \text{status} + b_4 \text{Republican} + b_5 \text{Republican} \times \text{status}$

Equation 3: $y = a + b_1 \text{white} + b_2 \text{class} + b_3 \text{status} + b_4 \text{Democrat} + b_5 \text{Democrat} \times \text{status}$

Equation 4: $y = a + b_1 \text{white} + b_2 \text{education} + b_3 \text{income} + b_4 \text{professional} + b_5 \text{the 4th & knowl- edge} + b_6 \text{nonprofit}$

TABLE 4

STATUS, OCCUPATIONAL AND CLASS INDICATORS BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION,
STATUS AND RACE.^a

Class	Entire Sample		χ^2	Higher Status Whites		χ^2
	Democratic	Republican		Democratic	Republican	
Nonsupervisor	60.2% (1197)	45.2% (962)	0000	49.6% (121)	37.3% (185)	0333 ^b
Supervisor	29.9%	36.5%		40.5%	49.2%	
Self-employed	09.9%	18.3%		9.9%	13.5%	
High Income ^c	10.5% (1585)	19.3% (1245)	0000	40.4% (161)	53.5% (245)	0098
College Education						
Four-Year Degree	09.2% (1766)	15.8% (1379)	0000	32.3% (161)	43.7% (245)	0000
Advanced Training	05.9%	05.9%		41.0%	21.6%	
Census Code						
Administration	09.7% (1461)	19.4% (1157)	0000	13.5% (141)	26.5% (211)	0000
Professional	17.7%	19.2%		73.0%	54.5%	
Knowledge/Health	11.5% (1453)	09.9% (1166)	ns	49.3% (142)	27.1% (214)	0000
Industry ^d						
Nonprofit Sector ^e	22.5% (1461)	15.8% (1124)	0000	36.4% (140)	18.9% (201)	0003

Source: Pooled sample of 1980 and 1984 NES surveys of Americans 18 years and older

^a Percentages are based on the total number of party identifiers indicated within parentheses^b Only the proportion of nonsupervisor is statistically significant^c High income - the top one-fifth of family incomes^d Knowledge Industry - occupational codes for scientists, college professors, K-12 teachers, writers, editors and reporters; Health Care Industry - occupational codes for physicians, nurses, therapists, and social workers^e Nonprofit sector - industrial codes for public administration in either year and for 1984 whether respondents are employed by government or a nonprofit organization

lar results status-party interaction terms are most important, followed by status and race. Class is statistically significant, but substantively not very important. When controlling for the other variables, party identification is not significant.

The first equation (for total aid) is a second order polynomial estimating the curvilinear association between status and liberalism among Democrats. It also has an interactive term estimating the conservative propensity of higher status Republicans. The equation explains 31% of the variance in total aid. The strongest unique association is between conservatism and the combination of higher status and Republican party identification (.65). Among those not identifying with the Republican party, higher status is associated with more liberal attitudes (-.44). The second equation (column 2) is identical to the first, except that it is a first order polynomial estimating a positive association between status and opposition to general aid. It accounts for 27% of the variance in general aid. The relative magnitude of beta weights is similar to those found for total aid, however the coefficients are smaller. The third equation, predicting minority aid (column 3) is also a first order polynomial, but its interactive term estimates the liberal propensity of higher status Democrats (-.43). For other respondents higher status has the opposite effect, leading to greater conservatism (.23). The equation accounts for 24% of the variance in minority aid.

The results of the analysis of variance and multiple regression differ in two ways. First, the former indicates class is more important than either status and/or the status-party interaction in explaining general aid, while the latter suggests class plays a minor role. Second, party is the best predictor in the ANOVA, while status-party interaction is more important in the regression analysis. The reason for the class discrepancy appears to be that status is dichotomized in the first analysis, but not in the second. The association between class and issue position is weaker among lower status, poorly educated respondents. This does not detract from a class explanation of ideological differences among higher status respondents. The second discrepancy results from the different methods of measuring status-party interaction. The discrepancy is not as important as the finding that, by either method, neither class nor status can explain issue positions independently of party identification. In short, the strata polarization and strata inversion theories only partially account for the ideological disparity between Republicans and Democrats.

Higher Status Respondents

Closer inspection of higher status whites should shed more light on the partisan polarization. Table 4 shows there are significant status, occupational, and class differences between Democrats and Republicans. They exist even within the upper stratum. Higher status Democrats are twice as likely

TABLE 5

HIGHER STATUS WHITES: AVERAGE GOVERNMENT AID SCORES BY STATUS AND
OCCUPATIONAL INDICATORS AND RELATIONSHIP TO THE WORK PLACE

Average Scores	General Aid			Minority Aid		
	Self-Employed	Supervisor	Nonsupervisor	Self-Employed	Supervisor	Nonsupervisor
INCOME						
Low to Moderate	22.14	46 (34)	25 (62)	25 (4)	04 (56)	- 27 (67)
High	80 (15)	50 (55)	10 (36)	03 (17)	- 08 (57)	- 25 (35)
EDUCATION						
B.A. or less	51 (14)	45 (78)	19 (72)	14 (13)	06 (83)	- 06 (73)
Advanced Degree	102 (5)	47 (31)	20 (26)	- 04 (6)	- 23 (32)	- 70 (29)
OCCUPATION						
Other	41 (5)	64 (46)	19 (35)	06 (5)	13 (46)	01 (38)
Professional	96 (13)	39 (40)	20 (63)	02 (12)	09 (64)	- 42 (64)
INDUSTRY						
Other	68 (15)	54 (53)	25 (59)	19 (14)	03 (86)	- 10 (62)
Knowledge Able	71 (6)	27 (36)	11 (39)	32 (6)	- 15 (29)	- 51 (40)
SECTOR						
Profit	65 (19)	43 (86)	12 (77)	02 (18)	07 (93)	- 24 (51)
Nonsupervisor		60 (80)	10 (14)		27 (19)	40 (14)

Statistical Significance (ANOVA)^a
Predictors

	General Aid Prob SS	Minority Aid Prob SS
Income	945 (.004)	629 (0.214)
Relationship to the Work Place	019 (6.214)	103 (4.188)
Education	653 (0.157)	002 (8.648)
Relationship to the Work Place	017 (6.898)	088 (4.270)
Occupation	533 (.249)	019 (4.556)
Relationship to the Work Place	014 (6.483)	114 (3.792)
Industry	155 (1.583)	019 (4.984)
Relationship to the Work Place	034 (5.310)	244 (2.527)
Sector	156 (1.562)	453 (0.516)
Relationship to the Work Place	009 (.7384)	139 (3.629)

Source: Pooled samples of 1980 and 1984 NES surveys of Americans 18 years and older.

^aThe values are the average standardized score for each category. The more positive the score, the more can we relate the group is relative to the average respondent; the more negative the score, the more liberal is the group. The number of respondents in each group is enclosed in parentheses.

^bThe values are the probabilities the associations occurred by chance, and are listed in parentheses; the sum of squares indicating the relative magnitude of associations between predictors and issue positions.

Cell has one respondent.

as higher status Republicans to have received an advanced college education beyond the baccalaureate. Republicans have higher incomes. Although both are primarily employed in prestigious occupations, a greater proportion of Democrats are professionals, while Republicans are twice as likely to be administrators. A much higher proportion of higher-status Democrats are employed in the knowledge and health industries. They are twice as likely to be in the nonprofit sector. Finally a significantly greater number of Democrats are nonsupervisory employees. Republicans are more likely to own or manage the firm. These differences could account for disparate issue positions within the highest stratum.

Table 5 addresses this prospect. It breaks down average issue scores among higher status whites by income, education, occupation, industry sector, and class. Only class has a statistically significant relationship with general aid. While most higher status whites are opposed to the general idea of the welfare state, employers are the most opposed and nonsupervisory employees are the least. Minority aid is significantly related to three variables: advanced education, professional careers, and employment in the knowledge and health industries. It is also related to the combination of high status and low class: higher status nonsupervisory employees are the most liberal. Class is correlated with minority aid, but the relationship is not statistically significant for a group of this size.

The data in table 5 potentially overestimate the importance of the three variables associated with minority aid. Most higher status respondents employed in the knowledge and health industry are professionals and have received an advanced education. The bivariate associations with minority aid for education, occupation, and sector are partially redundant. Therefore, forward multiple regression is used to determine which, if any, have a unique association with issue position. The regression equation includes respondents' class, education, family income, and dummy variables indicating whether they are professionals, in the knowledge or health industries and employed in the nonprofit sector. The right half of table 3 shows the results. Only statistically significant Beta weights are presented. The analysis explains very little variance in issues positions in the highest stratum: 7% for general aid and 9% for minority aid. As before, class is the only variable to have a significant unique association with general aid (.18). Education has the largest unique association with minority aid (-.17). Once education is controlled, occupation and industry add nothing significant to the explanation.¹¹ None of the relationships are very strong. In short, occupation, class

¹¹Several additional models were tested for minority aid, but none improved on the equation in table 3. For example, a dummy variable identifying the "New Class" (college educated professionals in the knowledge and health care industries) and an interaction term estimating the joint effects of class and status both have significant bivariate correlations with minority aid, but they are not appreciably greater than the correlation found for education alone. College education provides the most parsimonious explanation.

and status variables fail to account for the discord within the upper stratum. Partisan polarization among high status respondents remains a mystery.

CONCLUSION

This paper shows the size and nature of the relationship between social stratification and liberal-conservative thinking depends on how the concepts are conceived and measured. Both concepts are multidimensional. A disregard for distinct dimensions can contribute to conflicting and incommensurable views of what are a variety of relationships between different types of strata and ideology. Disagreements between 'class' polarization and 'class' inversion theorists can be largely explained in these terms. Most prior research has measured "class" with status indicators. This study measures two types of stratification—status and class—and estimates their effects on attitudes toward government aid to minorities and general social welfare. The results indicate that what appear to be contradictory theories are compatible arguments—one based on class and the other on status.

Strata indicators have intricate relationships with attitudes towards government aid, depending on the type of issue—occupation, party identification, and race. Black respondents are far more liberal than whites on equity issues, regardless of their status or class. Among whites, there is a distinct status inversion, but it is limited to the issue of minority aid. Higher status Democrats are the most liberal. A status polarization exists for Republicans on general aid where highest status respondents are the most conservative. Class indicators generally distinguish an economically liberal lower stratum from a conservative upper stratum. High status employees who have no supervisory responsibilities at their place of work are the most supportive of government aid. Well educated professionals in the knowledge and health industries are the most liberal. They are generally Democratic. Those most opposed to aid are high status owners who identify with the Republican party. Supervisors are more liberal than owners—but significantly more conservative than nonsupervisors. Among the most liberal elements of the upper stratum, greater support is expressed for minority aid than general welfare. It appears they conceive of government largess more as a way to help specific groups with a clear history of discrimination (the "deserving poor") than as a device for redistributing income or reducing social inequalities generally.

Together class and status offer a better explanation of issue positions than does either alone. They help account for the apparent discrepancy between strata polarization and strata inversion theories. With party identification and race, they explain a good deal of the variance in issue orientations. These relationships are complex and in need of further study.

Much more pronounced than either strata inversion or strata polarization is the partisan polarization within the upper stratum. Higher status Republi-

cans are opposed to government aid. Most higher status Democrats approve of it. Multiple indicators of status, class, and occupation explain only a fraction of this disparity. Additional research using better measures of status and class and more sophisticated models for estimating their effect is needed.¹ For now, the social bases of the ideological divide separating Democrats from Republicans remains a mystery.

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¹The reason party identification is by far the best predictor of attitudes toward government aid can be attributed to the influence of ideology on one's choice of parties. However, this does not explain why Republicans and Democrats of the same strata have diverse ideological orientations. The inclusion of other, noneconomic variables (like region and religion) might provide more precise estimates of the effects of class and status (Verba et al. 1976, chap. 14). Another problem is measurement. This paper examines only one type of economic issue—government aid to disadvantaged groups. Different results are possible for issues dealing with government regulation of businesses, taxes, or trade policies. Random measurement error is a serious limitation in all survey research. For example, the estimated variance explained for total aid in table 4 increases from .31 to .74 with a correction for attenuation (the ratio of R to the alpha coefficient for total aid).

More sophisticated measures are needed for strata and occupation. I assessed status/class inconsistencies but not status inconsistencies (e.g., high education combined with modest income). It was easier to distinguish private from public sector jobs in 1984 than 1980. A measure of a Liberal Arts college education should provide a stronger estimate than a general college education. As indicated in footnote 8, a larger sample and better survey questions would contribute to a more precise measure of class. Finally, there is the problem of how to measure class for members of dual wage earner families. The ideal study would combine class estimates for both wage earners. However, this would cause problems of class inconsistency (where members of the same family have different relations to their places of work). In this paper, I relied on respondents' occupation. However, the analysis was replicated for the head of the household occupations with somewhat weaker results. This is consistent with the fact that, in cases where only the head is employed and he or she is not the person interviewed, the effects of work experiences on respondents' attitudes are indirect.

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Research Notes

Do Incumbent Campaign Expenditures Matter?

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Previous research reached the puzzling conclusion that an incumbent cannot increase his vote by increasing his campaign expenditures. This paper reexamines the finding by developing theory of campaign expenditures. The theory is then used to specify an econometric model. Previous studies did not develop a theory prior to specifying their econometric models. The new empirical results demonstrate that, in most races, incumbent expenditures do matter.

The 398 members of the U.S. House of Representatives who ran for reelection in 1980 spent almost \$70 million defending their seats. The literature on the effect of incumbent expenditures concludes that incumbent expenditures do not matter (Glantz, Abramowitz, and Burkhart 1976; Jacobson 1978; Silberman and Yochum 1978; Welch 1981; Jacobson 1985). This result seems puzzling given the enormous size of incumbent spending. Even Jacobson, the author of the most widely cited paper,¹ writes, "No matter how the data are analyzed . . . one finding remains undisturbed: incumbents gain nothing in the way of votes by spending money in campaigns. *The trouble is that no one—most particularly the incumbents themselves—really believes it. Nor, I think, should they.*" (Jacobson 1985: 41, emphasis added). The purpose of this paper is to reexamine this finding.

Jacobson (1978) estimated an econometric model to determine the effect of incumbent campaign expenditures. He regressed the challenger's percentage of the two-party vote on the challenger's campaign expenditures, the incumbent's campaign expenditures, the challenger's party affiliation, and the

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¹Jacobson (1985) provides an extensive survey of the literature.

²Jones (1981), Yiammakis (1981), Ragsdale (1983), Goldenberg and Frangott (1984), and Uhlaner and Schlozman (1986) are among the authors who cite Jacobson's 1978 paper.

challenger's party strength in the district. The ordinary least-squares results for the 1972 and 1974 U.S. House of Representatives general elections showed that the estimated regression coefficients for the incumbent's campaign expenditures were small in magnitude and not always statistically significant. This led Jacobson to conclude that incumbent expenditures do not matter. His reestimation of the model using two-stage least-squares supported the finding.

Jacobson did not develop a theory of campaign expenditures prior to specifying his econometric model. This means his model may have missed some explanatory variables or used a faulty functional form. This paper differs from Jacobson's study by developing a theory of campaign expenditures prior to specifying its econometric model.

THEORY FOR RACES INVOLVING AN INCUMBENT

Assume that all constituents vote, that there are only two candidates (a challenger and an incumbent), and that the candidates spend their money on two types of advertisements (negative advertisements and rebuttals to negative advertisements). The theory focuses on negative advertisements since incumbents are likely to lose if voters form negative impressions of them (Monroe 1979).

Assume that only the challenger sends negative advertisements, and that the incumbent sends rebuttals. This assumption recognizes that most challengers have never held public office before, in contrast, incumbents have track records that they are likely to stand on and emphasize. This assumption implies that only the constituents who initially intend to vote for the incumbent will be affected by the advertisements. That is, a constituent who initially intends to vote for the challenger will not be affected by an advertisement that criticizes the incumbent.

Assume that if no advertisements are sent, then the constituents will decide who to vote for based on party loyalty, incumbent constituency service, incumbent name recognition, newspaper endorsements, etc. Also assume that if a constituent initially intends to vote for the incumbent and if the constituent receives a negative advertisement, then the constituent's probability of voting for the challenger will increase, if the constituent receives a rebuttal to the negative advertisement, then the constituent's probability of voting for the challenger will decrease.

This last assumption implies that a rebuttal will only affect a constituent if the constituent has already received at least one negative advertisement. That is, if a constituent has not received an advertisement criticizing the incumbent, then a rebuttal addressing the criticism will have no effect.

Finally, assume that the probability of receiving any given advertisement

is less than one. This assumption is realistic since most advertisements are sent through the mail or through newspapers. That is, most people do not read each piece of mail or each newspaper that they receive. This assumption is crucial for showing that campaign expenditures exhibit diminishing returns.⁴

The above assumptions imply that the election outcome depends, in part, on campaign expenditures.⁵ Since I have postulated that there is a one-to-one relationship between a candidate's campaign expenditures and the number of advertisements that he sends, I can determine the effect of campaign expenditures by determining the effect of advertisements.

If the challenger sends some negative advertisements and the incumbent sends some rebuttals, then some of the constituents will intend to vote for the challenger and some of the constituents will intend to vote for the incumbent. If the challenger sends an additional negative advertisement, then some of the constituents who initially intended to vote for the incumbent will receive this advertisement. Since the reception of an additional negative advertisement increases a constituent's probability of voting for the challenger, this will cause some of the constituents who initially intended to vote for the incumbent to vote for the challenger. This means a challenger can increase his percentage of the two-party vote (CV) by increasing his campaign expenditures, i.e. $\partial CV / \partial CE > 0$.

If the challenger continues to send additional negative advertisements, then each additional advertisement will cause some of the constituents who initially intended to vote for the incumbent to vote for the challenger. Since the number of constituents who initially intended to vote for the incumbent and who have not yet received a negative advertisement decreases with each additional negative advertisement, the challenger will pick up fewer and fewer new supporters with each advertisement. This means that the challenger's campaign expenditures exhibit diminishing returns, i.e. $\partial^2 CV / \partial CE^2 < 0$.

If the challenger sends some negative advertisements and the incumbent sends some rebuttals, then some of the constituents who initially intended to vote for the incumbent will receive at least one negative advertisement. If no

⁴This assumption can apply more widely. For example, most people do not see every television advertisement.

⁵If I assume that the change in the probability of voting for the challenger diminishes with additional advertisements, then this assumption is no longer crucial for showing that campaign expenditures exhibit diminishing returns.

⁶My assumptions are consistent with the standard Downsian model that candidates simply pick issue positions to maximize vote support (Downs 1957, Davis, Hinkley, and Ordeshook 1970, Aldrich 1983), as well as with the new Downsian models that recognize that candidates may have to precommit in order to win their primaries (Aldrich 1983) or because they have specific preferences as well as an interest in winning per se (Wattman 1983).

additional rebuttals are sent, then this will cause some of these constituents to vote for the challenger. But if the incumbent sends an additional rebuttal then some of these constituents will receive the rebuttal. Since the reception of an additional rebuttal decreases a constituent's probability of voting for the challenger, this will cause some of these constituents to once again vote for the incumbent.

If, on the other hand, the challenger sends no negative advertisements and the incumbent sends some rebuttals, then an additional rebuttal will not cause any of the constituents to change their votes. This is because an additional rebuttal will only be effective if the constituent has already received at least one negative advertisement. Thus, an incumbent can usually increase his percentage of the two-party vote by increasing his campaign expenditures, i.e., $\partial CV / \partial IE \geq 0$.

If the challenger sends some negative advertisements and if the incumbent continues to send additional rebuttals, then each additional rebuttal will cause fewer and fewer constituents to change their votes. If, on the other hand, the challenger sends no negative advertisements, then each additional rebuttal will have no effect. This means the incumbent's campaign expenditures usually exhibit diminishing returns, i.e., $\partial^2 CV / \partial IE^2 \leq 0$.

If the incumbent sends an additional rebuttal, then the effectiveness of the rebuttal will depend on how many negative advertisements the challenger has sent. This is because the number of constituents that can be affected by the additional rebuttal increases the more negative advertisements that have been sent. This means an increase in the challenger's campaign expenditures will increase the effectiveness of additional incumbent campaign expenditures, i.e., $\partial^2 CV / \partial IE \partial CE < 0$.

Finally, if the challenger and the incumbent both send the same number of advertisements, then an additional negative advertisement will be more effective than an additional rebuttal. This is because the additional rebuttal can only affect the subset of the constituents that have already received the negative advertisements, while the additional negative advertisement can affect all of the constituents. This means that, in general, additional challenger campaign expenditures will be more effective than additional incumbent campaign expenditures, i.e., $|\partial CV / \partial CE| > |\partial CV / \partial IE|$.

ECONOMETRIC MODEL

Although the theoretical section predicts the signs and magnitudes of the partial derivatives of CV with respect to CE and IE , it does not predict the exact functional form of the econometric model. This is because many functional forms fit the known information. One such functional form is

$$CV = a + b_1 CE + b_2 IE + b_3 SHARE + b_4 P + b_5 CPS + e \quad (1)$$

where

CV is the challenger's percentage of the two-party vote⁹

CE is the challenger's spending in thousands of dollars¹⁰

IE is the incumbent's spending in thousands of dollars

SHARE is the challenger's percentage of total expenditures, i.e.
 $[CE/(CE + IE)] \cdot 100$

P is the challenger's party (1 if Democratic, 0 if Republican)

CPS is the challenger's party strength in the district¹¹

a is the intercept, the *b*'s regression coefficients and

e is the stochastic disturbance term

The only difference between equation 1 and Jacobson's specification is that the variable *SHARE* has been added.¹² But this is a big difference. For without the variable *SHARE*, the second partial derivatives and the cross partial derivative would all equal zero.¹³

To evaluate the first partial derivatives, I need to differentiate equation 1 with respect to *CE* and *IE*. Doing so gives

$$\partial CV / \partial CE = b_1 + b_3 100 [IE / (CE + IE)^2] \quad (2)$$

and

$$\partial CV / \partial IE = b_2 - b_3 100 [CE / (CE + IE)^2] \quad (3)$$

Equations 2 and 3 show that the signs of the first partial derivatives depend on the regression coefficients for *CE*, *IE*, and *SHARE*. If the regression coefficients for *CE* and *SHARE* are both positive and if the regression coefficient for *IE* is negative, then the first partial derivatives will have the predicted signs.

The second partial derivatives can be evaluated by differentiating equations 2 and 3 with respect to *CE* and *IE*. Doing so gives

$$\partial^2 CV / \partial CE^2 = -2b_3 100 [IE / (CE + IE)^3] \quad (4)$$

⁹Election data comes from Scammon and McGivary (1981).

¹⁰Campaign expenditure data comes from the Federal Election Commission and is adjusted to 1980 dollars.

¹¹The vote of the candidate running under the challenger's party affiliation in the previous election was used as a proxy for this variable.

¹²Jacobson (1976) regressed *CV* on *CE* and *SHARE*. My new specification differs from Jacobson's previous ones (1976 and 1978) by including all three expenditure variables in the same model. Since *SHARE* is *not* an exact linear combination of *CE* and *IE*, it is valid to include all three variables in the same regression.

¹³Another reasonable specification that allows the second partial derivatives and the cross partial derivative to differ from zero replaces the variable *SHARE* with the following three variables: the challenger's spending squared, the incumbent's spending squared, and the challenger's spending times the incumbent's spending. Unfortunately, the estimate of this specification resulted in severe multicollinearity making it impossible to test the signs of the partial derivatives.

and

$$\partial^2 CV / \partial IE^2 = 2b_1 100 \{ CE / (CE + IE)^3 \} \quad (5)$$

Equations 4 and 5 show that the signs of the second partial derivatives depend on the regression coefficient for *SHARE*. If this regression coefficient is positive, then the second partial derivatives will have the predicted signs.

The cross partial derivative can be evaluated by differentiating equation 3 with respect to *CE*. Doing so gives

$$\partial^2 CV / \partial IE \partial CE = b_1 100 \{ (CE - IE) / (CE + IE)^3 \} \quad (6)$$

Equation 6 shows that the cross partial derivative will have the predicted sign if the regression coefficient for *SHARE* is positive and if *IE* is larger than *CE*.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Equation 1 was estimated for the 1978 and 1980 U.S. House of Representatives general elections using ordinary least-squares.^{11, 12} The empirical results, listed in table 1, show that the estimated regression coefficients for *IE* and *SHARE* are positive and statistically significant. They also show that the estimated regression coefficients for *CE* are positive and statistically insignificant.

Although the estimated regression coefficients for *CE* are statistically insignificant, the variable should not be dropped from the model. The high *R*'s for *CE* regressed on the other explanatory variables suggest that a multicollinearity problem exists.¹³ This means the variable's insignificance may be due to the multicollinearity problem and not to lack of causality.

The empirical results (see the appendix for details) support the conclusion that a challenger can increase his vote by increasing his campaign expenditures, i.e., the estimated value of $\partial CV / \partial CE$ is positive. Similarly, the empirical results support the claim that an incumbent can usually increase his vote by increasing his campaign expenditures. The estimated value of $\partial CV / \partial IE$ is positive (and essentially equal to zero) only in races where the challenger spends either no money or so little money that there are no vote

¹¹ Following Jacobson I have only included electoral races in which the incumbent faced a major party challenger in the current and in the previous election.

¹² To examine whether the ordinary least-squares estimates suffer from a simultaneity problem I ran a Hausman test (see Kmenta 1986). The instruments that I used for the Hausman test were the ones proposed by Jacobson (1978). The results of the Hausman test do not support the conclusion that the ordinary least-squares estimates suffer from a simultaneity problem.

¹³ The *R*'s for *CE* regressed on the other explanatory variables are .76 for 1978 and .80 for 1980. Since these *R*'s are greater than the *R*'s for the overall regressions it appears that a multicollinearity problem exists (Klein 1962).

TABLE 1
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS CV

Explanatory Variables	Coefficients/ <i>t</i> statistics	
	1978 Election	1980 Election
Constant	11.36 (7.994)	14.95 (11.35)
<i>CE</i>	0.121 (1.709)	0.004 (0.548)
<i>IE</i>	0.151 (2.896)	0.106 (3.379)
<i>SHARE</i>	1.559 (7.065)	2.650 (5.969)
<i>P</i>	-1.682 (-2.068)	-3.521 (-4.615)
<i>CPS</i>	4.410 (10.47)	3.523 (5.539)
<i>R</i> ²	0.625	0.6989
<i>F</i> statistic	111.9	137.9
Observations	291	303

losses among the incumbent's supporters to be offset. This is consistent with the theory.¹⁴

The empirical results support the conclusion that challenger and incumbent campaign expenditures exhibit diminishing returns, i.e., the estimated regression coefficients for *SHARE* are positive. The empirical results also show that an increase in the challenger's campaign expenditures increases the effectiveness of additional incumbent campaign expenditures. The estimated value of $\partial^2 CV / \partial IE \partial CE$ is positive (and essentially equal to zero) only in races where the challenger outspends the incumbent by a wide margin. This is also consistent with the theory.¹⁵

Finally, the empirical results support my claim that, in general, additional challenger campaign expenditures are more effective than additional incumbent campaign expenditures. The estimated value of $|\partial CV / \partial IE|$ is greater than the estimated value of $|\partial CV / \partial CE|$ only in races where the challenger outspends the incumbent by a wide margin.

¹⁴If the incumbent sends many more advertisements than the challenger, then constituents will receive many more rebuttals than negative advertisements. This means the effect of sending an additional rebuttal should be very small.

¹⁵If the challenger has sent many negative advertisements, then most constituents will have received many negative advertisements. This means the number of constituents that can be affected by an additional rebuttal will remain just about the same regardless of whether the challenger sends an additional negative advertisement.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Jacobson studied the effects of the major public financing bill before the House in the Ninety-fifth Congress. This bill (HR 5157) would have imposed a ceiling of \$150 thousand on general election expenditures, and would have provided partial public funding of up to \$50 thousand on a matching basis. Jacobson found that the bill would have had differing effects. In 1972 it would have hurt challengers, and in 1974 it would have helped them.

I studied the effects of HR 5157 by adjusting each candidate's expenditures to meet the conditions of the bill. The expenditures were adjusted by doubling the candidate's expenditures if they were less than or equal to \$50 thousand, by adding \$50 thousand to the candidate's expenditures if they were greater than \$50 thousand but less than or equal to \$100 thousand, or by setting the candidate's expenditures to \$150 thousand if they were greater than \$100 thousand.

After adjusting the expenditures, I used the empirical results in table 1 to forecast the challenger's percentage of the two-party vote (CV). By comparing the forecasted values of CV with the actual values of CV, I found that if the bill had become public law prior to the 1978 election, then only one of the 19 challengers who won in 1978 would have still won and only one of the 30 challengers who won in 1980 would have still won.

The major campaign reform bill before the House in the Ninety-sixth Congress (HR 4970) would have limited the amount of contributions that a House candidate could receive from political action committees (PAC's). The bill stated that a candidate could not receive more than \$100 thousand from PACs during an election cycle.

I studied the effects of HR 4970 by also adjusting each candidate's expenditures to meet the conditions of the bill. The expenditures were adjusted by subtracting the party committee contributions (5% and 4% of total contributions in 1978 and 1980 respectively) and the individual contributions (61% and 67% of total contributions in 1978 and 1980 respectively) from the candidate's total contributions, and then reducing the remaining sum if it exceeded \$100 thousand.

After adjusting the expenditures, I once again used the empirical results in table 1 to forecast CV. By comparing the forecasted values of CV with the actual values of CV, I found that if the bill had become public law prior to the 1978 election, then only 13 of the 19 challengers who won in 1978 would have still won and only 19 of the 30 challengers who won in 1980 would have still won.

SUMMARY

This paper develops and tests a theory of negative advertising to examine whether incumbent campaign expenditures matter. The econometric model

is estimated for the 1978 and 1980 U S House of Representatives general elections. The ordinary least-squares results show that, as common sense would suggest but unlike the findings of previous research, an incumbent can usually increase his vote by increasing his campaign expenditures. The only situation in which I found no effect of increased incumbent expenditures is when the challenger spends next to nothing (either absolutely or relatively). This supports my claim that the principal effect of incumbent spending is to win back voters who would have voted for the incumbent in the absence of the receipt of challenger (negative) advertisements.

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APPENDIX

Equation 2 shows that the estimated sign of $\partial CV / \partial CE$ depends on the estimated regression coefficients for CE and $SHARE$. Although the estimated regression coefficients are positive, the estimated sign of $\partial CV / \partial CE$ may not be positive. This is because the estimated value of $\partial CV / \partial CE$ may not be significantly different from zero.

To determine whether the estimated value of $\partial CV / \partial CE$ is significantly different from zero, proceed in two steps. First, calculate a point estimate of $\partial CV / \partial CE$ for each and every race. The point estimates are calculated by substituting the actual values of CE and II into equation 2. Second, calculate a t -statistic for each point estimate. The t -statistics are calculated by dividing the point estimates by their standard errors.

The calculations show that each point estimate of $\partial CV / \partial CE$ is positive and significantly different from zero at the 5% level. This means the empirical results support the conclusion that a challenger can increase his vote by increasing his campaign expenditures.

Equation 3 shows that the estimated sign of $\partial CF / \partial IF$ depends on the estimated regression coefficients for IF and $SHARE$. Since the estimated regression coefficients are positive, the estimated sign of $\partial CV / \partial IF$ may be positive. To determine whether the estimated sign is positive, I calculated a point estimate of $\partial CV / \partial IF$ for each and every race.

The calculations show that the point estimates of $\partial CV / \partial IF$ are negative for 191 of 291 races in 1978, and for 212 of 303 races in 1980. The calculations also show that in the races where the point estimates of $\partial CV / \partial IF$ are negative, the absolute value of $\partial CV / \partial IF$ averaged .04 for 1978 and .035 for 1980. In the races where the point estimates of $\partial CV / \partial IF$ are positive, the effect is much smaller; the absolute value of $\partial CV / \partial IF$ only averages .01 for 1978 and .008 for 1980. Finally, the calculations show that the point estimates of $\partial CV / \partial IF$ are positive in only two types of races: those races where CE is zero, and those races where IF is large and $SHARE$ is small. In the second type of

aces *IE* averaged 464 for 1978 and 903 for 1980, and *SHARE* averaged 17 for 1978 and 16 for 1980. In the races where the point estimates of $\partial CV/\partial IE$ are negative *IE* averaged 149 for 1978 and 241 for 1980, and *SHARE* averaged 39 for 1978 and 35 for 1980.

Although it is puzzling that the point estimates of $\partial CV/\partial IE$ are ever positive, it is not of major concern. This is because the result only occurs when the absolute value of the point estimates is small, and *CE* equals zero or *IE* is large and *SHARE* is small. That is, additional incumbent campaign expenditures are supposed to be ineffective when the challenger is spending no money or when the incumbent is already outspending the challenger by a wide margin.

To determine whether the negative point estimates of $\partial CV/\partial IE$ are significantly different from zero, I calculated a *t*-statistic for each point estimate. The calculations show that 153 of the 191 negative point estimates in 1978 are significantly different from zero, and that 193 of the 212 negative point estimates in 1980 are significantly different from zero. This means the empirical results support the conclusion that an incumbent can usually increase his vote by increasing his campaign expenditures.

Equation 6 shows that the estimated sign of $\partial^2 CV/\partial IE \partial CE$ depends on the estimated regression coefficients for *SHARE* and on the actual values of *CE* and *IE*. To determine whether the estimated sign of $\partial^2 CV/\partial IE \partial CE$ is negative, I calculated a point estimate of $\partial^2 CV/\partial IE \partial CE$ for each and every race.

The calculations show that the point estimates of $\partial^2 CV/\partial IE \partial CE$ are negative for 236 of 291 races in 1978, and for 254 of 303 races in 1980. The calculations also show that in the races where the point estimates of $\partial^2 CV/\partial IE \partial CE$ are negative the absolute value of $\partial^2 CV/\partial IE \partial CE$ averaged .006 for 1978 and .005 for 1980. In the races where the point estimates of $\partial^2 CV/\partial IE \partial CE$ are positive, the effect is much smaller, the absolute value of $\partial^2 CV/\partial IE \partial CE$ only averaged .0007 for 1978 and .00006 for 1980. Finally, the calculations show that the point estimates of $\partial^2 CV/\partial IE \partial CE$ are only positive when *CE* and *SHARE* are large. In the races where the point estimates of $\partial^2 CV/\partial IE \partial CE$ are positive *CE* averaged 208 for 1978 and 318 for 1980, and *SHARE* averaged 61 for 1978 and 61 for 1980. In the races where the point estimates of $\partial^2 CV/\partial IE \partial CE$ are negative *CE* averaged 46 for 1978 and 65 for 1980 and *SHARE* averaged 20 for 1978 and 19 for 1980.

Although, once again, it is puzzling that the point estimates of $\partial^2 CV/\partial IE \partial CE$ are ever positive, it is not of major concern. This is because the result only occurs when the absolute value of the point estimates are small and when *CE* and *SHARE* are large. That is, if the challenger is already outspending the incumbent by a wide margin, then an increase in the challenger's campaign expenditures should not increase the effectiveness of additional incumbent expenditures.

To determine whether the negative point estimates of $\partial^2 CV / \partial IE \partial CE$ are significantly different from zero, I calculated a t -statistic for each and every point estimate. The calculations show that all of the negative point estimates are significantly different from zero. This means the empirical results support the conclusion that an increase in the challenger's campaign expenditures increases the effectiveness of additional incumbent campaign expenditures.

Comparison of the absolute values of the point estimates for $\partial CV / \partial CE$ and $\partial CV / \partial IE$ shows that the absolute value of $\partial CV / \partial CE$ is greater than the absolute value of $\partial CV / \partial IE$ for 277 of 291 races in 1978 and for 279 of 303 races in 1980. The only time the absolute value of the point estimate for $\partial CV / \partial IE$ is greater is when CE and $SHARL$ are large. This means the empirical results support the conclusion that, in general, additional challenger campaign expenditures are more effective than additional incumbent campaign expenditures.

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Viability, Electability, and Candidate Choice in a Presidential Primary Election: A Test of Competing Models

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Using data from an exit poll, this paper tests three models of voter decision making in a presidential primary: a simple candidate preference model, a bandwagon model, and an expected utility model. For both Republican and white Democratic primary voters, the data support the expected utility model. In choosing a candidate for their party's nomination, Republican and Democratic primary voters weighed electability in addition to their general evaluations of the candidates. Opinions about electability were, in turn, strongly influenced by perceptions of candidates' nomination prospects. Thus, viability had an important, but indirect, influence on voter decision making.

A presidential primary election presents voters with a decision-making context which differs sharply from that of a general election or even another type of primary election. Perhaps the most important difference between presidential primaries and other types of primary elections is the fact that presidential primaries involve a series of separate contests spread over several months. Thus, the results of early contests, and the way these results are interpreted by the media, can influence voters in later contests. The New Hampshire primary and, in recent years, the Iowa precinct caucuses, have been considered especially significant in this regard because they are the first major events of the nominating campaign, and they receive extremely heavy coverage from the news media (Orren and Polsby 1987).

The sequential character of the presidential nominating process and the intense coverage which the news media devote to Iowa and New Hampshire have led to a great deal of speculation about the significance of momentum in presidential nominating campaigns. By winning or doing "better than expected" in Iowa and New Hampshire, a presidential candidate is said to gain momentum in subsequent contests. Thus, in 1976 Jimmy Carter, a little known ex-Governor of Georgia, finished first in Iowa and New Hampshire and went on to win the Democratic nomination. Eight years later Gary Hart emerged from obscurity to challenge Walter Mondale for the Democratic

nomination on the basis of a "surprisingly strong" second place finish in Iowa and a victory in New Hampshire

Momentum is widely regarded as a major factor in the presidential nominating process. However, very little is known about why momentum is important or how it affects voter decision making in primary elections. In fact there has been almost no systematic research on voter decision making in primaries. A few studies have analyzed citizens' pre-nomination candidate preferences. Bartels (1985), using data from the preconvention waves of the 1980 National Election Study, found a reciprocal relationship between citizens' expectations about the outcome of the nominating process and their candidate preference. The effect of expectations on preferences appeared to be strongest during the early stages of the nominating campaign.

Several recent studies have used data from the NES 1984 "rolling cross section" survey to analyze pre-nomination candidate preferences. Abramowitz (1987), Bartels (1987), and Brady and Johnston (1987) all found that opinions about Gary Hart's and Walter Mondale's chances of winning the Democratic nomination had a significant influence on citizens' candidate preferences. Evaluations of Hart's nomination prospects and support for his candidacy both increased dramatically after his victory over Mondale in New Hampshire.

These findings appear to be consistent with the momentum hypothesis. However, the findings from the "rolling cross-section" survey may have reflected circumstances peculiar to the 1984 Democratic campaign - the fact that Gary Hart was largely unknown before the Iowa and New Hampshire contests may have magnified the impact of his early successes in those states. Moreover, none of these studies involved actual primary voters. Voters in a state holding a primary election may have a fuller opportunity to evaluate the entire field of candidates than citizens in states where the candidates have not been campaigning. Direct exposure to the candidates and their campaigns may reduce the impact of momentum on primary voters.


THREE MODELS OF VOTER DECISION MAKING IN PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES

This paper will consider three models of voter decision making in presidential primaries. In each model, the dependent variable is the voter's candidate preference (Choice), the independent variables are the voter's overall evaluations of the major candidates (Candidate Evaluation), the voter's perceptions of the candidates' chances of receiving their party's nomination (Viability), and the voter's perceptions of the candidates' chances of winning the November election (Electability).


Although many other variables, including social background characteristics and policy preferences, may have affected voters' decisions in the primary, previous research on voting behavior in general elections has shown

FIGURE 1
THREE MODELS OF VOTER DECISION
MAKING IN PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES


A Simple Candidate Choice Model



B Bandwagon Model



C Expected Utility Model



that the effects of these additional variables are almost entirely indirect—mediated by evaluations of the candidates (Markus and Converse 1979; Markus 1982). There is no reason to expect candidate evaluations to play a less central role in voter decision making in primary elections. In fact, given the absence of partisan cues, candidates are probably even more salient in primaries than in general elections. As long as the effects of social background characteristics and policy preferences are mediated by candidate evaluations, then leaving these variables out of the analysis should not bias our estimates of the effects of the variables included in the model.

All three models assume that voters engage in wishful thinking—opinions about the candidates' chances of winning the nomination and the general election are based in part on voters' evaluations of the candidates. However, opinions about the candidates' nomination prospects should also reflect the

results of earlier primaries and the media's interpretations of these results. All three models also assume that judgments about electability are influenced by voters' opinions about the candidates' nomination prospects. The most direct evidence that voters have available about a candidate's ability to wage an effective general election campaign is his or her ability to wage an effective pre-nomination campaign. Therefore, a candidate who does well or better than expected in the early primaries and caucuses will probably be viewed as more electable than a candidate who does poorly or worse than expected (see Aldrich 1980, 80–82).

The first model of voter decision making which will be considered in this paper is a simple candidate preference model. According to this model, opinions about the candidates' nomination chances and electability have no effects on voters' candidate preferences (see figure 1). Voters choose the candidate they evaluate most positively, and they also tend to assume that the candidate they like best is the one most likely to win the nomination and the general election. In this model, the results of earlier primaries and caucuses and media coverage of these results are important only if they influence voters' evaluations of the candidates.

The second model which will be considered in this paper is a bandwagon model. According to this model, opinions about the candidates' nomination chances directly influence voters' candidate preferences, but opinions regarding electability have no effect on candidate preferences. The motivational assumption underlying this model is that voters want to be on the winning side in the nominating campaign because supporting a winner is intrinsically more enjoyable than supporting a loser. However, voters in this model are concerned exclusively about the nominating stage of the presidential selection process—they do not weigh electability as a separate criterion in choosing a candidate.

The third model which will be considered in this paper is an expected utility model. According to this model, primary voters weigh electability along with their evaluations of the candidates in making a choice. The assumption underlying this model is that primary voters are rational actors who seek to maximize their expected utility (Aldrich 1980, 80–82). Candidate evaluations, in this model, represent voters' assessments of the utility which they would obtain if the candidates were elected to the presidency. Therefore, these evaluations must be discounted by the subjective probability of each candidate winning the general election. The results of earlier primaries and caucuses are important primarily because they provide evidence about the candidates' chances of winning the general election.

Data and Methodology

The data used to test these three models of voter decision making are from an exit poll of presidential primary voters conducted in Dekalb County

Georgia, on March 8, 1988. Self-administered questionnaires were completed by 451 Democratic and Republican primary voters at 13 randomly selected precincts. Of the 451 respondents in the exit poll, 278 reported voting in the Democratic primary and 173 reported voting in the Republican primary. Despite the relatively small size of this sample of primary voters, the candidate preferences of the respondents in the exit poll came very close to matching the preferences of all Democratic and Republican primary voters in DeKalb County. More detailed information about the procedures used to conduct the exit poll and the validity of the sample are provided in appendix A.

For the purpose of analyzing voting behavior in a primary election, an exit poll has several major advantages over conventional survey techniques. It is possible to measure candidate preferences and other attitudes immediately after voters have cast their ballots, before these attitudes are contaminated by information about the results of the primary. Conventional survey techniques (either telephone or personal interviews) require that citizens be interviewed either before the primary, when they may not have reached a final decision, or after the primary, when their attitudes may have been modified by exposure to information about the results of the primary. This problem is especially serious when it comes to measuring voters' opinions about candidates' nomination prospects and electability. In addition, all of the respondents in an exit poll are actual primary voters. With conventional survey techniques, it is necessary to determine which respondents are likely to vote or, in a post-election survey, which respondents actually did vote. Since the level of voter turnout in presidential primary elections is usually quite low (averaging less than one-third of the voting age population in recent years), the task of identifying actual voters in a cross-sectional survey is quite problematic.

The principal drawback of exit poll data is that the number of questions which can be asked is very limited, and the questions must be kept very simple so that voters can complete the questionnaire in a few minutes. In addition to asking respondents which candidate they voted for in the primary, the DeKalb County Exit Poll included questions asking voters for an overall evaluation of each major candidate in both parties, and for their opinions about which candidates had the best chance of winning the Democratic and Republican nominations, and which candidate in each party had the best chance of winning the November election if nominated by his party. These questions were used to analyze the effects of candidate evaluations, momentum, and electability on voting decisions in the primary.

Path regression analysis was used to test the three models of momentum in a presidential primary. The advantage of path analysis is that the direct

¹See appendix A for the wording of each of these questions, and the coding procedures used in the regression analyses.

and indirect effects of candidate evaluations, viability, and electability on candidate choice can be estimated (Asher 1976). Although the use of a dichotomous dependent variable violates some of the assumptions of regression analysis, the consequences of these violations are generally not severe unless the dependent variable has a very skewed distribution (Aldrich and Cnudde 1975). Since this was not the case, ordinary regression analysis was used to estimate the effects of our independent variables. Discriminant analyses of candidate preference were conducted for both Democratic and Republican primary voters, and the results were very similar to those of the regression analyses. These results are summarized in appendix B.

The Setting: Super Tuesday

On March 8, 1988, presidential primaries were held in 15 southern and border states, including Georgia, along with several states outside of the South. The brainchild of a group of moderate southern Democratic party leaders, "Super Tuesday" was designed to attract more attention to the South from the presidential candidates and to improve the prospects of a moderate candidate in the Democratic party. The Super Tuesday primaries were the first major campaign event following the New Hampshire primary, which was held on February 16. Thus, it should be possible to analyze the impact of the New Hampshire results on Super Tuesday primary voters.

The New Hampshire primary reestablished George Bush as the frontrunner for the Republican presidential nomination following a poor third-place finish in the Iowa precinct caucuses. Pre-Iowa polls had shown Bush with a huge lead over Robert Dole and Pat Robertson in New Hampshire. Following Dole's victory in Iowa, however, the polls and pundits generally portrayed the New Hampshire race as a toss-up between Bush and Dole. Although Bush's eight percentage point margin over Dole was actually much smaller than his earlier lead in the polls, the New Hampshire result was widely interpreted by the news media as a major disappointment and setback to Dole's campaign. In fact, Dole's campaign never recovered from his loss in New Hampshire. On Saturday, March 5, just three days before Super Tuesday, George Bush won a decisive victory over Robert Dole and Pat Robertson in the South Carolina Republican primary. On Super Tuesday, Bush won every Republican primary and virtually clinched the GOP nomination.

Michael Dukakis had been viewed as the early favorite in the New Hampshire Democratic primary because of his position as the governor of neighboring Massachusetts. However, after Dukakis finished third in Iowa behind Richard Gephardt and Paul Simon, there was some question about his ability to maintain his lead in New Hampshire. Dukakis' decisive victory in New Hampshire, combined with a huge financial and organizational advantage over the other Democratic candidates, established him as the Democratic

frontrunner going into Super Tuesday. Dukakis' position as the Democratic frontrunner was rather tenuous however. His ability to appeal to voters in the South was uncertain, and he faced two additional candidates on Super Tuesday who had not been major factors in Iowa and New Hampshire: Jesse Jackson and Albert Gore, Jr. The outcome of Super Tuesday on the Democratic side was a three-way split in both the popular vote and the delegate race among Dukakis, Jackson, and Gore. However, by finishing first in Texas and Florida and by maintaining his overall lead in delegates, Michael Dukakis probably solidified his position as the frontrunner for the Democratic nomination.

Results

There was a three-way split among Democratic primary voters in the exit poll, with Jesse Jackson winning 40% of the vote, followed by Albert Gore, Jr. with 26% and Michael Dukakis with 24%. The remaining 10% of the Democratic primary vote was split among Paul Simon (4%), Richard Gephardt (3%), Gary Hart (2%), and uncommitted delegates (1%). Among Republican primary voters in the exit poll, George Bush received 51% of the vote compared with 29% for Robert Dole, 11% for Pat Robertson, and 7% for Jack Kemp. Pierre DuPont and Alexander Haig each received 1% of the vote.

There was a high level of agreement among Democratic and Republican primary voters about which candidate had the best chance of winning each party's nomination. Michael Dukakis was perceived as the frontrunner for the Democratic nomination by 55% of Democratic primary voters. Trail'ing Dukakis among Democratic primary voters were Jesse Jackson at 21%, Albert Gore at 14%, and Richard Gephardt at 6%. Dukakis was also seen as the Democratic frontrunner by 64% of Republican primary voters, followed by Gephardt and Gore with 15% each, and Jackson with 4%.

George Bush enjoyed an even greater advantage in the GOP contest: 77% of Democratic primary voters and 80% of Republican primary voters viewed Bush as the most likely Republican nominee. Twenty percent of Democratic primary voters and 17% of Republican primary voters picked Robert Dole as the most likely GOP nominee. Only 2% of Democratic primary voters and 4% of Republican primary voters thought that Pat Robertson had the best chance of winning the Republican presidential nomination.

The question of electability also produced a strong consensus across party lines. Dukakis was viewed as the most electable Democratic candidate by 56% of Democratic primary voters and 63% of Republican primary voters. Among Democratic voters, Dukakis was followed by Jackson at 21%, Gore at 16%, and Gephardt at 5%, among Republican voters, 17% picked both Gore and Gephardt as the most electable Democrat while only 2% chose Jesse Jackson.

George Bush was viewed as the most electable Republican candidate by 77% of Democratic primary voters and by 74% of Republican primary voters. Among Democratic voters, Robert Dole was viewed as the most electable Republican candidate by 22% while Jack Kemp and Pat Robertson were each picked by 1%, among Republican voters, Dole trailed Bush at 23%, followed by Robertson at 3% and Kemp at 1%.

Judgments about candidates' nomination and general election prospects were clearly more than rationalizations of candidate preferences. Democrats and Republicans alike tended to view Michael Dukakis and George Bush as the frontrunners for the Democratic and Republican nominations and as the strongest potential candidates in the general election. This was true despite the fact that among Democratic primary voters, Robert Dole was evaluated much more positively than George Bush—42% of Democratic primary voters had a favorable opinion of Dole while only 24% had a favorable opinion of Bush. The fact that far more voters rated Dukakis and Bush as having the best chance of being nominated and elected than actually voted for either candidate suggests that opinions about the candidates' nomination prospects and electability were strongly influenced by the results of earlier contests and by media interpretations of these results.


How did the widespread perception of Michael Dukakis as the frontrunner for the Democratic nomination affect the candidate preferences of Democratic primary voters on Super Tuesday? In order to answer this question, it is first necessary to control for the influence of race. According to an exit poll, blacks comprised 35% of the Democratic primary electorate at Jesse Jackson received 97% of the black vote compared with 2% for Al Gore and 1% for Michael Dukakis. Among whites who voted in the Democratic primary, Gore received 39% of the vote followed by Dukakis with 38%, Jackson and Simon with 7% each, Hart with 3% and Bruce Babbitt and uncommitted delegates with 1% each.

Because of the overwhelming support for Jesse Jackson among black voters, our analysis of the effect of momentum on candidate choice will be limited to white voters in the Democratic primary. Among blacks, support for Jesse Jackson was a matter of racial pride.² We will further limit our attention to the two candidates who received the overwhelming majority of the white vote—Michael Dukakis and Al Gore.

Figure 2 presents the results of the path analysis of candidate preference among white Democratic primary voters. The estimates shown are the standardized regression coefficients or beta weights. These results support the expected utility model of voter decision making. Although candidate evaluations had the strongest direct influence on voting decisions, judgments ab-

² A separate analysis of the Jackson vote found that race was by far the strongest predictor of voting for Jackson followed by evaluations of Jackson. Opinions about Jackson's nomination prospects and electability had no impact on voting decisions.

FIGURE 2
PATH ANALYSIS OF CANDIDATE CHOICE IN DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY
(N = 98)




Note: Estimates shown are standardized regression coefficients. Double-headed arrow represents correlation coefficient. Estimate marked with asterisk is not statistically significant. All other estimates are significant at .05 level or greater.

which candidate had the best chance of winning the November election also had a substantial direct impact on candidate choice. Based on the estimated unstandardized regression coefficient for electability—perceiving Michael Dukakis as the most electable Democratic candidate increased the probability of voting for Dukakis over Albert Gore by about 27 percentage points compared with perceiving Gore as the most electable Democratic candidate. By multiplying the estimated unstandardized regression coefficient for relative electability (1.35) by the mean electability score among white Democratic primary voters (+.41), we can estimate that perceptions of electability increased Dukakis' overall vote by about 5.5 percentage points over what he would have received if he and Gore had been perceived as equally electable.

Opinions about the candidates' viability apparently had little or no direct influence on voting decisions, but did strongly influence opinions about electability. The estimated unstandardized regression coefficient for the effect of viability on electability (.60) indicates that perceiving either Michael Dukakis or Albert Gore as the most likely Democratic nominee increased the likelihood of perceiving the same candidate as the most electable Democrat by about 60 percentage points.

There is clear evidence of wishful thinking among Democratic primary voters: voters tended to perceive the candidate they liked best as having the best chance of being nominated and elected. However, perceptions of the

FIGURE 3
PATH ANALYSIS OF CANDIDATE CHOICE IN REPUBLICAN PRIMARY
(N = 128)



Note: Estimates shown are standardized regression coefficients. Double-headed arrow represents correlation coefficient. Estimate marked with asterisk is not significant at .05 level; other estimates are statistically significant at .05 level or greater.

candidates' nomination prospects were the most important factor influencing opinions about electability, and evaluations of Dukakis and Gore only explained about one-fourth of the variance in voters' opinions about which candidate was most likely to receive the Democratic nomination.

Among Republican primary voters in our exit poll, George Bush and Robert Dole received a combined total of 80% of the vote. We will therefore limit our analysis of Republican primary voters to those choosing one of these two candidates. Figure 3 presents the results of the path analysis of candidate preference among Republican primary voters. Once again, the results are consistent with the expected utility model of voter decision making. Among Republican primary voters, moreover, opinions about the candidates' electability had a stronger direct impact on voting decisions than evaluations of either of the candidates. Based on the estimated unstandardized regression coefficient for electability, perceiving George Bush as the most electable Republican candidate increased the probability of voting Bush over Robert Dole by about 48 percentage points compared with perceiving Dole as the most electable Republican candidate. By multiplying the estimated unstandardized regression coefficient for relative electability (.238) by the mean electability score among Republican primary voters (+.55), we can estimate that perceptions of electability increased the

overall vote by about 13.1 percentage points over what he would have received if he and Dole had been perceived as equally electable.

Perceptions of the candidates' nomination prospects had no direct impact on voting decisions (in fact, the estimate for this path is in the wrong direction), but did strongly influence opinions about electability. The estimated unstandardized regression coefficient for the effect of viability on electability (.812) indicates that perceiving either George Bush or Robert Dole as the most likely Republican nominee increased the likelihood of perceiving the same candidate as the most electable Republican by about 81 percentage points. Wishful thinking is again evident although evaluations of Bush and Dole had very little direct bearing on opinions regarding electability and only explained about one-third of the variance in judgments about which candidate was most likely to win the Republican nomination.

An alternative explanation for these findings is that they reflect post-decisional rationalization—after voters decide which candidate to support, they may rationalize that decision by assuming that their preferred candidate is the one most likely to win the nomination or the general election or both. However, the evidence from our exit poll appears to be inconsistent with this hypothesis. If voters rationalized their candidate preference by assuming that their preferred candidate was most likely to win the nomination and the general election, then candidate preference should have a direct influence on perceptions of the candidates' nomination prospects, after controlling for perceptions of electability. However, when perceptions of nomination prospects were regressed on candidate choice and perceptions of electability, vote choice had almost no impact on opinions regarding the candidates' nomination prospects. If voters' candidate preferences only affected their judgments about electability, then opinions about the candidates' nomination prospects should have no impact on voting decisions with electability left out of the analysis. However, opinions about the candidates' nomination prospects did have substantial and statistically significant effects on candidate preference in both parties when electability was excluded from the regression equation. Thus, if we can assume that opinions about candidates' nomination prospects are causally prior to opinions about their electability, the data from the exit poll are inconsistent with the post-decisional rationalization hypothesis.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Momentum had a major influence on the voting decisions of Republican and white Democratic primary voters in our exit poll. By winning the New Hampshire primary, George Bush and Michael Dukakis established themselves as the frontrunners for the Republican and Democratic presidential nominations in the minds of Super Tuesday primary voters. This perception was important primarily because it caused voters to view Bush and Dukakis

as the most electable candidates in their respective parties. In choosing a candidate for their party's nomination, Republican and Democratic primary voters weighed electability in addition to their general evaluations of the candidates seeking the nomination.

Although momentum was an important factor in both primaries, it probably was not the determining factor in the outcome of either. In the Republican primary, momentum reinforced the advantage in voter evaluations which George Bush enjoyed over Robert Dole. Without momentum, however, Bush's margin over Dole would probably have been substantially smaller. In the Democratic primary, the candidate with momentum, Michael Dukakis, finished third behind Jesse Jackson and Albert Gore. Dukakis' momentum was not enough to overcome Jackson's strong appeal to black voters or Gore's emphasis on ideological moderation and his appeal to regional loyalty. Without momentum, however, it is likely that Dukakis would have fared very poorly on Super Tuesday.

The findings presented in this paper do not support the idea that momentum is especially important when the candidates seeking the nomination are not well known. In our exit poll, the impact of momentum was greater in the Republican primary than in the Democratic primary, despite the fact that the two major Republican candidates—Bush and Dole—were very familiar national political figures, while both Michael Dukakis and Albert Gore were almost unknown at the start of the campaign. The importance of momentum in the Republican race may have reflected the absence of any clear issue or ideological differences between the two leading contenders. Both Bush and Dole campaigned in the South as conservatives who strongly supported Ronald Reagan's policies. The only controversy in the campaign was over which candidate had been more effective in supporting Reagan. Lacking any other basis on which to distinguish between Bush and Dole, Republican primary voters relied heavily on their judgment about which candidate had the best chance to win in November. That judgment was, in turn, strongly influenced by the perception of George Bush as the clear frontrunner for the GOP nomination.

To a considerable extent, the voters in our exit poll acted as rational utility maximizers. Anticipating the upcoming general election, they weighed electability along with their evaluations of the candidates in deciding whom to support in the primary. This finding may provide some comfort to those concerned about the effects of recent nominating reforms on the ability of the parties to choose candidates with broad electoral appeal (Polisby 1983). However, students of the nominating process may find it somewhat disturbing that primary voters base their evaluation of a candidate's electability almost exclusively on his performance in earlier primaries and caucuses. On Super Tuesday, George Bush and Michael Dukakis were seen as the most electable Republican and Democratic candidates largely because of their victories in the New Hampshire primary three weeks earlier. Many political analysts

and professional politicians did not share this view however. Several national polls conducted before Super Tuesday indicated that Robert Dole would be a stronger Republican nominee than George Bush because of his greater appeal to independent voters and Democrats. At the same time many southern Democratic party leaders and elected officials felt that Albert Gore would be a stronger candidate than Michael Dukakis because of his southern roots and moderate image. Judging a candidate's ability to win a general election on the basis of his success in party primaries and caucuses can be very misleading. Primaries and caucuses only test a candidate's appeal among voters who identify with the candidate's party. In order to win a presidential election however, a Democratic or Republican candidate must also appeal to independents and supporters of the opposing party. The candidate with momentum in March is not necessarily the candidate with the best chance of winning in November.

Much more research is needed on the role of momentum and electability in presidential primary elections. It would be hazardous to attempt to generalize from the findings of an exit poll conducted in a single county in one early primary contest. If possible, future studies should employ more sensitive measures of attitudes about candidates, nomination and general election prospects instead of asking voters which candidate is most likely to win. By obtaining probability or quasi-probability estimates of candidates' chances, it should be possible to test more sophisticated models of voter decision making (Abramowitz and Stone 1984, chap. 6). Future studies should also explore the effects of campaign context and timing on voter decision making. The relationship between momentum and voter perceptions of viability and electability may change over time: the results of recent primaries may have less impact on perceptions of viability and electability in the later stages of the nominating campaign. Finally, research is needed on the role of media coverage in shaping voters' evaluations of candidate performance in the primaries and caucuses. Given the role that perceptions of momentum play in voter decision making, the power of the media to set expectations regarding a candidate's performance and to evaluate performance in relation to these expectations may be crucial in determining a candidate's success in the nominating campaign.

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APPENDIX A DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLING PROCEDURE, QUESTION WORDING, AND CODING PROCEDURES USED IN EXIT POLL

A stratified random sample of 13 precincts in DeKalb County was used to conduct the exit poll. Because of the high level of racial polarization ex-

pected in the Democratic primary, all of the precincts in the county were first stratified according to racial composition. Within each racial grouping, a random sample of precincts was selected. Questionnaires were distributed and collected by undergraduate students at Emory University. Each student was assigned a specific precinct and two-hour time period and instructed to collect as many questionnaires as possible from voters leaving the polling place. Time periods were distributed throughout the day, but concentrated mainly during periods of heavy voting (early morning, midday, late afternoon, and early evening).

The results of the exit poll were very close to the actual results of the primary election in Dekalb County. In the county, 61% of the voters chose to participate in the Democratic primary while 39% chose to participate in the Republican primary; in the exit poll, 62% of the respondents reported voting in the Democratic primary while 38% reported voting in the Republican primary. In the Democratic primary, Jesse Jackson received 46% of the vote compared with 24% for Albert Gore, 23% for Michael Dukakis, 4% for Richard Gephardt, 3% for Paul Simon, and 1% each for Gary Hart and uncommitted delegates; in the exit poll, 40% of respondents reported voting for Jesse Jackson compared with 26% for Albert Gore, 24% for Michael Dukakis, 4% for Paul Simon, 3% for Richard Gephardt, 2% for Gary Hart, and 1% for uncommitted delegates. In the Republican primary, George Bush received 54% of the vote compared with 27% for Robert Dole, 12% for Pat Robertson, and 7% for Jack Kemp; in the exit poll, 51% of respondents reported voting for George Bush with 29% for Robert Dole, 11% for Pat Robertson, and 7% for Jack Kemp.

In the exit poll, candidate preference was measured by the following question: "Which candidate did you vote for in the primary?" Respondents were given a checklist of all Democratic and Republican candidates.

Opinions about the candidates' nomination prospects were measured by the following question: "Regardless of whom you support, which Democratic and Republican candidate do you think has the *best* chance of winning his party's nomination?" Respondents were given checklists of the following candidates: Dukakis, Gephardt, Gore, Hart, Jackson, and Simon for the Democrats; Bush, Dole, Kemp, and Robertson for the Republicans.

Opinions about the candidates' general election chances were measured by the following question: "Regardless of whom you support, which Democratic and Republican candidate do you think has the *best* chance of winning the general election in November if he is nominated by his party?" If choices were Dukakis, Gephardt, Gore, Hart, Jackson, and Simon for the Democrats, and Bush, Dole, Kemp, and Robertson for the Republicans.

Overall evaluations of the candidates were measured by the following question: "What is your overall opinion of each of the following political leaders?" Respondents were asked for their opinions of Bush, Dole, Dukakis,

Gephardt, Gore, Jackson, and Robertson. The response alternatives were "very favorable," "somewhat favorable," "neutral," "somewhat unfavorable," and "very unfavorable."

In the path analysis of Democratic primary voters, the vote choice question was scored as +1 for a Dukakis vote and 0 for a Gore vote. In the analysis of Republican primary voters, a Bush vote was scored as +1 and a Dole vote was scored as 0.

Candidate evaluations were scored from -2 (very unfavorable) to +2 (very favorable), with a neutral opinion scored as a 0. Among Democratic primary voters, opinions about the candidates' nomination prospects and electability were scored as follows: +1 if Dukakis was viewed as having the best chance, -1 if Gore was viewed as having the best chance, and 0 if some other candidate was viewed as having the best chance.

Among Republican primary voters, opinions about the candidates' nomination prospects and electability were scored as follows: +1 if Bush was viewed as having the best chance, -1 if Dole was viewed as having the best chance, and 0 if some other candidate was viewed as having the best chance.

APPENDIX B

RESULTS OF DISCRIMINANT ANALYSES OF CANDIDATE CHOICE AMONG DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN PRIMARY VOTERS

Variable	Democrats		Republicans	
	N	%	N	%
Candidate 1 evaluation	791		637	
Candidate 2 evaluation	838		526	
Electability	586		637	
Viability	672		141	
Chi-Squared	112.7		156.2	
Significance	.001		<.001	
Percentage of cases predicted correctly	92.9		96.1	

Note: Entries shown are standardized discriminant function coefficients. For Democrats, candidate 1 = Dukakis, candidate 2 = Gore; for Republicans, candidate 1 = Bush, candidate 2 = Dole. Based on Democrats voting for Dukakis or Gore; Republicans voting for Bush or Dole.

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Multiple Party Identifiers in Canada: Participation and Affect

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Many Canadians identify with one party at the federal level and another in provincial politics. Split-level partisanship is far less frequent in the United States. Nevertheless, it is an open question whether such dual partisanship is traceable to the same determinants in both countries. Following Neum et al. (1987), I examine whether split-level identifiers are less likely to participate in politics, as well as to have lower levels of efficacy than people who identify with one party (either being fully consistent or partially consistent). No support for either hypothesis is found. Split-level identifiers participate just as much as fully consistent and partially consistent partisans. Their efficacy is generally equal to that of other groups as well. The only exceptions suggest that split-level partisanship reflects citizens' political environments. If people face two very different party systems at the federal and provincial tiers, they are likely to have different patterns of identification regardless of their levels of participation and efficacy.

The concept of party identification has played a critical role in understanding political behavior in the United States. Partisanship in the United States is not only the major determinant of vote choice but also is marked by considerable stability over time, with respect to both direction and intensity (Converse and Markus 1979). The prominence of this "unmoved mover" in studies of American electoral behavior has led to widespread applications in other national contexts, with varying degrees of success (Budge, Crewe, and Fairlie 1976; Converse and Dupeux 1967). To what extent is the American model of partisanship transferable to other countries? If it has applicability anywhere, the concept of party identification should perform best in Canada, which shares life-styles, material well-being, and culture with its southern neighbor.

There has been a long-standing debate as to whether partisanship in Can-

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ada does follow the American model. Snderman et al (1974, esp. 287) argue that the structure of partisanship in the two countries is very similar. On the other hand, LeDuc et al (1984) demonstrate that both the direction and intensity of partisanship is far less stable than in the United States, varying in step with the issues and leaders of the moment (Jenson 1975). To be sure, the received view in the United States now is that partisanship should be viewed as endogenous (Fiorina 1981), but even so, very large differences persist between the two countries on this perspective.

One key indicator of the weakness of partisanship in Canada is identification with different parties at the federal and provincial levels, reflecting "two political worlds" (Blake et al 1985) that largely do not intersect. Only 44%–45% of Canadians had fully consistent partisan identifications from 1974 to 1980 (LeDuc et al 1984, 479), an identification is fully consistent if a voter selects the same party with the same strength at the federal and provincial levels. Niemi et al (1987) and Hadley (1985) find considerable split-level identification in surveys of contributors to national campaigns and among Louisiana voters and argue that this is an indicator of a dealigning party system. LeDuc (1984) holds that the Canadian party system is already "dealigned" and citizens have a different set of partisan choices to make. In many Canadian provinces, the partisan struggle for seats does not involve at least one of the two major parties at the federal level.

Slightly more than 60% of Canadians identify with the same party at both levels across the three surveys of the 1974–1979–1980 panel. In the 1979 survey to be analyzed in this article, 47.4% of the respondents had fully consistent identification, 22.4% were partially consistent, and 23.9% were multiple identifiers.¹ The extent of split-level identification in Canada appears quite similar to the findings of Niemi et al (1987), but the findings are not directly comparable. Niemi et al (1987) measured partisanship at three rather than two levels and also included independents. More critically, unpublished surveys indicate substantially lower levels of split partisanship nationally in the United States and in several states.² These results suggest that dual partisanship in the United States may not be a good indicator of realignment since there are even fewer dual partisans in the United States now than

¹ These figures may differ slightly from those reported elsewhere, since I have excluded respondents who did not select one of the four major parties at the federal level or these six parties plus the Parti Québécois at the provincial level.

² The 1987 pilot study of the National Election Studies found that 3% of the electorate had dual partisanship, while state studies in New Jersey (4%) and Louisiana (5%) reported similar results. These data were analyzed by Harold D. Clarke and Marianne Stewart who graciously shared the results with me. One possible explanation for the far higher rates of split identification in the contributor sample is that some contributors (such as Donald Trump) might pick the national Republican party, but feel constrained to back the dominant Democratic party at the local level (Lynn 1989).

there were (5%) in 1958 (Jennings and Niemi 1966). Whatever the interpretation of the American results,¹ it is far from clear that the correlates of dual partisanship should be the same in Canada and the United States. To what extent, then, is the American model of partisanship transferable?

PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND PARTICIPATION

Niemi et al. (1987) argued that multiple identifiers should differ from those who consistently select the same party with the same strength of attachment. The "consistent" identifiers should demonstrate the strongest affiliations with parties, multiple identifiers the weakest, with "partially consistent" respondents (those selecting the same party at each level, but with different strengths) somewhere in between. In turn, following what we have long known about partisanship, strength of partisanship should be related to levels of political participation. Putting the chain together, we have the following argument: Strength of partisanship determines consistency of affiliations, which affects the degree of participation. They found at best a modicum of support for this logic among American campaign contributors. To what extent are either the received model of partisanship or the findings of the contributor study applicable outside the American context?

I investigate this question employing the 1979 Canadian National Election Study. My purpose is not to analyze what drives multiple partisanship, but to compare as directly as possible the results for American campaign contributors to the Canadian public.² In Canada the relationship between the strength and consistency of party identification are even stronger than in the American contributor sample (data not shown). In the American data partially consistent identifiers are least likely to identify strongly with a party, more than half are independent leaners. In Canada partially consistent

These findings are not completely inconsistent with a dealignment thesis. Partisanship declined in the 1960s, especially in the South, as voters moved away from the Democratic party at the presidential level. As more voters shifted to the Republican party at all levels by the 1980s, the level of split-level identification would decline again in the wake of a regional *realignment*. In any event, the *national* dealignment thesis does not in any way depend upon an increase in split-level identification. Wattenberg (1984) persuasively argues that dealignment involves neutrality toward both parties, not hostility toward either. Thus, we would expect an increase in the percentage of pure independents and in that for partially consistent identifiers.

¹For an analysis of what drives multiple levels of partisanship in Canada, see Uslaner (1989b). The 1979 survey was selected because it alone among the three waves of the panel had variables for use in that study. Many of the participation questions to be considered here, however, were asked only of half of the sample, thus reducing the number of cases available for analysis. (This same problem affected the other two waves of the survey as well.) Throughout the analyses only the voters who identified with one of the four political parties that compete in federal politics (Liberals, Progressive Conservatives, New Democrats, and Social Credit) were included. This analysis employs the 1979 national cross-section sample, whereas Uslaner (1989b) is based upon the 1974-1979 panel weights.

TABLE 1

PARTICIPATION ACTIVITIES BY CONSISTENCY OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION *

	Consistent Identifiers	Partially Consistent Identifiers	Multiple Identifiers	Statistical Significance Level	tau c	gamma
<u>Federal Activities</u>						
Follow in newspapers	68.8	74.1	75.6	.098	.065	- .131
Discuss with friends	63.3	67.0	72.0	.062	.074	- .135
Try to convince friends	22.6	24.1	21.5	.797	.005	- .011
Attend Meeting	19.5	18.2	16.7	.641	.024	.066
Contact public officials	16.9	22.0	15.0	.110	.002	.005
Work for party candidate	13.2	11.9	10.5	.572	.023	.089
Contribute money	11.6	9.2	9.8	.577	.019	.083
<u>Provincial Activities</u>						
Follow in newspapers	71.0	76.3	79.0	.047	.073	- .157
Discuss with friends	61.9	63.5	71.9	.023	.080	- .143
Try to convince friends	22.0	21.3	25.6	.460	.025	.056
Attend meeting	19.8	18.5	21.4	.728	- .009	.022
Contact public officials	16.2	23.7	18.1	.052	.035	.092
Work for party candidate	10.5	11.8	12.6	.687	.019	- .074
Contribute money	10.8	10.3	14.5	.253	.027	- .106

* Percent of respondents answering often or sometimes as opposed to seldom or never
 N ranges from 972 to 978

identifiers are somewhat more likely than fully consistent respondents to have weak attachments.

Niemi et al. (1987) found that—contrary to expectations, split-level identifiers participated in politics at least as much as—and often more than—partially consistent did. As hypothesized, however, consistent had the highest levels of participation. The relevant data for the Canadian sample are presented in table 1. They do not at all conform to expectations. Respondents were asked whether they engage in each of seven activities at either the federal or the provincial levels: (1) follow politics in newspapers; (2) discuss politics with friends; (3) try to convince friends about politics; (4) attend political meetings; (5) contact public officials; (6) work for parties or candidates; and (7) contribute money.

As in the American contributor study, participation rates for multiple and partially consistent identifiers were quite similar. For many activities, especially at the provincial level, split-level identifiers were actually more likely to participate than were partially consistent. However, in only three of the 14 comparisons did consistent identifiers participate more than did either of the other groups (attending meetings, working for a party or a candidate, and contributing money, all at the federal level). About a third (five of 14) of the participation activities reached statistical significance at the generous .10 level. The tau- ϵ and gamma coefficients were all very small. Whatever patterns are there indicate more activity by multiple identifiers.

PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND POLITICAL EFFICACY

If participation measures of the type considered by Niemi et al. (1987) do not show any significant differences across the categories of partisan identification, what about other indicators of activity and political efficacy and trust? Two additional measures of participation—voting and being very interested in politics—show little variation across partisan types. On questions of efficacy, just one of the four items reach significance at the .05 level (see table 2). However, consistent identifiers are more likely to agree with the argument that "sometimes politics and government are so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on." In no case does the sign of the measures of association correspond with predictions although virtually all of the measures are very modest.

Similarly, three of the four measures of political trust have correlations not in the predicted direction. Just two of the four are significant at the .05 level. Consistent identifiers are more likely to agree that the federal government wastes tax money and that many in government are dishonest. Even these

All signs on the coefficients have been adjusted so that a positive correlation indicates correspondence with the hypothesized relationship and a negative sign indicates the opposite to what has been predicted.

TABLE 2

PARTICIPATION, EFFICACY, AND TRUST BY CONSISTENCY OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION *

	Consistent Identifiers	Partially Consistent Identifiers	Multiple Identifiers	Statistical Significance Level	tau-c	gamma
<u>Participation</u>						
Voted in 1979	91.5	90.7	49.9	.440	.017	.085
Very interested in politics	14.7	15.4	14.5	.140	.033	.059
<u>Efficacy</u>						
Government doesn't care what people like me think	55.0	53.1	47.6	.172	-.060	-.097
Politics too complicated	74.0	64.5	60.7	.000	-.124	-.225
No say about government	58.9	53.5	53.3	.226	-.056	-.091
Voting doesn't matter	14.6	15.9	9.6	.097	-.034	-.119
<u>Political Trust</u>						
Men in government dishonest	41.3	40.7	28.9	.006	-.045	-.163
Government wastes taxes	51.7	51.5	73.1	.019	-.065	-.159
Trust government to do right	72.2	67.0	66.9	.215	.053	.101
Most in government smart	70.2	68.7	74.0	.432	-.025	-.050

* For efficacy and trust questions, entries are percentages of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with question.
 N ranges from 960 to 965 N = 1968 for voting participation and 1977 for interest in politics

TABLE 3

PROBIT ANALYSIS OF CONSISTENCY OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Predictor	Coefficient	MLE/SF
Vote	- .342	- 2.069*
Interest in politics	.056	.754
Government doesn't care	-.041	-1.222
Politics too complicated	.063	1.914
No say about government	.011	.329
Voting doesn't matter	.004	.093
Many in government dishonest	.068	2.075*
Government wastes taxes	.026	-.677
Trust government to do right	.067	-2.039*
Most in government smart	.027	.817
Follow in newspapers (federal)	-.056	-.972
Discuss with friends (federal)	.017	.305
Try to convince friends (federal)	.083	-1.389
Attend meeting (federal)	.010	.168
Contact public officials (federal)	-.033	-.659
Work for party/candidate (federal)	.048	.681
Contribute money (federal)	.211	-2.685*
Follow in newspapers (provincial)	.090	1.498
Discuss with friends (provincial)	.008	.152
Try to convince friends (provincial)	.092	1.523
Attend meeting (provincial)	.031	-.354
Contact public officials (provincial)	.045	.885
Work for party/candidate (provincial)	.023	.071
Contribute money (provincial)	.172	2.318*
Constant	1.686	4.252*

2 Log Likelihood Ratio 47.870 (24 d.f.)

Estimated R Square .082

Rank Order Correlation (rho) .193

N = 779

*p = .05

Significant relationships are marked by modest measures of association ($\text{tau-c} < -.10$ and $\text{gamma} < -.20$). For most of the efficacy and trust questions, the partially consistent identifiers appear to be more similar to fully consistent partisans than to people with split-level attachments.

The standard model of partisanship treats identification as exogenous: people who have stronger ties to parties are more likely to participate in politics. However, one can also argue that the direction of causality goes the other way—or, more likely, both ways (cf. Fiorina 1981). People who are more participatory and trusting are also more likely to have stronger—and particularly more consistent—partisanship. To construct a simultaneous-equation model would take us too far afield. However, analyzing partisan consistency as a dependent variable is at least instructive in this context. The

24 measures of participation and efficacy together do a modest job at best predicting split-level partisanship. Table 3 reports a probit analysis of multiple party identification employing these variables.⁶ The estimated *R*² is only .082 and the rank-order correlation between the estimated and actual values is just .193. Of the 24 predictors, only three are significant at the level for a one-tailed test. Voters are more likely than nonvoters to be content identifiers, as are those who believe that the government can be trusted to do the right thing. People who give money to federal candidates are more likely to have consistent identifications, but those who contribute to provincial candidates are less likely to select the same party at both levels. Those who argue that many in government are dishonest are less likely to split their partisanship. The multivariate analysis confirms the weak overall relationship between the consistency of partisan identification and measures of participation and efficacy. No causal path (as the zero-order correlations in tables 1 and 2 indicate) appears supported by this analysis.

TWO ARENAS OF PARTISANSHIP⁷

Split-level identifiers in Canada seem to be just as participatory (perhaps even a bit more so) than consistent partisans. What differences we find in efficacy and trust are in the same direction. Multiple identifiers score higher than consistent partisans. (Partially consistent identifiers fall closer to people with fully consistent affiliations than to respondents with split-level attachments.) These results contradict our expectations and what we know about American politics.

While the Niemi et al. (1987) findings do not fully conform to the recent model of partisanship, the divergences are minor and explicable in terms of the nature of the sample. Contributors are by definition more participatory than other citizens. In most respects the contributor results support the traditional social-psychological perspective on partisan affiliation. What is surprising is that in a country with weaker and less stable partisan ties, both over time and across levels, the American model of partisanship should be decisively rejected. The alternative thesis of a weaker basis of party tie in Canada (Jenson 1975, LeDuc et al. 1984) is no more strongly supported than anything; it should predict an even stronger relationship between parti-

⁶ The dependent variable is a three-category ordinal measure of split-level identification: *partially consistent identifiers in the middle*. The sample size for this equation is reduced (11) because of list-wise deletion of missing data.

⁷ The signs of the coefficients reflect the responses to the agree/disagree questions in tables 1 and 2; the signs have not been reflected to correspond to theoretical expectations. Predictors employed in the probit analysis are: except for interest in politics, all dichotomous measures to conform to the analyses in tables 1 and 2. This does not affect the results of the analysis. Only one of the predictors (contributing money at the federal level) was statistically significant at the .01 level for a one-tailed test.

ship and participation and affect. If only a smaller subset of the Canadian electorate were strongly and consistently partisan, we should find large and robust measures of association with the participation and affect measures. Precisely the opposite obtains. However, unlike many countries in which the relationship of party identification to the vote is unstable, partisanship structures the vote in Canada in much the same way that it does in the United States (Uslaner 1989a) and with even greater consistency (LeDuc et al. 1984, 477, table 3).

To explain the different roles of partisanship here (consistency of identification across levels), we should look less to underlying psychological processes than to the different political and historical contexts in which political parties operate. Canada's two political worlds are very different from the pattern of party competition in the United States. The story of Canadian provincial party systems is one qualified by many "buts." The Atlantic provinces (New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island) are marked by the same two parties that dominate federal politics. They have the lowest levels of split identifiers by far and correspondingly the highest level of fully consistent identifiers (Clarke et al. 1980: 97), but they also have the lowest levels of both efficacy and trust of all Canadians (Adamson and Stewart 1985: 321). British Columbians live in a polity almost completely divorced from federal politics. They have the highest percentage of split identifiers of any province, but have the highest efficacy of all Canadians even as they distrust the federal government (Blake et al. 1985: 57). Perhaps only Ontarians—who reside in the only province where the three largest federal parties also compete in provincial elections—fit the expected mold of believing that the federal government is responsive to them, having a high degree of political efficacy, and a relatively low percentage of split identifiers (Kornberg et al. 1982: 79–80).

The supposedly anomalous findings make sense once we realize that provincial political culture is the intervening political variable. Consistent partisans do not appear to be higher on either efficacy or trust because many Atlantic province citizens are consistent but lack efficacy. Split-level identifiers do not appear to be low on efficacy because many British Columbia residents are inconsistent but high on efficacy. Most B.C. residents who distrust the federal government think that they can do something about it, while most Atlantic residents who believe that the federal government cannot be trusted believe that they can do nothing. Yet neither group, with very different patterns of consistency in partisanship, is high on trust. The strongest determinants of split-level identification in Canada are the historical strength of parties at the two levels and citizens' affinity for their provinces as opposed

³Ontario is marked, however, by reasonably high levels of partially consistent identifiers (25%) and of single-level identifiers (15%), so that only 49% of respondents are fully consistent (Clarke et al. 1980: 97).

to the country (Uslaner 1989b). This is reflected in the structure of party organizations. Canadian parties of the same name often maintain completely separate, if not outrightly competitive, organizations in many provinces (Whitaker 1985); in the United States, there is far greater party coordination among levels of government.

Of course, patterns of partisanship differ from one country to another. However, this does not necessarily mean that people in different countries have fundamentally different attitudes about political parties, or that if they do these orientations stem from essentially different social-psychological processes. As this study of two similar, but also culturally different, polities indicates, the answer is more likely to be in factors largely beyond individual control. In Canada, party affiliation may have a much heavier load to push than in the United States and, given what it has to work with, may be doing a rather remarkable job in keeping the percentage of split-level identifiers low as it is.

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Book Reviews

Book Reviews

Edward B. Portis Editor

V. O. Key, Jr. and the Study of American Politics Edited by M. Cummings, Jr. (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1988. Pp. vi, 51.)

Political scientists are indebted to Milton Cummings and associates in and around the Washington office for their use of the Evron Kirkpatrick Fund to commemorate the 25th anniversary of V. O. Key's untimely death and to keep his substantive contributions and methodological teachings warmly alive in our institutional memory.

This slim volume would, in my opinion, have been deeply gratifying to Key, for its brevity, its personally prepared bibliography of publications, and for its editorial decision to focus the three evaluative essays constituting the body of the work on the main areas of his professional interests: American parties (W. D. Burnham), elections (D. R. Mayhew), and public opinion (P. D. Converse).

There emerges in the finished product a one-sided balance that would have appealed to Key's sense of irony. A two-thirds majority, consisting of the Mayhew and Converse pieces, concentrate upon fresh insights into his manner and methods of "teasing out" hidden, elusive relations between theory and data in empirical research. Both essays emphasize what political and social scientists (if they choose) can share with him as professionals seeking to approximate and apply the disciplines of scientific analysis to political institutions and processes.

Burnham's style and observations, which would have appealed no less to Key's sense of the appropriate, have a more traditional philosophical effect. They provoke us into wrenching, if not soul-searching controversies in which we delight to participate and through which we entertain ourselves at professional society meetings, but cannot and probably do not want to settle. The controversies raised fall into two classes: (1) What did Key mean by those critical *factors* and *trends* he identified as necessary to understanding the American political system? (2) What did Key think about the appropriate relation between political scientists and public policy? An example of the first type: "Key's fame vastly exceeded his influence, both within the profession and outside." Of the second: "Such classic figures in the reform tradition as Merriam and Lasswell unequivocally endorsed a political science mission to influence what happens in politics, etc." Key was certainly more ambivalent.

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Party Campaigning in the 1980s By Paul S. Herrnson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988. Pp. 176. \$25.00.)

Paul Herrnson has written an interesting book. He argues that neither of the prevailing conceptions of American political parties is appropriate to understanding the current role of parties in congressional elections. Chapter one merely summarizes the conventional wisdom. Parties have been viewed either the highly organized political machines of the past, with extensive control over the recruitment of candidates and the conduct of campaigns, as essentially moribund entities with little relevance in the current era candidate-centered, incumbency-dominated congressional contests. Chapter two presents data which challenge this latter view of the current role of parties. Herrnson documents the growing activity of both parties' national committees, as well as their respective congressional and senate committees, during the last decade. Especially notable are both the growth of national party staffs and increased financial activity and party receipts. Contemporary national party organizations are larger, better financed, more stable, and more internally diversified than ever before. In a word, they have become institutionalized. As a result, the national parties have become more influential in their dealings with state and local party organizations, PACs, and political consultants' (46). These trends are significantly more pronounced for the Republican party.

The principal thesis of the book, presented in chapter three, is that institutionalization of the national parties has led to a new role for political parties in congressional elections, the national-party-as-intermediary. Herrnson's description of this role is based on interviews with 30 officials of political parties, 30 House and Senate candidates and campaign managers, and a limited number of PAC executives and editors of Washington-based newsletters. Parties-as-intermediaries play a role in the candidate recruitment process (sometimes discouraging particular candidates) and provide some direct services to campaigns. Party services include issue research and coordinate campaign communications, largely undertaken by the national committees. The four Hill committees provide candidate specific issue research which includes monitoring the roll call voting behavior and interest group ranking of opposition candidates. Both parties also provide their candidates with other services. The Republicans' sizable financial advantages allow them to provide such services to their candidates at substantially undervalued rates. The Republican financial advantage is especially striking in Herrnson's documentation (based on FEC reports) of party contributions and coordinated expenditures on behalf of congressional candidates. Republican total expenditures for House races were \$10.5 million and \$6.7 million respectively in 1984 and 1986. Democratic expenditures in the same years were \$3.1

lion and \$2.8 million. Partisan disparities are less apparent in Senate contests but the Republican advantage remains.

More important for the model of parties-as-intermediaries are the brokerage activities of the party committees which facilitate contacts and agreements between the candidates and PACs, consultants, and other electoral actors that are able to communicate with and learn about the electorate" (47). Probably the most valuable activity in this regard is party activity aimed at putting candidates in touch with the appropriate PACs. Both parties are especially interested in channeling assistance to those candidates who are seen as competitive. Therefore, party resources are deployed strategically rather than equally: efforts are concentrated where they are likely to have the most effect.

Chapter four examines party campaign activities as perceived by the candidates themselves. The data consist of responses to mail questionnaires which were sent to the population of 734 House candidates for 1984 and 132 Senate candidates for 1984 and 1986. A total of 355 House and 77 Senate surveys were returned. The analysis concentrates principally on the perceptions of those seeking a seat in the House, although Senate responses are analyzed and presented as well. The results demonstrate that the candidates do see the role of the national party organization as important. Moreover, Republican candidates especially found the activities of the Republican committees to be helpful.

The book provides an excellent summary of the current role of the national parties in congressional races. The concrete documentation of the substantial Republican advantage in all phases of this activity is useful and interesting. The model of parties-as-intermediaries seems especially appropriate. Herrnson does not disagree with those who claim that congressional contests in the current era are candidate-centered. Rather, he shows that parties as organizational entities have been able to adapt to the changed environment of American politics, and that they are capable of playing a significant role in these candidate-centered races. In this sense, the study treats party as a dependent variable.

Yet Herrnson also considers parties-as-intermediaries as independent variables. Having demonstrated that parties are playing a new role in American politics, he raises the question of what effect this new role has on the outcomes of elections or on the behaviors of those elected. The treatment of this question in the final chapter of the work is considerably less satisfying than what has gone earlier. Neither safe incumbents nor noncompetitive challengers were much affected by party activity. Alternatively, approximately 25% of major party House and Senate candidates are involved in competitive contests and have a strong chance of winning or losing a congressional seat. Most of them, and especially those who belong to the Re-

publican party, consider the national parties to be important sources of advice, vice, connections, and valuable campaign services and assistance" (12). If the actual documentation of the number of competitive races is vague, and other scholars have argued persuasively that competition has all but disappeared from House races, this point needs more attention. If the party intermediary is only really important in competitive contests, then the party for party may not be as large as suggested in the earlier chapters.

Herrnson asserts that the effects of the reinvigorated Republican party can be seen in the outcomes of congressional elections between 1978 and 1986. While few would dispute that 1978 and 1980 were Republican success years, many would argue that in the 1982, 1984, and 1986 House elections the Republican successes only in the sense that the GOP cut its expected losses and that the 1986 loss of the Senate was a significant setback. The 1986 congressional elections might also be viewed as disappointing for Republicans. Yet over this period of time, the Republican organizational advantage mentioned in the earlier chapters increased. Consequently, the effects of party intermediaries may not be as substantial as Herrnson alleges. At a minimum, the effects are open to subjective interpretation.

Also disappointing is the failure to examine the impact of this new party on partisan strength in the House and Senate. Herrnson raises an important question, but feels that it is too early to tell. Given that data on the rates of party voting are readily available for the House and Senate, in fact support his case, this latter omission is rather surprising.

Despite these flaws, Herrnson has written an interesting and provocative book. It should be on the priority reading list for all serious students of political parties and congressional elections.

Patricia A. Hunley, Texas A&M University

Bifurcated Politics: Evolution and Reform in the National Party Conventions

By Byron E. Shafer. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990. Pp. 391. \$27.50.)

Byron Shafer's book, *Bifurcated Politics*, published by Harvard University Press and the Russell Sage Foundation, continues a tradition at Sage of publishing important books on presidential nominations and elections. The edition includes Jeane Kirkpatrick's book, *Presidential Elites*, Warren E. Miller and Kent Jennings' book, *Parties in Transition*, and Shafer's earlier book, *Quiet Revolution*. It is a book serious scholars will want to be aware of. Shafer's thesis is an important one. It is not a book professors will want to assign to their undergraduates, since it is too weighty both in argument and length for most undergraduates.

Briefly stated, Shafer's thesis is that the national conventions have cl

drastically over the past two or three decades. Their major function is no longer to nominate our presidential candidates, since that nomination is now effectively completed in the presidential primaries. Instead, their major function is to launch the general election campaign. Indeed, all the additional functions of the convention—nominating a vice president, adopting a platform and a set of rules, and acting as pep rally—are marshalled by the candidate and their staffs as a backdrop for the launching of the general election. In addition, the party which used the convention best as a springboard is likely to go on to victory in November.

This situation demands the presentation of the conventions as a television extravaganza. Conventions are now staged and stage-managed as giant television shows designed to appeal to that large (though now shrinking) audience back home. Much of what is boring or messy is relegated to the morning or afternoon sessions and negotiated backstage. The prime time images and impressions must be controlled at all costs. Unfortunately for the candidate and convention managers, the new breed of issue and ideology-oriented activists want to use the conventions to advance their causes. The candidates must work hard, and give in on crucial issues, in order to keep the conflict in check and to paper over their compromises.

The results, according to Shafer, are bifurcated: conventions, one convention being what the convention participants see and hear and the other being the images transmitted over the airwaves. Indeed, the conventions are symptomatic of the larger trends in American politics, or in Shafer's terms they serve as a 'window' on larger trends in American society and politics. The most important of those trends are the decline of the political parties and the rise of interest groups (PAC's), in our politics, the nationalization of our politics, the rise of the mass media, procedural reforms, and the necessity of elites forming temporary and unstable coalitions to advance policy objectives. All of this is very tentative and very volatile. According to Shafer it is also a good synopsis of what has happened recently to American politics with our loss of mediating institutions, the rise of the mass media, and the selling of candidates and policies directly to the mass public.

This book offers an almost encyclopedic treatment of recent national conventions. This feature alone will make it an important reference book on conventions. Unfortunately, the book is overly long and repetitive in places. Shafer seems to require that every chapter stand alone, and thus several stories are told in more than one chapter. For example, the story of the Democrats' 1980 fight over Rule 36 is told in some detail at least twice. The book could have been shortened by heavier editing. If I could read only one chapter, the 'Conclusion' chapter captures the thesis succinctly. There is heavy emphasis on the new issue and ideologically-oriented activists in both parties and the central role they now play in the conventions. Shafer's data on pages 100-107 depicting the ideological stances of the

elegates are the best empirical data in the book. There are other places where more empirical data to buttress the argument would have been welcome. For instance, there is much empirical data available on the characteristics of other party elites—some of which indicate that these other elites are somewhat unlike the convention delegates. Yet such studies are only covered lightly.

The book's treatment of the "bifurcated" national conventions is more convincing and better documented than the larger contention that the whole fabric of American politics has become similarly bifurcated, and that the conventions provide an analog to the larger trends in American politics. This is an interesting thesis about American politics, however, there are some ends counter to that general direction. For example, much recent scholarship on state and local parties suggests that these organizations are not necessarily in decline. Also, the Reagan administration has attempted, with mixed success, to reverse the nationalization of American politics—a point partially acknowledged on page 327. In addition, I found the concept of "bifurcated" somewhat strained, and perhaps another label would have communicated the basic point more cogently. In summary, while this concept may be a perfectly acceptable term for trends in the national conventions, I doubt that it will catch on as a cogent analysis of national politics.

Nevertheless, this is a book the professionals will want to be aware of, and its richness will provide ample grounds for extensive citations in subsequent works.

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Lacks in Southern Politics. Edited by Laurence W. Moreland, Robert P. Steed, and Tod A. Baker. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987. Pp. 305. \$42.95.)

Other Mobilization and the Politics of Race: The South and Universal Suffrage, 1952-1984. By Harold W. Stanley. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987. Pp. xv, 185. \$35.00.)

the subfield of black politics is probably experiencing the greatest growth in its 30-year history. Much of the published research focuses on black politics in the South, an understandable emphasis given the greater degree of racial oppression which has characterized the historic South relative to other regions in the country, and the fact that a majority of blacks have historically lived in the South and continue to do so. Southern politics has undergone substantial change over the last 30 years and much of that change is attributable to increased black political participation. This review examines two of the most recent books which focus on black political participation in the South.

Blacks in Southern Politics examines the expanded role of blacks since passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. In the introduction to the book the editors make the familiar point that a strong case can be argued that an examination of contemporary southern politics requires attention to race. The editors state that there are still some unanswered questions regarding race in southern politics that need to be addressed by research and intimate that their volume addresses some of these unanswered questions. However, those unanswered questions are not stated. It would have been helpful to have done so as a means of better structuring the contributions to this volume and providing a clearer basis for evaluating the contribution of the volume to the extant literature on black and southern politics. This is a minor quibble. A second minor quibble is that the editors do not provide a concluding chapter, thus providing no basis for distilling the findings and conclusions of the constituent chapters. Unfortunately, this practice is becoming par for the course for edited books. These two minor quibbles notwithstanding, *Blacks in Southern Politics* on balance is a strong book which significantly advances our understanding of black political participation in the South.

The volume is organized in four parts with each part consisting of three or more chapters. The first part presents a twentieth century historical examination of blacks in southern politics before passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. In chapter one, Frederick D. Wright examines the history of black political participation prior to 1965. The preponderance of Wright's discussion is familiar to students of black political history. David C. Colby in chapter two examines data on white violence against blacks in Mississippi for the period 1960-1969. Using regression analysis Colby finds that black electoral power was the strongest predictor of white violence against blacks followed by the level of black nonviolent protest activity. Colby's analysis also shows an inverse relationship between the black proportion of the total population and the level of white violence against blacks. Significantly, Colby's analysis disconfirms the popular hypothesis that white economic frustration is a major cause of white violence against blacks.

In chapter three, Mark Sterns examines the efforts to attain black voting rights in the South in the context of presidential politics with special emphasis placed on the administrations of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. Although it is generally known that President Kennedy did not actively seek to advance the civil rights of blacks, the most useful contribution of this chapter is its detailing of Kennedy's lack of substantive support for civil rights legislation as a senator and during the first two years of his presidency in his effort to curry favor with the white South to first promote his presidential ambition and subsequently to promote his legislative agenda as president.

Part II examines various aspects of contemporary black participation in southern politics. In chapter four, Linda Williams' analysis focuses on the dif-

ference in attitudes held by blacks and whites regarding candidates and issues in the 1984 elections. In chapter five, Mark Stern examines the political progress made by blacks based on data on black registration and voting. Using correlation matrix analysis Stern finds that, in contrast to pre-1965 research findings by Key, Matthews and Prothro, and others, the black proportion of a county's population is positively related to the level of black voter registration and the black proportion of the total number of registered voters in the post-act period. The most important contribution of this chapter, however, is its empirically-based discussion of the relationship between black political participation and socioeconomic characteristics.

The relationship between black political participation and possible improvements in the social and economic status of blacks is one of the two most exciting areas of research currently in the study of black politics (the other is the impact of electoral rules on black representation). The relationship between black political participation and socioeconomic resources has two components: one is the extent to which the presence of certain social and economic characteristics facilitate or impede black political participation; the other is the extent to which black political participation provides social and economic benefits to blacks. Stern is concerned with the former in this chapter. Using bivariate correlation analysis, he finds that the percentage of black voters is negatively related to the education and income levels of the overall population and to the income level of the nonwhite population.

In chapter six, the volume editors—Moreland, Steed, and Baker—profile those blacks who participated in the 1984 state political party conventions in six southern states. Although descriptive, this chapter makes a very useful contribution to the study of black and southern politics in that it provides for the first time a thorough assessment of the extent to which blacks have succeeded in gaining representation in the two-party system in the South. In chapter seven, Charles Hadley examines the role of black ministers and black political organizations in the 1983 state and local elections in Louisiana. In chapter eight, Theodore Davis examines demographic and economic data on rural Mississippi counties that have black elected officials to develop a profile of those counties where blacks have achieved their greatest representation. Using simple, partial, and multiple regression, Davis finds that in rural Mississippi counties the black proportion of the voting-age population exerts the strongest influence on the level of black political representation. The relationship between the size of the black population and the level of black political representation is so uniformly documented in the black political literature that it is one of the strongest generalizations established in political science. The percentage of families below the poverty level is the second strongest predictor of black political representation in rural Mississippi counties.

Part III examines the influence of Reverend Jesse Jackson as a candidate

for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1984. Two of the four chapters in this part examine the nature of voter response to Jackson. Douglas Rose and Paul Stekler use a panel study of voters in New Orleans to investigate whether a link exists between racial consciousness and black response to Jackson's campaign. Similarly, David Sears, Jack Citrin, and Ruth Kosterman in chapter 10 employ data from the 1984 National Election Study to examine the differential impact of Jackson's candidacy on northern and southern whites and to explore the implications of Jackson's candidacy for southern politics. The authors' principal finding is that Jackson's white support was centrally determined by racial attitudes, with southern whites being much more subject to being influenced by racial considerations than northern whites.

The two remaining chapters of part III examine the reactions of party activists to Jackson's candidacy. Lee Bernick and Charles Pryby use data on black delegates to the 1984 political party convention in seven southern states to examine delegate responses to Jackson. Bernick and Pryby's analysis in this chapter makes an excellent contribution to the black and southern political literature. One could quarrel with their decision to use, in effect, as a guiding hypothesis the assumption that Jackson black state convention supporters would have been less politically involved in party activities than non-Jackson black state convention supporters. Certainly informal factors regarding delegate selection for state conventions favor political actors with a record of active involvement in party activities. It is not surprising that their analysis disconfirmed this assumption. The authors conclude that Jackson's support came disproportionately from liberal activists, those who thought that Jackson's chances of winning the general election were not much worse than Mondale's, and those who thought that Jackson's impact on the Democratic party would be beneficial rather than harmful.

Similarly, John McGlennon analyzes data from surveys of participants in Democratic precinct caucuses and delegates to the 1984 Democratic state convention in Virginia to examine the effect of the Jackson candidacy on black participation in the 1984 Democratic nominating process in that state. McGlennon examines the nature and extent of support for Jackson's 1984 candidacy among caucus attenders and convention delegates. Similar to Bernick and Pryby, McGlennon finds that the Jackson candidacy attracted a large number of individuals who have substantial experience in Democratic party activities. McGlennon's analysis also contributes to a clearer understanding of the subject in the Bernick and Pryby chapter relative to whether Jackson stimulated newcomers to political activity. McGlennon sees that that was the case.

Part IV provides a most useful perspective on the other of the two most important issues in the study of current black politics—that is, the impact of different election rules on black representation. Richard Engstrom and

Michael McDonald examine the impact of electoral arrangements (for example, at-large versus district election systems) on the chances for black electoral success. The authors examine the extent to which the underrepresentation of blacks on city councils in the South is a function of the type of election system used and the role that anti-single-shot voting may play in this regard. Using regression analysis, Engstrom and McDonald find that black representation on city councils outside the South is more proportional than it is within the South, and that this is explained by the greater magnitude of at-large elections and a prohibition on single-shot voting in the South.

Chapters by Harold Stanley, Charles Bullock, and Loch Johnson assay the accusation that blacks are disadvantaged by the use of runoff primaries in southern politics. Rejecting the argument that the runoff primary system in the South disadvantages blacks' electoral prospects, Stanley argues that abolishing the runoff primary would retard the election of blacks to public office and concomitantly favor the growth of the Republican party in the South. Abolishing the runoff primary would allow blacks to win more Democratic nominations for officeholding, but they would generally lose the general election to the Republican candidate who would benefit from the greater reluctance of southern whites to vote for a black candidate. The authors examine data on runoffs held between 1970 and 1984 to fill statewide congressional and state-level legislative and executive offices. Using bivariate and multivariate analysis, Bullock and Johnson find that incumbency exerts the strongest influence on the incidence of runoff elections. The relationship is negative—that is, there are more runoffs when there are fewer incumbents running for reelection. The authors also find that although the size of the black population fell just short of being a statistically significant predictor, it did increase the explanatory power of their model for Democratic runoffs. States with larger black populations are more likely to have runoff elections. Similar to Stanley, Bullock and Johnson feel that runoff elections are not particularly harmful to the political interests of blacks.

Stanley's *Voter Mobilization and the Politics of Race* examines southern electoral expansion since the 1950s. The critical questions examined are why the expansion occurred and what are its consequences. One of the author's principal points is that white voter registration in the South far exceeded that of blacks. The author's data base consists of voter surveys provided by the Survey Research Center of the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan. The data that Stanley consulted consist of responses from 4,521 respondents in the 11 states of the former Confederacy for each presidential election since 1952. In addition, the author uses interview data to bolster the survey data. During 1978 and 1979, the author interviewed 70 southerners who were active in voter registration, politics, and civil rights during the previous three decades.

Chapter two focuses on the factors which contributed to greater turnout

among southern voters and presents the methodology used to assess the relative importance of these factors. Several groups of factors are considered in this regard: racial concerns, socioeconomic characteristics, political attitudes, political competition, media usage, registration requirements, and state effects. Using multivariate logit analysis, Stanley finds that restrictive registration requirements exerted the strongest impact on explaining increased black registration. Shifts in political attitudes and competition and eased registration contributed the most toward explaining increased white registration. One rather surprising finding is that, contrary to popular belief, racial countermobilization did not exert significant influence in explaining the degree of turnout increase. For both blacks and whites, changes in racial attitudes exerted the least potent impact in increasing voter turnout.

In chapter three, Stanley teases out the impact of racial attitudes on increased turnout in the South. Again, contrary to popular belief, Stanley finds that the tumultuous 1950s and 1960s did not result in a mobilization of previously nonvoting whites. Moreover, Stanley finds that there is a negative connection between a county's black population percentage and the frequency of white voting. The greater the black vote, the less likely whites were to attempt to countermobilize.

Chapter seven examines the region-wide consequences of the increased registration and voter turnout in the South in terms of political balance between the two parties, support for government policy, and voter-government relations. Stanley shows that partisan change in the South has been substantial. While Democratic identifiers comprised three-quarters of the voting-age population in 1952, by 1984 they comprised a slight majority of 52%. Republicans' experiences have been in the opposite directions from those of Democrats as Republican identifiers rose 14% to 31% between 1952 and 1984. Independents increased from 2% to 15% during this period. More importantly, blacks and whites have been moving in opposite directions over this period. Among blacks, Democratic identifiers increased from 56% to 75%. Among whites, Democratic identifiers declined from 80% to 46%. Therefore, by 1984, three quarters of blacks, but less than half of whites, identified with the Democratic party, and more than one-third of whites, but only 10% of blacks, identified with the Republican party.

Stanley concludes that increased registration and voting has benefited the Democratic party. He fine-tunes this position by observing that it was the increase in black voting which has provided the additional support for the Democratic party. On the other hand, white voters who experienced a larger absolute increase did not have a distinct partisan bias; that is, their increase on balance, neither promoted nor retarded Republican gains.

Blacks in Southern Politics and *Voter Mobilization and the Politics of Race* are good works which significantly advance our understanding of the increasing role that blacks are playing in the political process in the South. They will

be required readings in courses on black politics and southern politics for several years and for those initiating research in these two subfields

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Jesse Jackson and the Politics of Charisma: The Rise and Fall of the PUSH/Excel Program By Ernest R. House (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988. Pp. xi, 196. \$23.95.)

This study has as its substantive base an evaluation by the author and a colleague of the official evaluation of a federally funded, charismatically inspired social and educational program for black teenagers. The problems and politics of educational innovation are only occasional issues of national politics and only occasional concerns of national politicians, including Jesse Jackson.

However, Jackson also is a charismatic leader, according to the author at least to a substantial segment of this country's black population. This book summarizes the "rise and fall" of the Jackson-inspired PUSH/Excel program as a springboard for discussing Jackson's leadership.

The PUSH/Excel program was initiated by Hubert Humphrey in December 1977 from his hospital bed after he heard Jackson describe on television a movement he was trying to launch to get black youths to stay in school and succeed there. As narrated by House, Humphrey called Joseph Califano, then secretary of HEW, and asked him to help Jackson. The federal government created and funded a national program to institutionalize an educational reform that had begun as a self-help grass-roots movement. The government program included an evaluation component which applied concepts based on the evaluators' experiences with rural development in Thailand.

The book emphasizes that Jackson's charisma derives from his preaching and his ministry in the black Baptist church as well as from his success in gaining the attention of the media. The church also is his power base, as it was that of Martin Luther King, whose mantle Jackson successfully appropriated. Church, school, and family had reinforced one another to shape Jackson's southern boyhood and direct his life. Their mutual reinforcement had been part of his vision and goal for helping urban black teenagers achieve middle-class status. But his vision did not translate into a program that worked in the schools or which met the federal evaluators' criteria of success.

Part one of the book narrates and condenses the history of the PUSH/Excel program and why and how it became a failure in all cities but one. The narrative is based on extensive documentation, including the federal evaluation which helped bring an end to federal funding and the author's own "metaevaluation" of the federal evaluation. Part two, "Jesse Jackson and the

Power of Charisma,⁷ concludes that the program could not have succeeded nationally because it was based on charisma, whereas Jackson was not charismatic to white educational bureaucracies—the crusade shattered against racial politics, against a negative and corrosive federal evaluation, and upon the inability of the PUSH/Excel staff to develop a more systematic program” (142). The book continues with a chapter on “The Politics of Race and Social Class,” which views the schools as arenas in which diverse ethnic and socioeconomic groups compete for educational advantage. The concluding chapters focus on Jackson’s character and presidential campaigns.

Jackson’s Middle East visit to Ararat in September 1979 was disastrous for the PUSH/Excel program. The visit eroded the program’s local support in cities around the country outside their black communities. But Jackson’s own ambitions as a national black leader included this appearance on the international political scene.

This study adds another case to those which show how powerful political figures can bring into existence a program which was not thought through, not pretested, for which there was an insufficient local political base, and which was not given enough time to realize its potential. The author’s focus on Jackson apparently led him to search political theory for theoretical explanations of Jackson’s successes and failures. It is to be regretted that the author is less than meticulous in his application of all the theories he quotes or to which he obviously is indebted. For example, despite his emphasis on Jackson as a textbook case of charismatic political leadership, he fails to present clear evidence that Jackson is indeed charismatic according to the criteria of the theory he employs. Nonetheless, in bringing to bear on the Jackson phenomenon a body of literature not commonly juxtaposed, this book makes an interesting contribution.

Dorothy Willner *University of Kansas*

The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation. By John M. Mendeloff. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988. Pp. 321. \$35.00.

This book is part of the MIT Press series on the “Regulation of Economic Activity,” the purpose of which is “to inform the ongoing debate on regulatory policy by making significant and relevant research available to both scholars and decision makers.” (ix). The author notes that many observers of regulatory activity have either suggested that (1) standards that the federal government has established to reduce workplace risks posed by toxic substances are so strict that we would have been better off by doing nothing, or (2) the slow pace at which standards are set has left us underprotected against a large number of hazards. Instead, the author argues that both observers are right and that “standard setting for toxic substances in the work-

place has been characterized by both overregulation and underregulation (xiii). Indeed, the argument presented in this book is that overregulation is an important cause of underregulation. By that the author means that if standard-setting does not reflect the most efficient approach or is too strict, inaction is often preferred on the grounds that it is the lesser of two evils. An implication of this argument is that if standards are set more sensibly—with more attention to weighing costs and benefits, we should be willing to regulate more extensively than we would otherwise.

The author has three primary objectives in this book. First, in chapters two through four, he presents evidence to suggest that this dilemma does in fact exist. That is, he argues that OSHA standards can be shown to be undesirable when it costs "too much" in some absolute sense. The real cost of this "overregulation" is the deaths that are not prevented because of the ensuing underregulation. Second, in chapters five through seven, he explains how this situation came about. He describes the mechanisms by which stricter standards generate delays. First, strict standards encourage court appeals by industry. Second, strict standards face a higher probability of failing judicial scrutiny. Third, the information that an agency needs to justify a standard is more likely to be withheld by industry groups if they believe that the agency will behave unreasonably. Fourth, both White House economists and political operatives are more likely to try to delay rules that they (or industry) perceive as particularly inefficient or burdensome. And fifth, industry complaints about overregulation are more likely when there are many highly protective standards to complain about. Moreover, similar processes are at work in the area of enforcement and implementation—as well as standard-setting.

Finally, his third objective in chapters eight through ten is to discuss regulatory reform proposals. In this concluding section, Mendeloff examines whether some of the most prominent proposals for regulatory reform will help to resolve the overregulation/underregulation problem. He discusses such reform alternatives as "negotiating regulations," a regulatory budget, and greater use of centralized regulatory analysis. He also looks at substantive alternatives to regulation—such as information strategies and expanded use of the tort system. Finally, in chapter 10, he finds that none of these alternatives provides a sufficient response to the regulatory dilemma. Instead, he proposes a three-step legislative package that could be applied to OSHA and other standard-setting agencies. Essentially, he concludes that policy of more extensive (but less strict) rule making would be preferable to the status quo. Such a policy could both protect more workers and cost less than the current system.

When this book is considered within the context of other diagnoses of the regulatory (and especially the environmental) dilemma, it makes a solid contribution to the debate on assessing the failures of (and prospects for) the

cessful regulation. He views the regulatory dilemma primarily in terms of failures in regulatory policy design, as opposed to those who view regulatory failure in structural terms (e.g., William Ophuls, Murray Bookchin, and Robert Heilbroner). The latter advocate drastic changes in our system of governance in order to ensure that the public is adequately protected from environmental threats. In fact, there is a growing body of literature that views the regulatory dilemma quite differently and prescribes vastly different solutions to the environmental problem. For example, we have the 'Hobbesians' and 'Structural Reformers' (including such individuals as Garrett Hardin, Robert Heilbroner, Herman Daly, and Lynton Caldwell). These individuals advocate major (or minor) institutional changes to deal with regulatory failure. We also find the 'Guardians' (e.g., Alvin Weinberg) who advocate the installation of a technocratic elite to govern environmental standard-setting and regulatory practices. There are also the 'Reform Ecologists' who advocate ecologically sound public policies (e.g., Barry Commoner, Paul Ehrlich, and Lester Brown), the 'Social Ecologists' (e.g., Murray Bookchin) who advocate a rejection of the capitalistic system in favor of 'anarcho-communism', the 'Deep Ecologists' (e.g., Bill Devall and George Sessions), who advocate decentralization of authority and a massive change in our public attitudes toward the environment, and the 'Neo-Conservative Regulatory Reformers' (e.g., Murray Weidenbaum) who advocate less regulation. The latter group argue that rules which set strict standards (e.g., the Delaney amendment, or absolute ambient air quality standards) run the risk of reducing the profitability of many businesses and the entire performance of the American economy.

Clearly, this book falls into the latter camp of thinkers with its advocacy of less strict standards, although Mendeloff's motivation for his position is presumably to make regulation more effective by making it more reasonable. As such, this book presents an important point of view that needs to be considered in any graduate course in regulatory or environmental policy. Moreover, anyone with a serious interest in the subject of social regulation would also profit enormously from reading this perceptive and well-written book.

James P. Lester, Colorado State University

Collapse of an Industry: Nuclear Power and the Contradictions of U.S. Policy. By John L. Campbell. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985.

Pp. xiii, 231. \$32.50 cloth, \$11.95 paper.

Nuclear Fear: A History of Images. By Spencer R. Weart. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985. Pp. xiv, 335. \$29.50 cloth.

Both Campbell and Weart provide excellent analyses of the history of nuclear power in the United States, though their approaches to the subject

could not be more different. Campbell's is a neo-Marxist discussion of the interplay between state institutions and private sector actors, focusing on financial and institutional arrangements surrounding the collapse of the civilian nuclear power industry. Weart's is a wide-ranging history of popular images associated with radiation and nuclear power, both in its civilian and military uses. Both provide important and complementary insights into the peculiar nature of the nuclear industry.

Campbell's book focuses on the interplay between the actions of government on the one hand and the private sector on the other as they combined to create a national policy leading to the abandonment of nuclear power as a major source of electricity generation in the United States. Particularly impressive is his demonstration of the interrelationship between the state and the private economy through the stock and bond markets, a topic too often ignored in political science and public policy studies, despite its importance in determining the reaction of investors and businesses to political events.

Campbell describes how the nature of the industry surrounding civilian nuclear power contributed to its own demise. In contrast to the smaller European countries which restructured their industries to ensure standardization of plant design and economies of scale, competition among plant designers and utilities during the 1960s led each to propose larger, specially designed, and untested plants, each different from the next. Despite a consensus that standardization of plant design would lead to tremendous savings and perhaps make the industry viable, the United States is the only major nuclear country in which almost every nuclear plant is largely custom built (p. 32). Governmental structures also contributed to the failure of standardization, as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's efforts to encourage it were inhibited by the antitrust laws. Architect-engineering firms whose designs were not chosen could argue that standard designs favored one firm over another, which they inevitably did. In other countries with more powerful executive agencies dealing with restructured industrial giants, standardization was indeed a key to the relative financial success of the nuclear industry.

Campbell describes the shifts in policy arenas which characterized the nuclear power industry in the 1970s, though he does not analyze their causes as fully as he might. Public acceptance of nuclear power never enthusiastic began to drop dramatically in the wake of changes within the community of experts. As conflict erupted in the governmental and administrative circles which once dominated policymaking for this issue, decision making shifted to other arenas. As the issue moved from one arena of policymaking to another, it attracted the attention of increasing numbers of policymakers, not all of whom shared the goals of the original proponents. Though Campbell does not specifically refer to Schattschneider, his analysis of how the issue attracted different groups of people as it changed in character fits in very closely to Schattschneider's description of the expansion of political conflict.

en governmental institutions were redesigned in the mid-1970s, so many ss points were created that proponents lost control. Congressional over- t shifted from one to 28 committees and subcommittees. state govern- its began to play an important role. and a system where proponents had yed almost complete control was transformed into one where opponents e aided by the range of access points.

ventually, the inability of the industry and government to agree on stan- dardization plans, the break up of the governmental consensus in favor of lear energy in the mid-1970s, the problem of waste disposal, reactor ty policy, and finance policy all added up to a disaster of the first order for American nuclear industry, as Campbell makes clear. Yet his theoretical lanation may overemphasize structural factors at the expense of the moti- ons and strategies of those involved. Campbell raises some interesting stions about how those once in control of the issue lost control, noticing xample that "conflict flowed to whatever arena seemed most promising erms of changing or blocking policy" (p. 88). However, he might have n more attention to the mechanisms by which a disparate group of envi- mentalists were able to wrest control from a powerful group of electric ities who at one point exerted virtually monopolistic influence over gov- mental decision makers, but who nonetheless allowed themselves to be maneuvered. Campbell provides a wealth of information about this ques- i, but he does not make it central to his thesis.

Campbell attributes many features of American policy toward nuclear en- v to the organization of the state, in particular in his discussion of stan- dardization policy. However, he might have given greater attention to other lanations. For example, the United States was making decisions on stan- dardization at a time when reactor research was advancing by leaps and nds. Standardization in the 1960s implied prohibiting utilities from ering the most recent designs. Of course this is exactly what the French , as Campbell correctly notes, and the organization of the French state is eed one aspect of the explanation for this important difference. Still, the nch did not standardize on the Westinghouse design until the mid-1970s, ecoming from the growth and experimentation in plant designs in the ited States throughout the 1960s. Not only the organization of the state, t a number of other factors, including the product cycle and the allocation research and development costs, influenced the success or failure of na- al nuclear power programs.

Campbell makes several important contributions to the literature, in par- ular tracing the complex history of the relationship between state and so- ty, between politics and markets, and the contradictions of U. S. policy in ' nuclear field. His book will be of interest to anyone concerned with the ture of the policy process in the United States, to those concerned with ' influence of business in a capitalist system, and to those interested in the

politics of nuclear energy. It provides many important elements which explain such a massive policy disaster.

Weart takes a global approach toward the history of the images surrounding nuclear power, showing the power of symbols and the ways in which popular understandings of the atom have shifted over time. Using the approach of "total history" (433) the author leads the reader through a tremendous range of sources of popular and scientific culture, including comic books, science fiction books, movies, news programs, and newsreels describing and reacting to the major developments in the history of the atom. More than almost any other technology, nuclear power has been associated since its discovery with diverse symbols, ranging from "White Cities" to "Black Death." By focusing on the history of symbols, Weart shows how popular reactions, and public policy toward nuclear power, have often been influenced by poorly understood psychological reactions to a process of which most people have no firm understanding. As he describes in reference to the use of radium as a medicine, "in the absence of knowledge, fantasy had free play" (37) as opponents and proponents made incredible claims both for its curative powers and dangers. Similar patterns of debate through the manipulation of symbols of good and evil have recurred throughout the history of nuclear power. As he correctly points out, "rational argument became less and less prominent in the controversy" (249).

The symbols and images associated with nuclear power have determined popular reactions to it, but they have not always been clearly understood. For example, Weart describes how proponents of nuclear power have never been able to make apparent the relative risks of nuclear versus other forms of power, focusing instead only on the enormous risks of nuclear catastrophe while ignoring the more mundane risks associated with other technologies. In fact, these ideas were developed partly by "atomic scientists and other nuclear industry leaders [who] insisted, with a perverse pride, that reactors were 'by long odds the most dangerous manufacturing process in which men have ever engaged'" (281). By careful attention to the concept of the "maximum credible accident," industry officials also focused attention on the worst fears of the public in a way in which other industries have been careful to avoid. Further, the links between the destructive force of nuclear weapons, the secrecy and deceit associated with weapons testing during the post-war period, and the loss of credibility of the institutions overseeing both the civilian and the military uses of nuclear power led to increased apprehension which was easily exploited by opponents.

Nuclear power has been associated with a number of powerful symbols, as Weart points out, and these symbols, both positive and negative, have been at the heart of public reaction to the technology. Partly, these symbols emerged through a process over which no one exerted control. On the other hand, Weart does mention that "political outsiders" were especially likely to

focus on symbols rather than rational argument (249). Weart may have focused on the reason which Campbell leaves out of his structural analysis of the failure of the civilian nuclear power industry in the United States. Opponents to nuclear energy have been better able than their adversaries to manipulate the powerful symbols of death, destruction, and big government. For some reason, proponents have not been able to focus attention on the positive symbols associated with the technology, even though these may be just as powerful as the negative symbols. Weart does not explain why one group proved better able to manipulate symbols than the other, but he gives much useful information in explaining how such a powerful group of scientists and government officials was able to lose control of a policy debate which they originally dominated.

Taken together, the two books on nuclear power by Campbell and Weart provide an impressive and complementary range of information which explain parts of the complex history of the nuclear power industry. It is noteworthy that two authors can write such different books on such similar topics. Hopefully, future works on this topic will be forced to note both the importance of the structural factors which Campbell makes clear and pay attention to the manipulation of emotional symbols which Weart emphasizes. Each book presents a well documented and convincing case for part of a more complex process.

Frank R. Baumgartner, *Texas A&M University*

Shaping Political Consciousness: The Language of Politics in America from McKinley to Reagan. By David Green. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988. Pp. 277. \$29.95.

Liberalism was the opprobrious label of the 1988 presidential election. George Bush crisscrossed the nation reminding Americans that liberal Democrats are soft on crime, short on patriotism, and sympathetic to interest groups. Despite the Dukakis claim that the campaign was about competence not ideology, in the end, the governor of Massachusetts embraced a particular brand of "liberalism" (i.e., the good kind of Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy) in a last-ditch effort to mobilize the traditional core of the Democratic party. Appropriately or not, the Bush campaign effectively dominated the public's understanding of the liberal label, imposed it on a reluctant Michael Dukakis, and ultimately won the election. This election showed once again that labels matter in politics. Political labels mobilize and direct the electorate, structure political debate and policy possibilities, and grant political leaders legitimacy which leads to the delegation of authority and power. The reward for the effective manipulation of labels can be electoral victory. The 1988 election is an apt illustration of David Green's histori-

cally derived conclusion that labels shape political consciousness, influence political action, and preserve and transform the structure of power

Shaping Political Consciousness is part of a growing body of scholarship which focuses on the influence of language and other symbols on political life. Political labels are important because they are "image-laden, appealing as much to the emotions as to the intellect" (2). They possess an evocative power which causes politicians to fight over them. As a result, politics becomes a struggle to assign meaning to abstract concepts like liberalism or conservatism. These concepts are treated as though they have an actual material existence. This process of reification "accustoms people to think of abstract concepts . . . as things that have real existence and can therefore be defined 'correctly'" (3). The power to shape the publicly accepted meanings of such concepts begets the power to shape public consciousness. There is great danger in the politics of labels. "Labeling implies judgment, and that stops analysis" (12). As a result, the renewal of labels perpetuates social and intellectual passivity and keeps "public analysis of politics . . . and public policy consciousness itself, at a perpetually superficial level" (12). However, the very power of political vocabulary ensures that the reification of specific labels is never permanent" (3). The competition to define political terms is ongoing. The inherent tension between the precision and ambiguity of labels means that "the process of political reification is at once paradoxically self-defeating and self-perpetuating" (3).

Green illustrates these claims by analyzing the labels which have dominated American political discourse and shaped the structure of political power from McKinley to Reagan. This work is at its best in the trenches of detailed historical description. It reveals the history of how various people—mainly presidents and elite political pundits—have used five major "good and bad" label combinations for political purposes. The "individualist" label of the 1860s–1890s—used by corporations and those opposed to corporate power—was juxtaposed to "paternalism." In the 1890s this gave way to McKinley's "conservatism" which stood opposed to "radicalism." From 1900–1930 the dominant tension was between "progressives" variously defined by Teddy Roosevelt, Wilson, and even Hoover, and "reactionaries." Rooseveltian "liberalism" replaced the "progressive" label in the 1930s in opposition to "conservatism." During the end of the Truman presidency the "anticommunist" label appeared.

Since Eisenhower's "middle of the road" label, which was a "moderate conservatism" embracing the New Deal, America has developed no new vocabulary. Instead political discourse has occurred through negative self-definition. While Kennedy and Johnson identified themselves as "liberals" both based the political and economic policies upon a negative, "anticommunist presumption" (253). Ronald Reagan—a master in the art of linguistic confusion—frequently quoted Franklin Roosevelt in support of his "conservative

ion." According to Green, "[k]eeping alive the debate about 'liberalism' versus 'conservatism' was a distraction that effectively diverted attention from the fact that Reagan's most important political label was not 'conservative' but 'anticommunist'" (257). The era of negative self-definition: George Bush made it abundantly clear that he is *not* a liberal, but it is impossible to say what he is.

Living Political Consciousness also contains a number of important propositions. (1) A change in labels does not imply a change in policies—and *contra* Teddy Roosevelt changed McKinley's language of conservatism to progressivism without really changing his political outlook (54–55). (2) Labels are inherently contradictory and herein lies much of their political power. Contradiction facilitates social adjustment and provides political leadership with the latitude necessary to pursue public policies. Wilson, for example, shifted to the liberal label because the war could not be pursued under the claims of progressivism. To effectively conduct the war Wilson eventually combined an appeal to liberty with a demand for massive coercion (85). Roosevelt's response to the Great Depression was to modify Wilson's vision of liberalism to include the politics of democratically distributed generosity. Coercion as freedom and confiscation as generosity are twin hallmarks of a redefined liberalism (123). (3) Victory in politics is achieved not by transmitting one's language to supporters but by transmitting it to one's critics (29). Critics fail because they lodge their attacks in the language of the prevailing idiom. Green advises critics to construct a language of dereification which would offer a cumulative analysis of how language manipulation works (89). (4) We should beware of 'custodial realism' which accepts prevailing labels as concepts for research. Criticism is most useful when we accept the concepts of those who hold power. Unfortunately, Green concedes that there is not an investigative vocabulary that is truly independent and noncustodial. There is only awareness—and no room, the paradox (18).

Living Political Consciousness is not without problems. This book is exclusively about elites and what they have to say to and about each other. It does not account for the influence of political labels on the general public.

Once the dominance of a label has been established, its influence on politics is assumed to follow. This assumption is not explicitly addressed. In addition, a strong antistate, almost libertarian, bias dominates Green's political analysis. Those who advance the role of the state are manipulated, while those who fail to effectively criticize and halt this development are praised. Finally, Green is missing the influence of the prevailing distribution of power. Finally, Green is missing the ability to explain why and how political discourse changes. Political vocabulary changes in response to the needs of its user at the time and in relation to a larger evolutionary pattern (7). That pattern is identified as moving toward greater governmental coercion and control. However, we are

neither told why one set of labels works better than another nor what accounts for this evolutionary development in America.

Green advises us to free ourselves from the power of language; discursive change is essential to accomplish that. For those committed to an authentic public life, this task commands immediate attention.

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Constitutional Faith. By Sanford Levinson. (Princeton: Princeton Press, 1988. Pp. xii, 250. \$19.95.)

Sanford Levinson's new book demands to be understood on its own terms. *Constitutional Faith* does not attempt to prove a thesis. It invites us to join the author in an intellectual enterprise. Levinson is not saying that the U.S. Constitution is the equivalent of divine law or should be treated as a sacred text. The objections to that thesis are, or should be, to require discussion. Levinson anticipates, and shares, our doubts (121) at even the comparison. But he maintains that important aspects of our constitutional tradition can be illuminated by taking seriously the suggestions implied by treating the Constitution as a central feature of 'civil religion' (90). He accepts the analogy between 'the law of the land' and 'the law of God'. This learned, provocative study proves his point: we can learn from the analogy. Its failure is its neglect of the analogy's crucial, and far from obvious, implications.

This book is the work of a mature scholar who demonstrates his command of his subject. Levinson masterfully integrates the disparate fields of law, history, and theology. He has the courage to write about himself. His personal revelation clarifies his argument. His work stimulates the reader's own analysis. *Constitutional Faith* is an outstanding contribution to the study of public law.

The Constitution is a paradox. As John Marshall declared in *Marbury v. Madison*, it is 'superior paramount law'. As such, it has often been treated as if it were, indeed, sacred. Edward Corwin dealt with this problem years ago, in 'The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law' (*Harvard Law Review* 42). Levinson takes the analogy seriously, and routes it into analytical as well as normative theory.

He finds a marked structural resemblance between theoretical interpretation and theological doctrines. He explores the relationship between what he labels the 'protestant' tradition of textualism and a commitment to individual interpretation ('judges' and 'commentators') and the 'catholic' tradition of extratextual sources and 'interpretive authorities'. He uses the resulting fourfold comparative method to provide original interpretation of jurists who range chronologically from the Founding Fathers to the present.

ial to Robert Bork, and ideologically from Laurence Tribe to Edwin

Levinson also recognizes what he might label 'jewish' and 'christian' notions of community—membership in the former is derived from kinship while the latter tradition bases membership on belief. His discussion of oaths, which he compares to creedal affirmations, suggests our historical preference for a 'christian' definition. The reader may suspect, although the author does not insist, that Americans have tended to adopt this notion of community in an extreme form.

The analogy's value does not end here. Even sacred texts do not uniformly affirm standards of perfect virtue. The Old and New Testaments contain passages that are as morally dubious as anything in the Constitution. Such passages range from the ambiguous (the many which appear to endorse slavery) to the blatant (Paul's exhortation that slaves obey their masters). Compare these to the Fifth Amendment's implication that loss of limb is an acceptable punishment as long as the accused is only tried once, and the Fifteenth Compromise or Service or Labor Clause.

The difficulty, though, is that a constitution—unlike a sacred text—does not define a moral code. It lays down rules which are ethical as well as legal—must treat one another fairly, not shut one another up, etc.—but these are minima, not maxima. Levinson frequently compares the public community of the polity to the private community created by marriage. But marriage in which the partners must speak of rights, rules, or equality is ill shaped. Religious doctrine, at its best, calls human beings to moral excellence in a way that law cannot and should not.

However paramount the Constitution may be—and however greatly relied on—it remains secular, positive law. It was written and is interpreted by fallible human beings with recognizable interests. If the Critical Legal School had done nothing else, its insistence on confronting us with this reality would have justified its existence. Levinson is well aware of this aspect of the Constitution's character, and—unlike many law professors—he is generous enough to acknowledge a debt to the 'Crits'. His discussion of the tension between principle and practice—and indeed, between competing principles—does not resolve the contradictions. But it does illuminate his own willingness to 'sign' the Constitution at the bicentennial exhibit in Philadelphia in 1987.

What, to the American slave, is your Fourth of July? Frederick Douglass asked in 1852. Herein lies the most obvious source of disquiet with Levinson's analogy, the conflict between any notion of the Constitution which partakes of the sacred, and the all-too-secular historical commitments to and acceptance of oppressive practices. Levinson cannot make the disquiet go away, but his honest and persuasive treatment of the conflict affirms constitutional faith in the presence of doubt.

Douglass is a prominent figure in this book. The great abolitionist's acceptance of the Constitution, despite his "outsider" status, is echoed in our own century by Barbara Jordan, one of the first black women to sit in Congress (in the 1970s): "My faith in the Constitution is whole. It is complete. It is total" (15). But Levinson is troubled by what we might call the "antibicentennial speech given by Thurgood Marshall. In May 1987, the justice characterized the original charter as 'defective from the start' (187). This conflict has its religious counterpart, too, compare the careers of Barbara Harris, the first woman bishop of the Episcopal Church, and Mary Daly, who rejected Christianity as inherently rather than tangentially patriarchal.

Levinson chose to sign Douglass' "ability to speak in the terms of the Constitution—and to stretch the sense of constitutional possibility—helped me to overcome my genuine doubts that had been reinforced by John Marshall's speech" (192). One outward sign of these possibilities is the presence of amendments which have alleviated much of what has been racist, sexist, or otherwise exploitative. These changes may have made the Constitution more acceptable to those once excluded from full participation.

'Could Barbara Jordan,' the author asks, 'necessarily sign even the 1868 Constitution?' (189). He does not know. But even to ask the question is to place an undue emphasis on constitutional language at the expense of context. In 1868, Jordan would not have been asked. Neither would Douglass have been asked in 1789. Their votes did not count. If either of their opinions had mattered then, why should they not have signed? They would almost certainly have been signing a different document from the original. But even the identical document would not have been the white man's Constitution which Thurgood Marshall condemned. What would the Service or Labor Clause have mattered, had there been no slaves? The analogy between Constitution and civil religion can blur these problems for us.

Levinson's discussion of the symbolic "signing" ignores the real difficulty with the ritual: not that the Constitution is harder for some to sign than for others, but that anyone should have dreamed up this practice at all. Like most of the continued bicentennial celebrations, even those few not dominated by white males, it partakes of collective self-congratulation. It has the worst characteristics of a loyalty oath. As the 1988 presidential campaign showed, affirmations of patriotism are not yet optional in this country, whether or not they are coerced. These events recall Nicholas Von Hoffman's description of the ultimate victory of McCarthyism: "Since the early 1950s no man's loyalty is presumed, he must manifest it, say it, swear it, and pledge it, not once but again and again" (*Citizen Cohn* 1988, 177). However valuable Levinson's analogy is, ultimately it reinforces acceptance of authority.

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State, Power and Democracy: Contentious Concepts in Practical Political Theory By John Hoffman (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988. Pp. 219. \$39.95 cloth.)

When Marx wrote in his critique of Feuerbach that we must grasp the significance of "practical-critical activity," he claimed to have effectively moved beyond the seductive abstractions of speculative philosophy and taken up the analysis of society and the state. John Hoffman, invoking this spirit of critical and practical theory, endeavors to rethink the political concepts of the state, power, and democracy beyond "the subversive abstractions and theological niceties" of classical and contemporary liberal thought. This task of reconceptualization demands attention because these core concepts have become highly politicized, and therefore contentious, in the wake of the new conservatism and ideological politics of the 1980s. By adopting a new analytic framework for each concept, as well as their more complex triadic interrelationship, Hoffman seeks to expose, once and for all, the glaring contradictions of the liberal tradition. His critique culminates in a reassertion of the legitimacy of participatory democracy. That is, a critical theory of democracy which squarely faces the realities of contemporary state-centered politics as well as the paradoxical power-authority relation. The goal is "true democracy." The discourse is Marxist.

All three concepts under revision must be grasped from a relational perspective. The state cannot be theorized without society; the question of legitimacy hinges on the complex relationship between power and authority; and liberal democracy must be decoupled and critiqued as essentially a contradiction in terms. It is these conceptual couplings that are broken down and subject to reformulation: these antinomies that stand in need of reconciliation and transcendence. Hoffman's study impressively combines intellectual depth and breadth. He draws extensively upon traditional political philosophy, political science, and recent social and political theory. He rejects the old Anglo-American alternatives of analytic philosophy and behavioral political science. Both modes of analysis, objectivistic and artificially divorced from political reality, belong to the now bygone period of welfare state consensus politics. The crisis years of the 1970s and 1980s demand a more practical and normative approach. Political theory, therefore, should situate itself in between the strictly academic and the highly ideological; i.e., it should be practical and problem-oriented. This is why the state is the subject of concern and not "the political system," why the liberal-democratic view of power is determined to be one-dimensional, and why the most contested concept in political theory, democracy, is freed from liberal mystifications. Political theory, in sum, establishes its territory in between political philosophy and political science.

Hoffman defines the state as a pathological paradox. It is both the prod-

uct of divisions within society and the producer of social contradictions. It seeks to protect an essentially nonexistent community that it has helped to create. Both libertarian-conservative and Marxist-anarchist camps strive to get rid of it, yet one always ends up with the Rousseauian paradox of humans "everywhere in chains" coming together to realize self-governance. Hoffman defines the state in terms of its relation to civil society. The state is an entity which embodies the institutionalization of highly concentrated social relations. Contemporary societies are state-centered formations in which all social relations are power relations. The difference between social and political power lies in the degree of concentration, the level of complexification. And as societies become more complex, the 'stateness' of societies increase in kind. The replacement of politics with administration becomes more evident. However, while acknowledging this trend and the necessity of a state-centered theory of politics, Hoffman adopts the politics of the 'transitional state,' the state gradually dissolving back into society as a more diffuse matrix of social power under pressure from below.

This understanding of the relation between the state (political power) and society (social power) is in turn crucial to Hoffman's working through the relationship between power and authority—the riddle of Machiavelli's *centaur* and Weber's formula of 'legitimate violence.' All relationships involve a mixture of power and authority. Power is primary. Authority arises out of power. Yet authority shapes the parameters within which power sustains and reproduces itself. Power cannot survive apart from authoritative grounding. Yet power, whether it be political (state) or social (society) involves coercion. Whether its locus is individual actors or collective structures, it involves a dialectic of control. Authority, differing in degree rather than kind, invokes the mediation of rational persuasion. Here Hoffman employs a rather restricted concept of authority. Authority can—and does, tap the deeper layers of the social unconscious and cultural tradition. The point here is that social authority relates as much to identity formation as it does to the more political-theoretic conceptualization of political power. Hoffman is more concerned with establishing the fact that all human relations involve coercion from the 'coercion of circumstances' (authority) to 'legitimate violence' (power). The level of concentration is the determinant factor here. Dahl (pluralism) and Domhoff (elitism), Poulantzas (structure), and Miliband (action), neither fully realize the three-dimensional nature of power (Lukes not fully appreciate the dialectical relation between freedom and necessity (Marx). What must be grasped is that analytic distinctions exist within a synthetic unity, that 'the interpenetrating character of the power/authority relationship' (127) enables us to better assess the autonomy/ domination mix of all types of human interaction. It further allows us to posit the possibility of a deconcentrated society in which self-discipline increasingly displaces the institutionalized coercion of the state.

Finally, Hoffman turns to the most ambiguous and promiscuous of political concepts, democracy. All modern societies claim to be democratic, yet democracy is in actuality "a name for what we cannot have." Neither the ancient nor modern liberal-democratic political traditions can claim to be exemplars of democracy. From classical "natural hierarchies" to abstract contractarianism, to the conservative federalism of the Founding Fathers, to utilitarianism, and to the Cold War, Hoffman brilliantly reconstructs the cunning liberal appropriation and ideological manipulation of "democracy." The particularistic use of democratic universalism is the key to understanding the modern liberal tradition. Yet can liberals become democrats? Hoffman turns to C. B. Macpherson's critical analysis of liberal democracy and the "transitional liberals." Here he disagrees with Macpherson's thesis that John Stuart Mill's model of developmental democracy signalled the transition from liberalism to democracy. Mill retreated from democracy just as the New Liberals (J. H. Green and L. T. Hobhouse) took refuge in the notion of the abstract state rather than the abstract individual and as the post-World War II theorists of democratic elitism (the equilibrium liberals) sought shelter in Cold War realism and abstracted empiricism. If democratic elitism can keep contemporary liberals from despair, the price to be paid is the revitalization of liberalism as conservative reaction. The New Right, with its return to classical liberalism and hypercapitalism, to Hayek and Friedman, talks Lockean minimalism and practices Hobbesian statism. The contradictions of liberal democracy are most fully revealed as democracy is jettisoned. The antagonistic discourses of elitism and participation contest the concept of democracy as traditional modes of representation find themselves increasingly displaced.

Emerging from this powerful critique of liberal democracy, Hoffman ends his impressive exercise in critical political thinking rather abruptly. We are told that the necessary transition from elitism to participation involves the abandonment of the liberal discourse: that democracy, which must be understood as both a state form and popular self-government, can only be realized through a socialist state; that the ideal of the transitional state can only be implemented in a postcapitalist society; and that participatory democracy can only be achieved through a state-centered, and not a society-centered, politics of transformation. A nonstatist socialist strategy is unrealistic. Here Hoffman is critical, and rightly so, of the vast majority of participatory democrats who avoid a direct confrontation with the omnipresent reality of state power. The debate between Marx and utopian socialism lives on. Yet the solution to this impasse is less an either/or option, but rather a question of both/and. Models of the "transitional state" and the "dual society" both have their place in radical democratic theory.

Hoffman's revisioning of the state, power, and democracy is ambitious yet incomplete. Two additional sections need to be presented: Democracy and

Marxism" and "Power, Authority, and Human Identity." The Marxist tradition, as I'm sure Hoffman knows too well, is replete with its own "subversive abstractions and theological niceties." Democratic state-socialism must be subject to the same dialectical critique that is launched against liberal state capitalism. What exactly does it mean to be a democratic socialist today? Where are the "transitional socialists" to be found who have made the leap from old, anachronistic models to post-Marxist, post-welfare state theorizing? And does participatory democracy represent a qualitative transcendence of both liberal and Marxist paradigms? The theoretical configuration of the state, socialism, and democracy must be reconstructed if we are really to make sense of our present historic situation of in-betweenness vis-à-vis state-capitalism and state-socialism.

More fundamentally, the entire edifice of Hoffman's exercise must be underpinned by a more profound rethinking of the relation between power conceived of as the field of structured action, authority understood as the historical-hermeneutic medium of cultural reproduction, and the structuration of human identity. This triadic relationship is the base of a state-society and democracy superstructure. Thus, the key concept of democracy is enriched by the fact that it is understood as a political form and a cultural way of life. The subversive logic of democracy, concludes Hoffman, allows us to transcend both the market and the state. Yet the political implementation of this ideal still rests upon the old Gramscian insight into cultural hegemony. The question of "cultural materialism" is precisely what forces us to dig deeper and explore the more complex dynamics of human identity formation and democratic self-constitution.

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Nietzsche and Political Thought. By Mark Warren. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988. Pp. 311. \$25.00.)

Nietzsche's political thought continues to vex even his most sympathetic interpreters. Previous interpretations can be roughly divided into two categories. The first explicitly or implicitly associates Nietzsche's philosophy with a politics of domination (Dannhauser, Eden, MacIntyre, Stern, Strauss). The second disassociates his philosophy from his politics and denies the importance of the latter. This category includes primarily philosophical (Kaufmann, Schacht) and more literary (Derrida, Nehamas) interpretations. In *Nietzsche and Political Thought*, Mark Warren provides a third approach and a middle ground. (Schutte and Strong, notable exceptions to the above categories, have somewhat similar orientations.) Warren argues that "Nietzsche's philosophy of power is politically relevant but also politically indeterminate" (12). That is, Nietzsche's philosophy does not uniquely determine

his politics. Instead, Nietzsche narrows the political possibilities of his philosophy with several arbitrary assumptions. The most important of these is that the will to power is a will to domination. This assumption violates Nietzsche's own critique of metaphysics (he deduces political domination from a life essence). It also prevents Nietzsche from properly extending his critical, postmodern account of human agency to modern politics (12). In short, Nietzsche 'misunderstood the innovative political implications of his philosophy' (237).

Those implications are Warren's central concern. He sees Nietzsche as a pivotal figure in the transition from modernism to postmodernism. Warren presumes that no political theory, even a postmodern one, can do without a concept of subjectivity. The question then becomes: 'How can humans be subjects of actions, historically effective and free individuals, in a world in which subjectivity is unsupported by transcendent phenomena or metaphysical essences?' (7). Nietzsche's answer lies in his concept of human agency as a social practice. It is this 'situated concept of agency' around which Warren organizes his interpretation of Nietzsche.

In chapter one, Warren offers a structural definition of nihilism. Nihilism refers to 'situations in which an individual's material and interpretive practices fail to provide grounds for a reflexive interpretation of agency' (17). Those situations involve 'a disjunction between experiential and interpretive conditions of agency'. Nihilistic cultures negate the experiential world and thereby 'remove it as a condition of willing'. Chapter two reveals that culture need not function that way. It can also create the potential for agency. According to Warren, Nietzsche associates agency with cultures which foster individuals' self-images as centers of activity. This productive model of political culture is, Warren argues, consistent with Nietzsche's philosophy of power.

Chapter three focuses upon the historicity of power in relation to Nietzsche's theory of truth. Warren argues persuasively that Nietzsche's theory of truth is part of his ontology of practices. By locating the ontological conditions that make human practices possible, the concept of will to power also provides criteria for judging statements about the world as more or less adequate to practice. It is in this sense that Nietzsche has a general, and perhaps plausible, theory of truth (95). In chapter four, Warren further develops his interpretation of Nietzsche's will to power as a desire for agency within the world. He shows how European nihilism developed when cultural ideologies, e.g., Christianity, became implausible and could no longer sustain a precarious sense of agency. Modern metaphysical political theory has, Warren argues, similar implications for agency. Warren concludes that Nietzsche's will to power contains tensions between domination and harmonization. But he argues 'that the conflicts are not so much between modern and post-modern possibilities within Nietzsche's philosophy' as between his

postmodern philosophy and his premodern politics" (113). He concludes that Nietzsche's notion of "the reflexive need for subjectivity" provides better grounds than domination for Nietzschean politics.

The elements of a new power as agency, i.e., Nietzsche's revaluation of science, morality, and art, are the subjects of chapter five. Chapter six considers the place of history, especially the eternal return, in Nietzsche's revaluation. These are the least satisfying chapters, perhaps because Nietzsche's own remarks on these topics are less clear and less complete. They do, however, set the stage for the final chapter on Nietzsche's political thought. Warren's concern throughout is to show that the will to power exposes domination, but does not necessarily embrace it. This chapter presents that argument. Nietzsche's own politics violates the intellectual integrity of his philosophical project. Nietzsche mistakenly associates the will to power with domination, in part, because he does not understand modern institutions, especially markets and bureaucracies. Warren argues that those institutions, not Nietzsche's biological fate, create a pervasive sense of powerlessness and, with it, European nihilism. Nihilism is, then, a social and political problem (as well as a cultural one) and it requires social and political solutions. Nietzsche's concept of agency points toward such solutions in ways he failed to realize.

As this brief summary suggests, Warren's treatment of Nietzsche is sympathetic throughout. He describes his attitude as "cautiously optimistic and reconstructive," saying "I want to know what Nietzsche has to offer, while also explaining why he held many of the seemingly contradictory positions he did" (2). If one shares this orientation, Warren's interpretation is insightful and intelligent. His argument is carefully crafted and thoroughly supported. It also makes Nietzsche interesting, even exciting, for postmodern attempts to reconstruct subjectivity. I wish Warren had said more about the postmodern politics consistent with Nietzsche's philosophy. But, as Warren admits, Nietzsche was not equipped to address this issue and the book is, after all, an interpretation of Nietzsche.

It is Warren's sympathetic orientation which makes me more uncomfortable. That sympathy rests upon the distinction between Nietzsche's philosophy and his politics. Such a distinction is extremely difficult (postmodernists might argue impossible) to make. Warren never does explicitly make it. How does he define philosophy and politics? Where does he draw the line between them? More bluntly, why is the objectionable Nietzsche political and the attractive Nietzsche philosophical? Warren's own assumptions about acceptable politics may motivate this distinction. He says that we "ought not to accept these [Nietzsche's political] assumptions since they are not very good ones" (247). I agree. But Warren begs the question. Why are they not good ones? Why would others be better? Warren needs to acknowledge his

political assumptions, better yet to defend his political alternative. Otherwise his politics may appear to be as arbitrary as those of Nietzsche.

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Liberal Utilitarianism: Social Choice Theory and J. S. Mill's Philosophy By Jonathan Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985 Pp 398 \$39.50)

This is a complex book. It could well have been two or—stretching a bit—three books. It puts forward first a set of proposals in social choice theory which build on a formalization of the distinction between higher and lower pleasures. Within the utilitarian tradition this distinction has come to be associated with the work of John Stuart Mill. The resulting complex form of utilitarianism can avoid some of the paradoxes and impossibility results that have been the mainstay of social choice theory. The book also—and quite independently—presents an interpretation of John Stuart Mill's version of utilitarianism. It ends finally with a set of interesting comments on questions of institutional design which are again relatively autonomous from the social choice results and the interpretation of Mill.

The book is somewhat schizophrenic—the different elements being only loosely connected to each other. As a unified and coherent treatise it leaves something to be desired. But so what? It is the details that matter more than overall coherence and it is the details that make this an important book in my judgment. Riley contributes to a new kind of political and moral theory, one more nearly endogenous to the social sciences, and requiring serious formalization as well as, in some cases, though not in Riley's book, empirical evidence and testing. The literature in this area has become quite rich, including (in random order) Rawls, Harsanyi, Sen, Elster, Roemer, Rae, Hardin, Kolm, Gauthier, Barry, Oppenheimer and Frohlich, and many others. Some of the literature is predominantly formal, but the most useful contributions integrate formal theory, philosophical argument, and empirical evidence.

Riley's formal model is a utilitarianism based on a vector valued conception of utility, instead of the more usual real valued conception. We are assumed to have not a single hierarchy of preferences but a hierarchy of hierarchies of preferences. Utilitarianism, therefore, does not aggregate only at one level, but at multiple levels. Different moral conceptions define different such metahierarchies. John Stuart Mill's is simply one such conception proposing one particular metahierarchy of this type. The middle of Riley's book presents this conception in some detail, shifting for this purpose from theory of social choice to the interpretation of philosophical texts.

Mill's metahierarchy expresses, in essence, a preference for a certain kind of character, a liberal utilitarian one. Utilitarianism based on this hierarchy has a very different content depending on the setting within which it operates. Only in the ideal situation, in which all parties have achieved the ideal character, will the Millian liberal utilitarianism be identical in form to the simple "Benthamite" version (e.g., maximizing average utility). At all other stages the complexity in the underlying conception of utility forces complexity in the moral consequences.

Riley does not simply construct the liberal utilitarian model fleshing it out with Millian content. He also provides us with a detailed discussion of at least three quite different cases of the model at work, so to speak. He considers the liberal utilitarian responses to Gibbard's rights-exercising paradox and to Sen's Paretian liberal paradox. To set up this discussion he surveys a great deal of the current state of social choice literature. In fact, that discussion alone can be recommended to those who want a sophisticated introduction to this field with something of a political philosophy angle. Riley's third case is quite different. In the last chapter, he shifts from the ideal normative theory which abstracts from the costs of setting up and maintaining institutions, to a more applied theory which takes those costs into account. At this stage Riley comes to be an advocate of a form of liberal constitutionalism with proportional representation.

A final contrast may be helpful in locating Riley's work intellectually. There has been in the last few years something of a revival of utilitarianism, whose new and more sophisticated forms derive serious lessons from game theory and the theory of social choice. Within this revival Riley's book could be seen as standing at the opposite extreme to, say, Hardin's *Morality within the Limits of Reason*. Hardin puts forward a minimalist utilitarianism. He shows how a game-theoretically informed strategic sophistication allows us to squeeze a great deal even out of fairly primitive forms of the utilitarian rule. Riley by contrast moves in the direction of a maximalist utilitarianism: he packs a lot of complexity into the utilitarian rule itself. It is at this level that his inventiveness is focused, with much less concern for the effect of the interdependence of decision making on the consequences of utilitarianism.

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States and Collective Action: The European Experience. By Pierre Buisson. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Pp. 232. \$39.50.)

This is a book that can be read profitably by two audiences. Scholars interested in problems of collective action will find intriguing and challenging the discussions of the relationships between the individual and the state in its different forms. Those whose interests include historical and sociological in

vestigations of the process of state-formation and the functions of the state will also benefit

Birnbaum's purpose is to treat the type of state (strong or weak) as a variable which will serve to account for the behavior of groups, parties, classes and nationalist movements which in every case are organized as a function of the type of state in relation to which they operate. (8) This is ambitious, and Birnbaum is not equally persuasive in examining the effects of the type of state on each of his four dependent variables. But he is at least troubling for his theoretical and historical scope does not allow for easy rejection of his premises or his conclusions.

The first two chapters of Birnbaum's book argue that the utility of approaches to collective action based upon the assumptions of what we can call class or group holism on the one hand and rational individualism on the other is largely a function of the values of the actors who commit themselves to [collective action] together with those of the agents of the particular state against which the mobilization is directed. (54) To determine why such mobilization occurs, both approaches should be used.

Birnbaum makes two points in this discussion of collective action. First the type of collective action that occurs, such as its level of violence, duration, and political content, is determined largely by the type of state, specifically the degree of differentiation and fusion with the ruling class. Second, the incentives for joining collective action vary from the individual-level rational calculations of an atomized society to the holistic society in which "the fusion of the group would be such as to endow it with a consciousness of its own, so that it would enjoy a complete hold over the values of each actor; a free-rider strategy would therefore be unimaginable." (47)

In these two chapters, Birnbaum presents a critique of theories of collective action and of state formation. In regard to the former, Birnbaum may be overly zealous in his dismissal of the utility of Olsonsque models of collective action. Birnbaum concentrates on the incentives for cooperation, and in so doing fails to distinguish fully between two kinds of defection. The first, as he states, entails vertical or horizontal mobility: the actor leaves the group. The second occurs when the individual remains in the group or class but determines that joining a collective movement is not in the individual's best interest. His criticisms of the rational models of collective action are not wrong, they are not complete. But his essential point, that the nature of incentives varies, is crucial for his argument that the structure of the state is responsible for the manner in which collective action occurs and of its goals. This point is persuasively argued.

Birnbaum's thesis that the form of the state determines the nature of collective action is developed more fully in the following chapters. He argues that France, Germany, and Britain have different types of states. For instance, the first two have strong states (differentiated), while Britain's is weak

(nondifferentiated) The states of Germany and Britain represent the interests of the ruling class, France's does not. As a result, collective action took different forms in these three cases. A class-based Marxism was the dominant form in Germany, France's collective action was primarily anarcho-dictatorialism. Both types of action were directed against the strong state. In Britain, however, the weak state was not the target of collective action. Rather, "the British working class did not go to war with the dominant class but negotiated, often violently, with the employers. . . . It almost invariably rejected any recourse to the state, preferring to strengthen itself, the better to assert its rights" (75).

Having outlined his hypotheses about the relationship of the type of state to the form of collective action, Birnbaum moves to discussions of corporatism in the United States, Britain, and France. In addressing the question of why socialism failed to develop in the United States, Birnbaum reiterates his conclusion "that one can correlate the more manifestly collective form of behavior with highly institutionalized states where the public sector has been greatly expanded" (105). Birnbaum then applies this model to the rise of Nazism. In a fascinating argument, Birnbaum maintains that the Nazi movement was directed toward a dismantling ("dedifferentiation ") of the strong Prussian state, with its replacement by the party. Nazi totalitarianism was directed against, not for, a strong state. The Nazi failure to destroy the strong state was due to the rivalries within the movement "the solidarity of Prussian state institutions" (145) and the war. Birnbaum contrasts the purpose of the Nazi movement with Italian fascism, whose goal was to increase the power and scope of the state.

The next chapters are applications of Birnbaum's thesis to the process of state expansion as it occurred in Scotland, Brittany, and Catalonia, the relationship between nationhood, culture, and political mobilization as it developed in the early stages of Zionism, and the rise of a national police force in Britain. These chapters contain interesting arguments, but they do not seem to test Birnbaum's propositions as do the earlier chapters. Indeed, one is somewhat less convinced after these chapters than before.

Birnbaum's book deserves a place among the most preeminent in the history of state-making. He undertakes the necessary task of connecting that process to individual-level values and interests. Collective action is an essential component of any model of the historical dynamics of political and social consolidation. And Birnbaum has developed important arguments that will have to be included in future works in the field.

Glenn Palmer, *State University of New York at Binghamton*

The French Socialists in Power, 1981-1986 Edited by Patrick McCarthy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987. Pp. xii + 212.)

Is Socialism Doomed? The Meaning of Mitterrand By Daniel Singer (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Pp. vi + 324. \$24.95 cloth.)

The French Socialists have long attracted the attention of scholars and pundits—even when the likelihood of their political success seemed distant at best. Their accession to power in 1981 marked the first time in more than 40 years that a government of the Left had ruled in France. This success stimulated a veritable tidal wave of book-length analyses of the Socialists' path to power, their programs, and their achievements from the first months in office. What made the Socialist government so intriguing was that the French Socialists had self-consciously distinguished themselves from other European social democratic parties by their loyalty in party program and doctrine to a fundamentalist brand of socialism. Openly contemptuous of the compromises and accommodations of West European social democrats, the French party was committed to breaking the power of monopoly capitalism and to introducing a new and genuinely socialist society. Thus the French socialist government promised an interesting experience in a democratic approach to a change of society.

The two books reviewed here were written just as the Socialists' first governmental experience in 40 years drew to a close with the election defeat in 1986. They reflect on the Socialist record in achieving the social changes they promised while in opposition and look also at the transformation of the Socialist party itself through the experience of governing. But the two books approach these evaluations with sharply different orientations. For the most part, the contributors to the McCarthy volume find the transformation of the Socialist party and its positions appropriate while Singer bemoans the failure of the Socialist experiment and contemplates its consequences for the future of socialism.

In *The French Socialists in Power*, a number of specialists on French politics assess the politics and policies of the Socialist experience in government from 1981 to 1986. Volkmar Lauber traces the shifting economic policy stands from the "obsolete" (23) and "archaic" (42) positions the party brought into power with it in 1981 to the increasingly realistic—and *laissez-faire* liberal—stands it in fact implemented, especially after 1983. In his chapter on foreign and defense policies, Michael Harrison illustrates how the Socialists' irresponsible rhetoric and policies of the 1970s yielded to acceptance of the Gaullist legacy with doses of Atlanticism and a European aspiration not suggested by their pronouncements while in opposition. Michaela Vaughan notes the transition in Socialist educational policies from the party's dogmatic *laïcité* and attachment to progressive educational reform to Chevènement's focus on republican elitism and discipline in the final years of the So-

cialist government. Ross shows how the Left in power started with desires to improve the lot of workers and to strengthen the unions and ended up accelerating the decline of the labor movement. He does not join in the apparent endorsement of the changes that the other contributors express. Indeed, Ross finds little in the Socialists' record in assisting workers to merit an overall positive assessment. But Ross correctly attributes much of this failure to "the continuation of deep-seated trends" which the Left was unable to control or reverse (124).

McCarthy explains how the party leadership led the way in the programmatic and doctrinal changes and brought along the more militant party rank-and-file as the party changed from a doctrinaire party to one embracing and shaping a national socioeconomic and political consensus. If the Socialists were unable to provide a new vision of socialism, he contends that they were able to offer a vision of social solidarity in providing some relief for the weakest groups in society while acting largely within the new consensus.

These essays, along with chapters on decentralization by Vivien A. Schmidt, on the National Front by Martin A. Scham, and on the Communist party by D. S. Bell and Byron Criddle, provide good but unsurprising summaries of the politics and policies of the Socialist government. While noting the shifts of Socialist practice in government from pre-1981 party positions, these authors find much to praise in the Socialist era. Their chapters resemble accounts with similar conclusions, often by the same authors, of other readers on the Socialist government. With an introduction on the politics leading to the Socialist era and good background information throughout, this is a book for the general reader and undergraduate courses in France or European politics.

Singer's *Is Socialism Doomed?* takes an entirely different viewpoint to the generally optimistic tone of the McCarthy volume. He is in accord with the notion that French Socialists moved away from their convictions as a result of their experience in government. His concern is what this suggests about the prospects for a genuine socialist society emerging from the democratic process. "Is Socialism, then a figment of the imagination, an inspiration unconnected with the rugged reality of modern society?" (7). "A more fundamentally, does the French experience 'mean the end of the belief that such a society can be built gradually, without any qualitative break within the framework of existing institutions?'" (9). Without such a change in society, the western world can look forward only to the inevitable future of the "Manhattan 1990" of American capitalism.

Despite the party's rhetoric, Singer finds that the Socialist leadership was much more moderate than they sounded. The Socialist leaders' realistic nature of their political and electoral coalitions, and the economic and social pressures of governing left the Socialist party with few achievements toward their former goal of a change in society. Singer traces many of the same policy shifts as do the authors in the McCarthy volume but his analysis is less

with accusations of betrayal rather than the schooling of experience in government

Above all, Singer identifies President François Mitterrand 'aloof and saving one thing while doing another' as the principal 'destroyer of dreams'. Mitterrand showed socialists of the western world how they could 'enter the engine room in a moment of crisis as a rescue team and, the takeover completed, continue roughly the same course' (285). As a result, the Socialist party left government in 1986 with little commitment to defend even those few structural changes it had accomplished. Thus, the Socialists opposed the conservative denationalizations after 1986 not by defending the virtues of public ownership but rather on the grounds that the new government was selling off the state's assets at bargain-basement prices.

Singer concludes that 'the French experience does not prove that socialism will not and cannot work' (277). It does indicate the immense task lying ahead for any movement committed to achieving an alternative society. The first step is to 'reinvent' socialism. Singer offers some ideas on the re-linking of socialism, renew its commitment of working toward the 'withering away of the state' even while acknowledging that that objective is far in the future, introduce democracy in the workplace, give greater weight to the 'historical agency' that the working class must play in the transformation of society, build on contemporary mass social movements, and rediscover the national dimension of socialism.

Singer writes with the passion of the believer both in the bitterness of his sense of betrayal of Mitterrand's Socialists and in his hopes for a future socialist movement able to achieve his vision of an alternative to the American model of capitalism. His prescription for 'reinventing' socialism has a familiar ring. He seems to believe that socialists can build a successful electoral coalition based on a frank and sincere commitment to such socialist principles. But the thrust of the contributions in the McArthur volume suggests that it was political and electoral realism, rather than a cynical betrayal of principles, that pushed the Socialists, some willingly, others reluctantly, toward the social, economic, and political consensus that so many have promoted now exists in France.

Frank L. Wilson, *Purdue University*

• *Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic*. By Mohsen M. Milani. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988. Pp. vii, 361. \$29.50 cloth.

In the past decade, a burgeoning literature has appeared on multifarious aspects of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Very few, however, have been of any theoretical substance or value. The present book for the most part falls in the elite category.

Societies, like volcanoes, reveal their content fully only when they erupt. Revolutions as social eruptions reveal the essence of their respective societies and expose broader sociological forces that are responsible for human metamorphosis. *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution* captures the root of this metamorphosis in its historical, economic, social, and political dimensions.

In part I, the author presents an astute and useful overview and critique of prevalent theories of revolution. Then the application and misapplication of these theories by the Middle East experts are evaluated. In the spirit of Hegelian wisdom that "truth is in totality," Milani develops a "holistic" approach to present us with a comprehensive analysis of the causes and the consequences of the Revolution.

Part II provides us with historical background on the constitutional movement of 1906-1909 and the ascendance of the Pahlavi dynasty to power. In this section Milani also probes the causes of the 1963 rebellion led by Ayatollah Khomeini and its role as a "dress rehearsal" for the revolution of 1979. While the author discusses history, he is not satisfied with presenting a mere narrative of events; his expositions for the most part are sustained and refreshing theoretical observations.

This takes the book beyond the narrow confines of most similar case studies on the subject. The present study provides us with many useful insights into similar events in other parts of the third world.

Part III assays the process of uneven economic development. While modernization produced economic growth, it induced political decay, thus precipitating crisis and instability. Industrialization was implemented at the expense of agriculture and it was accompanied by extensive foreign investment and state intervention in the economy. As the foreign investment increased, so did Iran's dependence on the West.

Having assessed the impact of an uneven economic growth on different social strata, Milani expounds on the weaknesses of the Shah's modernization program. According to the author, this program had three flaws. First, the development of modern technology and industry was superimposed on the old decrepit order, thus creating a dualism. Second, while the economic system was modernized, the political system remained archaic. Third, the program lacked a solid ideology to legitimize the process and create a popular base of support for the regime (127). In fact, his program helped to alienate more sectors of the Iranian society rather than mobilizing them behind the regime. The comparative allusions of the author to the role of state are particularly helpful in putting the case of Iran in historical perspective.

Chapter five discusses the ideology of different opposition groups from Islamic modernists to fundamentalists and Marxists. In this part, the ideology of Marxist Fedayian, modernist muslim Mujaheddin, as well as Shari'at Al-Ahmad, Bazargan, and Khomeini come under brief scrutiny. Alas, this im-

important chapter is very brief, and the author does not adequately explain the significance of the intellectual contribution of each of these precursors of the revolution of 1979.

Chapter six demonstrates how the cycle of the oil boom beginning in 1973 generated a tremendous rise of expectations only to be followed by the oil bust of 1975 and ensuing mass disillusionment and frustration, with the boastful, unfulfilled promises of the Shah's regime. As the oil boom increased the gap between the rich and the poor, the deepening class cleavages accompanied with cultural polarization planted the seeds of alienation and unrest deep in the soil of Iranian polity.

Chapter seven elucidates the problem of implementing reform in an absolutist monarchical system. The impact of the Carter human rights policy and the liberalization of the political atmosphere convinced the opposition that the American support for the regime was no longer unconditional. Hence, the Shah's autocracy was unable to control the social forces that were unleashed by the new policy of political tolerance. Using the deeply rooted and widely popular Shi'i rituals and symbols, and sensing that the Shah was on the retreat, the opposition changed its tactics from defensive to offensive mobilization, ultimately overthrowing the regime. In the next chapter, the author depicts an account of events that actually led to the dethroning of the Shah.

Chapter nine discusses the vicissitudes of dual power in post-Revolutionary Iran. Milani captures the roots of tension between the moderates and the extremists, the technocrats and the Shi'i populists. He aptly depicts Khomeini's Bonapartist role, elevating himself above the pervading conflict among factions and emerging as the ultimate arbiter and judge. This method made Khomeini immune to the debilitating damages incurred from personal involvement in the day-to-day running of administrative tasks of state, thus maintaining his moral authority unharmed.

Chapter ten captures the essence of power struggle in the Islamic Republic and guides the reader through the turbulent events that legitimized the theocracy. Having recounted the events that led to the demise of President Bani Sadr, the defeat of nationalists, and the liquidation of the Majaheedin and the secular left, the author then evaluates the policy of desecularization and Islamization. The chapter also entertains several possibilities and scenarios in regard to the succession to Khomeini.

The weakness and the strength of this book can be summarized as follows. First, ironically one of the major weaknesses of the present study stems from its very strength. Inherent in a holistic approach is an attempt to explain everything. Thus, the author at times spreads himself too thin and provides us only with a brief analysis of events and political actors involved in them, leaving his readers hungry for more. Moreover, the book, a revised edition of the author's dissertation, also suffers from the usual drawback of disserta-

tion style, a tendency to cut the subject into positivistic parts and dwell on each individual subsection to the detriment of the whole. Second, some of the event-by-event account of the anti-Shah movement is redundant. There is an obvious overkill on telling the "story" of the Iranian Revolution. This could easily have been avoided in the interest of more rigorous and in-depth analysis of some of the structural causes of the revolution, one of the major strengths of the book. Third, the study also contains a few glaring contradictions. For example, while the author in chapter one presents a viable critique of the theory of modernization and its application to the Third World, in his conclusion, Milani seems to agree with the general assumption of the theory that the main causes of revolution are to be found in the gap between economic growth and political underdevelopment (323). Fourth, terms such as "Shi'i populism" are utilized without ever defining the term or its relevance for the Iranian case.

The book has a multitude of strengths. First, the authors' preoccupation with theoretical questions and his ability to abstract and synthesize enable him to draw interesting and substantial conclusions. Gifted with an analytical mind, Milani is able to make the transition from the concrete (an event) to the abstract (its theoretical significance) a smooth one. He does this without the excessive use of scientific jargon that has rendered some of the other studies cumbersome and difficult to read. Second, revolutions are passionate events. As such, they evoke deepest human emotions either for or against their ideology, program, and leaders. The author must be commended for maintaining his objectivity, judiciousness, and fairness in treating his subject matter and presenting the contending ideological forces on both sides of the political spectrum. He does this without being dispassionate. Finally, the use of many primary sources in Persian lends certain originality to this research that some of the comparable studies on the subject lack. The author is meticulous in identifying sources and mediating contradictory opinions.

Manochehr Dorraji, *Texas A&M University*

Searching for Rural Development: Labor Migration and Employment in Mexico. By Merilee S. Grindle. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988. Pp. 196. \$21.95.)

Merilee Grindle probably knows more than anyone in North America about the politics and policy surrounding Latin American agricultural development. Her recent book, *State and Countryside*, is an invaluable survey and analysis of development experience in the region since the Second World War. In the present work, she starts from an analysis of the phenomenal widespread labor migration to assess alternative proposals for policy changes oriented toward more equitable, self-sustaining development in the Third

World The result is an insightful study which calls into question a good deal of the received wisdom of contemporary development thinking.

Grindle argues, in brief, that widespread labor migration in Mexico reflects the deep-rooted debility of local economies to provide an adequate livelihood on the land for the country's rural population. In some cases, local resources are simply too scant to support significant agricultural development. In others, long-term patterns of labor migration have established an economic structure that is highly dependent on remittances from migrants and highly resistant to development—even given adequate resources. (The case studies at the heart of the book bring these points out particularly well.) Political and economic obstacles to further redistribution moreover mean that Mexico's landless workers and *minifundistas*—the majority of the rural population today—are not likely to gain access to the agricultural resources they would need to obtain an adequate living on the land.

The Mexican case thus stands as a warning according to Grindle to those theorists of development who see possibilities for economic growth in making small-scale agriculture an engine for rural development generating demand for locally produced inputs and a gradually widening array of consumer goods. As Grindle says: "A broad-based agriculture-led development strategy requires much more equitable access to land and other resources than is the case in Mexico and many other countries. Where development strategies of the past have created a politically and economically significant sector of large-scale modern commercial farmers, however, the prospects for altering fundamental allocations of agricultural resources may be remote" (172). In such circumstances, she argues, rural development must not be confused with agricultural development—a point that has gained wide currency in recent discussion. Rather, governments will have to focus more seriously on employment generation in the countryside involving rural industrialization efforts and the strengthening of linkages between urban and rural markets. In some cases, labor migration and long-distance commuting will continue to be important ways in which rural people maintain their community ties while ensuring an adequate livelihood for their families.

Though this argument is innovative and largely convincing, it is important to note the degree to which Grindle's analysis rests on a realistic assessment of the status quo that is at least questionable. Her account of Mexican development makes clear the inequities that pervade the system and the betrayal of the promise of the Revolution that these inequities reflect. But she argues that political realism demands that we recognize the difficulties of giving peasants increased access to land or even of mobilizing rural constituency in favor of policy changes more favorable to peasant producers and workers. Motivation for change, she argues, will have to come from the top and while the persistent "urban bias" that has so far worked to the detriment

of peasant producers might be mobilized today to stanch the flow of rural migrants with schemes for decentralization and the generation of rural employment (a process already underway in Mexico), prevailing political alignments continue to militate against renewed redistribution. That may be. On the other hand, the resurgent peasant movement of the 1980s, despite relative diversity, shows a real possibility of making an impact on policymakers, in part by assuming increasing initiative at the local level. Revivified peasant collectives of the northwest, moreover, have demonstrated considerable capacity for absorbing rural labor and increasing productivity, as Gustavo Gordillo has recently shown: they have also proclaimed themselves a political force in the region. The electoral shakeup of the summer of 1988, finally, should make clear how vulnerable the entrenched interests of Mexican politics really are. Grindle's approach sells radical change short.

In terms of theory, moreover, her focus on labor migration as a 'rational strategy' in the effort of peasant households to 'diversify their portfolio' (28), obscures both the considerable suffering induced by the condition of the rural labor market and the degree to which the development of a migrant labor pool has reinforced structures of exploitation that perpetuate rural employment. For an appreciation of both individual suffering and the institutional nature of unemployment in the Mexican model of development, one would have to turn to the decidedly structuralist work of such Mexican scholars as Irma Juárez G., LUISA Pare and Enrique Astorga Lara. What Grindle's methodological individualism misses is the possibility that increased employment opportunities in the countryside may provoke a crisis in labor-dependent commercial agriculture, prompting an accelerated turn to mechanization and to those sorts of crops most susceptible to mechanization, thus throwing still more *campesinos* out of work. Without significant redistribution of resources, 'employment generation'—however important in the short run, is likely to be just one more of those palliatives by which successive Mexican governments have tried to stave off the crisis in which the country is now immersed. At the moment, Mexico does not appear to possess the resources, political or economic, for palliatives. Realism may favor more radical alternatives.

Michael W. Foley, Texas A&M University

Political Participation in Rural China. By John P. Burns. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. Pp. 283. \$35.00.)

The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic. By Vivienne Shue. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988. Pp. 175. \$25.00.)

Each of the books under review explores the relationship between state and society in the Chinese countryside and each has its origins in its authors' direct

dissatisfaction with available models of state-socialist systems—models that ascribe overwhelming influence to the state.

John Burns' dissatisfaction is evident in his opening sentence. He asserts that in spite of collectivization and one-party rule, socialist states do indeed have "a significant and lively local politics." Moreover, it is clearly this idea that has driven Burns' considerable research effort. Mining the mountains of low-grade ore that constitute the Chinese provincial press, Burns has sought to extract, for the period 1962 to 1984, those nuggets of 'news' that show peasants speaking out at village assemblies, voting in local elections, contacting higher officials, writing letters, posters, and petitions, withholding cooperation, engaging in bribery, and demonstrating their displeasure at various government policies. Burns has supplemented this material with interviews in Hong Kong with 36 former residents of rural China.

Do the results add up to a significant and lively local politics? Judging by Burns' conclusions, they do not. Village assemblies mainly served to mobilize the peasantry to carry out party policy; local elections were generally regular affairs with candidate selection in the hands of higher-level officials; probably few peasants sought to exercise influence via any sort of written communication; sabotage and demonstrations, to the extent that they occurred, were largely contingent on leadership by officials at one level or another. Individual contacting—the most preferred method of participation—cast the peasant in the role of supplicant. Finally, in a more theoretical vein, Burns concludes that the often-positited relationship between modernization and participation fails to hold in the Chinese case.

These conclusions are troublesome, not because they are necessarily wrong, or because they seem to belie the initial thesis of the book, but because, with the exception of the discussion of local elections (the book's best chapter), they do not seem to follow in any direct way either from the data presented to us or from a sustained, coherent argument. Certainly there are valuable things in this book—the description of various local government structures and bodies; a Chinese assessment of outside workteams as inadequate mechanisms for ensuring local elite responsiveness; and the description of letters to the editor in provincial newspapers, among others. But these things invariably sit isolated on the page in the apparent absence of a clear notion of why we are interested in political participation in the first place.

Two observations will illustrate the point. First, political scientists have commonly sought to evaluate different modes of participation in terms of the incentives they provide for elite responsiveness, the kinds and quality of information they convey to elites, and the extent to which they serve to voice some interests more than others. Although Burns organizes his material around different modes of participation, he is not concerned with these issues in any systematic way. His categories are almost wholly atheoretical.

Second, although political scientists have long recognized that effective

citizen participation hinges crucially on citizen knowledge of elite activity and of the workings of elite politics, Burns does not seem to have probed his Hong Kong informants about the structure of knowledge underlying peasant participation in China. Thus, when Burns describes peasants in one brigade being denied marketing opportunities available to peasants in neighboring brigades (108), one wonders, parenthetically, if all of these brigades belonged to the same commune and, more importantly, what peasants can be expected to know about policies beyond the boundaries of their own basic units. Similarly, when Burns describes "higher authorities" intervening on behalf of one brigade's villagers and against county officials who have refused to permit household contracting (161), one wonders if the villagers perceived this intervention as a sort of miracle or as merely the inevitable and intended outcome of the villagers' own mass demonstration. Throughout the book, Burns reasonably asserts that peasants are able to participate more effectively to the extent that they can take advantage of interelite conflict to build elite-mass alliances. How well peasants are able to do this, however, would seem to depend, first of all, on what they know.

In sum, Burns is primarily concerned with the quantity of peasant participation in China and with the conditions that serve to alter this quantity. He is not much concerned with the quality of participation or with the nature of peasants as political actors. His research materials are better suited for the latter topics than for the former. His book is most useful, then, for the factual nuggets it contains. Readers interested in a sense of both the limits and liveliness of local politics will do better to consider the recent village studies by Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger. And for a sense of the structural sources of local politics in Mao's China (and earlier), they ought to read the new book by Vivienne Shue.

Vivienne Shue's subject is not really local politics but the weakness of the Chinese state. Where we might expect a modernizing center imposing greater rationalization and bureaucratic regulation on a backward periphery, Shue sees local and regional cadres pursuing the interests of their own areas against other areas and even against the demands of the state center. Where we might expect central planners directing comprehensive and balanced national development from the capital, Shue sees commune officials planning their own local economies, generating their own investment funds and, if possible, meeting their own needs for energy, raw materials, machinery, and appropriate personnel. And, finally, where we might expect a modern party/state successfully inculcating 'progressive' values and norms via the latest propaganda techniques, Shue sees a parochial peasantry seemingly entrenched in its reluctance to abandon "traditional" habits, customs, and beliefs. By the mid-1970s, she concludes, local officials in China had acquired such considerable leverage and such skill at evading or distorting central policy that top leaders from whatever faction were greatly handicapped

ped in getting *any* policy—even one that was generally beneficial—implemented widely *as it was intended to be implemented* (130).

How might this weakness of the Chinese state be explained? For Shue, an important part of the answer is to be found in the structure of incentives surrounding local-level officials. This structure is most clear for team and brigade cadres. Throughout the Mao era, these cadres were recruited from and served within their own home villages. They derived their incomes not from fixed state salaries, but from a proportion of whatever their units were able to produce. These incomes moreover often failed to compensate adequately for the pains and privations of the job. Finally, the chances for promotion to jobs outside the locality were virtually nil. This structure of incentives, Shue suggests, encouraged local cadres to identify their interests more with those of their localities than with those of the state center. Marshalling slightly different arguments, Shue makes a similar case for commune county and even higher-level officials. The result, she suggests, was a China composed of small, relatively autonomous communities operating within larger encapsulating units—themselves relatively autonomous—all fitting together in a kind of 'honeycombed' pattern.

Why did the Chinese revolutionary state develop in this particular way? Shue searches for part of the answer in China's imperial past. China, she notes, never experienced the profound political fragmentation of European feudalism. Thus, the competition between the ambitions of imperial state-builders and the prerogatives of the landed elite was not so fierce as to require the destruction of one side or the other: in China a bargain could be struck whereby local elites would be able to maintain considerable autonomy while assisting the state in collecting taxes, maintaining social order, and serving as public examples and guardians of Confucian state ideology. Shue argues that the similarities in local state structure between Imperial China and Mao's China are sufficiently striking that we ought to consider the possibility that these structures derive—at least in part—from a common set of factors. Shue identifies four: the vastness of the territory to be administered; the prevailing patterns of social organization in peasant villages; the smallness of the administrative group relative to the size of the rural population; and above all the lack of state revenues as a result of the relative restriction of advanced capitalist relations in the economy.

This last factor suggests a final source of state weakness—the state's own policies. Maoist rural development strategy, Shue argues, served to strengthen localities while weakening the links between them. The emphasis on grain quotas guaranteed the urban population enough to eat, but inhibited specialization and trade in the countryside. State monopolies prevented serious inflation but perpetuated rural scarcities that in turn made local self-reliance seem a reasonable policy. Restrictions on peasant mobility saved China from the miseries of uncontrolled urbanization, but forced rural communities to

turn inward upon themselves. These policies, as Shue notes, were abandoned to a considerable degree after 1978 in favor of reforms giving greater scope to the market. Shue's interpretation of the meaning of these reforms follows closely from her analysis: she argues that they are best thought of as a means to *extend*, rather than to diminish, the reach of the state

The preceding account misrepresents Shue's book in at least two ways. First, the book consists of four interlinked essays organized around the following theme: the forms and actions of states are at once the causes and consequences of the forms and relations of the societies in which they occur. The book, then, is much richer than my more linear rendering of the principal arguments would indicate. Second, and relatedly, Shue is as much concerned with "how to think about the Chinese state" as with "what" to think about it. Here, I have two difficulties. First, I am unclear as to how Shue would accommodate her categories and concepts to the Chinese state of 1949 to 1956, a period in which by most accounts (including Shue's own in an earlier book) the state was remarkably successful in carrying out, first, land reform and, then, collectivization. Second, I am unclear as to how she would accommodate her categories and concepts to a peasant view of the strength of the state. Although Shue is careful (but not always) to distinguish between the interests of local level cadres and the interests of the peasants below them, her focus is primarily on the former. If one adopts this focus and the perspective of a modernizer, the state looks relatively weak. If one shifts one's glance to the peasantry, however, and adopts the perspective of a democrat, the state looks relatively strong. But these are small points. Vivienne Shue's brief book is hugely informative, constantly stimulating, and beautifully written. On virtually every page there is indication of a truly fine mind at work.

Fritz Gacnslen, *University of Vermont*

Business and Politics: A Study of Collective Action. By William D. Coleman. (Montreal: McGill-Queens, 1988. Pp. xv, 352. \$39.95 cloth, \$15.95 paper.)

Pressure of the Poor: The Poverty Lobby. By Paul F. Whiteley and Stephen J. Winyard. (London: Methuen, 1988. Pp. 174. \$65.00 cloth.)

The Best Congress Money Can Buy. By Philip M. Stern. (New York: Pantheon, 1988. Pp. xiv, 321. \$18.95 cloth.)

Perhaps the most persistent controversy among modern political scientists concerns the power of economic interests in industrialized democracies. This long and intense debate has produced several points of agreement, however. First, the relationship between economic interests and the govern-

ment varies widely from country to country, ranging from corporatist connections to those that are more fragmented, competitive, and adversarial. Second, Anglo-American countries are found toward the fragmented and adversarial end of this spectrum, where interest group politics is most public and acrimonious. Third, the recent success of right-wing political parties in these countries has exacerbated such fragmentation and its attendant ills.

The three books reviewed here contribute in modest but significant ways to fleshing out these points of agreement. The broadest is Coleman's *Business and Politics*, a survey of business associations in Canada, Whiteley and Winyard's *Pressure for the Poor* deals with antipoverty interest groups in Great Britain, Stern's *The Best Congress Money Can Buy* is a polemic against political action committees in the United States. Although each book emphasizes different interests and political tactics, all three offer helpful inventories or typologies of the groups studied and each concludes with a set of prescriptions. In addition, all three have a legitimate claim to being a "first" of its kind.

The political role of business in Brian Mulroney's Canada has been much in the news, and thus it is fitting that the first comprehensive study of the political activities of Canadian business associations appears now. While some specialists may quibble with the fine points of Coleman's descriptions, no one can complain about the multiple data sources upon which this book is based: a comprehensive review of the characteristics of Canadian business associations from 1876 to 1980, a mail survey of group leaders in 13 key sectors, and interviews on the political activities of 51 organizations. The result is an excellent description of the varied relationships between Canadian businessmen and their government.

Coleman is most concerned with whether or not Canadian business is "politically responsible." He explicitly accepts the view made popular by Charles Lindblom that business enjoys a "privileged position" in liberal democracies, and in return he expects businessmen to help serve broader national interests. While considerable evidence is presented on the political influence of business groups, the author emphasizes the "collective action" of businessmen through associations rather than the political activities of individual firms or capitalists.

Arguing from the initial motivations of individual actors to participate in associations, Coleman develops a fourfold typology of "policy networks" that govern particular sectors in Canada. These categories are based on such factors as the autonomy of government agencies, the role of private groups in the policy process, and the degree of control associations have over their members. For example, the diverse and divided Canadian manufacturing industries tend toward "pressure pluralist" networks where industry representatives are advocates before relevant public agencies. Agriculture, on the

other hand, participates in networks that tend toward "corporatism," where highly integrated associations participate intimately in policymaking. Other sectors lie between these examples, in "co-optive pluralist" (natural resources) and "clientele pluralist" (financial institutions) networks.

This array of policy networks bolsters Coleman's conclusion that Canadian business is highly fragmented and thus incapable of assuming appropriate "responsibility." The absence of well-integrated business associations makes effective consultation between economic interests and the government difficult. Since few associations are strong enough to "deliver" their member support, policy coordination is also ineffective. Instead of comprehensive economic policies, Coleman finds business associations pursuing irresponsible sector-by-sector "bail outs." To remedy this situation, he urges Canadians to move toward "weak" forms of corporatism, such as are common in Great Britain.

Weak corporatism seems to exist for at least one "sector" in Margaret Thatcher's Britain, the "poverty lobby," which is given its first full treatment by Whiteley and Winyard. The poverty lobby is a loose collection of interest groups seeking to preserve and expand income maintenance programs. Although this book focuses on associations that are in one sense the chief rival of business, its findings are similar to Coleman's, as are its style and methodology. The authors offer a detailed review of 42 antipoverty interest groups, based on interviews with group leaders, civil servants, government ministers, and MPs. While purists may question some of the definitions employed, the book is invaluable to students of welfare policy as well as interest group politics.

Whiteley and Winyard's goal is to explain the rise, behavior, and impact of the "poverty lobby." In doing so they test a number of common scholarly hypotheses about interest groups and often find them wanting. For example, they find antipoverty groups to be more numerous, organizationally complex, and politically diverse than the literature would suggest. And their origins are not well accounted for by entrepreneurs, disturbances, nor as by-products of economic or social processes. The authors offer instead a synthetic explanation that stresses available resources, elite opinion, and the political environment.

The heart of the book is a four-dimensional analysis of antipoverty groups based on strategies, sources of political support, degree of acceptance by policymakers, and group goals. For example, one important kind of group fits an "OPAL" profile: "Open" strategies (focusing on institutions besides Whitehall), "Promotional" support (claiming to speak for groups other than their own members), "Acceptable" to policymakers, with "Lobbying" goals (rather than service provision). Roughly the opposite are groups with a "FRAS" profile: strategy "Focused" on Whitehall, "Representational" support from their members, "Acceptable" to policymakers, with "Service" providing goals. In

terestingly enough, the authors found no examples of antipoverty groups that were unacceptable to policymakers.

One key finding is that the newer and more aggressive OPAL groups have no less influence than the older and less aggressive FRAS groups. In fact, the poverty lobby has had considerable success in influencing the policy agenda and securing benefits for their diverse clientele. However, such influence seems related to the increasing fragmentation of income maintenance policy in Great Britain and the ability of particular groups to develop close relations with policymakers. One wonders if the poverty lobby would meet the standards of responsibility Coleman expects of Canadian businessmen. Indeed, Whiteley and Winward conclude that the poverty lobby should mobilize broad electoral support in order to be more influential.

Meanwhile in Ronald Reagan's America, the participation of interest groups in electoral politics runs not — or so Philip Stern would have us believe — Stern is currently co-chairman of Citizens Against PAC's and has been an advocate of public financing of American elections since the early 1960s. The book is a polemic in the muckraking tradition and has only one point: money talks loudly in politics and only in various dialects of corruption. Poorly researched and argued, the argument is filled with innuendo and unfounded allegation. The author seems unaware of the fact that most scholarship on PAC's either tempers or contradicts the conclusions he assumes to be true.

Despite its many failings, this book is nevertheless important. First, it is a useful compendium of neoprogressive arguments about campaign finance. Second, it is perhaps the first polemic on this subject that attempts to marshal systematic evidence. Stern's appendix listing the funds raised by members of Congress is very informative. Last, the issues raised are very important. Surely much is wrong with American campaign finance, but the most serious problems run far deeper than personal venality. Thus, Stern's prescriptions, such as public financing of campaigns, may fail to address the underlying organization of power in American politics.

What is most disappointing about Stern's effort is its lack of analysis of the varied relationships between PAC's, elected officials, and the policies they oversee. The kinds of typologies that inform the other books reviewed here are sadly lacking. PAC's surely exercise power, but knowing how, where, and when they are powerful is very important. For example, Stern makes much of the impact of dairy cooperative donations on votes for dairy price supports, but he ignores all competing sources of influence — such as district interests, committee logrolling, and party coalitions. How funds interact with these sources of influence will reveal more accurately the kind of Congress money buys.

However, the limited evidence that Stern presents on these questions suggests that American interest groups — be they business associations or

their rivals, are even more fragmented and adversarial than their Canadian or British cousins. Consequently, they are likely to be less "responsible" politically and less concerned with broad-based electoral mobilization.

John C. Green, *University of Akron*

Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform: The Great Challenge. By Karol Dawisha. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Pp. 264. \$29.95 hard, \$12.95 paper.)

Dawisha's focus is upon the prospects and dilemmas of reform within the Eastern bloc. There is a commendable objectivity here in the treatment of the subject of reform. Those who believe that Moscow will never fundamentally rethink its relations with its Eastern European allies or that the communist systems of Eastern Europe are incapable of achieving through reform greater legitimacy in the eyes of their populations may be troubled by Dawisha's open-minded approach to these issues.

In the opening chapters of this volume, Dawisha presents a survey of Soviet and East European perspectives on mutual relations which emphasize the divergences in the interests of Moscow and its allies. Implicitly at least Dawisha rejects the imperial command model of bloc relations in favor of a more complex model which acknowledges an improving bargaining position for the states of Eastern Europe on nonsecurity issues. She offers an analysis of the evolving economic relationship which demonstrates that benefits now flow in both directions. Overall, Dawisha concludes, however, that the Soviet Union remains dominant in structuring trade.

In what is perhaps the most controversial part of her study, Dawisha argues that the regimes of Eastern Europe are more stable today than at any time since their creation. Though she is careful to distinguish between 'stability' and 'legitimacy', she clearly does not regard the regimes of Eastern Europe as incapable of carrying out reforms which will significantly increase their legitimacy and long-term viability. Dawisha contends that 'reform is on the top of the policy agenda, as never before, in Eastern Europe' (2). While this statement applies in varying degrees to the states of the region, pressure for important policy changes within the bloc is generally mounting. This circumstance is due not only to the fact that the reform process in the Soviet Union following Gorbachev's ascension has both stimulated and implicitly at least sanctioned reformist stirrings in Eastern Europe, but also to the fact that economic crises rooted in the 1970s stimulated reformist impulses in Eastern Europe before a similar development occurred in the Soviet Union. It may be suggested, however, that what Dawisha treats under the heading of "issues" on the policy agenda are in fact festering political and economic problems. Whether demands for broader participation in govern-

ment, enhanced status for unions, and for the democratization of public life will be dealt with as part of a policy agenda remains to be seen. While Dawisha is correct in stressing that the political systems of Eastern Europe have undergone significant evolution from their Stalinist foundation, the modifications have yet to involve power-sharing concessions which threaten the Party's preeminent role. Yet it may be contended that the long-term viability of these regimes requires just such concessions.

The abiding relevance of nationalism in the political life of Eastern Europe is a theme in this study as well as other recent scholarly reflections on the region by Ash, Ascherson, and Rothschild. Dawisha contends that building on the states' pre-communist heritage is the most potent mechanism for enhancing legitimacy. Thus far, the regimes of Eastern Europe have been constrained from building on this heritage, however, both by ideology and Moscow's reservations. The extent to which this situation changes may well be, as Dawisha implies, the key factor in determining whether the regimes of Eastern Europe can acquire a broader legitimacy. Yet while Dawisha is unquestionably correct about the relevance of nationalism, the economic problems facing Eastern Europe, especially the dilemma of price and wage reform, deserve more attention than they receive as factors shaping the future of the regimes of the region. It was, after all, economic conditions in Poland which inspired the Solidarity movement.

The sections of this study dealing with Moscow's policy toward Eastern Europe are somewhat tentative. Dawisha traces the initial stages (up to late 1957) of the new debate in Moscow regarding tolerance of diversity in Eastern Europe. This debate has yet to end, however, and Dawisha herself concludes that Moscow has not yet developed a new approach to Eastern Europe. She suggests that the nature of the bargaining relationship between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is undergoing an important change, but a more systematic effort to compare the scope and extent of Moscow's influence in earlier periods with the situation in the 1980s would have been desirable.

Dawisha notes that although there are signs that Gorbachev favors a somewhat more relaxed definition of socialist internationalism, he has so far been willing neither to repudiate the Brezhnev Doctrine, nor the 1968 Soviet intervention into Czechoslovakia. It may well be, as she suggests, that the Soviet leadership only wants better goods and quiet times from Eastern Europe. Quiet times, however, do not appear to be the most likely future for Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. In pursuing domestic reform, Gorbachev, like Khrushchev in the 1950s, may stimulate reforms in Eastern Europe which exceed the limits of Soviet tolerance. Dawisha does not delve as far as some readers may wish into the repercussions which Soviet glasnost, de-Stalinization, and what may be termed de-Brezhnevization may have on the authority of Eastern European political establishments.

Overall, however, there is more to praise than to fault in this book. Dawisha has written an informative and thought-provoking overview of the problems and prospects for political evolution in the Eastern bloc. Both specialists and general readers should find this book of interest.

William D. Jackson, *Miami University*

Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy. By D. Michael Shafer. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985. Pp. 331. \$34.50.)

This book attempts several major tasks simultaneously. It is a criticism of U.S. counterinsurgency (CI) policy from 1945 to 1965. It also attacks political development theory. A third goal is to present a methodology for assessing foreign policy. In some respects, Shafer succeeds admirably, but in trying to do so many different things, he sometimes leaves gaps that the reader must fill in. His basic thesis is that U.S. counterinsurgency policy has been a failure, primarily because its basic assumptions are wrong. Despite its failure, policymakers have persisted in applying it. It is this paradoxical combination of failure and continuity that the author seeks to explain.

Shafer begins by asserting that CI, as a prescription for America's allies threatened by insurgents, has often failed to achieve its aims. Indeed, even when "insurgencies fell to defeat, victory was not the result of American efforts but of circumstances and actions largely unrelated to them" (5). The reasons for its persistence are that policymakers have failed to understand why insurgencies occur and that they are incapable of knowing when, where, and how to apply counterinsurgency. The paradigm that underlies counterinsurgency is flawed, still, that paradigm was not altered, in part because it was reinforced by academic views of political development in the Third World insurgency arena.

The author presents five alternative explanations for counterinsurgency policy. They are realism, presidential politics, bureaucratic politics, psychopolitics, and societal explanations. In each case, he presents the best arguments and lists possible objections to the explanation. His review is most cogent in the cases of realism and bureaucratic politics and weakest in "presidential politics," by which he means "the role of the president and the characteristics of the presidency" (28). He chooses not to consider psychological analysis because it is too complicated and *ungenerous*. He divides societal explanations into two categories: political culture and cognitive content. The purpose of this fivefold typology is to establish his methodology, which is to review four cases of postwar counterinsurgency and determine the best explanation for its continuity and consistency despite its irrelevance, counterproductivity, and persistent failure. The result of his effort is

flects a basic problem with the book. It is too simplistic for advanced readers and too cryptic for beginners. Also, his dismissal of psychological analysis is somewhat perplexing since one of his apparent prescriptions is to treat each case of insurgency idiosyncratically.

In part II, Shafer critiques the intellectual underpinnings of postwar American counterinsurgency policy (43). This critique is presented systematically in three chapters. His theme is that in the postwar period there was only one basic perception of the Third World, commonly shared by academics and policymakers in the United States. In chapter three, he argues that this perception became the ruling academic paradigm because of its "familiarity" (i.e., it was consistent with Western philosophy), utility (it prioritized the need for *order*, using instruments of the state), and "methodology" (i.e., political development theory was inherently incapable of falsification). There is much merit in his succinct critique of political development theory, especially the ambiguity of its lexicon, its tautological nature, and its Olympian abstraction (67). However, there is nothing particularly new in his indictments.

Chapter four connects the academic view of Third World insurgencies with the policymaker's prescriptions for responding to them. Those prescriptions focused on simultaneously providing security for threatened friendly Third World regimes and promoting progress and development. This is Shafer's most coherent chapter, and it provides the context for his description and analysis of U.S. counterinsurgency policy in chapter five.

That policy was based on the assumption of "universal vulnerability. Modernization and change are universal Third World goals (the 'familiarity argument'), and insurgency is universal because Third World governments are too weak and inept to control change. The 'universal tactic' of insurgents is to exploit this universal vulnerability. The 'universal counter tactic' is counterinsurgency. The two components of counterinsurgency are 'hearts-and-minds' and 'cost-benefit,' and both were fundamental to the development of CI doctrine. The weaknesses of this policy are the limited leverage the United States has on the 'host' government, the limits on the host government's reform prospects and capabilities, and the policy's failure to assess correctly the relationships of 'the people' to both the government and the insurgents. (It is disappointing that he offers no remedies for these weaknesses.)

Part III studies four cases of counterinsurgency to test his thesis that the ruling paradigm was faulty, and that the resultant policy was a failure. He begins with the French colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria to test the validity of the political culture explanation. He rebuts "American Exceptionalism" as the reason for U.S. counterinsurgencies by showing that despite different histories (and political cultures), the U.S. and French policymakers shared similar perceptions of and prescriptions for Third World insurgency (165). He follows with chapters on U.S. efforts in Greece, the

Philippines, and Vietnam. All of these case studies are well-documented and while he makes a convincing case that there was a ruling paradigm, he is less persuasive on other points.

His blithe argument that U.S. policy failed in Greece and the Philippines is a bit too cavalier. Perhaps the policy succeeded for the wrong reasons or due to events beyond American control, but neither of these means that it failed. By not defining "success," Shafer provides no guidelines by which to identify "failure" other than his assertions. Certainly Greece and the Philippines do not seem like failures in the normal connotation of that term. Also, he is unconvincing in arguing that Greece was either a prototype or a surrogate Third World country.

Another problem is Shafer's tendency to combine all policymakers and political development theorists by means of a single citation that fails to substantiate this claim. It is critical to his thesis that there was a single, universally shared paradigm upon which CI policy was always based, but he does not make a convincing case to prove that argument. For instance, he is far too categorical in his argument that all U.S. policymakers failed to understand Vietnamese politics, especially given the overwhelming evidence of Washington's doubts, divisions, reluctance, hesitation, and frustration over their byzantine nature.

Finally, while his criticisms of both political development theory and U.S. counterinsurgency policy frequently are telling, he does not supply meaningful alternatives. This failure to offer either a contrasting paradigm or substitute prescriptions for dealing with Third World insurgencies is especially frustrating. The result is a book that is thoughtful and thought-provoking but which must be read carefully and critically.

Stafford T. Thomas, *California State University, Chico*

Oil and Mexican Foreign Policy. By George W. Grayson. (Pittsburgh, PA: University Press, 1988. Pp. xiv + 207. \$19.95.)

This study by George W. Grayson analyzes recent changes in Mexican foreign policy and examines their implications for United States-Mexican relations. Centering on the dominant force in Mexico's political economy since 1970, the oil industry, Grayson traces the evolution of Mexico's foreign policy across the administration of Luis Echeverría, José López Portillo, and Miguel de la Madrid.

Grayson employs the heuristic of role analysis to describe the development of Mexico's foreign policy in the 1970s and 1980s. He argues that Mexico's foreign policy orientation shifted from populist inflationism with a regional leadership role in the 1970s to the more limited and pragmatic role of responsible debtor in the 1980s. The structural weakness of Mexico's po-

troized economy revealed in the collapse of world oil prices in 1981 forced Mexico's leaders to come to grips with the reality of their growing dependence on the U.S. economy. The deepening of this dependence manifested in finance, oil exports, foreign investment, and other areas explains the ascendancy of liberal-rationalist policymakers in the crafting of Mexican foreign policy, supplanting the more ideological nationalist-populist leadership that earlier prevailed.

Mexico's present leadership, he argues, is confronted with managing this asymmetrical interdependence with the U.S. economy while maintaining a semblance of sovereignty and political independence. These countervailing imperatives are apt to fuel an increasingly contentious bilateral relationship in the future.

Grayson's analysis of the basic trends in Mexican foreign policy falls well within the prevailing liberal orthodoxy and does not attempt to address formal questions in international relations in a theoretically rigorous way. However, Grayson's superb description and synthesis of the political dynamics propelling recent Mexican foreign policy is unmatched in the present literature. Grayson's treatment provides important insights into a number of dimensions of Mexico's foreign policy that will interest specialists and generalists alike.

Worth mentioning is his detailed analysis of the domestic policy debate between nationalist-populist and liberal-nationalist factions during the administrations of Jose Lopez-Portillo and Miguel de la Madrid. Concentrating on the change in policy direction at PEMEX, Mexico's national oil monopoly, Grayson gives an excellent account of the shift to a new team of technocratic administrators during de la Madrid's tenure. Under the leadership of PEMEX's new director, Mario Ramon Beteta, Mexico's oil policy gradually turned away from the politically expedient but costly practice of supporting OPEC's oil prices in the direction of more flexible and efficient market-oriented pricing. Innovation occurred despite bureaucratic and political constraints presented by entrenched interests like the powerful national union of oil workers and nationalist-populist advocates at the Secretariat of Foreign Relations. This liberalization at PEMEX is indicative of the shift toward a responsible debtor role, Grayson argues, with ramifications across the economic spectrum.

Grayson also provides an illuminating account of Mexico's efforts to project its influence in the United States. Mexico, he argues, has long undervalued the importance of attending to a diverse assortment of executive and legislative entities comprising the basis of much American foreign policymaking. Its failure to cultivate such sources of influence has contributed to its image problems in the United States and its vulnerability to periodic bouts of "Mexico bashing" as witnessed in the 1986 Helms hearings in Congress.

Grayson describes how coincident with de la Madrid's policy reorienta-

tion, PEMEX sought to fill this policy vacuum by opening an office in Washington, DC. Though modestly staffed, this innovation improved Mexico's capacity to influence bilateral economic affairs. Mexico also retained a U.S. public relations outfit to promote its interests. While Grayson is critical of these incipient lobbying efforts, he argues that successful bilateral relations turn increasingly on Mexico's recognition of the importance of a greater diplomatic presence in this country.

Much of the book is given over to documenting Mexico's shift toward a responsible debtor-honest broker role in foreign relations. Grayson supplies useful interpretations of Mexico's travails with OPEC, its experiment with development assistance in the San Jose Accord, and its flirtation with revolutionary Nicaragua. His treatment of these initiatives is unabashedly supportive of Miguel de la Madrid's liberal restructuring of the Mexican economy and its diminished pursuit of regional leadership. This new pragmatism, he argues, realistically responds to the practical constraints of asymmetrical interdependence and promises to steer a more viable course towards sustainable development.

In his concluding chapter, Grayson speculates on the likely course of Mexico's foreign policy during the incoming Salinas de Gortari administration. He predicts substantial continuity with the directions set by de la Madrid. Mexico's entry into GATT is irreversible, he says, as is the commitment to liberalizing the Mexican economy. These trends portend a further deepening of Mexico's dependence on the United States, however, and the intensification of Mexico's psychic need to distance itself politically from her northern neighbor.

Increasing contentiousness in Mexican foreign policy, however, bodes the strengthening of structural ties with the United States. The challenge confronting leadership in both countries is to appreciate the high stakes of policy failure and negotiate around the rhetoric in bilateral affairs. Grayson follows other scholars in recommending a segmented rather than linkage approach to resolving bilateral issues, more effective Mexican lobbying in the United States, and a reduction of U.S. hyperbole about a special relationship with Mexico as several constructive ways of managing this new contentious relationship.

It should be noted, in fairness, that Grayson's analysis suffers slightly from his method and the unfolding of events. Few scholars will quarrel with his characterization of Mexico today as a responsible debtor. It is probably unwise, however, to treat its quest for regional leadership as incompatible with responsible debtorship. Mexico's capacity to project regional influence is to be sure, circumscribed at present. The hyperbolic nationalism of an earlier era is likewise muted. Yet it is premature to predict the specific valence of Mexican foreign policy in the next *sexenio*. A swing of the pendulum should not be ruled out. Mexico's 1988 election, in fact, suggests a revival

of nationalist-populist sentiment in Mexico and a tempering of liberal-rationalist influence may be in the offing.

Just the same, Grayson should be commended for maintaining a high standard of scholarship and directing our attention to the fundamental influences on Mexican foreign policy making over the past two decades. Grayson's analysis of the process and direction of Mexican statecraft is essential reading for those who wish to understand the past or anticipate the future of bilateral affairs. As Mexico experiences historic changes in its domestic politics, the appearance of this book could not be any more timely or more important for American audiences.

Stephen P. Mummie / *Colorado State University*

Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1857-1939. By David Lake. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985. Pp. vi + 242. \$29.95.

A common starting point in discussions of international trade is to ask why, given the obvious benefits of free trade, protection is so common. The usual explanation looks to domestic politics: trade restrictions benefit relatively narrow interest groups which, it is asserted, have greater incentive to organize and influence the political process than the more diffuse mass of consumers who benefit from free trade.

The central theme of David Lake's book *Power, Protection, and Free Trade* is that, while there is some truth to this common wisdom, its explanation of trade policy is seriously incomplete. The most important shortcoming, in his view, is that domestic explanations neglect the extent to which trade policies represent a rational response of nations and their leaders to the constraints and opportunities inherent in the prevailing international economic system. Under some international circumstances, particularly when the system is dominated by an economic 'hegemon' willing to allow access to its markets without reciprocal concessions, protectionism rather than free trade is actually the most rational policy for lesser nations because it allows them to expand export markets without compromising the position of their own sensitive sectors. In the absence of a clear hegemon, on the other hand, the costs of protection are more evident and political leaders are more likely to use trade concessions to wrest corresponding concessions from other nations.

Lake's most impressive theoretical contribution is his construction of a complex and sophisticated 'theory' of international economic structures that considers the trade preferences of a number of types of nations classified by their relative size and productivity. He begins by identifying eight major types of international actors, including large and productive 'hegemon'

leaders," smaller but highly productive "opportunists," medium-sized a less productive "spoilers," and smaller and less productive "free trade freeriders." He then explores the interaction of various combinations of actors using a simple but effective game-theoretic analysis of trade preferences. Finally he offers a briefer examination of how international factors are injected into domestic political systems, distinguishing between 'foreign policy executives' inclined to "promote the power and wealth of the nation-state within an anarchic international system," and 'representative' institutions more likely to reflect the rent-seeking activities of narrow economic sectors (66-67).

After offering a general theory of international trade, Lake goes on to test it with reference to four phases in United States commercial history between 1887 and 1939. This period, Lake argues, poses a 'hard' test of the theory that the United States—possessed a large domestic market, low levels of economic interdependence, an isolationist ideology and strong societal pressure groups within a highly permeable political process (3)—all of which would seem to suggest the prominence of domestic rather than international factors in explaining trade policy. Nevertheless, Lake demonstrates throughout the period international factors consistently played an important role in shaping U.S. trade policy.

For example, during the first phase from 1887 until 1897, the United States was able to 'free ride on free trade' since the 'self-abnegating strategy of nonretaliation' (107) of the British hegemon allowed countries of medium size and productivity like the United States to actively pursue the most desired outcome of free trade abroad and protection at home. During the next phase, from 1897-1912, the United States continued to free ride, although to a lesser extent—on the British—but as American productivity grew political leaders became more active in using trade concessions as a tool for securing markets in third countries for a growing export sector. By the time of the third phase, 1912-1930, the British economic position had declined to the point that it was roughly similar to that of the United States. Under the resulting system of 'opportunistic cooperation' it was possible for relatively free trade to occur even in the absence of a hegemon, as each opportunist was willing to compromise domestic protection to some extent in the interest of export expansion. Finally, the international economic instability between 1930 and 1939, together with the further decline of Britain and the inability of President Hoover to understand the systemic constraints confronting him (222) led to an increase in protection, only to be followed by a partial return to free trade under the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934. Lake's detailed analysis ends in 1939, but he does suggest that the contemporary trading system is most like that of the period of 'opportunistic cooperation' between 1912 and 1930. Such a system resembles

an iterated prisoner's dilemma in which leadership and a long 'shadow of the future' (as represented by relative economic stability) are the most important factors encouraging cooperation.

Perhaps the most impressive feature of Lake's book is its skillful interweaving of sophisticated theory and detailed historical analysis. Most immediately, the book makes an important contribution to an emerging theory of international trade that takes into account both contemporary economic approaches and the insights of political science. More generally the book speaks to the broader-gauged theory of international political economy, particularly to the refinement and test of neorealist theories: its careful focus on nonhegemonic regimes and nonhegemonic actors within hegemonic regimes is an especially welcome contribution to this literature. All in all, Lake's book is representative of the best contemporary work in the field of international political economy. Its appearance, and the appearance of a number of similarly impressive works in recent years, are signs that the field has come into its own as a major discipline within the broader field of international studies.

Vincent A. Mahler, *Loyola University of Chicago*

Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age. By Joshua S. Goldstein. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985. Pp. xiii + 433.)
Crisis and War. By Patrick James. Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1986. Pp. x + 192. \$29.95.

The two books under review here are about war, but at this point the similarity ends abruptly. Whereas Joshua Goldstein's *Long Cycles* concerns principally the economic context of system-destroying wars, Patrick James' *Crisis and War* treats mainly the political variables which seek to distinguish between crises that end in war and those that do not. Goldstein examines the period from 1495 until the present; James looks at the far shorter interval of 1946 to 1975. Goldstein's methods are explicitly longitudinal; James' are cross-sectional. And for reasons that are detailed below, Goldstein's volume is a major contribution to the scientific study of war; James' book, sad to say, is not.

The core of Goldstein's analysis is the relationship between elements of the long cycle and what has been called the hegemonic war, more on that usage momentarily. As conceived of by Nikolai Kondratieff in his first 1925 publication, long cycles are waves of economic activity which undergo long upswings and downswings as measured by prices, production, and trade among other economic indices. His legacy, although not without substantial controversy, has been to bequeath his name to what is now frequently called the Kondratieff wave. More recently, George Modelski suggested theoretic-

cal relationships between the Kondratieff wave (or more generally, the long cycle) and world war, and William Thompson, among others, provided empirical support for aspects of this relationship.

In this book, data on prices, production, wages, and other important economic indicators are collected over the period 1495–1975. A total of 55 economic time series are used to test a bevy of hypotheses that Goldstem has collected from the long-cycle literature. What is appealing about these hypotheses is that they are frequently paired with their obverse counterparts also culled from that literature. Thus, the first hypothesis—that ‘long waves exist’—is paired with its obverse, namely that ‘long waves do not exist’ (164). Or ‘war concentrations occur on long wave upswings’ is coupled with ‘war clusters early in the downswing’ (168). The economic time series that are used to demonstrate the strong relationship between prices and, in time-lagged effect, production, with periods of war severity (measured by battle fatalities) occurring on the long-wave upswing. This is the major contribution of Goldstem’s study—not only to confirm or disconfirm hypotheses in the long-wave literature using a variety of straightforward as well as highly sophisticated methodologies—but finally to demonstrate a robust relationship between two of the most frequently used economic variables in long-wave research, and periods of war severity. These points coincide with wars such as the Thirty Years War, the Napoleonic Wars, and World War I. If findings are used to construct a theory of long waves with production growth and war severity at its core.

These accomplishments notwithstanding, there is a problematic area in the historical treatment of the book. And in fairness to Goldstem, this emerges not so much from his own analysis—as in his acceptance of the term hegemonic war, used by others, to characterize his periods of greatest war severity. The difficulty may be summarized in the question: Who is the hegemon at any given time? It is fairly easy to pinpoint hegemonic powers in the contemporary period, especially if one accepts the primacy of economic production and sea power in that determination. Great Britain during the nineteenth century or the United States during the latter part of the twentieth century easily comes to mind. But what of earlier time periods when the choice of a particular country is unclear and the criteria for selection so fuzzy? These difficulties lead Goldstem to choose Venice as the initial hegemon of the modern period beginning approximately in 1350 and ending in 1648. With a population only slightly in excess of 100,000 in the middle of this period, and a military size to match, it is difficult to conceive of Venice as a hegemonic power. True, in economic terms, and especially trade, she stood out from the remainder but is it sufficient to use only economic criteria and sea power in the Mediterranean, when the other bases of power are so meager? This problem points to the further difficulty of choosing either land-based or sea-based power as the principal basis for selecting the hegemon.

The debates here could be endless, as we are now beginning to see in the literature.

It is for these reasons, and others, that in my own recent book (*The Onset of World War*) I avoided using the term 'hegemonic war' (opting instead for 'systemic war'). Using the latter terminology avoids the sometimes intractable problem of who is the hegemon, and by implication, who is the challenger. Even if there occurs a systemic war involving most if not all of the great powers within a system, it may be exceedingly unclear as to the precise status of hegemon and challenger. Goldstein 285 lists Venice as the hegemon and the Habsburgs as the challenger in the Thirty Years War. Yet Venice had a very small, even negligible role in that war, especially in comparison with the great protagonists of that conflict, Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Spain, and Austria. To speak of a 'challenge' at a distance, or by indirection, is to vitiate the whole concept of hegemony and challenge to its international dominance.

Neglecting this legacy from earlier usage, Goldstein's major contribution is in the precise specification of long-cycle waves, their relationship with war severity, and now the placing on a firm empirical foundation of long-cycle research as one competing (there are others) paradigm for the understanding of major international conflict. His model of the dynamics of long cycles and war severity is a carefully developed and extremely useful point of departure for future research.

Patrick James' *Crisis and War* also is an attempt to pin down elements of earlier theories but with less successful results. He looks to Kenneth Waltz's three images of war: the individual person (ordinarily a decision maker), the state, and the international system. Each of the three elements of Waltz's metatheory is represented by a prominent theory of international conflict.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's expected utility analysis of war is the theory chosen to represent the first image (or level of analysis, in J. David Singer's terminology). The role of positive (or negative) expected utility for initiating powers is examined for crisis endings, in the form of war or some other outcome. On the whole, his results are moderately supportive of the expected utility approach, confirming some propositions, but disconfirming others. The problem here is not so much the data analysis which is fairly straightforward, but the assignment of Bueno de Mesquita's version of expected utility to the first image. After all, some of the major criticisms of Bueno de Mesquita's approach have centered on his use of measures of alliance and power, which make the theory, in its operational form, only a version of balance of power theory. James in fact treats the balance of power as a third image theory. Since James also uses measures of power, and modifies Bueno de Mesquita's expected utility measures only slightly, one can only with difficulty argue that this treatment accords with Waltz's first image, pitched at the level of the individual decision maker.

More successful is James' treatment of the internal-external conflict. One might expect this outcome given his training at the University of Maryland where much of the earlier research was carried out. The innovation here is the introduction of change in internal conflict preceding change in external conflict. Changes in both manifest and latent internal conflict (principally economic measures) are found to distinguish between crises that end in war and those which do not. Later, in a multivariate analysis including measures at all three levels, change in manifest internal conflict is found to be the strongest predictor of crisis outcomes.

Least successful is James' treatment of the third image or level. Balance of power is said to be the theoretical counterpart of this portion of the model, but is treated operationally as polarity. Clearly, balance of power theory and a structuralism centering on polarity are related but, at bottom, analytically distinct strains of theory—perhaps best exemplified respectively by the writings of Morgenthau and Waltz. To make matters worse, multipolarity in crisis situations is operationalized as a multilateral crisis with more than two actors and bipolarity as a crisis with only two (135). The multilateral category includes crises with both great power and small power actors with regard to their actual power distributions, which of course is the essence of the concept of polarity. Similarly, bilateral crises (e.g., the Hungarian uprising included here) occur between countries with vast power disparities, thus contradicting the very meaning of polarity.

Now the finding that multilateral crises degenerate more frequently into war than do bilateral may stand on its own merits but surely does not allow the inference that multipolar systems are less stable than bipolar—a position in fact that I agree with, but obviously for other reasons. Nor does this finding allow for inferences concerning the power of balance of power theory to distinguish between crises which end in war and those that do not. The multilateral crisis involving both great and small powers—as so many do—cannot in itself reflect on the balance of power except perhaps in the most indirect ways. Multilateral crises may degenerate into war more frequently than bilateral simply because the importance or severity of the crisis issues attract additional actors at the outset. In this sense, the outcome of war may be partially predetermined in the multilateral case. There is a disjunction between theory and empirical test here that is disquieting.

There are heartening and disappointing aspects to both books taken together. On the positive side, the study of systemic, world—or hegemonic—wars is now receiving separate and, I might add, highly successful theoretical and empirical treatment. This is indicative of the maturation of a science. Cognate elements of a phenomenon are analyzed separately from the remainder to see how well they cohere in the attempt at explanation. Additionally and importantly, how successful is that explanatory effort? Fortunately, in the case of Goldstein's treatment, the answer to both questions is yes. The disappointing aspect emerges in the danger that analysts of sys-

emic wars may become increasingly divorced from those who treat smaller wars. This danger is already foreshadowed in the two books under review here. Neither Modelski, Levy, nor Doran are referenced in James' book. In turn, neither Bueno de Mesquita, Zinnes, nor Wilkenfeld are referred to in Goldstein's volume. The division already is appearing at this time, with unforeseen, but I suspect ultimately deleterious consequences for the field of international conflict research.

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Minds at War: Nuclear Reality and the Inner Conflicts of Defense Policy Makers. By Steven Kull. (New York: Basic Books, 1985. Pp. 341. \$19.95.)

The author, a clinical psychologist, has set out to examine the psychological processes used by national security policymakers in the formulation and justification of security policy strategies and weapons development. Kull's underlying theme (which influences the methods and the presentation of his research) is that most security decision makers, in both the United States and the USSR, rarely self-examine the logical inconsistencies in their policy positions. Moreover, he argues, these policy formulators are able to psychologically maintain these irrational positions by failing to extend the many policy consequences of their positions beyond the immediate strategic balance.

Kull's primary source of data (besides public speeches and published articles) are the results of some 84 interviews with prominent defense policymakers, including two former secretaries of defense, two former joint chiefs, six NSC members, several key senators and Congress members, Scowcroft Commission people, as well as numerous think-tank types from such institutions as Rand and Livermore Laboratories. In these in-depth interviews, the author focuses upon the principal nuclear security issues of maintenance of parity, advantageous termination in the event of nuclear war, counterforce strategies, and strategic defenses. Kull argues quite convincingly that in all four issues the driving force behind most nuclear policy decisions is not a coherent strategic policy, but rather questions of technological feasibility ("if we can build it, we should"), conventional war mentality, i.e., it is possible to win a nuclear war, therefore more is better, and the need to send messages to the USSR. Thus, Kull contends that even though few in the Reagan administration resort to a perceptual rationale in the justification of the development and deployment of the MX, the Pershing II, the B-1, or the SDI, many of the policymakers view perceptions of the Soviets, our allies, the Third World, and domestic publics as quite important in enhancing U.S. power in international politics. Many of the interviewees refer to how the Soviets strengthened their international standing with the development of the SS-20's in the 1970s despite the fact that the strategic balance between East and West remained fundamentally unchanged. Moreover,

since these decision makers believe that the various publics accept "bean-counting" mentality, it is incumbent upon them to project the image that the United States is willing to compete with the Soviets. And, it is for this competition, Kull believes, that many U.S. policymakers derive psychological satisfaction with current U.S. national security policy despite much of its untenability.

Many social scientists will feel uncomfortable with Kull's interview techniques. Despite the extraordinary access of the author, there was obviously no attempt at a random sample of defense decision makers. Perhaps more grievous in the eyes of many would be the probing strategy employed by the author. On several occasions, Kull reports challenging the interviewees with alternative arguments and highlighting their own logical inconsistencies. While this probing strategy yields some genuinely interesting sights, this approach can, no doubt, result in the interviewees becoming very defensive and thus concealing their true beliefs on the subject.

Although the book is centered upon historic and current U.S. national security issues associated with nuclear weapons development, in one chapter Kull reports the results of his 30 interviews with various Soviet diplomats, journalists, and academics. With few exceptions, Kull's Soviet interviews reveal a consistent party line. The Soviet respondents invariably seemed to maintain parity in order to restrain U.S. behavior. They were wavering in their opposition to SDI. Furthermore, they universally reject the notion of "controlled limited nuclear war." On the other hand, the U.S. decision makers doubted the credibility of the Soviet doctrine, especially their rejection of a limited nuclear war. The questions immediately come to mind: Did Kull not tap the Soviets' true strategic thinking on these issues; alternatively, are most U.S. decision makers misreading the Soviets; and, a more obvious fundamental difference? These questions are worthy of further research.

Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the book, given the professional training Kull brings to such a topic, is the lack of a consistent theoretical framework to analyze these psychological processes. Consequently, he is often left with various analogies (e.g., greater fool market, or the bull wagon effect) to explain his findings. Moreover, this absence of a theory results in a writing style characterized by a mere listing of arguments with illustrative quotations and little or no evaluation of how the arguments fit a particular psychological pattern.

Despite these limitations, Kull's work is a well-balanced work for candidly portraying the absolute insanity of current nuclear strategy among policymakers. While his arguments are not original they are so forcefully presented that the book should be required reading for all those in the defense establishment.

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